Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 1

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst

BI-WEEKLY BRIEFING VOL. 17 NO. 13 08 JULY 2015

Contents

Analytical Articles

THE UZBEK-TAJIK DÉTENTE: CAN IT LAST? 3 George Voloshin

AGRI’S PROGRESS ADVANCES BRUSSELS’ AND BAKU’S ENERGY AGENDAS 7 Micha’el Tanchum

ISLAMIC STATE IN CENTRAL ASIA: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY 10 Charlie Smith

IS THE NORTH CAUCASUS BECOMING ANOTHER BATTLEFIELD 13 IN THE GLOBAL JIHAD? Tomáš Baranec

Field Reports

TAJIKISTAN’S GOVERNMENT MISSES THE REAL PROBLEM 17 OF LABOR MIGRANTS Oleg Salimov

RULING COALITION TO CUT FUNCTION OF GEORGIA’S NATIONAL BANK 19 Eka Janashia

KYRGYZSTAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER DISMISSES JUDGE 21 Arslan Sabyrbekov

BAKU CRACKS DOWN ON ALTERNATIVE MEDIA AFTER CONCLUDING 23 EUROPEAN GAMES Mina Muradova Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 2

THE CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS ANALYST

Editor: Svante E. Cornell

Associate Editor: Niklas Nilsson

Assistant Editor, News Digest: Alima Bissenova

Chairman, Editorial Board: S. Frederick Starr

The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst is an English-language journal devoted to analysis of the current issues facing Central Asia and the Caucasus. It serves to link the business, governmental, journalistic and scholarly communities and is the global voice of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Joint Center. The Editor of the Analyst solicits most articles and field reports, however authors are encouraged to suggest topics for future issues or submit articles and field reports for consideration. Such articles and field reports cannot have been previously published in any form, must be written in English, and must correspond precisely to the format and style of articles and field reports published in The Analyst, described below. The Analyst aims to provide our industrious and engaged audience with a singular and reliable assessment of events and trends in the region written in an analytical tone rather than a polemical one. Analyst articles reflect the fact that we have a diverse international audience. While this should not affect what authors write about or their conclusions, this does affect the tone of articles. Analyst articles focus on a newsworthy topic, engage central issues of the latest breaking news from the region and are backed by solid evidence. Articles should normally be based on local language news sources. Each 1,100-1,500 word analytical article must provide relevant, precise and authoritative background information. It also must offer a sober and analytical judgment of the issue as well as a clinical evaluation of the importance of the event. Authors must cite facts of controversial nature to the Editor who may contact other experts to confirm claims. Since Analyst articles are based on solid evidence, rather than rumors or conjecture, they prove to be reliable sources of information on the region. By offering balanced and objective analysis while keeping clear of inflammatory rhetoric, The Analyst does more to inform our international readership on all sides of the issues. The Editor reserves the right to edit the article to conform to the editorial policy and specifications of The Analyst and to reject the article should it not be acceptable to our editorial committee for publication. On acceptance and publication of the edited version of the article, The Central Asia-Caucasus Institute of The Johns Hopkins University-The Nitze School of Advanced International Studies will issue an honorarium to the author. It is up to the individual author to provide the correct paperwork to the Institute that makes the issuing of an honorarium possible. The copyright for the article or field report will reside with the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst. However, the author may use all or part of the contracted article in any book or article in any media subsequently written by the author, provided that a copyright notice appears giving reference to the contracted article’s first publication by the "Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, The Johns Hopkins University, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies."

Submission Guidelines: Analytical Articles require a three to four sentence Key Issue introduction to the article based on a news hook. Rather than a general, overarching analysis, the article must offer considered and careful judgment supported with concrete examples. The ideal length of analytical articles is between 1,100 and 1,500 words. The articles are structured as follows: KEY ISSUE: A short 75-word statement of your conclusions about the issue or news event on which the article focuses. BACKGROUND: 300-450 words of analysis about what has led up to the event or issue and why this issue is critical to the region. Include background information about the views and experiences of the local population. IMPLICATIONS: 300-450 words of analysis of the ramifications of this event or issue, including where applicable, implications for the local people’s future. CONCLUSIONS: 100-200 words that strongly state your conclusions about the impact of the event or issue.

Field Reports focus on a particular news event and what local people think about the event. Field Reports address the implications the event or activity analyzed for peoples’ lives and their communities. Field Reports do not have the rigid structure of Analytical Articles, and are shorter in length, averaging ca. 700-800 words.

Those interested in joining The Analyst’s pool of authors to contribute articles, field reports, or contacts of potential writers, please send your CV to: and suggest some topics on which you would like to write.

Svante E. Cornell Research Director; Editor, Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst Central Asia-Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University 1619 Massachusetts Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036, USA. Tel. +1-202-663-5922; 1-202-663-7723; Fax. +1-202-663-7785 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 3

THE UZBEK-TAJIK DÉTENTE: CAN IT LAST? George Voloshin

On June 22-24, Uzbekistan’s capital, Tashkent, hosted a third meeting of the Uzbek-Tajik intergovernmental commission on economic cooperation. Unlike the two previous sessions, which were organized in Dushanbe in August 2002 and February 2009, this year’s bilateral trade talks took place against the backdrop of an emerging détente between the two Central Asian neighbors. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan are currently confronted with a host of shared challenges ranging from the threat of radical Islam to socioeconomic instability, while their bilateral relationship is still constrained by unsettled disputes from the past.

BACKGROUND: Relations between response to recent cross-border Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have been attacks by the Islamic Movement of invariably tense since the two Uzbekistan (IMU) terrorist group. countries gained independence in According to media accounts, eight 1991. Uzbekistan, Central Asia’s by far Tajiks, including a 15-year-old girl, most populous national republic, was from the Sarvak enclave whose total in Soviet times considered a regional population has never exceeded 500, leader, having benefited territorially died from land mine explosions from border modifications during the between 1999 and 2005 while six 1920s. The densely populated Fergana others were seriously wounded. In Valley, which is historically shared 2001, the Uzbek government among Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and introduced visas for Tajik citizens, Kyrgyzstan, still contains ethnic granting only a limited number of enclaves that have often become the exemptions regarding requests for epicenter of violent clashes over visa-free travel in order to bury dead contested territory and scarce water relatives. resources. While the enclave issue Yet the most significant dents in mostly concerns Kyrgyzstan’s difficult bilateral relations have so far been relations with its Uzbek and Tajik caused by unfriendly economic neighbors, the situation in the Tajik measures as Uzbekistan has willingly enclave of Sarvak in Uzbekistan’s pursued a so-called beggar-thy- Namangan province has also been a neighbor policy vis-a-vis the source of recurrent tensions. impoverished Tajikistan. In 2008, Less than a year after the dissolution Tashkent began to selectively seize rail of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan cargoes bound for southern Tajikistan unilaterally cancelled direct flights and subsequently imposed sharp between Tashkent and Dushanbe. In increases in the transit fees for a wide 1999, it further began to mine parts of range of goods, including staple foods its border with Tajikistan – officially in and construction materials. In early Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 4

2012, it even halted rail Uzbekistan and Tajikistan was laid communication between Amuzang and during Uzbek President Islam Khatlon in Tajikistan, pointing to a Karimov’s visit to Dushanbe in purported terrorist attack against the September 2014 to attend the 14th railway the previous November. The summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Tajik government and local journalists Organization (SCO). He had previously said, however, that this was likely a visited the Tajik capital in August pretext for discontinuing the transit of 2008, also within the framework of goods and services amid the growing SCO diplomacy, after which the two controversy over Dushanbe’s plans to presidents met only occasionally on build the Rogun Dam on the Vakhsh the margins of several other summits. River, a tributary of the Amu Darya. While their meeting last September Uzbekistan’s actions also extended to did not lead to any major the suspension of cross-border breakthrough in the deadlocked electricity sales in 2009, after it exited relations, it has since been regarded as the starting point of a renewed the Central Asian United Energy System (UES). Three years later, in dialogue aimed at mending fences and 2012, it suspended natural gas reaching a durable compromise on a supplies to Tajikistan, which are yet to number of sensitive topics. resume. Several Tajik enterprises, In January 2015, the Tajik side including the TALCO aluminum plant reportedly sent a note to Uzbekistan and Tajikcement, have thereby suggesting the resumption of direct air suffered considerable losses and a communication between their capitals shortfall in output. Overall, since the and the delivery of visas to travelers at mid-2000s tensions between border crossings. Another possible Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have improvement mentioned in the resulted in a sharp reduction of trade: document would permit Uzbek and from slightly more than US$ 230 Tajik nationals to travel visa-free up to million in 2008 to US$ 160 million last one month. Visa restrictions still year. remain a vivid illustration of the mutual distrust in Central Asia as many if not most post-Soviet countries, which are now part of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), have enforced visa-free regulations with regard to other CIS members. It was initially planned that direct flights would resume at the end of March, but talks have been ongoing (Source: Wikimedia Commons, B. Ajeganov) ever since to set mutually acceptable IMPLICATIONS: The groundwork for airport fees and sort out other the ongoing détente between financial and technical modalities. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 5

As far as Uzbek-Tajik economic currently considered, not without relations are concerned, the recent reason, to be the most formidable meeting of the intergovernmental radical organization in the wider commission in Dushanbe was Middle East and Central Asia, with dedicated, among other things, to several hundred Uzbeks and Tajiks discussing the possibility of renewing presumably fighting within its ranks. bus shuttles as well as electricity and In late April 2015, the heads of both natural gas sales to Tajikistan. countries’ border guards met for the Uzbekistan’s Deputy Prime Minister first time ever in Khujand, the capital Rustam Azimov, one of President of Tajikistan’s northern Sughd Karimov’s closest confidants, said province, pledging to jointly patrol the Tashkent was ready to supply cars, state border with a view to making it buses and trucks, agricultural less susceptible of penetration by equipment, chemicals and other foreign radical elements. products. He further added that all On June 4-6, Uzbekistan’s Interior those goods could be sold at discount Minister, Lieutenant General Adkham rates due to lower rail tariffs, which Akhmedbayev, met in Dushanbe with have yet to be separately negotiated his counterparts from the SCO in what with the competent Tajik authorities. was the first visit by an Uzbek minister Following the entry into force on of internal affairs to Tajikistan since January 1, 2015, of the Eurasian 1998. It seems that the complicated Economic Union (EEU) between regional environment is likely to make Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus – the Uzbek-Tajik rapprochement in joined the next day by Armenia and security matters even more rapid and soon to include Kyrgyzstan – both productive than the one on trade and Uzbekistan and Tajikistan remain economic issues. outside any CIS-based integration CONCLUSIONS: Despite the early signs blocs. The Eurasian Economic of a détente, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan Community (EurAsEc) cofounded by are still worlds apart on their biggest Dushanbe in 2001 and including bilateral controversy – the issue of Uzbekistan as a member between water resource management in Central 2006 and 2008, was dissolved last Asia. Last November, Karimov visited October to give way to the EEU. Kazakhstan where he once again Meanwhile, no Central Asian economic criticized Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s cooperation organization has emerged hydropower generation plans. since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Uzbekistan fears that the construction given the lack of trust among the of major dams in the upstream region’s newly independent states. countries could deprive its strategic Security is another area where cotton industry of the water resources Dushanbe and Tashkent would be it requires. As long as Dushanbe better off cooperating than continuing continues to view the Rogun Dam to break lances. The Islamic State is project as a national priority and is Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 6

willing to commit funds to its implementation, the easing of tensions with Tashkent will likely fall short of a full-scale rapprochement. AUTHOR'S BIO: George Voloshin is an international affairs expert widely published on issues related to Eurasian politics, with a special focus on Central Asia. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 7

AGRI’S PROGRESS ADVANCES BRUSSELS’ AND BAKU’S ENERGY AGENDAS Micha’el Tanchum

On June 24, 2015, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Romania signed a declaration committing to advance the Azerbaijan-Georgia-Romania Interconnector (AGRI) project that will transport Azerbaijani LNG across the Black Sea to Romania for re-gasification and sale in European markets. The project creates a theoretical possibility for Turkmen LNG to reach Europe through a modified use of the system. Of great geopolitical consequence, the option requires a commensurate amount of political will to implement. Independent of potential Turkmen gas exports, the furtherance of the AGRI project constitutes an important advance for Azerbaijan’s strategic policy to develop European Union stakeholders in its political sovereignty.

BACKGROUND: While often less In January 2011, the SC AGRI LNG touted than the Trans-Anatolian Project Company SRL was registered Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) mega- in Romania with SOCAR, GOGC, and project that will transport Azerbaijani Romgaz as the shareholders. In March gas across Turkey to Greece for sale in 2011, the state-owned Hungarian European markets, the AGRI project power company MVM became a constitutes a critical second pillar in shareholder, resulting in each of the the effort to create transportation four state-owned firms maintaining a infrastructure for Azerbaijani natural 25 percent equity share. In 2012, the gas to reach Europe. In September AGRI LNG Project Company contracted 2010, twenty-one months prior the UK-based engineering firm Azerbaijan’s signing a binding Penspen to conduct a feasibility study intergovernmental agreement with for the project. Penspen presented its Turkey on the construction of TANAP, results in December 2014 and, the Presidents of Azerbaijan, Georgia, according to GOGC, the AGRI LNG Romania and the Prime Minister of Project Company approved the results Hungary declared their support for the of the study in January 2015. development of the AGRI Project. The AGRI system will transport During the summit of the four heads of Azerbaijani natural gas via pipeline to state in Baku, the state-owned energy Georgia’s Black Sea coast where the companies of Azerbaijan (SOCAR), gas will be liquefied and delivered by Georgia (GOGC), and Romania tanker across the Black Sea to a (Romgaz) signed a Memorandum of receiving terminal at the Romanian Understanding as well as Articles of port of Constanta. The LNG will be Association that served as the basis for regasified and transmitted through the formation of a company to oversee Romania’s distribution system to the project’s implementation. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 8

Hungary from where it can also be Romania lost between 34-39 percent transported to other European of its gas supply while Hungary lost markets. The US$ 5 billion project will approximately 45 percent of its supply. take nine years to complete and when While Romania has since reduced its fully operational will have an initial overall gas consumption as well as its maximum delivery capacity of 8 bcm imports from Russia, Romania’s annual annually. consumption stands now at IMPLICATIONS: Against the backdrop approximately 12 bcm. Hungary’s of the ongoing Ukraine conflict and annual gas consumption rate is Russia’s efforts to redirect gas flows to roughly 8.5 bcm. Comprising a alter supply and demand balances in significant portion of each nation’s EU markets, an inter-ministerial natural gas supply mix, the gas meeting was held in the Romanian received from AGRI will be a game- capital Bucharest to expedite the changer for Romania and Hungary’s development of the AGRI project, an reliability of supply. From Hungary’s existing gas hub at Városföld, important element in the EU’s energy security program. At the meeting, the Azerbaijani gas could then enter other Azerbaijani and Romanian energy Central and Eastern European markets ministers, the Georgian deputy energy through various existing and proposed minister, and the Hungarian pipelines. ambassador to Romania, issued a common declaration of their support for the continuation of the project based on the Penspen feasibility study. The meeting was also attended by representatives of the four respective national energy companies as well as representatives of BP and the European Commission. BP is the (Source: Wikimedia Commons, B. Ajeganov) largest shareholder in the Phase II In his press remarks after the AGRI development of Azerbaijan’s Shah inter-ministerial meeting, Romania’s Deniz natural gas field that will likely Minister of Energy Andrei Gerea made supply the AGRI project while the clear AGRI’s geopolitical significance. European Commission has listed AGRI “We believe that the AGRI project is a among its Projects of Common component of the southern gas Interest. corridor that may make an important AGRI is intended to secure Romania contribution to the European energy and Hungary’s gas supplies as well as security,” said Gerea, adding that the deliver gas to other Central and ministers had also made an agreement Eastern European markets. When to continue the technical development Russia cut gas supplies to Ukraine of the project to increase its capacity. If during the 2009 Russia-Ukraine crisis, the AGRI system’s capacity is Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 9

increased, it could potentially technical advancements in overland accommodate LNG exports from LNG transport place the option within Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan’s the realm of commercial affordability, participation in the Southern Gas it will also be a test of the amount of Corridor has been long stymied by political will that exists in Brussels as Russian and Iranian opposition to the well as in European and Caspian Basin construction of the undersea Trans- capitals to ensure that Turkmenistan Caspian Pipeline between becomes integrated into the EU energy Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. architecture. Such a development With the sufficient expansion of AGRI’s would be in Brussels’ and Baku’s long- capacity, it becomes possible to term strategic interests as Azerbaijan’s consider Turkmenistan’s participation existing gas reserves will be depleted in the SGC through tanker-borne in 40 years if exploitation continues at shipments of Turkmen LNG delivered the current rate. Nevertheless, the from Turkmenistan’s Caspian coastal furtherance of the AGRI project and the recent progress in TANAP’s city of Turkmenbashi to Baku. In August 2013, the Turkish construction construction create the prospect that firm GAP Inşaat began a 4-year port Azerbaijan will now have two different complex development project in delivery routes to Europe. As a result, Turkmenbashi that will be connected Azerbaijan’s strategy to develop to Turkmenistan’s massive Galkynysh Western stakeholders in its political field by an 800 km pipeline. sovereignty through the construction of energy infrastructure appears to be The transshipment of Turkmen LNG to on more solid diplomatic footing. Europe via the AGRI system would require the development of an AUTHOR’S BIO: Micha’el Tanchum is a additional second leg of the Senior Fellow with the Eurasian Azerbaijan-Georgia section of the Energy Futures Initiative at the transportation route. Currently, the Atlantic Council. AGRI system will transport Azerbaijani gas via pipeline to Georgia’s Black Sea coast where the gas will be liquefied. Turkmen LNG arriving to the Baku area would need to be transported by LNG tank truck or potentially by rail, using a system similar to those developed in North East Asian nations for the transport of LNG to their domestic markets.

CONCLUSIONS: While the feasibility of Turkmen LNG entering European markets via the AGRI system will depend on the extent to which Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 10

ISLAMIC STATE IN CENTRAL ASIA: THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY Charlie Smith

Central Asia is a key region that many believe has fallen into the crosshairs of the terrorist group calling itself the Islamic State (ISIS). Local governments are gravely concerned about returning fighters and possible ISIS infiltration in the region, and foreign powers, especially neighboring Russia and China, have expressed their deep concerns. This grim picture, however, obscures a more complex, and perhaps more accurate, story. Might the specter of ISIS have less to do with its on-the-ground ability to destabilize the region and more to do with the geopolitical concerns of those who are stating these threats?

BACKGROUND: ISIS is casting an Authoritarianism and political increasingly long shadow over Central volatility are common concerns in the Asia, a trend which started in 2014. In region. High unemployment is another May of that year, a group of fighters in issue, since potential recruits can be Syria from former Soviet states, lured by the promise of a paycheck – including those in Central Asia, swore leaflets found in Tajikistan have allegiance to ISIS. In September last offered fighters US$ 5,000 a month, far year, Taliban forces linked to ISIS above the average wage level. Islamic attacked an Afghan Local Police militancy also persists in the region, outpost in Ajristan, allegedly with the Al-Qaeda- and Taliban-allied beheading several people and raising Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) the black flag of ISIS. Also in and the Taliban both maintaining their September, the anonymous hanging of conflict against local authorities. the ISIS flag in Tashkent was tied to IMPLICATIONS: Despite what the declarations that the group had above warnings would have one selected an emir for Uzbekistan. A believe, the fact remains that very little video that surfaced in January 2015 ISIS activity has been conducted or featuring Tajik ISIS militants called for spotted in the region. There is scant jihad against Tajikistan’s central ISIS rhetoric so far that mentions government; less than one month Central Asia, instead mostly targeting earlier, 50 men in the country had countries in the Middle East or the been arrested for trying to travel to West. Additionally, in Afghanistan, Syria to fight. where an alliance between the group Coupled with this trend are Central and the Taliban may pose a threat, the Asia’s underlying weaknesses, which reality today is that there are deep many point to as providing a fertile political and ideological divides ground for a larger ISIS presence. between the two organizations that Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 11

prevent meaningful coordination. In The success of Central Asian the absence of confirmed numbers of governments in playing the ISIS card regional ISIS recruits, 1,000 fighters with Russia stems from a long- may be a more feasible total – still a standing Russian fear of and history figure for concern but far less of a dire with Islamic extremism. The country’s threat to the region. military presence in Tajikistan is thus Why would these countries play up the tied to the presence of Islamic ISIS threat? The answer lies in the extremists in the region, including the domestic priorities of the Central Asian Taliban. There is also a strategic countries themselves. This newest concern for Russia’s involvement with iteration simply means that ISIS is a the region: Moscow can use ISIS as a convenient bogeyman in the region, tool to retain influence in Central Asia, with governments using the group as a which has been moving towards China political tool for removing threats and in recent years. Paying out large sums winning support. to willing recipients such as Tajikistan is simply a way to utilize the situation and maintain influence. China’s rising influence in the region has given it a larger stake when it comes to ISIS. A Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece explicitly links the ISIS threat with instability and challenges to Chinese authority in

(Source: Wikimedia Commons, B. Ajeganov) Xinjiang, proposing greater intelligence and military cooperation Governments in Central Asia are also with Central Asian states as a solution. eager to receive assistance from Conveniently, such a response would foreign powers, and drumming up the increase China’s strategic position in threat of ISIS is an effective way to get the region. their attention. Kyrgyzstan, which has moved closer to Russia in recent years, Unrest in the wider Central Asia region has latched onto that country’s fear of has also been a lingering concern for U.S. domination; the Kyrgyz Russian- Beijing, largely because of the language media outlet has suggested possibility of Islamist regimes coming that American forces could use ISIS as to power and undermining China’s an excuse to send more NATO forces to authority in Xinjiang. Additionally, the the region and dent Russian influence. Chinese are sourcing a larger The Tajik government has been quite proportion of their energy resources successful in its appeals to Russia, from the region, and so securing them which has recently granted the against ISIS and other threats is a country upwards of US$ 1.2 billion in priority. military equipment to combat ISIS via What of other foreign actors in the its border with Afghanistan. region? The U.S. has responded to the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 12

ISIS threat in Central Asia with little ISIS may become to be a more tangible vigor for a new fight. The Pentagon has concern in the region someday, but the called ISIS in the region “nascent at evidence at this point is limited. While best” and “aspirational,” despite Central Asia is often thrown into the periodic statements from elected U.S. conversation about the expansion of officials that play up the ISIS threat for ISIS, doing so ignores a more Central Asia. As another regional complicated reality. player, Iran has been happy to blame AUTHOR’S BIO: Charlie Smith is a its enemies in the Persian Gulf and the specialist on emerging and frontier West for the rise of ISIS, but has markets, with a focus on political risk reserved its focus on the group for and private sector development, and is operations in the Middle East. The a recent graduate of the Johns Hopkins European Union, making a recent push University School of Advanced towards influence in Central Asia but International Studies. largely minor in comparative influence, has likewise been absent from the ISIS conversation. CONCLUSION: ISIS may, in reality, pose a bigger opportunity than threat for Central Asia, whose states have already secured foreign support and implicit approval for continued domestic control as a result of the militant group’s ominous, if shallow, regional growth. As such, ISIS in Central Asia today represents more of a political point rather than a real concern for the region’s countries, and a mix of the two for outside players.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 13

IS THE NORTH CAUCASUS BECOMING ANOTHER BATTLEFIELD IN THE GLOBAL JIHAD? Tomáš Baranec

The continuous crackdowns on North Caucasian militants conducted by Russian security forces intensified in first half of 2015, deepening the crisis caused by the split in the Caucasus emirate. Although security forces are targeting both Caucasus emirate loyalists and pro-Islamic State rebels, the former appear less resilient to such operations. Paradoxically, in comparison to the pro-ISIS group, the Caucasus emirate is better established and hierarchal and its cells are therefore more easily infiltrated by moles. The assassination of the Caucasus emirate’s emir Aliaskhab Kebedov, nom de guerre Ali Abu Muhammad, dealt a fatal blow to the virtual theocracy, facing a decreasing pool of possible recruits and increasing competition from ISIS. Despite such developments, it remains unlikely that ISIS, with its brutal methods, will prove capable of establishing itself in the North Caucasus.

BACKGROUND: Despite some contacts Caucasian insurgent movement deeper with Al-Qaeda and Arab volunteers into the global jihad. fighting in the ranks of the North Besides its isolation, the North Caucasian militants, the Caucasus Caucasian insurgency differs from IS emirate has remained a local with regard to its character and movement with loose links to the methods. Local insurgents are heavily global jihad. Prior to the rise of ISIS, its dependent on the support of local independence was endangered only inhabitants and therefore seek not to once, when three Naibs; Aslambek alienate them. Because brutal attacks Vadalov, Khusein Gakaev and Tarkhan on the civilian population, such as Gaziev, renounced their oaths of suicide bombers and even selective allegiance to Doku Umarov in 2010. assassinations of brothel and alcohol The Commander of Arab mujahedeen store owners, damage the movement’s and the al-Qaeda emissary Yusuf reputation among local residents, the Muhammad al-Emirati (Muhannad) Caucasus emirate has avoided (despite played a key role in the rebellion several brutal attacks) direct terror inside the Caucasus emirate, seeking to against civilians on a large scale. extend Al-Qaeda’s influence over Kebedov also proclaimed female rebels in the North Caucasus. suicide attacks as alien to Caucasian Muhannad’s death in April 2011 paved traditions. The practice of the the way for reconciliation in the Caucasus emirate, despite its many Caucasus emirate and marked the end tragic attacks, therefore stands in of a brief attempt to involve a contrast to the terror unleashed by ISIS. Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 14

In late 2014, a new split hit the around Asilderov objected to Caucasus emirate following a series of Kebedov’s nomination, supported on defections of influential commanders the opposite side by the Kabardino- (most notably the amir of Vilayat Balkarian jamaat. Soon thereafter, Dagestan Rustam Asilderov), pledging Asilderov criticized Kebedov for his allegiance to the leader of ISIS, al- dependence on foreign Chechen Baghdadi. As a result, the Caucasus émigrés, who have become a emirate found itself on the brink of significant force and monopolized the collapse and ISIS appeared to have organization’s external sources of established its presence in the region. funding. The infighting has been However, it was not Caucasian natives combined with more effective counter returning from Syria who brought ISIS insurgency tactics on the part of to the region, despite many federal forces and the insurgency, expectations to this effect. Instead, the replete with moles, has been unable to organization’s foothold in the region deliver any visible blow to the Kremlin consists of discontent rebels from in over a year. Under such within the Caucasus emirate, who circumstances, the proclaimed were never in direct contact with ISIS association with ISIS primarily and its ideology. represents a tool for discontent commanders of the Caucasus emirate to challenge Kebedov’s leadership and his supporters. Several possible scenarios exist for the ISIS establishment in the North Caucasus. A first is the triumph of ISIS in the region. Such a scenario could possibly materialize if Al-Baghdadi

would take the oaths of allegiance (Source: Wikimedia Commons, B. Ajeganov) from North Caucasian insurgents IMPLICATIONS: Several facts indicate seriously and provide the pro-ISIS that the pro-ISIS group led by group with tangible support. Such a Asilderov did not come about as an development would not just effect of sincere inspiration from ISIS’s significantly increase the resources of ideology, but rather a result of internal the pro-ISIS group but also attract struggles within the Caucasus emirate. more local youngsters into its ranks. In the ongoing split, significant This scenario would, however, numbers of Dagestani and Chechen probably lead to a shift of practices militants joined the pro-ISIS group, from the still quite moderate methods while the Kabardino-Balkarian jamaat of the local insurgency to the more remained adamant in its support for radical and aggressive methods of ISIS. Kebedov. This resembles the earlier By adapting to ISIS practices, local split over succession, when the group insurgents would increase their Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 15

external support, which is often crucial other hand, new leader of Vilayat for the victory of insurgencies against Dagestan and the rising star of the central governments, but would Caucasus emirate, Kamil Saidov, has paradoxically also simultaneously proclaimed that he is ready to weaken their support base in the local welcome his brothers who left the population, who generally despise Caucasus emirate back as soon as they such methods. And in most cases, will decide to return. A possible re- support from the local population is unification of the Caucasus emirate crucial in the day-to-day survival of will depend on the personality and insurgencies. There are so far no signs skills of the new emir. However it that ISIS is willing to fund its self- should take place before the first blood proclaimed subordinates in the North is spilled between the two groups, and Caucasus, despite the fact that many of a blood feud emerges among its high-ranking commanders are vengeance-ready mountaineers. themselves Caucasians. CONCLUSIONS: The triumph of ISIS in In a second scenario, the pro-ISIS the North Caucasus is still far from group could prevail even without inevitable and in fact remains rather tangible support from ISIS as a result unlikely. Its emergence in the region is of a collapse or marginalization of the the result of struggles within the Caucasus emirate. Under such Caucasus emirate in combination with circumstances, there would be no a series of setbacks, drying sources of pressure on the pro-ISIS group to external funding and internal practically subordinate itself to ISIS recruitment, rather than its ideological and adopt its policies. North Caucasian influence. Even if al-Baghdadi would insurgents could still use the ISIS name be willing to support his self- for propaganda and recruitment, but proclaimed subordinates in the their movement would probably stay Caucasus, the methods used by ISIS local with no real influence of ISIS in could lead to a loss of support from the the region. wider local population. Four main The third possibility is a re-unification factors will influence developments in of the Caucasus emirate. Although the foreseeable future and should be Kebedov’s death weakened it, a closely observed. First, the new emir of window of opportunity can open for a the Caucasus emirate, his character, diplomatic solution under the new abilities and relations with Asilderov. emir Magomed Suleymanov, nom de Second, the amount of tangible guerre Abu Usman Gimrinsky. As support, if any, provided by ISIS to the relations between the two groups pro-ISIS group in the Caucasus. Third, remain tense, many high-ranking the returning militants from Syria, commanders of the Caucasus emirate backing both ISIS and al-Qaeda. And of declared their readiness to prevent the course, much will be decided by the future actions of Russian security penetration of pro-ISIS cells into territories under their control. On the forces. With a decreasing number of Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 16

recruits willing to join the North Caucasian insurgents, preferring instead the battlefields in Iraq and Syria, the recruiting system of local Vilayats may once again become more selective and careful. As a result, the

Kremlin’s ability to plant moles into jamaats and destroy them through selective operations, rather than during brutal zachistkas, could become significantly limited.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Tomáš Baranec is a graduate of Charles University in Prague. His research interests include nationalism and factors of ethnic conflicts and separatism in the Caucasus. He works at the Institute of Security and Defence Studies (Armed

Forces Academy) in Bratislava.

Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 17

TAJIKISTAN’S GOVERNMENT MISSES THE REAL PROBLEM OF LABOR MIGRANTS Oleg Salimov

Tajik labor migrants are again at the contribute to a negative image of center of political games between Tajikistan. Russia and Tajikistan. At the end of At the same time, Karomat Sharipov, June, Tajikistan’s Ministry of Foreign the chairman Tajik Labor Migrants, Affairs delivered a note of protest to published the group’s response to the Russia’s Ambassador in Tajikistan, article on its website. Sharipov objecting to an article in the Russian asserted that the article was part of a newspaper AiF, which describes dirty political campaign by Russian Tajikistan as a country of labor pseudo-patriots, aiming to discredit migrants. Soon thereafter, the Russian Tajikistan and denigrating the Tajik government allowed the reentry to people. Sharipov agreed that the visa over 1,000 Tajik migrants earlier regime for labor migrants is needed, deported from Russia for violating but mainly in order to protect Tajiks immigration laws. This step, as well as arriving in Russia as opposed to the removal of the article from its protecting Russia from Tajiks as original source, tempered the Tajik argued in the article. He also noted government’s reaction. However, the that such publications are problem of Tajik labor migrants is far unacceptable for countries seeking to from resolved. build a strategic partnership. The original article published in the Following the public outrage in popular Russian newspaper was titled Tajikistan, the Russian government on “The country of guest workers. AiF’s July 2 pardoned over 1,000 Tajiks, who special report from Tajikistan.” The had previously been deported from article’s central theme was the urgent Russia for violating the rules of their need for a visa regime between Russia legal stay. According to Abdullo Kodiri, and Tajikistan. Tajikistan’s the press-secretary of Tajik Migration government as well as the Russia- Services, the agreement was reached based social movement Tajik Labor after negotiations between the two Migrants found the article highly countries’ migratory services. Russia derogatory and offensive. The official hosts close to a million Tajik migrants statement of Tajikistan’s Ministry of as of June 2015, according to Russian Foreign Affairs pointed to the Federal Migratory Services. The destructive consequences of such number is about 200,000 lower than in publications on the Tajikistan-Russia December 2014. relationship. The ministry appealed to the Russian government to prevent The amount of money transferred publications that distort the truth and from Russia to Tajikistan by labor Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 18

migrants in the first quarter of 2015 is problem of labor migrants, whose also down by 42.4 percent compared input into Tajikistan’s economy to the first quarter of the last year, reached 42 percent of the country’s according to Tajikistan’s National Bank GDP at its peak in 2013. Instead of (TNB). TNB reported a total of US$ 289 negotiating with Russia on pardoning million transferred to Tajikistan from labor migrants, Tajikistan’s Russia in the first quarter of 2015. government should focus on fighting Russia’s Central Bank instead reported unemployment at home and building a transfers of US$ 364 million from self-sustaining economy. This will Russia to Tajikistan and a drop of 87 create a far more positive image of percent in the first quarter of 2015, as Tajikistan, which was the primary compared to the same period in 2014. concern of the government’s protest. The coefficient of money transfers Tajik Labor Migrants warns about the from Russia to Tajikistan’s GDP is growing number of Tajik migrants down from 30.8 percent in the first disillusioned with their own quarter of 2014 to 19 percent in the government and the prospects of first quarter of 2015, according to employment back home, which TNB. become radicalized and join extremist The lower number of Tajik labor groups like ISIS. In the beginning of migrants and the significant drop in July 2015, Radio Ozodi/Freedom money transfers to Tajikistan can be reported that Tajikistan’s embassy in explained by the slowing Russian Moscow had received a letter from economy as a result of falling oil prices Russian ultranationalists requesting and economic sanctions implemented the immediate return of all Tajik by the U.S., EU, and some other migrants to Tajikistan to avoid “dire countries. While Tajikistan is not part consequences.” Tajik labor migrants of West-Russia confrontation, the are frequently treated as a point of country feels the effect of these leverage in political negotiations sanctions firsthand. Tajikistan could between Russia and Tajikistan, but are have avoided this situation if the Tajik simultaneously a highly vulnerable government would have been group whose real needs are rarely genuinely concerned about the recognized. problem of outmigration from Tajikistan, unemployment, and the dependency of its economy on money transfers from labor migrants. While provocative, the AiF article describes a problem that the Tajik government continues to neglect. While expressing its outrage over the article, the Tajik government has failed to outline any actions to address the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 19

RULING COALITION TO CUT FUNCTION OF GEORGIA’S NATIONAL BANK Eka Janashia

On June 27, Georgia’s parliament formerly ruling United National passed, in the first reading, a bill that Movement (UNM) party. deprives the National Bank of Georgia The legislation’s timing coincides with (NBG) of its supervisory function of an escalating confrontation between financial institutions, assigning these senior GD politicians and Kadagidze. tasks to an independent agency. The initial attacks against Kadagidze The proposal, initiated by the Georgian took place in February last year, when Dream (GD) ruling coalition a month the depreciation of Georgia’s national earlier, has faced a spate of sharp currency reached a dramatic level. criticism not only from the political Former Prime Minister Bidzina opposition but also from influential Ivanishvili lashed out at the NBG international financial institutions, president, blaming him for inaction to civil society and the business sector. prevent the currency crisis by using President Giorgi Margvelashvili the national reserves (See 03/18/2015 pledged to veto the bill in case it was issue of the CACI Analyst). Since then, endorsed. Kadagidze, whose term in office will According to the amendments, a new expire in February 2016, has become a body – the Financial Supervisory frequent target of attacks from GD Agency (FSA) – will monitor and politicians. conduct oversight of Georgia’s banking Opponents of the bill also question the sector and financial institutions, a financial advisability of moving function currently carried out by NBG. banking supervision from the NBG, A seven-member board, including a arguing that there is no economic and representative and the president of financial rationale justifying the NBG, as well as five government damage implied by the planned nominees, will run FSA after the changes. parliamentary confirmation. The board Reputable financial institutions, members, in turn, will name the head including the International Monetary of the agency, which should also be Fund, World Bank, European Bank for approved by the parliament. Reconstruction and Development and The critics of the bill discern political Asian Development Bank have warned motives behind the proposal, arguing PM Irakli Gharibashvili and Parliament that it is designed to undermine the Speaker Davit Usupashvili that position of NBG’s President Giorgi splitting the NBG’s functions will Kadagidze, who is affiliated with the weaken “the independence and quality Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 20

of banking supervision in experts including from the European Georgia” and challenge both stability Central Bank. In fact, neither NBG, nor in the banking sector and the local or foreign experts, or sustainability of economic growth. In representatives of Georgia’s business particular, they warn against community, were invited to participate empowering the parliament to appoint in the preparation process of the draft FSA Board members, which will bill. Moreover, the sponsors of the bill undermine the principle of checks and failed to provide the political, financial balances practiced in the current and economic rationale justifying the appointment procedures for the NBG prospective reduction of NBG’s Board. Such a shift risks leading to a functions and the need for creating a politicization of banking supervision, new agency. damaging its independence and If the bill is approved, GD will obtain autonomy, the institutions assert. real levers on the FSA Board, which By contrast, GD argues that the will increase the perception of political amendments will grant “more motives behind the new amendments. independence” to the banking sector. A The president’s pledge to veto the bill co-sponsor of the bill, GD MP Tamaz will be largely symbolic since GD is Mechiauri, who chairs the well positioned to override it. The parliamentary committee for finances, coalition holds 86 seats in parliament – explained that the proposal will lead to 10 more than it needs to overturn a the de-politicization of NBG’s currently presidential veto. politicized board, which “do not reflect at all the interests of those forces, Given the overall economic context – which are currently in power.” decreasing exports and investment as well as a slowdown of economic Against the background of such growth in Georgia, the endorsement of statements, UNM insists that bill was the bill will even further fuel initiated and backed by Ivanishvili, speculations on the government’s who aspires to obtain a “key” to the agenda vis-à-vis NBG, and will banking sector – the only sector that is complicate Georgia’s relations with not under his control. financial donor organizations. The president’s office rejected the bill for its lack of professionalism and also lamented that the way it was elaborated contradicts Georgia’s commitments under the Association

Agreement with the EU. According to the 2014-2016 Association Agenda, Georgia is obliged to boost the NBG’s independence by revising its legislation according to EU best practices and with the support of Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 21

KYRGYZSTAN’S CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER DISMISSES JUDGE Arslan Sabyrbekov

Kyrgyzstan’s judicial system has citizens’ fundamental constitutional always depended on the executive and rights and have filed a case to the legislative branches of power that still Constitutional Chamber of the tightly control the appointment and Supreme Court. Sooronkulova was dismissal of judges. To ensure the appointed the leading judge to judiciary’s independence in the examine the case and sought aftermath of the April 2010 international advice on the matter. But Revolution, two bodies were created; before she could announce her ruling the Council on the Selection of Judges on the case, Svetlana Boljurova, a and the Judicial Council, a professional lawyer from the parliament’s legal and body of judges. However, because both judicial affairs committee, filed these bodies are closely linked to the allegations against her. She claimed parliament and the President, they are that in breach of procedure, judge hardly independent. This observation Sooronkulova revealed her views that is supported by the fact that a number the biometric data collection was an of judges have been ousted from their unconstitutional act, ahead of position for voicing legal opinions at announcing them publicly and odds with the views of the country’s demanded that she be removed from political leadership. the case. This time, a senior judge in the In the Constitutional Chamber of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court, the judges were split Supreme Court, Klara Sooronkulova, 50 to 50. The Chamber’s chairperson was dismissed for her position on the had the decisive vote and removed controversial legislation on biometric Sooronkulova from the case. At data collection. Last year, the Kyrgyz Boljurova’s further demand, the parliament passed a law for a Judicial Council reviewed an allegation nationwide biometric data registration that Sooronkulova had shown program. The program was initially “insubordination” by criticizing her termed “voluntary,” but the colleagues for “following the direct submission of fingerprints was later order of the president’s and that of the linked to the upcoming parliamentary parliament’s Office.” On these charges, elections, with the authorities making the Judicial Council ordered registration “obligatory” in order to Sooronkulova to step down before the cast the ballot. Civil society activists expiration of her term and submitted have issued a unanimous statement all the documents to the parliament to that introducing biometric registration pass a final decision. as a condition for participating in the Kyrgyzstan’s parliament voted three elections is a gross violation of times before it managed to reach 80 Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 22

votes out of the 120 sitting MPs. Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Chamber, According to Sooronkulova, “the which was a separate Constitutional situation is completely chaotic. It is Court before the country’s constitution clear that in between the votes, the was adopted in 2010, has become President’s Office was working with increasingly challenged over the past MPs using different several months. Under the suggested methods.” Sooronkulova also added terms of the upcoming amendments to that the head of the President’s Office the country’s constitution, the was present during the voting. Constitutional Chamber risks turning Kyrgyzstan’s prominent civil society itself into an institution that can only activists immediately issued a give decisions of recommendatory statement, describing the situation as a nature, paving the way for state of complete lawlessness. unconstitutional acts. Emil Oskonbaev, According to civil society activist another judge in the Constitutional Cholpon Zhakypova, Sooronkulova did Chamber, was reprimanded for expressing his support to his now not even have the opportunity to defend herself, speak in front of the former colleague Sooronkulova. parliamentarians and present evidence Sooronkulova’s forced and of direct pressure to the Constitutional controversial resignation favors the Chamber. Indeed, Sooronkulova’s interpretation that the declared demand to address the parliament was comprehensive reform of the judiciary, rejected by its Speaker on the grounds passed by a presidential decree in that “there is no necessity to listen to 2012, does not aim to turn it into an Sooronkulova since we have received independent branch of power. The all the documents that prove she was judiciary remains as dependent as in breach of her competencies and did ever. not observe the required procedure.” Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 23

BAKU CRACKS DOWN ON ALTERNATIVE MEDIA AFTER CONCLUDING EUROPEAN GAMES Mina Muradova

After 17 days of competition, the first sports.” Azerbaijan, enjoying loud European Games have ended in Baku. support at every venue, has surprised Yet the crackdown on dissenting many and was second in the medal voices continues in Azerbaijan. The table with 18 golds. Nearly 6,000 country will be remembered not only athletes from 50 countries competed for its capable hosting of a major in 20 sporting events at the Games that sporting event, but also for its ended on June 28. silencing of critical voices in However, Azerbaijan was widely connection with the event. criticized before and during the games Azerbaijan’s government hailed the for politically motivated arrests and games as a triumph and is now for banning the Guardian, along with a considering bidding for the Olympics. number of media outlets and human “The first European Games will go rights activists, from entering the down in sporting history,” the Minister country to cover the games. of Youth and Sport Azad Rahimov said Two days after the closing ceremony in in a statement on July 3. “I’m very the Baku Olympic Stadium, seating proud of what has been achieved in 68,000, the prominent human rights Baku and the positive feedback we activist and director of Meydan TV have been getting … It has been a Emin Milli posted that “It is success for Azerbaijan and will be a remarkable that the government has launch pad for future sporting events started repressions against Meydan TV we will host. The coverage ... and the the day after the European Games’ positive messages we have sent have closing ceremony. Several journalists really highlighted Azerbaijan on the from Meydan TV have been banned world and European map.” from leaving Azerbaijan, stopped at Next year, Azerbaijan will host the the border and were not allowed to 42nd Chess Olympiad and a Formula come for a short trip to Tbilisi, Georgia. One race through the streets of Baku. It … from past cases, we may conclude will also stage the Islamic Solidarity that there is now a criminal case Games in 2017 and soccer matches in opened and an investigation going on the Euro 2020 competition. against Meydan TV.” According to Rahimov, “There is a new On June 26, Milli reported that he had culture growing, this is very important, received a threat from Minister of supporting the development of Rahimov, in connection with his sport … Every ticket sold is an critical reporting on the European important contribution to sustain and Games. Meydan TV is a Berlin-based maintain our sporting arenas and online television station that provides develop our athletes in different alternative news coverage of Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, 08 July 2015 24

Azerbaijan. During the European speak out, publicly condemning the Games, Meydan TV’s materials were threat against Milli, as well as the widely used by international media, broader human rights crackdown including critical cartoons, stories on taking place in the country. Finally, an Azerbaijani bus driver who crashed Sport for Rights calls on German into three Austrian swimmers and an authorities to provide Milli with interview by a national television immediate and full protection. station of a fake British tourist – both of which were highly embarrassing to the ruling regime. International human rights watchdog organizations expressed their concerns over “an increase in the government harassment of independent journalists” in Azerbaijan in the wake of the European Games. “We fear that this growing harassment is a forerunner of a new crackdown targeting Meydan TV’s staff,” said Johann Bihr, the head of the Reporters Without Borders Eastern Europe and Central Asia desk. Azerbaijan is ranked 162nd out of 180 countries in the 2015 Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. There are currently about 100 political detainees, at least 20 of whom are identified as “prisoners of conscience” by Amnesty International. Sport for Rights calls on the Azerbaijani authorities to put an end to their ongoing attempts to silence critical reporting, and to take immediate steps to improve fundamental freedoms in the country, including by releasing all the journalists and human rights defenders currently behind bars for political reasons. The campaign further calls on the European Olympic Committees to