Thebatti.E Ofnarva
Total Page:16
File Type:pdf, Size:1020Kb
THEBATTI.EOFNARVA 20th November 1700 by PeteBerry ln the monthofSeptember 1700 the Swedish troops garrisoning an!'wherc in fact where the Swedeswere not about to arrive, the town of Narva, a small but stmtegicallysignificant andunder pretext ofvisiting a moresoutherly for€e of soldiers settlementnear the East Baltic coastline.found themselvessentto headoff the Swedes,Peter left the campso quicklyhe undersiege. The besiegenwere the soldiersof TsarPeter the abandonedhis jewels and his personalcase of €harnpagne. Great.The Russianmonarch had decided that at lastthe time Behindhim he left a Frenchman,the Duc du Croy,to oversee wasripe to capturehis "window on the West" - a meansof t}le Russianforces. This worthyhad only beenpresent at the creatinga Russianpresence in the Baltic. siegeas a neutralobserver. He spokeno Russian,had liltle Tothisendhe enteredinto a triplealliance with Denmark and regardfor the qualitiesof the Russianpeasant soldier, and was Saxony,two other stateswith much to gain at Sweden\ unwillingto undertakethe job. Peterhimselfhadto "pe^uade" expense.All threepowers were confident in theiractionsas the the noblemanto undertakethe task.andwhen Peterthe Great Swedisharmy wastiny comparedto their collectivestrength, under the influenceof severalbottles of brandy personally and the Swedishmonarch, CharlesXII, was a teenager, penuadedyouto do somethingitwasa verystrong man indeed inexperiencedin war and statecraft.Here wasstealing candy who wasnot pe$uaded! from a babyon a very grandscale indeed. So,70,000 Russians, adrnittedly ill-equipped and ill-trained, The Swedesgarrisoning Narva were as aware of this as the stood behind their defencesand cannonand waited. What Tsar,but theygrimly defended their positions.They could see professionalofficers they had spokeGerman or Frenchonly, the Russianforces daily buildingup, andthe siegeworks grew andwere mistrusted. while native Russian officers were noted moreextensive and more complete. Narva itseflay in a bendof for drunkenn€ssorstupidity, or both.Butnumbe$ and position the river Narova,on a bridgingpoint whichconnected it with weresolidly on their side. the old citadelof Ivanogrod.The Russiansiegeworks took the But what of the Swedes?Charles XII had led his Inenin a form of a vastarc bendingaway ftom the town, with its ends punishingmarch to reachNarva, with little rest,no foodand in restingon the banksofthe river. Afler the initial circumvalla the teethof the Balticwinter elements- The sheerhaste ofhis tion had been built to keep the defendersin, the Russiansbreakneckmarch had had its loll. and the Swedishforce rhat tumed to defendingtheir own lines.To guardlhe mainroad reachedNarva on 20th Novembernumbered no more than into Narva a raisedplatform was constructed,fortified and 10,500men- Even wiih the besrtroops in Europe,what could providedwith artillery.This bastionwas duly dubbed"Fort Charlesand his generalshope to do to the massiveRussian Troubetsky" in honour of ils commandingofficer. To guard defences? againstany attemptsto raisethe siegefrom the east.a line of The answerwas reachedfairly quickly.Sitting on the hill contravallationwas raised, reinforced by deep trenches, overlookingthe Russianpositions, the Swedessaw the lwo panpers, chevaw de frise and palisades.To the south of Fort major weaknessesin the Russianpositior. Firsdy,the sheer Troubetskythe two lines of fortificationsran more or less numberof men packedinto the constrictedspace of the rwo paralleltoeachother, with a distanceof30to 50metres belween defensivelines meant that Russianlaleral communication and them.To the northof Fort Troubetskythe lineswere iflclined a manoeuvrewas almost impossible. Secondly, the Russianshad littleto the west,partly to takeadvantage ofthe l;e ofthe land only one escaperoute to bomesoil - the pontoonbridge. andpa(ly to protecta pontoonbridge which had been thrown Contemporarymilitary practice, as conducted by gentlemen acrossthe river flear the village of Kamperholm.As the in morc southerlyclimes would havemeant that the Swedes permanentbridge acrcss the riverNarovawascontrolled by the should have begun a lengthy siege, digging saps and garrisonof Narva the pontoonbridge was the sole line of approaches.However, sieges ofthis t)?e wereconducted when communicationbetween the Russianarmy and their home the attackersournumbered rhe defenders,and not vice\er.a. €ountry.By the time of the climaxof the siegethe besiegingMoreover,as readers ofmy earlierpieceson the Swedisharmy for€enurnbered over 70,000 men and 180suns. ofthis periodnay remernber,the Swedishmonarch\ tempera, By Octobera strangerumour beganto sweepthrough the mentwas not fittedfor patientspadework. The onlyoption was Russianlines. Incredible as it seemed,the Swedes,instead of inmediateattack, and planswere drawn up accordingly. suingfor peace,had actually taken up thegauntlet and in a bold Two principalpoints of attackwere decided upon, one either counterctrokehad invaded Denmark and forced the Danesout sideof Fort Troubetsky.The Foot weresplit into two groups, ofthe war.Perhaps a littlemore disquietingwas the rumourthat and formedinto deepcolumns of atrack,the right handforce an armyofthe samemadmen led by their boy-kingwas sailing under GeneralOtto Vellingk, the left under GeneralCarl acrossthe Baltic to raisethe siegeof Narva. GustavRienskiold. The artilleryunder master gunner Johan Huddledbehind the rampartsoftheirmassive siegeworks the Sjobladhwas also divided inlo two groups,one to engagein Russiansbecamemore uneasyas, on November18th and 19th, counterbattery fire with the gunsof Fort Troubetsky, the other a steadystream of beatenand frightenedtroops beganto to supportthe attackofthe infantrycolumns. To facilitatethis straggleinto €ampbearing tales of how an unstoppableforce dual role the artillerywas formed into on€ largebody, and waspushing in a of theoutposts and pickets and was less than a placedin betweenthe two groupsof Foot.This use ofrnassed day'smarch away. These may have only been rumours, but they infantrycolumns and atillery supportwould seemto betong certainly had a dramatic effect on one pa(icipant in the siege. moreto the ageofNapoleon than that ofMarlborough,but, as PeterI Romanov,Tsar of a the Russias,was at Nafla to in everythingelse, the Swedespreferred to be the exception overseethe finalstages ofhis triumph.However, upon hearing ratherthan the rulel about the nearby presenceof the swedes, he decided The Horse reserveunder Johann Ribbing wasplaced to the precipitatelythat he wasneeded elsewhere. "Elsewhere", was rearofthe left handinfantry column. Their task was to exploit the initial breakthroughand by riding throughthe breaches escaperoute for some70,000 Russians. establishedby the Foot, sweepto the rear of rhe Russian As often happensin thesesituations, individuals and units positionsand cut off the linesof retreat. foundsome r€solve, and a hastydefence was now conducted. The two nain bodiesof Horsewere placed on the extreme The Semenovskiand Preobrazhenskiregiments - the Tsar's flanks of the infantry columns.Th€ir initial task was to Cuards,and the besttroops in the army,built a makeshiftfort demonstratealong the lengthofthe fortifications, attracting the out of overtumedwaggons, and beganthe most tenacious attentionof the defenders,and at the samelime preventing defenseof thebattle.In fact, in termsof Swedishcasualties and them from makinga flank attackon the columnsby salling length of resistance,this and General Wiede's stubborn overthe defenceworks. This tumed outlo be an unneccessaryresistancein the southmark the real battleof Narva. precaution,as the Russiansremained resolutely attached to Sogreat didthe Guards'resistance become that Chadeswas their fodfications. obligedtosendforVellingkt commandto reinforcehis attacks Charleshad thusdeployed his armyso asto concentratehis on the barricade.A holding for€e was left to ensurethat num€ricallyinferior forces at two narrowpoints. The Russians, Wiede\ commanddid not get up to any mischief.Fort deployedon a longand constrictive front wereto be unableto Troubetsky had to be stonned, and it was the eventual fall of concentEtetbeir vastly superior forces to countertheir enemy. this strongpointthat saw the resistancefinally begin ro die In efiect,the sheersize of the ill-trainedarmy was to be used down.Even so, it$as not until 8 o'clockin the eveningthat the agarnstrt. surrenderof the Guardswasobtained. andWiede held out until At 2 o'clockin the afternoon.the attackcommenced. With two houn after midnight.With the fall of this lastforce, the the grenadiersformed as thefront ofthe atta€kingcolumns,the SwedishtiumDh wascomolete. Footbegan their assault.Equipped with fascines,they were to When one ionsidersth; odds involvedin the battle. the stormthe Russianpositions in the fashionthey had leamt so casualtyfigures for both sides are also truly impressive.Total well a pointblank volley and a chargeto finishthe job with Russiandead andwounded may have been as high as 20,000, an cold steel. of the remainderbeing taken prisoner.All of the Russian As the attackwas laun€hed it seemedthat the Swedeshad baggagetrain, supplies,artillery and waggonsfell to the recruitedtheweatheronto theirside. A suddenand heaiy snow conquerors,as well as vastamountsofcolours. Against this, the beEan,with the wind blowingdirecdy into the facesof the Swedeslost about 700 killed and 1200wounded. defenders-The Russianartillery tried to bearonthe advancing A dramaticvictory indeed. The results were nany andvaried. columns.but infli'rtedfew casualties.The blankwhite