Canadian Military History

Volume 22 Issue 1 Article 7

2013

Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Royal Canadian Comes of Age

William J. McAndrew

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Recommended Citation William J. McAndrew "Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Comes of Age." Canadian Military History 22, 1 (2013)

This Feature is brought to you for free and open access by Scholars Commons @ Laurier. It has been accepted for inclusion in Canadian Military History by an authorized editor of Scholars Commons @ Laurier. For more information, please contact [email protected]. : Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age

William J. McAndrew

or the first decade of its existence, the off season, but military aviation the Royal Canadian Air Force was Abstract: During the interwar rated a low priority. It was not until F period, the Royal Canadian Air Force all but excluded from the military reoriented itself from an exclusively 1927 that the “bush pilots in uniform” planning process in . Despite civil to a military service. In doing so, obtained their first military aircraft its superb antecedents in the First it assumed primary responsibility for since the war, a flight each of already World War – more than 20,000 Canada’s direct home defence, put in obsolescent RAF Atlas’ and . Canadians served in the Royal Flying place a command and administrative Although it was fully air defence structure spanning and the – the Canada, and gained coequal status preoccupied with civil flying air force barely survived postwar with the other services. Moreover, operations, the RCAF never entirely reconstruction. When the fledgling by 1939 the air force had on hand disregarded the military component two- Canadian Air Force, a cadre of technically trained staff in its make-up. All but a few newly which finally had been formed in officers prepared to take over the commissioned RCAF officers had many higher appointments created late 1918, was disbanded in Britain by the expansion required to meet the served with the RFC/RAF/RNAS in 1919, the future of Canadian demands of the Second World War. during the past war, many with military aviation was left very much combat distinction. Furthermore, in doubt. By 1920, a non-permanent the RCAF was organized, trained, air force had been organized, and twenties), when it was made the and administered on the RAF model two years later it attained separate central government agency not only and shared most of its customs and permanent status in a reconfigured to regulate and control the airspace traditions, from uniform patterns Department of National Defence. but to conduct civil flying operations to mess dinners. Even in the bush, There was no doubt, however, of the for the federal government. Initially the eternal military verities had to RCAF’s subordination to the army. these centered on forest fire patrols be observed, officers saluted and As a minor cog in Canada’s militia which gave way by the end of the trousers pressed. More important, establishment, its senior officer was a decade to an ambitious national as early as 1922 the RCAF regularly Group whose military advice program of aerial survey. The range of sent selected officers to Britain for was confined to technical matters and the service’s civil activities, however, training in RAF establishments, then only on the rare occasions on was remarkable – from conducting especially the Imperial Defence which it was asked.1 National defence buffalo and reindeer census to paying and RAF Staff Colleges. In time, a planning was a matter for the army Indian Treaty money, from crop growing body of officers was exposed and to a much lesser extent the navy. dusting to topographical mapping, to ideas and doctrine in the tactical The Air Force’s theoretical role was from medical rescue missions to and strategic employment of aircraft. to provide support, like any other pioneering exploratory flights. “Schools for higher training are a fighting arm, on the First War model. Military training as such was rare. necessity if the is to The RCAF found its raison A few elementary inter-service become something more than a mere d’etre in civil aviation rather than in exercises were held, and the Camp chauffeur,” declared Lord Trenchard, military flying (the case for which had Borden training center ran regular the directing force of the RAF, and a certain incongruity in the Canadian refresher and technical courses in he had insisted on forming separate

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Air Force schools because to rely on Strength Appropriations Flying Hours those of the older services “would Year (Permanent) make the creation of an Air Spirit Military Civil Service Civil Officers Airmen 2 an impossibility.” The RAF Staff 1930 2,510,000 4,965,700 13,996 13,640 175 669 College course of study, to inculcate 1931 2,266,000 3,066,000 19,172 11,185 177 729 that air spirit, was 1932 1,560,000 190,000 6,904 3,522 178 700

devised with two objects in view; 1933 1,405,000 292,000 7,272 3,491 103 591 firstly to train officers in staff duties 1934 1,930,000 332,000 8,721 3,746 106 586 whether in peace or war; secondly, 1935 3,130,000 1,176,364 12,010 4,050 118 676 to afford a education which 1936 4,685,028 2,124,187 12,241 4,686 142 884 will serve as a sound foundation for 1937 11,391,650 361,000 17,417 2,361 148 959 the building up of a school of thought 1938 11,330,517 365,000 24,204 2,864 178 1,523 in the Royal Air Force. It aims at 1939 28,450,515 325,050 261 1,930 developing the habit of steady 1944 1,260,168,000 38,756 140,626 reading and thinking rather than at 526,320,500 8,818 44,425 the acquisition of a mass of detail.3 1945 1947 89,587,140 2,140 10,486 The teaching itself, which concentrated on imperial and small and a Navy, the work of these two We strike first, then, at another and wars (until 1939 the war game services must suffer considerably in equally vital point, within range was based on mounting a counter the opening phases of any campaign. of both our bombers and fighters. to a Turkish threat to Mosul),4 had There would appear to be only one Well directed bombing will cause a little direct relevance to RCAF needs practicable means of establishing this clamour for protection. The tendency but, as one RAF graduate later very much desired condition, and will be for the enemy to divert some, commented, “The value was not in that is offensive operations against maybe all, of his fighters to defend the stuff but in the training I had in the enemy’s means of production… the threatened point. absorbing it and dealing with it.”5 It should be realized…that offensive RCAF students customarily were operations in the air, as distinct from But the result will not be a called upon to lecture on their purely cooperative measures, should proportional increase in resistance to unique work in Canada and they concentrate on what must eventually our attacks. We have the advantage duly described what must have be their main object. This, it seems, of initiative, choice of objectives, seemed to their RAF peers, back is the principal centre of the enemy.6 approaches, methods, and times of home from policing imperial deserts, attack. Also, being forced on to the a somewhat esoteric life surveying Later Canadian students defensive will react adversely on the the Canadian back woods. They also also easily absorbed the dogma morale of the defenders…7 were exposed to what was rapidly of bombing. As becoming conventional air force G.E. Wait wrote following his Staff On his return from the 1930 Staff wisdom, the Trenchardian doctrine College tour, “The moment war is College course Flight of employing bombers independently declared, Air Power must be ready G.R. Howsam published “Canada’s as the prime air offensive weapon to exert direct pressure upon the Problem of Air Defence,” which to subdue the will and production enemy’s internal organization.” brought bombing theories home centres of the enemy. On his return to Centers vital to the enemy’s war- to Canadian realities.8 Howsam Canada, a 1924 RCAF graduate, making capacity would be the prime accepted the basic premises of air J.L. Gordon, wrote, in bombing targets but “to safeguard power proponents that while aviation terms which Trenchard would have her home interests,” the possibility resources employed with the navy approved: could not be ruled out that Britain and army were subordinate to them, might “be forced into direct air It would appear…that in stressing attack on enemy populations.” In

The RCAF Siskin Aerobatic Flight Team. Museum 19800211-010 Canadian War the necessity for establishing Air any event, “civilian casualties will be This aircraft was the only first-line Superiority prior to carrying out unavoidable,” but, “C’est la guerre.” fighter the air force had until the late aerial operations which may be of Offensive bomber forces possessed 1930s. vital importance to both an Army unprecedented flexibility:

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Two Vickers Vedettes of No.5 Photo Detachment moored to a dock at Long Lake, Manitoba. Civil flying operations in the Canadian north earned RCAF flyers the title of “bush pilots in uniform” during the 1920s.

true air power was only achieved air attack until then, but technological for each coast. “In the 20th Century through the independent use of advance would make coastal raids there may be a Seven Days War – the air arm. “Bombers, supported from carrier aircraft feasible within an air war.” Howsam concluded, by fighters,” he wrote, “are the a short ten years. Fighters could “the nation which can most quickly embodiment of air power which is offer some defence, but the principal beat its plough shares into swords applied by air bombardment.” While means lay in using bombers to (bombers on the enemy) will win fighters provided the means for attack the bases without which the next war. The suggested peace defence, which could be only partial enemy aircraft were useless. Heavy plan of Non-Permanent Squadrons at best, bombers were the prime bombers with a 450-mile operational of Air Force is considered a step in weapon: radius meant that allowing for ships’ this direction.”10 night movement during which they It would be misleading to place In the last resort air power is one would be undetected, “no carrier too much emphasis on these views. of the instruments whereby a or other surface craft can approach Junior officers in any age publish nation is guarded, but without air unmolested within 150-miles of our their own uncertain thoughts in bombardment an air force becomes shores if protection aircraft (bombers) military journals, particularly after an ancillary to the other services. are employed.” An attack on Canada’s the out-of-the ordinary intellectual Abolish air bombardment and there Pacific coast was most likely and stimulation of a staff course. Howsam is no air power, no air striking force, to defend it “our requirements in tactfully made clear that he had no air defence and no Air Menace.9 military aircraft are bombers, fighters “no intention of tilting at Air Staff and flying-boats for the Air Force opinion,”11 which, as late as 1933, Canada’s military responsibility, proper. These are subject to air even after drastic financial reductions Howsam thought, had been clearly strategy and would be employed had eliminated most flying, still defined at the 1926 Imperial chiefly in Coast Defence.” Howsam viewed civil operations as the RCAF’s Conference which accepted the proposed to circumvent the high primary training mechanism,

principle that each component of the costs of permanent units by forming Museum 19920166-043 Canadian War Empire must provide, first of all, for its auxiliary squadrons with permanent as it is considered that the experience own defence. Canada had remained cadres initially on the scale of one within limits is equally as valuable invulnerable from the possibility of flying-boat and one bomber squadron as an equivalent amount of flying

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performed for strictly military RCAF Aircraft Strength training, and in addition, there is 1936 1939 nothing better for the morale of Service Service the force than a certain amount of Siskin 8 Hurricane 19 work of practical importance to the Atlas 15 Siskin 5 development of the country.12 31 Shark 4 Atlas 13 Wapiti 22 92 Nor did the articulation of an air Vancouver 4 doctrine indicate any alteration Battle 10 in the Canadian defence planning Shark 11 Civil 58 structure. Planning remained the Vancouver 4 preserve of successive Army Chiefs Training 46 Stranraer 8 of the General Staff who, as far as Photographic and Overall Total 135 48 the record shows, felt little need Communications to consult their air force advisors Training 130 on policy matters, at least until the Overall Total 270 Canadian War Museum 19750315-016 Canadian War mid-1930s. The process of thinking about aerial options, therefore, was t is impossible to say how long the aviation. The second was the military important primarily in allowing Iexisting civil-military relationship staff planning made necessary by officers to evolve a modicum of would have continued without an Canada’s participation in the Geneva service identity – Trenchard’s “Air external stimulus for change. But Disarmament Conference, which, by Spirit” – which eventually might coincidentally in the early 1930s two requiring Canadian military planners be called upon. Howsam recalled unrelated but equally incongruous to reconsider their force levels, also many years later, “We had no Staff circumstances combined to jolt prompted them to reevaluate the College in Canada at all. That level the RCAF out of its civil and into country’s strategic priorities and the of thinking, that level of doing, a purely military role. The first employment of the three services.14 was completely unknown. It was a was the Great Depression which It was fitting that disarmament Godsend. Without it, we’d have been prompted the government to talks concerned with the utility and absolute neophytes.”13 decimate the aviation budget, thereby ethics of bombing got under way setting in motion a chain of events as Japanese were falling on * * * * * which led by 1936 to a structural Chinese cities.15 For Canada’s new separation of civil from military chief of the general staff (CGS),

Two aircraft at RCAF Station Jericho Beach, Vancouver, BC. On the left is a Vickers Vedette and on the right a float version of the dependable De Havilland Moth trainer.

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An Armstrong Whitworth Siskin at Rockcliffe Air Station. Standing in front of the aircraft are (left to right): Flying Officer E.A. McNab, Victor Beamish, and Flying Officer E.A. McGowan. The three officers were members of the famed Siskin flight, which thrilled thousands of spectators at air shows in Canada and the . McNab would later command No.1 Fighter Squadron RCAF during the and rise to the rank of . Beamish, an RAF officer seconded to the RCAF, reached the same rank before being killed in action in March 1942.

however, the timing was fortuitous “worst case” scenario which gave a considered and consistent military for other reasons. Since becoming rationale for organization, training, policy,” Professor Stacey has written: chief in 1928, Major-General A.G.L. and mobilization, which could be McNaughton had become convinced adapted to other purposes.16 For its no responsible Canadian statesman of the need for a fundamental review part, the RCAF was not consulted ever paused to ask himself these of Canadian defence planning and until 1927 when, at the request of the simple and fundamental questions: the Geneva discussions provided a Joint Staff Committee, the Director if this peace proves fleeting, what convenient reason for proceeding. allotted (paper) army cooperation is the nature of the menaces that Until 1930, the only completed squadrons on the First War scale will threaten Canada? What form of contingency plan for the employment of one to each (paper) division and organization would offer the greatest of Canadian troops was designed to corps headquarters. security against them? How far does defend the country against American Defence Scheme No.1 had only the existing organization satisfy these attack (Defence Scheme No.1). This a tenuous connection with political needs?17 envisaged mobilizing a 15-division reality and it seems doubtful that it militia in a levee en masse to take the ever would have been considered In the absence of a planning field and hold until relief could be at all had staff planners been given mandate, McNaughton’s staff ensured by the . The mass clear political direction. This was not raised many of these questions in militia force on which it depended, forthcoming and “one searches the an appreciation of the country’s however, never materialized in the records of successive administrations defence requirements it completed inter-war years as funds were not in vain for evidence of anything in January 1931. In the process it made available to recruit and equip that could be described as a well- demolished the case for an American it. Its only value was to provide a war. Noting that the evolution of

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events over the previous ten years American differences had made any considerable objections from militia had invalidated the premises on sense at all in 1919, it no longer did units which would be disbanded which Defence Scheme No.1 had so in the 1930s. or amalgamated, and was able to been based, the staff concluded that offer it as tangible evidence of its the possibility of a continental war The direct defence of Canada against support for disarmament. As Sir had receded beyond the bounds of invasion by the United States is Maurice Hankey, the secretary to realistic probability. Ties between a problem which in the last ten the Committee of Imperial Defence, Canada and the United States had years has become increasingly noted, “By this step the Government grown so close, and international susceptible to political solution, but could take the credit for a large conventions so inhibiting, that: quite incapable of being satisfactorily reduction in establishments, and the answered by Empire military army would be the more efficient for Provided Canada acts ethically action…[therefore] organization of the reduction.”20 and on the defensive, the United the Militia Forces of Canada for a war For the RCAF, the Geneva States must spurn the Treaty of 1909 of this nature is undesirable, even if discussions raised two quite (which created the International it were practicable.19 different immediate concerns. One Joint Commission), defy the League was the possible freeze of current of Nations and forget the Pact of Having rejected the concept of establishments which would then be Paris (Kellogg-Briand) in resorting a North American land war there accepted as upper force limits; this, to invasion each and all impossible was no need to maintain the existing of course, would have set the RCAF’s to conceive under existing world unwieldy militia structure, and military potential permanently at conditions.18 McNaughton recommended that it zero. The other was the proposal to be reduced to a more manageable restrict the habit of seconding military Certainly, from Canada’s perspective, seven-division level. The government aviators for civil duties. Although this if an appeal to arms to settle North accepted the proposal, despite was meant to control the practice,

The Armstrong Whitworth Atlas was a purpose-built army co-operation aircraft based on First World War experience. Here an Atlas skims low over an airfield to practice a message snatch. Note the observer leaning over the side of the aircraft. Canadian War Museum 19910109-199 Canadian War

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especially by Germany, of masking active participation on one side or the RCAF could well assume the the build-up of military capabilities the other.” Otherwise, “if Canada responsibility as the country’s first behind a guise of civil flying, its does not take the requisite measures line of home defence: effect on the RCAF would have been to maintain her neutrality…the equally crippling. However, nothing United States would doubtless take Air Forces even in small numbers are came of either possibility as the independent action, presumably on a definite deterrent in narrow waters Geneva talks ground to a halt amidst Canada’s behalf.”23 and on the high seas in the vicinity the wrangling which accompanied Traditionally, of course, the of the shore; they can be developed the breakdown of international senior service had responsibility with considerable rapidity provided order.21 for coastal defence, but the RCN’s a nucleus of skilled personnel in a The significant aspect of emaciated 1,000-sailor complement suitable training organization is in the disarmament events on the was barely able to man the four existence; pilots engaged in civil development of the RCAF, however, destroyers and few other smaller aviation can be quickly adapted to lay primarily in the strategic vessels it could put to sea. To be made defence purposes; civil aircraft are reassessment they had set in motion. effective, the navy needed either not without value in defence, and As long as the direct defence of the a major ship acquisition program any aircraft manufacturing facilities country remained based on a mass or to be assured of immediate are equally available to meet military land army, the air force was relegated reinforcement on the outbreak of war; as well as civil requirements. That is, to a subordinate, support role, the former was politically impossible, from a comparatively small current much as it had been on the Western the latter technically unlikely. In the expenditure a considerable deterrent Front. When the oversize militia CGS’ view, “the Canadian navy as can be created in a relatively short was restructured, however, the air presently constituted is not an answer time, and this is particularly the case force’s role in Canada’s defence to any problem of Canadian defence.” in Canada where aviation plays a posture also was altered. The general McNaughton may have shared a large part in the economic life of the staff identified two contingencies, general landlubbers’ aversion to country, a part which is increasing neither of them new but now given salt water but he was also a realistic naturally at a rapid rate.26 enhanced priority, for which plans pragmatist24 who was attempting to were required. One was participation fashion a coherent defence policy * * * * * “in another overseas war in defence within the paralyzing constraints y the end of 1931 the RCAF staff of Empire security.”22 The possibility imposed by depression funding. Bhad completed a preliminary of raising an expeditionary force for He also dominated the defence review of the units it would need imperial deployment – or the indirect establishment, both by the force of his to meet its newly identified military defence’ of Canada as it invariably intellect and personality and his close responsibilities.27 Then, when Group was termed – never had been far from association with the Prime Minister Captain Gordon returned from the minds of militia commanders which gave him considerable political his course at the Imperial Defence and staffs. Nor did it stray far now. influence. He was convinced that the College in the spring of the new year, The option was so well entrenched limited defence funds could be used he was relieved of his administrative in a political no-man’s-land that it best in maintaining small, technically duties specifically to prepare the could be approached only warily; impeccable, permanent cadres which more detailed plans the air force but planning proceeded in any could quickly train larger forces required.28 In mid-July, Gordon’s staff case, the RCAF’s role being limited on mobilization. Coastal defence submitted a proposal for the “Peace to supplying army cooperation required forces in being, but the RCN Organization and Establishments squadrons in support of ground was unable to present “a minimum of the RCAF considered necessary forces. The other option, in effect, deterrent to seaborne attack… to meet minimum requirements for redefined the concept of “direct Moreover it is of the nature of naval National Defence.”29 defence.” The staff concluded that forces that they cannot be rapidly The paper, prepared by Squadron any military threat to Canada likely expanded to meet emergencies Leader G.V. Walsh,30 considered would materialize on the coasts as and, in consequence, it seems to three contingencies for which the a by-product of a war between the me that little purpose is served in service must plan: direct or home United States and another power, maintaining a small nucleus.”25 The defence (coastal), the maintenance most probably Japan. Even if it was air force, McNaughton concluded, of neutrality, and provision for an able to avoid belligerency, Canada could replace the navy; aerial patrols expeditionary force. Of these, coastal would be forced to defend its coastal not only would be more effective defence was the most vital, and it borders as “the only alternative to but were much less expensive; and was on this major concern that most https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss1/764 8 : Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age Canadian War Museum 19920166-045 Canadian War

The minister of National Defence, Grote Stirling, prepares for a flight in an Armstrong Whitworth Atlas.

planning throughout the remainder mobilization; one fighter squadron provide further operational air of the 1930s concentrated. Coastal with a secondary bombing capability; support on mobilization.32 defence included, Walsh noted, and one general purpose squadron Walsh’s numbers were revised “protection of important localities convertible either to bombers or as his plan percolated upwards in and ports from air raids, defence fighters. The army cooperation headquarters, but not fundamentally.33 of the Pacific and Atlantic coasts squadron would be stationed at Nor were his premises challenged. by means of coast reconnaissance, where it could work closely The primary consideration for the anti-submarine patrols, co-operation with the militia, the fighter squadron RCAF remained Canadian direct with coast defence artillery, and in Montreal where it would be defence, the requirements for which protection of empire Air Routes available to reinforce Atlantic coast were the same for either contingency and Convoys.”31 Seven Permanent defences, and the general purpose of countering enemy raids or for Force squadrons were required to squadron at able to maintaining the integrity of the coasts carry out the tasks, four of them reinforce Pacific defences. Two other to ensure Canadian neutrality. The controlled by Group Headquarters Group Headquarters, at Winnipeg task required forces in being and at Halifax and Vancouver, each with and Montreal, as well as sufficient therefore home defence squadrons one bomber and one flying-boat supply depots and administrative had to be found from the permanent squadron. The others were one army services for an expanded force, force. As McNaughton viewed the cooperation squadron which would completed the command and potential threat: maintain contact with the latest logistics structure. In addition, 12 doctrine and equipment in the United Non-Permanent squadrons, four The outbreak of hostilities, under Kingdom and provide a training each of fighter, bomber, and army present conditions, would today, cadre for Non-Permanent army cooperation aircraft, formed in the possibly, and tomorrow probably, be cooperation squadrons required on principal Canadian cities, would signalized by an immediate attack by

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air. Indeed, such an attack might be to extend the existing network of [which] can furnish all the gasoline, made before a formal declaration of military airfields in the United States. all the bombs, oil, and ammunition, war had been made. It is conceivable Several Air Corps officers sketched spare parts, all the food that is that attempted air attack from an scenarios indicating that the country essential to take care of the operating aircraft carrier might not be kept conceivably could be subjected to air personnel of 15 bombers, as well as secret, but direct attack (by trans- attack within a relatively short time. the ground personnel for 30 missions, oceanic flight) could easily be kept One pointed out to the Committee each one of which goes in 1,500 miles secret as the destination of aircraft that the Douglas Company was and comes back 1,500 miles.” With a cannot be gauged as can that of naval building a bomber able to carry a 3,000-mile range, a European force or Military Forces. Therefore, there 2,500-pound load for 3,000 could fly to Churchill on Hudson would not be time for any Canadian miles at a speed of 225 mph. A hostile Bay, for example, timed to meet its Air Forces to expand in sufficient coalition of powers, he thought, floating railhead. After refuelling time to meet an attack.34 would be able to establish temporary and arming up, they then could be seaborne logistical bases on the North directed to pre-designated targets. The secondary needs of an American continent to supply a fleet Unlike ground troops, their flexibility expeditionary force, which would of long-range bombers in an attack precluded the need to concentrate require a preparatory mobilization on the continental United States. anywhere but in the target area: period, would be met by non- “Fortunately or unfortunately,” he “With the radius of action that we permanent units. informed the startled Representatives, have, they could move from points The changing face of war, as “the Creator has given countless in James Bay and along the noted by McNaughton, in which air operating bases within a radius of coast simultaneously and concentrate power was assuming much greater action of this country in the vast over any place on the frontiers of this significance, became a public matter number of sheltered water areas that vital area and deliver an attack in in Canada and the United States are available deep in Canada and far mass against whatever targets you in the spring of 1935. The occasion removed from any sphere of action want.” The only way to counter such was a leak to the press on closed of ground forces.” From James Bay, a potential threat, he concluded, was hearings held in February by the Labrador, and Newfoundland, down by bombing the hostile bases. In order House of Representatives Committee to Bermuda and the Caribbean, small to create this defensive capability, it on Military Affairs.35 The Committee vessels carrying 2,000 tons of supplies was necessary to locate and construct had heard testimony on legislation could establish “floating railheads more airfields, specifically a system in

A , with floats and folded wings, sits on the shore at RCAF Station Jerico Beach. The RCAF modified most aircraft it obtained for use on rivers and lakes.

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each of the threatened regions of the posed potential difficulties for question of air defence is becoming country with sufficient intermediate American planners but “there is no one of increasing importance to this stations to connect them.36 Canada’s record of their having uttered one country.“41 position was particularly strategic, syllable of hostility towards Canada.” Despite McNaughton’s and another officer emphasized. Even Therefore, Ashton’s advocacy, however, if Canada itself was not actively RCAF expansion proceeded only hostile, its neutrality would cause No umbrage can properly be taken imperceptibly. A battle of memoranda problems because “neutrality by Canada at these disclosures. ensued as the militia and air force involves responsibilities as well as Publicity has simply been given to skirmished with the navy before rights, and flying across Canadian the fact that is known to the world the Treasury Board for a share of territory would be a violation of of Canada’s impotence with regard diminishing funds sufficient to enable Canadian neutrality, and if they did to anti-aircraft defence. Not only are them to survive. The depression and not take steps to carry out the laws of our gates wide open but we have not financial retrenchment continued neutrality we would have to do so, I even the semblance of a fence and to win. Estimates through 1935 imagine.“37 our neighbour is, in consequence, remained below the already stringent Official reaction in Washington obliged to provide against our lack 1931 level and the air force neither to the leaked testimony was swift of provision.39 could maintain the manpower levels and vehement. President Roosevelt, established for the disarmament his Secretary of State for War, and Other Canadian comment proposals nor obtain suitable the State Department immediately agreed. The Ottawa Evening Citizen aircraft.42 The only military machines repudiated the suggestion that the editorialized that the United States available in 1930 were the aging Siskin United States viewed Canada in had to look to its own defence, and fighters and Atlas army cooperation anyway other than the best of “good if Canada was not doing its share, machines bought earlier. The total neighbours” or that any resort to it was because the Government number of aircraft on hand in that arms was conceivable. The officers had “virtually disbanded the Royal year was 235. Between 1930 and 1935, who testified, they made clear, did Canadian Air Force.” Canada could 143 machines were written off due to not set United States’ policy and in afford to ignore its responsibilities age, crashes, or general deterioration, no way represented it; moreover, no longer “unless the pretence of and only 82 replacements were made, the Committee was irresponsible nationhood is to be completely leaving a balance in October 1935 in making their private views abandoned.”40 of 174. These included 8 Siskins, 15 public. Apologies abounded, but the The issues raised by the Atlas’, 5 converted Vancouver flying- legislation itself passed the House Air Defences Bill officially were boats, and 4 Shark torpedo bombers in June and the Senate a month acknowledged and extended that for operational use in addition to 40 later, both unopposed, and received fall in a staff study approved by training and 45 civil types. It was Presidential approval in August. (The McNaughton’s successor, Major- not much from which to fashion a first site selected was at Fairbanks, General E.C. Ashton. Although the fighting force capable of protecting Alaska, in July 1936).38 United States legitimately could be the nation’s shores.43 Canadian reaction was generally concerned with a bombing threat, the A change in the political restrained. The Department of planners noted, “As the Eastern and climate had to precede any material External Affairs obtained a copy of Western portions of Canada lie on improvement, and this did not the hearings and asked the General the Great Circle routes from Europe begin until late in 1935 when the Staff for comment. Their report was and Eastern Asia to the United States, depression-plagued administration of remarkably sympathetic with the respectively, it is clear that Canada is R.B. Bennett gave way to Mackenzie American military viewpoint. They still more exposed to air operations King’s Liberals. King’s resumption accepted the need to plan for all from overseas…[consequently] the of power could hardly have been contingencies, however unpalatable, continued supposition that Canada received optimistically by those and thought “The United States is, in is and will remain free from attack pressing for a larger defence budget. Canadian War Museum 19800621-010 Canadian War consequence, obliged to contemplate by a trans-oceanic power is becoming The Prime Minister always had been measures to protect itself from attack open to criticism.” The paper, which somewhat suspicious of the military. not by Canada but via Canada.” The was primarily concerned with For sound political reasons King had staff agreed that the combination of devising mechanisms to mobilize to be extremely wary of Britain’s advancing technology and Canada’s the full resources of the country in the claims to leadership and solidarity, large and uninhabited coastline event of war, emphasized that “the as imperial military ties could

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An RCAF is moored to the dock at RCAF Station Rockcliffe in October 1930. In front of the aircraft are (left to right): C.S. MacDonald, Flight Sergeant H.J. Winny, Flight Lieutenant F.J. Mawdesley and Sergeant S.C. Dearaway.

easily involve Canada in foreign the RCAF was placed once more in of accelerating international anarchy entanglements. The services were not most favoured status because of its and the complete absence of national equally suspect, however. The Navy unsullied role in home defence.44 defences had to be faced. He was was hopelessly anglophile, and the partially successful. The inherent army, despite its protestations to the * * * * * nature of the problem meant that contrary, always kept the notion of an there could be no quick solution, imperial expeditionary force well in ll this took time. It was not but from the 1937-1938 fiscal year, mind; but the air force was different. Auntil the following August estimates began to rise helpfully. In his earlier administrations, in that King briefed himself on the Throughout the parliamentary the 1920s, Mackenzie King had appalling inadequacies of the discussion, the government made looked favourably on the new service three services. His diary records in clear that priority was to be given because its active role in the economic stunning detail the tortuous process direct, national defence with the development of the frontier provided he underwent persuading first RCAF manning the first line.45 obvious political advantages which himself, then his Cabinet colleagues, Accordingly, the RCAF prepared a purely military air force could and then the Liberal caucus that the plans to implement expansion on not. Now, in a different context, potentially disastrous combination three-, five-, and ten-year programs. https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss1/768 12 : Canadian Defence Planning Between the Wars The Royal Canadian Air Force Comes of Age

The estimated cost of the three- not an air force to strike immediate hand a cadre of technically trained year scheme was about $31 million terror in the hearts of the enemy, staff officers prepared to take over in the first year, $17 million in the but fortunately the state of the art the myriad of higher appointments second, and $11 million in the third. precluded trans-Atlantic bombing. an inflated war establishment As well as for operational units It had just over 3,000 all ranks in created. It was, consequently, able the estimates included funds for uniform, 11 permanent and another to mobilize the country’s aerial larger training facilities, additional 12 non-permanent formed but potential for war, conduct training instructors, housing, and ancillary ill-equipped squadrons, and an on the unprecedented scale of the equipment. In comparison, the five- assortment of obsolescent military British Commonwealth Air Training year program called for a first-year aircraft – Stranraers, Vancouvers, Plan, assume responsibility for anti- expenditure of about $19 million Sharks, Battles and Wapitis, along submarine and convoy protection with the subsequent years scaled with a few Hurricanes. These patrols, and contribute operational proportionately. Ultimately the RCAF numbers represented less than half squadrons to virtually all active cut its own first-year figures to $16 the men and a quarter of the fighting theatres of war. million and finally received only two- aircraft the RCAF needed to perform thirds of it. The funding, of course, its primary function of defending went only part way in equipping Canada’s coasts. There was nothing Notes the air force, but it is arguable that left for other tasks. “Canada has the existing industrial base could neither equipment nor trained This article originally appeared in Aerospace not absorb much more in the early personnel in effective quantities Historian 29, no.2 (June 1982), pp.81-89. It has 46 been reprinted with the kind permission of stages. Modern aircraft were vitally to offer the Royal Air Force at the Jack Neufeld and the [US] Air Force Historical needed, but most countries were present time,” the Chief of the Air Foundation. rearming by this time and there were Staff wrote in 1939. Therefore “we 1. The details of the origins and early not enough to go around. In any case, can best help the United Kingdom by activities of the RCAF will be found a sound logistical foundation had to concentrating our entire efforts, after in the forthcoming volumes of the be laid. As one staff memorandum securing our home defence, upon the official history now in preparation. [Now available: S.F. Wise, Canadian Airmen pointed out, accumulating stocks was production of the greatest possible and the First World War, vol.1: The Official a long, drawn-out process: numbers of trained personnel in all History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, categories.”48 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980; W.A.B Douglas, The Creation of There is a large and varied list of Measured against a standard of a National Air Force, vol.2. The Official equipment which represents a effective national air defence, the History of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, considerable capital investment RCAF in 1939 clearly fell far short. 1986); Brereton Greenhous et al., The required before the aircraft can be Measured against what it was able Crucible of War, 1939-1945, vol.3: The maintained and operated efficiently. to achieve over the next few years, Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force (Toronto: The University of These include, aircraft spares; rations; however, the RCAF had laid well Toronto Press, 1994).] In the meantime, clothing and necessities; motor the basis for future success. Within a for background see James Eayrs, In transport; motor transport gasoline relatively few years it had reoriented Defence of Canada: from the Great War to the Great Depression (Toronto: University of and oil; marine craft; miscellaneous itself from an exclusively civil to Toronto Press, 1964); and F.H. Hitchins, states including hand tools; work a military service. In the process, , Canadian Air Forces and Royal shop equipment; electrical equipment; the RCAF’s defence responsibilities Canadian Air Force (Ottawa: Canadian War Museum, 1972). parachutes; armament stores; bombs had grown sufficiently to ensure its 2. R.A. Mason, “History of the Royal and ammunition; barrack stores; service maturation from subordinate Air Forces Staff College, 1922-1972,” wireless telegraphy equipment; status to complete independence. It Directorate of History and Heritage [DHH] (Formerly Directorate of History). photographic equipment; aerial had, in fact, assumed the primary 3. Ibid. gasoline and oil; overhaul equipment responsibility from the navy and 4. Ibid. 5. R.I. Chapman in (engines and aeroplanes); printing militia for Canada’s direct home Mason. and stationery, etc.47 defence. By 1938 the RCAF had 6. J.L. Gordon, “Air Superiority,” Canadian in place a separate command and Defence Quarterly (July 1927), pp.480-482. This is a review essay of a contemporary War overtook rearmament in administrative air defence structure book on air power, Basic Principles of Air 1939. In late August the RCAF’s few spanning Canada, and its senior Warfare (Aldershot: Gale and Polden). See ill-equipped, operational squadrons officer had been granted co-equal also Gordon’s “Limitations of Aircraft in Naval Warfare: A Reply to Lieutenant- deployed to their war stations on status with the other service Commander Ballou,” Canadian Defence either coast and began flying coastal commanders as chief of the air Quarterly (July 1926), pp.413-419. Gordon patrols almost immediately. It was staff. Importantly, it also had on was senior in 1932-33 after

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which he was seconded to the army 1934,” The National Archives, United he thought that civilian fields could be where he remained as a district officer Kingdom [TNA] CAB 63/81. constructed. “I would have been very commanding in the rank of brigadier for 21. The record of the RCAF’s planning for the glad to put in the bill the Great Lakes six years. disarmament talks is in DHH 76/664. area,” he noted, “but I would not put 7. G.E. Wait, “Aims and Objects: a Study in 22. General Staff “Memorandum on the it in the bill because of the Canadian Doctrines,” Canadian Defence Quarterly Reorganization.” situation. You will notice No.7 in my bill (April 1933), pp.349-353. Wait attained 23. Minutes of the Joint Staff Committee, 14 is camouflaged. It is called ‘intermediate’ the rank of air vice-marshal. March 1933, LAC RG 24, PARC 266198, stations for transcontinental flights, but it 8. G. R. Howsam, “Canada’s Problem of HQS5199. means the same thing.” Ibid. Air Defence,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 24. Hankey preferred “clever opportunist,” 37. Ibid. (April 1931), pp.256-360. Howsam also “Impressions of Canadian Defence 38. See the External Affairs correspondence reached air vice-marshal rank. Policy- December 1934,” in LAC, RG 25, Gl, vol.1746. 9. Ibid. 25. Quoted in Eayrs, p.275. 39. A copy of the General Staff report is in 10. Ibid. Howsam also included two Army 26. Ibid. DHH 74/256, vol.II. Cooperation Squadrons in his proposal. 27. J.L. Gordon to CGS, 11 May 1933, LAC 40. Ottawa Evening Citizen, 30 April 1935. 11. Ibid. RG 24, PARC 826453, 045-4, vol.1. 41. “The Coordination of Canadian Defence,” 12. General Staff, “Memorandum on the 28. Gordon was the first RCAF officer in DHH 74/256, vol.I. Reorganization of the Non-Permanent attendance. Deputy Minister, DND, to 42. From its 1930-31 level of $7,475,700, the Active Militia,” 29 January 1931, Library Minister, 2 March 1932, LAC RG 24, aviation budget was cut to $1,600,000 in and Archives Canada [LAC], RG 24, PARC vol.829218, HQ.895-1. 1933-1934. It was ironic that its military vol.2740, S 5902, vol.1. At the meeting 29. “Walsh to Gordon, 18 July 1932; “Peace responsibilities were being elevated of the Joint Staff Committee on 19 April Organization and Establishment of the while RCAF resources were being 1934 the acting chief of the naval staff RCAF considered necessary to meet reduced. Most of the cuts were met by asked that the RCAF be detailed to minimum requirements for National virtually eliminating civil operations assist the navy in combined operations Defence,” DHH 76/33. which entailed discharging many of training especially in reconnaissance 30. Walsh retired as an air vice-marshal. the service’s short-service pilots. See and night action. The chairman, General 31. Walsh to Gordon, 18 July 1932, “Peace Hitchins, Air Board, Canadian Air Force McNaughton, replied that combined Organization.” and Royal Canadian Air Force, pp.259-299. training only would be possible that 32. Ibid. Walsh’s proposed Permanent Forces 43. Senior Air Officer to Deputy Minister, year on the West Coast as all available establishment planned for 281 officers 7 July 1938, LAC, Ian Mackenzie paper, aircraft in eastern Canada were involved and 2,205 airmen. These numbers, he vol.31. in RCMP preventive (anti-smuggling) warned, exceeded those submitted 44. On King see H.B. Neatby, William Lyon operations. “Minutes of JSC,” LAC, RG earlier during the disarmament talks Mackenzie King, vol.3: 1932-39 – The Prism 24, vol.2684, HQ S5199, vol.2. by 14 officers and 143 airmen. The of Unity (Toronto: University of Toronto 13. Transcript of Interview Howsam – W.A.B. Non-Permanent establishment was Press, 1976). Douglas, August 1975, DHH 76/120. correspondingly reduced by 36 officers 45. See, for example, LAC, Mackenzie King 14. The peculiarity of the needs of and 252 airmen. diary, 25-26 August 1935. disarmament discussions leading 33. In 1933, the number of Permanent 46. Senior Air Officer to CGS, 24 September ultimately to armament planning was Force squadrons was increased by 1936, with enclosures, DHH 76/204. not confined to Canada. As one historian two more, all for strengthening coastal 47. Senior Air Officer to CGS, 16 September has commented on British experience, defence, for example, 1938, with enclosed memorandum, DHH “It is more than a little ironic that the squadrons were added. See J.L. Gordon 76/40. Cabinet committee on the disarmament to CGS, 11 May 1933, LAC, RG24, PARC 48. Air Vice-Marshal G.M. Croll, Appendix conference should be turned over to 826453, 045-4, vol.1: CGS to Minister, to Committee document, the consideration and planning of 9 May 1933, LAC MG 30, E133, Series ”Action of , rearmament without so much as an 11, McNaughton papers, vol.103; H.D. 1939,” 15 September 1939, DHH 112-S M appropriate change in title.” R.P. Shay, Crerar, “An Appreciation of the Defence 2009 (D36). Jr., British Rearmament in the Thirties: Problems Confronting Canada with Politics and Profits (Princeton: Princeton Recommendations for the Development University Press, 1977), p.34. of the Armed Forces,” 5 September 1936, 15. On the Geneva talks see Shay, pp.34- DHH 114.1 (D11). 47, and H. Montgomery Hyde, British 34. McNaughton, “The Defence of Canada,” Air Policy Between the Wars, 1918-1939 26 May 1935, copy in DHH 74/256, vol.1. (London: Heinemann, 1976), pp.274-317. 35. A copy of the testimony is in SAO file, DHH 16. See R.A. Preston, The Defence of the 74/56, vol.II. The full title is “Hearings Undefended Border: Planning for before the Committee on Military Affairs, Bill McAndrew joined the army at age War in North America, 1867-1939 House of Representatives, 74th Congress, 17, was commissioned the following (Montreal:McGill-Queen’s Press, 1977); First Session on H.R.6621 and H.R.4130. year and served the next eleven years Eayrs, In Defence of Canada: from the Air Defence Bases: to authorize the as an infantry officer in Canada, Korea, Great War to the Great Depression; John selection, construction, installation and Germany and Ghana. On leaving the Swettenham, McNaughton, vol.1: 1887- modification of permanent stations and army, a high school dropout, he attended 1939 (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1968). depots for the Army, Air Corps, and Glendon College, York University as a 17. C.P. Stacey, The Military Problems of Canada Frontier Air Defence Bases generally. mature student and gained his doctorate (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1940), p.86. February 11, 12, 13, 1935.” at the University of British Columbia. 18. General Staff in “Memorandum on the 36. Brigadier-General Charles Kilbourne, McAndrew taught at the University Reorganization.” assistant chief of staff in charge of the of Maine at Orono and directed that 19. Ibid. War Plans Division, was conscious of the university’s Canadian Studies programme 20. See “Precis, Minutes of Meeting of sensitivity of the proposal. He wanted before joining the Directorate of History Conference of Defence Associations, 18- to locate one of the airfields in the Great in Ottawa from which he retired in 1996. 19 November 1932,” LAC RG 24, vol.2740, Lakes area, but in order to avoid “passing His particular interest has been in the HQ55902, vol.1. Hankey, “Impressions away from the century-old principle that battlefield behaviour of soldiers. of Canadian Defence Policy – December our Canadian border needs no defence,” https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol22/iss1/770 14