Filial Piety and the Chinese Conception of Rights

FILIAL PIETY AND THE CHINESE CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS:

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS IN CHINA

Kai Lin

A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the University of Delaware in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology

Summer 2018

FILIAL PIETY AND THE CHINESE CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS:

AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF COLLEGE STUDENTS IN CHINA

Kai Lin

Approved: ______Karen Parker, Ph.D. Chair of the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice

Approved: ______George Watson, Ph.D. Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences

Approved: ______Ann L. Ardis, Ph.D. Senior Vice Provost for Graduate and Professional Education

I certify that I have read this dissertation and that in my opinion it meets the academic and professional standard required by the University as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Signed: ______Aaron Fichtelberg, Ph.D. Professor in charge of dissertation

Signed: ______Ivan Sun, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

Signed: ______Joel Best, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

Signed: ______Ethan Michelson, Ph.D. Member of dissertation committee

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The completion of this dissertation marks the end of my six years of graduate studies at the University of Delaware. This has been, beyond any doubt, the most enriching and rewarding six years of my life. Many individuals and institutions have provided support to my intellectual and emotional growth in this journey, and I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude. This dissertation would not have been possible without Dr. Aaron Fichtelberg, my Dissertation Chair. I owe Aaron many thanks for not only providing the rigorous academic support for this dissertation, but also the countless counsel and advice he offered me as my mentor throughout my entire graduate career. Aaron has also been a dear friend and “guru” whose sober yet uncynical attitude towards life has been a constant source of encouragement and inspiration. I learned from Aaron the art of teaching with a passion, and the art of balancing academic life and personal happiness. Thank you, Aaron! I would also like to thank Dr. Ivan Sun, who not only helped me grow as a scholar by including me in his research initiatives and guided me closely in the research process, but has also been making me feel at home since the first day I set foot on this country. My impression and feelings of Thanksgiving are forever going to be associated with the lively and generous spirits at Ivan’s Thanksgiving dinner parties. I would also like to thank Dr. Joel Best for all the advice he offered for my academic as well as professional development over the years. Joel’s passion for teaching and life-long commitment to public sociology have been encouraging many

iv junior sociologists such as myself who are passionate about connecting academic insights to teaching and to social change.

My thanks also go to Dr. Ethan Michelson, who not only graciously agreed to be an external reader for this dissertation, but has also been very generous with his time and constructive criticisms for this dissertation. I would like to thank Dr. Christy Visher, Laura Rapp, Steve Martin, and Dan O’Connell. My time at CDHS has opened my eyes to the world of applied research, and I also received a tremendous amount of academic, professional, and emotional support from my CDHS advisors. I would also like to thank my family and friends. I thank my mom for being supportive of my decision to pursue a PhD in sociology, despite her initial doubts. I also feel very lucky to have made so many friends in Delaware: Matt, Joe, Melissa, Brandie, Laura and Job, Colin, and Yehia, without you guys my time in graduate school would have been much paler. I also feel extremely indebted to the generous support of the

University of Delaware and the Department of Sociology and Criminal Justice. I have had a great experience here as a graduate student, and feel grateful that I made the decision to study at UD. In particular, I would like to shout out to Dr. Mary Martin. Dr. Martin works tirelessly and makes every graduate student feel warm inside the moment they start graduate school. Thank you, Dr. Martin!

v TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES ...... ix ABSTRACT ...... xii

Chapter

1 INTRODUCTION ...... 1

2 CHINESE CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS...... 9

Liberty, Economy, and Authority: Early Writings of the Chinese Political Style ...... 10

Montesquieu ...... 10 Karl Marx ...... 14 Max Weber ...... 18

Rights and Law in Modernizing Asia ...... 22 Recent History of the Legal System in Mainland China ...... 26 Confucian Moral Economy and the Chinese Conception of Rights ...... 28 Rights Discourses in Contemporary China ...... 30 Class Status, Political Liberalization, and the Chinese Conception of Rights .. 34 Concluding Notes...... 35

3 FILIAL PIETY IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS .. 36

Filial Piety and Political Authority in Confucianism ...... 36

Confucianism and the Philosophical Origin of Filial Piety ...... 38 Governance and Authority in Confucian Thought ...... 43

Filial Piety and State-Society Relations in Imperial China ...... 49 Filial Piety in Contemporary China ...... 54

Filial Piety as a Value and as a Practice ...... 54 Filial Piety and Political Authoritarianism ...... 56 Filial Piety and Chinese National Identity ...... 59

Concluding Notes...... 60

4 METHODOLOGY ...... 61

Population Selection and Analytic Strategy ...... 61

vi Sample and Specific Analytic Strategies ...... 64

Sample...... 64 Analytic Strategies ...... 65

Descriptive Statistics and Exploratory Factor Analyses ...... 66

Endorsement of Rights ...... 66 Endorsement of Traditional and Modern Values ...... 71 Endorsement of Cosmology ...... 77 Understanding of Filial Piety ...... 80 Creation and Specification of Key Variables ...... 84

5 TRADITIONAL AND MODERN VALUES ON CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS ...... 90

Dependent and Independent Variables ...... 90 Multivariate Analyses ...... 91 Discussion ...... 92

6 DIMENSHIONS OF FILIAL PIETY AND THEIR SOCIAL CORRELATES97

Dependent and Independent Variables ...... 98

Multivariate Analyses ...... 98

Discussion ...... 99

7 FILIAL PIETY AND THE CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS ...... 104

Bivariate Analyses ...... 104 Multivariate Analyses ...... 105 Discussion ...... 107

8 CONCLUSION ...... 111

Chinese Conception of Rights and State-Centric Normativism ...... 111 Traditional Culture, Political Liberalization, and Social Solidarity ...... 118 Religiosity and Cosmologies ...... 123 The Mainland and Non-Mainland Difference ...... 124 Chinese Cultural Nationalism: Implications for Future Research ...... 125 Limitations ...... 128

REFERENCES ...... 131

vii Appendix

A SURVEY QUESTIONS IN CHINESE ...... 140

viii LIST OF TABLES

Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Characteristics (n=1017) ...... 65

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (n=1017) ...... 67

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (Mainland, n=714) ...... 68

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 69

Factor Analysis of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (n=1017)70

Factor Analysis of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (by citizenship) ...... 70

Descriptive Statistics of Traditional and Modern Values (n=1017) ...... 72

Descriptive Statistics of Traditional and Modern Values (Mainland, n=714) ...... 73

Descriptive Statistics of Traditional and Modern Values (Non- Mainland, n=303) ...... 74

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Traditional and Modern Values (n=1017) ...... 75

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Traditional and Modern Values (by citizenship) ...... 76

Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Cosmology (n=1017) ...... 78

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Cosmology (Mainland, n=714)78

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Cosmology (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 79

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Endorsement of Cosmology (n=1017) 79

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Endorsement of Cosmology (by citizenship) ...... 80

ix Descriptive Statistics of Understanding of Filial Piety (n=1017) ...... 81

Descriptive Statistics of Understanding of Filial Piety (Mainland, n=714) ...... 81

Descriptive Statistics of Understanding of Filial Piety (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 82

Factor Analysis of Understanding of Filial Piety (Mainland, n=714) ..... 83

Factor Analysis of Understanding of Filial Piety (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 84

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (n=1017) ...... 86

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Mainland, n=714) ...... 86

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 87

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Mainland, n=714) ...... 88

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 88

Correlation Analysis of Constructing Dependent Variable (Mainland, n=714) ...... 88

Correlation Analysis of Constructing Dependent Variable (Non- Mainland, n=303) ...... 89

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Civil and Political Over Economic Conception of Rights (n=1017) ...... 94

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Civil and Political Over Economic Conception of Rights (Mainland, n=714) ...... 95

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Civil and Political Over Economic Conception of Rights (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 96

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Reciprocal over Authoritarian Filial Piety (n=1017) ...... 101

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Reciprocal over Authoritarian Filial Piety (Mainland, n=714) ...... 102

x Table 16.3 Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Reciprocal over Authoritarian Filial Piety (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 103

Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables (Mainland, n=714) ...... 104

Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables (Non- Mainland, n=303) ...... 105

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Filial Piety on Civil and Political over Economic Conception of Rights (Mainland, n=1017) ...... 108

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Filial Piety on Civil and Political over Economic Conception of Rights (Mainland, n=714) ...... 109

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Filial Piety on Civil and Political over Economic Conception of Rights (Non-Mainland, n=303) ...... 110

Typology of Legal Consciousness ...... 117

xi ABSTRACT

Elizabeth Perry argued that the Chinese conception of rights is primarily based on the historically developed state-society relations in China, in which the state’s centralized power is legitimated by its provision of economic goods to the peasantry. This moral economy, Perry argued, was further solidified by Confucian moral philosophy, the state orthodoxy of imperial China. This study is intended to empirically contextualize Elizabeth Perry’s argument of the Chinese moral economy by examining the relationship between Confucian interpersonal ethic (in particular, filial piety) and the Chinese conception of rights among contemporary college students in China. The results of quantitative analyses in this study confirm Perry’s argument about the primacy of economic security in the Chinese conception of rights, and link Confucian values such as filial piety to this conception of rights. However, findings in this study also reveal that although Confucianism and filial piety as cultural symbols continue to shape contemporary legal and political consciousness, their contemporary meanings have significantly shifted. Specifically, understanding filial piety as authoritarian predicts stronger endorsement of civil and political liberties over economic security as rights. The findings of this study are also discussed in relation to Chinese nationalism and the possibility of political liberalization in China.

xii

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

From a Western perspective, contemporary China remains an exception to many generally predictable consequences of modernization. One of the most vexing of these is political liberalization (De Mesquita and Downs, 2005). On the one hand, the formerly Communist country has adopted capitalism so successfully that it has experienced an unprecedented economic growth over the last three decades. A billion of its citizens have been pulled out of extreme poverty, and millions can afford the living standards comparable to the American middle class1. On the other hand, China remains one of the most unfree territories in the world: an increasing incidence of human rights violation, especially regarding freedom of speech on the Internet and in the press, has been documented by multiple international human rights organizations (Human Rights Watch, 2017; Freedom House, 2017) in recent years. Many artists, journalists, and lawyers are subject to political arrests; pro-labor-rights activists and democratic reformers are also arrested and prosecuted for “instigating social chaos (Wong and Chen, 2017).” Nevertheless, despite often being accused by Western media and politicians of serious violations of human rights, the regime is highly trusted by its people (Li, 2004; Wang, 2005; Shen, 2009).

1 https://data.worldbank.org/country/china

The changes that China has undergone, and is still undergoing, present important challenges for various versions of “modernization theories.” Orthodox modernization theory, most notably propagated by Lipset (1960), argued that “democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances it will sustain democracy (31).” More recently, scholars have revised the orthodox theory and argue that it is not economic development that “causes” political liberalization. Rather, they proposed that modernization led to changes in mass attitudes that are conductive to political liberalization (Inglehart and

Welzel, 2010). Others such as Robinson (2006) also denied the causal effect of economic development on political liberation and argued that the nearly constant correlation between per capita income and democracy existed because “the same features of a society simultaneously determine how prosperous and how democratic it is (503).” Some exceptional cases in Asia, however, seem to have undermined the applicability of even these revisions of the theory to certain Asian countries. South Korea and Taiwan, for example, had remained under authoritarian rule for decades despite rapid economic growth in the 60s and 70s, and did not realize full democratization until late 1980s2 (Chen, 2010). In a similar light, Singapore had long attained a Western level of economic prosperity, yet is still perceived by the West as an authoritarian state (Rajah, 2011). More contemporary cases include China and Vietnam,

2 As I will further discuss in Chapter 3, it may even be argued that the democratization of South Korea and Taiwan are more incidental than inevitable: both countries relied on US military protection against their Communist enemies, and democratization further separates them from their Communist counterparts and strengthens ideological alliance with the United States.

which are still under authoritarian rule of their Communist Parties regardless of recent economic reforms that led to significant economic growth and market liberalization.

An alternative explanation of the paradox between economic modernization and political authoritarianism in some Asian countries contends that despite their economic success, these Asian countries generally endorse a set of very resilient “Asian values (in particular, Confucian values)”. These values prioritize both economic prosperity and social stability as goals of development, while individual liberty and democratic participation lauded by the West are often considered as much more secondary to these priorities (e.g., Zakaria and Lee, 1994; Kausikan, 1993). One plausible consequence of prioritizing economic growth and stability over individual freedom is that political authoritarianism becomes tolerable as long as it is effective in bringing forth prosperity and stability, which explains the paradoxical coexistence of economic modernization and political authoritarianism in some Asian countries, and counters Robinson’s (2006) revised modernization theory. It also resists Inglehart and Welzel’s (2010) “weak culture argument” of economically induced cultural transformation leading to political transformation, and endorses a “strong culture argument,” centralizing the place of traditional “Asian values” in shaping social development. Nevertheless, while empirical studies (Kim and Park, 2003; Park and Shin, 2006; Inglehart and Baker, 2000) were able to identify unique clusterings of values associated with East Asian countries (including the affinity between traditional attitudes and tolerance of political authoritarianism), the social, cultural, and historical contexts of this association were not fully expounded in these studies. This conceptual deficiency has elicited criticisms from cultural sociologists (e.g., Lizardo, 2017) who have argued that to explain personal

level characteristics (such as educational attainment) with cultural traits at the collective level renders such a cultural theory spurious.

Elizabeth Perry’s (2008) cultural theory presents an alternative to the “Asian values” argument. Perry argued that since Mencius, the Chinese had envisioned a more proactive role for government, which is often expected to promote economic welfare and security. This expectation was routinized into what Perry termed “Confucian moral economy,” which was later repackaged in Communist propaganda but largely unchanged by Mao and the succeeding Chinese leaders. Since the imperative of this moral economy is to promote people’s livelihood, civil and political liberties were placed in far less consequential positions by both the people and the state. This unique conception of rights, Perry argued, is the root cause of the particular political configuration in not only imperial, but also contemporary China. Perry further contended that the “rights consciousness” that many empirical studies assigned to protests in contemporary China erroneously assumed that the Chinese conception of rights, as its Western counterpart, was founded upon political autonomy and individual liberty and exaggerated the threat that these protests posed to the authoritarian political order of China. Instead, Perry (2009) attributed a “rules consciousness” to these protesters, which denotes the instrumental and strategic use of state-sanctioned rules to advance socioeconomic benefits without challenging the ruling authority of the state. In contrast to the crude “Asian values” argument, Perry better contextualized Chinese tolerance of political authoritarianism in not only the cultural heritage from imperial China, but also the historically formed and economically based state-society relations. Insightful as it is, Perry’s (2008) study remains a historical and philosophical reconstruction of the Chinese conception of rights. As I will further discuss in Chapter

2, recent empirical studies of pro-rights activism in China are uncovering nuances behind the conceptions of rights in contemporary China. This body of empirical studies challenged the naïve dichotomy of “rights consciousness” and “rules consciousness” in the contemporary context, and complicates Perry’s characterization of the Chinese conception of rights as the linear function of traditional Chinese philosophy and Chinese imperial history. Building on Perry’s cultural theory of the Chinese conception of rights (which I will further unpack in Chapter 2) as well as empirical studies of rights discourses as they emerged in pro-rights activism in China, and with survey data collected from over 1,000 college students across three provinces in China, this study is intended to contribute to the existing literature by empirical examining the extent to which the Chinese conception of rights is based on state provision of economic welfare, and the extent to which traditional culture and values (in particular, Confucian filial piety) shape the Chinese conception of rights in the contemporary context.

As I will further elaborate in Chapter 3, filial piety was the manifestation of a broader scheme of Confucian interpersonal ethics within the family, and the cornerstone of the Confucian social order. The Confucian social order encompasses not only the routinized state-society relations at the macro-level, or “Confucian moral economy” in

Perry’s terms, but also interpersonal ethics at the micro-level. Furthermore, I argue that there is an intimate link between the micro-level interpersonal ethics and the macro- level moral economy that results in the traditional conception of rights in China: the peasants’ need for subsistence may explain the source of the state’s legitimacy in its far- reaching and concentrated administrative power, but the solidification of this state- society relationship was only made possible with the adhesive of interpersonal ethics

such as filial piety. This link was hinted, but not fully developed in Perry’s theoretical arguments, nor was it explored in empirical research on rights conceptions in China, as I will further demonstrate in Chapter 2. While plenty of studies have been conducted on filial piety and some touched on its affinity with authoritarianism (e.g., Liu et al., 2015; Ho, 1994), the relations between filial piety and attitudes in favor of authoritarianism were oversimplified and suspiciously spurious: none of these studies were contextualized in the Confucian moral economy and study the Chinese conception of rights as a mediating variable of authoritarian attitudes. Therefore, the primary objective of this study is to explore the relations between Confucian interpersonal ethics (i.e., filial piety) and the empirically measured conceptions of rights among college students in contemporary China. As I will further discuss in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, given drastic social and economic transformations in the last century, both filial piety and the traditional conception of rights in China have undergone significant challenges. While some literatures seem to suggest the deterioration of filial piety practices, others identified a consistently strong endorsement of pro-filial-piety values and attitudes across time and space3.

3 Similarly, there is tension between scholars about whether pro-rights activism in recent years was completely informed by a "rules consciousness" (that recognizes the state's ultimate authority in granting rights) or whether it had started to exhibit some characteristics of "rights consciousness" (that rights are universal and inalienable part of "the individual"). My review of the literature in these chapters attempted to disentangle these issues and argued that while the traditional paradigms are still very much dominant, the Chinese attitudes towards both filial piety and legal rights have witnessed some significant new developments that warrant a new explanatory framework.

This study is focused on college students as an important demographic group in Chinese society. College students surveyed in this study grew up in the post-reform era of rapid social change. Furthermore, college students played significant leadership roles in various movements towards political liberalization in the 20th century from the May Fourth Movement of 1919, to the Tian’anmen Protest of 1989 (Zuo and Benford, 1995; Zhao, 2001). This social stratum has a particularly strong proclivity to organizing radical political movements within many developing countries (Lipset, 1968), partly because they tend to organically connect the radical intellectuals with the masses (Cox,

1993). While students may not have experienced any grievances or economic hardship that would awaken a rights consciousness, their economically privileged social position enables more idealistic pursuits in politics, making them an extraordinarily active political group in developing nations where there is a weaker presence of a middle class. By surveying college students, this study is intended to ground contemporary realities in historical continuity yet avoiding being too reminiscent of the past to lose sight of the contingently arising present. To achieve this research objective involves the following analytic steps. This study first identifies (1) the extent to which contemporary college students in China endorse traditional values such as filial piety, in comparison to modern values. To robustly capture the complexity of filial piety both as a norm and a practice, I further explore (2) students’ understanding of what practices or actions constitute filial piety. I also measure (3) what types of rights and liberties (including rights to socioeconomic welfare, political participation, and civil liberty) college students see as most essential to a Chinese citizen. I then explore (4) the relations between filial piety and the social and cultural characteristics of Chinese society, as well as its relations with the

empirically derived conceptions of rights. Finally, (5) I compare these characteristics and mechanisms between mainland Chinese and non-mainland Chinese students.

In Chapter 2, I will contextualize Chinese authoritarianism in the rapid modernization and significant legal transformations in post-reform China as well as further unpack Perry’s notions of “Confucian moral economy,” and discuss the empirical literature on pro-rights activism in China. In Chapter 3, I will introduce the historical contexts as well as contemporary developments of filial piety, as well as the link between filial piety and the traditional conception of rights in China. In Chapter 4, I will introduce the methodology involved in the collection as well as analysis of data in this study. Three separate sets of analyses will be performed in Chapter 5 through Chapter 7. Chapter 5 will explore the social and cultural correlates of the Chinese conception of rights. Chapter 6 will independently investigate the social correlates of various conceptual dimensions of filial piety. Chapter 7 will specifically examine the relations between various dimensions of filial piety and the Chinese conception of rights. I will conclude this study in Chapter 8 and discuss social and political implications of this study, as well as directions for future research.

Chapter 2

CHINESE CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS

First, this chapter critically reviews the classical Western sociological perspectives on the nature of political authority in imperial China. The supposedly punitive or disciplinary nature of Chinese authority (Stephens, 1992: 6) has served as a useful contrast to Western models of governance in Western political thought. In this chapter, I review the writings of three social theorists, namely, Montesquieu, Marx, and Weber, on political liberty and authority in relation to various economic and social factors of Asian (Chinese) society. While these are not the only social theorists who have contemplated “the East,” they are the ones that have had the most influence in shaping Western perceptions of political authority in Asia. Second, I briefly present the historical contexts of political liberalization in the modernization of Confucian Asia, then proceed to a discussion of the current status of rule of law and human rights in Singapore and China respectively, the two Confucian Asian nations that remain politically authoritarian. I then discuss the connections between the social and political configurations of China, and the Chinese conceptions of rights. In particular, I focus on how the traditional conception of rights conceived in the Confucian moral economy (Perry, 2008) was differently related to the peasant class and the elite class in imperial China, and how the shifting demographic dynamics in contemporary China inform more diverse and complex conceptions of rights.

Liberty, Economy, and Authority: Early Writings of the Chinese Political Style

Montesquieu

One of the classical texts on the relations between political authority, the state, and the people was Montesquieu’s (1990) magnum opus—The Spirit of Laws. By “spirit,” Montesquieu was referring to the relations between laws (including civil and public laws) and various natural, economic, political, social, and cultural conditions of any particular society:

Law in general is human reason, inasmuch as it governs all the inhabitants of the earth: the political and civil laws of each nation ought to be only the particular cases in which human reason is applied…They should be in relation to the nature and principle of each government… They should be in relation to the climate of each country, to the quality of its soil, to its situation and extent, to the principal occupation of the natives…to the religion of the inhabitants, to their inclinations, riches, numbers, commerce, manners, and customs…This is what I have undertaken to perform…these relations I shall examine, since all these together constitute what I call the Spirit of Laws (emphasis on the original, 3).

From this perspective, law is the embodiment of human reason in the sense that it “governs all the inhabitants” by reflecting the local cultural and social conditions. Although he was primarily concerned with the relationship between politics and law and tended to treat natural, social, and cultural factors as background constraints (i.e., exogenous variables), Montesquieu’s notion of “the spirit of laws” as an approach to examining the relationship between law, authority, and society, resonates with contemporary approaches in law and society scholarship, especially the legal culture (Friedman, 1969; Nelken, 2004) and legal consciousness (Engel, 1998) literatures. “The spirit of the law” provides a way of thinking about a set of complex relations between social, cultural, and economic factors that gave rise to the legal-political structures

known as “the rule of law.” Importantly, the concrete manifestation of this spirit varied across cultures and throughout history, and he held specific viewpoints on the relationship between “the spirit of laws” and “the rule of law,” in non-Western societies such as China. In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu distinguished between the “nature” and “principle” of government. “The former is that by which it is constituted, the latter that by which it is made to act. One is its particular structure, and the other the human passions which set it in motion (9).” He further developed a typology of government according to their different natures:

…a republican government is that in which the body, or only a part of the people, is possessed of the supreme power; monarchy, that in which a single person governs by fixed and established laws; a despotic government, that in which a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice (4). Although laws are enacted in both democracy and monarchy, their operations and functions are not the same, because the two polities are established according to different principles.

There is no great share of probity necessary to support a monarchical or despotic government. The force of laws in one, and the prince’s arm in the other, are sufficient to direct and maintain the whole. But in a popular state, one spring more is necessary, namely, virtue…it is clear that in monarchy, where he who commands the execution of the laws generally thinks himself above them, there is less need of virtue than in a popular government where the person entrusted with the execution of the laws is sensible of his being subject to their direction (9). The principle of democracy, Montesquieu argued, was “virtue”. Virtue was inspired by the fact that in a popular government, the authors of the law are also the addresses of the law. In contrast, he attributed “honor,” which is “the prejudice of every person and

rank,” to monarchy, and “fear” to despotism. Laws under monarchy are nothing but instruments serving the interests of the monarch, who rules above the law.

When applying these concepts to imperial China, Montesquieu ran into several notable contradictions. On the one hand, he acknowledged that the governance of a vast landmass occupied by a large population such as China required good administration (and good laws) to ensure the subsistence of every peasant. Without such good governance, peasant resurrections could easily undermine political authority:

The Emperor of China is not taught like our princes that if he governs ill he will be less happy in the other life, les powerful and less opulent in this. He knows that if his government be not just he will be stripped both of empire and life. As China grows everyday more populous…the inhabitants are incessantly employed for tilling the lands for their subsistence. This requires a very extraordinary attention in the government. It is their perpetual concern that every man should have it in his power to work without the apprehension of being deprived of the fruits of his labor. Consequently, this is not so much as civil as a domestic government (58).

However, he then continued:

Such has been the origin of those regulations which have been so greatly extolled. They wanted to make the laws reign in conjunction with despotic power; but whatever is joined to the latter loses all its force. In vain did this arbitrary sway, laboring under its own inconveniences, desire to be fettered; it armed itself with its chains, and has become still more terrible (58).

China is therefore a despotic state, whose principle is fear. Perhaps in the earliest dynasties, when the empire had not so large an extent, the government might have deviated little from this spirit; but the case is otherwise at present (58). In seeming contradiction to the point he made earlier, Montesquieu insisted that the Chinese Emperor was not capable of ruling by law, and concluded his analysis by classifying imperial China as a despotic state operated on the principle of fear.

Beyond this self-contradiction, Montesquieu’s account of the imperial Chinese legal and political system is flawed on further grounds:

Our missionaries inform us that the government of the vast empire of China is admirable, and that it has a proper mixture of fear, honor, and virtue…But I cannot conceive what this honor can be among a people who act only through fear of being bastinadoed (57). Empirically, Montesquieu’s assessment was weak, based on scanty reports from European merchants (57). Moreover, his account also shows a strong personal bias, which resulted from Montesquieu’s inadequate understanding of Chinese history and Chinese society in general, and his inclination to undermining authoritarianism at all cost and advocating for a more liberal and democratic political order (using imperial China as a typical representation of despotism). Montesquieu mistook the Chinese Emperor for a mere despot who acted on caprice rather than at least simultaneously a monarch who ruled with established laws and customs, a historical fact that many contemporary historians acknowledge (Shiga et al, 1998; Huang, 1993). After all, China did develop a complex system of administrative laws and bureaucracy early in its imperial history, which needs to be taken into serious consideration. Despite its shortcomings, Montesquieu’s assessment of imperial China was accurate on a few points. There was undeniably a hyper concentration of power in the hands of the Chinese Emperors throughout much of the nation’s history, and the administration of imperial China was particularly sensitive to the demands of the peasants (whether it was just for subsistence is a different matter that will be discussed later in Chapter 3). However, while he made some profound insights, the actual legal, political, and cultural conditions in China were much more complicated (and will be discussed in Chapter 3) than Montesquieu realized.

Karl Marx While Montesquieu dramatically oversimplified and overemphasized the power of the Emperor in the Chinese political system, later theorists developed a more nuanced understanding of Chinese authoritarianism. The highly bureaucratic character of the Chinese state was first notably analyzed and theorized by Marx himself, and later, by Marxist sinologists (e.g., Wittfogel, 1953; Krader, 1975). Although Marx also identified Asian societies as highly despotic, as a historical materialist, Marx substantiated his argument with much more rigorous historical evidence and analyses than did Montesquieu. Given that Marxism, in the forms of Leninism and Maoism, was the guiding political philosophy of the People’s Republic of China since it was founded in 1949, it is important to understand the Marxist perspective on Chinese society and Chinese political authority. Marx’s writings on what he called “the Asiatic mode of production,” first appeared in Grundrisse and were later published in English in 1965 under the title Pre-

Capitalist Economic Formations. Following his materialist approach, Marx identified a series of socioeconomic conditions associated with Asiatic society (which included both India and China) that lead it to take its particular political form. Marx’s lengthy discussion of these conditions were well summarized by Brook (1989: 10-11) as follows:

The main productive activity is agriculture, and the natural unity between agricultural and domestic handicraft labor has not been broken my commerce

Agriculture depends on irrigation, which is facilitated by state-controlled hydraulic projects.

The basic social unit is the village community or commune, a simple organism that reproduces itself without exploitation.

Land is owned in common, though the state asserts ownership in such a way that there appears to be a legal absence of private property in land

The representative of the state exists as a class divorced from the rural dwellers, whom they rule despotically

Tax is the principal form in which surplus is extracted, tax and rent forming a unity.

Social change is imperceptibly slow: society is stagnant. Marx argued that the Asiatic mode of production is characterized by agricultural production based in isolated rural communities (villages), and state (communal) ownership of landed property. This particular form of property ownership was identified by Marx as the “Asiatic (or Oriental) form,” in contrast to the other two historical ideal types found in the West, namely, the “ancient classical” form, and the “Germanic” form (Brook, 1989; Ke, 1989; Krader 1975). The “Asiatic form of property” was founded on “tribal or common property.” Under this ideal ownership type, the community is the “hereditary possessor” of property, but the community is subordinated to the state which is “the real owner, and stands as the real precondition for common ownership (Marx, 1964: 69-70).” In contrast, both the “ancient classical” form and the “Germanic” forms of property allowed greater room for individual claims to what is otherwise a communal ownership. Furthermore, in the Asiatic model, the state’s ownership claim was enabled and legitimized by the state’s stronger role in matters of economic and public administration related to agricultural production, especially the construction of hydraulic projects. Perhaps the best example of such a project is the Grand Canal. Stretching over 1800 kilometers, this Canal linked five of China’s main river basins and played an important role in ensuring the Chinese empire’s economic prosperity and stability. Constructed in sections from the 5th century BC onwards, it was a unified means of

communication for the Empire for the first time in the 7th century AD (Sui dynasty). A series of gigantic worksites associated with the construction of the Canal created the world’s largest and most extensive civil engineering project ensemble prior to the Industrial Revolution. Completed and maintained by successive dynasties, it formed the backbone of the Empire’s inland communications system. It remains the longest artificial waterway in the world and is still in use today as a major means of communication4. Finally, when it comes to the political authority of the state, Marx’s argument mirrored Montesquieu’s in that he identified the political order of Asiatic societies as despotism. While Montesquieu failed to resolve the two seemingly contradictory phenomena, namely, the capricious character of Oriental despotism and the Emperor’s supposedly constant apprehension for poor administrative performance that could result in a peasant resurrection, Marx explained how the Asiatic villages were “ruled despotically” in economic terms: the political power of the isolated small villages dwarfed in front of the state with an extremely strong administrative capacity, and had no choice but to succumb to the exploitation of the state in the form of taxes. “These idyllic village communities,” Marx argued (1930: 150), are “the solid foundation of [the] Oriental despotism,” of “the ancient communities” that “have for thousands of years formed the basis of the cruelest form of state.” The bureaucratization of the state, in Marx’s view, is nothing but a natural consequence of the ruling class’ (in this case, the Emperor and the landholders’) strategy in preserving and advancing their economic interests; it better enabled the state to strengthen its control over the isolated villages.

4 http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1443

Unlike Wittfogel (1953), who used Marx’s analysis of Oriental despotism to critique the totalitarian regimes in Russia and Asia, Marx’s and Engel’s references to the Asiatic mode of production were intended mainly as a caveat for Europe. It was intended as a warning for Europeans of some of the most gruesome exploitation that may grow under uninhibited state authority (Brook, 1989). Marx was also writing against the European imperialist colonial enterprise in Asian countries such as India and China, stating that not only did it not free Asian people from their previous exploitation, but strengthened their exploitation (Marx, 1930). Nevertheless, in the context of Marx’s overall historical materialism, it was an indisputable, although perhaps unintended, implication of Marx’s analysis that the Asiatic mode of production represented a backward mode of development; its lack in strictly private ownership of land sustained extremely authoritarian control of the state as well as stagnating social evolution towards capitalism. Marx’s analysis received tremendous support in China during the Communist revolution (as well as after the establishment of the People’s Republic) as a tool for understanding China’s stagnating past and for justifying radical change (Dirlik, 1996). Many Chinese historians even argued that the Asiatic mode of production represented a “primitive” mode of production preceding both feudalism and slavery (Brook, 1989:

104), which demonstrated the severe exploitation of the peasants by the imperial state. More recently, however, historians of imperial Chinese history have come to disagree with the Marxist notion that economic and political progress was largely stagnant in imperial China. Chinese historians noted that throughout Chinese history, land ownership was not always controlled by the state. In fact, state ownership only existed in name ever since the Song Dynasty (Ke, 1989; Kishimoto, 2011). Although during

dynastic transitions, existing land ownership claims were often destroyed, de facto private ownership was soon restored after power had been consolidated. In particular, private land ownership stabilized in the last two dynasties (Ming and Qing) of imperial China (Kishimoto, 2011) and during the late Ming period, and there were even workshops that relied on employed labor in the wealthier Yangtze River Delta (Ho, 1954). This evidence challenged the notion that the Asiatic mode of production was the dominant mode throughout the pre-modern history of Oriental societies, especially in the case of China.

Max Weber In comparison to his contemporaries, Weber (1978; 1951) was perhaps one of very few Western social scientists in the late 19th century who adopted a more interpretive approach (one that not only examines the structural social conditions, but also the subjective interpretations of the people regarding these conditions) to the analysis of non-Western societies. His examination of social domination, for example, did not simply take the perspective of the dominant, but also that of the subordinate. Weber (1978) noted that social domination is only possible with the obedience of the dominated: “every genuine form of domination implies a minimum of voluntary compliance, that is, an interest in obedience (212).” Not every case of domination makes use of economic means; in fact, it does not always have economic objectives. Domination over a large number of people often requires an administrative staff, and “purely material interests and calculations of advantages as the basis of solidarity between the chief and his administrative staff result…in a relatively unstable situation. Normally other elements, affection and ideal, supplement such interests (213).” In other words, in addition to material and economic interests, there needs to be some

mechanism of legitimation, either through affection and charisma, or normative persuasions.

Weber (1978) argued that social actions become increasingly oriented towards rationalization as a society develops. In traditional societies, social actions tended to be informed by affects, traditions, and values, whereas in modern societies they become primarily informed by a calculative and instrumental type of rationality. This particular form of rationality manifests itself as the impersonal and efficient administrative apparatus of bureaucracy, and the legitimation of social domination through rational and formalized laws and legal processes. It is noteworthy that Weber’s (1978) sketch of the rationalization process was by no means a pure abstraction, but was grounded in his omnivorous empirical analyses of various social institutions (including the law) across multiple civilizations. In Weber’s view, the formal and substantive rationalization of law was “not part of an articulate and unambiguous policy on the part of the wielders of power; they were rather driven in this direction by the needs of their own rational administration (809).” Weber demonstrated, via his detailed analyses of various social and legal institutions of modern society, that the modern legal order featuring bureaucracy and rational-legal domination emerged within the context of the heightened system complexity and system differentiation under capitalism, whose inherent objective lies in optimizing economic efficiency. Weber’s social analyses were firmly grounded in the economic and structural conditions of the society he studied. That being said, Weber was by no means an economic determinist. Rationalization sometimes occurred independent of economic conditions, in various areas of social life, at multiple levels of social organization, and across various social strata. For instance, Weber found evidence of rationalization even

in various religious practices, a realm of human activity conventionally perceived as the breeding ground for blatant rejections of rationality (Gerth and Mills, 1998: 267-301).

Rationalization is not the product of modernization alone, but is affected by purely cultural or ideological factors as well; it is at least partially independent of economic development. In his study of imperial China, Weber (1951; 1978) conducted a much more comprehensive and rigorous empirical analysis of the Chinese legal and political system than did Marx or Montesquieu. He argued that the inadequately rational character of the

Chinese legal system was closely associated with the absence of the notions of natural rights and natural laws, ideas which were fundamental to Western political thought. Weber observed that the Chinese legal and political systems were characterized by what he described as “patrimonial factors (1978: 818).” According to Eisenberg’s (1988: 83) interpretation of Weber’s works, patrimonialism “broadly typologizes a polity wherein the political sphere is under the leadership of one royal house (organized as a court) that has attained a degree of autonomy vis-a-vis other social sectors.” Eisenberg further argued that, “Weber viewed patrimonial domination as an extension and development from an earlier system of political-kinship control exercised by the extended patriarchal household (loosely characterized by common residence and commensality) (83).”

The Chinese Empire, according to Eisenberg’s reading of Weber, was “a highly rationalized form of a patrimonial regime…[a] loosely linked territorial entity, administered by servants of the throne, whose concept of office tended to blur with their private family status responsibilities (the merging of official and private duties and sources of income) (84).” Eisenberg argues that although Weber acknowledged the existence of a complex and instrumental system of bureaucracy and administrative laws

in imperial China, he drew a clear line between the modern form of bureaucracy and the patrimonial form characteristic of imperial China: “While patrimonial administrative structures were capable of developing functional divisions, often of a stereotypical nature, and rationalization, they were ultimately characterized as being direct tools, subject to the discretionary political power of the prince and lacking in formal legal jurisdictions (85).” Hence his view of the law as an instrument of domination is comparable to that of Montesquieu’s in this respect. In Weber’s (1951) monograph on imperial China, he devoted as much time analyzing the ideological influences of Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist thought as he did to the economic and political structures of Chinese society. Unlike Marx or Montesquieu, Weber clearly recognized that these philosophical traditions as well as their affiliated cultural practices (such as ancestral worship and Daoist meditative practices) produced life orientations that legitimated the patrimonial political order. (The sources of these philosophical traditions and their practical influence will be discussed in length in Chapter 3). However, Weber’s analysis of the effect of normative structures such as Confucianism on Chinese consciousness was not divorced from his analysis of the underlying socioeconomic and political structures. He acutely noted, for example, that Confucianism did not only construct a discourse that legitimated the authority of the state, but also gave rise to a unique social stratum, the Confucian literati (107-136). Similar to the clergymen in Medieval Europe, the Confucian scholars had access to literacy and knowledge, which fostered a sense of prestige among them. Unlike their European counterparts, however, the Confucian scholars were not only literati, but also bureaucrats with actual administrative authority issuing from the imperial state. The civil bureaucracy of imperial China was staffed by these learned

men who were well-versed in both Confucian philosophy and classical Chinese literature, yet performed administrative roles such as advisors to families, kindship groups, and ceremonial matters, as well as the adjudicatory role as the state’s official arbitrator of justice. Although he marveled at and expressed appreciation for the complexity of Chinese bureaucracy as well as the “rule of scholars,” Weber nevertheless came to the conclusion that patrimonialism constrained rationalization in imperial China. The failure to separate the adjudicative and the administrative systems of civil bureaucracy under Chinese patrimonialism, resulted in the prioritization of substantive justice over legal formalization in Chinese law. The fact that it was the imperial bureaucrats, as opposed to formalized laws and legal processes that administered justice in China, was an indication that Chinese law (and Chinese society) was far from being rationalized. In Weber’s (1978) view, legal formalization and rationalization is a defining characteristic of modernity, and the social conditions in China were not conducive to these developments.

Rights and Law in Modernizing Asia In 1910, the Qing government (the last imperial dynasty in China) issued a draft of the country’s first constitution as a response to numerous social and political movements for political liberalization (modernization). Although the Emperor’s power was not effectively limited in this constitution, it was the first document that enumerated the political rights and liberties of citizens in a legal form (Nathan, 1976). However, the Qing Dynasty was overthrown a year later and the Republic of China (ROC) was founded in its place.

Between 1911 and 1949, the Republic of China was first ruled by separatist warlords and then united and ruled in 1927 by the Kuomingtang (the Nationalist Party).

During this period, China was haunted by numerous civil wars along with the Japanese military invasion and the ensuing occupation. Although democracy and the rule of law were nominally maintained and championed by progressive social movements, military authoritarianism remained the primary mode of government. When the Kuomingtang was defeated by the Communist Party and was forced to retreat to Taiwan in 1949, it brought with it its brand of authoritarianism (Nathan, 1976). Ethnic and clan conflicts bred pro-democratic movements, while the conflict with mainland China justified military repression in various aspects of civic life. Regardless of authoritarian control, the economy of Taiwan prospered in the 1960s and 1970s. The calls for democracy became stronger amidst social movements, and eventually led to the non-violent revisionist democratization in the 1980s (Chen, 2010: 873-877). By and large, South Korea followed a path similar to Taiwan after the Korean

War, and achieved de facto status of a democratic republic in the 1980s (Chen, 2010: 971). Although both Taiwan and South Korea had historically been heavily influenced by Confucian culture (Kang, 2010), the brand of authoritarianism that Taiwan and South Korea experienced differed from that imposed by the Communist Party of China.

In both countries, procedural (although not necessarily democratic) legitimation in legal form was still required for the delegation of public power; the legal order informed the process of political legitimation, however nominally it may have been practiced (Chen, 2010). However, it should also be noted that the democratization of these two countries occurred under specific historical conditions: both were under US military protection against Communist enemies, and democratization not only brought them ideologically

closer to their US ally but also further distinguished themselves from the Communist Other. In other words, it should not be taken for granted that democratization would have been the natural course of development without these historical contingencies. Indeed, economic modernization as well as the routinization of legal rule did not necessarily translate into a liberal political order in some Asian countries. Experiencing economic boom around the same period as South Korea and Taiwan, Singapore represents a contrasting paradigm of political order under modernization. Economically developed and legally complex, Singapore did not give rise to a liberal version of rule of law. In its stead is a system of draconian legal rule that lacks the promise of many fundamental political freedoms and effectively defends the interests of the elites. Analyzing discourses produced by the state, lawyers, and judges over Singapore’s Vandalism Act, Rajah (2011) revealed that in contrast to brute authoritarianism which places state authority above the law, under “urbane authoritarianism (Halliday and Karpik, 2012)” the legal complex is co-opted and subordinated to a societal imperative dictated by political elites. In Singapore, this imperative was initially economic prosperity and political independence, but in more recent years, has shifted to preserving an Eastern cultural identity that is immune to colonialist, Western liberalization (Jones, 1997; Rajah, 2011). The justification of allegedly cruel punishments such as caning should be viewed within the context of these imperatives: vandalism has to be punished severely to preserve the status of Singapore as a popular tourist destination (which is a primary source of economic growth), and the method of caning should be reserved because it reflects the cultural tradition of Singapore in juxtaposition to the colonialist West. On the same token, the authoritarian rule of the

state is legitimated on the basis of maintaining economic prosperity, which requires drawing a contrast with Western liberalism and democracy.

This conception of political legitimacy based on alleged “Asian values” (e.g., Lee and Zakaria, 1994) of prosperity and stability poses a challenge to the classic Western, liberal conception of citizenship. Even in Habermas’ (1996: 118-131) proactive and participatory approach to citizenship, a body of fundamental and unalienable rights which guarantee basic freedom from political persecution ought to be identified and conferred to the citizens of a polity simultaneously before further political deliberation in which civic solidarity between citizens and between citizens and the state is supposed arise. What this body of fundamental human rights should entail specifically, however, is the central issue of much controversy between advocates of liberal democracy and advocates of Asian exceptionalism. Rajah (2011: 945) argued that while an “authoritarian rule of law” may not necessarily be oxymoron, Singapore’s strategic reconfigurations of the “rule of law” produced acceptance of law that observes procedure while erasing rights. Thio (2010) also argued that the “soft” constitutional law in non-liberal democracies such as Singapore may subvert liberal constitutionalism as a tool for consolidating state powers and curtailing political freedoms in service of public interests.

However, in the recent elections of Singapore, citizens continued to express support for the authoritarian rule of the People’s Action Party, although elections had become more competitive than before. Some argued that the legitimacy of the authoritarian rule of PAP was largely based on their manipulation of the elections and election laws (Tan, 2013; Miller, 2015). Nevertheless, while popular endorsement of authoritarianism may indeed be a result of cunning political manipulation, it reflects a

persistent preference for prosperity and stability over instability commonly associated with adversarial politics, and lends at least partial support to the “Asian values” argument: the traditional Asian cultural frames still have far-reaching political consequences, even though the transmission processes of these cultural frames from the macro-national level to the individual level may be much more complex than what “Asian value” advocates proposed.

Recent History of the Legal System in Mainland China Under the rule of the Communist Party of China (CPC), legislation, administration, and adjudication are not clearly separated. Constitution-making and lawmaking are performed by the National People’s Congress, the state legislature, which is functionally a political puppet that reflects the will of the party-state (Wang, 2015). Ever since the economic reforms in the late 1970s, however, the Chinese state has also been implementing a series of judicial reforms, which entails crafting new legislations, promoting legal professionalism, and cultivating citizens’ reliance on the judicial system for resolving grievances (Landry, 2008; Moustafa, 2014; Cai, 2008; Minzner, 2011). There are a number of historical contexts to this policy orientation. First of all, transition to the legal rule from totalitarian political rule was essential to developing a market economy, which required state recognition and protection of contractual and proprietary rights from arbitrary violations, including potential violations from the state itself. This resulted in a number of milestone legislations in protection of contractual as well as proprietary rights in the late 1970s and the 80s (Landry, 2008; Moustafa, 2014). In addition, as a consequence of economic liberalization, economic differentiation and social complexity drastically increased in China with a number of

worrying consequences: incidents of crime (especially economically motivated crimes), for example, have dramatically risen (Qi and Oberwittler, 2009), as have incidents of economically related legal disputes (Landry, 2008; Moustafa, 2014). These structural changes demanded a more efficient system of public administration (including justice administration) to offload the functions of mediation and arbitration traditionally performed almost entirely by the party-state. Thus, promoting a belief in the “rule of law” and a “legal consciousness” on the part of the population is functionally instrumental to more efficient and legitimate rule of the CPC amidst rapid economic modernization (Cai, 2008; Landry, 2008; Moustafa, 2014; Minzner, 2011). The latest edition of the Chinese Constitution included “the rule of law (fazhi, 法治)” as a general constitutional principle. Although the phrase fazhi is quite commonly used in China as a colloquial expression, it bears remarkably different social and cultural connotations than it does in the West. One salient difference that may be puzzling to Western observers, is the stipulation in the Constitution that the “socialist rule of law (shehui zhuyi fazhi, 社会主义法治)” of China is subject to the leadership of the CPC5. Similar to the political function of law in Singapore , “the rule of law” in this context is better understood as “rule by law (Lee, 2002; 2007; Moustafa and Ginsburg,

2008),” which places less emphasis on guaranteeing individual rights and limiting state power, but more on citizens’ recognition (and obedience therein) of law as an extension of state authority. In other words, fazhi or “rule of law” in China serves as an instrument for authoritarian rule. It follows that “legal consciousness” commonly used in Chinese

5 http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Constitution/2007-11/15/content_1372963.htm

propaganda should be seen as part of a state-led project to enhance its “rule by law,” rather than “rule of law” (Gallagher, 2006). “Legal consciousness” in the Chinese colloquial context has a narrower definition than Ewick and Silbey’s (1998) academic coinage, and primarily refers to citizens’ compliance with official laws and regulations, as well as their habituating use of law for conflict resolution.

Confucian Moral Economy and the Chinese Conception of Rights Indeed, empirical studies in China have documented an increasing incidence of legal mobilization (Landry, 2008; Cai, 2008), even in the economically disadvantaged groups such as workers (Gallagher, 2006; Lee, 2007; Wong, 2011) and rural villagers (Michelson, 2007; O’Brien and Li, 2006). Perry (2009) argued that as opposed to attributing the increasing legal mobilization as well as the invocation of rights-based discourses to an awakening “rights consciousness,”it is more accurate to conceive of this newly emerged Chinese “legal consciousness” as a “rules consciousness,” which interprets the law as a set of instrumental rules for the purpose of governance and justice administration with a tacit understanding that it is the state, not the people, that has the ultimate authority to alter them. Perry (2009) argued that the manifestation of rules consciousness qua legal consciousness in China does not simply reflect the CPC’s successful propaganda, but also a deeply rooted cultural paradigm. Although China has drastically changed over the past century, the “Confucian moral economy,” which denotes a set of economic and political relations between the Chinese state and Chinese society, had not only continued in Mao’s era but well into the present day (Perry, 2008). The main proposition issuing from the concept of moral economy is that in many traditional societies, the security of livelihood was often embedded in non-

economic institutions such as kinship, religion, and politics (Booth, 1994). While this idea was employed to analyze economic provisioning in multiple cultures such as ancient Greece, James C. Scott’s (1976) study of modern peasant villages was one of its most notable application. Essentially, Scott argued that in these rural communities where subsistence was of utmost priority, there existed a moral expectation based on the right to subsistence, which leads to redistribution of wealth within the community. The elites in these villages legitimate their ruling position by appeasing the hardworking peasant class with subsistence. In time, this practice develops into a tacit moral expectation (from the peasant) and obligation (of the elites) undergirding the social and political structures of these rural communities. Although Perry (2008) did not reference Scott’s work, her proposed notion of the “Confucian moral economy” connected the subsistence of the Chinese peasantry to their relationship with the Chinese state. In the Confucian tradition, the peasantry was considered to be such a fundamental political force in Chinese society that the ruler of

China should never cease to appease. Since the peasantry has a moral expectation for subsistence, the Confucian state (consisting of Confucian elites) ought to provide them with basic subsistence welfare. This exchange for political legitimacy with promises of subsistence welfare explains the much more proactive role that the Chinese state has historically played, and is still playing. In addition, it also shapes the Chinese conception of rights, which is rooted in the moral expectation for subsistence and the state’s promises of realizing this expectation. According to Perry (2008), under the Confucian moral economy, rights “are seen more as state authorized channels to enhance national unity and prosperity than as naturally endowed protections against

state intrusion, popular demands for the exercise of political rights are perhaps better seen as an affirmation of—rather than an affront to—state power (46-47).”

It is noteworthy, however, that although “the right to subsistence” existed not only in Chinese but also other traditional societies such as early-industrial England (Strand, 2016), the Chinese expression of the “subsistence ethics” was embedded in a number of vary particular social, political, and cultural conditions, and thus exhibited some variability from other traditional agricultural economies. First of all, there was very little dispute among political elites, unlike in England, that the elites had a moral obligation to provide subsistence to the impoverished. As I will further illustrate in Chapter 3, this moral obligation was consecrated in the teaching of Confucianism, the state orthodoxy. Furthermore, the Confucian moral economy far exceeded a promise of subsistence, but contains an implicit promise of “prosperity.” In other words, what the peasants expect from the elite-controlled state are more than just the bare minimum, but a life with basic security and a prospect of progressive economic abundance.

Rights Discourses in Contemporary China This conception of rights, while deeply rooted in the historical conditions of Chinese society, stands in stark contrast with that developed in the European-Anglo- American tradition. While empirical studies of citizen pro-rights activism in contemporary China showed findings largely congruent with Perry’s theoretical arguments about the dominant influence of Confucian moral economy on the Chinese conception of rights, when considered together, these empirical studies tell a more complex and nuanced story about the conception of rights in contemporary China where a series of drastic social transformation have taken place since the late 1800s.

Lee’s (2007) study of aggrieved workers, for instance, concluded that Chinese workers did not demonstrate a “rights consciousness” that would empower them to negate the authoritarian rule of the Chinese state as illegitimate. While the labor protesters do aspire to have their rights protected by laws enforced by the central government, “the civic citizenship they have in mind is one that dovetails with the regime’s project of ‘rule by law’ rather than a ‘rule of law’ system (117).” Lee further noted that “there is no criticism of the lack of popular participation in legislation, no demand for independent worker organizations, no questioning of the adequacy and rationale of law and policy set by the central authority (117).” Findings in Lee’s study resonate with those from O’Brien’s (2003) study of rural villagers in China. While the Chinese villagers “are busy exploiting the gap between rights promised and rights delivered (58)” by “reworking rights talk” and “dressing up genuinely transgressive claims in contained clothes (59),” their mobilization efforts have not fundamentally challenged the rights-conferring authority of the state, and thus have not transcended “rules consciousness.” Gallagher’s (2006) study of labor dispute plaintiffs who mobilized the law to address their grievances revealed a dualistic and almost ambivalent attitude on the part of the plaintiffs towards legality in the process of navigating the legal system.

Aggrieved Chinese workers experienced “informed disenchantment” with the law, that is, they became increasingly pragmatic and skilled in “working the law” to enhance their interests, while expressing skepticism with the fairness and effectiveness of the legal system. Although Gallagher did not conclude that Chinese legal consciousness has transgressed the typical “rules consciousness,”he duly noted that “legal consciousness

in China is developing, moving not from low to high but from naïve to critical, from a vague sense of rights to a detailed list of grievances (813).”

Boittin (2013) studied sex workers’ rights discourses in China, and found that although most sex workers’ rights claims did not deviate from the scripted pleas for state protection and tolerance, there were notable exceptions that exhibited “unambiguous” rights consciousness (271). As is documented in this study, a small group of sex workers in China organized protests urging the legalization of prostitution or substantially changing the current policies to provide the necessary protection for them against life-threatening interactions with both clients and the law enforcement. This proactive claim of legalization sex work, Boittin argued, differed from that documented in other marginalized populations elsewhere (e.g., Nielsen, 2004), who had a much more cynical (and passive) attitude towards the law. Moreover, these protesters invoked a discourse of basic and universal rights to physical safety and survival, which should be considered unrelated to their illegal activities, and granted to every human being. Boittin claimed that these sex workers were acting from a rights consciousness that aspires autonomy, rather than the typical rules consciousness that simply seeks state protection. O’ Brien’s (2003) and Gallagher’s (2006) takes on rights consciousness in China share much similarity: while they both acknowledged the increasingly sharpening awareness of their own entitlement of “rights” revealed in rights-based discourses among rural villagers and aggrieved workers, they also concluded that such “boundary- spanning” had not exceeded state-authorized limits. In contrast, Boittin’s finding of Chinese sex workers’ willingness to invoke a “with the law” discourse while engaging in an “against the law” profession not only offered a refreshing perspective on legal

mobilization of marginalized groups, but also hinted on an emerging “rights consciousness” among these marginalized groups in China. Nevertheless, while some sex workers in Boittin’s study have indeed employed a much broader and universal notion of rights, it did not fundamentally challenge the state’s ultimate authority in granting these rights. The seeming difference in claimsmaking between the small group of sex workers on the one hand and the aggrieved workers and rural villagers on the other belies their common perception of economic or survival related injuriousness, rather than the lack of participation in legislation, as a violation of rights. Viewed in this light, the sex workers’ invocation of basic human needs as a reason for policy change becomes less transgressive claimsmaking, but more a reminder of the promises (especially those concerning basic economic welfare) that the state had made. The demand for legislative changes from the sex workers was essentially a signal to solicit state reaffirmation of state-sanctioned “rights,” which most typically translates into state provision of basic security and welfare. It is not surprising, then, to see that socially disadvantaged groups such as aggrieved workers, rural villagers, and sex workers possess a fundamentally compromising attitude toward the state, yet simultaneously adopt an instrumental attitude towards the law and legal rights, given that such an attitude would enable them to maximize their leverage with the authoritarian state in meeting their demands for basic economic welfare. This interpretation resolves the seeming contradiction between the strategic and instrumental employment of pro-rights discourses on the one hand, and their disenchantment with the legal system and readiness to settle on the other.

However, as all the aforementioned authors suggested, it would be yet another mistake to assume that these Chinese social actors were not making any significant strides towards a more critical consciousness of their entitlement to certain “rights (albeit dictated by the state)” in the process of their mobilization. In other words, an increasingly more transgressive and critical “rules consciousness” may be the fertile ground in which a “rights consciousness proper” eventually arise, a necessary practice on the way to an eventual realization of individual autonomy and rights.

Class Status, Political Liberalization, and the Chinese Conception of Rights Even when China was still under imperial rule, progressive Confucian scholars such as Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao were already advocating for a constitutional monarchy, one which guarantees protection of civil and political liberties characteristic of the Western, liberal political order. The conviction in civil and political freedoms was only strengthened among the elite intellectual class in the following decades, including the 1989 Tian’anmen protesters who called for democratization (Zhao, 1995). Indeed, empirical studies have shown that the college educated middle class exhibit more critical attitudes toward the government and its policies, and endorse civil and political rights to a greater extent (Lu and Chan, 2011). Liu and Halliday’s (2016) recent study of criminal defense lawyers, for example, found that criminal defense lawyers exhibited much stronger support for political liberal values, largely because their legal training and interaction with aggrieved defendants strengthens their faith in procedural justice and its associated liberal values. On the same token, Michelson and Liu’s (2010) study showed that educated elites more likely to be politically liberal than the average population. Furthermore, this growing political consciousness may be overflowing to other social strata: in Li’s (2010) quantitative study of rural villagers’

attitudes toward state policy, he was able to identify both rules and rights consciousness among the Chinese rural residents.

Concluding Notes Taken together, findings from all of these studies caution us not to jump to a hasty conclusion about the nature of legal and political consciousness in China. The distinction between “rules consciousness” and “rights consciousness,” I argue, is only meaningful under the epistemological as well as normative-political assumptions of the Western experience of modernization and political liberalization, and is less applicable to analyzing cases such as China. Legal and political consciousness in China is connected to a culturally specific conception of rights implicitly conceived in a broader scheme of economic and cultural reproduction (i.e., the Confucian moral economy) and micro-level interpersonal ethics such as filial piety. Both the traditional social and cultural forces as well as the social transformation that China has been undergoing in the past four decades have to be taken into consideration before a more general theory of Chinese legal and political consciousness can be formulated, and the purpose of this study is to provide some empirical support for this more integrated and nuanced perspective about Chinese legal and political consciousness.

Chapter 3

FILIAL PIETY IN HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY CONTEXTS

In this chapter, I first introduce the historical background of filial piety in the Confucian philosophical tradition, and then introduce the actual practices of filial piety in relation to Chinese morality, legality, and political authority in imperial China. Finally, I discuss the status of filial piety in contemporary Chinese society, in reference to recent empirical studies of filial piety in sociology and social psychology.

Filial Piety and Political Authority in Confucianism The link between Confucian interpersonal ethics (in particular, filial piety) and Chinese state-society relations featuring a high degree of deference to centralized authority was most notably explored by Max Weber (1951):

Feudalism rested on honor as the cardinal virtue, patrimonialism on piety…Piety (hsiao) toward the feudal lord was enumerated along with piety toward parents, superiors in the hierarchy of office, and officeholders generally, for the identical principle of hsiao applied to all of them…In a patrimonial state where filial piety was transferred to all relations of subordination, it can be readily understood that an official— and Confucius for a time was a minister—would consider filial piety was the virtue from which all others issue (157-158). In other words, Weber conceived of filial piety (xiao, 孝) as the cornerstone of the patrimonial state-society relations in China; filial piety as both a practice and a value constituted the microscopic foundation of the macroscopic Confucian moral economy and the broader network of power relations. In the terms of contemporary cultural sociologists (e.g., Lizardo, 2017), “culture” is an extremely rich concept that encompasses multiple levels and multiple dimensions: it has a nondeclarative (i.e., unconscious, subliminal action-orientations) and a declarative (i.e., linguistic, symbolic order) dimension, as well as an individual and a collective level (which is often

declarative, as in the case of “national values”). Filial piety exemplifies such a rich cultural phenomenon that seeps into many aspects and levels of Chinese social life.

To understand how xiao became such a central part of Chinese culture reflecting not only family ethics but possibly far broader code of conduct as Weber suggested, we need to situate xiao in its historical and cultural (both symbolic and practical) contexts. Historical research has shown that the notion and practice of filial piety predated Confucius’s advocacy of the concept. The character xiao (孝) was found in oracle bones from Western Zhou dynasty (1045-771 BC), frequently as a verb in texts about the performance of sacrifices (Chan and Tan, 2004: 1). Other scholars such as Holzman (1998) argued that the earliest appearance of the character was on a bronze vessel appeared at the very end of the Shang dynasty, roughly about 1000 BC. Holzman also argued that given the evidence, the etymology of the character is clear, featuring an old man being supported by a child. Knapp observed that the earliest meaning of xiao was connected with providing food offerings to one’s ancestors. However, during the

Western Zhou dynasty, the meaning of the character already encompassed service to both living parents and ancestors. Knapp (1995) also noted that while the general meaning of xiao (as selfless devotion to the welfare of one’s elders) stayed mostly constant, the particular actions embodying it and to whom it was addressed were often subject to change. Unmistakably, the most profound interpretation of xiao was issued by none other than Confucius himself who made xiao a central component of his moral and political theory. The Confucian interpretation of xiao became the orthodox interpretation in Han dynasty (206-8 BC), and remained so for the rest of the Chinese imperial history.

Confucianism and the Philosophical Origin of Filial Piety Confucianism as a school of philosophy originated in the late Spring and

Autumn period (771 to 476 BC), among a variety of other schools of thought. The late Spring and Autumn period and the subsequent Warring State period (476 -221 BC) were periods in Chinese history characterized by its openness to a diversity of thoughts, and attributed by modern historians as “the Axial Age” of Chinese civilization (600-200 BC). A substantial amount of intellectual receptivity and diversity was possible largely as a consequence of social and political instability (Unger, 1977; Roetz, 1993). The political order under the unified Western Zhou Dynasty was declining, and the empire was rendered de facto independent (into small, warring kingdoms) by different aristocrats who had actual economic and military control over local regions. During this period, wars were common and constant, and kings of different kingdoms sought advice from various intellectuals on matters of military strategies and the ruling of kingdoms. Confucius was one of many renown scholars at the time who traveled from kingdom to kingdom to promote his ideas of good governance. According to Confucius, it is of utmost importance that the li (禮) of the Zhou

Dynasty be resurrected. Li was commonly translated as “propriety,” (Roetz, 49-50), sometimes “rites,” or “etiquettes,” (Chan, 2004: 156) referring primarily to the various rituals and etiquettes, through whose performance proper (and often hierarchical) social roles are solidified. The political significance of li lies in its capacity to restore a stable political order, one where the Emperor’s authority is well respected by the aristocrats, and the authority of the superiors in the social hierarchy is respected by the subordinates across the entire Empire, so that peace and unity of the kingdoms under the Emperor, as opposed to wars and separation, could prevail.

The moral significance behind proper rituals and etiquettes (i.e., li) is crystalized in another central concept of Confucius’s: ren (仁). Ren is often translated into

“humaneness,” or “benevolence” (Roetz, 1993: 119; Chan, 2004: 154). Although the literal translation of the character is less controversial, since the very Chinese character denoting ren literally contains two elements, “human” and “two,” its rich meanings manifested throughout the classical texts were more difficult to decipher, and even more difficult to form a consensus among generations of scholars (Roetz, 1993: 119). At an ontological level, ren has its metaphysical root in Dao (道)6, an apriori cosmological virtue (and perfect virtue in that sense) transcending the finitude of humanity, and the specificity of social and historical contexts. In contrast, ren itself is not necessarily an ethereal metaphysical concept, nor is it unattainable by humans, but is instead reflected in the moral character of all kinds of everyday activities (although Confucius stated that he had never seen anyone with ren). In his writings on ren, Confucius did not prescribe any one specific definition of ren. Rather, he hinted that the substance of ren cannot be articulated, but can only manifest itself in specific moral contexts. In fact, he had given vastly different answers to his disciplines who asked him to explain the concept of ren7:

Yan Yuan asked about perfect virtue [ren]. The Master said, “To subdue one’s self and return to propriety [li], is perfect virtue [ren]. If a man can for one day subdue himself and return to propriety, all under heaven will ascribe perfect virtue to him. Is the practice of perfect virtue from a man himself, or is it from others?” (Lunyu, 12.1)

6 Confucius used various terms to represent this metaphysical reality, sometimes “dao” sometimes “tianming” (the Mandate of Heaven) etc.

7 All of the Confucian texts were retrieved from The Chinese Text Project, an online open-access digital library that makes pre-modern Chinese texts available to readers and researchers all around the world. Retrieved at https://ctext.org/analects/ens

Zhong Gong asked about perfect virtue [ren]. The Master said, “It is, when you go abroad, to behave to every one as if you were receiving a great guest; to employ the people as if you were assisting at a great sacrifice; not to do to others as you would not wish done to yourself; to have no murmuring against you in the country, and none in the family.” (Lunyu, 12.2)

Fan Chi asked about benevolence [ren]. The Master said, “It is to love all men.” (Lunyu, 12.22) According to Confucius’s response to Yan Yuan, li is the essential practical approach to ren: when one becomes well accustomed to various substantive etiquettes and rituals, one eventually acquires, at a more abstract level, “propriety.” Mastering propriety is the first step towards mastering ren. However, ren not only encompasses the rational and practical elements of li, but also an affective component; it manifests itself not only as cold and rigid etiquettes and rituals, but also a feeling of love and compassion. This feeling of love and compassion, although seemingly general and universal in Confucius’s response to Fan Chi, is grounded in family love:

Benevolence [ren] is the characteristic element of humanity, and the great exercise of it is in loving relatives [qinqin]. Righteousness is the accordance of actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy. The decreasing measures of the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honor due to the worthy, are produced by the principle of propriety [li]. (Zhongyong: 20) In this paragraph, ren and li come together in the act of qinqin, which literally translates

“to love your kins.” This verse establishes qinqin as a bidirectional and reciprocal act that glues individuals within their family and clan. Although Confucius did not further explain the meaning of qinqin, in the context of ren and li, it is safe to assume that he was referring to both parents’ love for children and children’s love for their parents. In a verse from Liji, a Confucian text consisting of writings from Confucius’s disciples, there is a specific verse that connects all of the core concepts in Confucianism:

What are “the things which men consider right?” Kindness[ci] on the part of the father, and filial duty [xiao] on that of the son... (Liyun in Liji: 18)

In other words, harmonious family life that reflects the principle of ren should be one where the father is kind and forgiving (ci), and the son is filial (xiao), devoted to his family, especially his parents. Although the reciprocal love between parents and children is the essence of filial piety, in most of Confucius’s and later scholars’ writings on filial piety, it falls upon the children to fulfill their filial obligations, and please their parents. Perhaps it is assumed that parents’ love for children is a given; after all, even many animals attend to their young. However, fulfilling filial obligations with propriety requires additional moral strength and resolution. According to Confucius, the essence of fulfilling filial piety is to obey one’s parents’ and serve them with propriety:

Meng Yi asked what filial piety was. The Master said, “It is not being disobedient.” Soon after, as Fan Chi was driving him, the Master told him, saying, “Meng-sun asked me what filial piety was, and I answered him, - ‘not being disobedient.’” Fan Chi said, “What did you mean?” The Master replied, “That parents, when alive, be served according to propriety; that, when dead, they should be buried according to propriety; and that they should be sacrificed to according to propriety.” (Lunyu, 2.5) The emphasis on obedience and the instances of propriety prescribed here are meant to instill a sense of reverence for one’s parents. This is further illustrated in verses where Confucius demanded that children serve their parents with a pleasant attitude:

Zi Xia asked what filial piety was. The Master said, “The difficulty is with the countenance. If, when their elders have any troublesome affairs, the young take the toil of them, and if, when the young have wine and food, they set them before their elders, is THIS to be considered filial piety?” (Lunyu, 2.8)

Zi You asked what filial piety was. The Master said, “The filial piety nowadays means the support of one's parents. But dogs and horses

likewise are able to do something in the way of support; - without reverence, what is there to distinguish the one support given from the other?” (Lunyu, 2.7)

As we can see, Confucius was not only concerned with the objective or external aspects of xiao, such as providing care for elderly parents, but also the subjective aspects, which focus on making the parents feel satisfied and respected. Jing (敬) or “reverence” is, in

Confucius’s view, a central element of xiao. This is consistent with the affective connotations of ren, and when it comes to xiao it is ultimately about feeling loved by one’s parents, and feeling loved by one’s children. The emphasis on parents’ subjective perception of reverence is best illustrated in the following verse:

The Master said, “In serving his parents, a son may remonstrate with them, but gently; when he sees that they do not incline to follow his advice, he shows an increased degree of reverence, but does not abandon his purpose; and should they punish him, he does not allow himself to murmur.” (Lunyu, 4.18) The scenario described in this verse is delicate. On the one hand, Confucius demanded that individual principles be upheld and firmly defended: if one is confident that he is right, he should persistently pursue his cause, even if it elicits objections or even punishments from one’s parents. On the other hand, in pursing one’s righteous cause, he is never to lose reverence (in fact, Confucius demands more reverence in the case of objection) for his parents. This is a unique way of persuasion, one in which, ideally, the son will eventually get what he wants without significantly hurting the parents’ pride. In fact, in the writings of Xunzi, another Confucian scholar in the Waring State period, a positive view towards contentions between the father and the son, and between the lord and the ministers, was attributed to Confucius:

A father who has a contentious son will not act in ways that lack ritual propriety [li]. A well-bred man who has a contentious friend will not do

what is not yi. Thus, if a son simply obeys his father, how would that son be filial? If a minister simply obeys his lord, how would that minister be exercising fidelity? To be careful about the cases in which one obeys another—this is called filial piety, this is called fidelity (Xunzi, 29.2).

Of course, there is no way of knowing whether Xunzi simply used Confucius to legitimize his own view about filial piety and fidelity. But as a representative Confucian scholar who lived relatively close to Confucius’s time, Xunzi’s verse further complicated the conventional impression of filial piety in Confucian thought. Finally, according to Confucius, being a filial son is also the minimal prerequisite to becoming a junzi, the moral ideal of a morally refined gentleman:

The superior man [junzi] bends his attention to what is radical. That being established, all practical courses naturally grow up. Filial piety [xiao] and fraternal submission [ti]! —are they not the root of all benevolent [ren] actions? (Lunyu, 1.2) In a word, filial piety (xiao) is a central value in Confucius’s thought, as it connects ren and li at both practical and affective levels, and is thus essential to the cultivation of moral perfection (junzi) in the Confucian tradition. However, the significance of filial piety is not limited to individual moral cultivation; it is also conducive to the social and political ideals of Confucianism. In this next section, I will discuss how filial piety is related to principles of governance and the legitimation of political authority in Confucian texts.

Governance and Authority in Confucian Thought

The duke Jing, of Qi, asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, “There is government, when the prince is prince, and the minister is minister; when the father is father, and the son is son.” “Good!” said the duke; “if, indeed, the prince be not prince, the minister not minister, the father not father, and the son not son, although I have my revenue, can I enjoy it?” (Lunyu, 12.11)

As we can see in this conversation, li or propriety is conceived of by Confucius as the performative manifestation and affirmation of the legitimacy of the hierarchical social and political order. Maintaining this order was desirable for Confucius, because the Spring and Autumn as well as the Warring State eras were characterized by a lack of order and constant warfare. It is also noteworthy that the “father-son” relation is an essential link in this chain of social and political propriety. In particular, Confucius saw the father-son relation as analogous to the relationship between the minister and the prince. Here Confucius extended filial piety to one’s father to loyalty (忠，zhong) to the prince, another important concept in Confucianism. This view appeared in the same verse from Liji cited earlier:

What are 'the things which men consider right?' Kindness on the part of the father, and filial duty on that of the son; gentleness on the part of the elder brother, and obedience on that of the younger; righteousness on the part of the husband, and submission on that of the wife; kindness on the part of elders, and deference on that of juniors; with benevolence [ren] on the part of the ruler, and loyalty [zhong] on that of the minister - these ten are the things which men consider to be right (Liyun in Liji, 18). If zhong were to resemble xiao in channeling the spirit of ren, it must, just as xiao, reach beyond mere rational and practical propriety to include an affective component. Furthermore, there should be a somewhat reciprocal character to zhong, just as xiao manifests itself as parental benevolence/care (ci) on the one hand, and filial piety on the other. This dynamic between ren and zhong is enabled by the initiation of ren (with an emphasis on the affective aspect of benevolence and compassion here) on the part of the ruler, and response from the minister and subjects as zhong. This next two verses further demonstrate this relationship:

Ji Kang asked how to cause the people to reverence their ruler, to be faithful to him, and to go on to nerve themselves to virtue. The Master said, “Let him preside over them with gravity; then they will reverence

him. Let him be filial and kind to all [xiao ci]; then they will be faithful [zhong] to him. Let him advance the good and teach the incompetent; then they will eagerly seek to be virtuous.”

Therefore, the administration of government lies in getting proper men. Such men are to be got by means of the ruler’s own character. That character is to be cultivated by his treading in the ways of duty. And the treading those ways of duty is to be cultivated by the cherishing of benevolence. (Zhongyong, 20) Although we see a clear analogy between the father and the ruler, the son and the minister, Confucius placed stronger moral obligations on the part of the ruler in initiating ren, as opposed to the minister and subjects in maintaining zhong. He even prescribed a number of situations where disloyalty may be acceptable:

Ji Zi Ran asked whether Zhong You and Ran Qiu could be called great ministers. The Master said, “I thought you would ask about some extraordinary individuals, and you only ask about You and Qiu! What is called a great minister, is one who serves his prince according to what is right, and when he finds he cannot do so, retires. Now, as to You and Qiu, they may be called ordinary ministers.” Zi Ran said, “Then they will always follow their chief - will they?” The Master said, “In an act of parricide or regicide, they would not follow him.” (Lunyu, 11.24) In other words, Confucius saw zhong as a secondary to ren. Loyalty is contingent upon whether the ruler shows qualities of humaneness (ren), and observes propriety (li). This emphasis on “benevolent governance” (ren zheng) was even more salient in the writings of Confucius’s student, Mencius, who was the second most influential figure in Confucianism after Confucius. Mencius also expanded Confucius’s idea about benevolent governance, and stipulated some very specific criteria for what benevolent governance should look like. In a conversation with King Hui of Liang, King Hui asked Mencius why even though he did his utmost to take care of his people, namely, relocating people who had suffered natural disasters to areas without natural disasters,

and transporting crops to those who lived in disaster-affected areas, his country still had a smaller population than its neighboring country. Mencius replied:

You need not hope that your people will become more numerous than those of the neighboring kingdoms. If the seasons of husbandry be not interfered with, the grain will be more than can be eaten. If close nets are not allowed to enter the pools and ponds, the fishes and turtles will be more than can be consumed. If the axes and bills enter the hills and forests only at the proper time, the wood will be more than can be used. When the grain and fish and turtles are more than can be eaten, and there is more wood than can be used, this enables the people to nourish their living and mourn for their dead, without any feeling against any. This condition, in which the people nourish their living and bury their dead without any feeling against any, is the first step of royal government [wang dao] … Let careful attention be paid to education in schools, inculcating in it especially the filial and fraternal duties, and grey-haired men will not be seen upon the roads, carrying burdens on their backs or on their heads. It never has been that the ruler of a State, where such results were seen - persons of seventy wearing silk and eating flesh, and the black-haired people suffering neither from hunger nor cold - did not attain to the royal dignity (Lianghuiwang Shang in Mengzi, 3). Before he even replied to the King of Hui, Mencius asked a rhetorical question and euphemistically mocked the King and hinted that he barely did enough for his people, yet was brazen enough to ask for the people’s respect8. His actual response to the King could be interpreted as a blue print for a welfare state, in which the government was not only involved in planning for economic growth, but also play an active role in providing social welfare such as lands and education. The legitimation of the authority of the state is thus contingent upon its performance in generating and distributing these economic and social goods. What is also implied by Mencius, is that if the state fails to observe

8 Mencius replied, 'Your majesty is fond of war - let me take an illustration from war. The soldiers move forward to the sound of the drums; and after their weapons have been crossed, on one side they throw away their coats of mail, trail their arms behind them, and run. Some run a hundred paces and stop; some run fifty paces and stop. What would you think if those who run fifty paces were to laugh at those who run a hundred paces?'

“royal government,” its legitimacy becomes dubious. In another verse, Mencius more explicitly expressed this idea:

Mencius said, “The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest. Therefore to gain the peasantry is the way to become sovereign; to gain the sovereign is the way to become a prince of a State; to gain the prince of a State is the way to become a great officer. When a prince endangers the altars of the spirits of the land and grain, he is changed, and another appointed in his place. When the sacrificial victims have been perfect, the millet in its vessels all pure, and the sacrifices offered at their proper seasons, if yet there ensue drought, or the waters overflow, the spirits of the land and grain are changed, and others appointed in their place.” (Jinxin Xia in Mengzi, 60) This verse not only established the people (the peasantry) as primary and the sovereign as secondary, but also implied that the people have the final say in deciding who should serve them. After all, if the spirits of the land and grain can be replaced when they fail to perform their duties, so can the sovereign if they do not meet the demands of the people. The welfare that the sovereign was expected to provide, according to this verse, well exceeds bare sustenance to include culture, education, and a harmonious community environment. In sum, as a philosophical concept, filial piety is not unidimensional; instead, it is embedded in the matrix of other Confucian ideas (i.e., ren, li, zhong etc.), each rich with multifaceted meanings. In particular, the relations between filial piety and political authority are complex and nuanced, contingent upon specific social and political contexts. Although both Confucius and Mencius see social stability as a priority, they both stressed the importance of benevolent governance. In Confucius’s view, while respecting the hierarchical social order is crucial to maintaining social stability, it should always occur within the bounds of ren and li. If a parent or a king makes unreasonable demands, the son or the subordinate will be justified in refusing them.

Mencius takes it a step further and argues that not only are people entitled to refusing unreasonable orders, they are entitled to replacing the sovereign if they fail to guarantee a decent life for them. Mencius’s writings are an important source of influence that Perry (2008) identified as part of the “Confucian moral economy,” which she argued was inherited by later Emperors and even Mao himself in maintaining a balanced state-society relationship that prioritizes the economic security of the peasantry. The motivation for making this moral choice, of course, comes from the pressure of potential peasant resurrections. In the next section, I will discuss how this moral economy was not simply sustained by Confucian moral philosophy, but also the actual economic and political conditions of imperial China. While ideas about interpersonal ethics and benevolent governance from these original writings undoubtedly influenced the ways people conducted their everyday lives as well as how Emperors ruled China, they were also adapted (sometimes unfaithfully but strategically) by Emperors and the patriarchal ruling class in general to enhance their rule. In the next section, I will also discuss how Confucianism was used by the Emperors to enhance their rule, and how the historical practices of filial piety are connected to the moral, legal, and political practices of imperial China.

Filial Piety and State-Society Relations in Imperial China Confucian interpersonal ethics such as filial piety and fidelity are not simply ethical choices for the individuals, but are embedded in the economic as well as the legal-political structures of traditional Chinese society, and played a central role in maintaining the “Confucian moral economy.” When Confucius was alive, his thought had not been very well received by kings of the warring states, since Confucian moral philosophy could not have helped them with military defense and the conquest of other kingdoms. In contrast to Confucianism, the Legalist tradition, which was one of the Hundred Schools of Thought that flourished during the late Spring and Autumn Era, made fewer virtuous assumptions about humanity, and emphasized the role of a militarily strong state in the enforcement of laws in regulating social relationships (Unger, 1977; Zhao, 2015). Nevertheless, the primacy of law and bureaucracy in the Legalist tradition did not describe a contractual relationship between the state and its subjects, nor did it imply a conception of inalienable natural law (or natural right). To the Legalist, laws and bureaucracy were mere instruments to enhance the rule of the monarch and the state they symbolize, especially during a period of warfare and intense competition with neighboring states. It was not until after the unification of China under Qin, and shortly (15 years) after, the Western Han Dynasty (202 B. C. to 8 A.D.) that Confucianism was consecrated as the state orthodoxy. Emperor Wu of Western Han employed Dong Zhongshu, a Confucian scholar, to endorse him as tianzi (天子, the Son of Heaven), and his rule over China as tianming (天命, the Mandate of Heaven), through Dong’s interpretations of Confucian classics. This started the millennia long political alliance between Confucianism and the Chinese Emperors. As the orthodox state ideology, Confucianism not only lent legitimacy to the Emperor’s rule, but also to the authority of

the patriarchs in general. Dong feverishly advocated for sangang wuchang (三綱五常), which stipulates that wives should follow their husband’s will, sons their father’s, and ministers their monarch’s. This version of Confucianism demands that everyone adhere to their ascribed roles (and recognize the authority of the Emperor as the “Mandate of Heaven”), and cultivate a virtuous personality that abstains from unethical behaviors to achieve harmony and prosperity (Unger, 1977; Zhao, 2015). The implementation of punitive laws, in contrast, signals failed moral education for the people. Thus, moral education and ceremonial rituals were prioritized in the Confucian tradition while law simply played an auxiliary role. However, the actual ruling of mass territories with constant pestering from nomadic tribes in the north requires pragmatic tactics, and as this need for maintaining order and efficiency was the central concern of the Legalists, which was secretly adopted and practiced alongside Confucianism by the ruling Emperors (Unger, 1977: 105-109; Zhao, 2015: 184-187). The principles of both Confucianism and Legalism are well reflected in the actual organization of law and bureaucracy in imperial China. The hierarchical division of administrative power from county to the Emperor had been in existence since the Qin Dynasty, the first imperial dynasty (221-206 B.C.) of China, and remained largely unchanged throughout the entire imperial period. The first comprehensive penal code in

China was introduced in 629 A.D. during the Tang dynasty (618-907 A.D.), only a hundred years after the Justinian code (Ma, 2011: 49). During this dynasty, an administrative system featuring six horizontal ministerial divisions (government, revenue, ceremony, justice, military, and works) under the imperial bureaucracy was established, serving alongside the hierarchical administrative system. The traditional

Chinese legal apparatus was an integral part of the administrative system, with the official bureaucrats acting as the arbiter in criminal cases (Huang, 1996: 76-77).

Despite the highly concentrated power in his hands, the Emperor could by no means act capriciously. In Qing dynasty (1644-1911 A.D.), for example, almost all rulings on criminal cases required the citation of specific penal codes, and any failure to ground a ruling in laws would be punishable. All legal decisions on criminal cases underwent a mandatory review through the administrative hierarchy, with capital punishment personally examined by the Emperor himself (Shiga et al, 1998: 9; Huang,

1996: 76-79). Even though the Emperor could override the decisions of bureaucrats, he could not do it often, as ruling of a vast country required a large administrative staff following relatively standard and stable rules (Jones, 2004). The moral function of Confucianism, and the punitive/administrative function of the legal system were also reflected in the organization of the justice system of the Qing Dynasty. This consisted of two levels: at the state level, an elaborate body of codified laws were stipulated, and a complex bureaucratic system of administration, including that of justice administration, was established and implemented. This reflects the Legalist ideal of ruling with laws and bureaucracy (as opposed to morality). At the local and community level, well-established customary practices for dispute resolution by kin/community mediation play the primary role of administrating justice (Huang, 1993). This represents the Confucian ideal of ruling through ethics and morality. In Weberian terms (Weber, 1951), codified laws and the bureaucratic system in ancient China constitute the administrative apparatus of state domination, while morality and rituals in the Confucian tradition fulfill the function of legitimation.

As a moral ideology, Confucianism places much emphasis on filial piety and respecting the authority of those who maintain the hierarchical social order. In fact,

Confucianism transforms the state and the monarch into a benign paternalistic figure, and loyalty to the state is constructed and reinforced through various rituals of ancestral worship as equivalent to loyalty to one’s parents and ancestors (Weber, 1951: 142-169; Unger, 1986: 109; Zhao, 2015: 180-181). The state had invested a great deal of moral education as well as legal constraints to etch the ethics of filial piety and fidelity into the souls of the Chinese subjects.

Morally speaking, it was expected as the children’s obligation to respect and obey the parents when they were alive, and practice three years of mourning rites (in which, in addition to strict customs and rituals, also required that one refrain from serving in office and any type of entertainment) after they passed away. Deviation from these practices may have resulted in censure from the elders of the community, whereas exceptional examples of filial piety may have moved the heavens to manifest divine miracles (Knapp, 1995). Filial piety was also part of the codified criminal laws since the Tang dynasty. For example, the killing of disobedient children was permitted by law in various dynasties, although the burden of proving “disobedience” varied; in the most recent imperial dynasties (Ming and Qing), killing of disobedient children was not a punishable crime unless the killing was proved to be “inhumane” (Chu, 1961: 23-24). Even when the father was found guilty of inhumanly killing the child, the punishment was often not severe, such as receiving 100 strokes in Ming or just paying a fine in Qing (Chu, 1961: 24). However, until now, we have only told half of the story of the Confucian moral economy. On the other side of the supreme authority of the state, are the people’s

heightened expectations for state’s performance in maintaining social stability and distributing economic goods (Moore, 1966; Zhao, 2009; 2015; Yang and Zhao, 2015).

Historically, there has been numerous incidents of peasant uprising in China that eventually led to the demise of a dynasty. In fact, Moore (1966: 202) noted that compared to countries such as India, Japan, or many parts of Europe, China historically had much more frequent peasant uprisings. He (Moore, 1966: 201-214) attributed this to the fairly loose integration of the peasants to the state. Chinese villages were de facto autonomous from state control. State sanctioned laws and order did not necessarily affect the peasants who primarily rely on their villages and clans to serve justice. However, one important link connects the peasant and the state: the distribution of lands. Unlike their Western counterparts, Chinese peasants rarely coordinated with one another in agricultural production. Every household owns some lands, and agricultural production takes place within the household. Landless laborers, therefore, would not have been able to survive by seeking employment by other land-owning peasants. The state is essentially responsible for guaranteeing the provision of arable lands among peasants necessary for subsistence. This expectation for land provision is still prevalent among Chinese farmers today (Wright, 2010: 146). If this expectation is not adequately met, a peasant insurrection is not beyond imagination. Therefore, the expectations on the state to maintain peace, guarantee lands, and manage agricultural production (especially the construction of hydraulic projects) are strong, which further legitimizes the state’s centralized administrative power, although failure to meet such expectations may lead to revolts and even regime shift. The alchemy of the moral philosophy of Confucianism, the pragmatism of Legalism, as well as the strong administrative role of the state in social and economic

affairs reinforce the ultra-stable relationship between the Confucian-Legalist state and Chinese society (Zhao, 2015). As Unger (1977), Weber (1955), and Zhao (2015) noted, although an elaborate system of bureaucracy and administrative laws were developed in China, they remained expedient political tools for the ruling state. While the separation of state (public) affairs from economic and social (private) affairs existed, the lack of a transcendental religion and the lack of a notion of natural law (right) prevented further separation of the judiciary function from the administrative power characteristic of the rule of law in a “liberal society”9.

Filial Piety in Contemporary China

Filial Piety as a Value and as a Practice While Confucianism was under total attack during the in the heyday of Communist totalitarianism (1949-1976) with numerous Confucian Temples destroyed and Confucianism completely rejected in the official educational material of the country, filial piety as a traditional cultural value and practice was tolerated by the anti- traditionalist Communist regime as a mechanism to provide social welfare for rural villagers (Chow, 1991). In the wake of the economic reforms of the 1980s, some practical aspects of filial piety were officially revived by the state. For example, in the 1982 Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, which is still in use, providing for

9 Unger (1977: 68) identified the defining characteristic “the rule of law” as the separation of administration from legislation, and the separation of adjudication from administration. He also argued that the rule of law can only arise in a liberal society with “a structure of group, and specifically of class, domination, a structure not sufficiently stable and comprehensive to win the spontaneous allegiance of its members.”

one’s parents is considered a legal obligation. Whyte (1994) compared filial behaviors and filial attitudes between mainland China and Taiwan, and found that filial piety was still resilient in urban areas of mainland China in the early 1990s. However, Whyte also found that filial practices and attitudes were much more prominent in Taiwan than in mainland China: Taiwanese parents were more likely to live with a married son, and intergenerational exchanges were less balanced, featuring a predominant flow of assistance from children to parents10. As modernization furthered, practices of filial piety as well as attitudes toward filial piety seem to have evolved with it in all Chinese societies. In mainland China, an increasingly lower proportion of children continue to reside with their elder parents, and daughters are playing an increasingly prominent role in parental caretaking, in contrast to the tradition in which sons and daughter-in-laws played a more significant role (Zhan and Montgomery, 2003). A recent study in three Chinese cities revealed that both endorsement of filial piety and cash payments were lower in cities with higher levels of modernization, and that the deterioration of filial piety associated with modernization was less prominent among citizens with higher education (Cheung and Kwan, 2009). In Singapore, a majority Chinese society, Metha and Ko (2004) found that even though a high proportion of Sinaporeans acknowledged filial piety as an important value, they challenge its definition in the 21st century. Using a 42-item pool of filial piety measures, Lum and colleageus (2016) consolidated a 10-item Contemporary Filial Piety Scale (CFPS) in Hong Kong. What’s noteworthy in this consolidated scale, is that what are

10 Although a more recent study seems to have documented a reverse trend: Chen, Bond, and Tang (2007) showed that mainland Chinese exhibit higher levels of filial behavior yet lower levels of filial attitudes.

considered “filial piety,” such as attending a parent’s funeral regardless of how far one lives, are not grossly different from common practices of adult children in the West.

Despite evolving practices, studies seem to document a consistent and strong endorsement of filial piety. Yue and Ng (1999) found a strong endorsement of filial obligations by the young participants in Beijing, even higher than the corresponding expectations held by the elderly. According to a nationally representative survey study (CGSS, 2013) with both multiple choice and write-in questions assessing “what constitutes the important value in contemporary China”. The expectation of filial piety from Chinese parents also fuels the legitimacy of the value and practice. Empirical studies of elderly care (e.g., Cheng and Chan, 2006) in contemporary China found a strong correlation between elder parents’ psychological wellbeing and children’s filial practices (especially providing care when parents fall ill, and showing respect). The discrepancy between high endorsement of filial piety as a value on the one hand, and the increasingly obvious deviation of its behavioral indicators from traditional standards seems to suggest that filial piety is serving a greater symbolic role than a functional one in the contemporary context. My further discussion in the next section will reveal some clues as for what this symbolic role may be.

Filial Piety and Political Authoritarianism As we have discussed earlier in this chapter, filial piety was traditionally constructed as a family ethic that promotes obedience to the parents, which is then transformed into loyalty to the state. Some empirical studies conducted recently have attempted to assess whether this is still the case in the modern context. Yeh and Bedford (2003) proposed a “dual of model of filial piety,” which argued that filial piety consists of dual dimensions, an authoritarian dimension and a reciprocal dimension. A couple of

studies conducted by Yeh and colleagues (Yeh and Bedford, 2003; Yeh, Yi, Tsao, and Wan, 2013) compared filial attitudes between China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan and found that while Taiwanese and Hong Kong residents showed stronger support for statements such as “being grateful to parents,” “treating parents well no matter what they do,” and “supporting parents to make them more comfortable,” mainland Chinese showed much stronger endorsement of statements such as “one should give up personal interests to fulfil parental expectations” and “one must have at least one son to continue the family line.”

Chen, Bond, and Tang’s (2007) study was unable to differentiate between Yeh and Bedford’s two dimensions with either their behavioral measures or attitudinal measures of filial piety. However, Chen and colleagues’ measure of filial behaviors and filial attitudes adopted survey items that conceptually tap mostly into the authoritarian dimension of filial piety11, since their design followed that of Ho’s (1994) early study of filial piety, which linked filial attitudes to what he termed “authoritarian moralism” and

“cognitive conservatism.” In other words, Ho argued that the endorsement of filial piety was informed by underlying authoritarian and conservative attitudes. Similarly, Chen and colleagues found that socially conservative attitudes as well as the understanding that investment of human efforts will lead to positive outcomes predicted filial behaviors. However, as discussed earlier, Ho’s as well as Chen and colleague’s studies used measures of filial piety that skewed towards parental authoritarianism. Lum and

11 These items include “I don’t’ socialize with people whom my parents dislike,” “I take care of my body in order not to worry my parents,” “As long as my parents are alive, I do not leave them to live overseas for a long period of time” etc.

colleagues (2015) formulated a much more balanced and exhaustive 42-item filial piety scale to a 10-item one, which reflects two underlying dimensions of filial piety, namely, practical obligations (such as taking care of parents when sick), and compassionate reverence. This consolidated scale depicts a version of flail piety very much congruent with the reciprocal dimension of filial piety by Yeh and Bedford. To better contextualize the dual dimension model, a recent study on heterosexuals’ attitudes toward gay and lesbian people in China adopted Yeh and Bedford’s dual model, and found that only the authoritarian dimension was predictive of negative attitudes toward gays and lesbians (Lin et al., 2016). The nuanced relationship between filial piety (which seems to contain both a benign, reciprocal dimension, and an authoritarian one) and support for political authoritarianism is most notably explored in a recent study conducted by Liu, Yeh, Wu, Liu, and Yang (2015). In this research, Liu and colleagues studied Taiwanese adolescents’ belief in the benevolence and moral legitimacy of leaders in the central government. The findings of the study revealed that the affective components of adolescents’ filial piety towards their parents contribute to their beliefs about benevolent authority: within the relationship with mothers but not fathers, adolescents associated higher reciprocal filial piety, authoritative parenting, and authentic (positive) affect with higher benevolent authority beliefs. For daughters but not sons, reciprocal filial piety, authoritative parenting style, and authentic (positive) affect in the relationship with their father were positively associated with benevolent authority beliefs. Although this study demonstrated a clear gender difference in the socialization of benevolent authority beliefs, it also invited the interpretation that affect-based transfer from parent-child relationships rather than authoritarian obligations based on

rote learning was a key socializing factor of attitudes toward political authority and legitimacy in a contemporary Chinese society.

In short, even a benign, affect-based, and reciprocal filial piety seems able to transmit certain beliefs in benevolent authority, which may be used to justify political authoritarianism. However, whether such beliefs do indeed turn into support for political authoritarianism is another story altogether. After all, Taiwan, in which Liu and colleague’s study was conducted, is a fully democratic society. Another recent study by Gu (2013) found that Confucian values that govern interpersonal relations within one’s immediate social environment (such as filial piety) are not in conflict with support for democratic government and social liberal values, such as tolerance and trust in Chinese society. Others such as Fukuyama (1995) had long argued that Confucianism and Confucian interpersonal ethics are not exclusive of democratic values and practices.

Filial Piety and Chinese National Identity

How do we make sense of filial piety as a culturally and ethnically specific value and practice, whose meaning has obviously evolved with modernization, and its alleged affinity with political authoritarianism conceived in the traditional paradigm of state-society relations? Liu, Ng, Weatherall, and Loong’s (2000) study may provide some inspirations. In this study of Chinese New Zealanders, it was found that filial attitudes were associated with strong endorsement of stronger Chinese cultural and ethnic identity among Chinese New Zealanders. The finding of this study as well as the documented discrepancy between strong and consistent endorsement of filial piety as a value across Chinese societies and its inconsistent behavioral indicators seems to suggest that filial piety as a value has become somewhat independent of traditional expectations of filial obligations or practices, but transformed into a symbol of the

Chinese ethnic and cultural identity. It is preserved at the symbolic level as an essential marker of the Chinese identity. Even though filial attitudes do not necessarily correspond to observable filial behaviors, it may impact other social and political attitudes as a purely cultural and psychological construct. Whether this Chinese identity has to appeal to political authoritarianism is a contingent, and context-specific issue. As we will discuss in the last chapter, some Chinese scholars such as Jiang (2013) argue that not only are Confucian interpersonal ethics not incompatible with democracy and liberal rule of law, they serve as an essential mechanism in maintaining national solidarity without which anomie and other social problems may arise.

Concluding Notes Filial piety played a central role in the Confucian order of imperial China, and seems to continue shaping the Chinese cultural identity and the Chinese understanding of political authority and individual liberty. However, the practice and meanings of filial piety have also undergone significant change over the years of radical social transformation that took place in China. It remains an underexplored empirical question as for whether filial piety still shapes the Chinese conception of individual rights and liberties (vis-à-vis state authority) via the same pathways and mechanisms as suggested by Weber (1951).

Chapter 4

METHODOLOGY

This chapter first provides explanations for selecting college students as the population of interest, as well as adopting quantitative methods as the primary analytic strategy for this study. I then introduce the demographic characteristics of the sample and specific quantitative analytic strategies used in this study before proceeding to present descriptive statistics as well as results from exploratory factor analyses of all key variables. Based on the results of factor analysis, composite scales of key variables are constructed in the last section of this chapter.

Population Selection and Analytic Strategy The current study empirically explores Chinese college students’ conception of rights against various social and cultural contexts of contemporary Chinese society. This is an important demographic group that may reveal unique insights into the more progressive political consciousness of the country. Because the college students surveyed in this study grew up in the post-reform era of rapid social change, their identification with traditional Chinese culture and the traditional conception of rights should not be automatically assumed. In fact, the resilience of traditional culture among contemporary Chinese college students constitutes one of the primary research questions of this study. Furthermore, informed by intellectual elites at various universities, college students played significant leadership roles in various movements towards political liberalization in the 20th century dating from the May Fourth Movement of 1919, to the Tian’anmen Protest of 1989 (Zuo and Benford, 1995; Zhao, 2001). This social stratum has a particularly strong proclivity towards organizing radical political movements within many developing countries (Lipset, 1968), partly because

they tend to organically connect the radical intellectuals with the masses (Cox, 1993). While students may not have experienced any grievances or economic hardships that would awaken their consciousness to defend their “rights,” their economically privileged social position enables more idealistic pursuits in politics, making them an extraordinarily active political group in developing nations where an equivalent to “the middle class” is still in early formation. By surveying college students, this study is intended to ground contemporary social and political realities in the historical continuity of traditional Chinese culture while not losing sight of the contingently transforming social conditions of contemporary China. Analytically, this study represents the very first attempt to quantitatively measure and explore the conceptions of rights and liberty in China. As was reviewed in the previous section, past studies of rights consciousness in China (e.g., Boittin, 2013; Gallagher, 2006; O’Brien, 2003; Lee, 2007; Yang, 2009) were predominantly based on qualitative data, and did not interrogate the relationship between rights consciousness and the Chinese conception of rights. The several existing quantitative studies either only measured one dimension of rights (e.g., Li, 2010), or did not explore attitudes toward constitution-making and lawmaking (e.g., Wong, 2011; Perry, 2009; Chen and Lu, 2011). Participation in constitution-making and lawmaking was an essential distinction between rights consciousness and rules consciousness as they were posited in the academic debate (Li, 2010; Perry, 2009). Last but not least, this study also explores the connection between interpersonal ethics and the paradigm of rights conceived in broader social and historical contexts by examining the effects of “traditional” ethics on the Chinese conception of rights, and comparing these effects. On the side of traditional ethics in particular, this study represents one of the very first

to comprehensively measure various dimensions of filial piety (i.e., endorsement versus understanding, authoritarian versus reciprocal) and explore their social and cultural correlates, as well as their links to Chinese conceptions of rights. It is also noteworthy that given the social differences between mainland China and the Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan areas (e.g., Whyte, 2004; Yeh, Yi, Tsao, and Wan, 2013), I conducted separate analyses on the two subsamples to compare and contrast these differences. There are two reasons why I adopted a primarily quantitative approach to studying these questions. First, I seek to establish a robust generalizability (to the population of college students in China) in my findings, for which a quantitative approach where a larger sample size can be more practically attained, is more appropriate. Secondly, concurring with many contemporary scholars in the field of cognitive and cultural sociology, I find that survey has several advantages in revealing hidden mechanisms of culture. Building upon Bourdieu’s (1986) seminal work on cultural reproduction, these scholars (e.g., Vaisey, 2009; Cerulo, 2010; DiMaggio,

1997) argued that culture is often transmitted to us through repeated habituation, which forms a largely dormant (or unconscious) habitus that can be instantaneously activated in situations of need. For example, we may not consciously know how we are able to ride a bike, but once learned we never forget the skill and will be able to use it as needed. On the same token, some of our attitudes, values, or beliefs are closely associated with other values, beliefs or social characteristics without us even being consciously aware. Survey and experiments (or quasi-experiments), in particular, are conducive to tapping into this largely automatic part of our cognition (in contrast to the “deliberative” part characterized by speech and conscious thinking), since the research participants may not be conscious of how s/he come to a particular value or preference

for action, but the mechanism may be identified using quantitative analytic techniques (Vaisey, 2009).

This study first identifies (1) the extent to which contemporary college students in China endorse traditional values such as filial piety, in comparison to modern values. To robustly capture the complexity of filial piety both as a norm and a practice, I further explore (2) students’ understanding of what practices or actions constitute filial piety. I also measure (3) what types of rights and liberties (including rights to socioeconomic welfare, political participation, and civil liberty) college students see as most essential to a Chinese citizen. I then explore (4) the relations between filial piety and the social and cultural characteristics of Chinese society, as well as its relations with the empirically derived conceptions of rights. Finally, (5) I compare these characteristics and mechanisms in mainland Chinese with non-mainland Chinese students.

Sample and Specific Analytic Strategies

Sample The sample used in this study came from a research project entitled Survey of Contemporary Chinese Young Adults (SCCYA), funded by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. The project aims at investigating the political consciousness and political identities of Chinese young adults between the age of 18-30 who were either enrolled in universities or are currently working. The data used in this dissertation came from surveys administered to college students. Traditional pencil-and-paper surveys were administered at five (5) universities across three provinces in southern China, between 2015 and 2016. Two (2) of the universities were major nationally ranked first- tier research universities with comprehensive disciplines and specializations; one (1)

was a local comprehensive university, and the other two (2) were local comprehensive universities with strong disciplinary focus on either ethnic studies or education. A total of 1,500 surveys were administered in the five universities. Out of the 1,500 surveys, 1139 valid surveys were returned, and 1017 of them were included in the final sample after dropping missing cases. It is noteworthy that two (2) of the universities being surveyed recruited a significant number of overseas Chinese students (who are ethnically Chinese, but do not possess PRC-citizenship), including those from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macao. A sample descrptives is summarized in Table 1.

Descriptive Statistics of Demographic Characteristics (n=1017)

Demographic Mean SD Range Characteristics Male .52 .50 0-1 Age 2.17 1.48 18-28 Urban Hukou .66 .48 0-1 PRC citizenship .70 .46 0-1 CPC membership .17 .38 0-1 Ethnic minority .25 .43 0-1 Science or engineering .60 .49 0-1 major Religious .26 .44 0-1

Analytic Strategies In the next section of this chapter, I present the descriptive statistics of all the key variables in this study. Results from exploratory factor analyses are also presented, and (composite scales of) the key variables of analyses are constructed. In the following three chapters, three separate sets of analyses are performed. Chapter 5 explores the social and cultural correlates of the Chinese conception of rights. Chapter 6

independently investigates the social correlates of various conceptual dimensions of filial piety. Chapter 7 specifically examines the relations between various dimensions of filial piety and the Chinese conception of rights. In these chapters, results from hierarchical multivariate OLS regression analyses are presented.

Descriptive Statistics and Exploratory Factor Analyses

Endorsement of Rights Tables 2-4 break down the descriptive statistics of the students’ responses to the survey item “What do you think constitutes the basic rights and liberty of a Chinese citizen?” by citizenship status (response categories range from 1 “strongly disagree,” to 6 “strongly agree”) The column to the far right shows the percentage of students who responded “agree” or “strongly agree” to indicate their extent of agreement to the following rights as basic rights and liberty: “to obtain social welfare such as medical care, education, pension etc.,” “to work and receive compensation for it,” “to elect and be elected, including that of the nation’s leader,” “to participate in the making and revision of the constitution and laws, either directly or via representatives” “to follow religions and participate in religious activities,” “freedom of speech, including the right to criticize the government and its affiliates,” “to organize public demonstrations,” “to participate in the making of local and national policies.” Overall, the results suggest that the vast majority of the respondents, with either mainland and non-mainland origin, conceived of the rights to work and social welfare as basic rights and liberty, although mainland students had stronger endorsement across the board, except for the right to assembly and demonstration. While civil and political rights were also considered as basic rights by the majority of the respondents, the

strength of support is significantly lower, especially when it comes to this right to participate in lawmaking and public demonstrations.

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (n=1017)

Survey Item Mean SD Range %* To obtain social welfare such as medical 5.69 .54 3-6 96.7 care, education, pension etc. To work and receive compensation for it 5.71 .51 3-6 97.6 To elect and be elected, including that of the 5.39 .83 1-6 87.9 nation’s leader To participate in the making and revision of 5.00 1.12 1-6 9.2 the constitution and laws To follow religions and participate in 5.22 .92 1-6 81.6 religious activities Freedom of speech, including the right to 5.17 1.06 1-6 77.1 criticize the government and its affiliates To organize public demonstrations 4.66 1.32 1-6 61.5 To participate in the making of local and 5.02 .99 1-6 72.2 national policies

* denotes the percentage of respondents with response category of “agree” or “strongly agree”

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (Mainland, n=714)

Survey Item Mean SD Range %* To obtain social welfare such as medical 5.74 .50 2-6 98.0 care, education, pension etc. To work and receive compensation for it 5.75 .47 3-6 98.5 To elect and be elected, including that of 5.41 .83 1-6 89.0 the nation’s leader To participate in the making and revision 4.99 1.15 1-6 71.5 of the constitution and laws To follow religions and participate in 5.23 .89 1-6 82.7 religious activities Freedom of speech, including the right to 5.16 1.09 1-6 77.7 criticize the government and its affiliates To organize public demonstrations 4.63 1.35 1-6 6.7 To participate in the making of local and 5.06 .97 1-6 73.4 national policies

* denotes the percentage of respondents with response category of “agree” or “strongly agree”

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Survey Item Mean SD Range %* To obtain social welfare such as medical 5.57 .64 3-6 92.9 care, education, pension etc. To work and receive compensation for it 5.58 .60 3-6 95 To elect and be elected, including that of 5.31 .80 1-6 85.2 the nation’s leader To participate in the making and 5.01 1.03 1-6 69.9 revision of the constitution and laws To follow religions and participate in 5.15 .97 1-6 78.6 religious activities Freedom of speech, including the right to criticize the government and its 5.13 1.01 1-6 74.5 affiliates To organize public demonstrations 4.67 1.26 1-6 61.8 To participate in the making of local and 4.87 1.04 1-6 68.2 national policies

The results of a factor analysis (principal component analysis with varimax rotation) displayed in Tables 5-6 indicates clear clustering of two types of rights conceptions, namely, an economic conception of rights based on the receipt of social and economic welfare from the state, versus a civil and political conception of rights. With the exception of the right to elect local and national leaders, in which case non- mainland students seemed to classify it as an economic right whereas mainland students with civil and political rights, the two groups of students showed a strong similarity in the clustering pattern of their rights conceptions.

* denotes the percentage of respondents with response category of “agree” or “strongly agree”

Factor Analysis of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (n=1017)

Factors Variables and items 1 2 Basic Rights and Liberty To obtain social welfare such as medical care, education, pension etc. .88 To work and receive compensation for it .90 To elect and be elected, including that of the nation’s leader .53 To participate in the making and revision of the constitution and laws, .75 To follow religions and participate in religious activities .68 Freedom of speech, including the right to criticize the government and .79 its affiliates To organize public demonstrations .79 To participate in the making of local and national policies .64 Eigenvalues 3.71 1.30 Percent of variance explained 46.41 16.30

Factor Analysis of Endorsement of Basic Rights and Liberties (by citizenship)

Mainland Non-Mainland (n=714) (n=303) Variables and items 1 2 1 2 Basic Rights and Liberty To obtain social welfare .86 .86 To work and receive .90 .88 compensation To elect and be elected .62 .75 .40 To participate in lawmaking .78 .68 To follow and practice religions .68 .70 Freedom of speech .77 .84 To organize public .76 .85 demonstrations To participate in policymaking .69 .53 Eigenvalues 1.31 3.63 1.31 3.91 Percent of variance explained 16.3 45.39 16.47 48.83

Endorsement of Traditional and Modern Values Tables 7-9 summarize the descriptive statistics of the respondents’ perceived importance of various traditional and modern values (ranging from 1 “not important at all” to 6 “very important at all”) in response to this survey question: “As a citizen of contemporary Chinese society, how important do you think the following ethics or values are?” These values include “honesty,” “abiding by laws and rules,” “showing filial piety to parents,” “respecting superiors and seniors,” “maintaining amicable interpersonal relationships,” “serving the people selflessly [a common slogan of the Communist Party],” “staying informed and actively involved in public affairs,” “freely expressing one’s opinions and talents,” “being innovative,” “willing to speak up for the socially and economically disadvantaged.” According to Tables 7-9, among both mainland and non-mainland students, the values closely associated with traditional (Confucian) doctrines including honesty, abiding by laws and rules, filial piety, respecting superiors and seniors, and maintaining amicable social relationships were all rated as substantially more important than other values. Results of factor analyses displayed in Tables 10-11 indicate clear clustering of traditional values versus modern/contemporary values for both groups of students.

Descriptive Statistics of Traditional and Modern Values (n=1017)

Survey Item Mean SD Range % Honesty 5.72 .58 1-6 97.5 Abiding by laws and rules 5.62 .66 1-6 94.7 Showing filial piety to parents 5.79 .54 1-6 97.6 Respecting superiors and seniors 5.43 .76 1-6 9.1 Maintaining amicable interpersonal 5.43 .74 1-6 90 relationships Serving the people selflessly 4.84 1.03 1-6 91.3 Staying informed and actively 4.63 1.09 1-6 91.2 involved in public affairs Freely expressing one’s opinions and 4.85 1.03 1-6 96.3 talents Being innovative 5.17 .88 1-6 97.3 Willing to speak up for the socially 5.29 .84 1-6 95.3 and economically disadvantaged

Descriptive Statistics of Traditional and Modern Values (Mainland, n=714)

Survey Item Mean SD Range % Honesty 5.78 .50 1-6 98.6 Abiding by laws and rules 5.66 .62 1-6 95.0 Showing filial piety to parents 5.86 .46 1-6 98.5 Respecting superiors and seniors 5.50 .70 1-6 92.1 Maintaining amicable interpersonal 5.49 .69 1-6 92.0 relationships Serving the people selflessly 4.90 1.00 1-6 67.6 Staying informed and actively involved 4.89 1.07 1-6 66.5 in public affairs Freely expressing one’s opinions and 5.28 .83 1-6 83.0 talents Being innovative 5.39 .78 1-6 86.6 Willing to speak up for the socially and 5.12 .89 1-6 75.4 economically disadvantaged

Descriptive Statistics of Traditional and Modern Values (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Survey Item Mean SD Range % Honesty 5.58 .72 1-6 95.0 Abiding by laws and rules 5.49 .74 1-6 95.0 Showing filial piety to parents 5.64 .67 1-6 92.3 Respecting superiors and seniors 5.25 .88 1-6 85.3 Maintaining amicable interpersonal 5.29 .84 1-6 84.3 relationships Serving the people selflessly 4.67 1.08 1-6 57.5 Staying informed and actively 4.74 1.03 1-6 6.1 involved in public affairs Freely expressing one’s opinions and 4.93 .95 1-6 69.3 talents Being innovative 5.08 .91 1-6 76.3 Willing to speak up for the socially 4.90 .98 1-6 69.7 and economically disadvantaged

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Traditional and Modern Values (n=1017)

Factors Variables and items 1 2 Traditional and Modern Values Honesty .806

Abiding by laws and rules .728 Showing filial piety to parents .750 Respecting superiors and seniors .733 Maintaining amicable interpersonal .578 relationships Serving the people selflessly .707 Staying informed and actively involved in .804

public affairs Freely expressing one’s opinions and talents .818 Being innovative .761 Willing to speak up for the socially and .759 economically disadvantaged Eigenvalues 4.69 1.53 Percent of variance explained 46.90 15.3

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Traditional and Modern Values (by citizenship)

Mainland (n=715) Non-Mainland (303) Variables and items 1 2 1 2 Traditional and Modern Values Honesty .81 .81 Abiding by laws and rules .73 .78 Showing filial piety to parents .75 .83 Respecting superiors and seniors .74 .74 Maintaining amicable interpersonal relationships .58 .68 Serving the people selflessly .71 .65 Staying informed and actively involved in public affairs .81 .78 Freely expressing one’s opinions and talents .82 .85 Being innovative .76 .81 Willing to speak up for the socially and economically disadvantaged .76 .77 Eigenvalues 4.71 1.53 4.35 2.01 Percent of variance explained 47.10 15.33 43.46 2.18

Endorsement of Cosmology

The respondents’ endorsement of various cosmologies was measured by the respondents’ extent to which (ranging from 1 “strongly disagree” to 6 “strongly agree”) they agreed to each of the following survey items: “There exists an ultimate authority in the universe (such as “God”) in charge of everything in the universe including humanity (Endorsement of Monotheism).” “There exists unthinkable laws and principles (such as the “Dao”) that exceeds the current status of scientific knowledge. (Endorsement of Buddhist/Daoist Cosmology)” “Everything in the universe, including human beings, are governed by materialist laws; there is no life or reincarnation after death. (Endorsement of atheism)” “Human beings reincarnate incessantly; the good or bad behaviors in life become Karma that constitutes the cause of reincarnation (Endorsement of the Buddhist notion of Karma).” “There exist heaven and hell; good people live in heaven for eternity, and bad people suffer in hell for eternity (Endorsement of heaven and hell).”

“Whether heaven and hell, or reincarnation exist or not, good people are always rewarded, and bad people punished (Endorsement of secularized notion of Karma).” “Metaphysical entities such as “God” or the ‘Dao’ or ‘Buddha’ may or may not exist; we should respect other people’s practice but keep a distance from this kind of ideas. (Endorsement of Confucian Skepticism)” Tables 12-14 display the descriptive statistics of the students’ endorsement of various religious and secular cosmologies. Among both mainland and non-mainland students, the predominant majority endorsed secular cosmologies as opposed to religious ones, although non-mainland students showed a much stronger endorsement of both religious cosmologies as well as atheism/skepticism, and a weaker endorsement of the secularized notion of karma. The exploratory factor analysis presented in Tables 15-

16 show identical clustering structures between mainland and non-mainland students, yielding to a factor of “religious cosmologies” and “secular cosmologies.”

Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Cosmology (n=1017)

Survey Items Mean SD Range % Endorsement of Monotheism 2.92 1.62 1-6 19.9 Endorsement of Buddhist/Daoist 3.81 1.63 1-6 40 Cosmology Endorsement of heaven and hell 2.98 1.54 1-6 18.4

Endorsement of the Buddhist notion of 3.13 1.62 1-6 21.4 Karma

Endorsement of secularized notion of 4.20 1.53 1-6 48.1 Karma

Endorsement of atheism 3.79 1.51 1-6 36.1 Endorsement of Confucian Skepticism 3.61 1.49 1-6 29.2

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Cosmology (Mainland, n=714)

Survey Items Mean SD Range % Endorsement of Monotheism 3.49 1.55 1-6 27.8 Endorsement of Buddhist/Daoist 4.08 1.49 1-6 43.1 Cosmology Endorsement of heaven and hell 3.60 1.48 1-6 29.1 Endorsement of the Buddhist notion of 3.79 1.49 1-6 32.0 Karma Endorsement of secularized notion of 4.55 1.38 1-6 58.5 Karma Endorsement of atheism 4.08 1.38 1-6 42.2 Endorsement of Confucian Skepticism 4.02 1.39 1-6 37.9

Descriptive Statistics of Endorsement of Cosmology (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Survey Items Mean SD Range % Endorsement of Monotheism 2.68 1.59 1-6 16.4 Endorsement of Buddhist/Daoist 1-6 38.6 Cosmology 3.70 1.68 Endorsement of heaven and hell 2.72 1.49 1-6 13.9 Endorsement of the Buddhist notion of 1-6 17.1 Karma 2.86 1.59 Endorsement of secularized notion of 1-6 43.6 Karma 4.05 1.57 Endorsement of atheism 3.67 1.54 1-6 33.5 Endorsement of Confucian Skepticism 3.45 1.49 1-6 25.4

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Endorsement of Cosmology (n=1017)

Factors Variables and items 1 2 Endorsement of Monotheism .84 Endorsement of Buddhist/Daoist Cosmology .72 Endorsement of heaven and hell .86 Endorsement of the Buddhist notion of Karma .84 Endorsement of secularized notion of Karma .74 Endorsement of atheism .85 Endorsement of Confucian Skepticism .67 Eigenvalues 1.06 3.77 Percent of variance explained 15.07 53.80

Exploratory Factory Analysis of Endorsement of Cosmology (by citizenship)

Mainland Non-Mainland (n=714) (n=303) Variables and items 1 2 1 2 Endorsement of Monotheism .84 .81 Endorsement of Buddhist/Daoist Cosmology .73 .68 Endorsement of heaven and hell .86 .86 Endorsement of the Buddhist notion of Karma .84 .85 Endorsement of secularized notion of Karma .76 .61 Endorsement of atheism .84 .89 Endorsement of Confucian Skepticism .66 .72 Eigenvalues 1.10 3.70 1.10 3.62 Percent of variance explained 15.64 52.83 15.64 51.64

Understanding of Filial Piety Table 17-20 summarize the deceptive statistics of respondents’ understanding of various acts of filial piety. For both mainland and non-mainland students, showing respect is considered as the act most indicative of filial piety, followed by frequent contact with parents and providing monthly allowance. Results in Table 21-22 indicate that regardless of citizenship origin, students’ understanding of filial acts load onto two different factors, namely, reciprocal versus authoritarian filial piety (Yeh and Bedford, 2003).

Descriptive Statistics of Understanding of Filial Piety (n=1017)

Survey Item Mean SD Range % Should respect parents 5.74 .55 1-6 97.5 Should always take parents’ feelings and 4.47 1.27 1-6 55.0 “face” in to consideration Should bring honor to the family 4.34 1.26 1-6 48.7 Should follow parents’ choice for occupation 3.10 1.53 1-6 19.5 and spouse Should live as close as possible to parents 4.34 1.26 1-6 27.7 Should live with parents 3.77 1.34 1-6 29.9 Should take care of elderly parents by oneself 4.98 1.05 1-6 73.6 Should provide monthly allowance for 5.25 .92 1-6 84.7 parents Should marry and have children according to 3.35 1.49 1-6 22.1 parents’ wishes Should maintain constant contact with 5.52 .74 1-6 91.1 parents

Descriptive Statistics of Understanding of Filial Piety (Mainland, n=714)

Survey Item Mean SD Range % Should respect parents 5.78 .50 1-6 98.0 Should always take parents’ feelings and 4.35 1.31 1-6 51.1 “face” in to consideration Should bring honor to the family 4.29 1.27 1-6 46.4 Should follow parents’ choice for occupation 2.98 1.47 1-6 15.8 and spouse Should live as close as possible to parents 4.31 1.27 1-6 47.5 Should live with parents 3.69 1.34 1-6 27.3 Should take care of elderly parents by oneself 4.93 1.06 1-6 72.5 Should provide monthly allowance for 5.23 .96 1-6 84.3 parents Should marry and have children according to 3.23 1.47 1-6 18.8 parents’ wishes Should maintain constant contact with 5.58 .72 1-6 92.7 parents

Descriptive Statistics of Understanding of Filial Piety (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Survey Item Mean SD Range % Should respect parents 5.65 .63 1-6 96.4 Should always take parents’ feelings and 4.76 1.11 1-6 64.0 “face” in to consideration Should bring honor to the family 4.47 1.21 1-6 54.1 Should follow parents’ choice for 3.39 1.62 1-6 28.1 occupation and spouse Should live as close as possible to parents 4.41 1.24 1-6 48.2 Should live with parents 3.97 1.33 1-6 36.0 Should take care of elderly parents by 5.10 1.00 1-6 76.2 oneself Should provide monthly allowance for 5.32 .82 1-6 85.5 parents Should marry and have children 3.64 1.52 1-6 3.0 according to parents’ wishes Should maintain constant contact with 5.39 .79 1-6 87.1 parents

Factor Analysis of Understanding of Filial Piety (Mainland, n=714)

Factors Variables and items 1 2

Filial Piety Should always take parents’ feelings and “face” in .58 to consideration

Should bring honor to the family .62 Should follow parents’ choice for occupation and .85 spouse Should live as close as possible to parents .74 Should live with parents .84 Should marry and have children according to .85 parents’ wishes Should take care of elderly parents by oneself .45 Should provide monthly allowance for parents .73 Should respect parents .74 Should maintain constant contact with parents .61 Eigenvalues 4.59 1.2 Percent of variance explained 45.94 12.00

Factor Analysis of Understanding of Filial Piety (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Factors Variables and items 1 2 Filial Piety Should always take parents’ feelings and “face” in to .64 consideration Should bring honor to the family .68 Should follow parents’ choice for occupation and .85 spouse Should live as close as possible to parents .62 Should live with parents .79 Should marry and have children according to .82 parents’ wishes Should take care of elderly parents by oneself .58 Should provide monthly allowance for parents .66 Should respect parents .60 Should maintain constant contact with parents .74 Eigenvalues 4.11 1.44 Percent of variance explained 41.05 14.42

Creation and Specification of Key Variables Based on results of the factor analyses, the composite scales of key variables were created and summarized in Table 22. “Economic conception of rights” is an additive scale of “the right to work” and the “right to social welfares.” “Civil and political conception of rights” is a scale consisting of five items: “the right to election,”

“the right to participate in law-making and constitution-making,” “the right to follow religions,” “freedom of speech,” “the right to assembly and demonstration,” and “the right to participate in policy-making.”12 “Religious cosmology” is an additive scale of

12 Factor analyses in Table 5 indicate that the “right to election” loads with other civil and political rights in the total sample, although in the non-mainland subsample, it loaded with economic rights. Subsequent inter-item reliability test suggests that the

“monotheism,” “Buddhist/Daoist cosmology,” “endorsement of heaven and hell,” and “endorsement of the Buddhist notion of karma.” “Secular cosmology” consists of “the secularized notion of karma,” “atheism,” and “Confucian skepticism.” Cronbach Alphas of each scale indicate predominantly high, and at least acceptable, inter-item reliability. The main dependent variable of interest in this study was the constructed composite scale “Civil and political over economic conception of rights”. As a measure, “civil and political over economic conception of rights” has previously been operationalized by Michelson and Liu (2010) to study favorable attitudes toward political liberalization in China. In contrast to simply comparing endorsement of economic rights to the endorsement of civil and political rights, this measure focuses on the relative difference between an economic conception of rights and a civil/political conception of rights. This is a better indicator of the respondent’s favorable attitude towards political liberalization. It at least partially circumvents the problem that many respondents tend to report inflated scores across all survey items, given that surveys are sometimes used as an official tool to assess and cultivate mass loyalty. Therefore, it is the relative importance (not the gross endorsement) assigned to civil and political rights over economic rights that reveals the underlying favorable attitudes. To create the composite scale of “Civil and Political over Economic Rights,” the four-itemed scale “Civil and Political conception of rights” was first divided by three to the match the number of items (2) in the scale “Economic conception of rights.” “Civil and political over economic conception of rights” was then created by subtracting “Economic conception of rights” from the rescaled “Civil and political conception of

Civil and political conception of rights” scale has high inter-item reliability (alpha=.83). The item is thus included in the scale.

rights.” Table 22-24 summarized the descriptive statistics of the dependent variable and its components of the entire sample, and by regions of origin. They also summarized all the key variables used for analysis in Chapter 5.

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (n=1017)

Variables Mean SD Range Alpha Economic conception of rights 11.41 .96 8-12 .80 Civil and political conception of rights 10.03 1.64 4-12 .81 (rescaled) Civil and political over economic conception -1.38 1.57 -6.8- of rights 2.8 Modern values 25.21 3.77 5-30 .86 Traditional values 27.99 2.57 5-30 .83 Religious cosmology 12.84 5.43 4-24 .87 Secular cosmology 11.60 3.60 3-18 .71

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Mainland, n=714)

Variables Mean SD Range Alpha Economic conception of rights 11.50 .87 8-12 .76 Civil and political conception of rights 10.05 1.65 4.8- .80 (rescaled) 12 Civil and political over economic conception -1.45 1.58 -6.8- of rights 2.8 Modern values 25.58 3.62 9-30 .86 Traditional values 28.29 2.27 7-30 .81 Religious cosmology 11.94 5.37 4-24 .87 Secular cosmology 11.18 3.63 3-18 .69

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Variables Mean SD Range Alpha Economic conception of rights 11.15 1.14 8-12 .83 Civil and political conception of 9.93 1.61 4-12 .83 rights (rescaled) Civil and political over economic -1.22 1.53 -6.8-2.4 conception of rights Modern values 27.26 3.03 5-30 .86 Traditional values 24.31 3.91 5-30 .85 Religious cosmology 14.96 5.00 4-24 .85 Secular cosmology 12.64 3.28 3-18 .70

Based on the results of a factor analysis on understanding of filial piety, two variables were created. Variable “Reciprocal filial piety” is a summative scale of four items: “Should take care of elderly parents by oneself,” “Should provide monthly allowance for parents,” “Should respect parents,” “Should maintain constant contact with parents.” Variable “Authoritarian filial piety” consists of six items: “Should always take parents’ feelings and ‘face’ in to consideration,” “Should bring honor to the family,” “Should follow parents’ choice for occupation and spouse,” “Should live as close as possible to parents,” “Should live with parents,” “Should marry and have children according to parents’ wishes.” For more efficient comparison, “Authoritarian filial piety” was recast into the same scale as “Reciprocal filial piety.” “Authoritarian filial piety” was then subtracted from “Reciprocal filial piety” to create a new scale “Reciprocal over authoritarian filial piety.” The following tables summarize the descriptive statistics of the two variables and the additive scale.

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Mainland, n=714)

Variables Mean SD Range Alpha Endorsement of filial piety 5.85 .46 1-6 - Reciprocal filial piety 21.52 2.27 12-24 .61 Authoritarian filial piety 15.23 4.12 4 -24 .85 (rescaled) Reciprocal over 6.29 3.68 -1.7-17 - authoritarian filial piety

Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Variables Mean SD Range Alpha Endorsement of filial piety 5.64 .67 1-6 - Reciprocal filial piety 21.46 2.27 15-24 .64 Authoritarian filial piety 16.42 4.26 4.7-24 .88 (rescaled) Reciprocal over authoritarian 5.03 3.54 -2.3-18.7 - filial piety

Correlation Analysis of Constructing Dependent Variable (Mainland, n=714)

Reciprocal over Authoritarian Reciprocal authoritarian filial piety filial piety Reciprocal over authoritarian 1.00 -.836** .103** Authoritarian filial piety -.836** 1.00 .460** Reciprocal filial piety .103** .460** 1.00

Correlation Analysis of Constructing Dependent Variable (Non- Mainland, n=303)

Reciprocal over Authoritarian Reciprocal authoritarian filial piety filial piety Reciprocal over 1.00 -.85** -.03 authoritarian Authoritarian filial piety -.85** 1.00 .56** Reciprocal filial piety -.03 .56** 1.00

To reiterate, three separate sets of analyses will be performed in the following three chapters. Chapter 5 will explore the social and cultural correlates of the Chinese conception of rights. Chapter 6 will independently investigate the social correlates of various conceptual dimensions of filial piety. Chapter 7 will specifically examine the relations between various dimensions of filial piety and the Chinese conception of rights.

Chapter 5

TRADITIONAL AND MODERN VALUES ON CONCEPTION OF RIGHTS

Although Perry’s (2010) focus of the Confucian moral economy rested on elite Confucian philosophy, in reality, Confucianism functioned through various well- integrated ethical values and practices such as filial piety, respecting figures of seniority and authority, endorsing Confucian (which, according to Weber, is secular but mystic) cosmological views etc. If the Confucian moral economy argument is to stand, it follows that these traditional values (i.e., those that tend to support and sustain the traditional patriarchal social order that privileges older men with higher socioeconomic status) as well as traditional cosmological views should continually exert some influence on the Chinese understanding of rights (Weber, 1951). This chapter first assesses the Confucian moral economy argument (of the Chinese conception of rights) by examining the extent to which traditional Chinese cultural values exert an effect on the prioritization of an economic over a civil and political conception of rights. In addition, this chapter also explores the extent to which “modern” values (i.e., those arise from contemporary, market-oriented economic and social life) shape the contemporary Chinese rights conception: Did modernization and its associated values erode the traditional conception of rights? Or did they coexist with the traditional conception of rights? These are the second set of questions that this chapter seeks to shed light on.

Dependent and Independent Variables As is summarized in Table 8.1-3 in the previous chapter, the dependent variable of interest in this chapter was the constructed composite scale “Civil and political over economic conception of rights”. “Endorsement of traditional values,” “Endorsement of modern values,” “Religious cosmology,” and “Secular cosmology” were the key

independent variables of interest. Demographic variables were also included in the bivariate and multivariate analyses.

Multivariate Analyses Hierarchical OLS regressions were performed on civil and political over economic conception of rights. Model 1 contains all the demographic variables. In Model 2, endorsement of traditional and endorsement of modern values were added as independent variables. In Model 3, endorsement of religious and secular cosmology was added as the last set of independent variables. Tables 29-31 summarize the results of hierarchal OLS regressions on civil and political over economic conception of rights. The results show that for both the aggregated sample and the subsamples (of mainland versus non-mainland students), each set of new variables progressively improved the previous model when included, and the improvements were statistically significant with a considerable effect size.

Although regression analyses of the total sample on Table 29 suggests that the mainland and non-mainland students do not significantly differ in their conception of rights, given the observed economic, social, and political differences between mainland students and non-mainland students in the descriptive statistics, regression analyses were performed separately on the two groups. Specifically, for mainland students, the explanatory power of the model increased by 9% (from 2% to 11%) when measures of endorsement of traditional values were added to the model, and the increase in explanatory power was 3% (from 3% to 6%) for non-mainland students. Overall, being male, endorsing modern values, and endorsing religious cosmologies were positively associated with endorsement of a civil and political over an economic conception of rights for both mainland and non-

mainland students. For mainland students, endorsement of traditional values is negatively associated with endorsement of a civil and political over an economic conception of rights, but the same association was not found among non-mainland students.

Discussion These findings suggest that traditional culture, or at least the symbols of traditional culture (i.e., various codes of conduct) as they are conceived of in the mainland Chinese collective consciousness, is still potent in shaping Chinese legal and political consciousness. Specifically, traditional culture sustains the traditional conception of rights (which privileges economic benefits), while values introduced by modernization supports a conception of rights that places a stronger emphasis on civil and political liberties. The fact that endorsement of religious cosmology significantly predicts (in both mainland and non-mainland samples) a stronger civil and political over economic conception of rights reflects the repression of non-secular identities under both Communism as well as the Confucianism (which is primarily secular and had been the orthodox throughout Chinese history). It strengthens the argument that a conception of rights based on civil and political freedoms is most likely to develop in a theologically derived notion of autonomy, which is not indigenous to Chinese culture (or at least not indigenous to Confucianism). The mainland/non-mainland difference in regard to the predictive effect of endorsement of traditional culture may result from the different understanding of traditional culture between the two groups. It may be hypothesized that the “traditional values” reflect not simply the cultural legacy of ancient China, but are indicative of what Inglehart and Baker (2000) termed “survival orientation” commonly identified in

developing economies. In other words, not all of the traditional values are relevant in shaping legal and political consciousness in non-mainland areas where social and economic development has reached a much higher level. This issue will be further addressed in Chapter 7 when we independently examine endorsement filial piety in relation to understandings of filial piety in shaping the conception of rights.

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Civil and Political Over Economic Conception of Rights (n=1017)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Bet SE Beta SE Beta SE a Demographic Characteristics Male .14 .11 .13** .10 .12** .10 ** Age .01 .03 .02 .03 .02 .03 Urban Hukou .04 .11 .03 .11 .02 .11 CPC member -.04 .13 -.04 .13 -.03 .13 Minority .03 .13 .02 .12 .00 .12 Science/engineering major .00 .11 -.01 .11 .00 .11 Religious .00 .11 .01 .11 -.02 .11 PRC citizenship -.04 .13 -.06 .13 -.03 .13 Endorsement of values Traditional values -.10** .02 -.09* .02 Modern values .31** .02 .28** .01 Cosmology Religious cosmology .16** .01 Secular cosmology .02 .02 Adjusted R2 .02* .9** .12** N 1017 1017 1017

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Civil and Political Over Economic Conception of Rights (Mainland, n=714)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic characteristics Male .13** .13 .11** .12 .11** .12 Age .03 .05 .04 .04 .04 .04 Urban Hukou .05 .12 .05 .11 .03 .11 CPC member -.07 .14 -.07 .14 -.06 .13 Minority .01 .15 -.01 .15 -.03 .14 Science/engineering major -.03 .15 -.03 .14 -.02 .14 Religious .01 .15 .02 .14 -.01 .14 Endorsement of values Traditional values -.12** .03 -.11** .03 Modern values .36** .02 .33** .02 Cosmology Religious cosmology .16** .01 Secular cosmology -.01 .02 Adjusted R2 .02* .11** .13** N 714 714 714

Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Civil and Political Over Economic Conception of Rights (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic characteristics Male .15* .19 .14* .18 .13* .18 Age -.09 .06 -.08 .06 -.07 .05 Urban Hukou -.02 .34 -.02 .33 -.04 .33 CPC member .06 .38 .06 .38 .06 .37 Minority .10 .36 .09 .36 .08 .35 Science/engineering major .09 .18 .06 .18 .08 .18 Religious -.06 .18 -.04 .18 -.07 .18 Endorsement of values Traditional values -.09 .03 -.07 .03 Modern values .20** .02 .17** .02 Cosmology Religious cosmology .14* .02 Secular cosmology .10 .03 Adjusted R2 .03* .06** .10** N 303 303 303

Chapter 6

DIMENSHIONS OF FILIAL PIETY AND THEIR SOCIAL CORRELATES

As was discussed in Chapter 3, the practice of filial piety seems to have been waning in multiple Chinese societies as modernization furthers. However, as a cultural value symbolizing the Chinese national and cultural identity, filial piety remains central. Nevertheless, new nuances in the meanings of filial piety have also developed. Two distinct and increasingly incompatible dimensions of filial piety, namely, the reciprocal dimension of intergenerational care and the authoritarian dimension focused on obeying the parents have been identified in different Chinese societies. In addition to the diverging conceptual dimensions, both the practice and understanding of filial piety were found to distribute differently across different Chinese societies: while some studies found that Taiwan and Hong Kong retained more of the traditional practices (Whyte, 1995), some other studies found that Mainland Chinese hold a stronger authoritarian understanding of filial piety than Taiwan and Hong Kong residents (Yeh and Bedford, 2013). Though it may be deteriorating in practice, filial piety remains a central value associated with the Chinese national identity, as was indicated in the students’ response to the importance of filial piety in this study, as well as Chinese citizens’ response in the Chinese General Social Survey (CGSS, 2013). There seems to be new interpretations of what constitutes filial piety (i.e., as more of a less onerous version of reciprocal care than absolute parental authority. These new developments may as well redefine filial piety’s role in shaping legal and political consciousness in China.

This chapter investigates the relations between endorsement of filial piety and understanding of filial piety, and their relations with other traditional and modern values as well as demographic characteristics. In particular, I am interested in exploring those characteristics that strengthen the conception of filial piety as a less onerous version of intergenerational care over the traditional conception of the obedient offspring (Knapp, 1995). I am also interested in exploring these differences across the mainland and the non-mainland samples.

Dependent and Independent Variables “Reciprocal over authoritarian filial piety” is the dependent variable of interest in the bivariate analyses of this section and multivariate analyses of next section. “Endorsement filial piety,” “Endorsement of traditional values13,” “Endorsement of modern values,” “Religious cosmology,” and “Secular cosmology” are the key independent variables of interest. Demographic variables were also included in the analyses as another set of independent variables.

Multivariate Analyses Hierarchical OLS regressions were performed on reciprocal over authoritarian understanding of filial piety. Model 1 contains all the demographic variables. In Model 2, endorsement of filial piety, as well as endorsement of other traditional values and endorsement of modern values was added as independent variables. In Model 3,

13 To contrast the effects of endorsement of filial piety and the endorsement of other traditional value, the variable “endorsement of traditional values” did not include the survey item on filial piety.

endorsement of cosmologies was added as the last independent variable. Regression analyses were performed separately on the mainland and non-mainland students.

Tables 32-34 summarize results of hierarchal OLS regressions on reciprocal over authoritarian understanding of filial piety. The results show that for mainland students, each set of new variables progressively improved the previous model when added (explaining 5% of variability of the dependent variable in Model 1, to 10% in Model 2, and 22% in Model 3), and the improvements were statistically significant with a considerable effect size. For non-mainland students, the demographic variables alone did not predict the dependent variable at a statistically significant level. When the variables of traditional and modern values were added, the model was able to converge at a statistically significant level, but it only explained 3% of the variability in the dependent variable. When the final group of independent variables, endorsement of cosmologies, were included, the explanatory power of the model increased to 13%. For mainland students, being male, being older, being an ethnic minority, endorsing modern values, or endorsing religious cosmologies predicts a weaker understanding of reciprocal over authoritarian filial piety. Urban origin and endorsing filial piety are associated with a stronger understanding of a reciprocal over an authoritarian filial piety. For non-mainland students, only endorsing modern values and endorsing religious or secular cosmologies are associated with a weaker understanding of reciprocal over authoritarian filial piety.

Discussion The findings of the analyses above suggest that values associated with modern economic and social life tend to support an authoritarian over a reciprocal understanding of filial piety. It seems that under modernization, filial piety is

increasingly perceived by educated Chinese youth as a regressive practice standing in opposition to the full expression of values and qualities desirable in modern society.

Cosmology, a previously neglected dimension of spirituality and religiosity in the research literature, also seems to detract support for a notion of filial piety that sugarcoats the authoritarian constraint of individual freedom with intergenerational love. In addition, the social and historical differences between mainland China and the non-mainland areas are also well reflected in the findings. Demographic characteristics such as gender, age, Hukou status (which is often used as a proxy for socioeconomic status), and religious affiliation influence mainland but not non-mainland students. This seems to indicate that the uneven economic and social development in the mainland has led to the more distinct differentiation of demographic groups reflected in their associated social and cultural attitudes, including attitudes toward traditional culture: males, minorities, and religiously affiliated individuals tend more likely to perceive filial piety as authoritarian, while individuals originated in the less developed rural areas tend more likely to perceive filial piety as reciprocal.

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Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Reciprocal over Authoritarian Filial Piety (n=1017)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic

characteristics Male -.14** .24 -.13** .24 -.11** .22 Age -.01 .08 -.02 .08 -.03 .07 Urban Hukou .08* .26 .08* .25 .11** .24 CPC member -.01 .30 -.01 .30 -.02 .28 Minority -.10** .30 -.09** .29 -.06 .28 Science/engineering major -.02 .26 -.01 .26 -.03 .24 Religious -.07* .26 -.09** .26 -.02 .25 PRC citizen .19** .30 .20** .29 .13** .28 Filial piety .15** .31 .12** .29 Endorsement of values Traditional values -.08 .07 -.08 .07 Modern values -.19** .04 -.13** .03 Cosmology Religious cosmology -.30** .02 Secular cosmology -.08* .03 Adjusted R2 .05* .10** .20** N 1017 1017 1017

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Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Reciprocal over Authoritarian Filial Piety (Mainland, n=714)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic characteristics Male -.20** .29 -.18** .29 -.16** .27 Age -.07 .11 -.08* .10 -.08* .10 Urban Hukou .08* .27 .08* .27 .11** .25 CPC member -.01 .33 -.01 .32 -.02 .30 Minority -.16** .35 -.15** .34 -.11** .32 Science/engineering major .00 .35 -.01 .34 -.02 .32 Religious -.09* .34 -.10** .33 -.03 .31 Filial piety .11** .34 .09** .32 Endorsement of values Traditional values -.07 .09 -.08 -.08 Modern values -.20** .04 -.14** -.14 Cosmology Religious cosmology -.34** .03 Secular cosmology -.02 .04 Adjusted R2 .05* .10** .22** N 714 714 714

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Table 16.3 Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Reciprocal over Authoritarian Filial Piety (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic

characteristics Male -.01 -.01 .01 .41 Age .06 .06 .05 .12 Urban Hukou -.03 -.03 .00 .76 CPC member -.06 -.06 -.07 .85 Minority .02 .02 .03 .80 Science/engineering major -.09 -.09 -.10 .40 Religious -.05 -.05 -.01 .40 Filial piety .19* .42 .14 .40 Endorsement of values Traditional values -.10 .12 -.07 -.12 Modern values -.14* .06 -.11** -.06 Cosmology Religious cosmology -.14* .05 Secular cosmology -.23** .07 Adjusted R2 .3* .13** N 303 303

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Chapter 7

FILIAL PIETY AND THE CONCEPTIONS OF RIGHTS

This chapter explores the relationship between filial piety and the conceptions of rights, the central research question of this study. In particular, this chapter examines the Weberian argument (Weber, 1951) that filial piety is a microcosm reflecting the broader patriarchal and authoritarian power relations of Chinese society. If the Weberian argument were to stand, endorsing filial piety, and understanding filial piety as authoritarian should predict stronger endorsement of economic over civil and political rights.

Bivariate Analyses

Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables (Mainland, n=714)

Endorsing Reciprocal Authoritaria Civil/political over filial piety filial piety n filial piety economic rights Endorsing 1 .317** .176** -.014 filial piety Reciprocal 1 .460** .043 filial piety Authoritarian 1 .189** filial piety Civil/political 1 over economic rights

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Correlation Matrix of Dependent and Independent Variables (Non- Mainland, n=303)

Endorsing Reciprocal Authoritaria Civil/political over filial piety filial piety n filial piety economic rights Endorsing 1 .290** .064 -.104 filial piety Reciprocal 1 .555** .087 filial piety Authoritarian 1 .208** filial piety Civil/political 1 over economic rights

Tables 35-36 summarize the bivariate analyses of endorsement of filial piety, different understanding of filial piety, and endorsement of civil and political over economic conception of rights. For both groups of students, civil and political over economic conception of rights is mildly associated with authoritarian understanding of filial piety. Endorsement of filial piety is also mildly associated with reciprocal understanding of filial piety for both groups of students. For both groups, the authoritarian and the reciprocal understanding of filial piety are also moderately associated.

Multivariate Analyses Hierarchical OLS regressions were performed on civil and political over economic conception of rights. Model 1 contains all the demographic variables plus endorsement of filial piety. Model 2 further included the reciprocal versus authoritarian understanding of filial piety. In Model 3, interaction terms between endorsement of

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filial piety and understanding of filial piety were added. Regression analyses were performed separately on the mainland and non-mainland students.

Tables 37-39 summarize results of hierarchal OLS regressions. The results show that for non-mainland students, each set of new variables progressively improved the previous model when added (explaining 4% of variability of the dependent variable in Model 1, to 7% in Model 2, and 9% in Model 3), and the improvements were statistically significant with a considerable effect size. For mainland students, however, the demographic variables alone only predicted 2% of the variability. When the variables of traditional and modern values were added, the explanatory power increased to 5%, but it remained unchanged after the interaction terms were included. For mainland students, only two variables, being male and having an authoritarian understanding of filial piety, significantly predicted the dependent variable; they are positively correlated to a stronger civil and political over economic conception of rights. For non-mainland students, besides being male, which has a positive effect on the dependent variable, different dimensions of filial piety also shape the conception of rights. As in the case of mainland students, authoritarian understanding of filial piety predicts stronger civil and political over economic conception of rights. In addition, interactions between understanding and endorsement filial piety are also significant predictors. In particular, when endorsement of filial piety interacts with understanding of filial piety, the directions of their predictive effects are reversed: when interacted with endorsement, an authoritarian understanding no longer predicts a stronger, but instead a weaker civil and political over economic conception of rights, while reciprocal predicts a stronger civil and political over economic conception of rights in interaction with endorsement of filial piety.

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Discussion Consistent with findings from previous chapters, those who perceive filial piety as authoritarian, for both mainland and non-mainland students, tend more likely to support a civil and political over an economic conception of rights. However, the mainland and non-mainland students do exhibit difference when it comes to the effect of endorsement of filial piety and its interaction with understandings of filial piety. For non-mainland students, endorsement in filial piety reduces the effect size of understanding filial piety as authoritarian, and generates a negative effect interacting with understanding of filial piety as reciprocal. These effects were not found in the mainland sample, which may suggest that there is a greater discrepancy between endorsement of filial piety as a central value of the Chinese national identity, and its understanding (and practice) in the mainland. This is consistent with previous literature comparing filial piety between mainland and non-mainland populations (Whyte, 2004; Yeh, Yi, Tsao, and Wan, 2013), which indicate that filial piety is better preserved outside of the mainland. It is also interesting to contrast results in this chapter with results in Chapter 5. It seems that although other traditional values exert negligible effects on conception of rights among non-mainland students, filial piety has a special place. This further strengthens the argument that traditional values, including filial piety may be held more sincerely by non-mainland Chinese, and some of them (such as filial piety) still influence legal and political consciousness among this population. While filial piety along with other traditional values does reflect the authority-deferential and survival- oriented collective consciousness of mainland Chinese, they are considered more or less as symbols of “Chineseness,” but do not carry as much actual meanings in their own rights.

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Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Filial Piety on Civil and Political over Economic Conception of Rights (Mainland, n=1017)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic

characteristics Male .14** .11 .11** .10 .11** .10 Age .01 .03 .01 .03 .01 .03 Urban Hukou .03 .11 .05 .11 .04 .11 CPC member -.04 .13 -.04 .13 -.04 .13 Minority .04 .13 .02 .13 .02 .13 Science/engineering major .00 .11 .00 .11 .00 .11 Religious .00 .11 -.02 .11 -.03 .11 PRC citizenship -.04 .13 .00 .13 .00 .13 Filial Piety .14 .11 -.07* .10 -.02 .11 Reciprocal filial piety -.03 .03 -.03 .03 Authoritarian filial piety .21** .01 .21** .01 Endorsement*Reciprocal .12** .05 Endorsement*Authoritarian -.09* .02 Adjusted R2 .02* .05** .06** N 1017 1017 1017

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Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Filial Piety on Civil and Political over Economic Conception of Rights (Mainland, n=714)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic

characteristics Male .14** .13 .10** .13 .10** .13 Age .04 .05 .03 .05 .03 .05 Urban Hukou .06 .12 .07 .12 .07 .12 CPC member -.07 .14 -.07 .14 -.07 .14 Minority .01 .15 -.02 .15 -.02 .15 Science/engineering major -.03 .15 -.03 .15 -.03 .15 Religious .01 .15 -.01 .15 -.01 .15 Filial Piety -.02 .13 -.04 .13 -.03 .16 Reciprocal filial piety -.05 .03 -.05 .03 Authoritarian filial piety .21** .01 .21** .01 Endorsement*Reciprocal .06 .06 Endorsement*Authoritarian -.05 .03 Adjusted R2 .02* .05** .05** N 714 714 714

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Hierarchical OLS Regressions of Filial Piety on Civil and Political over Economic Conception of Rights (Non-Mainland, n=303)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Beta SE Beta SE Beta SE Demographic characteristics Male .15* .19 .14* .18 .14* .18 Age -.09 .06 -.07 .06 -.06 .05 Urban Hukou -.02 .34 -.02 .34 -.02 .33 CPC member .06 .38 .05 .38 .05 .38 Minority .10 .36 .11 .36 .12* .35 Science/engineering major .08 .18 .06 .18 .05 .18 Religious -.05 .18 -.07 .18 -.07 .18 Filial Piety -.10 .13 -.12* .14 -.01 .17 Reciprocal filial piety .01 .05 .06 .05 Authoritarian filial piety .20* .02 .18* .02 Endorsement*Reciprocal .27** .08 Endorsement*Authoritarian -.20* .03 Adjusted R2 .04* .07** .09** N 303 303 303

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Chapter 8

CONCLUSION

Chinese Conception of Rights and State-Centric Normativism First and foremost, the findings of this study have lent empirical support to Perry’s (2008) theoretical argument regarding the Chinese conception of rights. Chinese college students clearly prioritize economic benefits and welfare over civil and political liberties. It is noteworthy, however, that such prioritization does not completely exclude an appreciation of civil and political liberties; the majority of the students, albeit in lower proportion than in the case of economic rights, indicated that they valued civil and political liberties. On the surface, the significantly lower level of concern for participation in constitution-making and lawmaking as well as for participation in public demonstrations seems to validate Perry’s (2009) “rules consciousness” argument.

Rights in China do not originate in the democratically derived “common will (embodied in democratic participation in constitution-making),” which, in the Western tradition, has the ultimate legitimacy in defending rights against even the state. Instead, rights in China are conferred by the state, and the only way to maximize the utility of rights is to play by state-stipulated rules. It follows then that public demonstrations as a challenge to state authority are less expedient for realizing “rights.” Nonetheless, it would be erroneous if we were to take this as an indication of a total lack of a critical attitude or any sense of autonomy in the Chinese political consciousness. Chinese students are not complacent regarding civil and political rights. Next to economic rights, Chinese college students strongly endorsed the right to elect their political leaders, including the national leader. The strength of this endorsement, in

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contrast to a much weaker endorsement of other civil and political liberties such as freedom of speech and to public demonstrations, should be contextualized in the specific paradigm of state-society relations in China, as well as the gradual awakening of a notion of privacy and individual autonomy as a consequence of modernization. Democratic participation is not new to Chinese politics. As Moore (1966) argued in his analysis of Chinese revolutions, imperial China experienced a much higher incidence of peasant insurrections (a form of democracy, if a chaotic and violent one) than in contemporaneous India, Japan, or Europe. While the state enjoyed highly concentrated power, the peasantry reacted more sensitively to inadequate state performance (Zhao, 2015) than elsewhere. Oftentimes these insurrections were targeted of particular corrupt or incompetent political leaders (such as the Emperor or his chief ministers) or local political figures, rather than a demand for radically new political configuration. However, a total overthrow of existing political order resulting in dynastic successions had occurred 36 times in the imperial history.

Although this critical attitude towards ruling political figures rooted in a history and culture of insurrections is by no means equivalent to a “rights consciousness” that consecrates individual autonomy as the foundation of sovereignty, it is self-empowering in its own manner. It entails the potential of social and political mobilization (which rarely occurs, but when it does, it often leads to mass insurrections), which may, in time, pave way to the maturation of public awareness of individual political autonomy. In this study, the awakening notion of autonomy was reflected in the students’ relatively strong endorsement of religious freedom (coming third after the right to elect leaders) and the freedom of speech, although their support for more antagonistic forms of political liberties such as organizing public demonstrations was much lower.

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Indeed, the two dimensions of this critical consciousness (i.e., one with historical origin in peasant insurrections versus one grounded in the contemporary contexts more adjacent to the Western notion of rights) were empirically documented in O’Brien’s (2003) discovery of the “boundary-spanning” and “rightful resistance” (O’Brien and Li, 2006) of Chinese rural protesters, whose demands were “neither contained or transgressive,” as well as Li’s (2010) finding that the Chinese political consciousness displays characteristics of both rights and rules consciousness. Theoretically, the hybrid nature of this contemporary Chinese conception of rights can be explained by the notion of “state-centric normativisim,” which situates the “with the law” and “against the law” legal consciousness in a traditional, economically- based conception of rights and the normative background of Confucian moral economy, as opposed to reducing them to a mere consequence of economic modernization and legal rationalization14.

14 Based on extensive in-depth interviews with American citizens on their experience with law and their attitudes toward and perceptions of law, Ewick and Silbey (1998) proposed three types of legal consciousness. “Before the law” characterizes a conception of the law as impartial and removed from everyday life by its objectivity. “In this form of legal consciousness, the law is described as a formally ordered, rational, and hierarchical system of known rules and procedures (47).” “With the law” characterizes a more instrumental approach to the law wherein the law is conceived essentially as a game that involves rules. Social actors obey the rules, and sometimes break the rules to serve personal interests. In addition, there are those who participate in legality through resistance “against the law”. While individuals approach resistance with diverse goals and means, “rarely, however, are such efforts to resist the power of law cynical; more often, people undertake small subterfuges, depicts, and other violations of conventional and legal norms with a strong sense of justice and right (49).” In other words, those who act “against the law” conceive of the existing law as incapable of expressing a broader principle of justice and right.

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As demonstrated by Habermas (1996: 84-94) in his analysis of the genesis of the conception of rights in the West, the Western conception of rights is fundamentally political; it was rooted in the notions of private and public autonomy specific to the cultural and historical traditions of the West. Private autonomy emanates from the notion of the inviolability of the person and the notion of the individual’s “power to rule.” However, the determination as well as protection of private freedoms requires public recognition of these private freedoms as worthy on moral grounds. “Rights” are therefore determined not simply by sheer subjective endorsement, but by a process of public deliberation and negotiation. These rights are eventually sanctified and enforced in the form of positive laws by which the common will is embodied. In Habermas’s formulation, rights and laws emerge “co-originally” (p. 89):

At a conceptual level, rights do not immediately refer to atomistic and estranged individuals who are possessively set against one another. On the contrary, as elements of the legal order they presuppose collaboration among subjects who recognize one another, in their reciprocally related rights and duties, as free and equal citizens. This mutual recognition is constitutive for a legal order from which actionable rights are derived. Therefore, “rights consciousness” defined in Li’s (2010) terms as the ability to recognize rights as grounded in higher moral and legal principles is closely bound to the moment of constitution-making when the people gathered to enter into a democratically derived social contract amongst themselves and with the state, which is supposed to serve only as an executive of the common will of the people. Constitutionalism is the source in which the awe, respect, and objectivity associated with law in a “before the law” consciousness is grounded, and where the legitimacy to resist “against the law” is normatively drawn. Legal instrumentalism (or “with the law” consciousness), which is the bona fide “rules consciousness” in

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industrialized Western society, also arose out of the specific social and political conditions of the West. Weber (1948) classically characterized these conditions as the mundane and stifling effects of instrumental rationality (i.e., “iron cage”) associated with modern capitalist society. In contrast, while “with the law” and “against the law” consciousnesses also exist in contemporary Chinese society, they are embedded in a drastically different historical and social context. Although she did not make it explicit in her analysis, the Confucian moral economy proposed by Perry (2008) consists of two components: the reciprocal state-society economic and political relation and Confucianism as the state ideology. In contemporary China, this moral economy does not seem to have significantly changed. The growing “rules consciousness” as it is documented in recent empirical studies (Gallagher, 2006; Michelson, 2007; Lee, 2007; O’Brien and Li, 2006) reflects, on the one hand, the increasing rationalization of society (in the form of legal instrumentalism) and the persistent dynamic between the individual (the beneficiary of economic policy) and the state (the benevolent paternal figure demanding authority and respect), on the other. Nonetheless, we have also seen, in this study and elsewhere (e.g., Lu and Chan, 2011; Boittin, 2013), a growing awareness of individual entitlement (in legal and political forms) to a series of “rights,” which does not necessarily contradict or completely negate the traditional moral economy, but pushes established boundaries to demand additional protection of freedom from the state. In other words, these newly “awakened” citizens still very much acknowledge the legitimacy of state monopoly of economic and political power, especially when it comes to fulfilling the function of welfare provision and administration, but they expect the state to perform additional imperatives of freedom protection while continuing fulfilling its economic function.

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The efforts of “boundary-spanning” (O’Brien, 2003) and “rightful resistance” (O’Brien and Li, 2006) reflect a legal consciousness of what I term “state-centric normativism,” which, unlike constitutionalism, does not ground the power to confer rights in a democratic process, but in a highly-centralized state. On many occasions, this legal consciousness manifests itself as legal instrumentalism and “rules consciousness.” (Gallagher, 2006; Michelson, 2007; Lee, 2007; O’Brien and Li, 2006) But as documented in this study and others (e.g., Lu and Chan, 2011; Boittin, 2013), social actors not only employ state-conferred rules strategically, but also creatively contest the limits of state monopoly of rights, and gain new grounds for individual autonomy. When such contestations occur, individuals often appeal to broader normative principles beyond legal ones (such as traditional ethics or principles of justice universally applied in the West) (Zhao, 2001). Since China lacks the democratically constituted constitution-making process that would have otherwise sanctified the legal field, such contestations must be extra-legal.

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Typology of Legal Consciousness

Conception of Rights Economic Political (Chinese) (Western) Legal Consciousness Rules consciousness Legal Instrumentalism State-Centric “With the law” Normativism Rights consciousness Constitutionalism “With the law” and “Before the law” and “Against the law” “Against the law”

In sum, state-centric nomrativism denotes a unique form of legal consciousness

(mixed with characteristics of “with the law” and “against the law”) grounded in an economically based conception of rights (illustrated in Figure 1). The centrality of the state is legitimated by its essential function of welfare provision, and the state tends to overpower other areas of social life, dictating rules and laws which social actors strategically enact to advance their economic interests. However, the state’s legitimacy hangs by a thread; a failure to perform its economic function may result in a justifiable resistance to state authority and laws. In contrast, laws are outcomes of democratically constituted political processes in the Western model, and while it can be used instrumentally by both the state and social actors, lawmaking and lawfinding are intended to be independent of administrative control from the state. In the Western model, rights emanate from the culturally engrained notions of private and public autonomy, whereas in the Chinese model, rights are not ipso facto associated with individual autonomy. In China, autonomy-based notions of rights can only arise as a result of popular challenges to the taken-for-granted boundaries of state authority in matters of civic freedom. This possibility need not necessarily rely on Western

117 influence from without, but is immanent, as Perry (2008) suggested, in normative ideals of justice and rights contained within some sources of traditional Chinese culture (such as the writings of Mencius). The consecration of rights in the Chinese context may resemble less a coming-together of autonomous citizens forming a social contract with each other and the state, but more a gradual retreat of state influence in private and civic domains of Chinese citizens.

Traditional Culture, Political Liberalization, and Social Solidarity The findings in Chapters 5 and 7 indicate that traditional culture, or at least the symbols of traditional culture (i.e., various codes of conduct) as they are conceived of in the Chinese collective consciousness, are still potent in shaping Chinese legal and political consciousness. Specifically, traditional culture (such as filial piety) sustains the traditional conception of rights, while values introduced by modernization (such as public engagement) support a conception of rights that places a stronger emphasis on civil and political liberties. This study found a discrepancy between filial piety as a normative symbol of ethical conduct, and filial piety as a voluntary practice. Consistent with many previous studies on filial piety in contemporary China, this study found an evolving understanding of filial piety among contemporary college students. While most students conceptualize filial piety as an expression of intergenerational love, care, and reciprocity, those who see it as more authoritarian and constraining tend to show a stronger endorsement of a conception of rights based on individual political autonomy and freedom. This statistical relationship affirms, albeit negatively, the Weberian observation that filial piety constitutes the center of gravity in Chinese attitudes toward

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rights, laws, and political authoritarianism: that is, filial piety serves as the microscopic basis of the patriarchal and patrimonial social order. However, the fact that most educated young people in China no longer endorse a conception of filial piety that would mandate cohabitation with their parents beyond marriage, or give them a significant influence over their major life decisions from their parents (as is shown in Chapter 4) suggests that filial piety as a practice may indeed be deteriorating, although its symbolic, cultural significance remains. On the one hand, it continues to serve as the central symbol of interpersonal care and state care toward its citizens; on the other, it has become the icon of an outdated traditional culture whose repressive and authoritarian aspects elicit rebellion from the younger generation, which explains why students’ relatively firmer understanding of filial piety as authoritarian predicts a stronger civil and political over economic conception of rights, as is shown in Chapter 7. The salience of traditional Chinese culture, despite its tensions with modernization, seems to suggest that traditional culture still plays a significant function in social integration. In industrialized Western societies, economic and social interdependence across social strata, and the consecration of negative legal rights have become reality (Habermas, 1996). Although Western societies have journeyed long into the course of modernization, Western social and political theorists are still concerned about the inadequate social integration and solidarity given the deterioration of traditional institutions and practices. Some theorists, such as Habermas (1996), called for a “constitutional patriotism,” the idea that individuals from various backgrounds are integrated into a society through a process of rational public deliberation. Other theorists questioned the

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efficacy of appealing to constitutional principles and public deliberation in maintaining solidarity. Sanders (1997) and Young (2001), for example, argued that Habermas’ insistence on deliberation excludes certain social groups from engaging in public deliberation. Given social inequalities that contribute to unequal distribution of resources as well as the capacity to “rationally” deliberate, it would be impossible for these groups to engage in Habermasian communicative practices15. When the issue of cultural diversity is considered, Song (2011: 196) argued that Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, which redirects attention to the political process rather than ethnic-cultural commonality, may be too thin a basis for uniting citizens who come from diverse cultural backgrounds. In many societies, the political culture and the ethnic-cultural- linguistic traditions are not readily separable (197-198). Indeed, notions such as human rights, popular sovereignty, and constitutionalism (which constitute the various aspects of the ideal of rule of law) have origins in the legal-political traditions of the West, and do not necessarily share an elective affinity with the habituated cultural conditions of non-Western societies. In the case of many non-Western countries, generating new forms of solidarity faces with multiple challenges. For one thing, these countries need to develop cultural or political mechanisms to complement the tenuous organic solidarity generated by economic interdependence alone. In countries where traditional culture is not germane to the development of civil rights and individual autonomy (and Habermasian

15 Sanders (1997) used the example of the American jury and argued with evidence from social scientific research that even when citizens are expected to deliberate democratically, they often appeal to authority (legal experts or people in the jury with higher social standing) in making their decisions.

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constitutional patriotism thereafter), authoritarian governments often prize their ability in maintaining stability and solidarity. As we will see in the next section, this is true of some Asian governments. It has become the quest of many Chinese social theorists to envision a liberal political system that preserves the integrating capacities of traditional culture. Jiang (2013: 27), a native Chinese scholar, proposed “Confucian Constitutionalism” as an alternative to build a modern state. Confucian constitutionalist order resembles any Western constitutional order, except for the inclusion of an Academy populated by scholar-officials that serves supervisory, mediation, and culturally specific roles. Jiang contended that Confucianism is a humane social and political philosophy that seeks to realize an equilibrium within a society characterized by diverse social relations, as well as an equilibrium between humanity and nature. Western democracy and the rule of law, on the other hand, effectively guarantees human rights against the state, and encourages popular participation in political affairs, both of which are central to

Confucianism, yet are unable to materialize under authoritarian rule. Such a Confucian constitutionalism, he argued, preserved the cultural essence of the Chinese identity, while adding key elements of the Western concept of political liberty. Acknowledging the positive integrative effects of including Confucianism in civic education, Chan (2013) is skeptical of the need to institutionalize Confucianism as a comprehensive doctrine of life16 at the constitutional level. She is also dubious of the

16 This language is borrowed from John Rawls’s theory of justice and political liberalism. In Rawls’s (2005) framework, a political conception of justice differs from many moral doctrines, which are regarded as general and comprehensive views. A moral conception “is comprehensive when it includes conceptions of what is of value in

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sheer practicality of Confucianism actually realizing its social integrative effects; after all, Confucianism is no longer the orthodox state ideology despite its residual effects on

Chinese social practices. Others (Li, 2013; Wang, 2013), echoing Habermas, are doubtful that granting political power to an ethnically based cultural institution such as the Academy would encourage popular loyalty to the state and impair ethnic and cultural diversity, as well as freedom of speech. In other words, it remains uncertain whether a Confucian constitutional order has the capacity of universal inclusion that Confucianism propagates, and if it does, bringing Confucianism into the secular constitutional order that is already supposed to approximate universal inclusion becomes superfluous. It is important to bear in mind, however, that Jiang’s (2013) primary concern is to maintain social integration while realizing democracy and the rule of law in China where historical and contemporary social conditions have not proven favorable for such institutions. The concern for social stability and integration is not frivolous, since the tumultuous recent history of Western colonialization, military separatism, Japanese invasion, and Communist totalitarianism have weakened the foundation of social solidarity. Among these historical events, the victory of the Communist revolution as well as the establishment of the People’s Republic could be seen as the nationalistic reaction to continuous foreign invasions and foreign interference into domestic Chinese business. Nonetheless, while it did initially bring the people together under the social and political ideal of Communism and the leadership of Mao, it ended in social chaos, divisions, and radicalism under the Cultural Revolution. Given this historical

human life, and ideals of personal character, as well as ideals of friendship and of familial and associational relationships… (13)”

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background, Chinese demands for a social and political order where modern liberal components coexist with traditional, nationalistic components, are contextually understandable. What Jiang (2013) proposed is essentially a liberal constitutional order with a mechanism of integration “thicker” than the Habermasian model, perhaps even with a healthy dose of nationalism.

Religiosity and Cosmologies Given the Communist Party’s dismissive stance on religious discourses and practices, the roles of religiosity and cosmology in shaping conceptions of rights are more ambiguous than other variables, in contrast to China’s celebrated multicultural religiosity in its imperial past (Feuchtwang, 2016). Although Confucianism was the dominant state ideology in the imperial era with a largely world-affirming orientation, it contained undertones of mysticism which opened it up to heterodox religions such as Buddhism and Daoism (Orrù, 1989), the latter of which gained much traction among the lower strata of society (Weber, 1951). However, these religions were also practiced along a variety of folk religions that combined ancestral worship with pantheism. Religious identities in imperial China was thus less rigid and more mixed and flexible. The relaxed attitude towards formal membership was exacerbated by the social and political stigma associated with religion during the height of Communist rule, which left an “ideological vacuum” in the subsequent reform era, a fertile ground for the emergence and shocking growth of cults such as Falungong (Chan, 2004). It is in this context that religious affiliation and the endorsement of religious cosmologies exhibit effects on conceptions or rights. Religious affiliation predicts the endorsement of an economic conception of rights, whereas endorsement of religious cosmology predicts the endorsement of civil and political liberties as rights. This

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difference may be explained by the fact that religious practices in China are sometimes a “pragmatic business” (Berger, 2014): people follow religions not necessarily from a faith in the divine but because they seek worldly rewards. Thus, those who truly believe in an otherworldly order, regardless of their membership or involvement in organized religion, may find the logical (or perhaps more accurately, ideological) ground for individual autonomy in a cosmological order involving some divine power. Indeed, Weber (1951) attributed China’s lack of legal formalization as well as formal science to the lack of notions of natural law and natural right, which issued from a recognition of the divine in its Western manifestation.

The Mainland and Non-Mainland Difference The backgrounds of the non-mainland students are diverse and complicated, and should not be seen as equivalents to their peers who attended college in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and other parts of the world. Their choice to complete their undergraduate training in the mainland may suggest preexisting affiliation with the mainland, which may be associated with a more positive attitude towards the mainland. Regardless of these imperfections, the findings from this study still revealed several thought- provoking differences between the mainlanders and non-mainlanders. First of all, the mainlanders tend to score high on all indicators throughout the entire study. This may very well be because mainland students were used to completing mandatory surveys and although participation in this survey was voluntary, they may felt certain pressures to assign high scores to all survey items. As I mentioned elsewhere, this does not mean that their responses are rendered invalid; it simply means that they tend to be inflated overall and should certainly be separated from the non- mainland sample.

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However, non-mainland students scored higher on several indicators of authoritarian filial piety, including preference for living with parents, supporting parents financially, and following parents’ decision on marriage and family. Like their mainland counterparts, conceiving filial piety as more authoritarian predicts stronger support for a conception of rights based on civil and political liberties. But endorsing a more reciprocal (i.e., more benevolent) understanding of filial piety does not seem to contradict a civil and political conception of rights for non-mainland students; in fact, it diminishes the negative effects from endorsing filial piety strongly as a value on a civil and political conception of rights. In other words, this may be interpreted as non- mainland students take traditional values and practices not simply at face value as a cultural symbol (as in the case of their mainland counterparts), but remain faithful to the traditional meanings of these values and practices.

Chinese Cultural Nationalism: Implications for Future Research

Although this study remains largely exploratory, its findings pose significant implications for several interrelated areas of research. While the possibility of a liberal democracy in China is not out of the question, it is a less meaningful question to raise, if we contextualize the idea of political liberalization in its Western origin (namely, the conceptual as well as political evolution of “autonomy”), and examine Chinese political configurations in the economic and cultural conditions of Chinese society. A more meaningful question, one that issues from a thoroughly Chinese perspective, would simply be: What would Chinese political configurations look like, if China were to maintain its “Chinese characteristics” with optimal adaptation to economic modernization? Although full-blown Western liberalization remains a possible response, rephrased in this way, the question demands more serious and thorough

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consideration of the full range (and combinations) of political configurations available. Given the imperatives of both system integration as well as social integration under the constraints of a Chinese collective identity developed throughout Chinese history and China’s historical relations with the world (especially the West), what genuinely Chinese political systems are possible? The ethnocentric Chinese identity revealed in this research, regardless of whether it was actually developed historically or imagined post-hoc by contemporary Chinese, is integral to a more truthful understanding of contemporary Chinese society.

The prioritization of economic prosperity and social harmony was historically grounded in the Confucian moral economy and in Confucian ethics. As is shown in this study, such a prioritization still very much applies in the contemporary context, but it is now mediated by an indispensable yet malleable Chinese identity. In China’s remote past, the centrality of “Chineseness” was grounded in China’s dominant role in the political order of East and Southeast Asia throughout much of its imperial history (Kang, 2010).

Although the Chinese identity was a symbol of civility and superiority, it was more or less taken for granted by the Chinese, since the “Others” that China encountered only confirmed its perceived self-image. However, the Chinese identity has drastically shifted since China’s first encounter with the West, an “Other” that no challenges

China’s familiar self-identity as civilized and superior. Instead, China descended from an imperial regional power to a backward nation facing technologically advanced colonialists to a “righteous” yet impoverished Communist state fighting against the evil Capitalist West, and finally to a rising global power unsure of its identity and place in the evolving global order. Historically, the Chinese identity was an identity of glory and

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pride, whereas it signals a combination of shame, rebellion, and confusion in recent history.

Empirical findings in this study reaffirmed the primacy of state provision of economic welfare in the Chinese conception of rights. A further argument that may be made is that the prioritization of economic prosperity serves as both an imperative of system integration (i.e., adapting the political subsystem and cultural subsystem to the ever-growing economic subsystem), but also social integration in the sense that economic prosperity as an essential goal in life is being consciously connected to the

Chinese identity as it is manifested in the Chinese conception of rights (e.g., Kausikan, 1993; Zakaria and Lee, 1994). In other words, the Chinese identity has become a crucial “latent variable” since it is where the ideal of economic prosperity (contained in the Confucian moral economy) and Confucian interpersonal ethics meet. This identity is indispensable for maintaining the independence of the national system in an increasingly globalizing world, and provide motivations for further system differentiations (i.e., economic modernization) domestically. It inevitably must, however, stay open to adjustments, since the system imperative of further modernization in a globalizing context demands such an openness. Future research should investigate how the Chinese identity is interpreted and its role in connecting economic modernization with legal and political configuration. This growing reflexivity is already palpable in elite intellectual circles. For example, Jiang (2013) proposed that China’s political reform should aim to establish a “Confucian constitutional order,” one that reestablishes the political influence of Confucian sages and fused with popular democracy. This growing reflexivity is significant in that historically, effective social and political transformations in China seemed to have often

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taken the form of top-down reforms. However, the significance of investigating the ever-changing Chinese identity lies beyond mere intellectual utopianization of the

Chinese polity, but also in the actual intentions and imagination of the Chinese populace. The emergence of a mass critical consciousness is rarely the direct result of any intentional social engineering, but has developed out of the cumulative experience of oppression and resistance. In particular, future research should take special interest in examining which expressions (ethnic, cultural, political, or any combination of them) of Chinese identity are being promulgated in state-controlled media as well as in popular discourses. This is important because the perceived nature of China’s self-image shapes its perspective on the outside world, and determines how open-minded it is willing to go in accepting international standards of human rights.

Limitations Several limitations of the data collection process as well as the data collected will be discussed here. First, the sampling strategy of data collection was purposeful, targeting young adults and especially college students in China. As I stressed earlier, college students as a demographic group bears unique social significance in the Chinese context. It is well recognized, however, that this sampling method obviously limits the generalizability of the conclusions. In particular, relatively high degrees of endorsement of civil and political liberties may not be found in the broader demographic context, as many previous studies have suggested (Chen and Lu, 2011; Michelson and Liu, 2010). Second, the traditional pencil-and-paper approach to collecting survey data in an authoritarian country such as China may raise concerns about the quality of the data, since students may feel pressured to fill out the survey, or that their responses may not be authentic, simply reciting the political propaganda they were taught in school. There

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may also be concerns about social desirability associated with all studies conducted in classroom or group settings. Although these concerns are valid for most studies conducted in China, especially studies concerning politics in China, they are seen as less problematic on college campuses, given the relative freedom that most college campuses enjoy. In addition, although they all recruited students from all over the country, the five universities surveyed are located in the far south of China, which historically had been less affected by the political struggles in the north, and was the birthplace of many progressive political figures and movements.

Third, the non-mainland portion of the data was not based on surveys actually collected in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or in overseas Chinese communities. While the author is well aware of the potential sample selection bias (given that those who voluntarily enroll in a mainland university may have preexisting affinity toward the mainland), it should be noted that the comparison was meant to be exploratory in nature, and future research is needed to more scientifically compare students from various regions outside of the mainland. Finally, there has been a long tradition in cultural sociology of criticizing studies of “Asian values” on social actions, arguing that such claims oversimplify the actual mechanisms of cultural transmission on the ground. Much of culture, according to these authors, is learnt and is used as a subliminal repertoire congealed in praxis, as opposed to well-formulated “values” informing actions (e.g., Lizardo, 2017). The author of the dissertation is aware of these criticisms and limitations of “values.” However, it should be pointed out that the author is just as interested in how social actors conceive of their “culture” as with the action-orienting capacity of culture itself. Further research (especially qualitative research) is indeed needed to tap into the actual discursive

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mechanisms through which filial piety and other aspects of traditional Chinese culture shapes legal and political consciousness.

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SURVEY QUESTIONS IN CHINESE

作为现代中国社会的公民，您认为下面这些非有有非品质或精神的重要性如何？常重点点不常重要重不重不要要重要重要要 1.诚实守信 1 2 3 4 5 6 2.遵纪守法 1 2 3 4 5 6 3.孝顺父母 1 2 3 4 5 6 4.尊敬上级和长辈 1 2 3 4 5 6 5.与人融洽相处 1 2 3 4 5 6 6.助人为乐 1 2 3 4 5 6 7.安邦治国的雄心 1 2 3 4 5 6 8.为群众服务的奉献精神 1 2 3 4 5 6 9.担任民间组织的志愿者 1 2 3 4 5 6 1.当家作主，主动了解和参与公共事务 1 2 3 4 5 6 11.大胆表达自己的观点和表现自己的才能 1 2 3 4 5 6 12.大胆创新 1 2 3 4 5 6 13.愿意为弱势群体表达他们的建议与不满 1 2 3 4 5 6 14.捐款帮助災难地区居民 1 2 3 4 5 6 15.积极支持国家的政策 1 2 3 4 5 6

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你认为孝顺父母意味着：非有有非常同点点不常同意同不同不意意同意同意意 16.尊敬父母 1 2 3 4 5 6 17.做什么事情都要考虑父母的面子和感受 1 2 3 4 5 6 18.出人头地，光宗耀祖 1 2 3 4 5 6 19.顺从父母对自己工作与配偶等生活的选择 1 2 3 4 5 6 2.应该尽量住在离父母近的地方 1 2 3 4 5 6 21.应该和父母一起住 1 2 3 4 5 6 22.应该亲自照顾父母养老 1 2 3 4 5 6 23.每月固定给父母生活费 1 2 3 4 5 6 24.依照父母的意愿结婚生子 1 2 3 4 5 6 25.与父母保持固定的联系 1 2 3 4 5 6

公民的基本自由和权利应当包括：非有有非常同点点不常同意同不同不意意同意同意意 4.取得社会福利（如医疗/教育/养老等）的权利 1 2 3 4 5 6 41.工作和获取报酬的权利 1 2 3 4 5 6 42.选举权与被选举权，包括选举最高领导人的权利 1 2 3 4 5 6 43.直接或间接参与宪法和法律的制定和修改 1 2 3 4 5 6 44.信仰宗教及从事宗教活动的自由 1 2 3 4 5 6 45.言论及出版自由，包括公开批评国家机关及其工 1 2 3 4 5 6 作人员的权利 46.集会游行示威的自由 1 2 3 4 5 6 47.了解本地及国家政策的制定 1 2 3 4 5 6 48.参与本地及国家政策的制定 1 2 3 4 5 6

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你是否同意以下的说法？有非非有点常常点不同不不同同同意同同意意意意意 77.宇宙中存在最高的主宰者（譬如“神”），主宰 1 2 3 4 5 6 包括人类在内的一切。 78.宇宙中存在不可思议的力量和法则（譬如 1 2 3 4 5 6 “道”），超越目前一般科学的认识。 79.人可以通过祈祷/忏悔/念诵/礼拜/静坐的方法来接 1 2 3 4 5 6 近形而上的神或道。 8.存在天堂和地狱；好人永生天堂，坏人永生地狱。 1 2 3 4 5 6 81.人总是不断轮回转生；人或好或坏的行为累积成 1 2 3 4 5 6 为业力，成为轮回转世的“因”。 82.不管有没有天堂地狱或者轮回，总之好人有好 1 2 3 4 5 6 报，恶人有恶报。 83.宇宙一切（包括人）都是唯物而生，人死如灯 1 2 3 4 5 6 灭，一了百了。 84.神鬼佛道或许存在，但是应该敬而远之。 1 2 3 4 5 6

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