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Force and Objectivity: on Impact, Form, and Receptivity to Nature in Science and Art

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Force and Objectivity: on Impact, Form, and Receptivity to Nature in Science and Art Force and Objectivity: On Impact, Form, and Receptivity to Nature in Science and Art by Eli I. Lichtenstein A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Philosophy) in The University of Michigan 2019 Doctoral Committee: Professor Gordon Belot, Co-Chair Professor Daniel A. Herwitz, Co-Chair Professor Andreas Gailus Professor Peter A. Railton Professor Laura Ruetsche 1 Eli I. Lichtenstein [email protected] ORCID iD: 0000-0002-8456-7316 © Eli I. Lichtenstein 2019 2 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am deeply grateful to Gordon Belot and Daniel Herwitz for their invaluable guidance, wide-ranging insight, and unwavering support during the preparation of this dissertation. I benefited greatly from Gordon's clear-headed questions, intellectual open-mindedness, and broad knowledge in the history, metaphysics, and epistemology of science, as well as from his technical expertise in general relativity—any remaining errors and gross 'poetic excess' in my understanding of the relevant physics are mine alone. I benefited equally from Danny's broad expertise in philosophy of art, the history of modern aesthetic theory, and post-Kantian philosophy more generally, as well as from his synthetic imagination and deep intuitive understanding of my early, often vague and chaotically scattered ideas. I would also like to extend special thanks to Pavel Godfrey for his intellectual collaboration throughout my time at Michigan, including extremely helpful discussions of and feedback on this work at all stages of its development in Ann Arbor. For their early mentorship in philosophy, and for sparking my interests in philosophy of science, Nietzsche, and Kant, I am grateful to Tom Ryckman, Lanier Anderson, and Helen Longino. For additional feedback and other help, I would also like to thank Dave Baker, Sarah Buss, Victor Caston, Andreas Gailus, Jimmy Hamzey, Johann Hariman, Jim Joyce, Ross Martin, Peter Railton, Laura Ruetsche, Tad Schmaltz, Janum Sethi, Jamie Tappenden, and several anonymous referees. Finally, I am extremely grateful to my parents, to my friends in Ann Arbor and beyond, and especially to Filipa. I could never have completed this project, or even undertaken it in a serious way, without generous support from all of the above. ii3 TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ii LIST OF APPENDICES v ABSTRACT vi CHAPTER I. Introduction 1 1. Objectivity and Nihilism in Modern Scientific Culture 1 2. Dynamism: On Force as Reality 23 3. Control-Freaks and Moralistic Force-Denial 36 II. Force as an Object for Conceptual Genealogy 45 4. 'God', 'Law', and 'Matter' as Physical Forces, Fields-of-Effect, and 45 Phenomena: On Early Modern Theology as a Guide to Current Scientific Metaphysics 5. Primordial Concepts of Force 78 6. Force as the Underlying Ground of Life as Nietzschean 'Self- 89 Overcoming' 7. Nietzsche Contra Sublimation 99 III. Force as the Ground of Poetic Objectivity 126 8. Force as Drive: On Will, Passion, and 'Aesthetic' Freedom from Desire 126 in Nietzsche, Schiller, and Kant 9. Force Beyond 'Nature' and 'Culture' 155 10. Aesthetic Objectivity as a Sensuous Presentation of the Elemental 160 1iii7 11. Sensory Force, Sublime Impact, and Beautiful Form 164 12. On the 'Pathetic Fallacy' and Artistic Objectivity 182 IV. Force as the Ground of Scientific Objectivity 223 13. Scientific Objectivity as a View from Explanatory Power 223 14. Physical Force as Transcendental Ground (I): Dynamic Structuralism 244 15. Physical Force as Transcendental Ground (II): Natural Form 268 16. Physical Force as Transcendental Ground (III): Physical Systematicity 273 as the Natural Form of Human Intellect 17. Physical Force as 'Immanent' (Quasi-)Empirical Object (I): Inertial 284 Force as Pure Impetus (Not 'Resistance') for Poetic Understanding 18. Physical Force as (Quasi-)Empirical Object (II): Passivity, Reactivity, 303 and Real Physical Interaction 19. Real Structure, Objective Field, and Universal Spatial Form 311 V. Conclusion: Force and Modern Understanding 330 APPENDICES 332 BIBLIOGRAPHY 366 2iv7 LIST OF APPENDICES APPENDIX A. Newton on God in Natural Philosophy 333 B. Nietzsche on the Will to Truth as a Will to Nothingness and Will to 338 Power C. Feuerbach and Marx as Exoteric Christians (On God in 'Materialism') 346 D. Marxist-Hegelian Dialectics as a Moralized Denial of Natural 354 Hierarchy 3v7 ABSTRACT I argue that scientific and poetic modes of objectivity are perspectival duals: 'views' from and onto basic natural forces, respectively. I ground this analysis in a general account of objectivity, not in terms of either 'universal' or 'inter-subjective' validity, but as receptivity to basic features of reality. Contra traditionalists, bare truth, factual knowledge, and universally valid representation are not inherently valuable. But modern critics who focus primarily on the self-expressive aspect of science are also wrong to claim that our knowledge is or should be ultimately mediated by ourselves. In objective science, we represent nature as a field of phenomena determined by and within explanatorily-basic physical structures that encode the causal impact of elemental physical forces. These causally-basic forces hence ground the possibility of objective scientific theory, even though (I argue) they are systematically excluded from its representational contents. I show how my notions of force and field emerge partly through my effort to naturalize concepts of 'God' and 'Laws' in 17th-century natural philosophy. In science, we use the structure of basic forces' impact to see corresponding objects. We do not see these forces themselves—and this relates to the 'transcendence' of 'God'. I supplement this historical analysis by critiquing standard accounts of objectivity, and by synthesizing elements from neo-Kantian epistemology and current 'structural' realism into a view that I call 'dynamic structuralism'. Finally, I argue that physics systematically relies on passive characterizations of phenomena like inertia and impressed force. Dynamic alternatives that are just as empirically adequate are possible, but they are non-scientific. Poetic objectivity involves a direct presentation of nature as an order of interacting forces. I elaborate first by developing a novel theory of the relation between beauty and sublimity, mediated by a basic category of 'sensory force' (e.g. a 'singing' tone in a beautiful melody). I then describe the interaction between sensory and affective dimensions of aesthetic experience, in relation to an original historical analysis of passion and 'disinterestedness' in Kant, Schiller and Nietzsche. I synthesize these lines of analysis into a critique of the role of 'expression' in art. I 4v7 i also resist 'spectator'-centric aesthetics, in this connection, by developing an account of artistic objectivity in dialogue with Ruskin's critique of the 'pathetic fallacy'. I contrast artistic objectivity with Romantic ideals of self-expression, while elaborating its positive relation to certain currents within Victorian and Modernist aesthetics, including Imagists' stress on 'exteriority'. My project creatively extends Nietzsche's view that philosophical and scientific theories are 'perspectival' expressions of theorists' drives. It is a virtue of Nietzsche's account that he takes the outlet of strong human drives in creative acts of theorizing to be just one among many higher modes of 'will to power' in nature—many of which are totally impersonal. But Nietzsche is still too focused on self-expression or willing one's own power. Objective science involves external forces' 'expression' in and through us, not just 'expressing' our own powers. And Nietzsche's vitalistic 'will to power' must be replaced by a basic ontology that better accommodates inorganic phenomena, like the 'lawful' order of celestial motions. Thus I aim to de- anthropomorphize and 'de-organicize' post-Kantian notions of willful striving and organic development, while preserving for force the primary ontological and evaluative status that theorists from Schiller and Goethe to Schelling and Schlegel to Emerson and Nietzsche attributed to will or to life. vii57 CHAPTER I Introduction 1. Objectivity and Nihilism in Modern Scientific Culture Objectivity is under systematic assault. This modern attack on older ideals of objectivity has often been fairly well targeted. But it has also clearly exacerbated tensions, adding to what is by now the conspicuous resurgence of frank tribalism in once-'polite' liberal societies. “Why is it not good for our view of reality to reflect who we are and what we care about?,” warring factions seem increasingly inclined to wonder out loud. “Why shouldn't we affirm our unique identities by embracing our 'subjectivity'? Why should we believe that 'bare facts' get at the real nature of things, more so than does the way that the world looks through the 'lens' of our basic values, our cultures, our languages, our history, our quest for recognition, our life experiences, our truth? Haven't we learned that all knowledge is value-laden and perspectival? So why not drop the pretense of neutrality that underlies old-fashioned accounts of objectivity, and instead try to create new knowledge that is as 'laden' as possible with our own standpoint, not other people's?” But the modern assault on objectivity remains largely unnoticed, even so, because objectivity is now often misunderstood, even where it has not been cast aside. Moderates who lament the loss of faith in the ideal of universally valid representations—the
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