Euromaidan Revisited: Causes of Regime Change in Ukraine One Year On
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KENNAN CABLE No. 5 l February 2015 First Anniversary of the beginning Euromaidan, honor march of Euromaidan Self-Defence troops. Photo credit: Sarycheva Olesia / Shutterstock.com EUROMAIDAN REVISITED: CAUSES OF REGIME CHANGE IN UKRAINE ONE YEAR ON Leonid Peisakhin1 A year has passed since mass protests on the Despite their importance, there are more questions Maidan in Ukraine’s capital Kiev culminated than answers about what happened over the in bloodshed and president Viktor Yanukovych course of these protests. Why did police use such unexpectedly fled to Russia. Since then, Ukraine extreme force very early in the protests, but held has plunged into a bloody civil conflict and a war by back from completely crushing the Maidan in the proxy with Russia. Relations between Russia and final days before Yanukovych’s departure? How the West are continuing to worsen, and Europe has well coordinated was the protest movement, and come to the brink of a large-scale interstate war for did it have explicit and consistent political aims? the first time since World War II. The Maidan protests What explains why the government responded have already catalyzed one of the most momentous so haphazardly and ineffectively to protesters’ geopolitical crises of the fledgling 21st century. demands? Why did Viktor Yanukovych flee the KENNAN CABLE No. 5 l February 2014 capital on the same day that he finally secured an given that members of the informal inner sanctum agreement with leaders of the opposition? What of government—referred to as “the Family” in was Russia’s role over the course of these events? Ukraine’s case—were chosen for their loyalty to the In exploring this set of questions I will draw on president and not their professional qualifications. interviews with 22 leading Ukrainian politicians What this meant is that Yanukovych’s regime and civil society leaders that I conducted in Kiev in failed to properly assess the nature of the protest June and July 2014 and on broader knowledge of a movement, to make concessions when these were country where I was born and which I have studied necessary, to leave the movement alone when it closely over the past decade. Of the twenty-two was waning, or even to adequately gauge the mood interviewees, fifteen were present on the Maidan of the security establishment when police were almost daily, beginning in late November 2013, and beginning to turn against the regime. several either worked directly for Yanukovych or had regular access to regime insiders. The Causes of Euromaidan Protests My conclusion is that the regularly cited causes One common misperception is that protesters were of regime change in Ukraine—public support for primarily motivated by a pro-European agenda, European integration, continued police brutality, and that the mass protest movement was largely or the size of the protest movement—are not the a violent public reaction to president Yanukovych’s main reasons for the implosion of Yanukovych’s last-minute refusal to sign the Association presidency. Regime change is not a product of Agreement with the European Union (EU) on 28 protest dynamics alone. In fact, mass protests November 2013. This view has been advanced by are rarely successful at overturning governments. media outlets in the U.S. and Western Europe2 Regime change is caused by inadequate and also by opposition parties who successfully government response to mass unrest. In the case branded the protest movement as Euromaidan. As it of Ukraine, the president’s inner circle, raised in happens, Yanukovych ran his presidential campaign an environment of Soviet authoritarianism and in 2009 on a platform of balancing between Europe incomplete post-authoritarian transition, understood and Russia. Over the course of 2013, he began the protest movement as a major challenge to to veer increasingly toward the EU. Yanukovych regime stability but also as lacking grass-roots changed his mind after Russia threatened to cut support and therefore easily suppressible. The trade ties with Ukraine and offered a $15 billion aid institutional structure of Yanukovych’s regime was package—ostensibly with few economic strings generally characteristic of countries transitioning attached. from authoritarian rule: a small circle of informal advisors competing with one another for the Notably, the presidential administration did not president’s favor. This structure restricted the make that decision lightly. In its monthly nation- president’s ability to adequately assess information wide monitoring of public opinion in November 3 and weakened the link between mid-level 2013, concluded on 25 November, the presidential government personnel and senior decision makers, administration fielded detailed questions to evaluate KENNAN CABLE No. 5 l February 2014 Days of national mourning for killed defenders of Euromaidan. Photo credit: Kiev.Victor / Shutterstock.com the state of public opinion on Ukraine’s relations managing the public’s anger. Simply put, political with Russia and the EU. The basic takeaway from parties of all stripes were largely irrelevant over that exercise was that the government had a great the course of Euromaidan. According to surveys of deal of leeway to do as it deemed fit. The public Maidan protesters fielded by the Kiev International remained deeply divided over Ukraine’s geopolitical Institute of Sociology [KIIS],4 only 5 percent of course. While 45 percent supported the signing of a those on Maidan on December 7-8, 2013 joined trade accord with the EU, 35 percent opposed that the protests because of solidarity with opposition initiative. In response to a direct question about the parties. That number dropped to only 3 percent by impact of non-signing of the Association Agreement February 3. While seasoned politicians waged a on respondents’ attitudes toward Yanukovych, 53 covert war in the halls of power ostensibly over who percent said that their attitude toward the president would be the next president, marginal groups— would not change, 13 percent reported that it would hodge-podge extremists like Pravyi Sektor (Right improve, and only 22 percent stated that their Sector) and Spilna Sprava (Common Cause) among opinion of Yanukovych would worsen. The potential others—were able to temporarily hijack control for protests remained unchanged since June of the protest movement at important strategic 2013; about 38 percent of respondents expressed moments. This inevitably resulted in violent clashes willingness in principle to participate in protests. with police, radicalization of mainstream society, the mass of ordinary protesters, and civilian casualties. Another common misperception, and one that Yanukovych’s entourage appeared to believe, is On the night of Saturday, November 30, police in that Ukraine’s opposition parties—Batkyvshchyna, riot gear attacked and beat several dozen peaceful Udar, and Svoboda—were primarily responsible for and unarmed student protesters who were successfully mobilizing the mass of protesters. In spending the night on the Maidan. More than fact, opposition parties largely failed in providing any other factor, it was this act of police brutality much-needed effective leadership for the protest that mobilized the mass unrest that followed. movement, formulating a clear set of goals, or KIIS surveys demonstrate that the overwhelming KENNAN CABLE No. 5 l February 2014 majority of protesters—69 percent in early opposed to a smaller protest led by opposition December 2013 and 61 percent in early February parties in the nearby European Square) had been 2014—came to the Maidan as a direct reaction to carefully orchestrated and largely controlled by the police brutality on November 30. All interviewees presidential administration and its head, Serhiy agreed that the police brutality against ordinary Lyovochkin. These protests were supposed to be students, who usually keep at a distance from permitted to die down slowly in the early hours of politics in Ukraine, shook society to its core.5 November 30. However, Lyovochkin’s competitors In the words of Vitaliy Portnikov, an influential within Yanukovych’s inner circle—notably Andriy Ukrainian freelance journalist, “Ukrainians had never Kliuiv, secretary of the National Security and been beaten [by police] before.” Ihor Lutsenko, a Defense Council, and his deputy Volodymyr prominent civic activist and member of the Kiev Sivkovich—favored a show of force that would city council, concurred and noted that in those demonstrate to protesters that public disobedience rare instances when police did use force against would be severely punished. In short, during these protesters historically, officers would selectively early days the management of the pro-European target only committed civic activists with an protests became a field of competition to curry established record. Police brutality against “innocent favor with the president. disproportionate use of children” fomented a psychological counter-reaction force would send a signal to protesters that the among ordinary citizens, which then manifested government was determined to prevent mass itself in the 800,000-strong protest in central Kiev unrest, while simultaneously discrediting those on December 1 and subsequent events. within the presidential administration who favored non-violent engagement with civil society. In the Use of Force by Yanukovych’s Regime end, police attack on students massively backfired by mobilizing the otherwise politically indifferent Why did police show such unusual lack of restraint