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Electoral Law Strasbourg, 3 July 2013 CDL-EL(2013)006 Or. Bil. EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW (VENICE COMMISSION) ELECTORAL LAW Contents General introduction ............................................................................................. Part 1 – Elections Code of good practice in electoral matters – Guidelines and explanatory report ................ Introduction ................................................................................................................................ Guidelines on elections .............................................................................................................. I. Principles of Europe’s electoral heritage ................................................................... 1. Universal suffrage ................................................................................................. 2. Equal suffrage ....................................................................................................... 3. Free suffrage .......................................................................................................... 4. Secret suffrage ....................................................................................................... 5. Direct suffrage ....................................................................................................... 6. Frequency of elections .......................................................................................... II. Conditions for implementing these principles ........................................................... 1. Respect for fundamental rights ............................................................................. 2. Regulatory levels and stability of electoral law .................................................... 3. Procedural guarantees ........................................................................................... 4. Electoral system .................................................................................................... Explanatory report ..................................................................................................................... I. The underlying principles of Europe’s electoral heritage .......................................... 1. Universal suffrage ................................................................................................. 2. Equal suffrage ....................................................................................................... 3. Free suffrage ......................................................................................................... 4. Secret suffrage ...................................................................................................... 5. Direct suffrage ...................................................................................................... 6. Frequency of elections .......................................................................................... II. Conditions for implementing these principles ........................................................... 1. Respect for fundamental rights ............................................................................. 2. Regulatory levels and stability of electoral law .................................................... 3. Procedural guarantees ........................................................................................... Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... Interpretative Declaration on the Stability of the Electoral Law ........................................... Declaration on Women’s Participation in Elections ................................................................ Study on electoral law and national minorities ........................................................................ Introduction ......................................................................................................................... I. Rules specifically providing for representation of minorities .................................... A. Representation of minorities as such ..................................................................... 2 B. Rules facilitating the representation of minorities ................................................ C. The system ............................................................................................................. II. The influence of electoral systems on the representation of political groups – what kind of general rules? ...................................................................................... III. The effects of electoral systems on the representation of minorities ......................... A. Political parties of national minorities – a factor in the representation of such minorities ...................................................................................................... B. The situation when there are no parties of minorities ........................................... IV. Constituencies and the representation of minorities .................................................. V. Debate on the electoral system and national minorities ............................................. Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... Questionnaire on participation of members of minorities in public life ............................. Synopsis of replies to the questionnaire on participation of members of minorities in public life ........................................................................................................ Report on electoral rules and affirmative action for national minorities’ participation in decision-making process in European countries .......................................... Introduction ......................................................................................................................... I. Affirmative action ...................................................................................................... II. Affirmative action and electoral rules ........................................................................ Conclusion ........................................................................................................................... Appendix: Electoral law and national minorities ................................................................. Report on electoral law and electoral administration in Europe – Synthesis study on recurrent challenges and problematic issues ...................................................................... I. Introduction ................................................................................................................ II. General remarks ......................................................................................................... III. The electoral administration structure ........................................................................ IV. The right to vote, and voter registration ..................................................................... V. The right to stand for election, and the registration of election subjects ................... VI. Election campaign ...................................................................................................... VII. The role of the media in election campaigns ............................................................. VIII. Election observation ................................................................................................... IX. Election day – the polling stations ............................................................................. X. Voter identification, and voting procedures ............................................................... XI. Vote count and the announcement of provisional results .......................................... XII. Election appeals and accountability for electoral violations ...................................... XIII. Final results, and the electoral system ....................................................................... XIV. Conclusions ................................................................................................................ Appendix I: Opinions and recommendations of the Venice Commission ........................... Appendix II: Reports and other documents of the Venice Commission ............................. Appendix III: Reports of the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities of the Council of Europe ................................................................................................................ Appendix IV: Documents of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe Appendix V: Reports by the OSCE/ODIHR ....................................................................... Appendix VI: Further publications ...................................................................................... Report on electoral systems – Overview of available solutions and selection criteria ......................................................................................................................................... 3 Introduction ............................................................................................................. Part One – Electoral systems on offer ....................................................................................... 1. Guiding principles
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