ABSTRACT

THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES’ FOOD AID ON THE SOUTH KOREAN DIET IN THE 1960s-1970s

by Min-A Park

The development of South ’s food industries during the 1960s-1970s was directly related to food aid from the United States which began promptly after World War II in 1945. Under Public Law 480 of 1954, the introduction of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities, especially wheat flour, was one of the most influential factors that contributed to ’s postwar economic recovery and the growth of its food industries. By utilizing the P.L. 480 policy, South Korean President Chung-Hee Park enforced the HCU policy in 1963 to support food industries producing instant and to encourage the public to consume U.S. wheat flour. The combination of the P.L. 480 policy and President Park’s HCU policy had a direct impact on South Korea’s food industries and furthermore ordinary people’s culinary culture. This thesis argues about South Korea’s development of food industries and the change of its ordinary people’s culinary culture by examining both the P.L. 480 policy and the HCU policy together. It was the U.S. food aid, specifically wheat flour, that proved to be most beneficial towards developing South Korean food industrial economy, and ultimately created a new change in South Korean diet.

THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES’ FOOD AID ON THE SOUTH KOREAN DIET IN THE 1960s-1970s

A Thesis

Submitted to the

Faculty of Miami University

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS

by

Min-A Park

Miami University

Oxford, Ohio

2020

Advisor: Dr. Amanda McVety

Reader: Dr. Marguerite Shaffer

Reader: Dr. Steven Conn

©2020 Min-A Park

This Thesis titled

THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES’ FOOD AID ON THE SOUTH KOREAN DIET IN THE 1960s-1970s

by

Min-A Park

has been approved for publication by

The College of Arts and Sciences

and

Department of History

______Dr. Amanda McVety

______Dr. Marguerite Shaffer

______Dr. Steven Conn

Table of Contents

Introduction ...... 1 Historiography ...... 6 Sources and Methodology...... 15 Chapter One: The United States Food Aid Policy Public Law 480 ...... 18 Chapter Two: A New Korean Culinary Tradition ...... 43 Conclusion ...... 79 Bibliography ...... 85

iii

List of Figures

Figure 1 A Slogan of Punsik (left). A Pamphlet of Making Flour-Based Food (right). ... 63 Figure 2 A newspaper advertisement of Samyang- ...... 66 Figure 3 The Notification of 1969 (left). The Statement of 1971(right)...... 72 Figure 4 A Promotional Material of the Saemaeul Undong in the 1970s...... 74 Figure 5 Posters Promoting the HCU in the 1970 ...... 76 Figure 6 A Saemauel Choir Competition for the Improvement of Dietary Lives (left). A Pamphlet of the Choir Competition (right)...... 77 Figure 7 Cooking Class for Honsik and Punsik in 1973 ...... 78

iv

Dedication

I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Young-Su and Jeong-Soon, and my grandmother who offered their spiritual support and unconditional love for positive change in my life. Thank you so much.

v

Acknowledgements

It was summer in 2018 when I took the first step in Oxford, Ohio to study history. I remember when I was deep in thought in a bus while appreciating the scenery of the vast cornfield over the window, which was on the way to go from the Cincinnati airport to Miami University in Ohio. I often think what I was thinking about in the bus, which was an academic desire and expectation. It was indelible when I met my advisor, Professor Amanda McVety by chance in the hallway of Upham, and she cared about me as asking how I was doing and encouraged me. I appreciate that moment because I was struggling with the new environment in Oxford. I believe that due to her encouragement and comprehensive advice I could keep working on and accomplishing my thesis. I convey my acknowledgment and sincere gratitude to Professor McVety who was waiting for me as a slow learner with her patience. Moreover, I would like to thank my committee: Professor Marguerite Shaffer and Professor Steven Conn for being their patience and leading me working on exciting researches. Also, I would like to thank my mother and father who always give me all their love, trust, and support. At last but not least, my gratitude goes to my entire family members who believed and supported me in all the situations during my entire study and also to my friends and cohort in the Department of History who boosted me to complete this thesis. I will remember all their names in my mind.

Thanking You Min-A Park

vi

THE IMPACT OF UNITED STATES’ FOOD AID ON THE SOUTH KOREAN DIET IN THE 1960s-1970s

Introduction

Crisis creates chances. In 1945 when the Japanese Occupation of the Korean Empire (1910-1945) ended along with the end of World War II (WWII) (1939-1945), South Korea was in an ongoing crisis as it was struggling with famine and economic instability due to the aftermath. Despite the liberation from Japan’s occupation, the Korean Peninsula was divided into South Korea and due to the ideological tensions at the time, and in turn the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was promptly established as the official ruling body of South Korea.1 Under the rule of USAMGIK, South Korea was offered diverse aid goods for humanitarian, military, political, and economic purposes through an relief program, the Government and Relief in Occupied Area (GARIOA) in 1946. With the start of the GARIOA aid program, the U.S. food aid to South Korea became medium to maintain the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea from the long-term perspective. Even after South Korea was established as an independent sovereign state with the name of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in 1948, the U.S. assistance kept supporting South Korea.2 For example, the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 caused the U.S. to defend South Korea by providing military and economic aid under the Mutual Security Act (MSA 402) in 1951. Even after the end of the Korean War, the U.S. offered South Korea food assistance through grant-aid and later loan-aid under the Agricultural Trade Development of Assistance Act (Public Law 480, P.L. 480) in 1954 in order to restore the postwar economic damage and to strengthen economic capacity. A series of crisis South Korea had to face created the U.S.’ several aid programs so that South Korea could employ U.S. food aid as a potential chance to develop South Korea’s industrial economy. That is, in 1963 South Korean President Chung-Hee Park utilized U.S. food aid as a development

1 Yoo, Seong-Ok, Sang-Woo Rhee, Young-Soon Chung, Sung-Wook Nam, Yong-Sub Han, and Myong-Sob Kim, South Korea’s 70-Year Endeavor for Foreign Policy, National Defense, and Unification (London: Palgrave Macmillan), 2. 2 Yoo, South Korea’s 70-Year Endeavor for Foreign Policy, 2. 1

fund. Based on the P.L. 480 policy, he carried out the Honpunsik Changnyo Undong (HCU), a policy that encouraged South to consume more U.S. surplus agricultural commodities. It was the U.S. food aid, specifically flour, that proved to be most beneficial towards developing South Korean food industrial economy, and furthermore created a new change in ordinary Koreans’ diet beyond the U.S.’ own aid purposes. South Korea supported food industries such as milling factories and instant companies by carrying out the HCU policy based on the P.L. 480. President Park encouraged ordinary people to consume domestic products and flour-related goods. For instance, in the 1960s-1980s South Korea contributed to the growth of food industries which produced instant noodles by providing low-cost flour, and ordinary people consumed them. Furthermore, by the effect of the HCU policy, housewives began cooking various kinds of Korean homemade meals made of flour. Koreans used to eat flour dishes only to satisfy their hunger due to a large quantity at a low price. However, they tried to cook varied diet by using flour. For South Koreans, flour was regarded as an economically low-cost ingredient due to its versatility to be used in a variety of dishes at low-cost. Hence, housewives cooked homemade meals made of flour such as wheat flakes noodles (sujebi), general noodle dishes (guksu), knife-cut noodles (kalguksu), stir-fried rice cakes (tteokbokki) in addition to domestic products such as instant noodles. Especially, among popular flour-based foods in South Korea, instant noodles called ramen are established itself as a global favorite food at the present day due to a lot of advantages. Ramen noodles are easy to cook, have a long shelf-life, economical, and can be flavored to suit the palate of most Koreans. According to the World Instant Noodles Association (WINA) in July 2020, South Koreans’ annual per capita consumption of instant noodles represented 75.1 servings which was ranked at the first in the world, followed by Nepal and Vietnam.3 Yet, the popularity of flour-based food in present-day South Korea was non-existent prior to the introduction of United States food aid. Prior to said food aid, rice had no rival until flour came into the scene. The Korean peninsula have appropriate environment in rice farming culture rather than wheat farming due to the characteristics of climate and geography. Rainfall, climate, and the percentage of sunshine across the Korean peninsula were good conditions of a location

3 World Instant Noodles Association, “Instant noodles at a Glance,” https://www.instantnoodles.org/en/noodles/report.html (accessed on July 15, 2020). 2

for rice agriculture.4 The origin of rice cultivation in the Korean peninsula traces back to about 2,000 B.C.5 Because seventy percent of Korean territory in covered with mountains, Korean could develop rice cultivation which was based on reclaimed mountains. Especially, the high temperatures and precipitation during summer in Korea helped cultivate rice as tropical crops. Indeed, there are many reasons why rice could become a staple crop in Korea. Koreans prefer eating rice because it is dense in calories and is superior in feeling full and satisfied compared to barley or flour. The yield from rice was higher than that of other crops allowing Korea to support a relatively high population with limited farmable land. For these reasons, rice was a valuable diet for Koreans. In this way, considering that eating steamed rice with side dishes has been the most traditional dish for Korean people for a long time, it is important to trace how flour-based food such as instant noodles could be established as a popular dish in South Korea. This thesis examines how flour-based foods—particularly instant noodles—became widely popular in South Korea during the second half of the twentieth century. It is a story of both foreign and domestic politics. The first chapter traces why and how the United States provided food aid to South Korea throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Much of that aid came in the form of wheat because American farmers grew much more of it than they could consume. Wheat had never been part of Korea’s culinary culture, but the South Korean government decided to use the grain to help cement its own popularity and power. By, first, supporting factories that turned the wheat into instant noodles and, second, running a massive publicity campaign to convince South Koreans to buy and consume those noodles, President Park’s HCU policy turned South Korea into one of the world’s largest producers and consumers of ramen noodles. This research is an important contribution to existing scholarship. One reason is that it goes beyond the question of U.S. Cold War politics and beyond the source base of U.S. foreign policy records to analyze how the South Korean recipients of food aid creatively utilized the products they received to forge a new national food culture. For this, President Park’s government was intent on one specific field, the economic development of South Korean, by carrying out the policy to strengthen the national unity. In addition, President Park maintained a partnership of mutual guarantors between the government and large companies. President Park’s

4 Haeok Jung, Hangukeumsik, (Munjisa, 2002), 17. 5 Jung, Hangukeumsik, 17. 3

government used U.S. flour as investible funds so that Korean economic actors could develop its food industries. Especially, domestic food industries of South Korea could make full use of U.S. flour with the governmental support, directly affecting the change of Koreans’ dietary lives. A variety of flour-based foods which food industries of South Korea produced, and ordinary people consumed and sometimes created became the popular food items of South Korea. The focus of the Park’s government on wheat is understandable in the historical context of the larger Cold War setting. The U.S. flour under the name of the HCU encroached on the Korean dietary culture. The U.S. food aid, especially wheat flour, means that the U.S. wanted to see not only democracy of South Korea but also its capitalism. Since the end of WWII and the rule of the U.S. military government in South Korea, South Korea grew as a democratic and capitalist nation along with industrialization and modernization. It shows that South Korean capitalism has been developed and operated along with the implement of P.L. 480. As for the consumption tendency of flour-based foods, it is important to rethink what the HCU in the period of President Park’s regime remains and what the meaning of the HCU is after reading this thesis. Regarding the capitalist development of South Korea, capitalism of South Korea was operated since the implement of the P.L. 480 policy. The U.S. aid policy influenced South Korea’s industry producing flour-based foods as well as South Koreans’ dietary culture consuming them. The development of flour-based food industry in South Korea created large companies and which deepened bureaucracy and authoritarianism. Chaebols in Korean means a capitalist group which holds financial power with large capital and is in command of deprivation enterprises. During President Park’s regime, South Korean capitalism seems to have developed large companies with a series of five-year economic development plans in the 1960s- 1970s, which dominated the people’s dietary culture. The focus of South Korean capitalism was on the country’s economic growth more than the distribution of capital. Although President Park’s government established the foundation of industrial development, many critical problems also left such as the matter of chaebols, the gap between the rich and the poor because his government sought for an economic growth policy to support the country and large companies by priority. Initially, Korean had no use for wheat flour, the main crop of U.S. food aid. However, South Korea made U.S. aid serve its own purposes. The inflow of U.S. wheat flour to South Korea ultimately extended the scope of staple food ranging from rice and barley into flour-based 4

foods. In this way, this thesis will show that ordinary Koreans understood and used American food aid in ways that were different from anything U.S. policymakers in Washington intended or even imagined. Beyond the U.S.’ food aid purposes, the South Korean government not only achieved the growth of food industries such as flour and instant noodles, but also ordinary Koreans consumed these domestic products and created a new culinary culture. Many kinds of flour-based foods appeared as new types of meals in South Korea, such as guksu, sujebi, kalguksu as well as ramen.6 These dishes became the popular food items of South Korea. Especially in terms of instant noodles, ramen, the Samyang Food Company initially produced instant noodles in South Korea in 1963. Subsequently, in 1978 the Lotte industry changed the corporate name into the Nongsim and embarked business, and in turn the Korea Yakult in 1983, the -Bo in 1985, the Binggrae in 1986, and the Ottogi in 1987 joined into the Korean instant noodle markets.7 Today, South Korea is the top-ranked producer and consumer of instant noodles in the world. The sixty-year history of the Samyang industry reflects the change of the South Korean food culture.

6 Dajeong Chung, “Foreign Things No Longer Foreign: How South Koreans Ate U.S. Food” (PhD diss., Columbia University, 2015), 63. 7 Dong-A Ilbo, December 4, 1998.

5

Historiography

Most historical writings about South Korea’s economic development vary significantly between American historians and South Korean historians. American historians focused on the P.L. 480 policy of the United States while South Korean historians focused on President Park’s economic policy, or his HCU policy. The approach of this thesis identifies both policies, P.L. 480 and HCU, as being pivotal in the development of South Korea’s food industries and shows that their combination led to a new expanded South Korean culinary diet. This new expanded South Korean culinary diet would include many flour-based foods, including ramen. The meaning of this thesis is here when I argue about South Korea’s economic development based on food industries and the change of its ordinary people’s culinary culture by examining both the U.S.’ P.L. 480 policy and South Korea’s HCU policy together. The analysis of food policies in both the United States and South Korea specifically contributes to a cultural perspective in discussing on the U.S. food aid’s impact on ordinary people’s culinary diet in South Korea. South Korean economy was deeply related with the U.S.’ aid programs since the establishment of the U.S. military government in South Korea, during the Korean War, and throughout the postwar economic reconstruction. These U.S. aid programs were significant topic among scholars in the United States and South Korea. In addition to the Government and Relief in Occupied Area (GARIOA) of 1945 and the Mutual Security Act (MSA 402) of 1951, the P.L. 480 policy is the most important aid policy in promoting South Korea’s economic development. The introduction of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities through the P.L. 480 policy to South Korea affected South Korea’s food policy and ultimately led to its food economy. The combination of the U.S. aid policy and President Park’s food policy had a direct impact on both South Korea’s food industry development and ordinary people’s culinary culture. Therefore, it is important to discuss on scholars’ studies in both the United States and South Korea and find the meaning of this thesis among them. In both the United States and South Korea, there were continuous debates on the P.L. 480 policy, the HCU policy, and as a result South Korea’ economic development. Most of studies in the U.S. discussed on the significance of the P.L. 480 policy by analyzing the aid purpose, the aid policy change, the aid influence on recipient countries, and the expansion of trade market 6

thanks to the aid policy. Most of American historians dealt with the economic development of recipient countries, but the discussion on South Korea tended to be partial and fragmentary. Meanwhile, most of research in South Korea more focused on the period of U.S. military rule during 1945-1948 in South Korea. Some of Korean scholars dealt with agricultural and economic policies and the direction of reformation which the U.S. military government in South Korea conducted. Also, there were many studies which dealt with economic developments during the period of President Park’s regime in 1963-1979. These studies more focused on Korea’s economy and developments although scholars mentioned the U.S. foreign aid. In other words, their main object of study was South Korea’s economic development itself rather than the development aid program which the United States provided. There are also a few of scholars who study the food . Willard W. Cochrane as an expert of agricultural policy in his 1960 study examined the P.L. 480 policy and related programs from an economic perspective.8 According to his research, in the 1950s surplus agricultural commodities of the United States were consumed through a variety of methods such as the MSA program, the P.L. 480 policy, and foreign currency loans and credits. He examined the consequences and the shortcomings of U.S. aid programs and sought for the improvements of them. He stressed that foreign surplus-disposal programs helped solve the severe problems of hungry, malnutrition, and starvation in the recipient countries. In this point, I agree in that the role of the U.S. food aid programs was considerable in solving the problems of the recipient countries’ famine. He argued that the U.S. government-financed aid programs between 1956-1959 could not have helped the development of recipient countries. He argued that the export of surplus agricultural produce used for U.S. government-financed aid programs between 1956-1959 could not help the development of the recipient countries. Because his research period just ranged from 1956 to 1959, he did not consider a case of South Korea. In this way, my research can provide a representative case, South Korea that achieved the economic development through the U.S. food aid in a longer period in that the P.L. 480 policy helped South Korea generate productive capacity in the 1960s-1970s.

8 Willard W. Cochrane, “Public Law 480 and Related Programs,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 331, no. 1 (1960). 7

Peter Williams’s article in 1962, “The Use of World Food Surpluses,” discussed the effort of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to solve the hunger issue in the world.9 In particular, he pointed out that P.L. 480 was launched in order to dispose farm surpluses because there are mass-produced agricultural crops in 1952-1953, for example wheat, flour, cotton, fats, oils, rice, and feed grains.10 I agree with him in that he emphasized that P.L. 480 was practiced for welfare and development in underdeveloped countries because the conquest of hunger depended on their productive capacity. He concentrated on the period of President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration during 1953-1961 when a range of the aid agreements for recipient countries were revised and signed from 1954 to 1961. His research is important in that President Eisenhower’s discussion on the aid programs had a continuous influence on the subsequent aid policies during the next administration. Since his study did not cover how the P.L. 480 policy affected recipient countries’ economic development in the 1960s-1970s, my research could supplement the economic effect of U.S. food aid policy by analyzing South Korea as an instance. Peter A. Toma in his 1967 book approached the U.S.’ food aid program from a political and economic perspective. His analyzed the P.L. 480 policy as the Food for Peace program by focusing on executive-legislative interaction during 1961-1964. He also examined the P.L. 480 policy as a key factor in U.S. diplomatic and global issue because the P.L. 480 policy contributed to the expansion of foreign trade markets. His research is useful when he approached P.L. 480 as a foreign affair program which coped with U.S. expenses for recipient countries and U.S. agricultural market development.11 However, he did not deal with the P.L. 480 policy’s direct impact in recipient countries because his focus was on the policy-making process and policy content. While his research contributed to the political study, my research would show how the U.S. food aid affected South Korea’s food policy in the 1960s. Published in 1973, Robert G. Stanley’s book, Food for Peace: Hope and Reality of U.S. Food Aid, discussed the concept, the purpose, and the function of P.L. 480. Stanley analyzed that the P.L. 480 policy was originally enacted for the purpose of the disposal of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities and later for the purpose of Food for Peace. In his economic

9 Peter Williams, “The Use of World Food Surpluses,” The World Today 18, no. 7 (1962): 304. 10 Williams, “Food Surpluses,” 310. 11 Peter A. Toma, The Politics of Food for Peace: Executive-Legislative Interaction (University of Arizona Press, 1967), 139. 8

perspective, he curated that P.L. 480 was a policy to encourage recipient countries to increase production for export by building their ability to be food self-sufficient.12 From an aspect of international aid in 1954-1969, he made a good explanation that the P.L. 480 policy would not only maintain peace for humanitarian reasons but also promote foreign trade in future.13 However, he did not examine how recipient countries absorbed and utilized the U.S. food assistance because his focus was on the analysis of P.L. 480’s result and its revising process. James I. Matray’s 1978 study showed that President Franklin D. Roosevelt, who served from 1933 to 1945, recognized Korea’s geographical importance in that the Korean peninsula is directly involved in surrounding strong nations such as Japan, China, and Russia. Matray examined the beginning of the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea by analyzing the U.S. trusteeship of South Korea during 1945-1948. The trusteeship of Korea began under U.S. military government, which was determined by the big-3 Foreign Ministers at the Moscow Conference when WWII ended in 1945; America, the Soviet Union, and England discussed on the position of Korea after the liberation of Japanese occupation as one of the postwar issues. They judged that South Korea should be aided, protected, and guided by the advanced country.14 According to Matray’s study, his work provided a great analysis of the U.S. trusteeship of Korea in that the Moscow Conference satisfied America’s desire to affect the influence on the Pacific. This is because South Korea was a key location for the United States regarding its military strategy to keep communism of the Soviet Union in check.15 Matray described that Korea emerged in 1945 “as a test case in international good faith and international cooperation.”16 However, he did not deal with the U.S. foreign aid policy’s further effects on South Korea’s development because his study concentrated on the beginning of the relations between the United States and South Korea. David S. Sorenson in his 1979 study explored the P.L. 480 policy as the Food for Peace program during 1963-1973 by asking if food is either for peace or for defense and profit. Sorenson explained three patterns of P.L. 480: the national security, humanitarian purpose, and

12 Robert G. Stanley, Food for Peace: Hope and Reality of U.S. Food Aid (New York: Gordon and Breach, 1973), 11, 62. 13 Stanley, Food for Peace, 264. 14 James I. Matray, “An End to Indifference: America's Korean Policy during World War II,” Diplomatic History 2, no. 2 (April 1978): 181. 15 Matray, “An End to Indifference,” 193-194. 16 Tyler Dennett, “In Due Course,” Far Eastern Survey 14, no. 1 (January 1945): 4. 9

economic benefit. He used data regarding the P.L. 480 allocations across recipient countries for the years 1963-1973 provided by USDA and U.N. statistics. He pointed out that the U.S. foreign food aid was given to friendly nations, such as non-communist countries and military allies.17 Also, he discussed that the P.L. 480 policy indicated the shift from a humanitarian purpose to a market development strategy.18 In particular, his social science approach showed the economic benefit explanation of P.L. 480 by examining the decrease of Title I and the increase of Title II and commercial sales in 1965-1973. However, his research was weak in that he did not apply the three patterns of P.L. 480 to the cases of recipient countries because he more focused on the shift. In this point, my research can provide the explanation of the economic influence of P.L. 480 on South Korea in the 1960s-1970s. In Trudy Huskamp Peterson’s book, Agricultural Exports, Farm Income, and the Eisenhower Administration, published in the same year with Sorenson’s 1979 article, she focused on America’s agricultural economy during the period of President Eisenhower’s administration (1953-1961).19 Peterson investigated the effectiveness of U.S. economic programs as well as the decisive role of Eisenhower’s administration in carrying out U.S. economic policies. She was good at explaining how U.S. government agencies under President Eisenhower practically used domestic surplus agricultural commodities as capital and as economic strategy over the world: for example, the FAO, the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (ICASD), the Council of Foreign Economic Policy (CFEP), and Interagency Staff Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (ISC).20 She argued U.S. food policies by analyzing these government agencies, and above all. She emphasized the role of John H. Davis, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture of the ISC in handling the surplus-disposal operation.21 The analysis of the U.S. food aid program’s influence on South Korea was weak, but her work was important in that she emphasized that the

17 David S. Sorenson, “Food for Peace-or Defense and Profit? The Role of P.L. 480, 1963-73,” Social Science Quarterly 60, no.1 (June 1979): 62. 18 Sorenson, “Food for Peace,” 67. 19 Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Agricultural Exports, Farm Income, and the Eisenhower Administration (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press, 1979). 20 Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Agricultural Exports, Farm Income, and the Eisenhower Administration (Lincoln, NE: The University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 40. 21 Peterson, Agricultural Exports, 45. 10

Eisenhower administration’s economic interest in South Korea in the 1950s led to the development of economic cooperation between the U.S. and South Korea.22 Stephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim, and Chung-In Moon in the 1991 work examined how South Korea achieved exported-led growth through the analysis of policy change in the economic debate. Their study accounted not only for President Eisenhower’s reconstruction aid to South Korea but also the discussion on economic aid between President John F. Kennedy’s administration and President Park’s government.23 The priority of the United States was to stabilize Korean economy and to open free markets. Under President Kennedy’s administration, the U.S. AID mission pressed the South Korean government to force it to adopt an economic stabilization plan. As the U.S. used aid and loans as an excuse to squeeze President Park’s government, President Park’s government had to pursue the Korean economic stabilization and free markets.24 Both the U.S. and South Korea successfully compromised the economic development plan of South Korea by carrying forward the establishment of basic industries and export promotion programs, for example, the Korean Trade Promotion Corporation (KORTA) founded in 1962. Thereby, South Korea’s modernization plans was able to begin in earnest with its policy making capability and self-sufficient. This research examined South Korea’s stabilized economy based on trade markets and the U.S.’ economic assistance to South Korea in the 1950s- 1960s. However, they did not directly deal with U.S. food aid’s contribution to South Korea’s industrial development such as food factories because they focused on the change of economic development plan of South Korea which led to its economic growth in the 1960s; it was not able to understand the U.S. food aid policy and its following economic and cultural legacies in South Korea in the 1960s-1970s. In this way, my research can contribute to the study of South Korea’s economic development based on food industries and the following effect on Koreans culinary culture by analyzing U.S. food aid policy and South Korea’s economic policy for the purpose of the practical use of U.S. food aid. Hyung-A Kim’s 2004 book, Korea's Development under Park Chung-Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-79, focused on South Korea’s economic growth during the period of

22 Peterson, Agricultural Exports, 75. 23 Stephan Haggard, Byung-Kook Kim, and Chung-In Moon, “The Transition to Export-led Growth in South Korea: 1954-1966,” The Journal of Asian Studies 50, no. 4 (1991): 863. 24 Haggard, Kim, Moon, “The Transition to Export-led Growth,” 863. 11

President Park’s regime.25 Regarding the industrial development of South Korea, she illustrated that South Korea had a high level of dependence on U.S. aid. Her study ranged over President Park’s contribution, his political philosophy, and his influence in terms of South Korea’s industry development. In particular, the principal person in her narrative was Samuel D. Berger who was an American diplomat and U.S. Ambassador to Korea from 1961 to 1964, close to President Kennedy. She showed that under President Kennedy’s administration, Berger exercised governmental power in discussing about the U.S. economic development assistance with the South Korean government. Her research is useful for the understanding of the U.S.-Korean relationship by arguing the process of negotiation for their aid agreements, but the description of the U.S. food aid policy to South Korea is relatively brief because she focused on Korea’s economic development during President Park’s regime from 1963 to 1979. Another study on South Korea’s economic growth during Park’s regime, authored by David Ekbladh, focused on P.L. 480 and deemed the results from South Korea as a “success story” of the P.L. 480 policy. He presented that the United States practiced the U.S. economic development plan of South Korea. His discuss on the U.S. long-term aid examined that the P.L. 480 policy eventually led to the economic success of South Korea.26 Furthermore, his focus was on the P.L. 480 policy’s contribution to both modernization of South Korea and the U.S. expansion of foreign trade markets. His work partially dealt with the case of South Korea in chapter 4, ‘modernization and U.S. policy in Northeast Asia, 1945-1960;’ however, the analysis of how Park’s government utilized the U.S. food aid was relatively brief, which my research can supplement. Nonetheless, his study is useful in understanding a concept of development aid across the United States and international society. Barry Riley in his 2017 book, The Political History of American Food Aid, argued the history of food aid of the United States as the world’s primary food aid country. He explored the history of the U.S. food aid; it ranged from the humanitarian aid during the period of the World Wars and the Great Depression to the P.L. 480 policy as foreign policy tool in the 1960s-1980s. His work showed that the U.S. food aid was used for various purposes such as the disposal of

25 Hyung-A Kim, Korea's Development under Park Chung-Hee: Rapid Industrialization, 1961-79 (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004). 26 David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and Construction of an American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009), 197. 12

U.S. surplus agricultural commodities, the problem of hunger, human rights, the necessity of allies, economic development for recipient countries, and the expansion of U.S. trade markets. His discussion on the U.S. long term purpose of U.S. food aid showed that it aimed not only to develop firm foreign markets in South Korea for agricultural products but also to exercise its political and economic influence over East Asia.27 His contribution to the study on the political history of U.S. food aid was significant. However, regarding the U.S. food aid to South Korea, he briefly mentioned the U.S. aid program to South Korea during the Korean Was. This is because his work focused on all events and policies which were related to the U.S. food aid under the U.S. administrations through the analysis of food aid agencies, drawing a big picture of the U.S. food aid history. In terms of the food history, there was a notable book which Yeongha Joo, Haesook Kim, and Mikeong Yang authored in 2017.28 The identity of the book well appeared in the book title, and the translation of the title in Korean is as follows: South Koreans, what did they eat to live? They accounted for the history of South Korean’s dietary life in the 1945-2015. The research period ranged from before-and-after the Korean War, the period of industrialization, the fusion food industries, to the Korean Wave of food and food diversification. Their work was important in that they concentrated on South Korean’s dietary life by tracing supply and demand of food since the liberation of Japanese occupation in 1945. They dealt with the introduction of U.S. agricultural surpluses to South Korea and President Park’s HCU policy. However, the mention of P.L. 480 was rather brief, and the description of HCU was also a mere eight pages long from the 354 pages book. In addition, they did not discuss on the relations between P.L. 480 and HCU because they mentioned both P.L. 480 and HCU in each separate section. Many studies on the P.L. 480 policy related to South Korea’s economic development dealt with its military, political, and economic aspects. There was no study across referencing both the U.S. food aid policy and South Korea’s economic policy, which were closely related to each other. My research contributes to the study on the history of both the U.S.’ P.L. 480 policy

27 Barry Riley, The Political History of American Food Aid: An Uneasy Benevolence (Oxford University Press, 2017), 466. 28 Yeongha Joo, Haesook Kim, and Mikeong Yang, Hangukin, mueutel mukgo salanna (The Academy of Korean Studies, 2017). 13

and South Korea’s HCU policy which were for the purpose of its economic development in the 1960s-1970s. In this point, it is important to approach the P.L. 480 policy by asking how the South Korean government utilized the U.S. food aid and how ordinary people in the country absorbed U.S. wheat flour. Moreover, my research examines the influence of the U.S. food aid on South Korea based on the economic and cultural perspective.

14

Sources and Methodology

The U.S. food aid under the P.L. 480 policy of 1954 led to South Korea’s economic development based on food factories in the 1960s. The U.S. food aid under the policy was one of the most significant policies when South Korea confronted the difficulties of food shortage and persisting economic crisis after the end of the Korean War. In this regard, by examining the P.L. 480 policy, I argue how South Korea was able to establish the growth of food industries during the postwar economic reconstruction and how the public utilized U.S. wheat flour. President Park supported domestic food industries producing ramen and flour by providing U.S. surplus agricultural commodities at low-cost. By enacting the HCU policy President Park encouraged South Koreans to consume flour-based food such as instant noodles that domestic food factories produced, and ordinary people created a new type of foods made of flour such as guksu, sujebi, and so on. My research matters in that it goes beyond the question of U.S. Cold War politics and beyond the source base of U.S. political records regarding foreign policy. This thesis is unique since I cross-reference official documents from the U.S. government and the South Korean government as well as newspaper articles of both nations. Beside official documents of South Korea, newspapers and images which were related to the HCU policy and U.S. food aid were significant to comprehend how President Park carried out the HCU policy and how it had an impact on South Koreans’ consumption of instant noodles and flour-based food. This thesis would contribute to existing scholarship in studying the history of the U.S. food aid because I examine the combination of the P.L. 480 policy with the HCU policy which ranges from both a political and economic perspectives to a cultural perspective. In the first chapter, I employ the U.S. government’s official documents in order to trace the beginning of relations between the United States and South Korea, the introduction of U.S. surplus wheat flour to South Korea through the P.L. 480 policy, and the U.S. proposal for South Korean economic development and the future aid plan. For these official records, I visited National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in College Park, Maryland in May 2019. I was as able to gather the documents which are related to the U.S. foreign policy, particularly the P.L. 480 policy toward South Korea. I supplemented additional materials through the official website of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS). These U.S. official

15

records were important when I accounted for the start of the U.S. food aid under the U.S. military government in South Korea and the U.S. aid program during the Korean War because these previous aid programs were closely linked to the U.S. surplus wheat flour aid under the P.L. policy. In addition, the U.S. official documents about the U.S.’ aid plan were critical in explaining the U.S.’ interest in the expansion of trade markets in Asia through the P.L. 480 policy and in describing the U.S.’ discussion on the plan of transition from grant-aid to loan-aid. In the second chapter, I employ the South Korean government’s official documents, especially administration order of HCU under President Park’s regime, and three of South Korean major newspapers including Dong-A Ilbo, JoongAng Ilbo, and Kyunghyang Shinmun. To collect the South Korean government’s materials, I visited National Archives of Korea in June 2019 which are in and Taejon in South Korea. Especially in Taejon, I could request official administrative records under President Park’s rule such as the administrative order about the HCU policy. Regarding three of major newspapers, I could retrieve important articles and advertisements through Naver News Library, a digital archive service of South Korea. These major newspapers were useful to trace the articles which dealt with the U.S.’ food surplus introduction, the transit of the U.S. aid type, President Park’s HCU policy, and domestic food companies’ ramen advertisements. I was able to extract several materials regarding the HCU policy from online newspapers such as JoongAng Ilbo and Woori-Munhwa Shinmun. These materials showed examples of how the South Korean government carried out the HCU policy and of how food companies publicized their products such as instant noodles through advertisement. The U.S. government’s official documents and South Korean government’s official records in addition to supplementary materials such as newspapers played an important role to support my argument; President Park supported food industries producing instant noodles in South Korea by utilizing the U.S. surplus agricultural commodities through the P.L. 480 policy, and the inflow of the U.S. wheat flour affected ordinary people’s culinary diet by carrying out the HCU policy to promote the consumption of U.S. wheat flour and domestic products. Although there was a difficulty to match the exact dates between both countries when I cross- reference and compare both nations’ official documents, it was possible to find out the crucial clues to support my argument. Moreover, this thesis is supposed to be unique in combining a

16

political and economic approach toward P.L, 480 and HCU with a cultural approach toward the changes of Korean dietary lives.

17

Chapter One: The United States Food Aid Policy Public Law 480

The purpose of this chapter analyzing the U.S. food aid policies to South Korea is to build the historical foundation to examine how U.S. surplus affected the flour-consumption policy of South Korea. After the end of World War II in 1945, the United States surplus agricultural commodities were moved abroad under several programs: Government and Relief in Occupied Area (GARIOA), the Mutual Security Act (MSA 402), Public Law 480 (P.L. 480), and foreign dollar loans and credits. South Korea was one of the recipient countries to which the United States provided international aid based on these policies. This chapter contributes to the study of the U.S. development plan of South Korea’s economy based on the U.S. food aid policies. In order to have a better understanding of the United States food aid policies toward South Korea, first, it is important to understand the relationship between the U.S. and South Korea. Actually, the Korean Peninsula was under Japanese occupation from 1910 until 1945 when Japan surrendered at the end of WWII. The end of the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula was the beginning of U.S.-South Korean relations. When the Japanese occupation ended, the newly formed South Korea wanted to establish itself as a sovereignty so that it could rule itself without the coercion of other nations. Nonetheless, the liberation from Japanese occupation did not immediately result in the independence of South Korea. This is because at the conclusion of WWII, the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as the major powers in the world, both sought to establish a unified Korea in the image of their respective ideologies. Due to the ideological conflict between democratic western capitalism and communism, a unified Korea was not possible, and negotiations continued. Finally, they decided to occupy and govern the territory by dividing the peninsula into a Soviet supported North Korea and an American supported South Korea. This explains how U.S.-South Korean relations began. After the liberation of Japanese occupation, the U.S. Army Military Government in South Korea (USAMGIK) was established in 1945, with the purpose of acting as a transitional government until South Korea was ready to establish its own government.29 “The statement of

29 Memorandum by the Assistant Legal Adviser for Political Affairs (Snow) to Mr. Rufus Burr Smith of the Division of Japanese and Korean Economic Affairs, May 22, 1947, Foreign Relation of the United States (hereafter FRUS),

18

United States Policies in Korea” which was issued in 1946 illustrated that “the United States wishes to see a united, independent and democratic Korean Government established as early as possible.”30 It also stated that “the United States believes in the right of the Korean people to determine for themselves the kind of economy and democratic political organization they require. It is opposed to establishing any minority group in power.”31 The USAMGIK as a temporary government emphasized that one of the aims of the U.S. government was to promote the citizens of both South Korea and any other country “to enter into contracts giving them economic advantages,” rather than the U.S. sought to create economic advantages in South Korea during the U.S. occupation.32 In the late 1940s, South Korea under the U.S. military rule had the core problem to overcome economic difficulties. In particular, the problem of the shortage of food in South Korea was severe in the winter and the spring of 1945 and 1946. That was the urgent problem which the U.S. military government had to resolve. For example, the policies of U.S. military government were summarized: “to stimulate production in order to relieve the accumulated shortage of consumers good,” “to assure a fair collection and distribution of food and other essentials so that all people may have enough to eat and share equally in other goods,” and “the restoration of trade between Korea and other nations so that the country will become economically independent and not be dependent upon Japan for either imports of exports.”33 The U.S. military government’s effort to relieve the issue of the lack of food implied the necessity to increase South Korea’s capacity for production. This is because the critical matters in a long term were South Korea’s economic independence and the dependable food supply to the Korean people. The telegram of Major General Archibald Vincent Arnold, the military governor of South Korea from 1945 to 1946, presented a specific plan of South Korea’s economic development.

1947, The Far East, vol. VI, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 334, pg. 401. 30 The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State, August 26, 1946, FRUS, 1946, The Far East, vol. VIII, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 541, pg. 733. 31 The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State, August 26, 1946, FRUS, vol. VIII, doc. 541, pg. 733. 32 The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State, August 26, 1946, FRUS, vol. VIII, doc. 541, pg. 733. 33 The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State, August 26, 1946, FRUS, vol. VIII, doc. 541, pg. 734. 19

Major General Arnold described that commission of 6 Korean civilians were dispatched to Washington “to negotiate with Governmental and private foundation agencies within the fields of agriculture, industry, medicine, education, and commerce in an effort to obtain U.S. rehabilitation aid.”34 It showed the USAMGIK designed the development aid of South Korea by providing funds. Arthur Bunce as the U.S. economic adviser in Korea indicated South Korea’s hardship of production since 1945 in his 1948 report to the Secretary of State. According to Arthur Bunce’s report, the farmers of South Korea were not able to utilize “chemical fertilizer from North Korea since August 1945.”35 The South Korean people had the difficulty of obtaining food due to the lack of fertilizer. Thereby, the U.S. government “purchased on world markets and brought into South Korea over 500,000 metric tons of chemical fertilizers.”36 After the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, the disharmony of economic cooperation between South Korea and North Korea was one of the major obstacles to hinder South Korea’s economic growth. The U.S. economic assistance to South Korea stemmed from the Government and Relief in Occupied Area (GARIOA) which the USAMGIK established in 1946. The U.S. agricultural surpluses initially arrived at South Korea for civilian feeding programs in April 1946 under the GARIOA. In 1947, Charles E. Saltzman as Assistant Secretary of State for occupied areas reported information on U.S. economic assistance to South Korea: “From May 1946 to March 1947 alone, the United States Government gave Korea $91,000,000 under the Civilian Supply Program. Approximately $10,000,000 of additional civilian supplies are now on their way to Korea. For the fiscal year 1948, the Congress of the United States has appropriated $600,000,000 for government and relief in Germany, Austria, Japan and Korea. Korea will receive its proportionate share of these funds. In addition, approximately $18,000,000 of the $25,000,000 extended to Korea by the Foreign Liquidation Commission, Department of State, has been

34 Major General A. V. Arnold to General of the Army Douglas MacArthur at Tokyo, December 1, 1945, FRUS, Diplomatic , 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, vol. VI, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 838. 35 The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State. Seoul, July 22, 1948, FRUS, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VI, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010). 36 The Economic Adviser in Korea (Bunce) to the Secretary of State. Seoul, July 22, 1948, FRUS, vol. VI. 20

expended for army surpluses needed in Korea.”37 This report showed that the U.S.’s aid package was considerable to South Korea at the time since the end of WWII in both ways of economy and military. The U.S. military government in South Korea lasted from 1945 to 1948; on August 15, 1948, South Korea became an independent nation with the name of the Republic of Korea (ROK). The USAMGIK with the support of the United Nations (U.N.) presented a resolution for the reunification of the Korean Peninsula. The goal of the resolution was to allow for a general election of Korea regarding reunification, under U.N. observation. The record of Joseph E. Jacobs as a Political Adviser in Korea on January 29, 1948 proved that there was a vigorous debate on “general election in United Korea.”38 Nonetheless, the Soviet Union disagreed with the resolution, so, the U.N. held a general election for South Korea as the next best alternative. As a result, the U.S. supported South Korea was established as a democratic country while the Soviet supported North Korea was established as a communist country. Actually, each government was unstable and denied the legitimacy of the other. They both still wanted to exercise their own dominating power over the peninsula. Negotiations on reunification between them were unsuccessful because of ideological conflict. This conflict ultimately triggered the Korean War. Following the GARIOA, the second U.S. food aid policy to South Korea was evolved during the Korean War in 1950-1953: The Mutual Security Act (MSA 402) of 1951 was enacted by President Harry S. Truman and was annually renewed until 1961.39 The MSA 402 was an American foreign grants-aid program to support the U.S. allies with military, economic, and technical aid. Through the MSA 402, South Korea was able to receive military and economic assistance from the U.S. especially during the Korean War when reconstruction of South Korea’s economy was the most urgent matter. The MSA 402 played a significant role to design the U.S.’ long term aid plans for South Korea’s economic development.

37 The Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas (Saltzman) to Mr. Ben C. Limb, of Washington. Washington, September 10, 1947, FRUS, 1948, The Far East, vol. VI, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010). 38 The Political Adviser in Korea (Jacobs) to the Secretary of State. Seoul, January 29, 1948, FRUS, 1948, The Far East and Australasia, vol. VI, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010). 39 Allan R. Millett, The Korean War, 3 vols (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), ix. 21

On October 2, 1950, Dean Acheson as U.S. Secretary of State dealt with a serious debate on “rehabilitating Korean national economy” since the Korean War occurred.”40 Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State, noted that “the ECOSOC [United Nations Economic and Social Council] urgently draw up plans for providing the necessary economic and technical aid to the Korean people through the UNO [United Nations Organization]” according to the recommendation of the General Assembly (GA).41 His record showed that the U.S. aid plans to South Korea’s economic reconstruction was cooperatively fulfilled with the UNO during the Korean War period. This war lasted for three years and ended on July 27, 1953 when South Korea and North Korea signed a ceasefire agreement, known as The Korean Armistice. The Korean War devastated the Korean Peninsula. As a result, “the supply expansion programs initiated during the Korean War.”42 South Korea had to rely on a large-scale of relief assistance and reconstruction aid. The United States provided military and economic aid to South Korea. On June 29, 1950, a few days after the Korean War occurred, American General Douglas MacArthur, who led the U.N. forces in the Korean War, was “authorized to send to Korea any munitions and supplies from resources at your disposal which you deem necessary.”43 After the end of the Korean War, the U.S. aid programs were necessary for South Korea to rebuild economy and to support the future success. On 31 March 1953 in a meeting, the U.S. National Security Council (NSC) reviewed the basic security policies and programs. The NSC adopted the new policies and programs regarding the Korean War. The NSC sought to continue to assist in building up the strength of the , and thereby aimed “to contain Soviet expansion and to deter Soviet power from aggressive war.” 44 The emphasis that the United States should increase in the meeting was

40 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State. New York, October 2, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Korea, vol. VII, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010). 41 The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State. New York, October 2, 1950, FRUS, vol. VII. 42 Report by the Special Stockpile Advisory Committee to the Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization (Gray), January 28, 1958, FRUS, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, vol. IV, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 272, pg. 549. 43 The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (MacArthur), June 29, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Korea, vol. VII, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pg. 241. 44 Draft Memorandum Prepared for the National Security Council - Condensed Statement of Proposed Policies and Programs, undated, FRUS, 1952-1954, National Security Affairs, vol. II, part 1, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pg. 308-309. 22

“bringing the Korean War to a final settlement acceptable to us” and “off-shore procurement of military materiel, designed to increase the capability of our allies to support their own defenses.”45 Likewise, when the Korean War was going to its end, the U.S. carefully considered the achievement of U.S. security interests and the reinforcement of the Korean economy to be the important matters. And, both considerations were required for the U.S. to support Korean economy because Korea’s own resources were not enough to maintain its national security and to recover the standard of living to its pre-Korean War level. On 9 April 1953, as the NSC recommended, President Eisenhower named Dr. Henry J. Tasca as Special Representative of the President for South Korean Economic Affairs and requested him to “investigate ways and means of strengthening the South Korean economy in light of the security objectives of the United States and the United Nations.”46 The Mission, headed by Dr. Tasca, visited Korea on April 17, 1953 and “headquarters were established in Pusan in offices of the United Nations Civil Assistance Command, Korea.”47 Dr. Tasca as the Special Representative visited and explored “most of the important industrial plants and agricultural and mining areas in South Korea.”48 Tasca as an American ambassador played an important role to research on the actual condition of South Korea’s postwar industry and economy and in turn to calculate the amount of U.S. aid for the rehabilitation of shattered . Furthermore, the Mission recommended that “the United States institute without delay a new three-year program of military support, relief, and reconstruction” in South Korea.49 Although the three-year program was not carried out due to the political instability of South Korea, Dr. Tasca’s report of Korean Economic Affairs helped President Eisenhower to propel economic aid plan to South Korea. The Eisenhower administration wanted to figure out the amounts and types of U.S. assistance in supporting the South Korean economy. Regarding the types of U.S. assistance, the

45 Draft Memorandum Prepared for the National Security Council - Condensed Statement of Proposed Policies and Programs, undated, FRUS, vol. II, part 1, pg. 282-284. 46 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, Korea, vol. XV, part 2, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pg. 1248. 47 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1248. 48 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1248. 49 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1253. 23

Mission intended to maintain existing U.S. appropriations for the U.N.’s Civil Relief in Korea (CRIK) and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency (UNKRA) programs “to accelerate recovery and reconstruction and to provide additional economic support to Korea’s defense effort.”50 Dr. Tasca emphasized that although the CRIK, the UNKRA, and other economic aid programs were separately made of their diverse funding sources, “in economic terms they should be considered to represent a single integrated program of economic assistance to Korea.”51 As to South Korean agriculture, the Mission supported a FAO team working on a study of South Korean agriculture. According to the investigation of FAO, “war damages are calculated to be $1 billion, and about 1,000,000 human lives have been lost since the invasion in June 1950. Production of rice, a basic crop in [South] Korea, last year was only two-thirds of the 1945/50 average. Per capita daily food consumption is below 1,500 calories.”52 The postwar economic damages of South Korea were severe, but the South Korean economy was gradually able to grow through the Mission’s restoration project of postwar South Korea. Dr. Tasca pursued to utilize U.S. resources in the most efficient manner possible to ensure the coordination of all economic programs in South Korea.53 Dr. Tasca specified his investigation of South Korea’s economy: “An economic policy for [South] Korea must (a) strengthen the [South] Korean economy to provide maximum support to the military effort of Korean and United Nations forces in [South] Korea; (b) ensure living standards for the [South] Korean population which will make Korea safe against starvation, disease, unrest and subversion; and (c) develop the Republic of Korea into a self-defending and self-supporting nation as early as possible and to the maximum degree feasible.”54 The U.S.’ economic aid plan was designed not only for South Korea as a nation but also for the public of the nation.

50 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1256. 51 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1256. 52 The Special Representative for Korean Economic Affairs (Tasca) to the President, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington: Government Printing Office, 2010), pg. 1246-1247. 53 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1248. 54 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1249. 24

With respect to the war demands of South Korea, the fundamental problem was “the extreme, acute, and widespread shortage of food stuffs, raw materials, equipment, and technical skills.”55 In terms of the shortage of U.S. assistance programs to South Korea in the 1950s, the main problem was the gap “between the sum of prescribed military and essential civilian requirements on the one hand and of resources made available from South Korean production and external assistance on the other.”56 Dr. Tasca analyzed that even if the Korean War would be ended, “economic chaos would be inevitable” in the country such as starvation, the exposure to disease, the loss of economic opportunity.57 Thereby, Dr. Tasca emphasized the necessity for U.S. assistance programs to South Korea to sustain both the civilian population and the defense forces from South Korean production and external assistance. The Mission for the economic development programs pursued to “rapidly produce increased supplies and essential goods and services and contribute to the attainment of self- sufficiency in food stuffs, fuel, and consumer goods.”58 The Mission focused on “investment in agriculture, mining, industry, transportation, and power,” and also presumed “that mining, agriculture and possibly the cottage industries are those with the greatest export potential.”59 Agriculture, industry, food stuffs, and consumer goods were considered to be potential investment fields that could build economic and boost economic growth. Meanwhile, Dr. Tasca also concerned on U.S. security interests: “such collapse of the ROK war effort and morale, with its attendant threat to the survival of the state itself, in addition to posing problems of the gravest magnitude in regard to the conduct of military operations in Korea, would seriously prejudice the U.S. position of international leadership as well.”60 It showed that the aftermath of the Korean War made the U.S. to keep providing assistance programs to South Korea in the 1950s. The U.S. government had to concentrate on “a defense

55 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1250. 56 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1250. 57 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1250. 58 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1255. 59 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1257. 60 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1250-1251. 25

posture” of South Korea and its “strengthening of economy.”61 This was because improving the economic capacity of South Korea was a significant issue for the U.S. due to the direct relation to the U.S. security interest in the world. The debate on the South Korean economic growth was important regarding the security interests of the United States. For purpose to strengthen the South Korean economy, the U.S. government sought for methods to increase South Korean consumption level and South Korean production. Dr. Tasca investigated “the consumption requirements of the Republic of Korea and production and investment possibilities and programs in all sectors.”62 “The recommendations are grounded in large measure on a ROK five-year program,” and the Mission kept developing the establishment plan and making its modifications over the reconstruction and recovery of South Korea .63 The Mission expected that modern equipment would play an important role to increase production for the undeveloped country by shifting from human power to mechanical power, which was an efficient way to produce profit even with small investments. The Mission mentioned in the report of strengthening the Korean economy that “no development of new technical or managerial research is needed in South Korea. The vast reservoir of knowledge available in Western civilization need only be tapped.”64 This explains how the Mission estimated South Korea as a nation in the early stages of development. After the Korean War, the division of the territory damaged the economy of South Korea which was heavily dependent on agriculture. In other words, the Mission assumed that a synergetic effect through the combination of the U.S. economic and technical aid and South Korea’s manpower would help the economic growth of South Korea although. From the perspectives of modernization, industrialization, and commercialization, the Mission expected that “human productivity” of South Korea can contribute to economic development of national life.65

61 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1249. 62 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1251-1252. 63 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1252. 64 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1254. 65 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1254. 26

As stated above, Dr. Tasca’s report of June 15 in 1953, regarding the ways and means of strengthening the South Korean economy, showed the seriousness of damages and the shortage of food production in South Korea due to the Korean War. In this circumstance, the practical use of U.S. aid to South Korea was a critical matter. In the report, he not only investigated military requirements, production, investment, and consumption in relation to defense posture for the purpose of the U.S. security issue but also sought to “make U.S. aid effective at lowest cost to the U.S.”66 The report of South Korean Economic Affairs headed by Dr. Tasca was a thorough fallback plan in the event of a ceasefire between North Korea and South Korea in order to rebuild the shattered postwar economy of South Korea and to work on its national security. As being under debate on a ceasefire between North Korea and South Korea, the NSC’s report on July 17 in 1953 discussed on “United States Tactics Immediately Following an Armistice in Korea.”67 “On the assumption that the Republic of Korea will cooperate satisfactorily with the U.N. in carrying out the terms of the armistice,” the NSC presented that the U.S. would “continue to develop and equip dependable ROK military forces in accordance with the present program,” “undertake with respect to the security of Korea,” and “continue to strengthen the government and democratic institutions of the Republic of Korea and continue to contribute to the economic recovery and rehabilitation of the Republic of Korea.”68 This report showed that the U.S. economic aid was “dependent upon the ROK’s “cooperation in connection with an armistice” as the U.S. “already warned the Republic of Korea.”69 This debate on the postwar issue of South Korea was the process to make sure the cooperation with the ROK in carrying out an armistice and the plan to expand economic assistance after the armistice. On July 13, 1953, there was an important report on the Tasca report by Norman S. Paul, Chairman of the Special Committee to Robert Cutler who was President Eisenhower’s National Security Advisor and the Chairman of the Planning Board. The NSC established the Special

66 Excerpt of Tasca Mission Report on Strengthening the Korean Economy, June 15, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1245-1246. 67 Report by the National Security Council Planning Board to the National Security Council, July 17, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Korea, vol. XV, part 2, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pg. 1386. 68 Report by the National Security Council Planning Board to the National Security Council, July 17, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1386. 69 Report by the National Security Council Planning Board to the National Security Council, July 17, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1386. 27

Committee “for the purpose of studying and reporting to the Planning Board on the Tasca report.”70 This report considered the ROK’s economic capacity and military capability to be desirable. Paul as Chairman of the Special Committee emphasized that it was crucial “to have a friendly government in South Korea with an economy able to maintain armed forces in accordance with the NSC” for the U.S. national security.71 The role of the Mission when President Eisenhower sent Dr. Tasca to Korea was important “because of the precarious economic situation, and its potential effect on our[the U.S.’] security objectives.”72 Paul recognized that “domestic production cannot increase without aid to agriculture, investment in repair parts, additional machines to replace those lost in war damage, and rebuilding” and then analyzed “the sooner production is increased, the sooner outside aid can be reduced.”73 Thereby, it was important to promptly discuss on the expansion of aid program and to assume the specific amount of aid as well as the field of investment in the ROK. After the Korean War ended with the Korean Armistice on July 27, 1953, all representatives of each department discussed on the ways to support South Korea’s economy on July 29, 1953.74 The conversation showed that they agreed that the U.S.’ military and economic assistance to South Korea was essential “to gain and hold control of as many aspects of the situation as possible.”75 It implied the U.S. aid to South Korea had a lot of potential from diverse perspectives. On August 6, 1953, there was another meeting between the U.S. and the ROK for discussion on economic assistance to the ROK. Secretary Robert T. Stevens presented that due to his interest in Korean economic affairs, President Eisenhower examined “a comprehensive economic report” which Dr. Tasca carried out when he visited Korea; “the distribution of 10,000

70 Memorandum by Norman S. Paul, Chairman of the Special Committee to the Chairman of the Planning Board (Cutler), July 13, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1390. 71 Report of Special Committee on Tasca Report, July 13, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1390. 72 Report of Special Committee on Tasca Report, July 13, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1391. 73 Report of Special Committee on Tasca Report, July 13, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1393. 74 The participants in the meeting were Mr. Noel Hemmendinger, Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, Mr. Walter Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs Mr. Charles Wilson, Secretary of Defense Mr. Frank Nash, Assistant Secretary of Defense Mr. Harold Stassen, Director of Mutual Security Mr. Joseph Dodge, Director of the Bureau of the Budget, and Secretary John Foster Dulles. Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Economic Affairs (Hemmendinger), July 29, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Korea, vol. XV, part 2, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pg. 1454. 75 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Economic Affairs (Hemmendinger), July 29, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1455. 28

tons of food for Korean relief was the President’s own idea.”76 In this meeting, President Syng- Man Rhee of ROK mentioned a confusion of “the duration of the economic assistance program” because some people said three or four year while other said it depended on Tasca’s recommendation.77 He wanted to clarify the matter about the duration of U.S. aid program. He also emphasized that it is important “to have a fertilizer plant, instead of always buying fertilizer from Japan” because he believed that having the production system of fertilizer can be critical for “the rehabilitation of Korea.”78 President Rhee wanted the ROK “to become self-sufficient industrially.”79 The conversation of the two nations showed that the two countries sought for direction of the economic assistance program of the ROK. In other words, after the end of the Korean War, the postwar economic reconstruction of the ROK was driven by the proper discussion on the economic development plan of the country between the U.S. and the ROK. Meanwhile, the U.S. domestic problem of agricultural surpluses in the 1950s was related to U.S. aid policies to South Korea. The Agricultural Trade Development of Assistance Act (Public Law 480) signed in July 10, 1954 by President Eisenhower contributed to a resolution of the chronic problem of surplus agricultural commodities in the 1950s.80 The P.L. 480 policy was revised from the MSA 402, an existing aid program. Regarding the domestic problem of surplus, on November 22, 1954, Joseph Dodge proposed an agenda on “the Development and Coordination of Foreign Economic Policy” to President Eisenhower “to identify and consider major foreign economic policy issues.”81 As a result, on December 11, 1954, President Eisenhower nominated Dodge as “Special Assistant to the President, and authorized him to establish and to serve as Chairman of the Council of Foreign

76 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), August 6, 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Korea, vol. XV, part 2, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pg. 1477. 77 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), August 6, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1477. 78 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), August 6, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1478. 79 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Young), August 6, 1953, FRUS, vol. XV, part 2, pg. 1478. 80 United States, Congress, House, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act, 956A; Willard W. Cochrane, “Public Law 480 and Related Programs,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 331, no. 1 (1960), 14. 81 Editorial Note, undated, FRUS, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, vol. I, part 1, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 27, pg. 105. 29

Economic Policy (CFEP)” to coordinate the U.S. foreign economic policies.82 The CFEP lasted until 1960 when the government prepared for the transfer from President Eisenhower to President Kennedy. According to a request of the CFEP, Clarence Francis, Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal, reported the study of “Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Domestic Agricultural Surpluses” to Dodge, Chairman of the CFEP on October 31, 1955.83 This report dealt with “the present laws, policies and programs for disposing of agricultural surplus products abroad.”84 The purpose of the report was to understand “the extent to which it is practicable and desirable to depend upon foreign disposal to meet the domestic agricultural surplus problem and the most appropriate and effective means of accomplishing such disposal.”85 Francis focused on potential of agricultural surplus commodities if using them through a foreign aid program; “agricultural surplus commodities can make an important contribution to programs designed specifically to accelerate capital development and increase consumption” in the recipient countries.”86 As regarding foreign aid programs as “investment programs,” Francis emphasized that “an increase in productivity in the low-income areas could result in the development of expanded export markets for United States commodities.”87 It showed that Francis recognized the opportunities that food aid could create national interest in a long term perspective. Then, he expected the expansion of the foreign trade market by utilizing agricultural surplus commodities. Through the P.L. 480 policy, the Eisenhower administration sought for the means to deal with the domestic matter of surplus disposal. An article on October 29, 1974, analyzed that “food played a vital role in the Marshall Plan, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and other programs” after the end of WWII, and furthermore “the huge handouts of foodstuffs provided a vital support for American agriculture.”88

82 Editorial Note, undated, FRUS, vol. I, part 1, doc. 27, pg. 105. 83 Letter from the Chairman of the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (Francis) to the Chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Dodge), October 31, 1955, FRUS, 1955–1957, Foreign Economic Policy; Foreign Information Program, vol. IX, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 49, pg. 158. 84 Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses, October 31, 1955, FRUS, vol. IX, doc. 49, pg. 159. 85 Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses, October 31, 1955, FRUS, vol. IX, doc. 49, pg. 159. 86 Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses, October 31, 1955, FRUS, vol. IX, doc. 49, pg. 160. 87 Prospects of Foreign Disposal of Agricultural Surpluses, October 31, 1955, FRUS, vol. IX, doc. 49, pg. 160. 88 “U.S. Ending ‘Food for Peace’ Despite Rising Hunger Abroad,” New York Times, October 29, 1974. 30

Providing food aid to South Korea was a proper function to help the ROK to establish a system of military preparedness because U.S. food aid to South Korea was significant in providing relief in emergency situations. Helping poor and vulnerable countries meet food requirements was also able to help the recipient countries to lay foundation for their economic growth. Delivering surplus abroad through the P.L. 480 policy also helped dispose surplus agricultural commodities. Besides, P.L. 480 played an important role in expanding trade market in Asia from a long-term perspective. In this way, the United States-South Korea relations are closely connected to U.S. food aid policy. The P.L. 480 policy, known as the Food for Peace Program, existed for diverse purposes. As U.S. food aid policies had been often amended, the most significant avenues of foreign surplus disposal were employed under the P.L. 480 policy. The main purposes of P.L. 480 were to provide U.S. surpluses and in turn to sell them to foreign recipient countries for local currencies, to provide grants-in-aid to friendly countries to address emergency situations, to distribute agricultural crops overseas with assistance of non-profit organizations and relief agencies, and to exchange farm products on the barter system.89 The P.L. 480 Title I (Economic Assistance and Food Security) contained “a variety of purposes to be accomplished by the sale of surplus commodities for foreign currencies and by the use of such currencies.”90 It provided the sale of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities to foreign countries for local currencies. Under Title I of P.L. 480, the U.S. government could accept the national currency of a foreign country in exchange for surplus agricultural commodities. Title I of P.L. 480 authorized the President to make agreements with friendly nations or organizations of friendly nations for the sale of surplus agricultural commodities for foreign currencies.91 These sales, which used to carry out through private channels, remained on

89 Trudy Huskamp Peterson, Agricultural Exports, Farm Income, and the Eisenhower Administration (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979), 75. 90 Review of Public Law 480 Decisions Taken by the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (ICASD), December 15, 1954, FRUS, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, vol. I, part 1, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), pg. 221. 91 U.S. Department of State. “American Foreign Policy 1950-1955, Basic Documents, Volume II,” Publication 6446, General Foreign Policy Series 117, (1957), p. 2941. 31

deposit of the foreign currency at Treasury which was equivalent of the export value of the commodities.92 The P.L. 480 Title II (Emergency and Development Food Assistance Programs) authorized “the transfer on a grant basis to friendly governments and to friendly but needy populations, of surplus commodities in CCC stocks in order to meet famine and other urgent relief requirements or to assist programs undertaken with friendly governments or through voluntary relief organizations.”93 It provided for grants of surplus agricultural commodities to friendly nations to meet emergency situations. Title II of P.L. 480 specified that it provided the assistance without cost in case of the poor strata, disaster relief, and school feeding. In addition, workmen on economic development projects were able to receive some donations of food supplies. On June 5, 1959, there was a discussion on the amendment of P.L. 480 to carry out the Food for Peace Program. As Paul. H. Cullen, Secretary of State, recorded, it was important “to make more effective use of U.S. surplus agricultural products in furtherance of Food for Peace.”94 For instance, with respect to administrative actions, it was essential “to increase commercial trade in agricultural products.”95 In particular, it was noteworthy of the administrative action that “the administration should increase the use of grants of food for school lunch programs under Title II, and broaden Title II to permit grants of food for economic development in cases where this is more appropriate than Title I.”96 The statement of administrative action indicated that the role of Title II of P.L. 480 was substantial in considering grant aid of food in the recipient countries. Indeed, the memorandum of November 22, 1977 proved that Title II of P.L. 480 played a consistent role for food grants in the recipient countries: “under Title II, food grants are made through private agencies, through the UN/FAO and other

92 United States, Congress, House, and Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Security Act of 1957: Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives (Washington, DC: GPO, 1957), 956A. 93 Review of Public Law 480 Decisions Taken by the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (ICASD), December 15, 1954, FRUS, vol. I, part 1, pg. 221. 94 Minutes of the 90th Meeting of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, June 5, 1959, FRUS, 1958-1960, Foreign Economic Policy, vol. IV, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 102, pg. 222. 95 Minutes of the 90th Meeting of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, June 5, 1959, FRUS, vol. IV, doc. 102, pg. 222. 96 Minutes of the 90th Meeting of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy, June 5, 1959, FRUS, vol. IV, doc. 102, pg. 223. 32

multilateral programs, and through friendly governments to help the needy for emergency/disaster relief and other purposes (maternal/child health, school feeding, etc.).”97 These records showed that P.L. 480 Title II worked well as the Food for Peace Program when food grants contributed to the public of the recipient countries through school lunch programs in the 1960s-1970s. An article on May 17, 1964, proved the contribution of the Food for Peace Program: “one of the most dramatic of the many activities of the Food for Peace program is the Alliance for Progress child-feeding program known as Operation Ninos, or Operation Children,” and school feedings “increased school attendance, better scholastic achievement and a drastic reduction in absenteeism.”98 Title III of P.L. 480 (Food for Development) authorized “barter for certain materials, amends previous legislation relative to surplus disposal by voluntary agencies, forbids trade with the Soviet area.”99 It was the donations of surplus foods for domestic distribution and for distribution to needy persons overseas, which was acted through non-profit, relief agencies. In fact, the United States provided a large component of food security efforts to South Korea by devoting emergency and supplemental feeding programs. Under P.L. 480, U.S. food assistance increasingly became development oriented. Title III of P.L. 480 was programmed on “a multi- year basis to support agricultural development programs in the recipient country.”100 Fourth, Title IV, added in 1959, authorized the barter of surplus agricultural commodities for strategic and other materials produced abroad.101 In fact, the scale of food aid that the U.S. government provided to South Korea was considerable. For example, on March 19, 1967, the New York Times presented that “an agreement under which the United States will supply South Korea this year with $1.9 million in surplus farm commodities was signed today” and the amount of farm surplus was 350,000 tons

97 Memorandum from Jessica Tuchman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski), November 22, 1977, FRUS, 1977-1980, vol. II, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 88. 98 “U.S. Aid and Health—II; Food for Peace Program Reduces Vast Supplies and Helps the World's Hungry,” New York Times, May 17, 1964. 99 Review of Public Law 480 Decisions Taken by the Interagency Committee on Agricultural Surplus Disposal (ICASD), December 15, 1954, FRUS, vol. I, part 1, pg. 221. 100 Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Katz) to the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Cooper), undated, FRUS, vol. II, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 258. 101 Cochrane, “Public Law 480,” 15. 33

of wheat and 75,000 tons of barley.102 An article, published on February 20, 1972, wrote that the U.S. “concluded an agreement here to provide $150 million worth of rice, wheat, corn and cotton to South Korea on concessional loan terms” and this agreement was “the largest annual Food for Peace program for South Korea.”103 The purposes of P.L. 480 policy generally included erasing the specter of famine, combatting undernourishment and hunger, and facilitating economic development in the recipient countries.104 From the U.S. perspective, the objectives of P.L. 480 policy the Congress stated were to promote economic stability for American agriculture, to expand international trade in agricultural commodities, to encourage the economic development of friendly countries, and to promote the collective strength of the free world as Cochrane described in his research.105 In other words, with regard to U.S. agricultural commodities, the United States used the P.L. 480 policy to dispose of burdensome surpluses at home, to buy as much military preparedness abroad, and to try to enhance economic capacity in the recipient countries.

Meanwhile, most foreign aid of the 1950s was grant-in-aid, but “a small amount of loans- in-aid were introduced in 1958.”106 In the 1950s-1960s, considerable amounts of P.L. 480 Title II grants were stationed to South Korea, and in the 1970s it was entirely offered in the form of loans.107 On June 4, 1958, Howard L. Parsons, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, submitted the progress report on the ROK. He noted that the ROK “made in the development of democratic institutions and political stability in the ROK” but on the economic perspective, there was “no substantial change in reliance on large-scale US aid.”108 Parsons brough the major issues such as “the achievement of eventual economic self-support” and “the development of fully

102 “U.S. Food Aid for Seoul Set,” New York Times, March 19, 1964. 103 “U.S., Seoul Conclude Pact in Food for Peace Program,” New York Times, February 20, 1972. 104 As stated in Chung’s work, U.S. food assistance to South Korea began with emergency food relief from 1945 to 1955, and then moved to civilian humanitarian food programs from 1955 to 1962. the P.L. 480 policy in South Korea had been “initially intended for short term emergency fund, but then was changed to “Self-help Program” in the mid-1960s.” Chung, “Foreign Things No Longer Foreign,” 15, 219. 105 Cochrane, “Public Law 480,” 15. 106 “In 1960, foreign aid came mainly in the form of loans. In 1961, long-term development loans were initiated by The Agency for International Development (AID).” Chung, South Korea in the Fast Lane, 308. 107 Chung, South Korea in the Fast Lane, 310. 108 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) June 4, 1958, FRUS, 1958–1960, Japan; Korea, vol. XVIII, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 225, pg. 460. 34

acceptable projects under the Development Loan Fund (DLF).”109 As Parsons analyzed, although the ROK’s economy was dependent on the U.S. aid, the ROK was steadily recovering its economy In this way, the U.S. sought for the ways to make the ROK government more stable on economic side. The U.S. considered the gradual transit of U.S. economic aid programs from grant-aid to loan-aid to be a major project, pursuing the development of the ROK’s self- supporting economy. There was much discussion about gradually decreasing the scale of U.S. grant-aid to South Korea after the end of the Korean War. By seeking for an efficient way of using U.S. funding, the United States specified the assistance plan to support the economic foundation of South Korea. The record of telephone call from Mr. Elizabeth M. Murphy, Secretary of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), on September 14, 1957, showed an instance of the U.S. effort to reduce the scale of U.S. grant-aid: “SEC said the purpose of the [South] Korea program was to cut down the charge against our mutual security program. SEC said naturally Defense would prefer to turn over equipment to [South] Korea and get money for it than leave it sitting in warehouses. SEC said perhaps amount could be cut from 50 million to 25 million; 50 million was quite a bit of money for [South] Korea.”110 It showed that Murphy, Secretary of the SEC, examined an efficient way to utilize U.S. aid funds for national interest. On the side of the ROK government, the U.S. loan-aid was supposed to help the ROK improve its economic stability in a long-term perspective.

In October 1958, In-Sang Song, a South Korean Minister of Reconstruction, submitted a proposal of “Korean Economy and its Requirements” to Leonard J. Saccio, a U.S. Deputy Director of International Cooperation Administration (ICA) via a letter of transmittal.111 Song outlined South Korea’s economic developments and future requirements. The record consisted of three parts: part I. aid requirements and some related matters, part II. aid operation, and part III.

109 Memorandum from the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Parsons) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) June 4, 1958, FRUS, vol. XVIII, doc. 225, pg. 461. 110 “The Defense position on modernization of South Korean forces was that General Decker could provide what was necessary out of surplus American equipment in Korea. Dulles indicated, in a handwritten note on the memorandum, that he was prepared to clear the cable on assumption that ’surplus’ to ROK [Republic of Korea] will not unduly burden MSA funds.” Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation between the Secretary of State and the Deputy under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Murphy), September 14, 1957, FRUS, 1955–1957, vol. XXIII, part 2, eds. Daniel J. Lawler and Erin R. Mahan (Washington, DC: GPO, 2010), doc. 246, pg. 508. 111 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, management number: CTA0001616, pg. 6. 35

annex and tables. Regarding development loan fund, he wrote, that “the loans from the Development Loan Fund can be a fundamental source of capital for the nations' long-range development program” and that “the existing program of grant aid should be gradually transformed into the loan type of aid such as the DLF.”112 When the ROK accelerated its economic growth, U.S. loan-aid from the DLF played a great role to lay foundation of industrial economy in the ROK.

As the South Korean government recognized the transit from grant-aid to loan-aid, Minister of Reconstruction Song applied for $56,470,200 of loans to cover key industries to the DLF, and furthermore submitted other loan applications for future projects totaling $85,265,700 to support economic development.113 For example, fertilizer plant, land reclamation, and small industry development were included in the development projects that Song suggested. Minister of Reconstruction Song also emphasized the significance of the P.L. 480 policy in part I of “Korean Economy and its Requirements”. He presented that U.S. surplus agricultural commodities to South Korea under Title I of P.L. 480 played a fundamental role for two purposes. First, “to supply urgently needed commodities, when the requirements are in excess of the normal requirements for agricultural commodities provided under the Section 402 program of the Mutual Security Act.” 114 Second, “to supplement the national defense support funds through the sales proceeds in hwan currency.”115 According to Song’ report, from 1955 to 1959 the South Korean government imported U.S. surplus agricultural commodities through which the equivalent value was 115,278,000 dollars under P.L. 480 and the hwan proceeds contributed to the price stabilization and military defense.116 This report explained that it was “necessary to continue the importation of surplus

112 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 9. 113 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 10-11. 114 The hwan was the currency of South Korea from 1953 to 1962, and since 1962 the won has been South Korea’s official currency. According to the currency reform, 10 hwan was exchanged for 1 won. The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 12-13. 115 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 12-13. 116 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 13. 36

agricultural commodities in as amount of at least $ 50 million under Title I of P.L. 480 in FY 1959.”117 This was because South Korea had to cover the national defense expenditure although the harvest of rice was “generally expected to be abundant in FY 1959.”118 In other words, South Korea’s situation was required to keep the importation of U.S. surpluses for a purpose of national defense; U.S. agricultural products such as wheat and barley were suitable items as an alternative food instead of rice as stated in his report. As Song noted, “much of the wheat and barley imported under this program will be used as a substituted food for rice, enabling [South] Korea to economic large-scale rice exports, thus regaining its pre-war position as a major supplier of this commodities. The rice sells for a great deal more per ton than wheat, and thus it is expected to double [South] Korea’s total commercial exports in the near future. The cereal grains under P.L. 480 play a key role in these plans.”119 Both the American Embassy in Seoul and the government of South Korea discussed on importable items which were supposed to be useful for the economic development of South Korea. In 1958, the government of South Korea requested food aid corresponding to an amount of 20,000,000 dollars for wheat and of 16,000,000 for barley.120 It indicated that the negotiations between the two nation on U.S. food aid to South Korea led to accelerating the economic development of food industry which used U.S. agricultural surplus commodities. Based on the P.L. 480 policy, the import of U.S. agricultural surplus commodities contributed to the economic stability of South Korea and the improvement of the self-sufficient capacity. In terms of the Korean stabilization program, there was an active negotiation between the United States Operations Mission (USOM) and South Korea. The memorandum of December 1964, which was sent to Clarence Eskildsen, an Associate Administrator of Foreign Agriculture Service at Department of Agriculture, dealt with the Rice Export Formula between the USOM and South Korea. The main purpose of the United States was to “help the ROK to

117 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 13. 118 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 13. 119 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 14. 120 The Record of Korean Economy and its Requirements by the Ministry of Reconstruction, Republic of Korea, October 5, 1958, National Archives of Korea, pg. 14. 37

achieve economic self-sufficiency.”121 It was enlightened self-interest. The memorandum noted that the “technical cooperation and development loan programs” of the U.S. aimed to enhance the economic ability at the foreign trade market in such ways “to enable the [South] Koreans to produce more of the investment and consumer goods which are required to raise their living standards, and to enable them to earn foreign exchange in the export market so that they can import the remainder of their need with their earnings from exports.”122 The enhancement of the Koreans’ economic ability was supposed to lead to the economic development of South Korea in export markets. Above all, it is important to consider the relations between the U.S. food aid and the economic development of the ROK in the 1960s especially since a new regime of the ROK emerged under the leadership of Chung-Hee Park on December 17, 1963. The correlation between the P.L. 480 policy of the U.S. and the use of U.S. food aid of the ROK clearly appeared during the period of the Park regime. Due to the P.L. 480 policy, the economic development plan of South Korea accelerated the growth of food industries in the ROK during the Park regime. The U.S. government concerned the economic instability of South Korea under President Park’s new regime due to its major economic problems. For instance, inflation, especially food prices, mounted and foreign exchange reserves declined. On September 21, 1962, a report of the U.S.-ROK economic summit by the Korean Embassy in Washington, D.C. summed up Seymour J. Janow’s questions about South Korea’s economy such as “the dynamics about the balance of international payments,” “the progress of the economic renewal after the currency revaluation,” and “developing countermeasures of inflation.”123 Janow participated in the U.S.-ROK economic summit as an Assistant Administrator for the Far East, Agency for International Development (AID). Janow’s questions were as to whether foreign exchange supply and material supply worked well, how much the industrial production index rose, and what caused the increase of demand for U.S. surplus agricultural commodities.124 It indicated that the economic situation in

121 Telegram from Clarence Eskidsen in Department of Agriculture to Rutherford M. Poats in the Far East, “Tenth Title I Sales Agreement for Korea,” December 11, 1964, file ECON PL 480, 1966, Record Group 59 (hereafter RG 59), National Archives (hereafter USNA). 122 Telegram from Clarence Eskidsen to Rutherford M. Posts, December 11, 1964, RG 59, USNA. 123 The Report of U.S.-ROK economic summit, September 21, 1962, National Archives of Korea, Project of Capital and Technical Cooperation between Korea-Colombo Plan Member Countries, 1962-1963, management number: DA0096160, pg. 3. 124 The Report of U.S.-ROK economic summit, September 21, 1962, National Archives of Korea, pg. 3. 38

South Korea tended to be unsteady despite the rapid economic development and the industrial growth in South Korea. In the early 1960s, the economic growth process of South Korea under the Park regime was unstable but persisting. In addition, the U.S. government knew South Koreans’ concern about the new regime. Because President Park seized the control of the country by military coup, South Koreans were criticizing that the new government was no capable of coping with these problems as compared with earlier regimes. Also, they were concerning that the U.S. might reduce economic assistance and armed forces. Overall, the U.S. recognized the necessity of the continuous U.S. aid. For that, on March 18, 1964, a substantial P.L. 480 agreement was accomplished by the Secretary of State.125 However, because the basic economic problems still persisted, how long President Park would stay in power depended on how he would handle these problems. In November of 1965, Dr. Dorothy Frost, an Executive Director of American-Korean Foundation, reported her impression of South Korea after her visit a year or two ago: “she noticed everywhere considerable improvement in economic conditions and greater self- confidence on the part of Koreans.”126 The U.S. regarded economic stability as one of the most fundamental matters in providing U.S. aid for South Korea. According to a document of January 1964, “the Description of Korean Economic Assistance Program PY 1965,” it is possible to review the U.S. AID proposal, ranging from Supporting Assistance, Development Loans, Development Grants to P.L. 480.127 These AID proposal covered essential raw materials to supply the industrial plant of South Korea as well as military budget. In the 1960s, the U.S. government tended to focus more on South Korea’s economic development rather than relief, as well as on the U.S.-Korean economic exchange. For example, on November 9, 1965, according to a “Briefing of Korean Businessman’s Group-Action Memorandum,” a group of 19 South Korean businessmen visited the U.S. to learn of American business methods and to establish contacts with the American business community. The South Korean business team members included various occupational groups such as leading industrialists, bankers, traders, and reporters: Lee Won-Soon as -

125 For Mr. Poats’ Congressional Briefing – in draft to AID, March 25, 1964, Central Files, 1950-1964, RG 59, USNA. 126 Memorandum of Conversation, November 15, 1965, file SOFA Negotiations 1965-1966, RG 59, USNA. 127 Summary Description of Korean Economic Assistance Programs PY 1965, January 1964, Central Files, 1950- 1964, RG 59, USNA. 39

America Trading Co., Ltd., Lee Cheju as a reporter of Tong-a Daily, Oh Hak-Keun as a managing director of South Korea Trade Association, Shin Chul Ho as President of Lotte Company, and Lee Kyung Ho as a managing director of Daehan Flour Mill Co. Ltd.128 To promote economic cooperation between the two countries, they visited selected government agencies, trade associations, institutions, banks, factories, as well as a variety of business corporations. The participants of both countries discussed the U.S.’ world trade activities, a discussion of international commerce, international trade activities of the Department of Commerce, some activities of the Department of Commerce in stimulating industrial expansion, and U.S. Participation in Foreign Business.129 A 1965 memorandum by Robert A. Fearey as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, noted that “although our assistance programs to [South] Korea remain very large, we have been reducing grant assistance to stimulate self-help, with marked success. It is no kindness, however, and is wasteful, to dispense our assistance without inciting [South] Korean efforts.”130 The U.S. government emphasized that South Korea needed to develop its economy through U.S. assistance, but pointed out the necessity of decreasing grant-aid. This was because the U.S. government believed that reducing the scale of grant-aid would ultimately be an efficient way to enhance the economic strength of South Korea. On July 25, 1966, Oye V. Stovall as a Director of U.S. General Accounting Office sent a telegram to the U.S. Secretary of Defense in order to suggest to save the expenditure of aid by furnishing raw materials in South Korea instead of offering finished consumable supplies.131 This telegram wrote: “we stated in our draft report that there was a good potential for effecting substantial dollar savings in the Military Assistance Program for [South] Korea by providing required raw materials and local currency financing for the in-country manufacture of consumable supplies in lieu of procuring and furnishing the finished products from United States supply sources. By using the Department of Defense’s projected requirements of finished

128 Memorandum of Briefing of Korean Businessman’s Group-Action Memorandum, November 9, 1965, file TP- Trade Promotion and Assistance Korea 1965, RG 59, USNA. 129 Memorandum of Briefing of Korean Businessman’s Group-Action Memorandum, November 9, 1965, RG 59, USNA. 130 United State Government Memorandum of Notes for Your Briefing of Dr. Hornig and Party (Briefing Memorandum), June 29, 1965, file SCI-7-Visits&Missions Korea 1965, RG 59, USNA. 131 Attention: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), July 25, 1966, file ECO GAO (Gen. Accounting Office) 1966, RG 59, USNA. 40

consumable supplies to be furnished to [South] Korea through fiscal year 1970, we estimated that a dollar savings of approximately $27 million might result if only the raw materials were furnished for processing in [South] Korea.”132 It showed that the U.S. paid attention to the role of industry in the South Korean economy in the 1960s. It also explained that the import of the U.S. raw materials contributed to the growth of flour mill industry of South Korea. Manufacturing in South Korea was the largest component of this industrial grouping. The industrial scale of most establishments tended to be of small and medium scale.133 Milling factories were “concentrated in Pusan and the Seoul-Incheon area, both with port facilities for ocean going vessels. Practically all wheat for the mills were imported.”134 South Korea depended on imports for most of the raw material required for export of manufactured goods. The major food processing industries were flour milling, sugar refining and canning-primarily sea food, all reportedly with considerable excess capacity. In other words, the U.S. food aid programs helped making more effective use of U.S. farm surpluses in South Korea so that U.S. food aid could be used as capital to finance economic development. Regarding South Korea’s use of aid supplies, there was the U.S.’ restriction in applying the P.L. 480 policy to South Korea. As stated in a U.S. record of 1966, the U.S. accounted for the limited use of aid supplies such as wheat flour in the recipient country through P.L. 480: “wheat is being provided [South] Korea under a P.L. 480 agreement which prohibits the exportation without the approval of the United States of the same or a like commodity. When approval is given, exports must be offset ton-for-ton with wheat or barley purchased commercially in the United States.”135 Similarly, another U.S. record of 1967 proved that the U.S. continued the restricted use of aid supplies: “if food recipient countries must buy wheat in addition to the amounts they are receiving from donors, they should buy from the United States.”136 It showed that the administrative restriction by the P.L. 480 policy would lead to dependent economic growth of South Korea. Nonetheless, this economic relations between the U.S. and South Korea

132 Attention: Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), July 25, 1966, RG 59, USNA. 133 Industrial Development in Korea, June 8, 1965, file SCI-7-Visits&Missions Korea 1965, RG 59, USNA. 134 Industrial Development in Korea, June 8, 1965, RG 59, USNA. 135 Limited Official Use, June 29, 1966, file ECON PL 480 1966, RG 59, USNA. 136 Summary Notes of the 576th Meeting of the National Security Council, October 11, 1967, FRUS, 1964–1968, vol. IX, International Development and Economic Defense Policy. 41

were complementary in that the U.S. expanded the foreign export market and South Korea enhanced food industry using wheat through P.L. 480 from an economic perspective. The consequence of foreign surplus-disposal programs of the United States in agricultural commodities has been the effect on food consumption for the countries involved. The U.S. wheat flour that was considered as “a foreign food staple for Koreans changed the everyday food practices of their Korean recipients.”137 “Wheat flour was becoming increasingly familiar in South Korean diet through the commercial market and various aid programs in the 1950s and 1960s” although the rice-eating culture was still predominant.138 These disposal programs brought a different result to South Korea, which this will examine in the next chapter. The South Korean government received the U.S. wheat flour through P.L. 480 Title II. The U.S. wheat flour was “the medium” that linked U.S. domestic politics of farm surpluses to the South Korean economic development plans.139

137 Brazinsky, Korea and the World, 55. 138 Brazinsky, Korea and the World, 56. 139 Gregg A. Brazinsky, Korea and the World: New Frontiers in Korean Studies (Lexington Book, 2019), 41. 42

Chapter Two: A New Korean Culinary Tradition

South Korean recipients of food aid could utilize the products to forge a new national food culture. South Korean people started eating flour-based food such as sujebi or kalguksu by mixing the flour and water to make dough. Sujebi is one of the South Korean comfort foods, putting small pieces of dough flakes roughly torn by hand into clear soup; the word su of sujebi means hands or handmade. Kalguksu is a warm , rolling out flour dough, cutting in strips to make noodles thin, and putting them into clear soup. The words kal means knife or knife-cut and the word guksu means noodles in Korean. Guksu is a generic term of Korean noodle dishes, and mainly made of wheat. The kinds of guksu are various according to soup base, ingredients, or recipes. For example, myulchi-guksu in which the word myulchi in Korean means anchovy is a simple warm noodle dish in a clear anchovy soup; -guksu is a noodle dish using kimchi as a main ingredient, a Korean fermented dish made of Chinese cabbage with many seasonings; and, bibim-guksu in which the word bibim in Korea means to mix together is a cold noodle dish mixing noodles and diverse ingredients with spicy and sweet seasoning, and thus is literally translated to mixed noodles. Besides, ramen is also a typical noodle dish madding of wheat flour in South Korea. since the inflow of foreign wheat. As the South Koreans began consuming wheat flour as an ingredient to make a meal, the menus for everyday meals were diversified. These flour-based dishes became part of staple food them in South Korea. The increase of consumption of wheat flour by South Koreans contributed to a big change in South Korean dietary culture. There were multiple factors at work throughout that played a role in creating a new food culture that used wheat: the Park government, the businesses, the newspapers, the women’s associations, the restaurants, the stores, the public as consumers in South Korea as well as the U.S. government. As the U.S. government was involved in the economic development plan of South Korea, it affected the growth of its food industries during the period of the Park regime. The supply of U.S. agricultural surplus commodities, especially wheat flour to South Korea ultimately influenced the change of the dietary lives of South Koreans. As a military dictatorship, the Park government carried out the HCU policy, which was a policy to promote wheat flour consumption, as well as supported the development of food industries using U.S. wheat flour. Due to the close relationship between government and business, the large food business 43

benefited from the Park government; they could use wheat flour as raw materials at a low cost and produced instant noodles, flour, and related products. Their food products were advertised via the major newspapers in South Korea. The newspaper companies published many articles about the HCU policy and diverse recipes using flour. The Women’s associations acted as a messenger to distribute the HCU policy to housewives taking care of meals at home by informing them of recipes using flour and related products. The merchants of restaurants were an agency which had to follow the administrative order of the HCU policy and the Grain Management Act. The public of South Korea also had to follow the HCU policy at school, work, and home, and were exposed by the advertisements of ramen or flour-related products. In other words, the change of South Koreans’ dietary lives resulted from the combination of the U.S. grant aid of wheat flour, the policy to promote consuming flour-based food by President Park’s regime, and South Korean media advertising. According to the strict administrative action and the modernization desire of President Park’s government, South Koreans’ taste enjoying rice was expanded into the type of flour-based food. The national campaigns of South Korea along with the inflow of U.S. surpluses also contributed to the development of various secondary industries such as instant noodles, baking, snacks, and milling of flour. Chung-Hee Park seized power by staging a military coup in May 16, 1961 and Park’ regime as President lasted in 1963-1979. In August 15, 1948 when South Korea became an independent nation as a sovereignty, served as the first President of the ROK, a rightwing politician supported by the U.S. government in 1948-1960. His despotic power was continued by means of improper ways. In 1952 during the Korean War, he was elected as the President; before the presidential election, he revised the system of indirect election into direct election of the president which was supposed to be advantageous for his reelection. In 1956, he was able to continue to serve as the President by modifying the constitutional law to remove the law of two-term limitation for the President. In March 15, 1960, he became the President via the illegal voting; due to his fraudulent presidential election, protesters of the ROK started the April 19 Revolution. The April 19 Revolution was a student-led pro-democracy movement against President Rhee’s autocracy and corruption as well as the gap between the rich and the poor; this eventually led to the resignation of President Rhee on April 26, 1960. As a result of the April 19 Revolution, on August 18, 1960, Chang Myeon newly emerged as the Prime Minister of the 44

parliamentary government, the Democratic Party, while Po-Sun Yun served as President of the ROK. In 1961, Park as a military dictatorship of the ROK Army carried out the May 16 military coup to bring the end of the government of the Second Republic of Korea. Thereby, Prime Minister Chang lost his position on May 16, 1963 and President Yun of the Second Republic of Korea stepped down in March 22, 1962. Park’s military junta promptly established the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction on May 16, 1961. The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction under Park’s military junta exercised a substantive power in the legislative, administrative, and judicial branches in the ROK, and lasted until December 16, 1963.140 On December 17, 1963, Park became the President of the representative government of the ROK as the result of the presidential election of October 15, 1963; Park’s presidential term ended in December 26, 1979. Park’s long-term seizure of power was driven by his “bureaucratic-authoritative leadership.”141 Since he emerged though the May 16 military coup, his regime was the lack of democratic property and legitimacy. President Park instigated the people of South Korea by establishing reformative policies with the cause of the nation’s modernization. Especially, on October 17, 1972, President Park declared the emergency martial law, the October Restoration or the October Yusin, which was a South Korean self-coup with the purpose of a long-term seizure of power. President Park suppressed the public by carrying out “undemocratic policies” although the people’s desire for democracy was steadily increasing.142 The October Restoration triggered Jaegyu Kim to assassinate President Park in December 26, 1979; Kim, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency of the ROK, was President Park’s close associates during Park’s dictatorship. Regarding political debates on Chung-Hee Park as a controversial figure, there were diverse arguments of the economic development of South Korea under Park’s regime. On the good side, Se-Joong Kim supported the claim that his autocracy with respect to the achievement of economic development was indispensable to achieve modernization and democratization in a short-term; it was a preferable choice in the given circumstance despite his long-term seizure of

140 “The Proclamation of the Three Branches of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction,” Dong-A Ilbo, June 11, 1961, 1. 141 Seung-Chul Oh, A Study on Political Leadership of President Park Chung-Hee and Roh Moo-Hyun (Dong-A University. Department of Political Science, 2017), 57. 142 Oh, A Study on Political Leadership (Dong-A University. Department of Political Science, 2017), 57. 45

power.143 On the other hand, there was a critical insistence to point out that his suppression and exclusion of the public contributed to the rapid growth of economy; Hee-Yeon Cho claimed Park’s regime was maintained “by the help of anti-Communist and developmentalist mobilization of the people.”144 As a counterargument against Cho, Jee-Hyun Lim and Sang-Rok Lee emphasized that the people spontaneously participated in the system of national mobilization under Park’s regime and asserted the theory of “mass dictatorship” which was a down-top dictatorship based on consent of the masses.145 Because assessing him and his era is never straightforward, it is important to discuss in depth Park’s personal characteristics, the long-term seizure of power, the suppression of democracy, the October Restoration, the fruition and the limits of his achievement of economic development from diverse perspectives. To understand South Korea’s economic development during the period of the Park regime in the 1960s-70s, it is important to comprehend South Korea’s political and economic circumstances before Park’s military regime emerged. After the liberation of Japanese occupation in 1945, “the core industries including banks and land business” that the Japanese government general of Korea during the colonial era used to have ownership were “nationalized” under government management.146 In South Korea as an agricultural country, the demand of consumption of rice rapidly rose because the domestic population increased according to “the return of overseas Koreans and the influx of North Korean refugees.”147 It was the eruption of demand for consumption of rice that was controlled by the Japanese colonial rule. South Korea under the U.S. military government as a transitional government was faced with the slump of rice production and the exhaustion of grain stock, aggravating the shortage of rice as major food. In October 5, 1945, the USAMGIK removed the control of rice according to “free market principles for rice”; however, it led to the soaring price of rice.148 In January 25, 1946, the

143 Se-Joong Kim, Park Chung-Hee’s Ruling Ideology and Nationalism, Korean Society of Modern History, no. 8, 1996. 144 Hee-Yeon Cho, A Study on the Epistemological Character and Issues in the Recent Debates over Re-evaluation of the Park Chung-Hee Dictatorship, Korean Critical Sociological Association, Economy and Society, vol. 67, 2005. 145 Jee-Hyun Lim, Sang-Rok Lee, ‘Mass Dictatorship’ and ‘Post Fascism’ towards Dr. Hee-Yeon Cho’s Criticism, History Criticism, no. 68, 2004. 146 “An Announcement of the Committee of Left and Right,” Dong-A Ilbo, October 8, 1946. 147 “200 Million of Overseas Koreans’ Return after the Liberation,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 24, 1947. 148 Ho-Ryong Lee, The Basic Nature of the Economical Policies of the U.S. Military Government, Study on the History of the Korean National Movement, vol. 39, 432. 46

USAMGIK announced “the rice collection order.”149 This order was to return to the previous food control policy which Japanese colonial government carried out; the problem of this policy was that it discriminated farmers from the target of food control. The public of South Korea had difficulty obtaining rice as it was not available at market; “smuggling rice out of the country” was often neglected and the matter of “profiteers from the distribution channel” was worse.150 Consequently, the price of rice soared again. The USAMGIK sought to solve the problem of rice shortage through rice collection and food distribution. However, the economic conditions of South Korea and the public remained backward until the 1950s. Since the independence of South Korea in 1948, the difficulty of obtaining food, especially rice as South Koreans’ staple food, was a continuous issue among the public. An article on March 3, 1949, noted that both the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Cabinet Council discussed on a proposal of land reform in considering that “the farmers who were nearly 80% out of the total population” of South Korea, suffered from the instability of domestic agriculture and the supply and demand of food.151 As the agricultural crisis was worse, President Rhee carried out the law of farmland reform in June 21, 1949 “to absorb the agricultural population to the industrial population as part of reorganizing the industrial structure.”152 Young-Sun Yoon, Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, accounted for the food policy. Yoon focused on “economic self-sufficiency, the acquisition of foreign currencies, and the movement of reducing consumption of rice” to secure the absolutely needed quantity of rice.153 In January 15, 1950, the Mayor of Seoul announced the special statement about the movement of “reducing consumption of rice.”154 Nonetheless, farmers were unavoidable from ; although South Korea was an agricultural country, it had to rely on foreign grains in dealing with the lack of food. Farmers of South Korea lost means of production for agricultural commodities and their livelihood.

149 Lee, The Basic Nature of the Economical Policies of the U.S. Military Government. (Study on the History of the Korean National Movement, vol. 39) 432. 150 “The Request of Re-examination of the Agricultural Policy,” Dong-A Ilbo, October 11, 1946. 151 The Matter of Land Reform,” Dong-A Ilbo, March 13, 1949. 152 Jin-A Chung, Syngman Rhee Government's economic policies in the first Republic of Korea (1948~1960)-The state-led industrialization policies and the economic development plans (Yonsei University, Department of History, Diss. PhD., 2007), 44. 153 “The Securement of the Absolute Quantity of Rice,” Dong-A Ilbo, February 4, 1950, 1. 154 Kong, “Honpunsik Changnyo Undong,” 4. 47

In June 25, 1950, the Korean War caused economic damage to South Korea and the public. The rice production decreased, the cost of grains soared, poverty worsened, and famine ensued. The difficulty of obtaining food, especially rice as South Koreans’ staple food, was a chronic problem to South Korea. After the Korean War, the inflation and the shortage of food were the severe economic matters in South Korea. President Rhee’s government sought to reduce rice consumption and to increase the consumption of flour and barley in order to combat the problem of rice shortages. The industry of South Korea due to the P.L. 480 policy of 1954 was able to develop, but by comparison the domestic agriculture and local farmers were sacrificed.155 The oversupply of foreign agricultural commodities at a low cost resulted in the decrease of the domestic food productivity. In 1956, the agreement by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Finance led to the movement of reducing consumption of rice and increasing consumption of flour.156 On November 27, 1956, an article indicated that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry planned to distribute flour at a low cost to the poor public and poor farmers in order “to expand the movement of reducing consumption of rice and to adjust the price of agricultural commodities.”157 As experiencing the division of the Korean peninsula, the Korean War, and the Korean Armistice, South Korea reinforced the ideology of anti-communism and tried to rebuild the postwar economy to develop as development nation.158 After the Korean Armistice of 1953, establishing the stable economic capability was an urge priority for both North Korea and South Korea to hold a dominating position in case of the realization of a Unified Korea. “Even though South and North Korea had different political systems, both of them expressed a strong desire for heavy and heavy chemical industries in order to achieve economic independence. Their ambitions, however, ultimately resulted in increasing their governments’ power because their plans were based on the theory of economic growth which ignored political and economic democratization.”159

155 Chung, Syngman Rhee Government's economic policies, 2007, 44. 155 “The Securement of 136. 156 Jae-Wook Kong, “Honpunsik Changnyo Undong and the Change of Dietary Life under the Period of State- Mobilization System,” Economy and Society 77 (2008): 4. 157 The Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 27, 1956. 158 Chung, Syngman Rhee Government's economic policies, 2007, 6. 159 Chung, Syngman Rhee Government's economic policies, 2007, 241. 48

In 1956, under President Rhee’s government, productive capability of South Korea was recovered through the postwar reconstruction project. Nonetheless, the problem about the imbalance in industrial structure was serious and South Korea’s economic independence was slow in progress. To build the foundation for self-supporting economy, the Rhee government proposed the three-year economic development plan; it could be not carried out due to the April 19 Revolution of South Korea in 1960. “Rhee government’s state-led industrialization policies and economic development plans centered on heavy chemical industry were eventually succeeded to Chang Myeon’s and Park Chung-Hee’s economic development plans.”160 The back-scratching relationship between government and big business in South Korea sprouted since Syngman Rhee’s government. After the Korean Armistice, President Rhee emphasized mechanization and industrialization after the Korean Armistice and supported Korean business. In the 1950s the Sambaek industry played a pivotal role in the economy of ROK until heavy industry developed in the 1960s; as the word sam and baek in Korean means respectively three and white, the Sambaek industry included flour, sugar, and cotton which are all white products. There was a controversial debate whether or not the Sambaek industry should be accepted as an end user in July 1958; the Committee for Agriculture and Forestry and the Committee for Finance and Economy criticized that the approval of the Sambaek industry to be an end user of raw wheat would be a policy “for a concealed assistance to millers” in large business, and that the introduction of foreign surplus would demand farmers’ sacrifice by have a bad influence on the price of domestic grain.161 Nonetheless, the Rhee government approved the Sambaek industry as “an end user” of raw wheat and then assigned aid supplies at a low cost.162 Receiving the distribution of aid materials was a big benefit for these industries, so the close relationship between the government and the big business was formed. Cartels for purchasing raw materials, such as the Korea Milling Industry Association, the Korea Sugar Association, and the Spinners & Wewavers Association of Korea, helped the Sambaek industry monopolize profit while smaller business were excluded.163 On September 30, 1958, both the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Economic Reconstruction in Industry held a meeting and agreed on “the total

160 Chung, Syngman Rhee Government's economic policies, 2007, 241. 161 “A Policy for Supporting Concealment,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, July 13, 1958. 162 Chung, Syngman Rhee Government's economic policies, 2007, 114-115. 163 Chung, Syngman Rhee Government's economic policies, 2007, 114-115. 49

loan amount equal to 3,100 million hwan of wheat” for South Korean millers.164 The growth of the Sambaek industry deepened the cozy relationship between government and business and moreover demanded sacrifice of labors and farmers. After the 1960s, the Sambaek industry lost the previous advantage when the five-year economic development plan was carried out by the Park’s government, emerging diverse industries and developing heavy industry. To seek for the national reconstruction, the South Korean government sold U.S. grains to domestic end users, and then properly diverted the margin for the national defense expenditure. The imported U.S. wheat was allocated to the Korea Milling Industry Association as the end users. The criteria of wheat allocation depended on the capability of facility in each milling factory. Thus, to secure larger amount of raw wheat, each milling factory tried to enlarge the scale of milling facilities.165 Under President Park’s long reign, the economic immature of South Korea caused the government to intervene the market economy. Park’s military government requested businesses to act as a substitute or a main agent for the economic development of South Korea. Businesses also depended on the legal system and governmental infrastructure which was fundamental for economic activities. President Park sought for the strong power of the nation to control businesses. President Park’s regime established criteria for dividend investment to industry by priority in order to invest capital for the growth of enterprise economy.166 President Park’s government used the U.S. aid as investible funds for South Korean economic actors with the purposes of domestic economic development and profit by constructing industries and developing technologies.167 This led to the formation of the link of a back-scratching alliance of government and businesses. The relations between the South Korean government and private companies were important because they had a “partnership of mutual guarantors.”168 As Minister of Reconstruction Song presented the proposal of “Korean Economy and its Requirements” to the ICA of the United States in 1958, President Rhee’s government established

164 “A Privileged Loan to the Milling Association, Undertaking Fund for Wheat 3100 Million Hwan,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 30, 1958. 165 Daesun Milling Corporation, Daesun Milling 50 Years, , 2009, 46. 166 Se-Jin Lee, “A study on the capital accumulation structure of Korean economy from 1950s to 1960s.” (PhD diss., Hanguk University of Foreign Studies, 2018), 166. 167 Ji-Yong Jun, “Corruption and Economic Growth: Focusing on the Developmental Strategy of the Park Chung- Hee Regime,” (MA diss., Seoul National University, 2018), 33. 168 Kurtuluş Gemici, “South Korea during the Park Chung-Hee Era: Explaining Korea's Developmental Decades,” Asian Journal of Social Science 41, no. 2 (2013):183; Byung-Kook Kim and Ezra F. Vogel, The Park Chung-Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 267. 50

the Industry Development Council to be dedicated to South Korea’s economic development plan with the U.S.’ consent. In 1960, the Industry Development Council designed the three-year economic development plan to seek for South Korea’s economic self-sufficiency on in a long- term.169 The three-year economic development plan was a state-led industrialization policy to concentrate on heavy industry and heavy chemical industry. This long-term economic development plan that President Rhee’s regime prepared was succeeded by Park’s military junta and was realized under the name of the five-year economic development plan. On November 14, 1961, the Ministry of Finance of South Korea submitted a proposal of the five-year economic development to the Chair of Supreme Council for National Reconstruction under Park’s military junta.170 The U.S. had a direct influence on South Korea’s economic policies and supported Park’s military junta to carry out the economic development plan. On December 15, 1961, Samuel David Berger, a U.S. Ambassador to Korea sent a letter to David Dean Rusk, a U.S. Secretary of State. Ambassador to Korea Bergur reported that he expected the political situation of South Korea to be “fairly well stabilized” until the election in May 1963 in that Park’s military junta “determined to make genuine reforms, to lay foundations for honest and effective government, and devoted to the return of representative government.”171 Accordingly, Berger emphasized that U.S. economic aid and loan and military assistance for 1962 “should provide enough to produce substantial economic progress next year.”172 South Korea’s economic development plan could be launched under Park’s military junta with the U.S’ support. The rapid economic growth period of South Korea ranges from 1962 when the first economic development plan was launched to 1981 when the fourth economic development plan was ended; by stages, the first economic development plan of 1962-1966, the second economic development plan of 1967-1971, the third economic development plan of 1972-1976, and the forth economic development plan of 1977-1981. This rapid economic growth period of South Korea in the 1960s-1970s cannot be discussed without Chung-Hee Park in that his long-term

169 Chung, Syngman Rhee Government’s three-year Economic Development Plan, 353-386. 170 “The Approval of the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan,” National Archive of Korea, The Ministry of Finance, management number: DA0547078, pg. 253. 171 “Letter from the Ambassador to Korea (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk,” FRUS, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, Northeast Asia, doc. 249, pg. 543. 172 “Letter from the Ambassador to Korea (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk,” FRUS, vol. XXII, doc. 249, pg. 544. 51

seizure lasted from 1963 to 1979.173 The purpose of the first and second economic development plans in the 1960s was to establish “the foundation for self-sufficient economy” in South Korea, to stabilize the people’s lives, and to accelerate the modernization of industry.174 The purpose of the third and fourth economic development plans in the 1970s was to fulfill the self-reliable economic structure, to balance regional development, to persist the improvement for living conditions in fishing and farming community, and to accelerate technological innovation and industrial advancement. The introduction amount of foreign capital – grant aid, commercial credit, foreign direct investment, and public loan – which was involved with the five-year economic development plans of South Korea in 1962-1981 reached nearly 24,527 million dollars.175 The amount of foreign capital was about 1,205 million dollars for the first five-year plan, 2,967 million dollars for the second five-year plan, 6,429 million dollars for the third five-year plan, and 13,926 million dollars for the fourth five-year plan.176 The higher increase of investment amount every five years reflected that the Park administration gained confidence from the high growth rate of previous economic development plans. On March 22, 1961, a South Korean newspaper reported that President Kennedy announced that U.S. foreign aid for the first economic development project would contribute to the establishment for South Korea’s “economic self-independence without the help of foreign aid.”177 As for the second five-year economic development plan of South Korea, according to a U.S. ambassador’s telegram to Ki-Won Kim, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of South Korea, on November 4, 1967, the House of Representatives in the U.S. passed the budget for annual

173 A few more of the five-year economic development plans of South Korea were continued until 1997. The fifth five-year economic development plan in 1982-1986 aimed to stabilize the economic foundation of the country as well as the people’s lives and to persist the export-led economic strategy. The sixth five-year economic development plan in 1987-1991 sought to advance the institutional development of economic society, to reorganize the industrial structure, to promote the balanced regional growth, and to enhance the welfare system of the public. The seventh five-year economic development plan as a last plan in 1992-1997 pursued to reinforce the competitive power of industry, to establish the citizen moral, and to seek for the groundwork of a united Korea as well as internationalization. 174 “President Park’s Announcement of Budget Message for the Establishment and the Stabilization of Self-Reliable Economy,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 08, 1966. 175 “Induction of Foreign Capital,” The Korean Economy 60 Year’s History, National Archive of Korea Table in the Appendix 1-3 pg. 80-81. 176 “Induction of Foreign Capital,” The Korean Economy 60 Year’s History, National Archive of Korea Table in the Appendix 1-3, pg. 80-81. 177 “The Total Amount of Foreign Capital 4 billion Dollars,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, March 23, 1961, 1. 52

expenditure of 1968 totaling nearly 2,164 million dollars; 400 million dollars for a developmental loan, 180 million dollars for a technical aid, 600 million dollars for assistance, 445 million dollars for Alliance for Progress, 365 million dollars for a military aid, and other funds sch as for emergency relief assistance and for contribution of international organizations.178 As to the second five-year plan, President Park concentrated on the Country Construction Project of South Korea such as the renovation of four major rivers, expressway construction, railroad work. The Country Construction Project aimed to “develop rural communities;” the focus of renovating the four main rivers of South Korea – the Han, Nakdong, Geum, and Yeongsan Rivers - was on electricity and water available for agricultural and industrial use, and water traffic for flood control; the expressway construction helped link central spine road between major cities; the railroad work built the coast circular railway to connect the East Sea, the West Sear, and the South Sea each other as South Korea is surrounded by three seas.179 According to an article on September 8, 1972, Donald S. Macdonald, the Assistant Secretary of the Office of East Asian Affairs in the AID, stated in the House of Representatives that the development loan to South Korea during the period of the third five-year plan would keep continuing; the aid amount of P.L. 480 was about 142 million dollars out of 1,659 million dollars in total, which included a technical aid, a grant military aid, foreign military credit, and more.180 The goal of the third five-year economic development plan was to advance the industrial structure, to correct the imbalance of international payments, to promote the development of farming and fishing community, realize the self-sufficiency in staple grains, and maximize the regional development based on the renovation of the four main rivers and the expansion of the superhighway network.181 President Park emphasized that the third five-year economic development plan stressed importance to the promotion of an agricultural community. For this, President Park more propelled the Saemaeul Undong, or the New Community Movement which launched in April 22, 1970. The word sae and maeul in Korean mean new and

178 “About U.S. Aid to the ROK,” National Archive of Kore, management number: BA0139651), November 4, 1967. 179 “The Expansion of the Country Construction Plan,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 2, 1967, 1. 180 “Macdonald, Persisting the Development Loan to South Korea,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 8, 1972, 1. 181 “The Determination of the Third Economic Development Plan, Average Annual Growth Rate 8.6%,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, February 9, 1971, 1. 53

community while the word undong in Korean means movement. It was designated as the Archives of Saemaul Undong by the UNESCO on June 18, 2013. The aim of the Saemaeul Undong, which was a nationwide movement the whole public participated in, was to increase the income of farmers and fishmen and to self-defend the regional community. Park’s regime tried to “inspired farmers and fishmen with voluntary participation in the New Community Movement.”182 In 1972, as President Park seized dictatorial powers through the October Restoration as a self-coup, the third five-year plan and the Saemaeul Undong were carried out under Park’s authoritarian regime. President Park achieved the advanced growth and industrialization to a certain degree through the previous five-year economic development plans. Thereby, the basic focus of the fourth five-year economic development plan of South Korea was on balancing the development for the qualitative improvement. Park’s government sought for the self-supporting economy, the social development, the innovations in techniques, and efficiency improvement. The total budget of the fourth development plan increased 54.9% comparing the third development plan.183 A series of the five-year economic development plans in the 1960s-1970s contributed to the high growth and the stability of economy of South Korea. At the same time, South Korea was facing many problems such as the imbalance of economic structure, the serious differentials between industries and between urban-rural areas, the increasing population of rural exodus, and the decline of the degree of food self-support. Improving the rural economy as well as the people’s lives in rural communities was President Park’s crucial task since the matter ‘to eat well and to live well’ was important for them. In solving these social and economic problems, the Saemaeul Undong played a great role as the economic and cultural policies. The aim of the Saemaeul Undong was for the national restoration and for the devotion for the country and the public; this movement also contributed to the formation of solid support base for Park’s authoritarian government. In the early 1960s, the level of the national economy of South Korea was low, and the political conflicts between democracy and communism also existed. The Park’s regime tried to design practical policies which not only can prevent the people from poverty and communist

182 “Government, Establishing the Saemauel Five-Year Plan,” Maeil Business Newspaper, March 27, 1972. 183 “The Economic Planning Board, Presenting the Fourth Five-Year Plane, Yearly Growth Rate to 9%,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 15, 1976, 1. 54

invasion by North Korea, but also protect the nation and the public. At first, to deal with the people’s matter ‘to eat well and live well,’ Do-Yeong Chang as the Chair and the martial law commander of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction of South Korea announced a statement to appeal the movement of reducing consumption of rice to the public, according to an article on May 21, 1961.184 On June 1961, the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction established the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters which carried the movement of reducing consumption of rice into effect. The movement of reducing consumption of rice carried out by the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters was absorbed into the Saemaeul Undong in 1970s. The movement of reducing consumption of rice was extended to the Honpunsik Changnyo Undong (HCU) by the inflow of U.S. wheat flour aid based on the P.L. 480 policy. The word honpunsik in Korean is a combination of the Korean terms honsik & punsik. The word honsik means to eat rice with mixed grains. Punsik means to eat flour-based food. The word changnyo means to encourage or stimulate to develop while undong means a movement. The Committee for the Improvement of Dietary Lives under the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters undertook the HCU; next, the Office of Food Policy under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry took charge of the HCU in the 1960s; later on, the Department of the Improvement of Dietary Lives under the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry took charge of the HCU in 1973. The HCU was propelled as part of the Saemaeul Undong in the 1970s. When Park’s military junta seized power in 1961, one of his pledges was urgently to eliminate the people’s famine and then to devote all the strength to the economic restoration of the nation.185 To secure the legitimacy of Park’s military rule by a coup, the priority was to overcome the people’s hunger problem. The National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters played an important role to conduct the task which purposed to solve the people’s economic difficulties. The major tasks of the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters were to organize the youth groups and women’s associations, to educate the executives of the organizations, to establish a welfare society between farming and fishing communities and cities,

184 “The Beginning of the Movement of Reducing Consumption of Rice Across the Country,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, May 22, 1961, 1. 185 “The Direction of the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters, the Public’s Way for the completion of the Revolutionary Task,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, September 15, 1961. 55

and to propagate their tasks for the national reconstruction by means of books, posters, slogans, and classes.186 The HCU was part of the national reconstruction tasks to overcome the food problem by encouraging the people to reduce consumption of rice and to increase consumption of barley and flour. The HCU can be classified to three periods according to a complexion of the government intervention. At the first period of the HCU in 1963-1965 as the introduction stage of the HCU, Park’s regime carried out the HCU by organizing women’s association to encourage the public to consume flour-based food. At the second period of the HCU in 1966-1968, the HCU to encourage the public to eat steamed rice and barley began because the yield of barley rapidly increased in 1965-1967 whereas the yield of rice decreased in 1967-1968. The third period of the HCU in 1969-1975 was when under Park’s authoritarian rule, the HCU was vigorously implemented as a government policy, especially in 1973-1975 since the emergence of the October Restoration by Park’s self-coup of 1972.187 The HCU formally indicated ‘encouragement’ of eating mixed grains and flour-based food, but the feature of the HCU was that it was a government policy under President Park’s authoritarian rule; the enforcement of the HCU to the public became distinct. The public and small businessmen either voluntarily participated in or had to follow the HCU as a government policy while the major businesses producing flour-related foods benefited from the HCU. That is, the HCU was a “state- mobilization policy” under President Park’s regime.188 In considering that the HCU was a thoroughly planned policy by Park’s regime, the HCU was not only a state-led movement for improving the people’s dietary lives but also a state-mobilization policy through which the government greatly intervened the public’s dietary lives. Since 1961 the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) provided loan-aid of surplus agricultural commodities to South Korea. Since U.S. agricultural surpluses flew into South Korea, American wheat flour become easily affordable for President Park’s government. Park’s regime made full use of U.S. agricultural aid to re-establish the national economy in the field of food industry. A series of the economic development plans of South

186 The National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters, “Education in Rural Area,” the National Assembly Library of the ROK, management number: MONO1198012248, 1963. 187 Joo, Hangukin, 87-88. 188 Kong, “Honpunsik Changnyo Undong,” 4. 56

Korea from the first to the fourth in 1962-1981 were closely related with the U.S. food aid, provided under the P.L. 480 policy between 1962 and 1978.189 The main goal of the economic development plans in the agricultural sector was the increase of agricultural products and the modernization of agriculture. It was important not only for the public to secure the smooth supply of foodstuffs and the improvement of economic lives, but also for the national economy to secure the advancement of the food self-support, the food industry, and the food exportation. It showed that President Park prioritized the growth-first policy and the business-concentration policy for the national economy. The U.S. surplus agricultural commodities such as wheat and barley mainly put into Pusan Harbor and Incheon Harbor. These products of wheat and barley were classified into official demands and civilian demands before processing them. Wheat was processed into flour at milling factories near the harbors which were mostly located at Pusan, Incheon, and Seoul while barley was processed at beer breweries. For an example of the U.S. wheat shipments to South Korea, a newspaper article on March 6, 1964 reported that a ship carrying 7,000 tons of wheat by the P.L. 480 policy entered the port of Pusan.190 This U.S. wheat shipment was loaded at the American Northwest in the middle of January, completed one month and a half across the Pacific Ocean, and arrived at Pusan Harbor. It was scheduled to be processed into flour at a milling factory which was located at the southeastern region of South Korea. The 50% of wheat would be used for government use and the other 50% for civilian use would be sold via a retail store according to a purchase statement. The problem of U.S. wheat shipments was that the time of arrival and the amount of wheat shipments was irregular. Thus, milling factories of South Korea used to close temporarily. According to a newspaper article of August 21, 1963, seven of milling industries in Pusan had to close due to the absence of raw wheat.191 It reported that flour was out of stock on the market, and the price of flour soared from 550 won to 720 won per a sack of flour. Because they could not buy flour even with the increased price, many restaurants using flour as a main ingredient

189 Richard Vengroff, “Food and Dependency: P.L. 480 Aid to Black Africa,” Journal of Modern African Studies 20, no.1 (March 1982): 33; U.S., Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 1945 - September 30, 1979 (Washington, D.C., 1979). 190 “The First Arrival of U.S. Farm Surpluses This Year,” Dong-A Ilbo, March 6, 1964, 2. 191 “All Suspension of Milling Factories,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, August 21, 1963, 6. 57

had to close their operations. The shortage phenomenon of flour was driven by the increase of consumption of flour as the people consumed flour due to the lack of rice. Regarding the introduction of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities, a newspaper editorial published on February 28, 1964 noted that it was important to import surplus agricultural commodities from the U.S. “as fast and as much” as possible.192 This was because the domestic supply of food grains in South Korea was not enough to meet the demand due to a bad influence of climate. Rice and wheat were out of stock, resulting in the instability of the grain prices. According to the newspaper editorial, to seek the stabilization of the food price, the domestic milling factory should properly operate and produce wheat flour. Thereby, it underlined having the amicable relationship with the U.S in that the supply and demand of food “could be stabilized by U.S. agricultural aid.”193 President Park’s government could utilize the U.S. supply of agricultural surpluses to carry out the HCU in the 1960s-1970s while the movement of reducing consumption of rice was carried in the 1950s. The South Korean government’s will to increase the use of U.S. wheat flour mainly appeared in the early 1960s. A variety of the administrative orders to change South Koreans’ dietary lives were actively carried out by President Park’s government in the 1960s- 1970s. The HCU as a state-led policy was a national movement for improving dietary lives. President Park’s regime carried out the HCU to encourage people to consume flour-based food and barley and to reduce consumption of rice as staple food. When the Saemaeul Undong was spreading in the 1970s, the HCU was carried out as a pan-national movement under Park’s authoritarian rule. Through the HCU as a state-led mobilization policy, President Park’s regime concentrated on the national economic development and emphasized the national unity. Ultimately, South Koreans’ staple grain for meals was changed from rice and barley into rice and flour-based food in their dietary lives. These two types of HCU, each eating mixed grains and eating flour-based food, resulted in different effects. Whereas the movement of eating mixed grains of rice and barley was “temporal” especially when the yield of barley increased in 1965-

192 “Hurry the Import of U.S. Surplus Agricultural Commodities,” Dong-A Ilbo, February 28, 1964, 2. 193 “Hurry the Import of U.S. Surplus Agricultural Commodities,” Dong-A Ilbo, February 28, 1964, 2. 58

1967, the movement of eating flour-based food made a “long and constant” impact.194 This was the most significant aspect of the change of South Korean food culture. In 1961 when Park’s coup seized power with the name of Supreme Council for National Reconstruction, the core national policy which the military junta emphasized sought for national reconstruction. The National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters, which Park’s military junta established as a central administrative agency, carried out the HCU. Regarding the HCU, the crucial tasks of the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters were the organization business and the enlightenment & propaganda business.195 Among several organizations which the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters constituted, Women’s Association for Reconstruction was established to work for improving dietary lives. The role of Women’s Association for Reconstruction was “to develop a proper menu, to provide food tasting to the headquarters, and to distribute it as a food substitute.”196 A substitute instead of rice that the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters emphasized was honsik using barley. That is, the recipe of honsik is to mix barley and rice properly and steam them together instead of steaming only rice. At a symposium to discuss on the movement of reducing consumption of rice, Han-Sang Oh as the Director of the Seoul Branch of the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters, emphasized honsik using barley; for the diffusion of honsik using barley, he also stressed the role of housewives because they generally took charge of home cooking.197 The movement of reducing consumption of rice was considered to be an enlightenment movement. Director of the Seoul Branch Oh sought to enlighten the public, especially housewives, through Women’s Association for Reconstruction; for this, educating the executives of Women’s Association for Reconstruction was more important to go in the right direction of the enlightenment movement. Women’s Association for Reconstruction was mobilized to distribute the HCU as a movement for improving dietary lives.

194 Kong, “Honpunsik Changnyo Undong,” 25. 195 The National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters, “Education in Rural Area,” The National Assembly Library of Korea, management number: MONO1198012248, 1963. 196 “Chairmen in Cities, Towns, and Counties, Electing instead of Appointing,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 22, 1961, 1. 197 “Discuss on the Movement of Reducing Consumption of Rice,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 16, 1962, 2. 59

The Seoul Branch of the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters incorporated the Counseling & Advising Center for punsik, which was a permanent establishment, into the main building of the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters in 1963.198 The goal of the Counseling & Advising Center for punsik was to give consultation to housewives regarding punsik using flour for meals. The establishment of the Counseling & Advising Center for punsik was part of the HCU under The National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters. The Counseling & Advising Center for Punsik provided information for cooking classes to housewives and counselled on their dietary lives to diversify the menu using flour at home. According to a newspaper article on November 17, 1962, YWCA, a private cooking institute, opened a cooking class for baking bread for free at the Miuman Department Store.199 The cooking class was held under the sponsorship of the Seoul Branch of National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters; it was part of the HCU carried out as a national reconstruction movement. An instructor was Hyeong-Sook Kim and the target of the cooking class was women. The participants in the cooking class were approximately from 20 people to 50-60 people per day. This article described the information of an oven to explain how to bake bread which included the price, the purchasing place, and the types by use. It also introduced the recipe of baking bread by using an oven. The Supreme Council for National Reconstruction under Park’s military junta established the Department of Women’s Association and the Municipal Division of Women’s Association as part of the national support policy of economic development until he became officially President of the third Republic of Korea in 1963. Park’s representative government in 1963 reorganized the Division of Women and Children which belonged to the Ministry of Health and Welfare. The Division of Women and Children took over the women’s association businesses by administrating the Women’s Counselling Office and the Municipal Office of Women’s Business. In terms of the HCU, a variety of women’s associations all over the country continued to act as a leader to open free classes to teach how to introduce diverse menus for punsik and honsik. On March 5, 1963, housewives were to gather at cooking classes with great interests that the

198 “Permanent Establishment of the Counseling & Advising for Punsik,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, April 3, 1963, 6. 199 “The First Step to Punsik,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, November 17, 1962, 3. 60

Women’s Association of Seoul opened every Monday.200 The Women’s Association of Seoul mobilized nutritionists and food experts to teach how to make bread, snacks, cookies, and more. On July 29, 1963, under the sponsorship of the Vocational Clinic for Women as a government- affiliated organization, a home cooking institute located in Seoul opened a free class of cooking punsik such as bread, noodles, and dumplings.201 Udon noodles is thick white noodles made of wheat flour and is often served in a hot, clear soup. The Vocational Clinic for Women played a role not only to provide information of employment for low-income female workers and rural women who moved to Seoul and struggled with unemployment due to urbanization and industrialization, but also to solve the problem of prostitutes. A newspaper article on March 12, 1966, reported that the Ministry of Health and Welfare established 30 blanches of the Center of Health and Welfare for Mothers and Sons at eight provinces of South Korea to provide bread and milk free of charge. For this, the Ministry of the Economic Planning Board and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry cooperated with the Center of Health and Welfare for Mothers and Sons. This was that Park’s government took over school feeding which was carried out as a civilian business through P.L. 480 Title III.202 As widening the scale of business, provide flour and milk power to preschool children and pregnant women. The Center of Health and Welfare for Mothers and Sons was autonomically managed by the residents and the local women’s association at each province while the Ministry of Health and Welfare provided flour and milk power. It was a practical policy in that local communities voluntarily participated in the management of supplies that the government provided and cared for themselves and the residents; it could also help improve children’s dietary lives to eat punsik using flour since childhood. The Chang-Woo Yang as the Secretary of the Home Affair in South Korea announced a statement on July 20, 1964 that “45,052 of the Youth Group and 44,899 of the Women’s Associations scattered all over the country would continue to exist and foster in each town hall although the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters was dissolved.”203 It showed that the youth groups and the women’s association acted as movement organizations which improved

200 “Boom in Cooking Classes of Punsik,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, March 5, 1963, 6. 201 “Free Class for Punsik,” Dong-A Ilbo, July 29, 1963, 6. 202 “The Center of Health and Welfare for Mothers and Sons,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, March 12, 1966. 203 “The Growth of the Youth Group and the Women’s Association as Informal Organization,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, July 20, 1964,1 61

the people’s living and dietary lives and made a large contribution toward the growth of local communities and rural areas. All the women’s associations great and small played a great role to carry out the HCU throughout President Park’s reign. The National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters carried out the policy of food distribution to the low-income people. On February 27, 1963, the Yeoungdeungpo district of Seoul distributed 2,205 sacks of flour as relief supplies to each village office; the amount of flour was distributed to 9,769 of the low-income people who resided in the Yeoungdeungpo district.204 The recipients had to carry out labor service which each village office assigned for nine days. The enlightenment & propaganda business under the National Reconstruction Movement Headquarters was one of the most important reconstruction movements. To propagate the core activities for the national reconstruction, the Committee for the Improvement of Dietary Lives played a role to spread diverse slogans for improving dietary lives to the public. The posters, slogans, banners, radio broadcast, newspapers were mobilized as the means for the spread of the movement for the improvement of dietary lives.205 A slogan that the Committee for the Improvement of Dietary Lives distributed in the early 1960s was “the improvement of living conditions through punsik, the enhancement of our physical constitution” in figure 1 (left). At the bottom of the slogan, the name of the Committee for the Improvement of Dietary Lives was printed. The Rural Development Administration as a government department, which was established in 1962, produced a variety of promotional materials to inform how to cook foods using flour such as bread and noodles. Figure 1 (right) was part of a publication that the Rural Development Administration produced. The title of the publication printed at the top of the first page was “Making flour-based food” and the publisher of the publication, “the Rural Development Administration,” was printed at the bottom of the first page. The food illustrations such as two different types of bread, noodles, guksu, and raw wheat were inserted in the middle of the first page. The second page described the limitation of eating steamed rice as a staple, the significance of honsik and punsik, and the advantage of eating honsik and punsik. The two pie charts were a comparison of nutrients between rice and flour such as carbohydrate, fat, protein,

204 “The Free Distribution of Flour to Volunteer Workers,” Dong-A Ilbo, February 27, 1963, 8. 205 “Chairmen in Cities, Towns, and Counties, Electing instead of Appointing,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 22, 1961, 1. 62

vitamins, and minerals. The left pie chart was rice and the right chart was flour. The part in red check in the right pie chart meant that flour had more nutrients such as protein, vitamins, and iron that rice. The bar graph in the third page displayed numerical figures in the comparison of nutrients between rice and flour. Under the bar graph, there was the recipe of guksu; it introduced several ingredients for making guksu and explained the way to make noodles by using a noodles maker with photo materials. The two pictures at the bottom in the third pages showed the process to make noodles. Most of housewives were able to learn the way to make noodles by hand; the way is to mix flour and water to make some dough, to roll out the dough thin, and to cut them long. They began making diverse noodle dishes according to a kind of coup such as meat soup or anchovy soup.

Figure 1 A Slogan of Punsik (left)206. A Pamphlet of Making Flour-Based Food (right).207

South Korean newspapers in the 1960s advertised cooking classes and promoted new products like yeast or oven in order to stimulate housewives’ enthusiasm for making bread. The Ministry of Public Information supported the Committee for the Improvement of Dietary Lives to open a baking bread class as a newspaper article reported on January 29, 1963.208 An oven company, the Baking Iron Pot, was able to sell oven housewives and female workers who took

206 “A Poster by the Committee for the Improvement of Dietary Lives,” National Folk Museum of Korea. 207 National Folk Museum of Korea 208 “Selling Oven at Producer Price, a Baking Bread Class,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 29, 1963, 5. 63

the baking bread class in cooperation with the Ministry of Public Information for a month. The demand of yeast for baking was increasing, but due to the lack of supplies, yeast for baking used to be out of stock in 1967.209 When cooking classes for punsik opened throughout the country, housewives learned flour-based food as a healthier food, which used to make them rush out to a direct outlet to buy oven in 1968.210 Some instructors of classes for punsik “tended not to mention that Western people eat bread with beef together.” Thus, dishes of unknown nationality were sometimes introduced to housewives.211 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry stated that the government “would reinforce the HCU even if it would be more coercive beyond the HCU as an enlightenment movement.”212 Thereby, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry released the essential points for guidance of the HCU in 1962. The Park government fully mobilized the government office, schools, workplaces, and homes. The cafeteria of the public office, schools, government enterprises, and public institutions had to use punsik using flour and honsik using barley. Schools had to censor students’ lunchboxes to check the ratio of rice and barley to be an 8 to 2 ratio. The public had to eat punsik at least for a meal a day. The alcohol business which used rice as a raw material to make was prohibited from producing raw rice wine, in Korean. Restaurants had to sell the same ratio of rice and barley as honsik. If the people did not follow these essential points for guidance of the HCU, the government applied legal limitations. For instance, Mirak restaurant and Mugungwha restaurant were forced to close the operations of five days; the two restaurants did not follow the regulation to sell grains that the ratio of rice and other grains should be an 8 to 2 ratio.213 The government judged the HCU as an enlightenment or encouragement movement could not help resolving the difficulties of supply and demand of food. The Committee for the Improvement of Dietary Lives which was established at each city, province, and district, played a great role to carry out the HCU.214 Hereby, as a pan-national task, the HCU to emphasize the improvement of dietary lives was distributed to the whole country.

209 “The Shortage of Yeast for Baking,” Maeil Business Newspaper, September 4, 1967, 4. 210 “How were Food, Clothing, and Shelter Changed,” Dong-A Ilbo, August 15, 1968, 6. 211 “How were Food, Clothing, and Shelter Changed,” Dong-A Ilbo, August 15, 1968, 6. 212 “The Coercive Encouragement of Punsik,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, January 10, 1963, 4. 213 “Two Restaurants, Suspension of Business violating Honsik,”The Kyunghyang Shinmun, June 11, 1963, 6. 214 “The Movement of Reducing Consumption of Rice Across the Country from the New Year,” Dong-A Ilbo, December 28, 1962, 7. 64

Regarding instant noodles, while the movement of reducing consumption of rice and the HCU were spreading in South Korea, ramen initially appeared on September 15, 1963, which produced by the Samyang company.215 The Samyang company borrowed funds from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and built production facility for instant noodles. The people tended not to regard eating instant noodles as a meal because flour was not recognized as a food ingredient for meals. Thus, the HCU focusing on flour consumption could not heighten an effect in reducing consumption of rice in the early 1960. However, as the government strongly promoted the HCU to come over the instability of supply and demand of grains, instant noodles became a proper alternative for rice. President Park presented an award certificate Joong-Yoon Jeon, the head of the Samyang food company, for its contribution to the national health care and administrative development.216 In 1967, the Samyang food company was able to receive a loan of 74,000 dollars from the U.S. Agency of International Development by which Samyang could play the great role to mass- produce instant noodles and to make South Koreans consume them.217 The Samyang company could rapidly grow when instant noodles exported to Vietnam for military supplies during the Vietnam War. On October 26, 1968, the first export of Samyang instant noodles started to Vietnam. The Samyang company contracted the export of instant noodles for the equivalent of 160,000 dollars for civilian demands of Vietnam.218 On July 30, 1971, the Samyang company concluded the contract of instant noodles for military supplies; 40 million servings of instant noodles were exported to Vietnam.219 On August 26, 1974, USAID provided 90,000 dollars as a development fund to develop a high-protein food to three of food manufactures, and the Samyang company was one of them. 30,000 dollars was allocated as the development fund to the Samyang company.220 The increase of demands for instant noodles that the Samyang company produced also contributed to the enhancement of national competitiveness as an exporting nation at foreign market. The Samyang company which launched when the HCU as a government

215 Joo, Hangukin, 87. 216 “The Award of National Health Service to Samyang,” The Dong-A Ilbo, March 25, 1967, 3. 217 “Samyang Food Company’s AID Loan,” Maeil Business Newspaper, May 6, 1967, 2. 218 “The First Export of Samyang Ramen,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 26, 1968, 2. 219 “The export of Instant Noodles to Vietnam, the Contract of 40 Million Servings,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, July 30, 1971, 4. 220 “AID, 90,000 Dollars Aid to Three of Food Companies,” Maeil Business Newspaper, August 26, 1974, 4. 65

policy began spreading helped solving the hardship of national food crisis and disseminating punsik to the people. In the 1960s, ramen was promoted as a substitute for rice through the HCU. According to an article on June 3, 1967, the Samyang company advertised instant noodles with a slogan, “Samyang food company’s instant noodles appeared as a substitute for a meal.”221 The Samyang company advertised an original ramen on the right and a new type of ramen, the curry-flavored ramen on the left on October 13, 1970. To describe the feature 1, the slogan “Ramen is the second rice!” was written at the top of the advertisement.222 In the middle of the advertisement, the phrase “A new delicacy at table! Curry ramen” was inserted. In the 1960s, ramen was advertised as the second rice through the mass media and was catching up the production of rice.223

Figure 2 A newspaper advertisement of Samyang-ramen In addition to the mass media, Samyang ramen was advertised through women’s associations. For example, on July 1967, the first lady of President Park, Young-Soo Yuk, worked for the Women’s Association of Military Family which consisted of generals’ wives. As the Representative of the Women’s Association of Military Family, Yuk provided Samyang instant noodle products for free to both soldiers on leave and discharged soldiers at a meal place in front of Yongsan Station.224 Women’s Association of Military Family was organized on September 22, 1962, with the purpose of reconstruction in all other fields such as the improvement of refinement, everyday life, economy, society, culture.225 Contrary to President

221 “A Hero of Flour Foods and an Active Worker, Samyang,” Maeil Business Newspaper, June 3, 1967, 2. 222 The Kyunghyang Shinmun, October 13, 1970. 223 “A Hero of Punsik and a Worker to Solve the Food Crisis, Samyang Ramen,” Maeil Business Newspaper, June 3, 1967, 2. 224 “Providing Samyang Noodles to Soldiers,” Maeil Business Newspaper, June 15, 1967, 3. 225 “The Organization of Women’s Association of Military Family,” September 22, 1962, 6. 66

Park with the authoritarian image, Yuk as his wife communicated with the public in everyday life and played a role to encourage the public to participate in activities for the national reconstruction. Her attitude about diligent and frugal living seemed to be a great support to neutralize President Park’s authoritarian image. Her voluntary activity to distribute ramen helped encouraging the people to consume ramen as part of the HCU. During the second period of the HCU in 1966-1968, honsik was more emphasized. This was because the barley crops increased for a few of years in 1965-1967. The Korea News played an audiovisual documentation about honsik using barley and punsik which the National Film Production Center produced in the 1967. The Korea News acted as a type of video press of the South Korean government and was played at theaters as a pre-movie advertising from 1953 to 1994. The National Film Production Center was established in 1948 and belonged to the Bureau of Public Information in South Korea. The title that the Korea News played in 1967 was “the encouragement of honsik and punsik.”226 The audiovisual documentation running one and a half minutes mentioned that “the reason why the proportion of eating punsik increased was attributed to the cooperation of the public.”227 At the last part of the audiovisual documentation, it showed a part of video which showed the scene of cooking or honsik and punsik a. The HCU acted as a state-led mobilization policy, but on the one hand, the action of the HCU was directing to encourage the public voluntarily to participate in the HCU. In 1968, the National Film Production Center produced another audiovisual documentation running about ten minutes about the HCU with the title “The encouragement of barley honsik and punsik.” It recommended to eat honsik and punsik such as “sujebi, bread, ramen, steamed barley, and dumplings” to manage health instead of eating steamed rice with low nutrients.228 In particular, this video emphasized that the barley crops were enough for all the public to eat them and that the government was supplying barley with low cost. The description about honsik and punsik in the video seemed to aim at women and housewives in that the focus

226 “An Audiovisual Documentation 5-5-The Korea News, Honpunsik Changnyo,” National Archive of Korea, management number: CEN0000553, produced by the National Film Production Center in 1967. 227 “An Audiovisual Documentation 5-5-The Korea News, Honpunsik Changnyo,” National Archive of Korea, management number: CEN0000553, produced by the National Film Production Center in 1967. 228 “An Audiovisual Documentation 1-1-Barley Honsik and Punsik Changnyo,” National Archive of Korea, management number: CEN0003243, produced by the National Film Production Center in 1968. 67

was on the effect of skin care and the prevention of stains and freckles as well as children’s physical growth and nutrients. President Park’s regime not only “reinforced the administrative action to restaurants and companies” to have violated the administrative order of reducing consumption of rice, but also “forced homes to eat honsik using barley” by cooperating with the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, and the Police Administration.229 As increasing of the barley crops, President Park’s regime emphasized the HCU to focus on honsik using barley. The HCU focusing on barley consumption could not last for long in the 1960s. South Koreans mostly preferred steamed rice which tastes sweet to barley which has a rough texture. The emphasis on the merits of flour-based food and mixed food with rice and other grains lasted throughout newspapers. The major news media in South Korea made efforts to publicize both the nutritional value and the inexpensive price of wheat flour. Maeil Business Newspaper issued a newspaper article that described how flour-based food holds an important position in terms of the improvement of dietary lives, insistently, “wheat flour food is more nutritional and economical than rice-based meals because it is possible to import foreign wheat flour with around one third of the price.”230 The newspaper article emphasized that wheat flour contains more protein, fat, and minerals which help digestion. It also pointed out that South Koreans tended to ignore the value of wheat flour as food reserves although flour was globally popular ingredient. For this, it underlined the role of the Samyang food company to produce instant noodles as effective food sources in order to place ramen as the second rice. The newspaper companies used to belittle the effect of eating only rice to reduce the consumption of rice by describing that eating mixed food of barley and rice is more nutritious than eating only rice. The newspapers introduced diverse menus that combine barley such as barley bread mixed with flour, noodles made of barley, and boiled barley and rice with bean sprouts; they often mentioned the explanation that those menus were ideal because of the high level of nutrition.231 Rice as an integral part of the Korean diet sometimes became a target of

229 “Reinforcing Barley Honsik,” Maeil Business Newspaper, August 18, 1966, 3. 230 “The Merit of Flour Foods and the Appearance of Ramen,” Maeil Business Newspaper, June 3, 1967, 2; “The Nutrition and the Comparative Prices," Maeil Business Newspaper, February 17, 1969, 1. 231 “Mixed Food with Barley,” The Kyunghyang Shinmun, August 12, 1967, 5. 68

criticism. The admiration for flour-based food overwhelmed the whole regions of South Korea under the name of the improvement of dietary lives. Newspapers competitively introduced various recipes using wheat flour and barley. A culinary expert wrote an article to explain the recipe of dishes using flour or barley such as and kalguksu.232 The recipe of bibimbap, which was introduced in the article, was to add more barley to the original bibimbap. The recipe of the original bibimbap is to mix a steamed rice with assorted mixtures of vegetables. Kalguksu is a hot soup dish with wheat flour noodles and vegetables. The third period of the HCU in 1969-1975 was when President Park intensively carried out the HCU. On January 13, 1969, the Cabinet Council of Economy voted for the scheme of reducing consumption of rice that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry proposed.233 It was based on the Grain Management Act. The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry appointed the ‘No Rice Days,’ Wednesday and Saturday.234 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry announced all over the country that all the tourist service establishments should obey the rules except in an exceptional case. For instance, cafeterias in public institutions, hotel restaurants, and golf course restaurants which use rice as the raw material for meals should “mix rice with 30 percent of other grains.”235 Restaurants were “forbidden from selling rice-based meals from 11 a.m. to 5 p.m. every Wednesday and Saturday.”236 They cannot produce and sell rice-based snacks, such as gangjeong or yakgwa, which are fried rice crackers and rice cookies made with flavors of ginger and honey, respectively. Rice cake, called in Korean, should be blended with more than 30 percent of barley.237 This administrative order was implemented because many restaurants tended to less and less use mixed food. In the case of grain dealers, they were “prohibited from selling rice and barley separately” while the flour producers had a “duty to produce average 80 percent of flour.”238 The cafeteria of the government offices, public institutions, and government enterprises was prohibited from making meals which is required to

232 “Summer Foods,” The Dong-A Ilbo, 1968.07.25. July 25, 1968, 6. 233 “Legislating No Rice Days and Honsik,” Maeil Business Newspaper, January 14, 1969, 7. 234 The Administrative Order Report of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of South Korea, “Demanding Fulfillment of Honpunsik of the Business Services,” (February 20, 1975), 95. 235 Administrative Order, “Demanding Fulfillment of Honpunsik,” 95. 236 Administrative Order, “Demanding Fulfillment of Honpunsik,” 95. 237 Administrative Order, “Demanding Fulfillment of Honpunsik,” 95. 238 Administrative Order, “Demanding Fulfillment of Honpunsik,” 96. 69

use rice as a raw ingredient. The chiefs of the central government and all the local administration should instruct the affiliated employees to be role models to eat honsik and punsik at workplace and at home. The censorship of school lunchbox was legislated. School principals should supervise students to prepare honsik and punsik as their lunchboxes. Besides, more than 25% of other grains should be added to rice for every meal at home. The ‘No Rice Days’ enacted in 1969 was symbolic in terms of the Administrative Orders of Honsik and Punsik in that the government coerced food ingredients for meals and intervened the public’s dietary lives. The Administrative Orders of Honsik and Punsik was revised several times and instructed until 1975 to reinforce the control and the crackdown on grain distributors, grain process manufacturers, and restaurant operators. While the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry administrated the HCU regarding the Grain Management Act, the Ministry of Health and Welfare played a practical role to affect the public’s dietary lives through the women’s associations. Since 1969 the systematic punsik recipe that the Ministry of Health and Welfare researched and presented was distributed all over the country; women’s associations at each city, province, and district actively opened diverse classes for baking bread and punsik. The movement of reducing consumption of rice was carried out through the women’s associations and the Saemaeul Undong,239 which was the national core project by President Park’s regime in the 1970s. After the 1980s, the movement of reducing consumption of rice disappeared since rice production increased and flour-based food became popular. The movement of reducing consumption of rice that the South Korean government carried out derived other forms of food movements for South Koreans’ dietary lives improvement. The left material in figure 3 was the notification according to Grain Management Act. On January 23, 1969, this notification was announced by Kyeong-Won Park as the Minister of Home Affair, Gae-Soon Lee as the Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, and Hee-Seup Chung as the Minister of Health and Welfare. This government notification as part of the movement of reducing consumption of rice was the forceful administrative order. The first part of the notification was about the terms of compliance, the second part of it was about the administrative measures, and the third part of it was about the enforcement date. All businesses dealing with food should serve meals by adding more than 25% of barley of flour noodles instead of serving

239 Kong, “Honpunsik Changnyo Undong,” 5. 70

100% of steamed rice. All businesses ranged from hotels, inns, to wagon restaurants. The cafeterias in the public office and government enterprises should not serve steamed rice and rice- related food. If they violate once a year, they were ordered to suspend business for 10 days; if they do twice a year, suspension of business would be for 30 days; if they do three times a year, their business licenses would be revoked. The right material in figure 3 was the government statement which was announced on November 8, 1971. This statement was signed with the names of Hyeun-Ok Kim as the Minister of Home Affair, Bo-Hyeun Kim as the Minister of Agriculture, and Kyeong-Ho Lee as the Minister of Health and Social Affairs. This statement appealed the national difficulties of obtaining rice and requested the public’s cooperation to increase consumption of honsik and punsik. First, at home, the public would eat honsik with the ratio of rice and barley to be a 8 to 2 ratio; they would eat punsik more than three times per week; they would not visit restaurant which did not follow honsik and punsik. Secondly, at all restaurants, all food businesses would mix more than 20% of wheat, barley of wheat noodles with rice; meals for patients would be exceptional; restaurants which was assigned as punsik center cannot be allowed to sell regular meals relating to rice; they cannot sell regular meals relating to rice every Wednesday and Saturday from 11 a.m. to 7 p.m. Thirdly, at grain processing industry, they would not be allowed to deal with rice such as rice wine, makgeolli in Korean. The statement seemed to be much strict to food restaurants according to the Grain Management Act. If the violate the Grain Management Act, they would be under suspension of business at least three months to six months, or the revocation of business license.

71

Figure 3 The Notification of 1969 (left).240 The Statement of 1971(right).241 President Park’s HCU as a government policy aroused diverse movements to change South Koreans’ eating lives. Active campaigning for eating mixed food of barley and rice and eating flour-based food was making progress.242 As President Park’s government encouraged the public actively to follow the HCU as a state-mobilization policy, the South Korean major newspaper companies such as Maeil Business Newspaper, The Kyunghyang Shinmun, and The Dong-A Ilbo issued a number of HCU-related news articles of the policy in 1960s-1970s; they had published was about 20~30 of HCU-related news articles per year between 1965 and 1975.243 In the 1960s, the newspapers companies published many articles about the activities of

240 “The Government Notification” management number: minsok080066, National Folk Museum of Korea. https://nfm.go.kr/common/data/home/relic/detailPopup.do?seq=PS0100200100108006600000. 241 “The Statement,” management number: minsok080067, National Folk Museum of Korea. https://nfm.go.kr/common/data/home/relic/detailPopup.do?seq=PS0100200100108006700000. 242 Dong-A Ilbo, June 14, 1967. 243 Naver News Library, a digital archive service, provides major South Korean newspapers so it is possible to search newspapers between 1920 and 1999. Link in: https://newslibrary.naver.com/. 72

the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry to advertise, the HCU as a pan-nationwide movement and as a government policy was to reduce consumption of rice and to encourage consumption of flour and barley. They also published many articles about the contributions of the Ministry of Culture and Education not only to order schools’ supervision over students’ lunchboxes for the encouragement of honsik, but also to employ nutritionists and food scientists to instruct honsik and punsik. The newspapers articles published in the 1970s showed that the government reinforced the crackdown on the public to force to follow the HCU although the aim of the HCU was to enhance the people’s dietary lives. The government expanded the object of the crackdown from restaurants in the big cities to restaurants, schools, and state-operated enterprises throughout the nation to make the HCU a pan-national movement.244 The side-effect of the crackdown on the HCU become serious. The Ministry of Culture and Education was criticized by some schools’ excessive regulation. As some of schools over-interpreted the administrative order of the HCU, they arranged the ratio of rice and barley of students’ lunchboxes up to a 5 to 5 ratio; according to the original regulation, the ratio of rice and barley was a 7 to 3 ratio. Other schools reflected students’ grades or confiscated their lunchboxes when they did pack their lunchboxes with the ratio of barley below 3.245 This data of HCU-related news articles in 1965- 1975 indicated the expansion of the HCU’s characteristics from the effort to accomplish the improvement of dietary lives as a pan-national movement to the effort coercively to enforce the HCU as a state-led policy. The Park government compulsorily propelled the HCU as a state-led mobilization policy by dispatching joint observer teams throughout the nation. The joint observer teams consisted of the members who belonged to the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the Ministry of Home Affairs, and the Ministry of Justice.246 The mass media such as newspapers, radio news, and television news was also mobilized as the means to advertise the HCU as a government policy. The Park government was criticized because of the media control and the coercive penalty for violation. Nonetheless, the HCU was characteristic in that the HCU as a national mobilization policy concentrated on the improvement for the people’s dietary lives and the enhancement of their health and welfare. In the 1970s, the

244 “The Expansion of the Crackdown on the HCU,” Maeil Business Newspaper, December 9, 1971, 3. 245 “The Crackdown of Students’ Lunchbox, Reflecting Grades and Punishing,” Dong-A Ilbo, June 12, 1976, 7. 246 “Controlling Foreign Grains through Honsik and Establishing Punsik Centers,” Maeil Business Newspaper, December 12, 1967, 3. 73

HCU became part of the Saemaeul Undong to look for the public’s better life. As emphasizing the national unity through the collaboration among the public, the focus of the Saemaeul Undong was on the people’s cooperation, patriotism, and furthermore participation in the national reconstruction. Figure 7 with the title of “The promotional material of the Saemaeul Undong” was a posting material for advertising the Saemaeul Undong which was a pan-national unity movement. This material of figure 7 suggested eight directions of the Saemaeul Undong with each key word. The subheadings of each posters, from the left in clockwise direction, were “taking care of a path of flowers, developing school facility, sweeping in front of one’s house, collecting waste articles and saving, helping neighbors, traffic safety, hygiene and prevention of epidemics, and honsik and punsik.

Figure 4 A Promotional Material of the Saemaeul Undong in the 1970s.247 The Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry of South Korea used to submit the project proposal to offer a prize for the best slogan which would promote eating mixed meals of barley,

247 “A Posting Material of Saemaeul Undong,” management number: minsok043567, National Folk Museum of Korea. https://nfm.go.kr/common/data/home/relic/detailPopup.do?seq=PS0100200100104356700000 74

flour, and rice at the Economy Ministers Meeting in 1966.248 The work selections of slogans were used for advertising and promotional materials of the HCU movement by the government agencies. In the 1970s, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and the Ministry of Health and Welfare diffused the HCU by utilizing posters. Figure 8 showed the efforts of these government departments to encourage the public to intake flour-based food in the 1970s. The left poster of figure 2 that was put up by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry illustrated a mother and a son eating guksu, writing that “A mother cooking punsik and our family enjoying it.”249 It indicated that the HCU focused on the role of housewives at home who took charge of family’s meals, and that noodles, guksu, can be regarded as a meal for young children. The middle poster of figure 8 displayed by the Ministry of Health and Welfare wrote “Let us look for wealth and power through honsik and look for health through punsik.” As the Ministry of Health and Welfare emphasized the nutritional value of wheat and barley, the poster in the middle illustrated that only the person who eats honsik and punsik can have a robust physique and can win the trophy of “health.” At the top of the trophy in the middle poster, the word “health” is written while “the improvement of dietary lives” is written at the column of the trophy. This kind of posters emphasizing nourishment of honsik and punsik were often made in order to advertise the HCU to the public in the 1970s.250 As another example, the right poster in figure 8, the phrase “Honsik and punsik I eat, my body strong and my country strong” which was a slogan inserted at the top of the poster.251 To illustrate specifically, one boy and one girl are sitting at a table, and on the table a noodles dish, guksu, and two donuts on a plate with a cup of water. One boy raising noodles high over his head with chopsticks is looking up the noodles while one girl picking up a donut over her head with a fork is looking up the donut. The posters showed the HCU was part of an enlightenment movement to improve the public’s dietary lives.

248 The Record of the Ministry of Agriculture of the Meeting of Minister Conference of Economy, “Advertisement of Slogan about Eating Mixed Grain with Rice and Barley and the Examination Plan,” (June 23, 1966), 51-64. 249 Yong-Jo Kim, “2422. “Honpunsik and Lunchbox,” Woori-Munhwa Shinmun, November 29, 2012, http://www.koya-culture.com/news/article.html?no=3582. 250 Dong-A Ilbo, August 9, 1971. 251 “Enlightenment Poster,” management number: minsok081666, National Folk Museum of Korea. https://nfm.go.kr/common/data/home/relic/detailPopup.do?seq=PS0100200100108166600000 75

Figure 5 Posters Promoting the HCU in the 1970 In 1971 the Seoul city gave out a notice that a free cooking class would open for housewives in order to promote eating flour-based food at home and improve their dietary lives. This announcement advertised the recipe to make bread as staple food and to help improve your health by using flour food. The product advertisement of yeast was also attached under the notice of the cooking class. Jun-Ryun Wang who was the president of the Research Institute of the Dietary Lives Development instructed the class. She studied the plan of diet and introduced diverse menus such as a hot noodle soup, a soup, a curry macaroni dish, and a chicken noodle soup.252 To lead the HCU across the country, the big cities and local districts employed food scientists, nutritionists, and food experts.

252 Jun-Ryun Wang, “Simple Lunch Menu,” Christian Home (1968): 111-115. 76

Figure 6 A Saemauel Choir Competition for the Improvement of Dietary Lives (left). A Pamphlet of the Choir Competition (right).253 Holding a choir competition was one of the diverse ways to encourage the improvement for the public’s dietary lives in the 1970s. On December 3, 1972, a choir competition was held along with the Saemaeul Undong. The Head Office of Women’s Association of South Korea hosted the choir competition, and the sponsors were the Ministry of Agriculture and the Korea Milling Industry Association. To describe the pamphlet in figure 9, the title “Saemauel choir competition for improvement of dietary lives” was written at the top of the left material in figure 9 while the host and the sponsor were printed at the bottom of it.254 The right material in figure 9 was a booklet about the choir competition. The first page of the booklet was typed with the list of the participants in the choir competition; the first part of the competition was for the family choir and the second part of the competition was for the housewives’ choir. The second page of the booklet consisted of the table of nutrients- rice, barley, wheat, bean, milk- and the merits of honsik and punsik with two images. The focus was on the intake of a broad variety of nourishing food and suggested a meal plan a day which was one punsik and two of honsik per day.

253 “A Saemauel Pamphlet,” management number: minsok020148, National Folk Museum of Korea. https://nfm.go.kr/common/data/home/relic/detailPopup.do?seq=PS0100200100102014800000 254 “A Saemauel Pamphlet,” management number: minsok020148, National Folk Museum of Korea. https://nfm.go.kr/common/data/home/relic/detailPopup.do?seq=PS0100200100102014800000 77

Figure 7 Cooking Class for Honsik and Punsik in 1973255 Feature 10 showed one example of diverse cooking classes in the 1970s. In feature 10 under the national flag of the ROK, the phrase “Special cooking class for hon.punsik” in a large blue font size and “For the improvement of dietary lives” in a smaller red font size were written on the white banner. At the bottom of the banner, the name of the sponsor is partially hidden and hard to discern. Feature 10 indicated that most of participants in cooking classes were women and housewives. Most of cooking classes for honsik and punsik for were hosted by the government departments, the women societies, government enterprises, or their cooperation. These classes taught the recipes of cookies, bread, donuts, and guksu. Besides these diets, housewives cooked at home such as instant noodles, bread, guksu, kalguksu, and sujebi.256 It showed that the HCU influenced on the consumption of flour-based food among the people.

255 Hae-Yong Son, “Sushi Using Mixed Grains Driven by the Effort of Reducing Consumption of Rice,” JoongAng Ilbo, November 24, 2018, https://news.joins.com/article/23152544. 256 Maeil Business Newspaper, April 13, 1973. 78

Conclusion

This thesis is a study about South Korean popular culture in international relations between the U.S. and South Korea. In the 1960s-1970s South Koreans consumed U.S. agricultural commodities, especially wheat flour, through the government’s policy, the HCU while they experienced U.S. wheat since the end of WWII. The result of the HCU appeared in South Koreans’ dietary culture. President Park’s regime wanted to people to think about U.S. wheat flour as a main ingredient for meals. The HCU played the role to promote people to consume wheat flour as well as barley. The HCU worked out in that it was implemented as a state-mobilization policy. People voluntarily and obligatorily began consuming flour-based food and barley-based food at home, schools, restaurants, and workplaces by President Park’s HCU policy. The inflow of U.S. food supplies made influence on the South Korean government’s Grain Management Act as an agricultural policy in managing agricultural product, and the Grain Management Act directly contributed to the practices of the HCU. South Korean primary sources such as newspapers, slogans, and administrative orders of the HCU under President Park’s rule showed how the HCU changed South Koreans’ dietary culture. The HCU which President Park carried out as a state-mobilization policy indicated a significant meaning regarding the change of South Koreans’ dietary culture in that their interest in wheat flour gradually increased. South Koreans were directly exposed by administrated orders and slogans of punsik using flour and honsik using barley that the government branches presented. Newspapers of South Korea published a variety of commercial advertisement about flour-related products such as ramen, flour, yeast, and oven while they also published a lot of news articles to emphasize the nutritional advantages of flour-based food. The Saemaeul Undong was a catalyst to promote the HCU. Although the HCU was a compulsory policy carried out by President Park’s authoritarian regime, the HCU was framed with a positive connotation by the Saemaeul Undong. The Saemaeul Undong was a pan nationwide campaign to appeal the public’s cooperation for the national restoration and for the devotion for the country. The public recognized not only that their active participation in the Saemaeul Undong was important, but the practice of the HCU, which was one of the campaigns that Saemaeul Undong sought for, was also significant. The public believed that their collaboration to fulfill the HCU and participation in the Saemaeul Undong can lead to the well-being of themselves. 79

The practice of the entire public in the HCU resulted in the expansion of their staple in dietary culture. They did not hesitate the consumption of flour-based food as meals. Punsik using wheat flour such as ramen, sujebi, and a variety of guksu became more popular foods in South Korea. A staple grain which accounts for the second highest consumption in South Korea after rice is wheat flour. Wheat flour as a raw ingredient for cooking has a high consumption value for South Koreans’ dietary life at home because flour can be used for planning diverse diets. Wheat flour, which is processed in milling factory, is used to produce a variety of flour-based foods at food industry in South Korea. Wheat flour is consumed as a complete product by itself by South Koreans while food industry uses wheat flour as a raw material to produce ramen, breads, snacks, and wheat noodles. According to the official announcement of South Korean enterprise in 2015, “30% of refined flours is provided to general consumers via retail stores while 70% of refined flours is supplied to baking, confectionery, and noodles manufacturing businesses.”257 The retail stores of South Korea which flour are provided to include department stores, supermarket chains, convenience stores, grocery stores, and more. The consumption of wheat flour in South Korea is overall influenced by domestic flour-based food industry. South Korean milling companies mainly import foreign wheat so that the fluctuations of the international grain prices or exchange rates can be a risky factor. However, from the point of view of consumers, the price of wheat flour does not seem to affect the demand of wheat flour in that “the price elasticity of wheat flour in South Korea is low;” also, South Korean “economic fluctuations or seasonal tendency do not affect the demand of wheat flour.”258 For these reasons, South Koreans tend to treat wheat flour as an appropriate food ingredient for preparing meals. Wheat flour is used as a versatile food ingredient at home in that people can make wheat noodles, dumpling skin, or bread by using flour dough. Instant noodles, ramen is generally regarded as one of basic human needs for South Koreans. The price fluctuations of ramen are low, and economic fluctuations are not affecting the demand of ramen. Ramen is a popular food which South Koreans enjoy regardless of age or gender. The South Korean companies producing ramen keep have developed a new menu by

257 Woo, Shunghwi, “A Study of Asymmetric Price Transmission between Imported Wheat Prices and Processed Food Prices by Distribution Channels on Flour and Ramen,” (MA diss., Seoul National University, 2016), 11. 258 Woo, “A Study of Asymmetric Price Transmission,” 13-14. 80

pursuing the flavor trends and the noodles trends of ramen. Seasonal tendency does not influence the ramen demand in South Korea all through the year. In other words, the ramen industries consistently try to device a new flavor of power soup base and liquid seasoning for people who want to try more hot and spicy ramen. Whenever the seasons changes, they also release instant noodles as a seasonal item, such as reman using cold soup instead of hot soup which people typically use or ramen without soup which people eat by mixing noodles with liquid seasoning. As to kalguksu and sujebi they were regarded as a homemade meal or a food available at a restaurant because the noodles of kalguksu and the flour dough of sujebi are generally made by hand; however, instant noodles companies release an instant noodles type of kalguksu and sujebi, kalguksu and sujebi became a convenience food as an easy and quick meal. As I mentioned earlier in the introduction about the statistics of South Koreans’ ramen consumption in the world which the World Instant Noodles Association reported in July 2020, South Korea is the nation which shows that the consumption of ramen per capita is the highest in the world and has gradually increased. The popularity of ramen today and the development of flour-based foods such as kalguksu and sujebi are attributed to the HCU in the 1960s-1970s. In addition, due to the impact of the HCU, diverse noodle dishes were deprived according to regional specialties. For example, makguksu which is made of buckwheat is a well-known noodle dish in Chuncheon; milmyeon is a representative noodle food of Pusan which is made of wheat as mil and myeon in Korean mean wheat and noodles, respectively. Under the HCU, the recipes of bread, burger, homemade noodles and the products of oven, yeast for baking were advertised. Among them, sujebi, kalguksu, makguksu, and milmyeon became more popular foods than other western foods in the 1960s-1970s. Later on, according to the development of a mechanism in utilizing wheat flour, Western foods such as pizza, burger, and beard became popularized; restaurant franchises and bakeries mushroomed since the 1980s, which came into the high demand of flour. The long-period import volume of foreign wheat up to the present proved the omnipresent use of wheat flour and the popularity of flour-based foods in South Korea. It shows the development process and the transition of South Koreans’ food consumption and dietary culture in the 1960s-2000s since the introduction of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities. In the 1960s, great and small bakeries appeared in South Korea, which was a result of the combination of the remains of both Japanese colonialism and American culture during the period of the

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USAMGIK. The New York confectionery was established in Seoul in 1967, and many private businesses and street vendors emerged in the 1960s. In the 1970s, along with South Korea’s economic development, many restaurant franchises appeared as well as small business owners emerged. Thereby, the change of South Koreans’ dietary culture began from a style of home cooked food into a style of restaurant food. For example, in 1979, a burger franchise restaurant, Lotteria, emerged, and the name of Lotteria is a combination of two words, a company, Lotte, and a cafeteria. The initial Lotteria was founded in Japan in 1972. In the 1980s, foreign restaurant franchises emerged in South Korea: Burger King in 1982, KFC in 1984, MacDonald in 1986, Domino’s Pizza in 1989. In the 1990s, many family restaurants emerged, for example, T.G.I. Friday’s in 1991, Subway in 1992, Mr. Pizza, a South Korean pizza restaurant, in 1993, Popeyes in 1994, and Outback Steakhouse in 1997. After the 2000s, the desire of the consumers increased, and in turn, diverse traditional restaurants of each country and international food restaurants emerged. A number of convenience stores also mushroomed. As to South Korean convenience stores, ramen cooking machines are widespread at the recent convenience stores in South Korea. The method of using a ramen cooking machine is to put ramen and a power soup in a container and press a button, and then the machine will set with a proper amount of water and cooking time to cook ramen. The consumption of flour-based foods among South Koreans keeps increasing. Despite the high demand of wheat flour in South Korea, the domestic self-sufficiency of wheat was a mere 1.2% in 2015.259 In addition to wheat, the self-sufficiency of corn, bean, and barley is respectively 3.3%, 25.4%, and 32.6% while the self-sufficiency of rice is almost one hundred percent.260 It indicates that South Korea largely relies on the foreign grains. The method to produce wheat flour in South Korea is to mill flour in domestic milling factory after purchasing foreign raw wheat which are imported from the U.S., Australia, and Canada. The number of local milling factories of South Korea were averagely 20 in the 1960s-1970s, 13 in the 1980s, 11 in the 1990-2000, and 10 since 2017 to the present.261 According to the statistics by Korean Milling Association, the import volume of U.S. wheat to South Korea was dominating;

259 “Establish Food Security by Enhancing the Self-Sufficiency of Wheat,” Korean Newspapers of Farmers and Fishermen, April 17, 2020, no. 3193, page 11. http://www.agrinet.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=176176 260 “Establish Food Security,” Korean Newspapers of Farmers and Fishermen, April 17, 2020. 261 Korean Milling Association, “Capacity to Process Wheat and the Results of Processed Wheat by year,” http://www.kofmia.org/data/stat_idx01.jsp 82

in the 1970s, U.S. wheat of 1,122,000 tons was dominantly imported while Canadian wheat of 37,000 tons was temporally imported. In the 1980s, the only U.S. wheat of 1,876,000 tons was imported. In 1985, Australian wheat of 31,000 tons was initially imported while the U.S. import volume of wheat was 1,917,000 tons.262 In 1990, the wheat import volume of the U.S., Australia, and Canada were respectively 1,769,000 tons, 315,000 tons, and 9,000 tons. Since 2000, the import volume of Australian wheat gradually increased; 1,329,000 tons of U.S. wheat, 1,036,000 tons of Australian wheat, and 140,000 tons of Canadian wheat. In 2010, the wheat import volume of the U.S., Australia, and Canada were respectively 1,057,000 tons, 941,000 tons, and 136,000 tons. In 2019, the wheat import volume of the U.S., Australia, and Canada were respectively 1,078,000 tons, 1,076,000 tons, and 136,000 tons. Wheat is also imported from Russia and several countries, but the wheat import volume from the three countries made up the greatest portion, nearly 98%, which reaches 2,000,000 tons for a year. The imported wheat is used for food industry and non-food industry for various purposes such as fodders and industrial resources. The yield of local wheat in South Korea and the self-sufficiency of wheat farming are considerably low while the dependence of foreign wheat import is overwhelmingly high due to the relatively low price of foreign wheat. The Park government’s focus on wheat impacted rice produces in South Korea outside of the cities. In the 1960s, the five-year economic plans led to industrialization and the growth of cities, but it caused the decrease of the population in rural areas. The young population left rural areas while the aging population increased in farm villages. In addition, the Park government’s low-price policy of rice brought economic failure in farming areas. Farmers’ economic burden increased as investing agricultural pesticides, fertilizer, herbicide, agricultural machinery, but the low-price policy of rice left their debts.263 The HCU did not play a role to diversify domestic crops. The Park’s government did rarely consider self-sufficiency in rice production while the reliance on imported flour from the U.S. increased. In other words, the farmhouse-hold income rapidly decreased because of the Park’s government’s imbalanced economic growth strategy between industrialism agricultural economy and because of overlooking self-sufficient

262 Korean Milling Association, “Import Volume of Wheat by Country of Origin” http://www.kofmia.org/data/stat_idx05.jsp 263 Tsatsralt, Altanbagana, “The Relationship between State and Peasants in President Park Chung-Hee Regime: From the "Saemaul Movement 1970s" Perspective,” (MA diss., Sungkyungkwan University, 2011), 13. 83

agricultural growth of rice produces; rice produces in farming areas were backward. In the 1970s, the mechanization of agricultural field contributed to rice produces, but the consumption level of rice did not increase much due to the HCU promoting the consumption of flour and the prohibition clause of processed foods which is made of rice. To sum up, when U.S. food aid policy was prevalent in the world, U.S. surplus agricultural commodities were permeated in South Koreans’ dietary culture by being blended with the country’s economic and social situation, President Park’s political ambition, and the public’s response. The influence of the blending prominently appeared during the period of President Park’s regime in the 1960s-1970s. In particular, the 1970s was when the HCU was compulsorily carried out a state-mobilization policy as well as when the type of U.S. grand-aid was transited into the loan-aid type. The characteristic of the five-year economic development plans in South Korea was the combination of U.S. aid of both agricultural surpluses and loans. The inflow of U.S. surplus agricultural commodities affected South Kora’s agricultural policy, flour industry, and even South Koreans’ dietary culture. In this way, studying the 1970s when U.S grant-aid was changed to loan-aid is significant. Furthermore, in order to have a better understanding of South Korean dietary culture, it is crucial to research on South Korea’s agricultural and economic policies by expanding the research period in that the country experienced both the period of Japan’s colonial occupation and the period of U.S. military government. In other words, there are many potential researches of South Korean food culture if we examine both the remains such as industrial foundations and agricultural policies under Japanese rule and the and the remains of American culture under U.S. military government. For this promising research, it would be important to approach to the relations between Japan and the U.S. as a transitional government in the 1940s; it would also be significant to develop comprehensive and firm study by analyzing the relations between the U.S. and South Korea, South Korea and Japan, and the U.S. and Japan.

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