6 the Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

Mari Teigen 6 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

The gender quota reform for corporate boards, first adopted in Norway in 2003 and fully implemented from 2008, has had great repercussions. A wave of diffusion of corporate board quota legislation has swept across Europe, and some other parts of the world (Fagan et al., 2012; Teigen, 2012a and b; Armstrong & Walby, 2012; Terjesen & Lorenz, 2014).1 In Norway, as an effect of the reform, the presence of women in corporate boards has increased dramatically over the last 10 years – and gender balance is evolving in other countries, especially in those where gender balance policies have been introduced for corporate boards (EWL report, 2012). This chapter departs from the ongoing European processes of gender quotas for corporate boards being in the making, takes a step back and analyzes the starting point: the making of gender quotas for corporate boards in Norway. This reform constitutes an innovative, however at first controversial, legal regulation. No other country had prior to Norway even considered to regulate the gender composition of corporate boards. To some extent gender quotas for corporate boards are at odds with the Norwegian industrial relation system, with its relatively clear boundaries for state interventions in the governing of private capital. Thus on the one hand, the introduction of gender quotas for corporate boards breaks with the established institutionalization of relations between employers, employees and the state. On the other hand, gender quotas for corporate boards constitute an enlargement of the relatively strong gender equality institution in Norway. At heart of this chapter is the question of why the gender equality institution in this case trumped the established boundaries for state intervention in the governing of private capital. The purpose is to describe and explore the interplay of contextual factors and processes that in sum pushed towards the making of the gender quotas for corporate boards. The chapter addresses national preconditions and processes and addresses questions about how this reform fits with the Norwegian gender equality institution: what factors facilitated the policy process and what was the role of political agency? Theoretically the chapter lends itself to insights from historical institutionalism (Thelen, 1999, 2014), including perspectives of path dependency (Pierson, 2004) and gendered institutional analysis/feminist institutionalism (Waylen, 2014; Krizsnan et al., 2012; Mc Bride & Mazur, 2010). In the next section I present some theoretical perspectives mainly belonging to the historical institutional theory tradition. Subsequently I provide an account

1 Spain (2007), Iceland (2009), France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy (2011) and Germany (2014) have adopted gender quotas for corporate boards. Theoretical Perspectives 97

of the Norwegian legislation for gender quotas on corporate boards and show the development of gender balance on corporate boards over the last decade. The major part of the chapter presents an analysis of the main factors and processes in the making of gender quotas for corporate boards in Norway. In the final part I discuss how these different factors and processes interplayed in relation to three central topics in historical institutionalism: temporality, path dependency and policy agency. I conclude by reflecting upon the development of gender quotas for corporate boards in light of political quotas and thus close with a larger discussion about the demarcation of the political and the economic sphere.

6.1 Theoretical Perspectives

Historical institutionalism offers approaches to investigate how and why institutional change occurs (Thelen, 2003; Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Feminist institutionalism is a variant of historical institutionalism particularly concerned with gender outcome and institutional continuity and change in transitions to state feminism and institutionalizations of gender equality policy (Waylen, 2014). Discursive institutionalism emphasizes the role of ideas and discourse in politics (Schmidt, 2008). Historical institutionalism helps explain patterns of events by taking processes in time – history – seriously. The historical institutional perspective directs attention to the relationship between sequences, trajectories and contextual factors of importance to explain social, political and economic change and stability (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010). Stability and perpetuation are the basic traits of institutions and a main contribution of institutional theory concerns its exploration of mechanisms of stability. The fact that institutions are not always stable has been explained as the result of exogenous shocks and critical junctures. A limitation of this perspective is however that change becomes too closely tied to abrupt transitions. In contrast, Mahoney and Thelen (2010, pp. 5-7) call for a general model of institutional change that takes into account both exogenous and endogenous sources of change. They draw a framework for institutional change consisting of the political and institutional context as drivers of processes in interaction with change agents. The policy context, and in particular the notion of path dependency, is central for understanding the emergence and particular formulation of policy reforms. The notion of path dependence is often used to describe why a certain development is chosen over another. The emergence of a particular institutional arrangement becomes decisive for later reforms. Path dependence has, however, been defined by different degrees of precision – in a broad or a narrow sense, in a loose or a rigid way. Paul Pierson comments that as a consequence of the lack of rigidity we may end up with a concept lacking a clear meaning (2004, p. 10). In a socio-historical version path-dependent processes emerge and are embedded in concrete temporal processes interconnected 98 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

with traditions, norms and expectations which drive processes in certain directions, while alternative routes would demand more thorough justifications and persuasion. Still, the main contribution of the notion of path dependence is the insistence on the significance of the order of events – on sequences and the temporal dimension of social processes (Pierson, 2000, 2004). Calling attention to the temporal context is important for understanding policy processes, as well as the role of policy agency. In this chapter the notion of path dependency is used to underscore that institutional and policy legacies are important to determine both change and continuity. The main point is to argue that there exists a policy legacy in Norway for solving “problems” of male dominance in decision-making by applying gender quota arrangements. The processes that led to the making of gender quotas for corporate boards in Norway are particularly interesting in regards to the way they bridge debates about gender balance in political and economic decision making. The institution studied in this chapter is the Norwegian gender the Norwegian gender equality policy institution, in particular, the regulation of gender balance in corporate boards. Simultaneously, this is to some extent also a study of the corporate board institution, where new regulations of gender representation have been included in the more general regulation of the corporate board institution.

6.2 A Note on the Data

The analysis presented is based on all relevant documents from the political process, as well as other types of information, such as from the media debate. The most important documents are: 1) the consultation proposal on the revision of the Gender Equality Act, from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs 19992, 2) the white paper from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs: Proposition on reforms to the Gender Equality Act (2000-2001)3 3) the consultation proposal on gender representation in public limited companies, state limited companies and state businesses, etc. and the

2 Consultation proposal from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs 1999. (Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven, Barne og familiedepartementet, 1999). 3 http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/dok/regpubl/otprp/20002001/otprp-nr-77-2000-2001-. html?id=123306, (08.05.2013). Proposition to parliament 77 (2000-2001), Ministry of Children and Fa- mily Affairs: Ot.prp. 77 (2000-2001), Om lov om endringer i likestillingsloven mv., Barne- og familiedepartementet. National Preconditions and Processes 99

proposal to change the Companies Act and some other acts4, 4) White paper from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs: Proposition on reforms to company legislation on gender representation in company boards.5 In-depth analyses of the first stages of the political process are provided in Teigen (2002), Evenrud (2010), Engelstad (2011) and Sørensen (2011). Cvijanovic (2009) provides an analysis of the media debate on the issue of gender quotas for corporate boards. Central aspects of deregulation policies were described in the government commission report (NOU 2000:19) on the privatization of public enterprises.6

6.3 National Preconditions and Processes

The Norwegian gender quota legislation for corporate boards applies to a wide range of companies: the boards of public limited companies (PLC), inter-municipal companies7 and state enterprises.8 Cooperative companies9 and municipal companies10 were included from 2008 and 2009. The numerous private limited companies, however, often small, family-owned businesses, were not subject to gender quota legislation. Nevertheless, the requirement of at least 40 per cent of each gender in the board rooms today regulates central parts of Norwegian business life. In this chapter the main focus is on public limited companies. The criteria for gender representation on the boards are set in the Norwegian Public Limited Liability Companies Act11 in its article 6-11a. Demand for representation

4 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dokumentarkiv/Regjeringen-Stoltenberg-I/bfd/Horinger/2001/ Horing-kjonnsrepresentasjon-i-styrer.html?id=421560, (08.05.2013). Consultation proposal from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs 2001. (Høring: Kjønnsrepresentasjon i styret i allmennaksjeselskaper, statsaksjeselskaper og statsforetak, m.v. – forslag til endringer i allmennaksjeloven og i enkelte andre lover, Barne- og familiedepartementet, 2001). 5 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/bld/dok/regpubl/otprp/20022003/otprp-nr-97-2002-2003-. html?id=127203, (08.05.2013). Proposition to parliament 97 (2002-2003), Ministry of Children and Fa- mily Affairs: Ot.prp. 97 (2002-2003), Om lov om endringer i lov 13. juni 1997 nr. 44 om aksjeselskaper, lov 13. juni 1997 nr. 45 om allmennaksjeselskaper og i enkelte andre lover (likestilling i styrer i statsaksjeselskaper, statsforetak, allmennaksjeselskaper mv.), Barne- og familiedepartementet 6 http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fad/documents/nouer/2000/nou-2000-19.html?id=117394, no translation to English. (08.05.2013) 7 http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19990129-006.html, article 10, no translation to English. (08.05.2013) 8 http://www.lovdata.no/all/nl-19910830-071.html, article 19, no translation to English (08.05.2013) 9 http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-20070629-081-eng.pdf, article 6-4a (08.05.2013) 10 http://www.lovdata.no/all/hl-19920925-107.html#80a, article 80a, no translation to English (08.05.2013) 11 The rules regarding representation of both sexes are to be applied separately to employee-elected and shareholder-elected representatives in order to ensure independent election processes. 100 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

of both genders on the board.12 Similar formulations of the legal demands apply for all types of companies object to the gender quota ruling. Figure 1 shows the increase in the presence of women on the boards of public limited companies. The legislation adopted in 2003 was formulated as a “threat»: if the companies did not voluntarily reach the gender demands by July 2005, the legislation would be effectuated. Although the representation of women increased between 2003 and 2005, the target set of at least 40 per cent women was far from reached by the public limited company boards. Thus, in late autumn 2005 the government decided to effectuate the legislation for newly established companies starting in 2006 and all PLCs starting in 2008.13

40 39 40 41 41 40 36

25 18 20 12 9 6

0 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

Figure 6.1. Proportion of women on the boards of Public Limited Companies, Norway. 2002 – 2013. Source: Statistics Norway.

12 The demand for gender representation is formulated as follows: 1) Where there are two or three members of the board, both genders should be represented. 2) Where there are four or five members of the board, both genders should be represented by at least two members. 3) Where there are six to eight members of the board, both genders should be represented by at least three members. 4) Where there are nine or more members of the board, the membership should comprise at least 40% men and 40% women. 5) Rules 1 to 4 also apply for the election of deputy members. 13 A main reason for the effective implementation of gender quotas for corporate boards was probably the rather tough sanctions that were implemented for breaching the law. The Company Act applies identical sanctions for breaching all its rules, with forced dissolution as the final step. Consequently, a company that does not have a legal board, despite several warnings with the possibility of correcting the matter, will be subject to forced dissolution. National Preconditions and Processes 101

6.3.1 The Norwegian Gender Equality Policy Institution

The politics of state feminism (Hernes, 1987) in Norway can be characterized as consisting of three core elements. The first element is the Gender Equality Act, which was passed in 1979. The Norwegian Gender Equality Act combines protection against discrimination with active duties for public authorities and employers to promote equality. Furthermore, it has included provision for positive action from the beginning, which has paved the way for preferential treatment and gender quota arrangements. A second element is family- and welfare policies. The Norwegian welfare state adopted maternity leave schemes and sponsored childcare policies from early on, and these policies have been regarded as part and parcel of woman-friendly policies, characterizing Norwegian state feminism. The generous leave schemes and the extensive childcare provisions have facilitated the reconciliation between family and work by promoting women’s participation in the labour market, as well as promoting men’s participation in the family and care for children. Third and finally, gender quota policies were established in the 1970s in Norway to promote and regulate the gender balance of decision-making assemblies. In recent years gender quotas in politics have spread globally (Dahlerup & Freidenval, 2005; Krook, 2009; Franceschet & Piscopo, 2013).

6.3.2 Positive Action and Gender Quota Arrangements in Norway

The existing positive action and quota arrangements can be divided into three main types: preferential treatment, promoting procedures and minimum representation rules. Preferential treatment is the most widely dispersed in recruitment and promotions in public administration (state and municipal sectors), in some private companies, and in connection with admission to gender-skewed types of education; applicants from the under-represented gender are given priority, when qualifications are equal or about equal. As a result of the careful formulation of these procedures, they have proven to have had only minor direct effects. Nevertheless, studies indicate that they to some extent positively affect organizations’ prioritizing and legitimizing of gender equality (Teigen, 2002). Promoting procedures constitute a slightly different kind of positive action procedure, which implies that candidates’ chances are improved by being moved upwards in ranking. The “additional point” system is the most commonly applied procedure to balance the gender composition of students within gender-skewed fields of learning. “Earmarking” is another promoting procedure, mainly applied at universities to increase the representation of women in academic positions. “Earmarking” of university positions for women, recruitment positions, as well as professor positions played an important role in the gender-equality strategy of Norwegian universities in the 1990s. This procedure was abolished after the procedure had been judged by the European Free Trade Association’s (EFTA) surveillance 102 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

authority (ESA), which concluded that this particular formulation of positive action would be in contravention of the principles of equality and proportionality.14 Minimum representation, or quotas in the restricted sense of the word, establishes requirements for the gender composition in terms of fixed distributions. In the Norwegian context, such arrangements are generally formulated as a demand for at least 40 per cent of each gender. Principles of minimum representation exist as voluntary agreements in five of the major Norwegian political parties, exceptions being the Conservative Party and the right-wing Progress Party. Voluntary quota arrangements are also widely dispersed among civil society organizations. Legislative quotas regulate the gender composition of publicly appointed boards, councils and committees, and were first introduced in 1981 in Section 21 in the Gender Equality Act. For more than 20 years this was the only legislative quota arrangement in Norway, until the revision of the Company Act in 2003. Gender quota arrangements have played a central role in the institutionalization

Procedures given are gender the under-represented of Candidates amount (same qualifications equal of in cases priority points). school of the of applicants to granted points school Additional places school of earmarking gender; under-represented with gender, the under-represented of candidates for qualifications. to according restrictions strict the under- of applicants promotions and In recruitment treatment preferential given are gender represented equal. or about equal are when qualifications regulate gender) each 40% of least (at Quotas party within appointments and party election lists parties political major the seven of in five organizations regulate gender) each 40% of least (at Quotas is it as far as bodies, decision-making of composition possible in be represented should gender each 40% of Minimum committees and councils boards, appointed publicly be represented should gender each 40% of Minimum publicly and companies limited public of in the boards enterprises owned of Norwegian gender equality policy (Teigen, 2011; Skjeie & Teigen, 2012). These schemes have for the most been rather powerful in achieving their aim, although the wider ripple effects have been modest (Skjeie & Teigen, 2012, p. 60).

6.3.3 Employee Representation on Corporate Boards

The idea that gender balance on corporate boards could be regulated did not emerge in the public debate before the late 1990s. Until then it was taken for granted that it was primarily the responsibility of the owners to select the board members they found the best suited to protect the company’s interests. However, the owners’ autonomy to choose board members was already restricted. With the revision of the Companies Act in 1972, workers in companies with more than 50 employees were given the right to elect up to one-third of the board members; and in companies with more than 200 employees, the company was obligated to set up an enterprise assembly, where

Adopted of School 1982; Norwegian education, Upper secondary 1980 Administration, Business and Economics 1981 Technology, and Science of Norwegian University procedure) 1997 (earmarking points), (additional 1985 sector, 1981; municipal sector, State 1975; Centre Party Left Socialist 1974; Party Liberal Democratic 1983; Christian Party 1979; Labour Party 1989 Party 2005 Unions, Trade of The Norwegian Confederation in the composition gender of regulation 1981, first gender, each Act, 1988, 40% of Gender Equality act, 1992 Government in the Local included (PLC), legislation in 2003 company Adopted in 2006, full new companies for implemented in 2008 implementation one third of the members were elected by employees and two thirds by shareholders (Hagen, Engelstad, this volume). Employee representation on company boards expresses an adherence to workplace democracy, as well as an extended view of board members mandate to be broader in terms of representing the interests of the owners’ shares in the company. The enlargement of industrial democracy was presented as a reason for introducing

Types Preferential treatment Promoting procedures Preferential treatment Minimum representation Minimum representation Minimum representation Minimum representation gender quotas for corporate boards in the consultation document in relation to the preparation of a revision of the Gender Equality Act.

Types of positive action/quota procedures according to social fields fields social to according procedures action/quota positive of Types

14 A similar Swedish arrangement was abolished by the European Court of Justice in the Abraham- Institutional fields Institutional Education Employment Politics Organizations Public commissions boards Corporate

Table 6.1: Table son Case (C407/98), as a contravention of the EU Equal Treatment Directive Article 141 (4). National Preconditions and Processes 103

6.3.3 Employee Representation on Corporate Boards

Types of positive action/quota procedures according to social fields fields social to according procedures action/quota positive of Types

Table 6.1: Table son Case (C407/98), as a contravention of the EU Equal Treatment Directive Article 141 (4). 104 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

In Norway the content of democracy is constantly evolving. How we conceptualize democracy is changing through practice, and demands to and implementation of democratic arrangements come for on more new areas. This was the reasoning behind the introduction of industrial democracy at that time. It could be relevant to draw a line between the development of industrial democracy and gender representation in company boards. Although there was disagreement about the introduction of industrial democracy, it is today granted and fully accepted that employees should be represented in company boards. (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, Consul- tation document, 1999, p. 58, my translation). 15

In the public debate gender representation was by some fronted as an extension of workplace democracy. The parallel made between employee and gender representation emphasize that there already exist restrictions to the autonomy of the owners in relation to the composition of company boards, something that may have contributed to prepare the ground for gender representation on company boards.

6.3.4 Deregulation Meets the Institutionalization of Gender Equality Policies

The first initiative to introduce gender quota regulation for corporate boards came in the government’s consultation with the social partners and civil society organizations as part of the preparation of a revision of the Gender Equality Act in 1999.16 As a part of the revision process the government proposed to expand the scope of article 21 in the Gender Equality Act to include all company boards. A context for the proposition to expand the scope of § 21 was the ongoing processes of deregulation. Heavy deregulation of publicly owned businesses was effectuated in Norway from the 1980 and onwards (Engelstad et al., 2003; Stjernø, 2005)17. To some extent, an unintended effect of the deregulation processes was that the scope of the existing gender quota regulation, in article 21 in the Norwegian Gender Equality Act, was narrowed. Thus, deregulated, but still publicly owned companies were no longer subject to the regulation of gender balance in public boards and commissions. On this background the government argued in its’ consultation document of 1999 and in its proposition to parliament in 2002 that a gender balance regulation limited to state

15 Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven (Barne- og familiedepartementet). (Consultation: Proposition for revising the Gender Equality Act (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs)) 16 Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven (Barne- og familiedepartementet). (Consultation: Proposition for revising the Gender Equality Act (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs)) 17 According to Vogel (1996) considerable confusion exists over the term ‘deregulation’. Deregulation can be described as “the reduction and elimination of government regulations” and liberalization as “the introduction of more competition within a market” (Vogel 1996:3). National Preconditions and Processes 105

companies would change the conditions for competition between private and public owned companies.18

The government wishes to grant all companies equal conditions to compete, irrespective of whether they are public or private companies. Rules of minimum representation of both genders in the boards of private enterprises will give private enterprises equal conditions for competition as for public enterprises. (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, consultation document, 1999, p. 58, m y translation).19

Important parts of Norwegian gender equality policies have been oriented towards state control, rules and regulations, while policies of deregulation have been reasoned on the grounds of the necessity to reduce government regulation and power of business and industry (Derthick & Quirck, 1985). A main argument for deregulation is that state intervention hampers economic growth and that the role of the state needs to be down-played to the benefit of stringent market criteria to secure distribution and well- being (NOU 2000:19; Jenson, 2010; Simon-Kumar, 2011). In this light, deregulation and gender equality policies appear to be inherently contradictory. However, exactly because of this contradiction the possibility of an expansion instead of confinement of the scope of the gender quota legislation was made salient. In addition, the fact that the Norwegian state is a prominent owner and actor in economic life, and in particular among the listed companies registered on the Oslo Stock Exchange, probably has strengthened the legitimacy for the state to take action. More than 40 percent of the values on the Oslo Stock Exchange is publicly, mainly state, owned.20 Moreover, as the debate on gender quotas for corporate boards arose, there were simultaneously other movements in the direction of expansion of the impact field of gender equality policies in working life. Until the revision of the Gender Equality Act in 2002, the pro-activity clause of the Act had been restricted to the public sector; starting in 2002 the duty to promote gender equality includes all employers as well as the social partners (Gender Equality Act, article 1a). Hence, at the turn of the millennium, mandatory gender quotas on corporate boards and the expanded pro- activity clause can be interpreted as an expression of movements in the border area between the state and the economic field.

18 Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven (Barne- og familiedepartementet). (Consultation: Proposition for revising the Gender Equality Act (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs)) and Ot. Prp. 97 (2002-2003) (Proposition to parliament 97 (2002-2003)). http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/bld/ dok/regpubl/otprp/20022003/otprp-nr-97-2002-2003-/6.html?id=127240 19 Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven (Barne- og familiedepartementet). (Consultation: Proposition for revising the Gender Equality Act (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs)) 20 http://vpsinfo.manamind.com/sectorstats/index.do?l=no 106 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

6.3.5 Women in Management

The “women in management” debate was high on the public agenda in the 1990s in Norway, as well as in most of the industrialized world. To some extent the debate hit Norway particularly hard by the way it interfered with the national self-image of being particularly successful in affairs of gender equality. In Norway, as in the other Scandinavian countries, a discrepancy exists between a relatively balanced representation of men and women in political decision-making on the one hand, and strong vertical gender segregation in the labour market, and especially in business (Teigen & Wängnerud, 2009; Niskanen, 2011). The small number of women in top positions in business has been perceived as paradoxical in light of the gender equality achievements within other society areas. Some studies indicate in fact that the representation of women in top management in business and industry is higher in many European countries and the U.S. than in the Scandinavian countries (Birkelund & Sandnes, 2003). At the same time, male dominance in top positions in business is a general trend characterized by surprising similarity across countries.21 Norwegian data show that the business elite express more negative attitudes towards gender equality policies in comparison with the other elite groups (Skjeie & Teigen, 2003). The poor representation of women in senior positions in economic life combined with a lack of will within business to adopt initiatives to promote gender equality probably formed an important backdrop for why improving gender balance in the board rooms became a pressing political issue. Consequently, the long established and generally accepted demand for self-regulation of private businesses was challenged by a growing claim for state regulation to promote gender balance.

6.3.6 The Public Debate on Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards

The institutionalization of party quotas and legal quotas for public commissions were certainly important for why the introduction of gender quotas for corporate boards appeared applicable. Nonetheless, even though gender quota policies have been more widely used in Norway than most other countries, they provoke opposition. The debate prior to the adoption of gender quotas for corporate boards was heated and polarized. The public and political debates over the gender quota for corporate boards have been studied through analysis of the media debate (Cvijanovic, 2009) and through analysis of the policy documents prepared by the government and the responses of organized interested in the consultative processes (Teigen, 2002; Evenrud, 2010; Engelstad, 2011; Sørensen, 2011).

21 http://20-first.com/wp-content/uploads/20-first-2014-Global-Gender-Balance-Scorecard.pdf National Preconditions and Processes 107

The participants in the public debate on gender quotas for corporate boards were primarily people in top positions. The main voices against quotas for corporate boards were expressed by corporate managers and owners and representatives of employers’ organizations, while the supporters were represented mostly by politicians and high- ranking civil servants, as well as actors connected to the gender equality machinery. The supporting politicians came from a broad spectrum of political parties, mainly the Norwegian Labour Party, the Christian Democratic Party and parts of the Conservative Party. Opponents among politicians mainly represented the Progress Party and the Conservative Party, but there were few participants from the opponents’ side representing the political parties. The women’s organizations did not take an active part either in the newspaper debate or in the consultation process. The central arguments in the public debate represented a wide range of opinions. Still they can be divided into three main types of argument, about justice, utility and democracy. The justice argument: Proponents of gender quotas for corporate boards argued that gender balance in economic decision-making positions concerns issues of justice, often without specifying when and how “justice” is relevant in this context. Given that justice is a matter of redistribution of resources, the claim is that positive action/ gender quota is a necessary tool to achieve gender equality. The strong presence of men in Norwegian corporate boards and in economic decision-making in general, is then posited as unacceptable and as a possible indication of unfair treatment of women. The main counter argument based on justice mainly argued that regulation of the gender composition would not be fair. Recruitment to corporate boards should not be based on the gender of candidates. The owners should have the right to select the candidates they find most suitable to sit on the board. Gender quota regulations were considered illegitimate unequal treatment and as discrimination against men. The utility argument: Arguments about utility and profitability were particularly central as arguments in favour of gender quotas for corporate boards. The human capital oriented argument claims that since the total talent potential of a population is distributed fairly evenly between men and women, male dominance in corporate boards indicates an under-utilization of women’s skills. The government explicitly argued that more women in company boards would be “good for companies”:

More women in company boards could add new resources, competences and impulses to Nor- wegian trade and industry. The ministry considers it to be a competitive advantage to get women into the board rooms. To exclude half of the competent workforce from the board room, expresses a bad utilization of resources and can weaken the quality. Enterprises that do not recruit women will have problems acquiring the best resources. As the public sector now has achieved a proportion of women at 40 percent in commissions, boards, etc., the quality is raised. (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, consultation document, 1999, p. 58). 22

22 Høring: Forslag til endringer i likestillingsloven (Barne- og familiedepartementet). (Consultation: Proposition for revising the Gender Equality Act (Ministry of Children and Family Affairs)) 108 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

This argument is particularly interesting in the way it uses the rhetoric of business life and thus appears in a way more unassailable. Nonetheless, the main counter arguments based on utility claim that gender quotas on corporate boards would lead to less competent women replacing more competent men. This argument is grounded on the opinion that not enough women have the relevant experience, and that the recruitment of qualified women needs to start earlier and further down the organizational hierarchy to create a pool of well- qualified women. Moreover, a related argument against the gender quota reform has been that the gender quota legislation would lead foreign investors to be less inclined to invest in Norwegian companies, with the consequence that Norwegian companies would lose competitive advantage. The debate on the effects of gender quotas for business performance is ongoing. Some analysts find a negative effect (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Matsa & Miller, 2013), while others find zero effect or a moderate positive effect for the relatively poorly performing companies (Dale-Olsen et al. 2013) The democracy argument: Arguments concerned with democracy were also central for the governments’ justifications of the gender quota reform. The argument was that gender balanced participation in economic decision-making is crucial for the Norwegian democracy, and in particular the importance of equal rights to participation on the boards of the biggest and most influential companies, where the state is often a major owner. In addition it was argued that regulation of gender balance of corporate boards implied an enlargement of industrial democracy, as described earlier in this chapter. A main counter argument concerned with democracy holds that gender quota regulations were incompatible with the principles of shareholder democracy. The claim has been that gender quota regulations would hinder owners’ democratic rights to recruit the candidates they find the most suited, as well as interfere with the election process. The argument is that the owners invest and risk their own money and should therefore have the right to decide who shall represent them on the board. The debate in advance of the gender quotas for corporate boards’ reform was, as mentioned, heated. The debate did not muster active participation among diverse actors; it was rather a top-down process. Civil society actors, such as the women’s organizations, mainly did not participate in the debate. The position of the women’s organizations has been weak throughout the last couple of decades, and this was probably not viewed as an issue with mobilizing potential. Gender quotas for corporate boards were mostly viewed as an issue concerning the elite levels of society. The elitist aspects may be important for why the debate suddenly disappeared from the public agenda. As soon as the quota legislation was implemented and the statistics showed that the requirement of at least 40 per cent of each gender represented on the boards were met, the debate more or less disappeared from the public eye. National Preconditions and Processes 109

6.3.7 The Policy Agency Context

The policy process lasted about a decade from when the first government motion was sent to the consultative bodies in 1999 until the full implementation of mandatory gender quotas in 2008. The first initiative to introduce a gender quota regulation for corporate boards23 came in the consultation audit regarding a major revision of the Gender Equality Act in 1999 by the minority Conservative-Centre government coalition (Bondevik I).24 The minister in charge was Valgerd Svarstad Haugland in the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, from the Christian Democratic Party. The gender quota motion was withdrawn however, due to necessary legal clarification. A new motion was sent upon consultation by the Labour Party government (Stoltenberg I) in 2001.25 Some important changes can be witnessed in this proposition in comparison to the white paper from 1999. First the gender quota regulation was to be regulated through the Companies Act, and not as in the previous round through the Gender Equality Act. Second, the companies subject to the legislation were the public limited companies in addition to the public companies (state and inter-municipal companies), while the 1999 proposition included all companies irrespective of type of registration. Third, the gender target was changed from at least 25 per cent of each of the genders to 40 per cent. The final adoption of a quota ruling in the Companies Act was based on the motion from 2001 and presented to parliament by a new Conservative-Centre government coalition (Bondevik II)26 in 2003 (Proposition to parliament, Nr. 97 [2002-2003]).27 When the new gender quota law was passed in Parliament it received broad political support; all parties except for the Progress Party voted in favour of the ruling.

23 The motion was to expand the functioning sphere of Article 21 in the Gender Equality Act to include also all company boards, however only requiring at least 25% of each gender, and not 40% which was the case for publicly appointed boards, etc. (White paper from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs, 1999) 24 A government coalition composed of the three parties in the middle of the party spectrum in Nor- wegian politics, the Center Party, The Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party. 25 White paper from the Ministry of Children and Family Affairs 2001: Gender representation in public limited companies, state limited companies, and state businesses, etc., proposal to change the Company’s Act and some other acts. (Høring: Kjønnsrepresentasjon i styret i allmennaksjeselskaper, statsaksjeselskaper og statsforetak, m.v. – forslag til endringer i allmennaskjesloven og i enkelte andre lover. (BFD, 2001). 26 A Conservative-Centre government coalition composed of the Conservative Party, the Liberal Party and the Christian Democratic Party. 27 Proposition to parliament, Nr. 97 (2002-2003). Government proposition on the revision of the Company’s Act, Ministry of Trade and Industry. (Ot. prp. nr 97 (2002-2003). Om lov om endringer i lov 13. juni 1997 nr. 44 om aksjeselskaper, lov 13. juni 1997 nr. 45 om allmennaksjeselskaper og i enkelte andre lover (likestilling i styrer i statsaksjeselskaper, statsforetak, allmennaksjeselskaper mv.). Oslo: Næringsdepartementet.) 110 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

Paying attention to the temporal context is about sequences and timing, as well as about political actors’ ability to seize the moment. In the policy process that led to the adoption of gender quotas for corporate boards, political agency was of crucial importance at two particular points in time. First, two politicians from the Christian Democratic Party, replacing each other as ministers of gender equality, played significant roles in the preparation of the gender quota legislation: Valgerd Svarstad Haugland and Laila Dåvøy. In 1999 the Minister of Children and Family Affairs, Valgerd Svarstad Haugland (1997-2000), from the Christian Democratic Party, proposed gender quotas in Norwegian corporate boards to be included in the Gender Equality Act. This proposition was part of the preparation for the major revision of the Gender Equality Act. The most obvious reason for why Minister Haugland proposed such a radical and controversial reform was the fact that gender equality was part of her portfolio as Minister of Children and Family Affairs. The issue became salient in connection with the process leading up to the revision of the Gender Equality Act. The first record where gender quotas on corporate boards was suggested as a legal possibility is found in an initial letter from the Gender Equality Ombud in connection with the preparation of the revision of the Gender Equality Act. The Gender Equality Ombud, Anne Lise Ryel, and the Director of the Centre for Gender Equality, Ingunn Yssen, were central in launching the possibility of legally regulating the gender composition of corporate boards, in the first place (Sørensen 2011). Women and management were, as mentioned earlier a hot public issue at that time. Actually one of the few central gender equality issues of the Christian Democratic Party, a party generally more concerned with traditional family values than with gender equality, is women in management (Vik 2012). Another concern relates to Minister Haugland’s more personal motives at that particular point in time. In many ways she was badly in need of a powerful gender equality issue to balance her reputation at that time of being anti-gender equality. Her “bad” reputation was due to her central position and responsibility for introducing the cash-for-care reform, a core issue of the Christian Democratic Party, representing their emphasis on traditional family values.28 There was an intense and heated debate surrounding the cash-for-care initiative, which came into force in 1998. A main argument in the public debate was that the arrangement meant a backlash for the Norwegian gender equality project (Ellingsæter, 2006, and this volume). An interpretation of Minister Haugland’s innovative endeavours for introducing gender quotas for corporate boards was that she was in need of strengthen and confirm her authority in relation to gender equality policies. After the possible regulation of gender balance in corporate boards was launched it was strongly supported by important stake-holders in ways that made it appear as though the political process proceeded on in its own dynamics. In between the

28 The cash benefit reform provided all families with children between 1 and 3 years with a monthly allowance, similar to the cost of state subsidies per child in state subsidized day care. Discussion 111

initial phase and the final adoption, the legislation was prepared in silence. The legal aspects were assessed. The Labour Party continued this process and left its mark on it by changing the target from at least 25 to 40 per cent representation of each gender. After a legal assessment by the Ministry of Justice, the scope of the legislation was delimited to include only publicly owned and public limited (mostly listed) companies. The second and final phase has been hailed as paramount in the international press,29 especially the final acts and moves of the Minister of Trade and Industry, Ansgar Gabrielsen, from the Conservative Party. Shortly before the law proposition was to be discussed by the government, Gabrielsen gave an interview to the (then) largest Norwegian newspaper (VG 22.2.2002), where he uttered that he was “sick and tired of the male dominance in business life”.30 This was an unexpected and vigorous initiative from a male politician from the Conservative Party, who enjoyed high esteem in business circles. The uncertainty regarding whether the gender quota act would finally be passed in Parliament, rested on the rather heavy opposition that was expressed against the gender quota law proposition, especially from within economic life. The Conservative Party has a strong tradition of being attentive to the opinions within the business sector, although there were internal party controversies on the gender quota issue. Gabrielsen’s sudden initiative in favour of the quota act in the final phase of the political process, and his claim of the problems of male dominance in Norwegian economic life, probably were decisive in the final government round. In the final phase of the political process, this move probably managed to tip a divided government in favour of the quota legislation (see Magma 2010). For the second time the initiative was pushed forward from where it was not expected. Finally only the members of Parliament of the Progress Party voted against it, although some of the Conservative Party’s MPs probably felt obligated by the conclusion of Minister Gabrielsen and the government. Nonetheless, a long political process was in motion before Minister Gabrielsen entered the stage. The importance of his role for the final result, the adoption of mandatory gender quotas on Norwegian corporate boards tends to be exaggerated. Still, no one really knows what would have happened if it were not for his manoeuvers in the final phase of the political process.

6.4 Discussion

The time and the timing of events were crucial for the making of gender quotas for corporate boards in Norway. For the policy process to be established, three critical moments that more or less coincided in time, have been identified as important. First,

29 See i.e. The Economist March 13, 2010, Time Magazine, April 26, 2010, Der Spiegel, July 8, 2010 30 http://www.vg.no/nyheter/innenriks/artikkel.php?artid=3024189 112 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

the highly profiled and heated media debate on women in management throughout the 1990s constituted an important background for why policy-makers started to search for policy initiatives to promote gender balance in economic decision-making positions. Particularly the discrepancy between the country’s self-image of being particularly successful in affairs of gender equality and the persistent male dominance in top positions in the economy, spawned political awareness about this as a problem and the need to promote policy innovations. The strong national tradition for applying gender quota measures directed attention in that particular direction. Second the preparation for the revision of the Gender Equality Act constituted a departure point for innovative thinking about the possibilities and limitations of gender equality legislation. In this initial phase central actors within the gender equality machinery (Ryel [Gender Equality Ombud] and Yssen [Director of Centre for Gender Equality]) played important roles as participants in the preparation of revision of the Gender Equality Act and as innovators. Thirdly, the deregulation of the economy, fuelled worries about the gender effects of neoliberal policies, and brought to the fore policies to counteract the limited scope of article 21 in the Gender Equality Act. In sum, the women in management debate, the revision of the Gender Equality Act and the effects of deregulation were important for preparing the ground for a novel policy initiative. Nonetheless, the adoption of gender quotas for corporate boards can be analyzed simultaneously as a continuation and a break with the Norwegian gender equality policy tradition. On the one hand, gender quotas for corporate boards builds on a policy legacy of adopting gender quotas. On the other hand, the expansion of such regulations beyond public boards and commissions can be viewed as a break with the institutionalization of boundaries between the state and the business sector. Moreover, it may appear counter to intuition that the scope of gender quota legislation was enlarged in a period otherwise characterized by deregulation and a weakening of political regulations. However, a main argument for deregulation is to provide similar conditions for companies irrespective of type and structure of ownership. Thus in the Norwegian context, deregulation (without gender quotas for corporate boards) would imply a delimiting scope of the legislation that regulates the gender composition of corporate boards. The extensive state ownership in Norway emphasizes the impact deregulation otherwise would have had on delimiting the scope of gender equality policy. The alternative, which would be to institute particular rules for publicly owned companies, would imply (at least in theory) a twist in the conditions for competition and were therefore not considered a realistic alternative. Hence, to avoid diminishing the impact sphere of gender equality policy, expansion of the gender quota policy emerged as an alternative solution. Thus, mandatory gender quotas on Norwegian corporate boards came forth as a national regulative response to the possible unintended gender equality consequences of the processes of deregulation. As argued by Vogel (1996, p. 3), deregulation often combines Conclusion 113

liberalization with re-regulations, “Hence we have wound up with freer markets and more rules”. Exactly because the adoption of gender quotas for corporate boards was at odds with the Norwegian system of industrial relations, it was for some time uncertain what the final result would be of the policy process. A final concern is with the role of political agency in this particular policy process. Significant reforms are often made possible through deviance from the ideological main path, often with the consequence that large reforms and new directions of policies are carried through in a smoother manner than otherwise would have been the case. The ways in which powerful leaders can prepare the ground for significant changes due to sudden and vigorous initiatives are sometimes referred to as the “Nixon goes to China” dynamic.31 In this case, a progressive gender equality reform was proposed by a Centre-Conservative government coalition. This constituted a breach with an established “division of labour” within Norwegian politics, where the policies of gender equality had been dominated by the left-wing parties, while the interests, rights and self-regulation of business and private owners has been the concern of the right-wing parties. Thus, it was sensational that a bold gender quota initiative came from a minister from the Christian Democratic Party. Many of the political actors who are normally sceptical of regulations and gender equality initiatives may have become somewhat confused and more hesitant than they otherwise would have been if the law reform had been issued by the Labour Party, generally acknowledged for being pro- regulation and pro-gender quotas. This bewildering situation was continued by the second unexpected move in this political process, staged by Minister Gabrielsen, with a strong reputation for being a solid, conservative Minister of Trade and Industry and without any prior public engagement in matters of gender equality. This contributed to create a basis for the broad majority behind the mandatory gender quota on corporate board proposition.

6.5 Conclusion

This chapter has described and explored the interplay of the contextual factors and processes that were decisive in the policy process that led to the making of gender quotas for corporate boards in Norway. This reform has been significant in the national context, by the way the gender equality institution managed to expand in

31 “Nixon goes to China” refers to incidents where significant changes occur as the result of the en- hanced legitimacy possessed by powerful leaders, as well as the windows of opportunity which may open when politicians foster unexpected initiatives. This is what happened in 1972 when President Nixon went to China and met with Chairman Mao, illustrating a breakthrough for a peace process in the relationship between the two countries. 114 The Making of Gender Quotas for Corporate Boards in Norway

an era otherwise characterized by relative weakening of political governance and increased liberalization of the economy. To some extent this tale emphasizes the strength of the gender equality institution in Norway today. Although the political process was clearly featured by uncertainty from the moment it entered the policy scene until adoption and implementation, arguments on gender equality triumphed arguments concerned with the autonomy of the business sector with the result that mandatory gender quotas for corporate boards were adopted. A final question would be whether not a radical measure, such as gender quotas for corporate boards, is a sign of a significant drop in the legitimacy of male dominance – a drop in legitimacy following decades of gender equality progress. The enormous international attention on gender quotas for corporate boards, as witnessed through the spread across Europe of gender quotas for corporate boards, is perhaps telling about a new turn in the gender equality debate – and of its’ status in general. References 115

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