Report to the President by the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident

Report to the President By the PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION On the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident June 6th, 1986 Washington, D.C. IN MEMORIAM "The future is not free: the story of all human progress is one of a struggle against all odds. We learned again that this America, which Abraham Lincoln called the last, best hope of man on Earth, was built on heroism and noble sacrifice. It was built by men and women like our seven star voyagers, who answered a call beyond duty, who gave more than was expected or required and who gave it little thought of worldly reward." - President Ronald Reagan January 31, 1986 Francis R. (Dick) Scobee Commander Michael John Smith Pilot Ellison S. Onizuka Mission Specialist One Judith Arlene Resnik Mission Specialist Two Ronald Erwin McNair Mission Specialist Three S.Christa McAuliffe Payload Specialist One Gregory Bruce Jarvis Payload Specialist Two ii iii iv Table of Contents - - Volume I - Preface Chapter I Introduction. Events Leading Up to the Challenger Chapter II Mission. Chapter III The Accident. Chapter IV The Cause of the Accident. Chapter V The Contributing Cause of the Accident. Chapter VI An accident Rooted in History. Chapter VII The Silent Safety Program. Chapter VIII Pressures on the System. Chapter IX Other Safety Considerations. Recommendations. The Commission. The Staff. Appendix A - Commission Activities. Appendix B - Commission Documentation System. Appendix C - Observations Concerning the Processing And Assembly of Flight 51-L. Appendix D - Supporting Charts and Documents. v Preface The accident of Space Shuttle Challenger, require attention to make future flights safer. mission 51-L, interrupting for a time one of Careful attention was given to concerns the most productive engineering, scientific and expressed by astronauts because the Space exploratory programs in history, evoked a Shuttle program will only succeed if the wide range of deeply felt public responses. highly qualified men and women who fly the There was grief and sadness for the loss of Shuttle have confidence in the system. seven brave members of the crew; firm However, the Commission did not construe its national resolve that those men and women be mandate to require a detailed investigation of forever enshrined in the annals of American all aspects of the Space Shuttle program; to heroes, and a determination, based on that review budgetary matters; or to interfere with resolve and in their memory, to strengthen the or supersede Congress in any way in the Space Shuttle program so that this tragic event performance of its duties. Rather, the will become a milestone on the way to Commission focused its attention on the safety achieving the full potential that space offers to aspects of future flights based on the lessons mankind. learned from the investigation with the The President, who was moved and troubled objective being to return to safe flight. by this accident in a very personal way, Congress recognized the desirability, in the appointed an independent Commission made first instance, of having a single investigation up of persons not connected with the mission of this national tragedy. It very responsibly to investigate it. The mandate of the agreed to await the Commission's findings Commission was to: before deciding what further action might be 1. Review the circumstances surrounding the necessary to carry out its responsibilities. accident to establish the probable cause or For the first several days after the accident- causes of the accident; and possibly because of the trauma resulting from 2. Develop recommendations for corrective or the accident-NASA appeared to be other action based upon the Commission's withholding information about the accident findings and determinations. from the public. After the Commission began Immediately after being appointed, the its work, and at its suggestion, NASA began Commission moved forward with its releasing a great deal of information that investigation and, with the full support of the helped to reassure the public that all aspects of White House, held public hearings dealing the accident were being investigated and that with the facts leading up to the accident. In a the full story was being told in an orderly and closed society other options are available; in thorough manner. an open society-unless classified matters are Following the suggestion of the Commission, involved-other options are not, either as matter NASA established several teams of persons of law or as a practical matter. not involved in the mission 51-L launch In this case a vigorous investigation and full process to support the Commission and its disclosure of the facts were necessary. The panels. These NASA teams have cooperated way to deal with a failure of this magnitude is with the Commission in every aspect of its to disclose all the facts fully and openly; to work. The result has been a comprehensive take immediate steps to correct mistakes that and complete investigation. led to the failure; and to continue the program The Commission believes that its investigation with renewed confidence and determination. and report have been responsive to the request The Commission construed its mandate of the President and hopes that they will serve somewhat broadly to include the best interests of the nation in restoring the recommendations on safety matters not United States space program to its preeminent necessarily involved in this accident but which position in the world. 1 Chapter I: Introduction The Space Shuttle concept had its objective space plan, became the focus genesis in the 1960s, when the Apollo of NASA's near-term future. lunar landing spacecraft was in full development but had not yet flown. The Space Shuttle Design From the earliest days of the space program, it seemed logical that the goal The embryo Shuttle program faced a of frequent, economical access to space number of evolutionary design changes might best be served by a reusable before it would become a system in launch system. In February, 1967, the being. The first design was based on a President's Science Advisory Committee "fly back" concept in which two stages, lent weight to the idea of a reusable each manned, would fly back to a spacecraft by recommending that studies horizontal, airplane-like landing. The be made "of more economical ferrying first stage was a huge, winged, rocket- systems, presumably involving partial or powered vehicle that would carry the total recovery and use." smaller second stage piggyback; the In September, 1969, two months after carrier would provide the thrust for the initial lunar landing, a Space Task liftoff and flight through the atmosphere, Group chaired by the Vice President then release its passenger-the orbiting offered a choice of three long-range vehicle-and return to Earth. The Orbiter, plans: containing the crew and payload, would A $8-$10 billion per year program continue into space under its own rocket involving a manned Mars expedition, a power, complete its mission and then fly space station in lunar orbit and a 50- back to Earth. person Earth-orbiting station serviced by The second-stage craft, conceived prior a reusable ferry, or Space Shuttle. to 1970 as a space station ferry, was a An intermediate program, costing less vehicle considerably larger than the later than $8 billion annually, that would Space Shuttle Orbiter. It carried its include the Mars mission. rocket propellants internally, had a flight A relatively modest $4-$5.7 billion a deck sufficiently large to seat 12 space year program that would embrace an station-bound passengers and a cargo Earth-orbiting space station and the bay big enough to accommodate space Space Shuttle as its link to Earth.1 station modules. The Orbiter's size put In March, 197O, President Nixon made enormous weight-lifting and thrust- it clear that, while he favored a generating demands on the first-stage continuing active space program, design. funding on the order of Apollo was not This two-stage, fully reusable design in the cards. He opted for the shuttle- represented the optimum Space Shuttle tended space base as a long-range goal in terms of «routine, economical access but deferred going ahead with the space to space," the catchphrase that was station pending development of the becoming the primary guideline for shuttle vehicle. Thus the reusable Space development of Earth-to-orbit systems. Shuttle, earlier considered only the It was, transport element of a broad, multi- 2 however, less than optimum in terms of technology new to the agency. Mercury, the development investment required: an Gemini and Apollo astronauts had all estimated $10-13 billion, a figure that been rocketed into space by liquid-fuel met with disfavor in both Congress and systems. Nonetheless, the recoverable the Office of Management and Budget. Solid Rocket Booster won the nod, even though the liquid rocket offered In 1971, NASA went back to the potentially lower operating costs. drawing board, aware that development cost rather than system capability would probably be the determining factor in getting a green light for Shuttle development. Government and industry studies sought developmental economies in the configuration. One proposal found acceptance: eliminate the Orbiter's internal tanks and carry the propellant in a single, disposable External Tank. It provided a smaller r, cheaper Orbiter r without substantial performance loss. For the launch system, NASA examined a number of possibilities. One was a winged but unmanned recoverable liquid-fuel vehicle based on the eminently successful Saturn 5 rocket from the Apollo Program. Other plans envisioned simpler but also recoverable liquid-fuel systems, expendable solid Artist's drawing depicts Space Shuttle rockets and the reusable Solid Rocket stacked for launch in view from dorsal Booster. NASA had been using solid- side of Orbiter (left) and from the left fuel vehicles for launching some small side of the stack.

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