Localism in Irish politics and local government reform

No.2 2013

Editorial Contents An excessive focus on local issues in Irish politics is blamed for weakening parliament's Introduction 2 capacity to hold the Government to account and scrutinise legislation. This localism has been attributed, in part, to the weak system of local How does weak local government government. affect the constituency workloads of TDs? 2 This Spotlight aims to connect Members with these arguments at a time when local What reforms have the potential to government reform is on the legislative agenda. reduce constituency caseloads? 8 It considers how the Government’s programme Local government reform (2012) and of local government reform might affect the localism constituency workloads of parliamentarians. 8 Spotlight no 8, 2012 examined how the Action Conclusion 11 Programme on Effective Local Government (2012) addresses the weaknesses in local government. Spotlight no 2, 2011 considered No liability is accepted to any person arising whether changing the electoral system can end out of any reliance on the contents of this excessive localism in Irish politics. paper. Nothing herein constitutes professional advice of any kind. This document contains a general summary of developments and is not complete or definitive. It has been prepared February 2013 for distribution to Members to aid them in their Central Enquiry Desk: 618 4701/ 4702 Parliamentary duties. Authors are available to discuss the contents of these papers with Members and their staff but not with members of the general public. 1

Political parties have argued that weak Introduction local government leads to locally-focused parliamentarians. Fianna Fáil’s Niall A 2010 survey found that Irish TDs, on Andrews TD blamed weak local average, spent 53% of their working week government for creating ‘a power vacuum on constituency-based work and 38% on which is filled by a TD.’5 , Sinn parliament-based duties.1 Dealing with Féin and LabourTDs have argued that a queries from individual constituents reduction in constituency workloads is accounted for 40% of time spent on dependent on the reform of local constituency work (Fig.1). While this focus government.6 promotes a strong voter-representative Political scientists offer explanations for link, 69% of TDs surveyed in 2009 said localism in Irish politics including: that the level of constituency work compromised their legislative duties.2  electoral incentives particular to PR STV Figure 1: Time spent on different  unresponsive public administration 3 aspects of Constituency Work  weak local government and7  executive dominance of the 8 Working on legislature. constituents' This Spotlight considers how weaknesses cases in local government may lead to excessive 10% localism in Irish politics. It examines how Lobbying on the Government’s local government behalf of the reform programme will address these constituency 40% weaknesses. 25% Visiting How does weak local Constituency 25% and delivering government affect the leaflets constituency Tabling PQs workloads of TDs? on behalf of constituents W eaknesses in Irish local government may be summarised as:

1. Narrow range of functions for which Advocates of political reform argue that local government is responsible and excessive focus on local issues by the dominant role played by central parliamentarians has reduced government agents in local service parliament’s capacity to collectively hold delivery; the Government to account and to play an 2. Complexity of institutional structures 4 active role in the legislative process. at the local level,

1 9% of time was spent on ‘other’ duties. Survey conducted by political scientists in Trinity College 5 Niall Collins TD, Magill S.School, July 2012. for the Joint Committee on the 6 Olivia Mitchel TD and Brian Stanley TD, Dáil Constitution, 30th Dáil, Third Report debates. 5 July 2011; Aodhan O’Riordan, Irish 2 O’Leary Eimear, UCC, Doctoral Thesis. Survey Times, 31 January 2013. of 66 TDs of the 30th Dáil. P. 186. 7 Farrell (1985) and 2011 (politicalreform.ie) 3 JCC, 2010, Fourth Report. P.22. 8 Gallagher and Komito in Coakley and Gallagher, 4 Joint Committee on the Constitution (30thDáil) edrs, Politics in the Republic of Ireland. London Fourth Report; Former Garrett and New York, Routledge. Farrell David, (2010). Fitzgerald, Magill Summer School 2010; Former p. 248; Hunt Brian (2010) ‘The Role of the Houses Minister Noel Dempsey, (2002) All Party of the in the Scrutiny of Legislation’ Oireacthas Committee on the Constitution Seventh Parliamentary Fellowship Houses of the Report Oireachtas pp.16-19. 2

3. Weak and less visible political - Staff management leadership at a local level Public health 4 of 10 (Germany, - Hospitals Hungary, Finland 4. Dependency of local government on 9 - Primary care and Portugal, the central government funds. former two providing We consider how each of these hospital care, the weaknesses can cause parliamentarians latter two providing primary care but not to be locally-focused. hospital care). 1. Narrow range of functions and Roads and public All 10 (note that this central government dominance transport function is exercised Irish local authorities possess three out of by urban authorities, groups of authorities nine core competencies associated with together or by higher local government in ten other European tier authorities). countries (Table 1). They are town Water 9 of 10 (excluding planning, housing and roads (secondary the UK) 10 roads only). It should be noted that Irish Electricity supply 8 of 10 (excluding local authorities do have competency in the UK and Hungary) core functions omitted from the study: Gas supply 6 of 10 (excluding environmental planning, waste collection the UK, Portugal, and sewage treatment, and culture. This Hungary and is generally also the case for the other ten Finland) countries. Economic development 7 of 10 (excluding including grants to Germany, Hungary Table 1: Core competencies of local industry and Sweden). 11 authorities in 10 European Countries Unlike most other European countries, Functions Country social welfare, health and education do Town Planning All 10 not come under the remit of local Germany government. Local representatives have Netherlands no direct connection to the network of Spain Portugal social welfare offices or HSE centres France Sweden operating throughout the country. The Hungary UK Italy Finland Department of Education is responsible Housing 8 of 10 (excluding for delivering primary and secondary - Direct or indirect Italy and the education. management Netherlands. Note As such, many issues affecting citizens’ - Housing benefits that in the UK, only everyday lives are not controlled by local housing benefits is a government.12 If local government were competency). Social welfare and All 10 itself responsible for administering social social services welfare payments and health services, for Education All 10 example, rather than local offices of the - Buildings/facilities department, locally-elected representative - Educational support might be the more obvious contact point if citizens required a brokerage service.13 Compare Ireland to Finland. Finnish 9 Spotlight 8 (2012) Local Government Reform. parliamentarians, like Irish TDs, have 10 Water Services Bill 2013 provides that local electoral incentives to focus heavily on the authorities will no longer be water authorities but 14 agents of Water Ireland the new central body. constituency. Finland has a candidate- 11 Council of Europe (2007) Local authority competencies in Europe prepared with Professor G. 12 Gallagher and Komito, (2010) p. 248. Marcou, Paris-Sorbonne University pp. 45-6. 13 MacCartaigh (2008) Government in Modern Information for Finland from UN-Habitat and Ireland IPA, Dublin p. 114 Seville City Council (2007) National legal 14 Raunio T (2005) in Gallagher and Mitchell, edrs frameworks for local government international (2005) The Politics of Electoral Systems Oxford, action. Oxford University Press. P. 484 3 focused proportional representation Figure 2: Prominent Issues in the average electoral system like PR STV and local, as TDs’ caseload19 opposed to national, party selectors are largely in control of candidate selection. % of TDs for whom However, where Irish and Finnish political systems differ is in the strength of local this issue arises government. Finnish local government has an extensive range of functions and daily has a high degree of financial autonomy to raise funds.15 Planning… 18% Housing 76% Strong local government explains at least Property… 6% in part why Finnish parliamentarians focus first and foremost on influencing national Social welfare 74% legislation.16 The ‘welfare officer’ role, Health 64% which generates casework, is ‘practically Immigration 27% non-existent.’ Parliamentarians do not Agriculture 27% tend to have designated constituency Broadband 14% offices and regular clinics are very much Education 26% the exception. A summer tour of the 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% constituency’s municipalities is a more typical way to retain contact with the electorate. It suggests that local government’s narrow range of functions explains at least part of Constituency problems tend to be directed the demand for TDs to be ‘welfare officers’ to the parliamentarian only as a last or mediators. However, the question resort. Instead, the agencies of local remains as to why people contact public government which deliver the wide range representatives at all about services of services can be contacted and, it would instead of those actively engaged in appear, answer directly to citizens.17 delivering the service? If the narrow range of functions is a key explanation for the extent of localism in Political scientists point to the poor Ireland, we would expect the vast majority (though improving) interface between of queries received by TDs to concern citizens and the agencies or Departments services delivered by central government. delivering services. The practice of using TDs as mediators is reinforced by the Does the evidence support this? special access they are granted to service A survey of TDs (2009) found that two of deliverers. For example, the Department the three types of issues most frequently of Social Protection’s special hotline brought by constituents to TDs – social enabling TDs to enquire about individual welfare and health - are indeed under the cases has existed for 20 years.20 remit of central government (Fig.2). This finding is consistent with earlier research Former Minister and TD, Noel Dempsey, by Gallagher and Komito 18 suggested in 2002 that helping citizens to engage with the State might be better 21 undertaken by local councillors. If local 15 Sjoblom Stefan ‘Finland’ in Loughlin, Hendriks, councillors or Citizens Information Lidstrom (2011). Bureaus had this type of access to 16 Raunio T (2005) p. 485. Departments, constituents may not look 17 Arter David ‘The Michael Marsh Question: How for TD’s assistance. Or if, as in Finland, do Finns do Constituency Service?’ Parliamentary Affairs Vol. 64:1 pp. 129-152. (2011) p. 140. 19 O’Leary E (2011) 18 O’Leary E, (2011)‘The Constituency 20 Gallagher and Komito, (2010), 253. Orientation of modern TDs’ Irish Political Studies, 21 All Party Oireachtas Committee on the Vol 26: 3 pp. 329-343. Survey and interview with a Constitution (2002) Seventh Progress Report: representative sample of TDs (66 in total). Parliament 4 citizens themselves directly contacted the 2. Complexity of institutional service provider with queries particular to structures at local level their individual cases, the need for the TD The demand from constituents for the as a broker may disappear. That some services of public representatives, TDs attributed a reduction in certain types whether local or national, is associated of queries to technological advances with the complexity brought to modern which aid the application process for government by the welfare state.25 benefits lends support to this argument.22 Political scientists explain that service In sum, it would appear that the demand delivery and governance at the local level for a constituency service from TDs would is increasingly complex, fragmented and reduce (a) if more competencies were networked. As a result, decision-making devolved to local government and (b) if depends on a number of key individuals local agents delivering services were who are located in different organisations 23 and on different levels instead of on the more responsive to citizens’ inquiries. 26 hierarchy of local government. Effect of other weakness in local In Ireland, this complexity is compounded government on demand not only by the extent to which central Equally striking in Figure 2 is the regularity government delivers every day services with which TDs are contacted about such as health and education, but also by issues which are, in fact, under the remit the many local structures which exist 27 of local government. outside of local government itself. For example, there are 33 VECs, 35 TDs are slightly more likely (76%) to be City/County Enterprise Boards,28 54 contacted daily about housing issues as integrated LEADER and partnership they are about social welfare issues companies, seven regional fishery boards (74%). Queries about education and and 17 harbour authorities.29 agriculture, both largely relating to grants which were administered by local With complexity comes a lack of clarity on government at the time of the survey, also the part of citizens about which level or featured regularly in a TD’s constituency agency of government is responsible for caseload as did queries about planning delivering particular services. If the permission.24 Unlike social welfare and agency is locally-based, it may be unclear health, these queries would more logically whether or not the agency is, in fact, a be raised with local representatives. part of the local government system. Therefore, local government’s narrow In the face of this complexity, a TD stands range of functions is not the only out as a leader - a high-profile elected explanation for constituency workloads. representative - with whom citizens Why do constituents contact TDs about identify.30 issues for which local government is But why does the TD stand out rather than responsible? the local County Manager or a local Two further weaknesses in local councillor? government help to answer this question: the complexity of institutional structure 25 Norris and Lovenduski,1995 Political and weak political leadership at local Recruitment, Gender, Race and Class in the British level. Parliament Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press 26 Steyvers et al (2008) Local Government Studies, Vol. 34.2 p. 136. 22 O’Leary (2010) p. 146. 27 O’Riordan, Assessing the local-centre 23 Arter, (2011) p.141. government policy relationship in Ireland PhD 24 Conversation with the author confirmed the type Thesis NUI Maynooth (2010). of queries received under ‘education’ and 28 The Action Programme (2012) plans to phase ‘agriculture.’ Note that responsibility for these out. educational grants has since been moved to a 29 O’Riordán (October 2010) pp. 201. central agency – SUSI. 30 John (2008) Local Government Studies Vol 34.2 5

3. Local political leadership contacted a Senator (Table 2).32 The contacts are not broken down by subject. Spotlight no. 8 (2012) described the Table 2 33 institutions of local government and the Public % of respondents extent to which the balance of power in Representative contacting public local government is weighted in favour of representatives in Managers over elected representatives. A the last 5 years Manager has little incentive to deal with TD 22.3% individual constituents’ cases. Councillor 6.1% However, the strength of the County Senator 1% Manager vis-à-vis councillors leads to Did not answer/not 70.3% applicable relatively weak political leadership at local level and local government which is not Have measures to strengthen local strongly accountable to local people. The political leadership elsewhere affected the local TD is more visible and perceived to constituency caseloads of be more powerful than councillors. The parliamentarians? dual mandate, which continued until 2004, may have contributed to the established Many countries, including some areas in practice of approaching TDs rather than the UK, have aimed to strengthen political councillors. TDs who were also councillors leadership by introducing directly-elected were seen as the mediators between local mayors to local government. One and central government.31 Further, TDs individual who is visible and accountable have more resources at their disposal is argued to be less confusing than the than councillors do. traditional collective and consensual forms of leadership typical of local If weak political leadership at a local level government.34 is an explanation for localism amongst TDs, one would expect that (a) Like Ireland, the UK has a centralised constituents are more likely to contact state, relatively weak local government TDs about any issue than councillors and and MPs with high constituency (b) that creating more visible political workloads.35What has been the effect of leadership at a local level would reduce introducing directly-elected mayors to the constituency workload of local government? parliamentarians. There has been little research into the What does the evidence say? effect of introducing directly-elected Figure 2 illustrates that TDs are contacted mayors on the constituency caseloads of about many issues which relate to national parliamentarians in the UK. There services delivered by local government. is evidence, however, that they This may be because citizens, confused dramatically raise the profile of local about the responsibilities of different leaders. agencies at a local level, and in the absence of a clearly accountable local political leader, see TDs as the public representative most likely to address their 32 INES, Trinity College Dublin, 2002. The concern. question was not repeated in the 2007 or 2011 There is evidence that citizens approach study. 33 This information dates from 2002. But O’Leary’s TDs more frequently than they do local research finds that the effect of new media –greater representatives. The Irish National availability of information and easier access to Election Study found that only 6.1 % of Members – has not resulted in a decline in the level voters had contacted a councillor in the of queries received by TDs. O’Leary (2011) p. 334. previous 5 years compared with 22.3% 34 See John (2008) opcit. Also Wollmann (2008) in who had contacted a TD and 1% who had the same volume. 35 Constituency workload of UK MPs is outlined in L&RS Spotlight (2011) PR STV and Localism in 31 Loughlin (2011) in Loughlin et al, edrs. p.65. Irish Politics. 6

A poll conducted shortly after the reduction depends on variables such as introduction of directly-elected mayors personal choice and how marginal an found that, on average, 57% of voters electoral area is.40 could name their mayor. In areas without directly-elected mayors only 8% of people 4. Weak Financial Autonomy could identify their local council leader.36 Spotlight no. 8 (2012) described the weak Further, many mayors hold open clinics, financial autonomy of Irish local appear on phone-ins and deal directly with government compared with other their constituents.37 European countries. Local government This suggests that a directly-elected depends extensively on central mayor with a relatively high political profile government for funding. Political scientists could serve as an alternative point of have argued that this creates incentives contact for citizens and could reduce the for parliamentarians to lobby central demand on TDs to undertake constituency government to bring resources to their caseloads. constituency, as opposed to ‘representing the general interests of their constituency On the other hand, academics have in the legislative process.’41 examined the impact on the constituency workloads of Westminster MPs of Is this the case in Ireland? TDs have establishing the Welsh Assembly and reported spending 25% of their Scottish Parliament. They found that constituency work-time lobbying central constituency casework, especially the government on behalf of the constituency. demand created from constituents for it, It is not clear what proportion of this time decreased for Scottish and Welsh MPs is spent lobbying about the disbursement since the establishment of a new, more of government resources. O’Leary’s 38 local, tier of representation. 63% of survey suggested that TDs belonging to Scottish MPs stated that their government parties are most likely to constituency workload had declined by engage in lobbying for resources as they 2004. are more likely to be successful.42 The decline in casework, in particular in Mayor Michael Murphy of Passage West Wales, was not as sharp as one might Town Council criticised local have expected given the level of government’s lack of financial autonomy devolution. The authors explained that the and its effect on the behaviour of elected new tier of elected representatives representatives. Without economic reduced the number of constituents resources, he said, local councils of any contacting MPs. It did not necessarily kind can do little. Instead, local and reduce the supply side i.e. the political national representatives must concern impulse on the part of MPs to continue to themselves with lobbying central undertake constituency caseloads for government so that they can offer detailed 39 electoral purposes. economic benefits to their localities just in 43 Similarly, research examining fifteen time for election time. different case studies across Europe, concludes that the introduction of a regional tier generally reduces the 40 Conversation with Prof. Jonathan Bradbury constituency caseload of national (November 2012). Research will be published by parliamentarians. The extent of this Oxford University Press in early 2013. 41 Gay Oonagh, ‘MPs go back to their Constituencies’ The Political Quarterly Vol. 76: 1 36 Lodge Guy (April 2012), Institute for Public pp. 55-66 p. 58 Policy Research (UK), ‘Mayors for all major 42 O’Leary (2011) PhD Thesis on the Constituency English Cities: a democratic argument’ published Role of TDs, Department of Geography, UCC. p. on www.opendemocracy.net/print/65281 182. There were party differences with 66% of 37 Lodge Guy (April, 2012). TDs seeing this role as important. 38 Bradbury and Russell (2007) p. 105. 43 Mayor in his submission to the White Paper and 39 Bradbury and Russell (2007) p. 107. as quoted in the South Eastern Star, 10 July 2010. 7

 leading economic, social and What reforms have the community development potential to reduce  delivering efficient and good-value constituency caseloads? services, and

 representing citizens and local The evidence above suggests that there communities effectively and are a number of reforms to local accountably.’44 government that would have the potential to gradually change the role of the TD. We examine it for evidence of the types of Firstly, by reducing the demand from reforms predicted to reduce TDs’ constituents for TDs to serve as a constituency workloads. ‘welfare/information officer’ mediating Devolve power to local government between constituents and the state; Weaknesses caused by unequal Secondly, by reducing the need for TDs to representation and inconsistent structures lobby central government for local funds. in local government are the primary focus of reform in the Action Programme.45 On These reforms would: the other hand, the devolution of power or  Devolve more power and functions, functions to local government is limited to to local government while its new role in economic and community simultaneously development. And the establishment of  Reducing the complexity of local Water Ireland suggests that a trend of governance and enhancing the centralisation continues. interface between citizen and those delivering services so that there is Most constituency queries about centrally- less need for brokers, provided services are about social welfare  Create more visible and and health. As such, the devolution of accountable political leadership at economic and community development local level functions is unlikely to alter the flow of constituents’ queries to the TD, with the  Increase the financial autonomy of possible exception of queries directed at local government. TDs by local interest groups. The However, it must be noted that these evidence from O’Leary’s study was that reforms would not necessarily change the while only 3% of regular representations ‘supply side’ of constituency casework. If to TDs from interest groups regarded political parties and TDs continued to see enterprise, 12% regarded local 46 electoral value in constituency casework, development. reforms to local government might not It has been argued that genuine reduce them but only change their focus. devolution only takes place if there is Does the Action Programme for Effective confidence amongst central reformers that Local Government Reform (2012) include Ministers will no longer be held 47 the type of reforms which may reduce the accountable for services at a local level. demand on TDs to focus primarily on It is possible that the Action Programme’s constituency work? reforms to enhance both the efficiency and accountability of local government will Local Government Reform (2012) and 44 Department of the Environment, (2012) Putting People First: Action Programme for Effective Localism Local Government. Summary p. iii. Spotlight no.8, Action Programme, 2012 2012 considered how the Government’s Action Programme for Effective Local Government would The Action Programme aims to make address the weaknesses in Irish local government. ‘local government the main vehicle of 45 See Spotlight no 8 2012 governance and public service at local 46 O’Leary, (2010) PhD Thesis.. level’ by: 47 Lodge Guy (2012). 8 increase this confidence and create space and the fixyourstreet.ie customer for the devolution of more functions to service initiative will be rolled out in local government in the future. every authority; Reduce complexity and enhance  Local authorities will be required to provide good quality public public interface information about local services and how it uses resources. Reducing complexity  Service Level Agreements between The Government’s policy is to end the Departments and local authorities practice of establishing new agencies at will be required. They will set out the the local level outside of the institutions of standards for local services in all of local government. This would reduce its programme areas. These will complexity. have to be approved by elected

members of local government. In terms of concrete examples of reducing institutional complexity at the local level, The extent to which these reforms will the Action Programme provides for a lead to improved citizen-local authority greater alignment of local community interface will vary from council to council. development supports with local Even in cases where they lead to a government. Moreover, it makes local significant improvement, the constituency government the central player in caseloads of TDs may not always decline coordinating local economic development, in volume. instead of agencies which are outside of 48 A decline in caseloads would depend, in the local government structure. part, on TDs’ willingness to re-direct relevant queries to the new Customer However, new structures for the delivery Service Officer in local authorities and/or of public services will be established at to local councillors. the national level if there are exceptional reasons to do so. This may increase Studies in the UK found that the re- institutional complexity at the local level.49 direction of queries by MPs to local councillors is least likely where the Enhance public interface parliamentary seat is marginal and where An improvement in the public interface the council is controlled by another and responsiveness of agencies and party.50 Evidence from devolution in Departments would reduce some of the Scotland and Wales suggests that the demand for constituency-focused TDs. higher the profile of the member of the However, this is outside the scope of a devolved institution, the higher the programme for local government reform. probability that Westminster politicians will re-direct constituents to them where On the other hand, the Action Programme appropriate.51 This brings us to the third does place emphasis on improving the type of reform which might reduce the public interface of those responsible for constituency caseloads of national service delivery at a local level. It includes politicians. some measures which could reduce the Strengthen local political leadership demand from constituents on TDs The Action Programme does not including: recommend the directly-elected mayor  Each County/City council will have a approach (except for proposing that the dedicated Customer Service Officer four Dublin councils hold a plebiscite in Dublin on the issue). In the Irish context, the office of the directly-elected mayor 48 This alignment is not without its critics. See might be an obvious place for local ‘2,000 jobs at risk in plan for local authority merger’ 26 November 2012. 49 See Bills Digest, Water Services Bill 2013 pp.26- 50 Buck and Cain (1990) cited in Russell and 7 for different roles of local authorities and Water Bradbury (2007) p. 101. Ireland in service delivery. 51 Russell and Bradbury (2007) p. 112. 9 constituents to bring issues. The 51% of Executive. However, they are unlikely Irish local councillors who are in favour of alone to fundamentally alter the strength introducing a directly-elected mayor cited of political leadership at a local level to the improved accountability and political extent that local representatives become leadership as amongst the benefits.52 the focus of citizens’ requirements for a brokerage service. Why? However, there are alternative ways to The policy and legal framework which enhance local political leadership while defines the balance of power between maintaining the Manager-Council model of Chief Executive and elected local government. These include representatives will remain. The Chief increasing the collective policy-setting Executive will remain accountable to the powers of councillors vis-à-vis the County Minister for the Environment and not to Manager or providing locally-elected locally-elected representatives and the representatives with stronger mechanisms political leader (mayor /cathaorleach) will for holding the executive (Manager) to remain a one-year, largely ceremonial account. Further, the visibility and role. authority of the indirectly-elected mayor/cathaoirleach could be Financial Autonomy strengthened by making it a five-year On the other hand, the Action Programme position. proposes a significant increase in the financial autonomy of local government The Action Programme includes some through a new local property tax.53 This measures which affect the relationship may in time affect the constituency focus between Managers and elected local of TDs in two ways. representatives: First, in terms of demand, if citizens are  Manager will be replaced by a Chief paying taxes directly to local government, Executive it may in time cause them to seek greater  Consideration to be given to a accountability of local government. With statutory role for elected this may come a greater focus on the representatives in ensuring that the actions of locally-elected leaders and, Chief Executive implements the consequently, they could become the policy they set out. focus of citizens’ queries.  Consideration to be given to Secondly, it may reduce the time spent by extending the ‘reserved functions’ of TDs lobbying Government to direct central elected representatives. government resources and funds towards  New mechanisms which will assist their constituency. However, as long as elected councillors (and central the centralised nature of service delivery government) in holding the Chief continues, the incentive for TDs to lobby Executive to account for Government to bring resources to their performance of the council. They constituency will remain regardless of the are a National Oversight and Audit enhanced financial autonomy of local Committee for Local Government authorities. and a statutory underpinning for Local Authority Audit Committees Supply of locally-focused TDs This Spotlight has focused primarily on These measures may strengthen the the demand from constituents for the position of elected-representatives vis-à- brokerage/information services provided vis the centrally-appointed Chief by TDs and on the extent to which reform of local government could reduce this

52 demand. The supply of constituency- Consultation with all councillors (June 2012) focused TDs, which was considered in conducted by the Minister for the Environment in advance of the publication of the Action Programme.. Reported in the Journal 17 October 2012 http://www.thejournal.ie/directly-elected- 53 See L&RS eOLAS page on Finance (Local mayor-dublin-638915-Oct2012/ Property Tax) Bill 2012 10 more detail in Spotlight no. 2 (2011), is a devolution of many powers or functions to separate issue. the local level, reforms which together could reduce constituency workloads. The Action Programme’s reform of structures, which are outlined in detail in Finally, reforms to local government which Spotlight no. 8 (2012), are likely to affect reduce the demand for constituency- the supply side i.e. incentives to focused TDs are unlikely to affect the undertake constituency casework. The 80 supply side of constituency work i.e. the Town Councils are to be abolished and perceived need to take on constituency new Municipal District Councils for all caseloads for electoral purposes. areas (bar Dublin) will be created. There However, a reduction in the demand from will be an overall reduction in the number constituents would allow TDs to represent of councillors by 667 and there will be their constituents in the legislature without significant changes to local electoral areas spending a large proportion of their which will be announced in 2013.54 working week dealing with constituents’ individual cases.’55 The precise impact of these structural changes to representation at the local level on general elections and, consequentially on the electoral strategies of aspiring TDs, is likely to vary from constituency to constituency. For example, as Spotlight no. 2 (2011) discussed, intense intra-party competition is considered to increase the perceived need on the part of candidates to undertake heavy constituency caseloads. The abolition of the position of Town Councillor could make the local electoral environment more competitive and drive up the supply of public representatives in some constituencies. This could result in large party tickets and, consequentially, more intra-party competition and more perceived pressure to undertake constituency caseloads. Conclusion This Spotlight has highlighted the type of local government reform which could reduce the demand on TDs to undertake the caseloads of individual constituents. The Action Programme for Effective Local Government includes some reforms – in particular to the complexity and efficiency of local government and to its financial autonomy- which may, in time, reduce the demand on TDs to take up the cases of individual citizens. However, it does not significantly strengthen local political leadership nor does it provide for the

54 There are currently 258 local electoral areas, 27 of which fall into the Dublin area. 55 Farrell David (2011). 11