The “Why,” “What,” and “How” of Healthy Self-Regulation: 7 Mindfulness and Well-Being from a Self-Determination Theory Perspective

Patricia P. Schultz and Richard M. Ryan

To be a self-regulating being requires awareness. with their self-endorsed values and authentic We live in a world with stimulating enticements, interests. Extensive research has shown the sig- myriad , and continuously arising and nifi cant physical and mental benefi ts that such competing motives and desires. Letting some autonomous regulation yields. In contrast, when pass, and acting on those that are most congruent people engage in activities based in introjections with living well, is a formidable task. Doing so or external pressures, the regulation of their entails a center of observation outside the fray, behavior is controlled , and such regulation is and a capacity to make use of it. associated with diminished persistence and per- Self-determination theory (SDT; Ryan & formance, and more impoverished experience Deci, 2000 ), akin to many other philosophical and well-being (Ryan & Deci, 2000). The dis- traditions and psychological frameworks, views tinctions between the autonomous and controlled awareness as a critical component of healthy self- reasons underlying people’s behaviors consti- regulation and well-being (Deci & Ryan, 1980 , tutes the “why” approach of SDT. 1985 ; Ryan, Huta, & Deci, 2008 ). According to Additionally, within SDT, processes associated SDT, awareness is central to the process of with awareness impact the content, or the “what” healthy regulation. When people act with auton- of people’s goals. Individuals can focus on attain- omy , they engage in behaviors that are congruent ing extrinsic goals (e.g., wealth, , attrac- tive image) or intrinsic goals (e.g., personal growth, community contributions, close relation- ships). The evidence reveals differential conse- quences of both the pursuit and attainment of * P. P. Schultz ( ) extrinsic versus intrinsic goals, especially with Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Psychology , University of Rochester , Rochester , regard to well-being (e.g., Kasser & Ryan, 1993 , NY 14627 , USA 1996 ). Both the “why” and the “what” of behavior e-mail: [email protected] regulation are predictive of more optimal develop- R. M. Ryan ment, social relationships, and wellness (Deci & Department of Clinical and Social Sciences in Ryan, 2000 ). Specifi cally, by acting autonomously Psychology , University of Rochester , Rochester , and pursuing intrinsic goals people can live eudai- NY 14627 , USA monically, with the rich positive experience that Institute for Positive Psychology and Education , attends living well (Ryan, Curren, & Deci, 2013 ). Australian Catholic University , Strathfi eld , NSW , Australia In this chapter we therefore address an impor- e-mail: [email protected] tant “how” of eudaimonic living, namely how

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2015 81 B.D. Ostafi n et al. (eds.), Handbook of Mindfulness and Self-Regulation, DOI 10.1007/978-1-4939-2263-5_7 82 P.P. Schultz and R.M. Ryan both more autonomous regulation and more ment of these basic needs facilitate intrinsic intrinsic goal selection are facilitated by the open motivation, integrated self-regulation, and wellness; and receptive awareness that defi nes the construct whereas need thwarting environments, lifestyles, of mindfulness (Brown & Ryan, 2003 ). To do so or activities are associated with antagonist out- we present a brief overview of SDT, delineate the comes (Deci & Ryan, 2012 ). construct of mindfulness, and review evidence of how this quality of consciousness relates to both the regulatory processes through which behav- A Differentiated View of Motivation: iors are enacted, and the content of goals that The “Why” of Self-Regulation individuals pursue. Unlike many theories that conceptualize motiva- tion as a unitary construct, SDT specifi es differ- Self-Determination Theory ent types of motivation underlying behavior regulation. First, SDT posits that humans have SDT is an empirically driven theory of human evolved to be liberally endowed with intrinsic motivation and development that posits that motivation , or behavior energized by its inherent humans are inherently active, curious, and satisfactions. Intrinsic motivation is typifi ed by growth-oriented creatures who naturally strive activities such as play, exploration, sport and lei- toward both the integration of a coherent and uni- sure reading, in which people exercise capacities fi ed sense of self, and the integration of the indi- and experience growth. Intrinsic motivation is vidual within a broader social framework (Deci also a prototype of human autonomy, in that & Ryan, 2000 ). Similar to other organismic theo- intrinsically motivated activities are invariantly ries of personality development, SDT postulates experienced as self-determined, or volitional. that people spontaneously seek challenges, pur- Yet, despite the importance of intrinsic moti- sue interests, and strive for social connectedness vation for learning and development, most daily (Ryan, 1995 ). Through the extension of their activities are not intrinsically motivated, but inherent capacities and integrated motives, indi- rather are instrumental in nature. That is, much of viduals more fully actualize their human poten- our behavior is extrinsically motivated . Although tials and experience more eudaimonic lifestyles many researchers have viewed extrinsic motiva- ( Ryan, Huta, et al., 2008 ; Ryan et al., 2013 ). tion as heteronomously driven or controlled (e.g., Yet within the SDT perspective, this natural deCharms, 1968 ), SDT has long proposed that inclination toward growth and integration is not extrinsic motivation is more complex. SDT viewed as by any means automatic, or even a instead describes a spectrum model of extrinsic typically smooth, developmental pathway. Just regulations spanning from highly controlled to like a seed needs critical nutrients to fl ourish, the highly autonomous forms of self-regulation integrative processes of human psychological (Deci & Ryan, 1985 ; Ryan & Deci, 2000 ). development require specifi c supports. In SDT The most controlled form of regulation in this the most critical of these are described by the spectrum is external regulation , which pertains to concept of basic psychological needs (Deci & behaviors that are enacted to comply with exter- Ryan, 2000 ; Ryan, 1995 ), which represent the nal contingencies, both punishing and rewarding. cross-developmental and culturally universal External regulation can drive behavior, but it is necessities for growth and wellness. SDT speci- often poorly maintained, and/or accompanied by fi es three basic needs: competence (i.e., mastery negative affect. A closely related form of extrin- and effi cacy), autonomy (i.e., volition and self- sic motivation is introjected regulation . endorsement of one’s behaviors), and relatedness Introjected acts are performed to experience self- (i.e., a sense of belonging and of being cared for). and/or other-contingent approval. Although Substantial research shows that social contexts “internally” regulated, introjected behaviors are and personal relationships that support the fulfi ll- experienced as controlled because the individual 7 Mindfulness and Self-Determination 83 feels pressured to avoid and/or projected and more relevant to our focus in this paper, disapproval, or conversely to garner esteem and internal processes are also important. At the core ego-enhancement. can be a powerful of volitional and self-endorsed regulation lies the motivator (e.g., Ryan, Koestner, & Deci, 1991 ), capacity to refl ectively consider one’s behavior but it comes with costs such as unstable persis- and its congruency with one’s personal values tence, stress, and lower well-being. and needs (Ryan & Deci, 2006 ). That is, the exis- On the more autonomous end of this spectrum tential commitment to act consistently with one’s is identifi ed regulation, in which the individual authentic self, and be sensitive to external cir- personally embraces and refl ectively endorses his cumstances, impacts the regulatory process. or her actions. As a result, identifi ed regulation is When awareness of inner and outer circum- associated with more persistence, better perfor- stances is blocked, so too is a person’s ability to mance, and more positive affect than controlled attend to prompts arising from basic needs, to forms of regulation. The most autonomous form mobilize resilience, and to consciously self- of extrinsic motivation is integrated regulation , organize and regulate actions (Ryan, Legate, in which the person has fully assimilated her Niemiec, & Deci, 2012 ). Thus, mindfulness, con- identifi ed regulation into the self, coordinating it ceptualized as internal and external awareness of with other values and goals. Like intrinsically the present moment, is a quality of consciousness motivated actions, integrated actions are highly that has been shown to lead to greater autonomy autonomous and wholeheartedly engaged. But (Brown & Ryan, 2003 ). When mindful, people integrated regulations are still technically extrin- are aware of what is truly taking place and thus sic because they are undertaken to attain out- better able to make purposeful decisions, engage comes separable from the actions themselves. their “self-compatibility checker” (Kuhl & Typically it is only through self-refl ection and Kazen, 1994 ), and function in a more integrated awareness that one is able to recognize one’s own way. Yet before elaborating on this, we turn next values and needs, and therefore able to bring new to what people are pursuing in their lives, or their regulations into such congruence. Thus, as we goals contents, which is also affected by shall detail, mindfulness is a crucial ingredient mindfulness. for the integrated regulation of behavior, and truly autonomous extrinsic self-regulation. At this point hundreds of studies have verifi ed: Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Aspirations: (a) that this spectrum of regulations forms a con- The “What” of Behavioral Regulation tinuum of autonomy (e.g. Roth, Assor, KanatMaymon, & Kaplan, 2007 ; Ryan & Connell, Although so far we have emphasized the “why” 1989 ); and (b) that more effective behavioral reg- of self-regulation (i.e., the regulatory processes ulation and enhanced well-being are associated through which outcomes are pursued), SDT with higher relative autonomy in multiple domains also concerns the “what” of self-regulation, or (e.g., Blais, Sabourin, Boucher, & Vallerand, the content of the outcomes or goals pursued 1990 ; Gagné & Deci, 2005 ; Reeve & Jang, 2006 ; and their associated well-being consequences. Ryan, Patrick, Deci, & Williams, 2008 ). Research in a number of cultures has shown that the pursuit and attainment of intrinsic goals “Internal” Promoters of Autonomous (i.e., goals such as personal growth, affi liation, Self-Regulation or community contributions) have a positive Taking into account the manifold positive per- relation to basic need satisfaction and a variety sonal consequences of intrinsic regulation and of well-being outcomes. In contrast, extrinsic more autonomous forms of extrinsic regulation, goals and aspirations (i.e., goals that refl ect considerable research within SDT has focused on extrinsic values, such as wealth, image, or the social contextual factors that affect relative fame) are related to need thwarting and accord- autonomy (see Ryan & Deci, 2000 ). Nonetheless, ingly, greater ill-being (Kasser, 2002; Kasser & 84 P.P. Schultz and R.M. Ryan

Ryan, 1993 , 1996 ). Studies have also found that (Brown & Ryan, 2003 ). Awareness is the the attainment of intrinsic goals predicts more background “tracking system” of consciousness, long-lasting well-being compared to the monitoring an individual’s internal and external achievement of extrinsic goals (Vansteenkiste, happenings. Attention, on the other hand, is the Ryan, & Deci, 2008 ). mechanism of focusing on a particular stimulus Why do these two types of aspiration have present in the conscious awareness (Westen, vastly different consequences? The explanation 1999). Therefore, an individual can be aware of a lies in the extent to which they ultimately facili- plethora of stimuli, but it is the attention that tate or undermine basic psychological need satis- directs what, within the “ground” of awareness, faction (Ryan, Sheldon, Kasser, & Deci, 1996 ). is in focus. Intrinsic goals are more closely associated with As is often the case, differing schools of the satisfaction of fundamental needs. For exam- thought highlight various aspects of mindfulness ple, willingly giving to others, which is associ- both theoretically and operationally (Dimidjian ated with relationship and community goals, & Linehan, 2003 ; Hayes & Wilson, 2003 ). Brown leaves one with a sense of autonomy (because the and Ryan’s defi nition of mindfulness as receptive act is volitional), competence (because one is attention and awareness differs from other having a positive impact) and relatedness approaches that include within the idea of mind- (because one is connecting); these in turn foster fulness qualities such as acceptance (Bishop enhanced well-being. In contrast, extrinsic aspi- et al., 2004 ); active cognitive operations on exter- rations are more closely related to obtaining nal stimuli (Langer, 1989 ); diminished self-talk, external approval or visible signs of worth, and non-judgment, and non-doing (Leary & Tate, thus are generally less likely to directly provide 2007), or holding a particular set of philosophi- need satisfaction, or may even distract from it, cal, ethical or therapeutic beliefs (Baer, Smith, leading to greater ill-being (e.g., Niemiec, Ryan, Hopkins, Krietemeyer, & Toney, 2006 ). All of & Deci, 2009; Vansteenkiste et al., 2007 ; these qualities are indeed associated with mind- Weinstein & Ryan, 2010 ). In the following sec- ful states (Brown & Ryan, 2004 ; Brown, Ryan, & tions, we will review how mindfulness fuels both Creswell, 2007a , 2007b ), but from the viewpoint the movement toward more autonomous reasons of Brown and Ryan, these other elements all fol- for acting, and the pursuit of intrinsic goal con- low from a truly open and receptive awareness, tents. But fi rst, it is important to precisely defi ne and many are consequences of mindfulness. mindfulness, and differentiate it from concepts Regardless of the specifi c defi nition or measures, that are sometimes mistakenly confused with it. however, research conducted over the last three decades on dispositional mindfulness, induced mindful states, and mindfulness training inter- The Construct of Mindfulness ventions has demonstrated the benefi ts of this attribute of consciousness for a wide range of Within the theoretical framework of SDT we outcomes, such as psychological and physical have drawn on the defi nition and measurement of health, and the quality of one’s relationships and mindfulness introduced by Brown and Ryan performance in multiple domains (e.g., Baer, (2003 ). In their approach mindfulness is defi ned 2003 , 2006; Brown et al., 2007a ; Grossman, as a receptive state of mind wherein attention , Niemann, Schmidt, & Walach, 2004 ). informed by a sensitive awareness of what is occurring at the moment, plainly observes inter- nal (e.g., psychological and somatic experiences) Mindfulness Versus Self-Awareness and external events that are taking place (Brown & Ryan, 2003 ; Kabat-Zinn, 2003 ). Attention and It is important to differentiate between the con- awareness, key elements in defi ning mindfulness, cept of mindfulness from the constructs of self- are important components of consciousness awareness and refl exive consciousness, which 7 Mindfulness and Self-Determination 85 have received much attention (e.g., Buss, 1980 ; larly the aspect of “self-refl ectiveness” (Trapnell Carver & Scheier, 1981 ). In a nutshell, such theo- & Campbell, 1999 ), has been related to maladap- ries describe self-awareness in terms of knowl- tive outcomes and poorer mental health. edge about the self. For example, private self-consciousness is described as a tendency to be highly aware of internal states (Carver & Self-Regulation and Mindfulness: Scheier, 1981 ). Nonetheless, this type of self- The “Why” consciousness can refl ect any type of internal state, including negative reactions or evaluative We have argued that the motives underlying dispositions toward internal or external events behavior are closely related to the quality of rather than receptive openness. Similarly, refl ex- engagement as well as to wellness consequences; ive consciousness (e.g., Baumeister, 1999 ) refers such that those who pursue authentic interests to metacognitive processes that operate within and values are overall more vital and healthy. Yet, thoughts, , and other contents of con- to pursue this trajectory of integration and auton- sciousness, and thus can involve varied cognitive omy, SDT posits that people are aided by envi- and intellectual operations and . ronments that support the fulfi llment of needs for Mindfulness is, in contrast, “prerefl exive” and autonomy, competence, and relatedness. Support has at its root a perceptual and non-evaluative for autonomy plays a particularly key role. This character: it means to simply and openly observe is evident in the fact that although support for current events or engage in “bare” attention. It is relatedness and competence may foster the inter- not thoughts or cognitions, but rather the space nalization of a behavior (i.e., one’s adoption of a between them that sets the context where they regulation or value), these supports by them- occur (Brown et al., 2007b ). Drawing from a Zen selves are not enough to promote integration, metaphor, this quality of consciousness is like a which is a process necessary for true self- polished mirror, merely refl ecting what passes regulation (e.g., Deci, Eghrari, Patrick, & Leone, before it, without distortions or conceptual 1994; Grolnick & Ryan, 1989 ; Williams & Deci, thoughts. The separation between consciousness 1996 ). Hence, for integration to occur, people (context) and mental content, also referred to as need to freely process and endorse their motives decentering and desensitization (Martin, 1997 ), and regulations, as well as synthesize their mean- allows more autonomous self-regulation because ing with other aspects of self, that is, feel the behavior is informed by authentic awareness, autonomy need satisfi ed. rather than distorted self-cognitions. To be clear, Because mindfulness relates to one’s capacity this unbiased receptivity is not an aloofness or to openly attend to current internal and external disconnection with the world, but rather a more experiences, it enables and supports the self- “alert participation in the ongoing process of liv- insight and the self-refl ection necessary for ing” (Gunaratana, 2002 , p. 142). ensuring one’s values are in accordance with Empirical evidence supports these distinctions one’s behavior. Furthermore, it builds a frame- between mindfulness and self-awareness. work that aids the blend of that particular behav- Research shows at best weak, and sometimes ior with values that are already part of the self. negative, relations of mindfulness and indicators This awareness is an important substrate of inte- of self-awareness, including private self- gration, and therefore a critical ingredient of consciousness, public self-consciousness, refl ec- autonomy development (Deci & Ryan, 1985 ). In tion, and self-monitoring (Beitel, Ferrer, & other words, one can only be highly autonomous Cecero, 2005 ; Brown & Ryan, 2003 ). More rele- when one is clearly aware of one’s values and vant to the present discussion, whereas mindful- goals, and thus is able to engage in behaviors that ness has been associated with adaptive outcomes are congruent with one’s true self, free from and psychological health (e.g., Baer, 2003 ; external pressures or internal distortions or Brown & Ryan, 2003 ), self-awareness, particu- judgments. 86 P.P. Schultz and R.M. Ryan

Aiming to empirically demonstrate the a substantial part of our day-to-day cognitive, previous argument, Brown and Ryan (2003 ) con- emotional, and overt behavior does not require ducted the fi rst studies that explicitly investigated conscious awareness and attention. In other mindfulness and related it to the SDT framework. words, a good deal of our thoughts and actions The authors developed the Mindful Attention occur automatically without intentional effort Awareness Scale (MAAS) to measure this con- (Bargh, 1997 ; Deci & Ryan, 1980 ; Tart, 1994 ). struct both as a disposition and as a “state.” They Despite the many pragmatic benefi ts for this demonstrated that the MAAS was positively automaticity of behavior (e.g., one’s speed in correlated with both dispositional and state response to situational demands, or the greater autonomy, as well as with the other two basic availability of cognitive resources for more rele- needs described by SDT, relatedness and compe- vant tasks; Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000 ; Mitchell, tence. Moreover, to understand the role of Nosek, & Banaji, 2003 ), there are also costly mindfulness in regular day-to-day living, they consequences. When acting non-consciously one conducted additional investigations using experi- is more susceptible to engage in many habitual ence-sampling procedures. Both student and problematic and self-defeating behaviors, which working adult samples, after having completed a if refl ected upon are not congruent with one’s measure of trait mindfulness, were assessed for self-endorsed values (e.g., Clark & Rhyno, 2005 ; state mindfulness, affect, and the relative auton- Levesque & Brown, 2007 ; Ryan & Deci, 2006 ; omy of their behavior at the receipt of a pager Verplanken & Velsvik, 2008 ). Mindfulness, signal, sent three times a day on a quasi-random through awareness and attention, pulls people basis. In both samples, higher levels of both closer to what is currently taking place, without dispositional and state mindfulness predicted judgmental or evaluative attachments. This awak- more autonomous activity in daily life and lower ened state allows consciousness to become clear levels of unpleasant affects. Interestingly, the and fresh, which, in turn, acts as a liberating effects of trait and state mindfulness on auton- agent of conditioned responses, and allows peo- omy were independent, suggesting that even ple to better refl ect upon the “why” of actions, momentary experiences of mindfulness contrib- thus promoting more self-endorsed, autonomous ute to more volitional self-regulation and emo- behavior (Brown et al., 2007a). This connects tional well-being. with evidence showing that enhanced attention These positive relations between autonomous and awareness can prevent the enactment of auto- regulation and mindfulness beg the question of matic habits or reactions (e.g., Dijksterhuis & the mechanisms and processes through which Knippenberg, 2000 ). For example, Gollwitzer these relations occur. We shall now discuss pro- ( 1999) experimentally induced individuals to be cesses through which they may obtain, namely: aware of their automatic stereotypic beliefs (1) interference with automatic maladaptive toward elderly people, and found that subse- behaviors that are incongruent with one’s quently these stereotypic thoughts were less endorsed values; (2) promotion of less ego- readily automatically triggered. In this same way, involvement and cognitive distortion, freeing the mindfulness has been shown to be a protective self from internal and external pressures. factor against automatization of behavior, thus leading to more self-determined, autonomous regulation. De-automatizing and Integrative Levesque and Brown ( 2007) investigated the Role of Mindfulness role of mindfulness as a moderator between implicit regulation (assessed using the Implicit One of the pathways for the salutary effects of Association Test—IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & mindfulness is that it may decrease the likelihood Schwartz, 1998 ) and explicit regulation of day- of automatic maladaptive behaviors. Research on to- day behavior using an experience-sampling automatic and implicit processes has shown that strategy. Both implicit and explicit measures 7 Mindfulness and Self-Determination 87 assessed the degree to which the participant’s To add to these fi ndings, another study by regulation was autonomous or controlled. Results Brown and Ryan (2003 ) found that mindfulness showed that implicit regulation style predicted was associated with “emotional intelligence” day-to-day regulation only for those lower in dis- (Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, positional mindfulness. That is, for those high in 1995 ), specifi cally in a dimension that is closely mindfulness, the degree of daily autonomy was associated with emotional self-knowledge: clar- relatively high independently of implicit auton- ity of emotional experience. Such self-insight is omy level; in other words, it was high even when thought to be a crucial result of the present- participants implicitly associated themselves centered awareness essential for self-regulation with pressure and control. These results under- and more integrated functioning. score the de-automatizing role of mindfulness, overriding maladaptative tendencies and catalyz- ing self-endorsed behavior. This is thought to Liberating Role of Mindfulness: occur because mindfulness acts as a brake or A Thought Is Just a Thought redirector between salient primes and responses to them (Deci & Ryan, 1980 ). Open attention and awareness also foster autono- Focusing on this integrative aspect of mind- mous behavior because they can help free indi- fulness, Brown and Ryan ( 2003) reported that viduals from the external and internal controlling those higher in trait mindfulness showed greater forces that are alien to the authentic self (Brown congruence between implicit or non-conscious et al., 2007a ). As Hodgins and Knee (2002 ) put emotional state (assessed using the IAT; it, “Individuals who are functioning autono- Greenwald et al., 1998 ) and explicit self-reported mously…are responsive to reality rather than counterpart. Given that implicit measures are not directed by ego-invested preconceived notions” controlled by consciousness, these results indi- (p. 89). Mindful individuals have an observant cate that more mindful individuals are more stance toward experience rather than a cognitive attuned to their implicit emotions demonstrated refl exive stance that constantly informs thoughts by greater concordance with the analogous about the self. Stated differently, they recognize explicit self- descriptions. Note that, in the case the “self” as a process of integration and assimi- of emotions, this last study suggests that mind- lation and not as the product of self-evaluations. fulness is related to a greater association between This raises the question of “self”: What is “self” implicit and explicit emotional states; whereas and how can we formally defi ne it? when it comes to motivation, mindfulness seems Scholars from many fi elds, echoing the cen- to be associated with a greater dissociation trality that the construct presents for the human between maladaptive implicit motivational ori- experience, have been concerned with the con- entation and adaptive behavioral motivation. cept of “self” (Brown, Ryan, Creswell, & These results are not contradictory because in Niemiec, 2008 ). The two notions of self that pre- both cases mindfulness appears to provide a dominate today are the “I” self (McAdams, space for refl ection: individuals who are more 1990 ), mainly studied within organismic and attuned to their emotions are in a better position developmental theories (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 1991 ; to be in touch with their true selves and behave Loevinger & Blasi, 1991 ); and the “Me” self at genuinely; individuals who have an implicit ten- the core of social constructionist views of self. dency toward controlled motivation, but are able The “Me” self or “self-as-object” refers to the to stop and reframe their course of action, may creation of personal identity, and is derived from behave more autonomously. Thus regardless of the Mead-Cooley tradition (Ryan, 1993 ; Ryan & the direction of the relationship between implicit Deci, 2011 ). This concept of self concerns one’s and explicit measures, this open awareness identifi cation with specifi c roles, attributes, group works as a facilitator of integration and authentic memberships, and beliefs, which individuals are self-regulation. often motivated to protect or enhance. Under this 88 P.P. Schultz and R.M. Ryan view of self, people strive to meet the standards true self-regulation or autonomy (Brown, Ryan, associated with these internalized and culturally et al., 2008 ; Martin & Erber, 2005 ; Ryan & derived-self images (Ryan & Brown, 2003 ). Brown, 2003). Expressed differently, for highly When maintaining such self-representations mindful people, rejections or successes do not becomes a predominant goal, it brings with it a involve their self-worth and are not destabilizing variety of , confl icts, and defensive reac- rather, are simply seen as part of the personal tions (Brown, Ryan, et al., 2008 ). growth process, a hallmark of the “I” self. As a On the other hand, the “I” self or “self-as- result, this “quieting of the ego” allows them to process” view construes self not as a concept or behave volitionally and without the need to set of self-evaluations, but rather as the inherent prove, maintain, or stay attached to conceptions integrative tendencies of people to grow and cre- of the Me-self, which is a pathway toward inte- ate coherence in their experiences. Behavior grated functioning (Niemiec, Ryan, & Brown, motivated by the “I” self is more fully self- 2008 ; Ryan & Rigby, 2015 ). endorsed and whole-hearted, and is more likely Several studies support the argument that to be positively experienced, whereas behavior mindfulness, because of its grounding in reality motivated by the “Me” self is more closely and detachment from ego-involved contingen- related to controlled regulation (Ryan et al., cies and self-centered biases, attenuates reactiv- 2012 ). Mindfulness, with its open attention to the ity to threatening or stressful situations (see present moment, promotes the “I” self regulation Baer, 2003 ; Brown, Ryan, et al., 2008 ). As a and its synthetic tendencies by a greater allowing prime example, Niemiec and colleagues (2010 ) of and interest in what is occurring, and by free- conducted several experiments informed by ing the individual from evaluative mental con- Terror Management Theory (TMT; Greenberg, cepts, ego-involvement, and self-centered biases, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997 ). TMT posits all characteristics of the “Me” self (Ryan & that humans respond defensively to reminders Rigby, 2015 ). of death (e.g., through suppression of death There is growing evidence linking mindful- thoughts, self-esteem enhancement, and defense ness with both (1) less ego-involvement and of their cultural worldview). In seven experi- defensive reactions, and lower stress appraisals ments, Niemiec et al. demonstrated that trait and (2) more autonomous self-regulation. First, mindfulness mitigates defensive responses to many studies using the SDT framework demon- existential threat. Moreover, these experiments strated how ego-investment in outcomes impedes showed that this effect was due to the fact that autonomy, increases pressure and tension, and those higher in mindfulness more fully pro- lowers vitality (e.g., Nix, Ryan, Manly, & Deci, cessed death thoughts in an immediate sense, 1999 ; Ryan, 1982). In addition, other investiga- and because of that, were less likely to be hold- tions showed how actions performed mindfully ing on to threat and behaving defensively in are less likely to be driven by ego-concerns, and subsequent moments. These studies connect less prone to high stress reactions (Kernis & with other research on relationship confl icts Goldman, 2006 ; Niemiec et al., 2010 ; Ryan & (Barnes, Brown, Krusemark, Campbell, & Brown, 2003 ; Weinstein, Brown, & Ryan, 2009 ). Rogge, 2007 ); social exclusion ( Creswell, As Brown, Ryan, et al. (2008 ) describe, mindful- Eisenberg, & Lieberman, 2008), emotional ness “entails a shift in the locus of personal sub- threat (Arch & Craske, 2006 ), and other ego jectivity from conceptual representations of the threats by showing that an open, mindful pro- self and others to awareness itself” (p. 82). As a cessing of situations promotes fewer defensive consequence, it lessens the intra- and inter- reactions to adverse situations, and, in turn, personal pressures that the Me-self entails, and increases adaptive responses and well-being liberates the individual from the often automatic (Brown, Ryan, et al., 2008 ). cognitive distortions and defensive reactions that In another example Weinstein et al. (2009 ) can disrupt the integrative process underlying demonstrated how mindfulness, by fostering less 7 Mindfulness and Self-Determination 89 defensive thinking patterns and more openness Mindfulness as a Pathway to Intrinsic toward challenging events, promotes less nega- Goal Orientation tive cognitive appraisals of situations, and reduced levels of perceived stress. Across four A growing body of research suggests that mind- studies that included experimental, longitudinal, fulness increases one’s focus on intrinsic aspira- and experience sampling designs, the authors tions, resulting in greater well-being and healthier found that mindful individuals made more benign lifestyle decisions (Brown & Kasser, 2005 ). stress appraisals, and reported more adaptive Mindfulness has also been associated with greater stress responses, and these, in turn, fully or par- and compassion for others (Beitel et al., tially mediated the relations between mindful- 2005; Brown et al., 2007a ). For example, Shapiro, ness and well-being. For example, in a Schwartz, and Bonner (1998 ) reported that medi- longitudinal study, fi rst-semester freshmen cal students who received mindfulness training within a single course completed measures of displayed increases in empathy over time relative mindfulness, cognitive appraisal, coping, and ill- to a control group, even in high-stress contexts being at three points during the semester: at the such as fi nals week. Barnes et al. (2007 ), in an beginning, 1–2 days before the mid-term, and investigation of the role of mindfulness in roman- during fi nal exams. The longitudinal design tic relationship stress, found that it might enhance underscored that more mindful individuals healthy romantic relationship functioning. The tended to appraise challenging situations as less authors suggest that these benefi ts stem from an threatening, and respond in more adaptive ways inclination to other-centeredness or a greater dis- over time. position to be present to the partner, even in chal- In sum, it appears that open and receptive lenging situations. Mindfulness has also been observation of internal and external events can related to the promotion of intrinsic values such lead to positive outcomes. Moreover, when as community involvement, relationships, eco- behavior is not driven by ego-concerns, it is more logical stewardship, and lower materialism over likely to be congruent and authentic. An alterna- extrinsic values such as popularity and wealth tive but not antithetical explanation is that mind- (Brown & Kasser, 2005 ; Brown, Kasser, Ryan, & fulness, in its ability to enhance self-endorsed Konow, 2008 ). behavior, may prompt a more selective choice of Pertinent to this discussion is a study con- situations (Brown & Ryan, 2003 ; Weinstein ducted by Brown and Kasser ( 2005) on a diverse et al., 2009 ). This higher predominance of self- national sample of adults differing in lifestyle. endorsed volitional activity may be conducive to They compared intrinsic and extrinsic value ori- a greater tolerance of unpleasant situations, thus entation, mindfulness, and multiple indicators of over time reducing exposure to stressors, which subjective well-being and ecologically responsi- in turn contributes to well-being. ble behavior. Results indicated that higher levels of mindfulness were related to greater intrinsic value orientation; and both variables were associ- Self-Regulation and Mindfulness: ated with subjective well-being and more eco- The “What” logically responsible behavior. Brown and Kasser suggested that mindfulness may foster greater So far we argued that mindfulness facilitates refl ection on one’s consumption and market more autonomous self-regulation, leading to choices and their ecological impacts. In turn, they greater satisfaction of the fundamental psycho- suggested that increased environmental and pro- logical needs of autonomy, competence, and social behaviors supply intrinsic satisfactions relatedness, and thus wellness. Nonetheless, also that enhance well-being (De Young, 1996 , 2000 ). critical to SDT is the goal content or the “what” In yet another relevant project, Brown, Kasser, of authentic functioning (Deci & Ryan, 2000 ; Ryan, Linley, and Orzech (2009 ) conducted a Ryan et al., 1996 ). series of studies on the role of mindfulness on 90 P.P. Schultz and R.M. Ryan

fi nancial desire discrepancy (the difference between what one has and what one desires) and Conclusions subjective well-being. In an initial study of British undergraduates, results revealed that Mindfulness is a deceptively simple concept con- mindfulness was associated with smaller fi nan- cerning an open, receptive awareness to the pres- cial discrepancy, which partially explained the ent. Yet this simple phenomenon has manifold positive relationship between mindfulness and infl uences on the pathways leading toward authen- well-being. Two more studies replicated these tic self-regulation and well-being. In this chapter fi ndings, controlling for fi nancial status and we reviewed evidence concerning how this state of showing similar fi ndings for working adults. A consciousness permeates critical components of fi nal, quasi-experimental investigation was con- SDT, globally referred to as the “why” and the ducted to elucidate causation pathways. “what” of regulation of behavior; thus, framing Participants were attendees at residential mind- mindfulness as an essential “how” of living well. fulness meditation training centers who partici- Central to autonomous self-regulation is the pated in a 4-week-training program. Findings capacity to refl ectively consider one’s behavior suggested that increases in mindfulness were and its congruency with one’s personal values related to declines in fi nancial desire discrepancy and needs. The enhanced attention and awareness and increases in subjective well-being. of mindfulness promotes such ability. This awak- Furthermore, these relations were not accounted ened state also allows consciousness to acquire a for by fi nancial status or recent fi nancial status clarity and freshness that act as liberating agents changes. While these studies highlight the asso- of automatic responses, and brings people to ciations between mindfulness, intrinsic values, refl ect upon the “why” of actions, hence fostering and well-being, other research within SDT sug- more self-endorsed behavior. Finally, it appears gests that these salutary effects stem, in part, that mindfulness can function as an antidote from the promotion of healthy self-regulation against external and internal controlling forces (Brown & Ryan, 2003 , 2004; Deci & Ryan, 2000 ; that frequently undermine the selection and Kasser & Ryan, 1996 ). enactment of more volitional behaviors. To summarize, the arguments above under- Mindfulness is a powerful integrative agent, and score the idea that mindfulness increases one’s SDT views integration as crucial to the develop- valuing of intrinsic goals and life pursuits. ment of more autonomous forms of motivation. Intrinsic aspirations are, in turn, inherently related When awareness of inner and outer circum- to basic need satisfaction, in contrast to extrinsic stances is heightened, so are people’s abilities to goals, which are pursued for their instrumental attend to prompts arising from basic needs, and value, and only fulfi ll basic needs indirectly or to consciously self-organize and self-regulate even distract from them. Finally, basic need satis- their actions in a manner fulfi lling such needs. faction is associated with autonomous self-regu- Consequently, one is more likely to focus on and lation and well-being. Considering the pressured attain intrinsic life goals, living more eudaimoni- societies we live in, where, as never before, con- cally in the process. This is supported by both sumerist messages seductively incite the pursuit research connecting mindfulness to intrinsic over of material goods, the display of wealth, and por- extrinsic goals, and the relations between these tray the glories of fame, mindfulness is an impor- goals and qualities of action, vitality, and overall tant asset that can act as a buffer, and reduce wellness. susceptibility to such extrinsic prompts and val- Beyond all the aforementioned benefi ts of ues. That is, because of their heightened aware- mindfulness, we must not overlook a valuable ness of internal and external states, more mindful aspect of this construct: the vividness that it adds individuals may more easily realize that material- to current experience and the moment-to-moment istic values are distant from their most essential sensory contact with life, without dense evalua- needs and from behaviors that represent healthy tive fi ltering of experience (Brown & Ryan, 2003 ; self-regulation (Brown et al., 2009 ). Kabat-Zinn, 2005). In the chaotic, often rushed 7 Mindfulness and Self-Determination 91 environment of modern society, where people happiness. Journal of Personality and Social strive to accomplish something every minute and Psychology, 59 , 1021–1031. Brown, K. W., & Kasser, T. (2005). Are psychological and where multi-tasking is the normal mode of opera- ecological well-being compatible? 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