The Guangdong Government and the American Consular Service in the Late Qing: a Case Study

The Guangdong Government and the American Consular Service in the late Qing: a case study

History Department of Sun Yat-sen university Mo Guanting Guangzhou

Abstract: In 1879, Guangdong Provincial Government purchased a number of ordnance from the Armstrong Company with the aid of Charles P. Lincoln, the American Consul, who acted as a middle man in the transaction. Lincoln’s involvement in the purchase was considered an act in defiance of the American policy that prohibited their consuls from conducting business for private benefits. Examining this particular case, this article attempts to disclose the deficiency of the American consular policies in the late 19th century. It also illustrates how Liu Kunyi, the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General, might have played a dominant role in laying out the coastal defence strategies for Guangdong, and in what way the Shanhou ju and Jiqi ju provided financial support for building up provincial coastal defence. Key words: consular service, Sino-American relationship, Liu Kunyi, C. P. Lincoln, Guangdong

From November 22nd to 24th, 1879, the American Consul F. D. Cheshire kept up a correspondence with the interpreter Yu Zhenxian(余贞祥) for several times in three days. The letters were upon the subject of the predecessor American Consul Charles P. Lincoln’s agreement with Guangdong provincial authorities for the purchase of guns from the Armstrong Company in London. Guangdong Provincial Government requested Lincoln to order some ordnance from the English manufacture for the reason that Guangdong schemed to build up provincial coastal defence at Humen (虎门, Bocca Tigris). 1 However, the event went twists and turns. To see his parents, Lincoln took a leave to return to America before the contract was signed up, and he had informed Yu Zhenxian to seal the contract with the Chinese official seal of the consulate for him. But as Cheshire replaced Lincoln to be deputy American Consul at Canton, he was discontented with interpreter Yu for Yu took the official seal without his consent and sealed the contract three days after he had assumed charge of the office. Immediately Cheshire suspended Yu from the office and reported the case to F.

1 Tyne and Wear County Council Archives. Accession No. 31. Microfilm No. 1070 _846, Mf 1070 _847. United Kingdom: Tyne and Wear County Council Archives Department, 1984. Here I may express a special note of acknowledgement to my tutor Prof. Ching Maybo for her kindness to me these rare archives. Hereinafter the same.

- 1 - W. Seward, the assistant secretary of state Washington D. C. 2 Before long, Seward addressed a note to Zongli Yamen (总理衙门, office for General Management) that although the American Consul Lincoln involved in the transaction, his act was of private but not an official attribute, so the consulate in Canton without responsibility for the case. As Zongli Yamen did not prosecute any further investigation, 3 controversy on the transaction of ordnance ended up with nothing definite in the central government. But in fact the Guangdong Provincial Government associated with Lincoln and accomplished the purchase of ordnance.4 Examining this particular case which involved departments of three different countries, this article attempts to explore issues in two aspects. Firstly, what kind of complexity had the American consular policies in practice in the late 19th century to face with, and what was the role Lincoln play of in this case? Secondly, with building up provincial coastal defence, why Liu Kunyi( 刘坤一, Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General) who took the lead of Guangdong Provincial Government purchase ordnance through the American Consul Lincoln, and how the government raised money for the expense of the ordnance, and in what way the Shanhou ju (善后局, Provincial Financial Office) and Jiqi ju (机器局, Arsenal at Canton) provided financial support for the provincial coastal defence project?

Part One: The American Consular Service in China in the late Qing

Since its emergence in the late 18th century, the American consular service in China could not be regarded as a formal and perfect system, yet for mercantile purpose. China was one of the primary trade partners of America, and the American consulate in Canton became the pioneer institution of foreign affairs in China or even in the Far East area for America. At its birth, the American consul in fact equaled to the merchant-consul. “In the first 50 years of the trade between American and China, the term of the American consuls who were dispatched in due form was no more than fourteen years. The place of the American consul was filled by merchant with intermission.” 5 Therefore, some scholar argues that “For the first 130 years of the United States as an independent nation, the principal business of the Department of

2 Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796 - 1906, M101-8, No. 79, No. 92, No. 95 enclosure. And Despatches from United State Ministers to China, 1843-1906, United States Embassy (China), 1958, Despatches No. 545. Microfilm from HKU, No. 2510153- 01, Reel 53. 3 Zhongmei wanglai zhaohui ji 1846-1931 《中美往来照会集 1846-1931》(Selected Records of the U.S. Legation in China), vol.5, Guilin: Guangxi Normal University Press, 2006, pp.277-278. And Zhongmei guanxi shiliao, guangxuchao (《中美关系史料·光绪朝》, The Historical documents of Sino-American relationship in dynasty of Guangxu), Taipei: Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica, 1968, pp.619-620. 4 Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796 - 1906, M101-8, No.105. 5 Wu mengxue: Meiguo zaihua lingshi caipanquan bainian shi (《美国在华领事裁判权百年史》, A century history of the United States consular jurisdiction in China), Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 1992, pp.9-10.

- 2 - State overseas was in the hands of American consuls, not American diplomats.” 6 China and the West established diplomatic relationship based on the treaties after Opium War in 1840. John King Fairbank points out that depending on treaties and regulations all kinds of rights become a system, and the time of the forties and fifties in the 19th century was the formation of “the Treaty System”. “The second group of unequal treaties, negotiated after fighting in 1858 and finally ratified after further fighting in 1860, became the perfected legal basis of this Sino-Western order”7 In business affairs, consuls were stated to replace Hong-merchants to take charge of trade management. Yet on institution, consular service had not been under the state administration system, and the United States “built a professional consular service in the post-World War I period”.8 Hereby in the late 19th century the American consular service in China did not have firm relation with the United States policy toward China. On the aspect of practice, “merchant-consul system” 9 still worked in existence after the Treaty of Wangxia (《望厦条约》)and the Treaty of Tianjin (《天津条约》) were negotiated. Accordingly, to what extent the American consular service that established after the treaties subscribed was in accordance with “the Treaty System”, remains a questionable issue. The American consular service in China underwent significant transformation in the period of the second half of 19th century. It was the consequence that the United States government made great efforts to standard the American consular service into professionalization as well as the Qing government did. The endeavor of the two governments aimed at weakening even rejecting the mercantile influence in the American consular service in China. We need to place the American consular service in China into the institutional development of American consular service in order to make analysis. In 1850s, the establishment of the American consular service yet was in the initial phase. The Congress of the United States enacted “An Act to Remodel the Diplomatic and Consular System” in 1855 and “An Act to Regulate the Diplomatic and Consular System of United States” in 1856,10 and purposed to standardize the appointment and administration of consuls. The regulations of the acts prescribed that consuls who earn more than fifteen hundred dollars a year should not be permitted to transact business either in their own name or through the agency of others. But in the said two acts,

6 Charles Stuart Kennedy, The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, 1776-1914, New York: Greenwood Press, 1990, p. vii. And a majority of American experts differ Consul Service from Diplomatic Service, and hold the point that professionalization of Consul Service comes forth after World War One with the combination of the Consul Service and the Diplomatic Service. 7 John King Fairbank, Trade and Diplomacy on the China Coast: the Opening of the Treaty Ports, 1842 - 1854, Standford: Standford University Press, 1969, p. 462. 8 William D. Morgan and Charles Stuart Kennedy, The U. S. Consul at Work, New York: Greenwood Press, 1991, p. 4, p.8. 9 The term “merchant-consul system” was put forward by Jules Davids (ed.), American diplomatic and public papers: the United States and China: Series 1, 1842 - 1860, Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1973, Vol. 1, p. xlvi. After the five treaty ports were open to foreign countries, the posts of American consuls were mostly occupied by Russell & Co. as their abundant wealth could easily support the low-salary posts, which was an important consideration for the United States Government. 10 See Jules Davids (ed.), American diplomatic and public papers: the United States and China: Series 1, 1842-1860, Vol. 8, pp. 106-127, 169–182.

- 3 - “consuls” consisted of “commercial agent” and “vice commercial agent”. It indicates that the United States government still permitted the merchants engaging in the consular affairs although “the Treaty System” had already established between the United States and China. It also reveals that the United States government took insubstantial resolution to reform the consular service. But the forthcoming of civil war, then post war reconstruction and industrial development, the 1856 Act hardly put into practice.11 On the aspect of the consuls in China, the United States fixed salaries on purpose to standardize the American consular service in China. “In the 19th century, the United States classified the consuls into three levels by the source of salary and allowance. The first class received fixed salary and allowance and could not engage in mercantile business. The second class received fixed salary and allowance less than the first class but could engage in mercantile business. And the third class did not received fixed salary and allowance, but could receive fees charges for services as subsidy and engage in mercantile business.” 12 In the American consulates in China in 1870s, consuls from Amoy(Xiamen, 厦门), Canton(Guangzhou广州), Foochow (Fuzhou 福州), Chinkiang (Zhenjiang 镇江), Shanghai (上海), Hankow (Hankou 汉口) and Sawtow(Shantou 汕头) were regarded as the first class, and consuls from Chefoo (Yantai 烟台), Newchwang (Niuzhuang 牛庄), Kiukiang (Jiujiang 九江), Ningpo (Ningbo 宁波) and Tian-tsin (Tianjin 天津) were regarded as the third class. To the year 1892, consuls from Shanghai, Amoy, Canton, Chinkiang, Foochow, Hankow, Tian-tsin and Ningpo belonged to the first class, and the third class only included Yingkow (Yingkou 营口) and Newchwang. 13 By the time of March 1901, as Henry B. Miller was dispatched as the consul of Newchwang and received 3000 dollars as annual salary, the posts of American consuls in China were no longer sufficient by the businessman.14 On the other hand, the Qing government also attempted to grasp the initiative in the operation of “the Treaty System”, and proposed to the United States that “merchant should not hold the occupation of consuls in China”. Soon after the Treaty of Tianjin was negotiated in 1858, Gui Liang, the imperial envoy of the Qing government, presented a note to William B. Reed, the American minister in China, that “Only the consul dispatched in China obliged to be an official one that would be permitted to manage consular affairs. And merchant should not nominally hold the occupation of consuls in China.”15 In reply, William B. Reed promised that “The

11 Andrew L. Steigman, The Foreign Service of the United States: First Line of Defense, Boulder: Westview Press, 1985, p. 18. 12 Huanggang: Zhongmei shilling guanxi jianzhi shi (1786-1994) (《中美使领关系建制史（1786-1994）》, History of Establishment of Sino-U. S. Consular Relationship) Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1995, p.40. 13 Regulations Prescribed for the Use of the Consular Service of the United States, Washington D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1870, pp. 375 - 377. And Register of the Department of the State (Corrected to March 17, 1892), p. 20. Cited by Huanggang: Zhongmei shilling guanxi jianzhi shi (1786-1994), Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1995, pp.40-41. 14 Register of the Department of the State (Corrected to February 28, 1903), p. 23. Cited by Huanggang: Zhongmei shilling guanxi jianzhi shi (1786-1994), Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1995, p.41. 15 Zhongmei guanxi shiliao, jiaqing daoguang xianfeng chao (《中美关系史料·嘉庆道光咸丰朝》, The Historical documents of Sino-American relationship in dynasty of Jiaqing, Daoguang and Xianfeng), p.312.

- 4 - United States has regulated that the consuls can not engage in mercantile business.”16 Actually, merchant-consul yet took the occupation in China. But in 1866, consuls who engaged in mercantile business were much less than before, and after 1870s, the majority of consuls in treaty ports were official, only with quite minority as exception.17 Although the Qing government and the United States reached consensus that merchant should not concurrently hold the occupation of consuls in China, and the United States enacted the acts to regulate the consul service, however, the system of the consul service left some space for the consuls to deal with various activities. This article attempts to make a point that, the salary that the American consuls in China received was not standardize effectively and the consular service failed to regulate the private business of consuls, which provided available room for the consuls conducting business for private benefits. The salary that the American consuls in China received was not standardized effectively in the mid-19th century. First of all, the annual salary for consuls was unreasonable, and “the reason for the irrational salary structure was that Congress established the pay at the time of the post’s creation and did not change it over the years.” 18 Secondly, although the 1855 Act and the 1856 Act stipulated the annual salary of the consuls, yet not every consul in treaty ports gained the annual salary. Till the year of 1867, the United States dispatched consuls only in twelve of the treaty ports in China, and none but the consuls in the six ports of Shanghai, Foochow, Canton, Chinkiang, Swatow and Amoy received annual salary between 3000 and 4000 dollars. On the other hand, the consular service failed to strictly regulate the private business of consuls. The 1855 Act and the 1856 Act regulated that consuls should not be permitted to transact business neither in their own name nor through the agency of others, however, the said acts allowed the existence of merchant-consul. Consequently, the consular service was incapable of independent in finance. The restrictions of forbidding the consuls involved in mercantile business was no more than a mere scrap of paper. “The man usually had their own business and the position of consul in a port city gave them additional prestige and sometimes commercial advantages.”19 In other words, even if the acts enacted by the United States had regulated that merchants should not take the occupations of consuls in China, however in fact, the consuls in China yet participated in mercantile business. It is just because the deficiency of the American consular policies in China which was under the transition in the late 19th century that made room for Charles P. Lincoln, the American Consul at Canton, to purchase the ordnance for Guangdong Provincial Government.

16 Zhongmei guanxi shiliao,tongzhi chao (《中美关系史料·同治朝》, The Historical documents of Sino-American relationship in dynasty of Tongzhi), p.8. 17 Wu lingjun: “Tiaoyue guanxi yu qingmo meiguo zaihua shangwu” (《条约关系与清末美国在华商务》, “Treaty relations the U.S. Commerce with China in the Qing Dynasty”), Taiwan guoli zhengzhi daxue lishi xuebao, (Journal of National Chengchi University in Taiwan), 2006, No.26. 18 Charles Stuart Kennedy, The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, p. 214. 19 William D. Morgan and Charles Stuart Kennedy, The U. S. Consul at Work, p. 4.

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Part Two: A Case Study:

Purchase of Ordnance and the Role Lincoln Played of

1, Construction of coastal defense in Humen and the raising of funds Guangdong purchased the Armstrong guns was for the reason that the Humen Fort needed the equipment with advanced weapons. In 1874, Japan armed invasion of Taiwan in excuse that Ryukyuan sailors were murdered, which shocked the Qing

government. In the following year, Shen Baozhen(沈葆桢) and Li Hongzhang (李鸿

章) were authorized to respectively supervise the coastal construction of Nanyang Fleet(南洋水师)20 and Beiyang Fleet(北洋水师)21. As Beiyang Fleet defended the capital city and its environs from invasion, together with Li Hongzhang’s prominent position, the construction of Beiyang Fleet went much more smoothly. In contrast, as Jiangnan-Jiangxi Governor-General(两江总督) and Minister of Nanyang Commerce, Shen’s status and prestige were inferior to Li. As a result, he could only in the name of Jiangnan-Jiangxi Governor-General (两江总督) take charge of Nanyang Fleet, and had no right to manage the coastal defence of Fujian and Guangdong which were beyond the Nanyang Fleet system. 22 Consequently, Liu Kun-yi, the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General, had a greater power of self-determination in laying out the coastal defence strategies for Guangdong. As Liu Kun-yi insisted on the thought that "Though coastal construction had to build up, yet at present defence is more crucial than attack" 23 and Guangdong coastal construction was facing the difficulties of insufficient funds, therefore, Liu considered the construction of major projects Humen Fort in priority. In October 1879, Liu “requested the American consul in Canton to purchase a number of British artilleries”,24 which refers to the case

20 The Nanyang Fleet was one of the four modernised Chinese navies in the late Qing Dynasty. Established in the 1870s, the fleet suffered losses in the Sino-French War, escaped intact in the Sino-Japanese War, and was formally abolished in 1909. See the website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nanyang_Fleet (2011-04-19) 21 The Beiyang Fleet was one of the four modernised Chinese navies in the late Qing Dynasty. Among the four, the Beiyang Fleet was particularly sponsored by Li Hongzhang, one of the most trusted vassals of Empress Dowager Cixi and the principal patron of the "self-strengthening movement" in northern China in his capacity as the Viceroy of Zhili(直隶) and the Minister of Beiyang Commerce (北洋通商大臣). Due to Li's influence in the imperial court, the Beiyang Fleet garnered much greater resources than the other Chinese fleets and soon became the dominant navy in East Asia before the onset of First Sino-Japanese War in 1894–1895 — it was the largest in the Far East and the 8th in the world during the late 1880s in terms of tonnage. See the website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beiyang_Fleet (2011-04-19) 22 Xie Junmei: Zhengzhi zhidu yu jindai zhongguo (《政治制度与近代中国》, Political System in Modern China), Shanghai People Press, 1995, pp.137-138. 23 Yangwu yundong (《洋务运动》, The Self-Strengthening Movement), vol.3, Shanghai People Press, 2000, p.332. 24 Liu kunyi yiji (《刘坤一遗集》, Collection of posthumous papers of Liu kunyi), Zhonghua Book Company, 1959, p.2476.

- 6 - discussed in this article. It is obvious that, the construction of Humen Fort need to equip with advanced weapons, so the Guangdong authorities purchased the Armstrong guns through the consul Lincoln. However, Guangdong was then under great financial pressure of the central government, thereby, how did Guangdong Provincial Government raise funds to purchase ordnance? Guangdong was under tremendous financial pressure. The budget of the coastal construction of Beiyang Fleet and Nanyang Fleet mainly came from 40% tariff from eight customs, including the Guangdong Customs; and the likin(厘金, lijin)25 taxation from seven provinces including Guangdong and Jingsu which amounted to three hundred thousand taels every year. 26 But “Jiangsu, Guangdong and Fujian provinces did not deliver the likin taxation to the central government.”27 The reason why Guangdong Provincial Government did not hand in likin taxation to the central government was that Guangdong undertook a lot of projects in their spending. Therefore, the likin taxation of Guangdong were allocated to build up coastal defence in the circumstance of defaulting the projects which the central government required Guangdong to charge. Later, Liu even submitted a proposal to the central government that withhold tariff in order to develop coastal defence.28 On October 8th, 1879, Liu proposed a memorial to the throne again: “Guangdong still requires emplacement and has to raise fund for purchasing”, and he requested that “Permit Guangdong retains 40% tariff which planned to hand in to Beiyang Fleet and Nanyang Fleet and now delivers to provincial offices of Guangdong.” 29 Hence, then Guangdong was in shortage of funding coastal defence. And Liu made requests to the central government to allow Guangdong withhold the likin taxation and 40% tariff for provincial coastal defence construction. Bearing the financial burden which the central government imposed on Guangdong, Liu appointed the Shanhou ju (善后局, Provincial Financial Office) raised funds of coastal defense. Although the Shanhou ju and the Jiqi ju (机器局, Arsenal at Canton) were not included in the official administrative system, they really played quite an important role in local affairs. The Shanhou ju raised the funds for purchase guns in the case discussed in this article. The Shanhou ju was originally a temporary institution to raise military pay and provisions. Later, it became a permanent establishment. In the late Qing, the Shanhou ju “had actually substituted for most or all of the power of the Fansi (藩司)30”, and jointly managed the city of Canton with senior officials directly or indirectly.31 The

25 The likin was a form of local taxation in China, which was first introduced as a means of financing the largely locally recruited armies to suppress the Taiping Rebellion, which was a widespread civil war in southern China from 1850 to 1864. See the website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lijin_(taxation) (2011-04-20) 26 See Yangwu yundong, vol.1, pp.162-164. 27 See Yangwu yundong, vol.2, p.424. 28 See Yangwu yundong, vol.2, pp.402-403. 29 Liu kunyi yiji, pp.540-544. 30 Fansi, also called chengxuan buzhengshi(承宣布政使), in the Qing Dynasty officially designated as the governor of a province responsible for managing the financial and civil affairs under the leadership of the Xunfu (the Governor of Guangdong). 31 Qiujie: “The daily official business of the County Magistrate of Nanhai during the Dynasty of Tongzhi and Guangxu”(《同治、光绪年间广东首县的日常公务》), Modern Chinese History Studies, 2008, vol.4.

- 7 - Shanhou ju of Guangdong was mainly responsible for the likin taxation.32 As the provincial governors took greater control over the likin taxation than the tariff, the likin taxation provided financial security for enhancing power of the provincial governors. And Guangdong was no exception. According to some statistics, before 1894, Guangdong coastal defense funding “was delivered to the Shanhou ju, which was in the name of the Guangdong police and defense funds”. “The funds for coastal defense in Guangdong Province were saved and diverted from the likin taxation but no other special funds. When at times of inadequate funding, it had to loan from the provincial financial administration. But it was of more expenditure and less taxation.”33 “The annual disbursement of the funds for coastal defense, before the years of 1886 was about four or five hundred thousand taels”; in many of the various costs of the likin taxation, the proportion of funding for coastal defense was continuing increasing. From 1875 to 1885, the funds for coastal defense occupied the proportion of 45% of the total. The expenditure of purchasing guns was an inventory of miscellaneous expenses of the likin taxation, which was raised by “part of merchants and part of some commercial organizations”, 34 and then finally managed by the Shanhou ju. 35 Hence, the funds for Guangdong coastal defense construction was mainly from the likin taxation and raised by the Shanhou ju, and the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General took control of it. Another organization involved in the guns purchase was the Jiqi ju. It was also in the control of the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General. On one hand, the personnel of the Jiqi ju was appointed by the provincial governors;36 on the other hand, the funds of the Jiqi ju was raised by the provincial governors.37 To be Specific, the funds of the Jiqi ju were collected by the Shanhou ju. 38 And the gentry and merchants in Guangdong supervised general affairs of the Jiqi ju.39 Therefore, when the Jiqi ju purchased and manufactured new weapons, it needed the provincial governors to solve the financial problems, and in fact the funds were raised by the Shanhou ju. Thus, in the context of the central government strengthening the coastal defense, Liu Kunyi, the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General, who on his own decision purchased ordnance from the West to build up the Humen Fort, appointed the Shanhou ju to provide financial support for building up provincial coastal defence. Guangdong Province could be independent to develop its provincial coastal defence construction, however, because of the lack of channels in purchasing the guns,

32 Zhou shoupeng ed.: Guangxuchao donghualu(《光绪朝东华录》), vol.4, Zhonghua Book Company, 1958, pp. 4438-4440. 33 Liu kunyi yiji, pp.394-395. 34 Luo yudong: Zhongguo lijin shi(《中国厘金史》, The History of Lijin), Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1936, pp.46, 55-57. And Guangdong Financial Report 《广东财政说明书》( )which was edited in 1910 explained in detail on this issue. See Series historical Financial data in the late Qing and the Republic of China (《清末民国财政史料辑刊》), vol.8, Beijing: Beijing Library Press, 2007, pp.489-499. 35 Series historical Financial data in the late Qing and the Republic of China, vol.8, pp.484-485. 36 See Liu guangjing: “Discussion on the power of the provincial governors in the late Qing” (《晚清督抚权力商榷》), Essays of Modern Chinese History (《中国近代现代史论集》), vol.6, Taipei: The Commercial Press, 1985, pp.341-386. 37 Liu kunyi yiji, pp.463-464. 38 Guangzhou fuzhi (《广州府志》,Guangzhou Prefecture), vol.65, Taipei: Chengwen Press, 1996, p.101. 39 Yangwu yundong, vol.4, pp.377, 406. And Liu kunyi yiji, pp.540-544.

- 8 - Guangdong chose another way different from other provinces which subscribed for the ordnance from the central government in a unified way, and commissioned consul Lincoln as a middleman to buy guns from the Armstrong Company.

2, The transaction of Lincoln and the Shanhou ju The case of purchasing guns discussed in this article concerns with many agencies. Liu Kunyi, the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General, and Yu Kuan (裕宽), Governor of Guangdong(广东巡抚), together negotiated the project for building up provincial coastal defence. Cheng Fu (成孚), the Fansi (藩司) of Guangdong, Zhang Xian(张铣), the Gaosi(皋司) 40 and Shi Zaiyu(施在钰), the Houbudao (候补道)41 supervised the project. The Shanhou ju and Jiqi ju provided financial support. Feng Fengshan(冯凤山), personnel of the Shanhou ju, was responsible for drafting of the contract.42 The American consul Lincoln acted as a middleman participating in guns purchase. In details, the Shanhou ju and Lincoln dealt with the specific contract signing and delivery of the payments. And the details of negotiations of guns purchase will be presented below. The reason why the process of purchase guns suffered setbacks was that the Shanhou ju delayed delivering the payment. Lincoln had been clearly explained to the Shanhou ju that according to the contract the payment should be delivered by three installments, however, on the eve of his departure from Canton, he received only $ 3,000 paid by the Shanhou ju as his personal reward; and the Shanhou ju refused to deliver the first deposit. The Shanhou ju insisted that “Beforetime when purchasing guns, the payment was delivered after receiving the ordnance”.43 As a result, The Shanhou ju doubted the quomodo of payment of this transaction. By all appearances, the Shanhou ju had previously participated in purchasing guns, but the quomodo of payment was different from that of the Armstrong Company,44 which made it failed to hand over the first deposit to Lincoln on time. Later, Lincoln received the first deposit from the Shanhou ju eventually, and instructed the interpreter Yu Zhenxiang to go to Hong Kong and remit the money to the Amrstrong Company. Nevertheless, when Yu returned to Canton, F. D. Cheshire had taken charge of the Consulate in Canton. As Cheshire was aware of this transaction, the accident mentioned in the very beginning of this article occurred. It is understandable that the Shanhou ju worried about that it could not receive the ordnance but the payment was delivered. After all, a huge

40 Gaosi, in the Qing Dynasty officially designated as the governor of a province responsible for managing the justice prosecution under the leadership of the Xunfu (the Governor of Guangdong). 41 Houbudao, in the Qing Dynasty, the persons could contribute money to obtain the vacancy of the senior civilian service. 42 Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796 - 1906, M101-8, No.843. 43 Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796 - 1906, M101-8, No.95, enclosure and No.96. 44 On the quomodo of payment of the Armstrong Company, Hong Zijie pointed out in his article that in 1875, Li Hongzhang ordered four ships from the Armstrong Company by Robert Hart. The quomodo of payment was “After signing the contract, a third deposit should be paid; after the completion of half of the warships, another a third should be paid; after the completion of all, the last a third should be paid”. “Such of quomodo payment became a fixed pattern of the purchase of China from the Armstrong Company”. See Hong Zijie: “A study on the China Custom purchased ships in 1875-1881”(《一八七五——一八八一年海关购舰之研究》), Taiwan National Central University, Institute of History, dissertation for master degree, 2008.

- 9 - amount of money was paid for buying guns. The total price of ordnance purchase was 17958 pounds 7 shillings 6 pence. According to the prevailing exchange rate then 1 pound equaled to 5.52 Mexican dollars, the price was 99130.16 Mexican dollars. Likewise, according to the exchange rate one hundred Mexican dollars equaled to 71 taels, 45 the total amount was 71074.32472 taels.46 After a large sum of money was paid, Guangdong authorities purchased a number of good quality ordnance. The types and prices of the guns that Guangdong ordered are as follows:

Table 1: Model and price list of the ordnance that Guangdong Provincial Government purchased from William Armstrong Co. of London in 1879

Model Caliber Weight Length Amount Price for (inch) (ton) (feet) each new style rifle bore steel gun muzzle 8 11 19 1 ￡1,600 loading new style rifle bore steel gun breech 8 11 19 1 ￡1,760 loading firing instruments with iron rails 2 250 pounds, 17 shillings, 11 pence wrought iron gun carriage with 1 ￡735 movable iron bed each 100 shells each weighing 180 lbs, 1 300 pounds, with 200 grape shot steel, ballets, 16 shillings, shells and solid balls as per custom 8 pence new style rifle bore muzzle loading 6 4 12 2 ￡415 steel gun new style rifle bore breech loading 6 4 12 2 ￡475 steel gun firing instruments with iron rails 4 137 pounds, 2 shillings, 11 pence wrought iron gun carriage with 1 450 movable iron bed each 100 shells or balls, weighing 70 4 180 pounds, 17 shillings, lbs each with other munitions as 10 pence customary old style rifle bore steel guns 9 12 12 2 ￡1745 old style rifle bore steel guns 7 7 11 4 ￡926 Total: 17958

45 During most of the time in the late Qing, the exchange rates of Mexican dollars to taels(库平银) was 1:0.71. See also Chen Chunsheng: "Foreign silver mintage in circulation in the Qing Dynasty in Guangdong”《清代广东的银元流通》, Chinese Coins《中国钱币》, 1985, No. 1. 46 The contract also stated, “and difference in scale weight, 355.38142 teal.” The 71% of 99130.16 equals 70382, which does not consistent with 71074 in the contract. And 0.5% of 71074 equals 355.37,which in the main accords with 355.38. According to Stanley F. Wright, Every major business center has its local recognized teal. At that time in all public treasury and old-style Chinese private banks, the buying rate and selling rate were uneven, ranged from 0.25% to 0.5%. See Wright: China's Struggle for Tariff Autonomy (《中国关税沿革史》), pp.20, 24. Here I may express acknowledgement to my teacher Li Aili for her instructions on this issue.

- 10 - pounds, 7 shillings, 6 pence Source: Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796 - 1906, M101-8, No.95, enclosure.

The Armstrong gun47 was one kind of the influential guns in the world in the years from late 1850s to 1880s, which enjoyed a high level of reputation with the German Krupp gun. Zhang Zhidong(张之洞), an eminent Chinese politician, once commented that “The first rank of wrought steel breech loading guns should be the German Krupp gun and the Armstrong gun, as the most refined ones.”48 During the years of 1870s -1880s, the Beiyang Fleet also purchased ships, guns and other armaments from the Armstrong Company.49 From the perspective of brand, the guns that the Guangdong authorities ordered from the Armstrong Company were of good quality. We will have a brief analysis of the guns that Guangdong purchased in three aspects of device technology, models and casting techniques. In the perspective of device technology, after the mid-19th century, the rifled guns embodied a concentrated reflection of revolutionary leap of firearms manufacturing device technology. Frederick Engels featured a brilliant exposition on the Armstrong gun: “increasing the range and precision of ordnance by rifling the bore, and thereby “giving the shot a rotation vertical to the line of propulsion”; In addition, the shells should be combined with the rifle, as “the oblong— cylindro-ogival —shot is of cast iron, but covered with a mantle of lead, which gives it a diameter somewhat larger than the bore”. “The explosion propels the shot into the narrow bore, where the soft lead is pressed into the grooves, and thus does away with all windage while giving the projectile the spiral rotation indicated by the pitch of the grooves. This mode of pressing the shot into the grooves, and the coating of soft material required for it, are the characteristic features of Armstrong's system.”50 In the aspect of models, the guns that Guangdong purchased both in muzzle loading and breech loading. With the technological developments of rifled guns in

47 William G. Armstrong was an expert in guns manufacturing, and the effective founder of the Armstrong Whitworth manufacturing empire. 48 Zhang Zhidong, Choujian qiangpaosuo zhe(《筹建枪炮所折》, “Memorial to the throne concerning preparing to establish a bureau of guns manufacturing”), cited by Cao Wenli (ed).: Guangdong jungong shiliao ( 《广东军工史料(1840-1949)》, Guangdong Military Historical Documents(1840-1949)), Internal distribution, The Office of Military History Collection within the Office of Defense Industry of Guangdong Province, 1980, pp.104-105. 49 See Tyne and Wear County Council Archives. Accession No. 31. The Self-Strengthening Movement carried out initially by the purchase of foreign ships and guns. On the development of military technology gap between Chinese and the West, could refer to the works of Huang yinong: Wars and Cannons Bought from Spain and Holland in Ming and Qing Dynasties《红夷大炮与明清战争( ———以火炮测准技术之演变为例, Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies,1996,vol.1); Lü xiaoxian: Chinese and British armed forces in weapons and combat effectiveness during the First Opium War.(《第一次鸦片战争时期中英两军的武器和作战效能》, Historical Archives, 1988, vol.3); Hu jianzhong: guns in the Qing Dynasty(《清代火炮》, Palace Museum Journal, 1986,vol.2); Mao haijian: The collapse of the Qing Dynasty 《天朝的崩溃》( , Beijing: Joint Publishing, 2005) p.45, and Eric Hobsbawm: The Age of Capital(1848-1875), (《资本的年代: 1848-1875》, Nanjing: Jiangsu people press, 1999), p.86, etc. 50 Friedrich Engels, “On Rifled Cannon", articles from the New York Tribune, April, May and June, 1860, reprinted in Military Affairs 21, no. 4 (Winter 1957) ed. Morton Borden, 193-198.

- 11 - the 19th century, breech loading technology broke through the technical difficulties. In 1854, while the Armstrong Company made significant progress in the muzzle loading guns, it created the wedge-shaped breechblock, with pre-compaction obturator, and produced the excellent Armstrong breech loading guns.51 As “its rear applied the bolt to obstruct the gas, which preferably solved the problem of the gas leaking from the rear after the shell projected”, “it is not only enhanced the power of execution, but also avoided the risk of the gunner being injury because of leakage”. 52 The muzzle loading gun and the breech loading gun both attributed to their own traits, but the breech loading gun higher enjoyed much higher technology. Furthermore, the large caliber guns that Guangdong purchased were quite suitable for coastal defense at that time. In the view of casting techniques, the steel guns manifested the advanced guns casting techniques in the 19th century. Around the years of seventies in the 19th century, metallurgical technology of the western countries had been greatly developed.53 The Armstrong gun was a cast-steel barrel gun, its production process was as follow: “first cast of the inner tube of the gun according to the designed caliber; afterwards wrap one or some layers of wrought-iron tubes round the inner tube.” “Each layer of the inner cylinder, in the cooling state, was slightly less than the external diameter of the casing. When heating, with expansion, the external layer rightly hitched the inner tube. After cooling contraction, it firmly hitched the inner tube hitched the inner tube. Then it became a compact solid steel gun.”54 Therefore, apart from the breakthroughs of rifle technique and breech loading technique, the success of Armstrong gun also lied in its revolutionary breakthrough of casting technique, which greatly increased the bearing load that generated by the explosion of large number of gun powder or ammunition. In the late 1870s, as both the metallurgical and the chemical approaches were studied by military engineers, they gained precise control of burn rates. “It was construction techniques that strengthened heavy guns and paved the way for enormous increases in their size and power during the third quarter of the century.”55 Referring to the price of the guns that Guangdong purchased, compared with the data of Armstrong Company selling to the France and Greece governments in the same period, we can see that the Armstrong Company sold arms in the uniform price as shown in the following table:

Table 2: Model and price list of the ordnance that the France and Greece governments purchased from William Armstrong Co. of London in 1877-1878 Year Sell to Model Price（pound）

51 Wang zhaochun: Zhongguo huoqi shi (《中国火器史》, History of Chinese Firearms), pp.390-391. 52 Wang zhaochun: Shijie huoqi shi (《世界火器史》, History of Firearms in the World), Beijing: Martial Science Press, 2007, p.394. Here I may express acknowledgement to my teacher He Wenping for his kindness to show me the book, and give suggestion on the discussion of the ordnance in this article. 53 See Pi Yongming and Gong Zhenyu: The World Military History in the Early Modern Times 《世界现代前( 期军事史》), Beijing: China International Broadcasting Press, 1996, p.41. 54 Wang zhaochun: Shijie huoqi shi, p.394. 55 Marshall J. Bastable, “From Breechloaders to Monster Guns: Sir William Armstrong and the Invention of Modern Artillery, 1854 – 1880”, Technology and Culture, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Apr., 1992), pp. 213-247.

- 12 - 1877 France 7 inch rifle bore steel guns 926 1878 Greece 7 inch rifle bore steel guns 926 1878 Greece 9 inch rifle bore steel guns 1745 Caption: The guns listed in the table of the two countries are the largest of the type in the order, and the remaining small guns are not listed. Source: Tyne and Wear County Council Archives. Accession No. 31. Microfilm No: Mf 1070_054, Mf 1071_469, Mf 1071_468.

With the revolutionary development of the western military technology in last 30 years of the 19th century, the development of Armstrong’s artillery also progressed into the transition period. Therefore in the help of Lincoln, the Guangdong authorities ordered a number of high quality guns from the Armstrong Company. In addition, the case also reflected that the Shanhou ju and Jiqi ju, which were not included in the official administrative system, yet played quite an important role in provincial affairs.

3, Lincoln: a middleman between the two worlds Geographically and culturally, the local authorities in Guangdong and the Armstrong Company in London were two worlds that had little interaction. The reason why the Guangdong authorities were able to order a number of high quality guns from the Armstrong Company was that Lincoln, the American consul in Canton, acted as a middleman and communicated with the Armstrong Company, primarily providing a crucial linkage between the two worlds. C. P. Lincoln was born in Michigan in 1842. He enlisted in the army for service in 1861, and from 1861 to 1864 he raised a company in the nineteenth Michigan Volunteers and was made Captain.56 Later he lived in Grenada County in Mississippi.57 In 1875, he was colonel of First Regiment Infantry in Grenada County. 58 In 1875 he was given a consulship to China by President Grant, which position he held till 1881 when he returned to Washington. He was elected Commander of the Department of the Potomac, Grand Army of the Republic in 1888. In 1889 he was appointed Second Deputy Commissioner of Pension. 59 Before Lincoln took the post of the American consul in Canton, the Qing Government had investigated his identity. It was certified that “Lincoln qualified as a consul, but not a businessman.”60 This reflects during the Dynasty of Guangxu (光绪年间, 1875-1909) the majority of treaty ports basically applied implementation of the criterion of consular identity. Lincoln was not a businessman, and his specific identity reflected the transformation of the consular service of the United States in mid-19th century. As Charles Stuart Kennedy pointed out that, “From the end of the Civil War till the turn of the century a noticeable

56 The New York Times, November 12, 1889. 57 Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796-1906, M101-8, No.1. 58 United States Congress, “Mississippi in 1875. Report of the Select Committee to inquire into the Mississippi election of 1875, with the testimony and documentary evidence”, Washington D. C. Government printing office, 1876. From Collection: Making of America Books. 59 The New York Times, November 12, 1889. 60 Zhongmei guanxi shiliao, guangxuchao, p.77.

- 13 - change took place in the patronage pattern in the consular service. In the early years the service was often a refuge for men engaged in the arts ... who looked to a consular posting to ease their financial burdens or give them some social status abroad. In the postwar industrial age men of arts were pushed aside to make room for former generals and other military men who had served either the North or the South in the Civil War.”61 In other words, Lincoln served as a retired colonel before he was appointed the American consul in Canton, which reveals the historical transformation of the American consuls who were appointed from men mostly engaging in the arts before the time of the Civil War to men serving the army in the postwar age. Although Lincoln was not a businessman by certification, he actually engaged in the transaction. As a middleman, Lincoln not only provided the Guangdong authorities with the manual of the Armstrong guns and equipments, but also participated in the transaction that assisted the Guangdong authorities in delivering the money to London and heading for the Armstrong Company and purchasing guns by himself, which helped the Guangdong Province purchase lots of good quality ordnance. It is also worth noting that Lincoln receive $ 3000 as a reward. 62 Lincoln considered that he only carried out the contract and in fact did not get much benefit.63 However, according to the comparison of the data from the following table, it is clear that the annual salaries of the American consuls in Canton in the second half of the 19th century remained between 3000 to 4000 dollars. As the annual salary standard in 1874, the reward of $ 3000 which was paid by the Guangdong authorities was a considerable income.

Table 3: Annual salary of American Consul at Canton in the second half of 19th century Year Annual salary of American Consul at Canton（dollar） 1855 3000 1856 4000 1867 4000 1874 3500 1906 5500 Caption: In 1906, the U.S. government withdrawed the consul in Canton, and established the Consul General. Source: (1) Jules Davids (ed.), American diplomatic and public papers: the United States and China: Series 1, 1842-860, Vol.8, pp. 112, 170; (2) Jules Davids (ed.), American diplomatic and public papers: the United States and China: Series 2, 1861-1893, Vol.18, p.76; (3) The New York Times, Archives, March 26, 1877; (4) The American Journal of International Law, Vol. 1, No. 3, Supplement: Official Documents (Jul.,1907), pp. 308-313.

Moreover, in 1878, Lincoln on behalf of Olyphant & Co. negotiated with Liu Kunyi on the case of trafficking in Chinese laborers, 64 which also shows that he built up

61 Charles Stuart Kennedy, The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service, p.209. 62 Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796-1906, M101-8, No. 92, No. 95, enclosure. 63 Despatches from U. S. Consul in Canton China, 1796-1906, M101-8, No. 96. 64 For the negotiations of Liu Kunyi and Lincoln, refer to Huagong chuguo shiliao huibian 《( 华工出国史料

- 14 - relationship with the American company. As consequence, although China the United States governments both committed to regulate the identity of the American consuls in China, the boundary between “consul” and “merchant” was not yet clearly defined. The regulation that “merchants should not hold the occupation of consuls” failed to guarantee the consuls not involve in business affairs. Obviously, in the mid- and late 19th century, China and the United States governments continually dedicated to regulate the consular service in identity and authority, however, the case that Lincoln, the American consul in Canton, involved in ordnance purchase revealed the flexibility and complexity of the American consular service in local affairs. As a middle man between the two worlds, Lincoln associated with the Guangdong authorities as well as kept contact with arms-manufacturer the Armstrong Company. Therefore, the case discusses in this article shows that, on the one hand, as the American consul in Canton, the identity, authority and duty of Lincoln needed to comply with the American consular service standards and requirements, which represented for the United States government’s position and interests. On the other hand, with the launching of the Self-Strengthening Movement (洋务运动)65 in Guangdong, the role of Lincoln extended with his involving in the project of coastal defence construction in Guangdong.

Part Three: Conclusion

The formation of a system or structure is a long historical process, and its operation is reflected by the event. Taking the two aspects of “system” and “region” into consideration, and examining the particular case that in 1879 Guangdong Provincial Government purchased a number of ordnance from the Armstrong Company with the aid of Charles P. Lincoln, the American Consul, who acted as a middle man in the transaction, this article attempts to disclose the specific facets in the operation of the American consular service in China in the late Qing. In the aspect of Sino-American relationship, the American consular service in China underwent significant transformation in the period of the second half of 19th century. The Qing government and the United States reached consensus that merchant should not hold the occupation of consuls in China. However, the American consul could still engaged in mercantile business in flexible strategies under the consular service. Charles P. Lincoln, the American Consul in Canton during the years of 1875 to 1881, acting as a middleman and playing the role of linkage between the Guangdong authorities and the Armstrong Company, was a good example, which reveals the deficiency of the American consular policies in the late 19th century. Lincoln’s

汇编》, Historical Documents of Chinese Labors Going Abroad), vol.1, part 3, Zhonghua Book Company, 1985, pp.1098-1169. 65 The Self-Strengthening Movement, c.1861–1895, was a period of institutional reforms initiated during the late Qing following a series of military defeats and concessions to foreign powers.

- 15 - involvement in the purchase was considered an act in defiance of the American policy that prohibited their consuls from conducting business for private benefits. The case argued in this article also illustrates that Liu Kunyi, the Guangdong-Guangxi Governor-General, might have played a dominant role in laying out the coastal defence strategies for Guangdong. When Boxer Uprising (义和团运动)66 broke out in 1900 in North China, the vast regions in South China were in the strange situation which was named “Mutual Defense of the Southeast” (东南互保). Tracing back to historical causation, enhancement of power of governors of provinces in the mid- and late 19th century exerted subtle influence on it. On the other hand, the Shanhou ju and Jiqi ju while not being included in the official administrative system, playing an important role in this ordnance purchase, provided financial support for building up provincial coastal defence. In addition, the level of world military has developed into a new stage of manufacturing modern weapons since the last 30 years in the 19th century. The guns purchased by Guangdong were the ones in relatively advanced level of technology. After the Taiping Rebellion(太平天国运动), a widespread civil war in southern China from 1850 to 1864, a great number of western weapons entered and circulated into China by various channels, whether in the government for official usage or in the society for private purpose. The social turbulence in southern China and the outbreak of Xinhai Revolution(辛亥革命) in the late Qing technically needed the great support of western arms. Therefore, the input channel of the western weapon is an issue worthy of study. As conclusion, the case that in 1879 Guangdong Government purchased a number of ordnance from the Armstrong Company with the aid of the American consul Charles P. Lincoln can be regarded as a reflection and microcosm of the Sino-American relationship, local coastal defence construction and military technology development in the era of the late 19th century. There are still many problems in the case, for example, the conflicts between the Shanhou ju and Liu Kunyi, to be discussed. Due to the limited knowledge of the author and the restricted length of this article, some problems may not be answer here. The author was hoping that a lot more historical documents will be explored in the future for further discussion.

66 The Boxer Uprising, also called The Boxer Rebellion by some historians or the Righteous Harmony Society Movement in northern China, was a proto-nationalist movement by the "Righteous Harmony Society" (义和团, yihetuan, known as "Boxers" in English), in China between 1898 and 1901, opposing Western imperialism and Christianity. See the website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Boxer_Movement (2011-04-20)

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