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EU and Ukraine Argue Over Timber Exports While Carpathians Become Disaster Area -Euromaidan Press | 1/16/2018 EU and Ukraine argue over timber exports while Carpathians become disaster area -Euromaidan Press | HOME NEWS ANALYSIS & OPINION UKRAINE CRIMEA ABOUT US ⤭ ☍ + SEARCH Can you donate just $5 to support independent media in Ukraine? we depend on your support to stay online DONATE $ 4,353 still to go! EU and Ukraine argue over timber exports while Carpathians become disaster area EU and Ukraine argue on timber exports while Carpa… http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/01/03/eu-and-ukraine-argue-on-timber-exports-while-carpathians-become-disaster-area/ 1/15 1/16/2018 EU and Ukraine argue over timber exports while Carpathians become disaster area -Euromaidan Press | About the Source OLENA MAKARENKO 2018/01/03 - 22:39 • ANALYSIS & OPINION Olena Makarenko is a Like 169 Share journalist at Euromaidan Press. In 2014, Olena started The frequent devastating oods in the Carpathian Mountains are a result of working as a volunteer on rampant deforestation. Ukraine introduced a moratorium on round timber public initiatives focusing on exports, but the European Union insists that it has to be lifted. Meanwhile building civil society and the illegal deforestation and smuggling of timber goes on at full speed promoting dialog between throughout the region. people from different regions of Ukraine. The path to European integration hasn’t easy for Ukraine. Last month, the EU sent the Ukrainian government a clear signal – its mistakes and endless procrastinating in the implementation of reforms were not going unnoticed. The » Analysis & Opinion » EU latest sign of this new stance comes with the European Commission deciding and Ukraine argue over not to provide Ukraine the nal third tranche of the Macro Financial Assistance timber... (MFA) in the amount of €600mn. The reason for this decision is that Ukraine has not implemented four of the 21 conditions for receiving the tranche. Three of these conditions are related to the nancial sector and ghting corruption Previous post: within the country. But one of them concerns Ukraine’s commitment not to James Gwartney: Ukrainians introduce trade-restricting measures, in particular lifting the ban on timber are successful everywhere exports. This last point has become a hot political issue. However, no matter except their homeland which party comes out of these negotiations victorious, the EU or Ukraine, there will be one clear loser – Ukraine’s forests. Next Post: Torture and humiliation: freed Ukrainians talk about Donbas captivity No EU tranche without free timber trade The MFA operations are part of a wider agreement that the EU has with neighbouring countries. At the request of Ukraine, the European commission proposed an MFA operation of up to €1.8bn. A corresponding Memorandum of Related Posts Understanding and Loan Facility Agreement were signed by the two sides in May 2015, and the EU has already paid out two tranches. Problems appeared with the third one, as the EU representatives stated there had been no progress in the following conditions: The condition related to the launch of the e-declaration verication process; Donbas Head of the Adoption of a law on credit register; Buddhist EU The condition on verifying information on beneciary company owners; monks Delegation settle in http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/01/03/eu-and-ukraine-argue-on-timber-exports-while-carpathians-become-disaster-area/ 2/15 1/16/2018 EU and Ukraine argue over timber exports while Carpathians become disaster area -Euromaidan Press | Lifting of the ban on timber export (as the moratorium introduced by Ukraine does not correspond to Ukraine’s commitments in terms of the World Trade Organization and the Association Agreement). The nal point became a reason for numerous manipulations by Ukraine’s Separatism EU-Ukraine politicians. Some of them speculated that the export of timber is harmful for Transcarpath Association Ukraine and proves that the EU considers the country only as a raw material style: is Agreement appendage. These allegations might well be credible but for one important detail Hungary ocially – Ukraine’s politicians and authorities have for many years been earning money aiming to enters into from the smuggling of Ukrainian timber. What is also noteworthy is that this smuggling would not be possible without the participation of European companies on the other side of the border. A 10-year moratorium SUBSCRIBE TO THE WEEKLY NEWSLETTER Email address: Your email add News and analysis highlights LetMyPeopleGo Friends of Ukraine Network Sign up FEATURED The Zakarpattia Oblast, bordered by Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania, is the largest victim of illegal deforestation in Ukraine The moratorium on the export of round timber was introduced in 2015 and came into full effect in 2017. The validity of the moratorium has been set at 10 years. Its declared goal is to prevent an ecological catastrophe and to support domestic production. The issue mostly concerns Western Ukraine, in particular Zakarpattia (Transcarpathia) Oblast, a mountainous region covered by forests. The state policy in question was presented to the Ukrainian public as being in defense of national interests. The EU’s main argument is that such a ban restricts free trade and does not help stop illegal deforestation. What Ukraine can take from the First of all it is important to say that Ukraine’s authorities have no single correct “Croatian answer – to lift the ban or not. Both options will bring them image losses. Scenario” of Keeping the ban may inuence Ukraine’s relationships with the EU and prevent further nancial support coming to the country, showing Ukrainians that the conict resolution http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/01/03/eu-and-ukraine-argue-on-timber-exports-while-carpathians-become-disaster-area/ 3/15 1/16/2018 EU and Ukraine argue over timber exports while Carpathians become disaster area -Euromaidan Press | government is not following the EU integration path. On the other hand, lifting What do people mean by the ban is also not an option. “the Croatian Scenario”? What time does it refer to? The “Croatian Scenario” “The question of lifting the moratorium is neither about economic refers to the Balkans in the discussions, nor even ecological ones. Only the political component is left,” mid 1990s. At that time, the Croatian War of the political expert Mykhailo Shelemba comments. Independence was taking place. The country had... He foresees that lifting the ban will bring the Ukrainian President Petro READ ARTICLE Poroshenko a reduction in his rating on the eve of the election (2019) in the key region of Western Ukraine. The Head of the Zakarpattia Institute of Political Studies Viktor Pashchenko compared Zakarpattia timber to Donbas coal: ADVERTISEMENT “Timber brings easy money. And if it is made impossible to earn it legally, people would work illegally just as they do in self-made mines in Donbas. And the politicians here perform either as critics of the opponents, or as owners of a business related to timber.” But if the question may bring Poroshenko a fall in ratings, leading him to perform a balancing act between two choices – feeding the EU partners empty promises while not lifting the ban, other political forces can use the issue for self-promotion with no harm. Let’s take a look at the brightest example. One person who slammed the prospects of lifting the ban is Viktor Medvedchuk, a pro-Russian politician and gray cardinal in Ukrainian politics, the leader of the organization Ukrainskyi Vybor: “Instead of establishing order in the country, promoting economic recovery, stimulating an increase in production volumes and export of nished products with high added value, the EU integrators have for the sake of the next loans turned Ukraine into a raw material appendage. It means that Ukrainians can hardly expect prosperity or a decent standard of living.” But let’s take a look whose interests this defender of Ukraine’s national interests really serves. Since the occupation of Crimea and the beginning of the war in Donbas, Medvedchuk has taken on the role of intermediary between Ukraine and the Kremlin. In reality, he is a direct transmitter of Moscow’s messages in Ukraine. The godfather of Medvedchuk’s child is Vladimir Putin. The politician is also a member of the trilateral contact group on implementation of the Minsk agreements. Behind the political sympathy towards Moscow, Medvedchuk also has business interests in Russia, in particular in coal, fuel and real estate. He also openly stands for the restoration of business relationships between the two countries. http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/01/03/eu-and-ukraine-argue-on-timber-exports-while-carpathians-become-disaster-area/ 4/15 1/16/2018 EU and Ukraine argue over timber exports while Carpathians become disaster area -Euromaidan Press | Putin (left) with Medvedchuk (right). Photo: vybor.ua In addition, Medvedchuk is suspected of being a KGB agent during the Soviet era. In 2014, he was one of the rst people to be sanctioned by the U.S. government for his role in Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea. So the motives of his statements against EU integration are clear. However, his pro-Russian position isn’t the only thing which ties Medvedchuk to the timber story. The men who ooded the Carpathian Mountains In 2001, many villages were ooded in the Ukrainian Carpathians. Photo: buvrtysa.gov.ua http://euromaidanpress.com/2018/01/03/eu-and-ukraine-argue-on-timber-exports-while-carpathians-become-disaster-area/ 5/15 1/16/2018 EU and Ukraine argue over timber exports while Carpathians become disaster area -Euromaidan Press | Medvedchuk was actively involved in the timber business in Western Ukraine, and is one of the two main people behind the devastating consequence of the oods that ravaged the Carpathian Mountains in the 1990s and 2000s. Since then, an environmental disaster caused by deforestation worries many Ukrainians.
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