THERE BYE-ELECTIONS III Fall of a Traditional Congress Stronghold Rushikesh Maru

The Rajkot by-election to the Lok Sabha in 2963 underscored the great importance of the organisational factor in the outcome of elections. Where the Congress party is dominated by one leader for a long time, the result is a highly personalised support structure and lack of institutional expression of political loyalties. Once the original condition of efficiency —the domination of the particular leader—is removed, or weakened, the Congress is suddenly found without depth or energy, greatly divided and lacking in drive and resources. This state of internal organisation reflects the large gaps in the social base of the Congress party's support —gaps between the masses and the ordinary leadership which had relied alt the time on the "great leaders" appeal and the failure to accommodate certain important segments of the social structure. For the opposition to take advantage of such a situation, it is necessary for it: (a) to close its ranks and present a united front; (b) to isolate the sections alienated by the Congress party and secure their support; and, (c) to sustain such a support by imaginative field organisation, with the help of influential key men and continuous pressure on voters either individually or in groups. In organising such an effort, it is vital to put into effect existing influence-networks based on kinship, caste and caste associations, traditional loyalties and economic relationships. It is this inter-twining between organisational factors on the one hand and a sharply differentiated social structure on the other, which provides the context in which a traditional Congress stronghold like Rajkot votes an opposition party to power.

THE defeat of the Congress candi- However, a closer look shows that the district, and the opposition parties date in Rajkot came as a shock while the Congress position was no continued to be weak Considered to both the local and the national doubt weakened in 1962, it was still against this background, the elec- leadership of the Congress, which bad substantial in the parliamentary con­ Congress debacle in the 1963 by-elec­ considered Rajkot as a stronghold of stituency and district as a whole, The tion cannot be explained by the the party. The Congress had won this Congress was still the only organised trend set in 1962, but rather by the parliamentary constituency in all three political party, a position it had breakdown of the Congress organiza­ elections. Its vote rose from 61.44 acquired through a long period of tion that took place at the time of the per cent in 1952 to 71.65 per cent in domination. The State People's Move­ bye-election. What alarmed the Con­ 1957. It: held all of the seven legis­ ment for popular government was gress leadership when the outcome of lative assembly seats that form part directed against the ex-ruler of Rajkot the election became known was not of the parliamentary constituency in as long back as 1921. The association so much the victory of the Swatantra the first two elections. However, in of Gandhi himself with this movement party, but the paralysis in the organiza­ the 1962 election, although the parlia­ and the fact that Gandhi was born in tion of the party, as reflected in the mentary seat was retained, the Con­ Saurashtra gave an advantage to the failure to mobilise adequate workers, gress lost in two assembly constitu­ Congress in Saurashtra. This identi­ and the lack of direction and drive encies and its strength diminished fication was made more concrete by a in the election campaign. in four other constituencies. As shown net-work of constructive programmes How is it that the Swatantra party, in Table 3, the anti-Congress vote in initiated in the early 1920's, This which had no local organization to Rajkot city constituency was more tradition of constructive work was start with on the eve of the election, than double that of the Congress and carried over even in the post-Indepen­ and who had nominated an outsider i although the opposition was divided, dence period. U N Dhebar, who has could unseat the Congress in its own one of the opposition candidates suc­ been the leading spirit behind these fortress? Was this due to the Swa­ ceeded in dislodging the Congress. activities, came to power as the first tantra Party's superior election strate­ The Congress was also dislodged in Chief Minister of Saurashtra State in gy, its financial resources, the candi­ the Paddhari Assembly Constituency, 1948. He emphasised the importance date's own national image, the support while the opposition secured a size­ of constructive work in providing a it got from traditional interests, or able votes in Jasadan, Dhoraji and network support to the Congress. Such the ideological impact of the Swatantra Uplita constituencies. The domina­ a structure of support was further re­ programme on certain sections of the tion of the Congress was thus already inforced by a very successful govern­ voters? These were no doubt some on the decline by the time of the mental performance during his regime. of the factors that influenced the out. third General Election; the decline The opposition failed to gain any come of the election. Though im­ turned into defeat in 1963. The Con­ strength in this situation. Inspite of portant in themselves, however, they gress vote fell from 71,65 per cent the success of a few independent provide little assistance in explaining 1957 to 55.24 per cent in 1962 and candidates in the 1962 elections, the the Congress organisation's failure to 44.4 per cent in 1963. Congress continued to be powerful in match the opposition attack. Only

987 June 19, 1965 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY a detailed examination of the organisa­ should be conceded that in the long the other hand, Dhebar himself had tional factor can help our understand­ run such an organisation of power also to depend on the organizational ing of the overall situation in which perpetuated a situation where political leadership at the district level for his the election took place. relationships could not get institutiona­ own communication with his supporters. lized. With this elevation of the status of district organizational leadership, there As an illustration of this general followed a competition among various The Congress Organisation point, let us take the structure of aspirants for the Number Two position In trying to explain the Congress Congress leadership in Rajkot district. under Dhebar. performance in 1963, we advance the The core of the district leadership ini­ hypothesis that a party structure based Here was a chance to create a tially came from Rajkot city and that on a network of personal loyalties heirarchy of leadership at the district too from the educated urban middle under a dominant and powerful level. But the compulsions of main­ class, which has since continued to leader, while it proves highly success­ taining his own leadership over that dominate, as shown in Table 4. It ful in the short run, becomes dysfunc­ of all others, and as acceptable to all controlled the majority of the D C C tional to the party, once the leader factions, did not allow Dhebar to de­ and governmental positions. Dhebar ceases to provide a symbol of common cide his next man. He kept the situa­ and his colleagues in the government loyalty. The role of U N Dhebar, tion fluid so as to see that no one kept direct contacts with the rural former President of the Indian Na­ could gain a decisive advantage over leaders who did not challenge the tional Congress, in the political deve­ anyone else. The resulting position, control of the D C C by urban leaders, lopment of the district provides a key which still continues, was that there partly because of the novelty of their to the understanding of the present came into being four factional leaders experience under a democratic system, position of .the Congress in Rajkot. A within the DCC, each claiming to and partly because they could always close associate of Gandhi, Dhebar rose be the district leader. Meanwhile, the look forward to Dhebar for the satis­ to the stature of an all-powerful leader new rural leadership which had emerg­ faction of their local demands. They in the district during his tenure as ed under new pressures from the coun­ thought they could satisfy the needs the Chief Minister of the former Sau- tryside challenged the urban leaders' of their own local communities through rashtra State from 1948 to 1955. He monopoly in the DCC, and claimed their direct link with the top-most combines within him the qualities of representation in the Legislature. This leader without needing to control the a dynamic leader, a realist in adminis­ further disrupted the unity of the DCC On the other hand, the urban tration and politics, and a strict urban leaders, each of whom tried to leaders in control of the DCC gradu­ Gandhian in personal life. The com- build his support in different sectors ally lost whatever contact they had 1 bination of these qualities made him of the rural elite. ' Thus the failure with the rural voters and leaders, be­ a successful organisational leader as to institutionalise a clear line of autho­ cause, once again, their strength was well as a revered mass idol. The rity resulted in acute factionalism and dependent on their capacity to retain success of his career as Chief Minister the consequent lack of direction to the confidence of Dhebar. lies in the direct link that he main­ the Congress rank and file, a fact that tained with the people, a link that was strikingly brought home during In 1954, Dhebar was invited to take had been forged during the period of the 1963 bye-election. on the Presidentship of the Indian "constructive work1' before Indepen­ National Congress. He resigned from dence. This direct link had two im­ the Chief Ministership of Saurashtra portant consequences. On the one hand, Nature of Factionalism and presided over the historic Avadi it raised the personal prestige of Dhe­ The factions that emerged during session of the Congress in January bar and nearly turned him into a 1957-62 were built around powerful 1955, and continued in the same posi­ charismatic leader. On the other hand, individuals competing for capturing a tion till 1958. In November 1956. however, it undermined the role of decisive position in the district Con­ Saurashtra State was merged with the the party organization as a liaison gress. It is true that Dhebar continu­ bilingual Bombay State. These two between the people and the Govern­ ed to dictate the relative positions of developments called for an altogether ment. these factions in the power structure different role on the part of the D C C of the district, but in so doing, he leaders, a role that they were not The whole structure of support for had also to take into account the the Congress in Saurashtra was built equipped to play. The physical shift comparative support potential of these out of an elaborate chain of personal in the governmental decision-making loyalties, finally merging into a com­ centre to Bombay and a substantive mon identity with the leader. It must, change in the position of the Saurash­ of course, be emphasised here that tra ministers as subordinates under a such a diffused and personalised com- larger set-up at once created a gap munication network under the domina­ between the people and the govern­ tion of a powerful leader was very ment in Saurashtra. The district; much in tune with the traditional Congress organisation failed to fill this culture of Saurashtra : a society which gap because it never had the status or was divided into 222 small feudal the experience to act on its own. There states and was used to personal was thus created a political void in governance. The new government's Rajkot (thus underlining the critica- success was mainly due to its ability importance of the Congress organisa­ to convey a modern theme through tion in the Indian political system). the traditional communication chan­ Dhebar's absence from the district — nels. Although this is a tribute to no doubt raised the status of the dis­ the genius of a pragmatic leader, it- trict organisational leadership. On

988 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY June 19, 1965

factions. The principal contenders in held in 1963, an uneasy alliance the necessary pains to mobilise all his the district were the leader who ulti­ between these various factions was resources. The factional alliance work­ mately got the Congress ticket for the worked out by Dhebar. However, the ed out by Dhebar thus resulted in inac­ parliamentary seat vacated by Dhebar mechanics of keeping together these tion on the part, of those who held (referred to here as faction leader A) diverse elements in one common front responsible positions in the election and the leader who was President of of action created an imbalance in the machinery and consequent lack of the DCC until 1962 (faction leader oranisation which dissipated energies. direction of the Congress campaign. B). B had sought to eliminate all Although D was the DCC president, Such inaction at the top resulted in except his own supporters during his B was made the Chairman of the free play of conflicts lower down. In tenure as President of the DCC. This District Election Committee. This each Assembly segment of the parlia­ resulted in all other factions joining arrangement was dictated by B who, mentary constituency there were two in a common front against his domina­ though not occupying a formal position groups, the in-group and the out-group. tion. The "outgroup" gradually be­ was yet very powerful in district poli­ The out-group was a direct conse­ came a majority group. Its leadership tics. He had his own supporters well quence of local elections in which was claimed by faction leader A. In entrenched in Municipalities, Local there were more claimants for pewer December 1962, a change in DCC Boards and Panchayats. In order to than could be accommodated by the presidentship was affected under the solicit his support, he was given this Congress. In the cities and town guidance of Dhebar. This time the important position in the election set­ conflicts centred round the municipality President was chosen from among the up. This frustrated faction leader D whereas in the villages it was around rural lenders. Faction leader D. re­ who felt deprived of his power. The the panchayats and taluka panchayats. presenting a majority community in result was that he did not exert his In both urban and rural areas, there the rural sector, became the DCC own influence fully in the rural sector, were also disputes on the distribution President. This move was in part confining his activities merely to h's of the Congress ticket for seats in the motivated by the growing need to own home town. On the other hand, State Legislative Assembly. to all contain the rural-urban cleavage in faction leader B, though he was given cases, but more seriously in the rural Rajkot district. But the change was formal charge of the election organisa­ areas where Panchayati Rai had been also acceptable to the faction leader tion, did not give sufficient attention implemented, there were big splits in A because the new president had also to the organization of the campaign. the Congress party, resulting in the joined with the majority group that His conflict with faction leader A, the emergence of a dissident group. The ousted B from power (Leader C had candidate in the election, influenced out-group either openly assisted the also lost in importance in the course his own behaviour. Although, he him­ opposition or sabotaged the Congress of this struggle). self did not ask his supporter: to campaign from within. The two pat­ When the bye-election was (c be sabotage the election, he did not take terns are well illustrated by factional June 19, 1965 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

990 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY June 19, 1965

behaviour in two of the Assembly position securing nearly the same vote and the official MLA, who had also segments, namely Upleta and jetpur. as the Congress in a constituency emerged as a very popular leader, and In Upleta, the Sarpanch group which where the latter had a majority of was made a Deputy Minister in the was the out-group, worked against the about 16.000 votes in 1962. newly formed Gujarat State. The former eventually succeeded in remov­ MLA group (the in-group), openly de­ ing the MLA from Jasdan through a fied the D C C directive, and assisted Another interesting example of carefully planned strategy in which he the opposition.''* The conflict was so factionalism could be seen in Jasdan, had the support of faction leader B acute that the constituency got physi­ a Congress stronghold, where the at the district level. At the time of cally divided into two regions one Congress lost by about 7,000 votes to nominating the Congress candidates in consisting of out-group controlled the Swatantra in 1963. The root of 1962, he was given a ticket outside villages, the other having villages the conflict goes back to the 1957 Jasdan, in Paddhari constituency, under the influence of the MLA group. elections to the Assembly, when a under the pretext of providing a safe (Table 5 sharply brings out the con­ local Congress leader in Jasdan was seat in Jasdan to a women candidate. centration of Swatantra gains in broths rejected in favour of a leading Muslim He lost to the Prince of Rajkot in where out-group was influential.) Such advocate of Rajkot (originally belong­ Paddhari, as was indeed expected. a clear expression of the conflict ing to Jasdan) for nomination as the Out of frustration, he left politics and allowed the in-group to put all its Congress candidate. The Jasdan Con­ took up the Chairmanship of the strength in the campaign without any gress leader did not support the official Public Service Commission. The fear of backdoor sabotage. The result Congress candidate who, however, got Prince of Jasdan who had all along was that the Congress had the biggest the support of the royal family of helped the Congress because of his lead in Upleta, in spite of acute inter­ Jasdan because of his personal ties close relations with the local MLA was nal factionalism. In Jetpur, the MLA's with the latter, and won the scat by very much annoyed by this move of group and the group led by the Presi­ a margin of more than 8,000 voles. the Congress, which in turn contribut­ dent of the Taluka Panchayat were After the elections, the dissident local ed to his decision to support the pitted against each other. Here how­ Congress leader gained strength through Swatantra in 1963. At the same time, ever, the MLA group was the out-group. an alliance with faction leader B at with the exit of the MLA from district The MLA remained away from the the district level. The former was politics, his supporters within the constituency throughout the election. brought back to a position of power Congress were gradually alienated. His supporters remained inactive and by making him the President of the They helped the opposition in 1963 some of them even sabotaged the District Local Board, and subsequently 4 The cost of the alienation of the Jas­ election. Here factionalism look a of the Zilla Panchayat. His re-entry dan Prince on the one hand, and the more underhand form, prevented open into local politics with renewed ex-MLA group, on the other, was very confrontation, and resulted in the op­ strength created conflict between him heavy for the Congress, whose loss in

991 June 19, 1965 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

Jasdan by 7,000 votes (from a lead these factions during this bye-election proper internal channels, or through a of about 8,000 in 1962) was bigger strikingly brought out the nature of known and open split. than in other legislative constituency. his power which, though it may have ' The example of Jasdan brings out been partly charismatic, was mainly Organisation of the Election the important relationship between political. It was based on his influence If we now turn from long term to factional movements within the Con­ and control over resources which could short term factors, we find once again gress and its support base outside the be used to satisfy different groups. the critical role of party organisation party. The former, when carried too Once he was out of this controlling in the outcome of the bye election. One far, alienated the latter. position, district politics semed to slip of the crucial factors in the bye-elec­ away from his firm grip. tion was the timely, efficient and uni­ In the past, such conflicts, whether Our analysis brings out the ambival­ fied organisation of the election cam­ or not they were resolved, did not ent role of factions in democratic poli­ paign. As the Swatantra Party had work against the Congress, because of tics. In Rajkot, these factions were practically no party machinery in the the direct relationship of the several woven around individual leaders seek­ district to start with, their performance factional leaders with Dhebar at the ing power positions in different poli­ was solely dependent on the efficacy of top, who was considered to meet to tical institutions. Factions based on their campaign organisation. The Con­ their respective demands in a more or individual power complexes would gress organisation too was in bad shape less impartial manner. This prevented tend, in the long run, to paralyse the and had to be properly mobilised to them from operating outside the party party machinery. So long as they are win the election. Thus the Rajkot bye- channels as they were primarily eng­ contained and resolved into an internal election has to be studied as, on he aged in pressing Dhebar to gain their balance, factions play a very useful role one hand, a case of organizational own ends. In 1958, Dhebar ceased to of conflict articulation. This can take paralysis of the Congress, and, on the be the Congress President and his place either through institutional chan­ other, as one of speedy establishment position in central politics gradually nels or the existence of a powerful and masterly conduct of the campaign became uncertain. Secondly, with the leader who resolves the conflicts within organisation by the Swatantra party. emergence of Gujarat State, he had to the party framework. Where both are The existence of these short-range con­ compete with Morarji Desai, who em­ lacking, however, the opposition may ditions allows us to empirically test our erged as the undisputed leader of the gain an advantage, either through a hypothesis about the role of the or­ congress in Gujarat. Dhebar did, of direct split in the ruling group, or ganizational variable in the bye-elec­ course, try to restrain Morarji Desai's through submerged expressions in the tion6 influence by a calculated strategy, but form of either inaction or sabotage on the outcome was a further decline in Before we discuss the campaign or­ the part of the "out-group". Even ganisation it should be pointed out that his political prestige at the national here, as shown by the contrast between even the permanent party organization level, and indirectly at the State level Uplera and Jetpur, an open expression of tiie Congress was not in good shape. also. With his stock with Nehru at a of the out group's hostility is prefer­ Except in Rajkot city, there were no low ebb, and his political standing un­ able to internal sabotage or non-co­ regular party offices, not even at Taluk certain, Dhebar decided to resign from operation. In other words, if factious headquarters. The D C C active mem the Parliament and from organizational have to become efficient categories of bership has remained static over the posts in the Congress. Although it politics, they need to be expressed on years. They have no paid full-time was officially announced that he was an efficient manner, either through workers, except one in the Rajkot resigning from these positions in order to take up the Presidentship of the All-India Khadi Commission, the political factors behind the change was obvious. The change had its ramifica­ tions right till the level of Rajkot poli­ tics. On the one hand, his image as a leader who could satisfy the de mands of all factions because of his position at the State (Chief Minister of Saurashtra) and national (as President of the Congress) levels was seriously affected. On the other hand, there was a feeling of helplessness in Rajkot dis­ trict as a whole, in the Congress as well as among the people, who had al­ ways derived a sense of gratification from their identification with Dhebar and his role in central politics' These reactions at the psychological level in­ fluenced the behaviour of the factional leaders during the bye-election. In spite of Dhebar's personal attempts to effect a compromise between warring factions, the conflict manifested itself in a variety, of forms ranging from open hostility to complete indifference. The inability of Dhebar to contain 992 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY June 19, 1965 central office. One of the reasons for April 30. But no election organization Swatantra leaders in charge of different not starting separate branch offices was established till May 12 when the assembly segments. At the same time, employing more full-timers is lack of full election committee was constitut­ their district election office was staffed adequate finance. This has resulted in ed, and Faction Leader B, ex-President by personnel brought from their central absence of efficient co ordination be­ of the DCC, ultimately given charge of office at Bombay. This turned out to tween D C C and other Taluk Congress the whole campaign. The delay was be a very business-like office organiza­ Commitees. Congress executives at ail caused due to acute differences within tion besides which the Congress office levels, including the D C C, are nomi­ the DCC on this issue, which had de- run wholly by volunteers made a poor nated. Internal organizational elec­ layed the formation of the DEC till comparison. Even the public meetings tions have not been held for a long May 9. The Taluka leaders were also and group contact meetings were bet­ time. The DC C is completely ineffec­ waiting for a clear directive from the ter planned by the Swatantra party. Its tive both in composing internal con­ DEC. After May 11, one senior Con­ managers had from the very beginning flicts or in guiding party activists in the gress leader, not belonging to the local emphasized the value of group meet­ district. The Taluk Committees be­ area, was sent to each of the seven ings. Separate meetings were arranged have as autonomous units which do not Assembly consistencies to supervise with leaders of different sections of the feel a sense of loyalty and accountabil­ and direct the local campaign. As it voters. If it was known that even with­ ity towards the D C C Such a state turned out, however, even after May in one section of the voters, there were of party organization could continue 12, these leaders had to mainly devote two or three different groups, separate because its functions wore suspended their energies to factional fights in meetings were arranged for each group. in favour of a personalized party each constituency. The final network The Congress organization did not structure. The growing political com­ of coordinated organization could .not show such imagination. They based petition in the District Congress put a be created till only a few days before their hopes on the influence of the heavy strain on the existing arrange­ May 26, the day of the election. ward leader or a "key man" whose ments. Existence of a powerful leader loyalty to the Congress was uncertain, who is able to contain the conflicting given the fluid state of support: for the While the Congress leaders were needs of different groups and a non­ official candidate. Even public meet­ struggling with their factional problems, competitive political environment in ings were better organized by The the Swatantra campaign had already all sub-areas of the district were two Swatantra. Their selection of the speak­ started penetrating into the district. pre-conditions for the smooth function­ ers and the timings of the meetings After May 18, the Swatantra campaign ing of such a personalized party struc­ were in tune with the changing mood created great impact and took such ture. Once these conditions were re­ of the campaign. The Congress had no momentum that the Congress was com­ moved, the lack of any regular party advance planning and. therefore, had pelled to leave half-way the task of channels for the expression of con­ to rush to call whoever was available organizing the basic network, and to flicts, such as organizational elections from the national headquarters to rush in an ad hoc manner to patch up and regular meetings of the Executives, counteract the Swatantra campaign. the cracks in their own strongholds were bound to bad to distortion and While most of the Congress leaders made by the Swatantra inroads. anaemia in the party structure. It 'Is from outside did not devote more than against this state of permanent party one or two days to the campaign, none machinery of the Congress that we of the Swatantra leaders stayed in the have to consider the organisation of Swatantra Party Organisation constituency for less than 4 days.8 the election campaign by the opposing The Swatantra party had established parties and candidates. election offices from May 1, thus scor­ the availability of an efficient volun­ ing a lead of ten days over the Congress teer force was an important factor in in organising the campaign, They had sustaining the tempo of the election from the very beginning put all the campaign. The Swatantra were fertu- Delays marked the Congress campaign from the very beginning, with the selec­ Table 5 : Votes Polled by Congress and Non-Congress Candidates In Booths Where the tion of the Congress candidate taking ' Outgroup ' was Influential in Upleta Segment-1962 and 1963 much time. All the important leaders were considered for the candidature, but some of them refused to contest- on personal grounds, others who offer­ ed themselves as candidates were re- jected, either out of factional considera­ tions or because they were thought to be too junior to claim this status. Fin­ ally, as a last resort, Jethalal Joshi, a prominent district and silling member from Rajya Sabha, was asked to con test the bye-election.7 The time taken in reaching a decision on the selection did not leave enough time for pre­ paration of the campaign.

The Congress campaign was formally inaugurated by a public meeting on April 28, and nominations filed on 99)

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY June 19, 1965 nate in getting a disciplined group of expected amount, put the large sums petty princes and gtrasdars on the one volunteers from the local RSS and the of money that ultimately arrived to hand and the urbanised middle classes Jan Sangh. At the same time, the Pre- effective use. This reflected the debi­ which provided the leadership of the sident of the Gujarat Swatantra Party, lity of the Congress mobilisation ma­ States' Peoples' Movement, and later who happens to be a pioneer in many chinery in general. on of the Congress. To this was ad­ fields a powerful figure, and till today The real measure of Swatantra's ded another cleavage after indepen­ the leading light in the opposition, organizational superiority is not to be dence as a result of the government's brought with him a substantial group found in the formal campaign arrange­ implementation of land reforms and of University students from his own ments but in its penetration of differ­ protection of tenants' and cultivators' Kaira district, where he had himself ent sections of voters. This penetration interests against the interests of the created a rural University after the was affected either by exploiting exist­ land-owners. The result was an align­ name of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel. A ing social and political cleavages and ment between the urbanized leadership portion of the Swatantra volunteers articulating them into bases of sup­ of the Congress and the rural peasan­ were employed on daily payment. The port, or by systematically rendering try, in the process alienating the Congress had also to hire volunteers, different groups to pressure and influ­ landed gentry and thetr numerous but inadequate finances restrained ence from outside, or by a combina­ hangers-on. their capacity to compete with the tion of the two techniques. Swatantra. It was really striking that Within the rural community there even after 15 years of control over all A remarkable feature of the Swatan­ had always been a .great distance governmental, social and educational tra party's electoral organisation was between Rajputs on the one hand and activities in the district, the Congress its ability to mobilise support on the other low-caste Kshatriyas such as found it lifficult to mobilize the youn­ basis of old as well as new cleavages. Kolis, Kathis, etc. The Rajputs were ger generation. There were reasons Before describing how such an opera­ at the top of the Kshatriya heirarchy for this. Till 1959-60, the powerful tion was successfully put through, and controlled political as well as Youth Congress controlled student however, it will be useful to spell out economic power before Independence. associations and other social institu­ the existing economic and social divi­ The State-wide reform movement of tions in Rajkot. Once these student sions within the district, and the the Kshatriya Sabha did not make leaders matured into active politicians, reflection of these in groups conscious­ much headway in Saurashtra owing to however, they came in to conflict with ly opposing each other. this social distance, as well as diver­ faction leader B, who was controlling The State of Saurashtra (now part gence of interests between the Rajpur the DCC, B made every attempt to of Gujarat) was formed in 1948 out of landowners and the others. This diver­ split the youth movement controlled the integration of 222 princely states. gence grew sharper after the imple­ by Youth Congress Workers by sup­ The transition to an integrated demo­ mentation of land reforms. The Con­ porting the rival youth faction which cratic State was effected successfully. gress also retained the support of was composed of Jan Sangh of socia­ However, the princely past left its other depressed and minority com­ list-oriented youth workers. In the legacy and structure of loyalties and munities, and especially of the Hari- event the Jan Sangh and socialist divisions. The main cleavage even jans and Muslims. Harijans are youth leaders increased their hold over before independence was between the scattered all over the constituency, students and youth associations. This proved a great loss to the Congress organization. The inability of the Congres to mobilize these sections these had its roots in the internal disputes in the party.

Mobilization of Votes In the sphere of publicity and finance too the Congress lagged behind. The main medium of publicity was the press. Out of the three daily newspapers published from Rajkot, two were Congress sympathisers, the third one being an all-out supporter of the opposition. The daily which supported the opposition is the oldest newspaper in Saurashtra, It is also superior to the Congress press in finance, circulation and editorial capa­ city. The Swatantra had no difficulty in getting huge sums for election ex­ penses. Not only did their total finan- i Jasadan is an exception to our general analysis. Congress has also lost heavily in cial resources exceed those of the rural area. This could only be explained in terms of a very substantial impact of Congress, their planning and utilization the Prince and Princess of Jasadan on the rural voters. was more efficient. The Congress on 2 Rajkot is an urban constituency. the other hand, could not, in the ab­ 3 Paddhari is a rural constituency. Although, Congress has not been able to score a lead, it has substantially improved its position as compared to its performance sence of any prior estimate of the in the 1962 General Election. (Refer to Table 3.) 995 June 19, 1963 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY June 19, 1965 whereas Muslims are mainly concen­ by stages, to mobilize the support of trated into this sector. The Muslims trated in the Dhorraji-Upleta segment all the opposition parties and indepen­ also got divided because of an internal of the constituency. dent members of the legislature. The feud within their own community, Some of the ruling families, indig­ process required considerable political which resulted in one rection support, nant at the Congress policy of land acumen and bargaining. The opposi­ ing the Swatantra candidate. tion parties in Rajkot had all along redistribution, contested against it in The most remarkable achievement of the elections held in 1949 to the been divided against each other. It goes to Masani's credit that he could Masani was his use of the economic Saurashtra State Council but, oven with and financial network in mobilising the limited franchise then, did not keep them together for the whole elec­ tion. This gave Masani a considerable his support in the urban and peri, cut much ice. The Congress emerged urban areas. This was, of course, base to start with.10 as the all-powerful political force and reinforced by an ideological affinity was very popular in the rural areas. Feudal Element Strong between the business community and However, once the land reforms were Masani had also realised that the the Swatantra party. In the urban accomplished and a few years had feudal elements, specially the Giras- sector, especially in Rajkot city, the passed, the girasdari element came to dars and the Princes, could provide party successfully articulated the terms with the new situation and the valuable material assistance, and what growing dissatisfaction of the business, old cleavage began to blunt a little. was more important, their traditional professional and other middle classes Loyalties towards the princely order status in the rural areas could be ex­ against high taxation, rising prices, began to be restored. New grievances ploited to make an impact on the gold control and other policies. The began to take place of the old ones masses. He brought some ex-rulers of corruption and inefficiency of the against the princes — against the big States from outside the constitu­ administration was also a factor that administration, the Congress, and ency who had considerable influence helped the Swatantra. specific factions within the Congress. on the small local rulers. The princes Elections — State and local — helped of Rajkot, Jasdan and Gondal actively However, the bigger impact was in this process. The change was strik­ supported the Swatantra campaign. along other lines. Masani's campaign­ ingly brought home in 1962 when The Girasdar Association which had ers employed all tactics and pressures some of the princes, pushed by the fought the Congress in the 1949 to mobilise the vote in his favour. The Swatantra Party and the changed interim elections to the Saurashtra plans were worked out in great detail political climate, made bold to contest State Council now supported the and the approach imaginative. Active against the Congress. The Prince of Swatantra party in the bye-election workers and sympathisers of the Swa­ Rajkot was one of these. He succeed­ The Jasadan prince and his sister tantra party belonging to different ed in defeating the Congress for the moved from house to house and asked communities and different regional first time in Paddhari constituency, the people to defeat the Congress. and language groups were brought to and that too with a majority of 5,125 The fact of the Prince and the Princess the constituency. Tamils, Biharis, votes. It seemed as if old loyalties coming out of their palace and mixing Parsees, Mohammedans, all were ap­ had once again revived, the "masses" with the people made a great emo­ proached in this way. Although Raj­ standing more behind their Prince than tional impact on the voters. The kot has a very small number of Gur­ behind the Congress. The alienation active participation of these traditional kha voters, a Gurkha worker was by the Congress of the girasdari de­ interests was an important factor in brought from outside to mobilise ment and its failure to accommodate influencing the outcome of the election. their votes. The same was done for them had now begun to prove costly. The Congress called F P Gaikwad, the various professions. Leading law­ It is against this background that the former Maharaja of Baroda, to counter yers, doctors and bankers were Rajkot bye-election took place. this move of the Swatantra party. brought to help Masani get the votes However, his task had been made diffi­ of their fellow professionals. The out­ In the urban areas, caste and other cult as all others had decided to sup­ siders were asked to keep in constant social divisions were not the bases of port the Swatantra party. 12 He had touch with their own regional com­ groups. For the urban voters, occu­ also been for long too closely identi­ munities residing in Rajkot. Business­ pational categories were mere mean­ fied with the Congress, and had in men of Rajkot who had business con­ ingful. There are mainly two broad fact himself become a rank and file nections at Bombay, Calcutta, Baroda occupational groups within the middle Congressman. In consequence, he did and other such big business centres class — the "service" class in govern­ not carry the same weight as he for­ received personal letters from their ment and private employ and the merly carried among the princely and counterparts requesting them to sup­ "commercial" class representing busi­ Girasdari elements. 13 port Masani. The actual network went ness and trade. After these, there are much further down. Letters from busi­ the artisans, the labourers and other The Swatantra party could also ness and industrial houses in Bombay menial workers, including the Harijans, divide the votes of the minorities, which were traditionally the preserve and elsewhere were addressed to com­ As for political divisions, these of the Congress. The independent mission agents, sales representatives, were mainly on party lines, mainly MLA from Rajkot, who had defeated stockists, and even small salesmen in Congress and non-Congress. Among the Congress in 1962, after defecting smallest towns and suburbs. Copies of the opposition parties there were CPI, from it, was a leading spirit of the all such letters were sent to Swa­ Jan Sangh and PSP. Before taking a Harijan Sevak Sangh, controlled by tantra headquarters in Rajkot for final decision to contest the parlia­ the Congress. When he resigned from them to follow up. Certain represen­ mentary election, Masani had come to the Congress, he was also compelled to tatives of big industrial concerns at Rajkot and negotiated with all the resign from Harijan Sevak Sangh. Bit Bombay were asked to devote most opposition parties (except the Com­ his personal influence among the un­ of their time for Masani's campaign. munists) and the independent members touchables was very great, and with Masani himself has wide-ranging con­ of the legislative Assembly. He tried, his help the Swatantra candidate pene­ tacts in the business world. He comes 997

THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY June 19, 1965 from the Parsi community which is (iii) Such a state of internal or­ Congress candidate, these sym­ known both for its pioneering role in ganisation reflects great gaps in the pathisers from the opposition the industrial field, and for its cohesion social base of the party's support, gaps sabotaged from within the election and communal loyalty, Some of the between the ordinary leadership and campaign. leading banks in Rajkot have Parsi the masses (relying all the time on 5 managers at the top. Their clients the "great leader's" appeal), and a The whole constituency felt reduc were personally requested by the failure to accommodate certain import- ed in importance and stripped of Agents to help Masani, and to spread ant segments of the social structure; its role in national politics. This the hint further. In Gujarat where the was manifested in the election (iv) For the opposition to gain business network is so widespread through the candidate orientation from such a situation, it is necessary and efficient, such a strategy was of the voters, who could not re­ for it: (a) to close its ranks and pre­ concile themselves to the Congress bound to pay handsome dividends. sent a united front, (b) to isolate the candidate, Jethalal loshi, who was The strategy of exerting influence sections alienated by the Congress and a district leader replacing a nation­ through the economic structure which secure their support; and (c) to sustain al leader, From this psychological Masani operated proved even more such a support by imaginative field angle, Masani, who is considered successful than the government and organisation, with the help of influen­ a national figure, had an advantage patronage machinery available to the tial key-men, and through continuous over his rival, Congress. In the urban areas, the pressure on the voters, either indivi­ Congress was completely routed as 6 dually or in groups; We define the "organization vari- shown by Table 6. able" as representing essentially The leaders of the Gujarat Ksha­ (v) In organising such an effort, two functions of the campaign or- triya Sabha worked hard to get the an important element is putting into ganization, namely the efficiency support of the Kshatriya masses for effect existing influence networks of the formal election machinery Masani. We have noted above how, based on kinship, caste and caste and its capacity to mobilise differ­ with the tenancy legislation now be­ associations, traditional loyalties, and ent sections of the electorate. economic relationships; ing a matter of the past, the old dis­ 7 The opposition, exploiting this tance between the Rajputs and lower situation, told the voters that even Kshatriya communities began to nar­ if they elect Masani, they are not row. This was symbolised by the fact Notes going to lose Joshi as their repre­ that the Rajput leaders of Saurashtra 1 Masani does not belong to Rajkot sentative because he was already had accepted the Prince of Jasdan, district. He had no previous con­ a sitting member of Parliament. who was a Kathi, as one among them. tact with the constituency. Bom- 8 Thus the revival of old loyalties and Thus C Rajgopalachari himself bay has been the base of his the strategy of building a numerically toured the constituency from May political career all along. large support base by the Rajputs 20 to 28. The last pre-election pub­ 2 helped the Swatantra party, through We can only say that this competi­ lic meeting of the party, a historic its close identification with the Guja­ tion resulting in alignment,? at meeting in Rajkot which attracted rat Kshatriya Sabha, to make inroads different levels will finally institu­ a record crowd was addressed by in the rural vote, which had so far tionalise these diffused personal Rajaji, Acharya Kripalani, Atalvi- always gone to the Congress. Even relationships. The process has hari Bajpai of Jansangh, and so, the Congress retained considerable just begun. Masani. Kripalani had come direct­ support in the rural areas, compared 3 The conflict had its origin in the ly after emerging victorious from with what happened in the urban areas. elections to the taluka panchayat the Amroha bye-election. which preceded the bye-election. 9 The editor and the Managing 4 Here, the whole operation of Director of this newspaper had Conclusion sabotage was more complicated. contested from Rajkot Parliamen­ The foregoing analysis brings out The Jetpur Municipality is con­ tary Constituency as an indepen­ the great importance of the organi­ trolled by a group of opposition dent candidate in 1962 general sational factor in the outcome of independent candidates. The elections, against U N Dhebar. elections. The main points that minority Congress group in the Although Dhebar won by a con­ emerge are: Municipality is composed of sup­ siderable majority, the 61,311 porters of the MLA group 'out- votes polled by the editor showed (i) The performance of the Congress group in the bye-election). Before in the elections depends on homogene­ a substantial following. the election, the Municipal op­ ous party organization which, in turn, position independent candidates to Refer to Table 2 and Table 3 for depends on the structure of leader- non-Congress support, 1962 Gene­ ship; enrolled themselves as Congress members and claimed representa­ ral Election results analysed earlier give us an idea of the opposition (ii) Where the party is dominated tion on the election committee. strongholds: Rajkot city, Pada- by one leader for a long time, the They exploited the rift within the dhari, a few pockets in Jasdan. result is a highly personalised support taluka Congress and posed as The Communist parly which has structure, and lack of institutional supporters of the President of the some following in Upleta offered expression of political loyalties. Once Taluka Panchayat. They occupied to support the Congress. The the original condition of efficiency is some important positions in the Congress response to their offer removed or weakened, the Congress election organisation. While the was not very encouraging. They is suddenly found without depth and MLA group remained indifferent not did not realise the importance energy, greatly divided, and lacking or hostile, and the Panchayat of exploiting this offer. in drive and resources; group worked earnestly for the 999 June 19, 1965 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY

11 We have already referred to the Prince of Jasdan had come out in between 1962 and 1963, (reducing feeling of antagonism created the open for the first time. This its loss from 5,125 to a mere 202) among these traditional interests created a great impact. As a it lost heavily in Jasdan (where when the Congress government result, whereas the Congress re­ its majority of 8,765 turned into introduced land reforms for the covered its position in Paddhari a loss of 6,994). first time in 1948. The drasdars and princes were pitted against the Congress in the interim elec­ tions to the State Council. After this solitary attempt, they were compelled to withdraw from active opposition by the increasing popularity of the Congress govern­ ment in Saurashtra, It should not be forgotten that though Con­ gress gave jobs to some of the more influential ex-rulers, it never consciously attempted to bring -other elements under the party fold. Most of them were enrolled as members of the Congress, but never integrated with the active party work. This was partly a result of Congress party's compla­ cency in judging their initial withdrawal as a permanent move, and partly of the increasing domin­ ance of the cultivating class in the Congress.

32 On the other hand. Congress leaders kept accusing the Princes as reactionary. In an interesting comment on this sent to the AICC, the Maharaja of Baroda strongly resented this and said that he found it ''highly embar­ rassing". In the same statement he also castigated the Congress for its dualist approach to the role of the Princes in which "the Princes in the Congress are good while the others in the opposition are bad*"

33 This point of "identification" is very important. We notice that even within the constituency there was great difference between the impacts created by the Prince of Rajkot and the ruler of Jasdan. The former, who had carried the day gloriously in 1962, proved less effective in 1963. Upon his election to the Legislative Assemb­ ly, he ceased to be a Prince and began' mixing with other ML As and with the constituents like other representatives. While this made a good impression on the educated who applauded the fact that the Prince was behaving like a citizen and a democrat, among the traditional population his statutre declined. Even though he remained popular, the impact of his traditional image gradually decreased. On the other hand, the

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