Fall of a Traditional Congress Stronghold Rushikesh Maru
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THERE BYE-ELECTIONS III Fall of a Traditional Congress Stronghold Rushikesh Maru The Rajkot by-election to the Lok Sabha in 2963 underscored the great importance of the organisational factor in the outcome of elections. Where the Congress party is dominated by one leader for a long time, the result is a highly personalised support structure and lack of institutional expression of political loyalties. Once the original condition of efficiency —the domination of the particular leader—is removed, or weakened, the Congress is suddenly found without depth or energy, greatly divided and lacking in drive and resources. This state of internal organisation reflects the large gaps in the social base of the Congress party's support —gaps between the masses and the ordinary leadership which had relied alt the time on the "great leaders" appeal and the failure to accommodate certain important segments of the social structure. For the opposition to take advantage of such a situation, it is necessary for it: (a) to close its ranks and present a united front; (b) to isolate the sections alienated by the Congress party and secure their support; and, (c) to sustain such a support by imaginative field organisation, with the help of influential key men and continuous pressure on voters either individually or in groups. In organising such an effort, it is vital to put into effect existing influence-networks based on kinship, caste and caste associations, traditional loyalties and economic relationships. It is this inter-twining between organisational factors on the one hand and a sharply differentiated social structure on the other, which provides the context in which a traditional Congress stronghold like Rajkot votes an opposition party to power. THE defeat of the Congress candi- However, a closer look shows that the district, and the opposition parties date in Rajkot came as a shock while the Congress position was no continued to be weak Considered to both the local and the national doubt weakened in 1962, it was still against this background, the elec- leadership of the Congress, which bad substantial in the parliamentary con Congress debacle in the 1963 by-elec considered Rajkot as a stronghold of stituency and district as a whole, The tion cannot be explained by the the party. The Congress had won this Congress was still the only organised trend set in 1962, but rather by the parliamentary constituency in all three political party, a position it had breakdown of the Congress organiza elections. Its vote rose from 61.44 acquired through a long period of tion that took place at the time of the per cent in 1952 to 71.65 per cent in domination. The State People's Move bye-election. What alarmed the Con 1957. It: held all of the seven legis ment for popular government was gress leadership when the outcome of lative assembly seats that form part directed against the ex-ruler of Rajkot the election became known was not of the parliamentary constituency in as long back as 1921. The association so much the victory of the Swatantra the first two elections. However, in of Gandhi himself with this movement party, but the paralysis in the organiza the 1962 election, although the parlia and the fact that Gandhi was born in tion of the party, as reflected in the mentary seat was retained, the Con Saurashtra gave an advantage to the failure to mobilise adequate workers, gress lost in two assembly constitu Congress in Saurashtra. This identi and the lack of direction and drive encies and its strength diminished fication was made more concrete by a in the election campaign. in four other constituencies. As shown net-work of constructive programmes How is it that the Swatantra party, in Table 3, the anti-Congress vote in initiated in the early 1920's, This which had no local organization to Rajkot city constituency was more tradition of constructive work was start with on the eve of the election, than double that of the Congress and carried over even in the post-Indepen and who had nominated an outsider i although the opposition was divided, dence period. U N Dhebar, who has could unseat the Congress in its own one of the opposition candidates suc been the leading spirit behind these fortress? Was this due to the Swa ceeded in dislodging the Congress. activities, came to power as the first tantra Party's superior election strate The Congress was also dislodged in Chief Minister of Saurashtra State in gy, its financial resources, the candi the Paddhari Assembly Constituency, 1948. He emphasised the importance date's own national image, the support while the opposition secured a size of constructive work in providing a it got from traditional interests, or able votes in Jasadan, Dhoraji and network support to the Congress. Such the ideological impact of the Swatantra Uplita constituencies. The domina a structure of support was further re programme on certain sections of the tion of the Congress was thus already inforced by a very successful govern voters? These were no doubt some on the decline by the time of the mental performance during his regime. of the factors that influenced the out. third General Election; the decline The opposition failed to gain any come of the election. Though im turned into defeat in 1963. The Con strength in this situation. Inspite of portant in themselves, however, they gress vote fell from 71,65 per cent the success of a few independent provide little assistance in explaining 1957 to 55.24 per cent in 1962 and candidates in the 1962 elections, the the Congress organisation's failure to 44.4 per cent in 1963. Congress continued to be powerful in match the opposition attack. Only 987 June 19, 1965 THE ECONOMIC WEEKLY a detailed examination of the organisa should be conceded that in the long the other hand, Dhebar himself had tional factor can help our understand run such an organisation of power also to depend on the organizational ing of the overall situation in which perpetuated a situation where political leadership at the district level for his the election took place. relationships could not get institutiona own communication with his supporters. lized. With this elevation of the status of district organizational leadership, there As an illustration of this general followed a competition among various The Congress Organisation point, let us take the structure of aspirants for the Number Two position In trying to explain the Congress Congress leadership in Rajkot district. under Dhebar. performance in 1963, we advance the The core of the district leadership ini hypothesis that a party structure based Here was a chance to create a tially came from Rajkot city and that on a network of personal loyalties heirarchy of leadership at the district too from the educated urban middle under a dominant and powerful level. But the compulsions of main class, which has since continued to leader, while it proves highly success taining his own leadership over that dominate, as shown in Table 4. It ful in the short run, becomes dysfunc of all others, and as acceptable to all controlled the majority of the D C C tional to the party, once the leader factions, did not allow Dhebar to de and governmental positions. Dhebar ceases to provide a symbol of common cide his next man. He kept the situa and his colleagues in the government loyalty. The role of U N Dhebar, tion fluid so as to see that no one kept direct contacts with the rural former President of the Indian Na could gain a decisive advantage over leaders who did not challenge the tional Congress, in the political deve anyone else. The resulting position, control of the D C C by urban leaders, lopment of the district provides a key which still continues, was that there partly because of the novelty of their to the understanding of the present came into being four factional leaders experience under a democratic system, position of .the Congress in Rajkot. A within the DCC, each claiming to and partly because they could always close associate of Gandhi, Dhebar rose be the district leader. Meanwhile, the look forward to Dhebar for the satis to the stature of an all-powerful leader new rural leadership which had emerg faction of their local demands. They in the district during his tenure as ed under new pressures from the coun thought they could satisfy the needs the Chief Minister of the former Sau- tryside challenged the urban leaders' of their own local communities through rashtra State from 1948 to 1955. He monopoly in the DCC, and claimed their direct link with the top-most combines within him the qualities of representation in the Legislature. This leader without needing to control the a dynamic leader, a realist in adminis further disrupted the unity of the DCC On the other hand, the urban tration and politics, and a strict urban leaders, each of whom tried to leaders in control of the DCC gradu Gandhian in personal life. The com- build his support in different sectors ally lost whatever contact they had 1 bination of these qualities made him of the rural elite. ' Thus the failure with the rural voters and leaders, be a successful organisational leader as to institutionalise a clear line of autho cause, once again, their strength was well as a revered mass idol. The rity resulted in acute factionalism and dependent on their capacity to retain success of his career as Chief Minister the consequent lack of direction to the confidence of Dhebar. lies in the direct link that he main the Congress rank and file, a fact that tained with the people, a link that was strikingly brought home during In 1954, Dhebar was invited to take had been forged during the period of the 1963 bye-election.