The Political History of the Jordanian Syrian Relations Within the Arab-Israeli Conflicts

Research Journal of International Studies ISSN: 1453-212X Issue 23 (2012) © EuroJournals Publishing, Inc. 2012 http://www.eurojournals.com/international_studies.htm

The Political History of the Jordanian Syrian Relations within the Arab-Israeli Conflicts

Abdulrahman A. Al-Fawwaz Department of Humanities, Faculty of Engineering Technology Al-Balqa Applied University, P.O.Box: 15008 Amman 11134 Jordan E-mail: [email protected]

Muna M. Al-Abdallat Department of Humanities, Faculty of Engineering Technology Al-Balqa Applied University, P.O.Box: 15008 Amman 11134 Jordan

Ahmad Kh. Al-Afif Department of Humanities, Faculty of Engineering Technology Al-Balqa Applied University, P.O.Box: 15008 Amman 11134 Jordan

Abstract The political history is considered one of the main pillars in narrating and analyzing the political efforts, thoughts and the political leaders’ movements (1). The political history is related with the international relations history and the affected circumstances upon this affecting events on these relations among the countries. Thus Ariosto has mentioned that the country that moves the human society from the general chaos to the case of social and coalition (2), the political diplomatic that usually concentrates on the development of the circumstances and negotiations, although it concentrates on the international relates according to the reasons of these circumstances and the affected aspects (3): The study focus on the Syrian- Jordanian relations during the period 1967-1972 for seeking the answers of the following questions: 1. What’s the extent of the relations between Jordan and Syria and their relations towards the Israeli enemy. 2. What’s the role of Jordan and Syria towards the Palestinian case. 3. What’s the extent of the leadership success in easing the tension of the relations between the two countries. The study has concluded that the Syrian- Jordanian relations during the period 1967-1972 was filled with harmony and political consensus. Despite the geographical proximity and political spacing. Where some differences appeared in the opinions of the leaders of the two countries Jordan and Syria, after the Palestinian resistance became strong inside Jordan, and got unlimited support from the Syrian side, where as the residence works contributed in cutting off the relations between Syria and Jordan, with military interfere from the Syrian side for the welfare on the Palestinian resistance tribes.

Keywords: Political history, Jordanian - Syrian relations , Israeli Arabic conflict

Introduction The study aims at offering the real value of the Syrian- Jordanian relations concerning the conflict that occurred among the two countries within the Israeli Arabic conflict between 1967-1972. Therefore, this period was an important part from the Jordanian, Syrian history after the Israeli forces seizing the West Bank, Julan highest and Sina’ desert, where as it witnessed lots of changes that impacted the political incidents whether negatively or positively on both the two countries. The study was concerned in analyzing the most important incidents and the affected aspects on the Syrian Jordanian relations. The inductive approach was used in studying which is equivalent with the nature of the research, and depends on the essential tool which is the notice, in order to reach to the purpose from the research through the notes, induction and witnesses from the political purposed facts. The study depends on a variety group of resources and references, most important are, the published documents mainly the Arabic whether Jordanian or Palestinian, and a group of newspapers and periodicals , where it depends on the leaders statements and responsibilities from the Syrian and Jordanian side in order to enrich the research a scientific value concerning the Political decision makers role and their impact upon the international relations. Also the Study purposes as the following scopes: 1. Acknowledging the political aspects and events affecting the Syrian- Jordanian relations. 2. Acknowledging the Arabic countries role and their position from Jordan and Syria within the frame work of the two countries relations. 3. Revealing the Palestinian tribes position in the Syrian- Jordanian relations. 4. Knowing the United Nations feed back and positions and the Great Powers from the Israeli- Arabic conflict.

The 1967 War As a result of the situation deterioration among the Arabic countries after being defeated in June 1967, some of the Arabic Organizations and Palestinians regulations adopted the idea of army fighting against Israel, in order to decrease the military defeat pressure, and give the resistant a role in liberating the Palestinian lands, where as Jordan became a suitable place for growing the Palestinian resistant movement in its lands as politically, military and publicity growth, after some Arabic regulations sent financial aids and contributions to their organizations when Jordan was suffering from weakness in their Governmental organizations as a result of being defeated, and has a defense line against Israel , which is the largest among the defeating Arabic lines , where a high percentage of the Palestinians fugitive are residence on their lands (4). Therefore, all these circumstance had put Jordan in Military, economical and political conflicts, where Jordan needs to take back the West bank and rebuild the Military forces and Governmental organizations, thus Jordan had compressed the political movements that aim at liberating the occupied territories and settling the conflicts in the region., in addition it asked the great countries to interfere in settling the Israeli Arabic conflict. On the international level, the international security council issued a resolution No.242 on 22/November /1967, which included the withdraw of the Israeli forces from the occupied territories and ending all the allegations of war, war cases, respect the state sovereignty in the region, the security of its lands, its political independence, its right to live in peace within safe and free boarders from the threats in force or works of force. The resolution also stressed on the necessity of securing the freedom of navigation in the international paths in the region, and achieving the fair settlement for the refugees problem, securing the security of each country and its political independence through certain procedures such as secure making lands free of weapons (5). As a result of this resolution, the Arabic countries situations varied , where each of Jordan and Egypt accepted this resolution , and we took the political work as a way of gaining the international world opinion for the welfare of the Palestinian case, in order to achieve the withdraw of Israel from the occupied territories (6). But the Syrian government had condemned the resolution, and described it © Research Journal of International Studies - Issue 23 (March, 2012) 104

as Zionism American plot that aims at imposing the peaceful conditions on the Arabs, and ending the Palestinian case (7). As the Palestinian Liberation Organization, and the other Palestinian Guerrilla organizations, which announced their complete refusal of the resolution, and assured that its purpose to end the case, loose the Palestinians rights. Where these organizations had chosen the military fighting as a method for liberating the occupied Arabic lands, that were supported by Syria that attacked at the same time Jordan and Egypt confession of the resolution (8). In light of the tension concerning this decision, Israel accused Jordan of being responsible of the guerilla activity on its lands, where it sent several strikes on the Military locations and other civil areas after increasing the guerrilla fights across the ceasefire line between Jordan and Israel (9). The Guerilla activities caused lots of tension between the Syrian- Jordanian relations, after Syria asked from the guerilla organization which are related to Syria to work through the Jordanian lands, and supported them Politically, military and by media, Hassan AL-Kayed, the Jordanian Minster of Interior announced : Jordan is not the only Arabic country that has common borders with Israel, therefore any serious work against the enemy, must be collective achieved by a coordinated plan and cooperative policy, as part of the a united Arabic situation . Thus the Jordanian Government won’t allow any party to take any impulsive position, which insists on keeping Jordan safe (10). Therefore the number of the Guerilla organizations had increase in Jordan. Where its number had reached twelfth organizations, where of it has a different Ideology, most important “Fateh” and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, which adopted a Marxist approach,Saeqa forces that were established by the Syrian organization in 1967, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine which adopted a Marxist approach, the Arabic Liberating Front related religiously and organizationally to Iraqi BAATH party, the Public Front- General Leadership, which considered itself as the legal authority, that it is the active leader for the Palestinian people .Where it started interfering in the interior, administrative and security affairs in Jordan. Some of its members started participating the inspection and security tasks, and faced the security forces and armed forces challenging the legal authority (11).

The Syrian – Jordanian Relations within the Growth of the Palestinian Resistance The Palestinian resistance started increasing its guerilla attacks on the Jordanian lands , its continue in the direct provocation of the citizens and affecting the ruling regulation, the situation increased when the guerilla organizations asked to bring down the authority of Jordan . In the light of many abuses of the guerilla organizations, the Jordanian government was obliged to issue the resolution on the 10th of February 1970, which aims at limiting the political activity of the organizations, maintaining the country’s sovereignty, reorganize the guerilla’s work on the Jordanian field (12). By the time of issuing the resolution, armed clash happened in Amman between the armed forces and some of the resistance factions. Which caused some of the Guerilla organizations to ask all the tribes to make a unified military and political leadership for the guerilla work. The parties that participated in the meeting: the Popular Front of the Liberation of Palestine- the general leadership, Saeqa organization, and others (13). Concerning the Syrian position, they have issued a statement for assuring the protection of the Palestinian resistance, and its preparation to offer any assistant the Guerilla asked for. In addition to removing all the obstacles that stand infront of the resistance way (14). Thus Noor AlDeen Al Atasi, President of the Syrian republic asked for Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanimeh , the Jordanian Ambassador in Damascus, and asked him to award the Palestinian residence movement the continuity and freedom methods (15). Within the increase of the military conflicts with the residence movement . the Jordanian Government held three meetings with the representatives of the united leadership of the Guerilla works, that were concerned in issuing the Governmental statement on 13th February 1970, announcing the end of the crises by freezing all the procedures for the sake of the common interest (16). Mr.Behjat Al-Talhouni, the Jordanian Prime Minister made an official visit to Damascus on 25,May1970 carrying with him a letter from King Hussein to Dr. Noor Aldeen Al-ATasi, where as Mr.Talhouni ,during his

visit to Syria, made several talks with Syrian representatives discussing the Arabic situations and the issues that concern the two countries (17), the Diplomatic mission was an in initiative of rapprochement between the two parties concerning the different views about the resistance works and its reflection on the Jordanian National Security. But the situations started with a new military conflict, between the Jordanian Forces and the residence, where the conflict occurred in Amman and Zarqa between 6-9 June 1970 (18). Which increased the irritation between the Syria- Jordanian relations. Where as, on 10th , June,1970, the Syrian Government issued a statement warning the Jordanian Government from continue ending the Palestinian resistance, announced its complete approval of the Palestinian resistance and asked the Arabic countries to work decisively to end the fighting I order to maintain natural balance, to provide the residence with the chances and abilities to attack the enemy. The American Initiative announced on 25 July1970, for the sake of making peace negotiations concerning the Middle East crises, where as William Rogers, USA Secretary of State announced the following suggestions (19): 1. Israel has to withdraw its forces from the occupied territories it occupied in the battle of 1967. 2. The conflicted parties in the Middle East announce taking a limited position for ceasing firing for ninety days period. 3. The USA ambassador shall assign Gunnar Young at United nations to cooperate with the conflicts parties in order to execute the Social Security resolution No. 242. 4. The agreement to make lasting and fair peace , shall be held on the mutual recognition and the unity of lands and political independence. The conflicted parties reactions from the Arabic countries were supporting and opposing concerning Rogers initiative, where Egypt announced on23 July 1970, its agreement on the initiative principles (20). Where Egypt at that time needed to cease-fire to give its army some rest, in order to be able to make platforms to launch rockets Sam at Suez Canal, where as King Hussein announced his support for the Egyptian Governments position where he described it as the wise political decision concerning the recent developments, that it stems from the national interest (21). Thus, the Jordanian Prime Ministry sent a note in 26 July 1970for the US Minister of Foreign Affairs announcing the acceptance of the Jordanian Government on the Rogers suggestions for it does not issue in its material the social security resolution 242, it also asked to take some of the procedures for the sake of executing this resolution, thus the Jordanian memo also stressed that the Jordanian Governmental shall hold on to the following two principles (22): First: Israel must accept the withdraw principle from all the lands it occupied since 1967. Second: recognition the full right of the Palestinian people . Referring to the Syrian position, which denounced the US initiative and considered it as a malicious conspiracy that aims at disrupting the Arabic ranks, and ending the Palestinian resistance movement, liberating the Arabic country’s movement, in addition to that it seeks to keep the Israeli occupation and acknowledge it (23). The Syrian leadership assured its holding to the military fight as an only way for liberating. According to the Palestinian Liberation Organization and the other Guerrilla organizations, they have announced their refusal position of Rogers initiative, and asked the Arabic countries to face it for it aims at ending the guerilla’s work and not giving the Palestinians their right on their land (24). Within the refusal of Syria and Palestinian resistance of Rogers Initiative , Noor El Dein Al Atasi , Syrian President welcomed Yasser Arafat , president of the executive committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Informing him that Syria guarantees offering the continuous support for the resistance movement, where as the two parties have agreed on uniting the their efforts to frustrate the initiative (25). Despite the Syria support for the guerilla organizations which their operations have increased in Amman city, King Hussein made a speech for the Jordanian people on 3September1970, assuring the necessity of cooperation among the Jordanian Government And the

Palestinian resistance in order to eliminate the discord: "We will not accept under any circumstances any internal collisions that might weaken or delay this process…..for this I asked my Government to bear the full responsibilities in the governance to establish security and stability in the capital and the Kingdom . I also asked the ministry to contact the central leadership of the resistance movement to settle the matters between the factions, so that a joint effort between the government and resistance leadership would help prevent any provocative acts and bring the situation under control to ensure security and public safety " (26) . However, resistance movements did not stop the abuses, which led to confrontation with the Jordanian government. The crisis worsened when militants of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine on September 6, 1970 kidnapped three aircraft, two U.S. and the third Swiss, two of the aircrafts landed at a desert airport in Azraq area of Jordan, which guerrilla organizations called it ( revolution airport), then militants of the Popular Front hijacked a British plane on 9 September 1970 and forced it to land in the (revolution airport) in Jordan (27). On 12 September 1970, militants of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine blew up the aircrafts , after evacuating the passengers and held them hostages (28). Jordan decided to resolve the situation following the many violations on its territory. On16 September 1970 , King Hussein ordered the formation of an interim military government headed by Brigadier General Mohammad Dawood, in order to preserve security and stability. The King explained in the designation letter the purpose behind the formation of a military government "... for our citizens and their safety , to preserve the stability and security of our country , and maintain comfort and safety of our children ... for the dignity of the soldier , to keep honor and confidence of his family, for the maintenance of the Constitution, Law and Order ... in order to maintain the capacity and capabilities of the honest guerrilla and enable him to perform his duty on his field , I assign the post of prime minister and entrust you with the formation of an interim government to immediately act to disrupt the planned anti scheme and get things back to what it should be to go on the right track ... We ask you to address the situation with the required and firmly and consistently effort to restore security, order and stability " (29). Soon, the crisis escalated on 17 September, 1970, resulting in a violent fighting between the army and the resistance in Amman, Zarqa ,Irbid, and Jerash (30). Syria announced its support for the Palestinian resistance movement, so Baath Arab Socialist Party organized on 18 September 1970 a massive march in Damascus headed by President Nureddin al-Atassi. The Syrian leadership decided to military intervene in favor of guerrilla organizations. Thus on the 19th of September 1970 a number of units of Syrian army , (believed to be an armored brigade ) crossed the Syrian - Jordan borders and took up positions close to Ramtha - Amman - Jerash triangle (31) .The aim of the Syrian military intervention was to relieve pressure of the Jordanian military forces on resistance forces ,to assist guerrilla organizations secure a safe zone under their control in the northern parts of the Kingdom of Jordan, so that the guerrillas be able to negotiate with the Government of Jordan (32). In light of the of the Syrian intervention , the Government of the United States feared that such intervention may lead to fall of Jordan legitimate authority in the hands of guerrilla organizations, and therefore, the Ministry of Defense ordered the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea to go east, and placed U.S. military units in West Germany on alert. The U.S. State Department condemned the Syrian intervention, and requested the Government of the Soviet Union to put pressure on the Syrian government to withdraw its troops urgently (33). The Soviet Union was quick to warn of any foreign intervention in Jordan, especially by Israel as it would lead to an escalation of the crisis (34).During the Syrian military intervention , President Nureddin Atassi, ordered Minister of Defense and Air Force commander L.General Hafez al-Assad to engage the Air Force in order to cover the Syrian armored operations on the Jordanian territory, but al-Asad refused to comply with those orders. The position of L. General Hafez al-Assad could be ascribed to the internal conflict in the Syrian leadership at both party and government levels as well as his

awareness of the seriousness of the situation, especially that the Syrian forces were not military developed compared to Israeli forces, so al-Asad feared that any escalation of the crisis might lead to an Israeli military intervention, thus exposing Jordanian and Syrian land to the risk of Israeli occupation (35) . On the other hand L. General Hafez Assad was not willing to fight Jordan, as he considered it necessary to maintain good relations with Jordan, and to preserve the military capabilities of Arab, especially that Jordan's plays a strategic role in the face of Israel which must be taken into account while maintaining the Palestinian resistance. The Syrian President Hafez al-Assad explained later the objectives of the Syrian military intervention in Jordan, saying: "The Syrian soldier fought an Arab soldier, who can not be considered an enemy soldier, but a brotherly soldier and an Arab soldier ... However, we fought that soldier in line with our belief that the Palestinian resistance is in danger, and that this resistance must grow and continue to play its historic role in line with our belief that the Palestinian resistance is a national historic need " (36). Arab summit conference was held in Cairo on 21 September 1970, following the intervention of the Syrian military on Jordanian territory. Kings , presidents and representatives of nine Arab countries: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Egypt, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Lebanon, Yemen in addition to Jordan participated in that conference to discuss the situation in Jordan (37). The Conference decided to send a delegation to Amman headed by Sudanese President Jaafar Nimeiri on 23 September 1970. The delegation held several meetings with King Hussein and the leaders of guerrilla action, and was able to reach an agreement for a cease-fire (38). Nevertheless, the Syrian leadership represented by President Nureddin al-Atassi, criticized the agreement claiming that it does not represent the opinion of the Palestinian people and called on Arab countries to take practical steps to support the continuation of the Palestinian revolution. This coincided with release of a fierce media attack against Jordan by Radio Damascus. The Syrian government confirmed its support of the Palestinian revolution (39). Which prompted King Hussein to send a telegram to the Arab leaders meeting in Cairo, denouncing the Syrian position and the fierce media campaign released by Radio Damascus (40).Where the kings and Arab leaders held an , an emergency summit in Cairo in September 27,1970 to discuss the situation in Jordan. At the end of the conference they endorsed the Cairo Agreement, which stipulates an end to all military operations by both sides, formation of an Arab committee to follow up the application of this Convention, withdrawal of the Jordanian armed forces to their bases, withdrawal of the Palestinian revolution forces from cities to places appropriate for guerrilla action, and assign Jordanian security forces full responsibility over the internal security (41). To ensure the implementation of the Cairo Agreement, the Arab Higher Committee in cooperation with the concerned parties signed Amman agreement on 13 October 1970, which is considered as a complement to the Cairo Agreement stipulated the new foundations for guerillas presence in Jordan, and stressed the respect for the sovereignty of Jordan (42).

Correction Movement and its Impact on Jordanian – Syrian Relations The war of June -1967 played a major role in the escalation of the constitutional conflict between the leaders of the Baath Arab Socialist party ; as differences in views become clearer, especially in the third and fourth regional conferences held in 1967 and 1968 , which led to the emergence of two different trends within the party:The first trend: The civil wing, led by Major General Salah Jadid Assistant Secretary-General of the party, in addition to a number of prominent civilian members such as Abdulkareem Jundi , Ibrahim Makhoos , and Yousif Zaein. The civilian wing called for a socialist transformation of Syrian society, and refused to cooperate with some of the conservative Arab regimes, who are to be blamed for the 1967 defeat. This wing also called for total dependence on the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc (43).

The second trend: The military wing, led by General Hafez al-Assad Minister of Defense and Commander of the Air Force and membership of most of the Syrian military leaders, notably: Major General Mustafa Talas, the Syrian army chief of staff. The military wing called for more cooperation with the national forces, establishment good relations with the public, and reconsideration of some actions occurring in the name of socialism. It also called for reducing dependence on the Soviet Union, fighting against Israel, and supporting a policy of political and military cooperation among Arab states , regardless of their political trends. The military wing stressed the need for an effective cooperation plan at the eastern military front. Thus, Syrian Military Leadership left some Syrian troops on Jordanian territories to mobilize Arab against Israel in order to recover the Arab territories occupied during the war of 1967 (44). In this context, President Hafez al-Assad said: "Before 1970, Syria was not in good terms with most Arab sates, and even though we today say this is an Arab Cause, we did not give Arabs the opportunity to take part in it. Whereas some of my comrades would denounce other Arab countries in a very aggressive manner, I strongly believe that we should encourage other Arab sates to play a role as all Arabs face a common threat" (45). The Syrian military intervention in the events of Jordan deepened the row between the two wings of the Baath Arab Socialist Party.Therefore the extraordinary tenth regional conference of the Baath Party was held in Damascus in the period between October 30 - November 12, 1970 with the aim of settling the differences, addressing the issue of duality of power, and discussing the political and economic trends of the state. Major General Salah Jadid and his wing won the support of members of the conference, and their opinions were adopted as key decisions of the conference , which were as follows (46): 1. To denounce the dual of power; any party member shall not hold military , civil and executive position at the same time; dual power will be seen as a deviation from the principles of the party. 2. To dismiss both Lieutenant General Hafez al-Assad minister of defense , commander of air force, and Army Chief of Staff Major General Mustafa Talas from their positions and entrust them with leading posts in the party . 3. To ask Lieutenant General Hafez al-Assad minister of defense to make contacts with the higher leadership in order to preserve the unity of the party and the army.4. To call for the formation of a new government, which shall mot not include L. General minister of defense Hafez al-Assad or General Mustafa Talas. Defense Minister L.General Hafez Al-Assad refused to comply with these decisions and managed to tighten his control over the army command, so he transferred the military commanders- loyal to the civil wing- to less important positions in the armed forces, and won the absolute support of the Air Force (47). Then, backed by his fellow militants, al-Assad managed to carry out a peaceful coup in 13 November 1970 . Consequently, he arrested a number of civilian members in the party leadership, namely Dr. Nur al-Din al-Atassi, Major General Salah Jadid, Dr. Yousif Zaein, and Ibrahim Makhos, took over public buildings, including radio and television corporation , and imposed his control over all newspapers (48). After taking control of the whole country , al-Assad announced in November 16, 1970 the start of the Correction Movement, and the formation of a new interim regional leadership of Arab Socialist Baath Party (49). The new leadership issued a new command statement that had worked as a work program to identify the policy of the interim leadership at various levels ; internal, Arab and international, In addition to a number of domestic tasks to be implemented by the interim leadership, as explained by the following statement: 1. Mobilize all progressive and popular efforts towards the establishment of a progressive front, led by the Baath Party.

2. The formation of People's Assembly within a maximum period of three months with representatives from the Party , people's organizations and progressive forces. 3. Deepen and develop the socialist transformations. 4. Set up and implement plans of economic development. 5. Continue building and developing the armed forces to be able to do their duty in the battle of liberation. The tasks at the Arab level: 1. To cooperate with all progressive Arab states and Arab forces in all fields that determine a strategy of armed struggle to rally Arab capacities in the crucial battle. 2. To work hard with the aim of achieving unity with the progressive states , especially with the United Arab Republic. 3. To support the Palestinian revolution and make the utmost organized efforts to unite the resistance factions. The party and the revolution in this country look with satisfaction and optimism to the unitary meetings that took place between United Arab Republic, the Libyan Arab Republic, and the Arab Democratic Republic of Sudan, so we will work to enable Syrian Arab Republic to take its natural place in these unitary meetings . However, the role of Syrian policy in the international field was determined by the following statement (50): 1. Development of relations with the socialist camp, especially with the Soviet Union. 2. Cooperation with all national liberation movements , and patriotic forces in the world. The national leadership of the Baath Arab Socialist Party issued a statement in Beirut on November 16, 1970 announcing the expulsion of L. General Hafez Assad and General Mustafa Talas from the party. The statement also declared the illegitimacy of the national interim leadership (51). Anyway, on November 19 the national interim leadership appointed Ahmed Al-Khatib as Interim President of the Republic, until members of parliament elect a new head of state (52), and named Hafez al-Assad a prime minister, who formed his first government in November 21, 1970, where members of Baath party occupied most of the ministerial seats. Other political forces took part in that government , so a number of portfolios went to Communists and Nasserites (53).As the internal stability was achieved, Syria began a new chapter of relations with all Arab states without exception, particularly with the progressive forces in the Arab world. On November 26, 1970 , Prime Minister L. General Hafez al-Assad visited Cairo and held talks with President Anwar Sadat. Later on, Hafez al- Asad announced the accession of Syrian Arab Republic to the three-state-union : Egypt, Libya, Sudan ; thus the four states formed a quartet with united leadership (54). Syria sought to improve its political and military ties with Arab states , so it decided on April 17, 1971 to join the Federation of Arab Republics, which included in addition to Syria: Libya and Egypt (55) . Moreover, Syria strengthened relations with the oil-rich Gulf States, especially: Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, and thus secured the financial support for her military efforts (56). With regard to Jordanian - Syrian relations , King Hussein considered that what happened in Syria is an internal matter, stressing Jordan's principle of non-interference in internal affairs of any Arab country. King Hussein has expressed his sincere wishes to the Syrian leadership to achieve greater political stability, and announced his desire to establish strong relationships based on mutual trust and sound cooperation (57). In order to boost cooperation between the two countries , Vice King and Crown Prince Hassan deputized Dr. Subhi Abu Ghanima, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in Damascus to convey a verbal message to officials in the Syrian Arab Republic (58).On 18 March 1971, Crown Prince Hassan headed to Damascus at the head of a Jordanian official delegation, carrying a special message of congratulations from King Hussein to L.General Hafez al-Assad on the occasion of assuming the presidency of the Syrian Arab Republic. Prince Hassan was well welcomed in Damascus, where he and his delegation held talks with Syrian officials on several issues that concern the two countries and discussed means of developing mutual relations (59).

Jordan welcomed the Syrian political approach, aimed at rapprochement with the Arab countries, and considered it an important step towards the achievement of Arab unity. King Hussein voiced his stance from the Federation of Arab Republics, saying: " What supports our conviction is the positive step the three Arab countries have achieved to realize Arab Unity... and we congratulate them on that , and hope this will be in favour of the all" (60). Syrian leadership identified its position from the Arab-Israeli conflict, considering that the military solution is the only way to restore the occupied territories. the continued occupation of the Golan Heights was a strategic challenge for Syria, especially that Israel declared its adherence to the Golan, making Syria rejects any peace settlement, In this context, President Hafez al-Assad said : "What a peaceful solution ... what a peaceful solution ... a peaceful solution is not available ... the Zionist movement aims to create a state from the Nile to the Euphrates, and the peaceful resolution as it is rumored now contrary to all Zionist political schemes --- the political activity ... did not achieve any success, Israeli officials still refuse to publicly withdraw from the occupied territories, political activity does not override the preparations to the battle " (61). Soon ,the Syrian position from the Arab - Israeli conflict was dramatically changed , as Syria stopped promoting the slogan of People's War, as it "will not be fit for " the nature of the war with Israel. On 8 March 1972, the Syrian leadership recognized the UN Security Council Resolution 242, and stressed the need to establish a just and comprehensive peace, and restore Arab territories occupied in 1967 without any prior conditions (62). the Syrian leadership sought to tighten its ties with the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist system, Syrian President explained the motives of this convergence, he said: "emerging from the principles of the Soviet union , who takes our sides and provides us with military support in the face of the Zionist invasion supplied with all types of arms and US military capabilities" (63). It was noted that Syrian- Soviet union relation was characterized with the tactical nature; the Soviet Union was the only source to supply Syria with weapons. On the other side , the Syrian-American relations witnessed an improvement, although President Hafez al-Assad blamed the U.S. administration for the worsening situation in the region by providing unlimited political and military support to Israel, he stressed that "the enemy, whom we resist is unique in its nature , there is no doubt that Israel is strongly linked to the American imperialism, a link based on the common interests and that each one depends on the other to materialize its schemes" (64) . In spite of that, the Syrian leadership realized the importance of flexibility in the international relations, and sought to improve its political and economic ties with capitalist countries, especially the United States and France (65).

Internal Stability in Jordan and its Impact on the Relations Jordan sought to achieve stability in the country, and emphasize the sovereignty of the state based on its adherence to the Conventions of Cairo and Amman. Therefore, Wasfi Tal , prime minister and general military commander issued a statement concerning the control over the arms of the militias, prohibiting the use of arms in cities and populated areas , and ordered that offenders of these instructions shall be held accountable. Despite the announcement of these security measures the country witnessed several clashes between the army and the resistance, especially in Amman and Irbid. Syrian position from these events was almost neutral , Hafez al-Assad Syrian Prime Minister at the time urged the parties to the conflict to stop fighting, and called for the need to unite Arab Military efforts in order to liberate the land: "The events aimed at the liquidation of Palestinian Arab resistance on one hand , and the liquidation of the Jordan Arab Army as an army stands in the face of the enemy on the other, and to avoid the liquidation of the resistance and the Jordanian army , we will do our duty fully, and we will be to the side of our nation and our people"(66). Armed confrontation resumed between the army and the resistance in the city of Irbid on 28 March 1971. Consequently , Yasser

Arafat, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization directed a message to the Arab kings and presidents briefing them on the latest development in Jordan, and urging them to intervene to stop the (crimes) committed to liquidate the guerrilla action in Jordan (67). On 29 March 1971, Prime Minister Wasfi Tal called on the Arab states to scrutinize the causes of fighting, saying: "We , in fact have problems with our Arab brothers who for one reason or another believe one party without bothering themselves scrutinize the matter . Most Arab brothers ignore the fact that the presence of militants is prohibited in cities and villages under the concluded agreements " (68). The Syrian government sent a military delegation headed by Major General Mustafa Talas Chief of Staff of the Syrian army to Amman on April 8, 1971 in an attempt to stop the fighting in Jordan, and to maintain national unity in Jordan. The delegation held talks with Jordanian officials and members of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization led to an agreement by the three parties to form a six-member committee to put the necessary measures to effectively implement Cairo and Amman Conventions, and to set new rules for the guerillas in Jordan (69). King Hussein received Major General Mustafa Talas, who handed him a letter from L.General Hafez Assad, President of the Syrian Arab Republic, which included several proposals to achieve cooperation between the two countries in all fields, particularly the military. These proposals were fully welcomed by King Hussein. At the same time, King Hussein discussed with Major General Mustafa Talas brotherly relations between the two countries and praised the Syrian initiative, describing it a national step which aims to achieve coordination, organization and rally efforts to face the challenges in the future (70). The Monarch expressed satisfaction over the Syria –Jordan relations in the light of the recent visit by the Syrian delegation to Jordan, where he described these relations as "brotherly relation, and it is natural to be well between the two countries and two peoples who stand as one people in the face of the same challenge and the same risk" (71). Many violations by Guerillas organizations , especially in the area of Jerash renewed clashes between the army and the forces of the Palestinian resistance, and within the Syrian move to calm the situation , Major General Mustafa Talas Chief of Staff of the Syrian army called Maj. Gen. Khalil Abdel Dayem Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Armed Forces (72), they agreed to send a Syrian military delegation headed by General Abdel Razzaq Dardari, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Syrian army to Amman on July 15, 1971, accompanied by representatives of the leadership of the resistance. On July 17, 1971, the Syrian delegation met with King Hussein and Jordanian officials and representatives of the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization. The tasks of the delegation focused on the need to address the situation and recent developments resulting from the renewed fighting, and to oversee the deportation of guerrillas to their new land in the north of Jordan (73). Prime Minister Wasfi Al Tal praised the Syrian position seeking to end the crisis in Jordan, describing the new initiative as a positive step emanating from the national policy of the Syrian government seeking to uncover the facts on the ground (74). A surge in guerrillas attacks on the northern cities of the Kingdom obliged the Jordanian government to protect its legitimate authority, by taking control of the security situation and recovering the stability in the country and ending the state of dual power in Jordan as the vast majority of the Jordanian people were to the side of the Monarchy. By the end of July, the Jordanian forces managed to defeat guerrillas and get them out of the land of Jordan to Syria and Lebanon (75). These events led to deterioration in Jordan –Arab relations , as Iraq, Egypt, Algeria and Libya cut off their political relations with Jordan, while Libya and Kuwait stopped paying financial aid to Jordan which were endorsed by the Arab Summit in Khartoum in 1967 (76). However, the Syrian government took a decision to close the Jordanian-Syrian border as of July 25, 1971 (77). The Government of Jordan presented a protest to the Council of Economic Unity, describing the Syrian procedure as a violation of the principles of the Arab common market and its stages that aim to facilitate the movement of goods between Arab countries members to the Market without barriers.

Ministry of National Economy instructed the Jordanian embassy in Damascus to stop the ongoing arrangements for the ward of Jordan in Damascus International Fair because Jordan can not participate in the exhibition (78). Syria severed diplomatic relations with Jordan on August 12, 1971, and closed its airspace to Jordan air navigation . The Syrian government justified this action by saying that it came to address the policy that goes against the Arab will and designed to serve the interests of Zionism (79). The Jordanian government considered the Syrian decision to cut the relation as emotional, and hoped the abolition of that decision as it may affect the Eastern Front , hinder the military and political coordination between Jordan and Syria, which will serve the interests of the enemy (80). This was followed by Syria's decision to mobilize troops on the border of Jordan, where an armed clash took place between the forces of the two countries . The General Command of the Jordan Armed Forces called the Syrian leadership to investigate the armed clash, and to take measures to prevent recurrence of such incident. Prime Minister Wasfi Tal said that Jordan will not take any action that may complicate the situation on the Jordan-Syria borders (81). Syria's reaction to the internal security measures in Jordan was to serve the tactical goals of Syria, and to uphold its national reputation in front of Arab masses. The deportation of guerrillas to the Syrian territory disrupted the Syrian leadership and put in an awkward position, as it is Syria who called for freedom of guerrilla action from Jordanian territory, and when the bases of guerrillas increased on its territory , it feared that guerrillas operations released from the Syrian territories might lead to a confrontation with Israel , which Syria was not prepared for yet. Meanwhile, Syria intensified its control over the activities of guerrilla organizations, insisted to subject them to the Syrian army strategy, and to relocate their bases to Lebanon (82) . In the context of the internal situation in Jordan, Prime Minister Wasfi Tal was extremely concerned to achieve national unity through the establishment of an Arab organization that bring together forces of the people from all political, economic, and social fields as well as establishment of a popular base believes in loyalty to the Jordanian regime, in which intellectuals play a main role in order to aligns with the class clan, which dominated the political and military affairs. In order to achieve this , the National Union of Jordan was announced on September 7, 1971 (83). King Hussein chaired a meeting of the Preparatory Committee of the Union explained that the Union would not be a political party in the literal meaning of the word , but a general framework governing all official and popular movements (84). The Charter of the National Union included general principles and objectives of foreign and domestic policy , as well as social, administrative, economic, and educational affairs. Accordingly, the objectives of the Union highlighted the importance of strengthening the national power under the Hashemite Royal Authority as a symbol of national unity to secure stability, as well as to consolidate the democratic approach in governing and management to achieve national unity and liberation of the occupied territories (85). As Wasfi Tal succeeded in emphasizing the authority of the government and the sovereignty of the Jordanian state, he sought to remove the political and economic barriers imposed on Jordan by the Arab world, so he sent Jordanian Foreign Minister Abdullah Salah on a mission to Damascus on 27 October 1971. It was the first visit by a Jordanian Minister to Syria since the latter closed its borders with Jordan. Abdullah Salah and Abdul-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Syrian Foreign Minister reviewed the , international situation in general and the latest developments, the talks were focused on the issue of opening the borders to ease the movement of Jordanian transport, especially for Jordanian exports to Syria and Lebanon. During the talks , the Jordanian side stressed the importance of these steps because the situation in the region requires the need for coordination between the two countries to achieve cooperation in various fields ; political, military and economic(86).In the course of the Joint Arab Defense Council in Cairo on November 27, 1971, Jordan Prime Minister Wasfi Tal met with Abdul-Halim Khaddam, Deputy Prime Minister and Syrian Foreign Minister. The two parties held a long meeting to discuss the Syrian –Jordan relations. Wasfi Tal urged the Syrian government to re-open its borders to the

movement of transport of Jordan, in the service of nationalism battle, and because the closure of border harms the Syrian and Jordanian economy alike. However , the Syrian government insisted on linking the issue of opening the border with reaching settlement between the Government of Jordan and the Palestinian resistance movement, leading to the establishment of new bases for guerrilla organizations on the territory of Jordan (87). During the period of the Joint Arab Defense Council in Cairo on November 28, 1971 , Wasfi Tal was assassinated by the (Organization of Black September). Consequently, King Hussein appointed Ahmed Al-Lozi as Prime Minister, who adopted the same approach of the previous government, and succeeded in establishing security and internal stability (88). Concerning the foreign policy, by raising King Hussein project of a United Arab Kingdom on 15 March 1972, Jordan sought to get out of regional isolation imposed on the backdrop of September 1970 events and the subsequent expulsion of the Palestinian resistance in July 1971. The project aimed at establishing a national unity between the two banks of the Kingdom on the basis of decentralization, so that to give autonomy to the West Bank after the liberation. In addition , the project aimed at reviving the cause globally, and to maintain control of the political settlement (89). However, the Jordan - Arab relations got worse when this project was brought up; it was rejected by the Arab governments in Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Egypt, and was harshly criticized on the ground that it aims to liquidate the Palestinian cause (90) . The Executive Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organization issued a statement on March 16, 1972, rejecting the project on the grounds that it is the Palestinian people only who have the right to decide their own future and the future of their cause (91). The Syrian position from the Arab United Kingdom project was announced in a statement issued by the national leadership of the Baath Arab Socialist Party on 18 March 1972, where Syria declared absolute refusal of the project, on the grounds that it only seeks to draft a new Palestinian state project aimed at liquidating the Palestinian cause. "The United States of America with its long history of conspiracies against our nation is behind the project to increase the rupture of our people and hinder every effort to find a unified Arab stance to address the aggression. The leadership of the party, based on the decisions of the party conferences believes that any partial solution , or any individual or suspicious deals with the enemy will help liquidate the Palestinian Arab Cause , and harm all powers of struggle and fight , the national leadership calls for all Arabs to assume their responsibilities and to stand united in their struggle against aggression and occupation ", the statement said (92). Mr. Abdul Munim Rifai personal representative of King Hussein headed to the Syrian capital on March 19, 1972, and delivered a message from King Hussein to President Hafez al-Assad, with an explanation of the United Arab Kingdom Project, and the importance of Arab approval on that project (93). However, President Hafez al-Assad declared in a speech on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Arab Socialist Baath Party, Syria's opposition to the Jordanian project and its total rejection of such individual initiative , considering that any approval of the project represents a deviation from the will of the Arab nation and a disavowal of its objectives. President Hafez al-Assad called on all nationalist and progressive forces in the Arab world to reject the project and challenge the Zionist- imperialist scheme - aimed to establish Palestinian entity subject to the influence of Israel (94). Jordanian government focused on the domestic economic situation due to its direct relationship to achieving security and political stability as the closure of Jordan –Syrian borders harmed the economic interests of the Jordanian people, especially the category of farmers and workers (95), and severely damaged the Jordan economy ; the prices of all imported goods went up due to high freights . Before the siege , the cost of transporting one ton from Beirut to Amman was four dinars only to jump to twenty dinars after that (96). The Syrian government's closure of its border with Jordan stopped the export of Jordanian phosphate to Turkey and Yugoslavia, making these countries import their needs of

phosphate from Israel (97). The value of Jordanian exports of phosphate went down from 3.5 million to 2.2 million dinars, the equivalent of 37% (98). In response to the Jordan suffering in this area the Syrian government decided in February 28, 1972 to re-open its borders to Jordanian phosphate transportation (99). In spite of the blockade policy imposed on the Kingdom , King Hussein expressed his hope that mutual relation be resumed between Jordan and Syria to be able to meet the common danger (100). Hence, Jordan prime minister , Ahmad Lozi said that the measures imposed on Jordan conflict with the national goals and the Arab common interest and conventions existing between Jordan and these countries, either charters of Joint Arab Unity or economic unity, in addition to the fact that Jordan is part of this nation, and its strength and steadfastness means strength of the nation Arab as a whole. In terms of results, Jordan will be affected but not more than the parties who imposed such measures (101). The Syrian leadership has decided to reopen its border with Jordan as of December 1972, which means that the closure lasted for 489 days. It should be noted that Jordan has not closed its borders with Syria during this period. Syrian spokesman expressed in November 30, 1972 the motives behind the issuance of that decision, he stated that it came to ease the burdens and difficulties the people of Jordan suffered as a result of closure of the border , and to enable Jordan armed forces confront the enemy (102). Syrian President Hafez al-Assad said the opening the border was taken in order to allow all Arab forces contribute to the liberation struggle, and stressed that the borders with Jordan were shut down for the sake of the Palestinian Cause and were re-opened for the Palestinian Cause (103). The Jordanian government welcomed the Syrian decision and considered it an important step in strengthening the trade exchange between the two countries, achieving cooperation, and coordinating the various efforts to resume the objectives of Arab unity (104).

Conclusion This study explained the features of international relation between Jordan and Syria during the period 1967-1972 and what prevails these relations of events and factors that affected the relations between the two countries, where all the political and economical interests connected between Jordan and Syria in a strong connection which was positioned on Jordanian lands after 1967 war. Syria supported all resistance platoons against Israeli occupation from Jordanian lands and not from Syrian lands which formed an actual increase in resistance, and it expanded greatly in main cities of Jordan and the resistance platoons formed internal concerned and disturbance source for the Jordanian State regime after several Israeli attacks on the Jordanian cities and bearing Jordan the responsibility of guerilla platoons within its lands. This study revealed the attitudes and announcements of leaderships of the two countries concerning the Palestinian resistance case and Syria assured in all its dedications about the necessity of supporting the Palestinian resistance and its armed fight against Israel and not to harm or aggress against the resistance and giving it all necessary means to move in full freedom on Jordanian lands, while Jordanian declarations were calling the need of controlling the activities of the resistance on Jordanian lands and respecting the sovereignty and legitimacy of Jordanian State. In addition, the study explained the positions of the United Nations and the great powers towards the conflict in the region and the reactions of Jordan and Syria concerning these positions or attitudes. Syria and the Palestinian resistance refused the United Nations' resolution 242 and they considered it an American Zionism conspiracy to end the Palestinian case and imposing restrictions on the Arab, while Jordan and Egypt considered the resolution a political step and a way of gaining the international public opinion in favor of the Palestinian question instead of using the military force. The United States presented Rogers initiative to settle the Middle East crisis, it was also rejected by Syria and the resistance and all Arab countries called to face this initiative and used the armed fight to liberate the occupied lands, while

Jordan and Egypt accepted the initiative provided its content not to draw away from Security Council resolution 242. After the rise of the corrective movement in Syria and Hafez Al-Assad came to power as the President of Syrian Republic as a consequence of peaceful coup on the previous president Nour Al- Deen Al-Atasi, from this point Syria started to follow an open policy with all Arab countries and in respect to Syrian-Jordanian relations they had witnessed a kind of political approach with assuring that the military solution is the only means to liberate the occupied lands and also Syria sought to strengthen the relations with the Union Soviet and socialist countries and the Soviet relations characterized by mobilization feature through supplying Syria with necessary weapons needed to face Zionism enemy where it is supplied were it is supplied with weapons and all types of American capabilities. Syrian- Jordanian relations connected with the fate of Palestinian resistance on the Jordanian lands and on the basis of continual fighting between the Jordanians and Palestinian platoons. Where as, Jordan has put an end to the situation after trying to overthrow the regime in it. Syria had a military intervention in the interest of the resistance, while the conflict was ended by the defeat of the resistance and its withdrawal from Syria and Lebanon, so this period was the worst period in the history of Jordanian- Syrian relations. Among the results of driving away the resistance out of Jordan cutting the diplomatic and economical relations with Syria, where Jordan considered this an emotional decision. Evacuation of the resistance later led to an internal confusion within Syria because of the increase bases and numbers of the resistance, thus Syria was afraid of confrontation occurrence with Israel due to guerilla’s activities, as Syria was not ready for this matter, so it put all resistance platoons under the Syrian army strategy. This study reveals Jordan's desire to make strong relations with Syria, nevertheless this was faced by refusal from Syria despite the diplomatic efforts made to open the boarders with Syria for the traffic and transportation between the two countries. Syria insisted on connecting the procedures of opening boarders with the issue of returning back the Palestinian resistance and making new bases on Jordanian lands. Moreover, Jordan sought for the project of United Arab Kingdom to get out the political isolation after driving away the resistance, but Syria rejected this project and it called upon all Arab countries to oppose this project, therefore cutting the relation with Syria causes to Jordan huge economic losses, particularly for the peasants and workers, in addition to the rise of cargo prices and imported commodities as well as stopping of exporting Jordanian phosphates to Turkey and Yugoslavia. Closing the boarders between Syria and Jordan after driving away the resistance went on about 489 days, still Syria decided to open the boarders in December 1972 to decrease the economic burdens from one hand and to face Israeli enemy on the other hand. Inspite of opening the boarders and improving the relations between Jordan and Syria, Syria had not have the desire to participate with Jordan in 1973 war and it became satisfied at the beginning to fight with the Israeli enemy from Egyptian side and later it saw there is a necessity to share Jordan, therefore Jordan sent part of its military forces to the Syrian front. The Security Council resolution 338 issued to seas- fire. Where as Syria, Egypt, Jordan and Israel accepted the resolution (338) as it is a commitment of the resolution 242 after Soviet Union offered to secure the Arabic rights, but Iraq refused the recognition of the resolution, and to withdrew its forces from the Syrian front.

References [1] Wiener, Philip, Dictionary of the History of Ideas; Studies of Selected Pivotal Ideas. Volume III, USA 1968. [2] Adnan AL-Sayed Hussein, International relations- War and Peace and Basic Principles. Documentation, Research and strategic Study Centre, Edition 1 Beruit 1994p.20 [3] Adnan AL-Sayed Hussein, Prior reference, p.20

[4] AL-Fawwaz Abdurahman, Triangle relations: Jordanian, American and Israeli, unpublished Master Thesis, Baroda University India 2001 [5] Palestinian Studies Organization, United Nation's Resolutions in respect of Palestine and Arab- Israeli Conflict 1947- 1974 pp. 197-198, Jordanian Documents 1967, Amman, Document No. 1146, p 323-329. [6] See statements of Abdulmunem AL-Refaee about Jordan's attitude from Security Council's Resolution in Jordanian Documentation for the year 1967, Document No. 149, p. 331, see also: Dar of Researches and Publishing, A series of Opinions' Register about the Political Events in the Arab Countries, 1968,p.636. [7] See statement of formal spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Syria about Security Council's Resolution 242 in the Newspaper, Beirut, issue 4877, 23 October 1968m AL-Nahar, Beirut, issue 10138,24 October 1968, Syria Arab Republic, Ministry of Information, Syria, Revolution in its seventh year, p 416. [8] See Fedayees Organization's Statement respecting Security Council Resolution 242 in AL- Anwar, Beirut, issue 2864, 16th October 1968. [9] Hisham AL-Dajani, Zionism Strategy towards East Jordan, Palestinian Affairs Magazine, issue 101, Bruit, April 1980, p.100, Ghazi Rababa', Israeli Strategy 1967-1980, p.256. [10] Amman, issue 307, 16 March, 1968, Jordanian Documents 1968, Edition 1,Amman 1973, Document No.21,pp.47-48. [11] Supreme Command of Jordanian Armed Forces, Fedayees between apostasy and suicide, pp.29-33. [12] Amman, issue 1022, 11 Feb 1970, Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No: 7pp. 31-33. [13] ALBa'th, Damascus, issue 2109, 11 March, 1970, Palestinian Documents 1970, Document No. 67, p.73. [14] ALBaa'th, Damascus, issue 2110, 12 March 1970. [15] ALBa'th, Damascus, issue 2111, 13 March, 1970, AL-Dustoor, Amman, issue 1024, 13 March 1970. [16] AL-Dustoor, Amman, issue 1025, 14 March 1970, Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No. 8p. 34 [17] AL-Dustoor, Amman, issue 1123, 26 May, 197 [18] Khalil Hendi, Palestinian Resistance and Jordanian Regime, pp.67-68 [19] Palestinian Liberation Organization, Palestine Documents, 280 Selected Documents, 1839- 1987,pp.191-193, Documents of Arab- Israel Conflict, Searching for a solution, Part 1, Arab Affairs Magazine, issue 28, Tunis, 5 June 1983,pp.241-242. [20] Strategic and Political Studies Organizations, Egypt and America, Historical Presentation for the Development of Egyptian American relations, p.83. [21] AL-Dustoor, Amman, issue 1168, 17 July, 1970 [22] Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No. 61,pp.139-140, AL-Dustoor, Amman, issue 1177, 6 August 1970. [23] Arab Documents 1970, Document No. 280,p.521, Document No. 289,p.544. [24] AL-Ba'th, Damascus, issue 2248,27 August 1970, Syrian Arab Republic, Ministry of Information, Syria the Rebellion in its seventh year,p.130, Patrick Seel, AL-Assad, Conflict on the Middle East,p.255, Jamal AbdulJwad, Syria's Attituele about Settlement, Inter atonal Political Magazine 71m Cairo, 1983,p.66. [25] AL-Ba'th, Damascus, issue, 3 August, 1970. [26] Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No. 72,pp.160-161. [27] Khalil Hendi, Palestinian Resistance and Jordanian Regime,pp.151-152, Sayed Ali AL-Adroos, Hashemite Arab Army 1908-1979,p.282, Jims Lint, AL-Hussein, Life biography,p.218. [28] Helen Cobban. The Palestinian Liberation Organization. People, Power and Politics. London, NYC, Cambridge University Press, 1984,p.50.

[29] Official Journal of The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman, issue 2260, 16 September 1970,p.1324, Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No. 82,pp.177-179, Yazid AL-Sayegh, Jordan and Palestinian,p.42 [30] Khalil Zugdi, Palestinian Resistance and Jordanian Regime,p.169 [31] Henri Kissinger, Kissinger Diaries in The White House 1968-1973, Part 2,pp.461-467, William Quant, America, Arabs and Israel, ten serious Years 1967-1976,pp.168-174, AL-Hussein Bin Talal, My career as a Kng rior reference. [32] Patrick Seel, AL-Assad, Conflict on the Middle East,p.259. [33] Henri Kissinger, Kissinger Diaries in The White Hause,pp.462-477, see: William Quant, ten serious years,pp.168-169, Diplomatic Peace Process,p.110. [34] A Sobel Lester, Palestinian Impassc Arab Gurrilla and International Terror,p.86. [35] Khaduri, Majed, The Arab Personalities in Politics, The Middle East Institute, 1981,p.202. [36] Syrian President Hafiz AL-Assad Thlk with AL-Munadel Mage Zine, Damascus, issue 226, May an June 1994,p.9. [37] Palestinia Liberation Organization Palestine Documents, pp.423-424. [38] Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No.106,p.213, Document No. 107,p.214. [39] ALBa'th Damascus, issue 2302,23 September 1970. [40] Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No,p.213, Document No.107,p.214. [41] Arab Documents 1970, Document No.365,pp.647-648, Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No. 123,pp.237-240, Ahmad AL-Rashedi, The Task of League of Arab States in the Field of Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, AL-Mustakbal AL-Arabi, issue 171, Beirut, May, 1993,p.95. [42] Arab Documents 1970, Damascus, Document No.375,pp:375, pp.657-659, Jordanian Documents 1970, Document No.125, pp.241-246, Ahmed Al-kalaila, Jordanian Strategy and its connecting with Palestinian Issue, p.325. [43] AlBa'th, Damascus, issue 1837, 21 March 1969, see also Nicolas Van Dam, The confliction Power in Syria Second Edition, Madboli Library, Cairo, 1995, p.105, Research and Publishing Dar, Series of the rehistar of opions about Political Events in Arab Countries, 1969, p.75. [44] Al-Nahar, Beirut, issue 643, 7 March 1969, Nicolas Van Dam, Conflict on Power, Syria, p.106, Peter lan Losyan, Hafiz Al-Assad, Struggler Bibliography, p.120. [45] President Hafez Al-Assad in an Interview with Patrick Seel, Damascus, 12 may 1985, Published in: Patrick Seel, AlAssad and Conflict on the Middle East, p.242. [46] AlBa'th, Damascus, issue 2346,13 November 1970, Arab Documents 1970, Documents no.387,p.715, Agnatsi Kratshcki, President Hafez Al-Assad, A leader of a Homeland and people, pp.23-24. [47] Majid Khaduri, The Arab Personalities in Politics, The Middle East Institute, p.203. [48] See the statement of National Command in charge of Alba'th party about Internal crisis in Syria, 14 November 1970, in: Arab Documents 1970, Documents no.390, p.718, Agnatsi Kratshcki, President Hafez Al-Assad, A leader of a Homeland, p.126, Addustoor, Amman, issue 1222, 14 November 1970. [49] Najah AlAttar, AlNaseej AlThawri between March And October, pp.16-20. [50] See the atatement of Country Command of 16 November 1970 in AlBa'th, Damascus , issue 2348, 17 November 1970, Arab Documents 1970, Document no, 391, p.721. [51] Arab Documents 1970, Documents no.393, Agnatsi Kratshcki, President Hafez Al-Assad, a Leader of a Homeland, p.124. [52] AlBa'th, Damascus, issue 2351, 20 November 1970. [53] AlBa'th, Damascus, issue 2352, 22 November 1970, Losyan Peter Lan, Hafiz AlAssad, Struggler Bipiography, p.138. [54] AlBa'th, Damascus, issue 2357, November 1970, Arab Documents 1970, Document No.410, p.750.

[55] Arab Documents 1970, Document No.21, p.325, Fawzi Allaf, Corrective Movement, Glances of our political Movement both on Arabia and International levels, 1976, p.28. [56] Bashar AlJa'fari, Syrian External Policy 1946-1985, p.166. [57] Jordanian Documents 1970, Documents No 144, P.293. [58] Al-Dustoor, Amman, issue 1247, 16 December 1970. [59] Al-Dustoor, Amman, issue 1323, 19 March 1971, Al-Ba'th, Damascus, issue 2448, 19March 1971. [60] Arab Documents 1971, Documents No. 215, p.327. [61] President Hafiz Al-Assad Talk with Mrs. Alyae Al-Sulh, 17March 1971, Published in: Arab Documents 1970, Document No.159, p.249. [62] AlBa'th, Damascus, issue 2759, 9 March 1972, Bashar ALJa'fari, Syrian External Policy 1946- 1982, p.167. [63] From a speech word President Hafiz Al-Assad in a Banquet held by Central Committee of Soviot communist Party on his honor in Moscow in 1 March 1971, Published in General, Mustafa Tlas Likethis said AlAssad, selected p.170. [64] General Mustafa Tlas, Like this said AlAssad, 295. [65] Bashar AlJa'fari, Syrian External Policy 1946-1982, prior reference, p.170. [66] Al'Ba'th, Documents, issue 2393, 12 January1971. [67] Arab Documents 1971, Document No. 166, p.260. [68] Arab Documents 1971, Document No. 170, p.262. [69] See the visit of Syrian Military Delegation under the leadership of General Mustafa Tlas to Amman on 8 April 1971 in: Arab Documents 1971, Document No. 180, p.277, ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1341, 9 April 1971, ALBa'th, Damascus, issue 2468, 10 April 1971, Losyan Peter Lan, Hafiz AlAssad and a Struggler Biography, prior reference, p.145. [70] Arab Documents 1971, Document No. 186, p.284, ALDustoor Amman, issue 1341, 9 April 1971. [71] Jordanian Documents 1970, Document Np.17,p.121, American University, Arab Documents 1971, Document No. 219,p.330, ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1356, 30 April 1971. [72] ALRai', Amman, issue 38, 15 July 1971. [73] See the Tasks of Syrian Delegation under the leadership of General AbdulRazzak ALDarari published in: ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1430,16 July 1971, and ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1432,18 July 1971, ALRai', Amman, issue 39,16 July 1971, and ALRai', Amman, issue 40, 18 July 1971, and ALBa'th, Damascus, issue 2552, 16 July 1971, and ALBa'th, Damascus, issue 2552, 18 July 1971. [74] ALRai', Amman, issue 43, 20 July 1971, Jordanian Documents 1971, Document No.53,p.53,pp.180-191, Arab Documents 1971, Document No. 334,p507. [75] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1434, 20 July 1971, Arab Documents 1971, issue No.324,p.494, Jordanian Documents 1971, issue No. 51,pp.175-177, Sayed Ali ALAdroos, The History of Hashemite Arab Army, prior reference,p.283, Mohammad Sulaiman ALDajani, Jordanian Political Regime, p.130. [76] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1434, 20 July 1971, and ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1445,31 July 1971, Wasfi AL-Tal, Writings on Arab Issues, pp.249-250. [77] ALBa'th Damascus, issue 2560,26 July 1971, ALRai', Amman, issue 47, 26 July 1971, AbdulMajeed Azzam, Jordanian External Policy Making Process, p.55, Peter Lan Losyan, Hafiz ALAssad, Struggler bibliography, prior reference, p.145. [78] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1445, 31 July 1971. [79] ALBa'th, Damascus, issue 2577, 13 August 1971, Arab Documents 1971, issue Mo. 363, p.556. [80] See the comment of Jordanian Formal Spokesman on the Syrian Government Decision a bout cutting diplomatic relations: Arab Documents 1971, Document No.364, p.557. [81] ALRai', Amman, issue 67, 18 August 1971.

[82] Haitham Kilani, Palestinian People an Armed Struggle, Arab Affairs Magazine, Tunis, issue 44, December 1985,p.19, AbdulMajeed ALShunnaq, The Political History of the Jordanian- Syrian Relations,p.412, Bashar AlJa'bari, Syrian External Policy, p.164. [83] Jordan National Union stays called with this name until the Declaration of the project of Union Arab Kingdom, then it was called Arab National Union. [84] Ahmad Abu Ghaneema, Glances of Political Life in Jordan from twenties unti seventies, pp.254-255, American University, Arab Documents 1971, issue No. 393, pp.609-610. [85] Mistry of Culture and Information, Department of Print and Publication, Arab National Union Covenant, Amman 1972. [86] AlMajeed AlShunnaq, The Political History of the Jordanian-Syrian Relations, p.425. [87] Wasfi AlTal, Writings on Arab Issues, pp.89-90. [88] Offical Journal of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Amman, issue 12336, December 1971, p.1999. [89] Laila Saleem AlQadi, A report about peaceful Settlement Projects of the Arab-Israeli Conflict 1948-1972, Palestinian Affairs, issue 22, Beirut, June 1973, pp.121-123. [90] Naji Allosh, Reaction on King Hussein Project, Palestinian Affairs, issue 9, Beirut, May 1972, pp.254-256. [91] Belal AlHasan, Palestinian Resistance and the replay on United Kingdom Project, Palestinian Affairs, issue 9, Berute, May 1972, pp.247-252. [92] Naji Allosh, Reactions on King Hussein Project, pp.254-255. [93] AlDustoor, Amman, issue 1671, 20 March 1972. [94] ALBa'th, Damascus, issue 2786, 8 April 1972. [95] AlDustoor, Amman, issue 1685, 3 April 1972. [96] AlDustoor, Amman, issue 1924, 2 December 1972. [97] ALRai', Amman, issue 184, 4 December 1972. [98] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1926, 4 December 1972. [99] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1651, 29 February 1972. [100] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1828, 25 August 1972. [101] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1840, 6 September 1972. [102] Losyan Peter Lan, Hafiz ALAssad, a struggler biography, prior reference, p. 163, Sulaiman Mousa, The History of Jordan in the Twentieth Century, prior reference, part 2+ p.396. [103] ALBa'th issue 2976, p.2, December 1972. [104] ALDustoor, Amman, issue 1924, 2 December 1972.