British Strategy in the War of 1812— the Balance of Power in Europe and the Perils of a Peripheral War

British Strategy in the War of 1812— the Balance of Power in Europe and the Perils of a Peripheral War by Andrew Lambert, PhD in Spain and France paled into insignifi- cance alongside the massive allied armies he War of 1812 was a curi- tion, and the titanic battle of Leipzig only Napoleon abdicated in April 1814—which gathering on the Rhine for the invasion of ous conflict with at least emphasized that the American war was a is why the Anglo-American peace was France. The central European perspectives three different interpreta- trifling, tedious distraction. The big event signed in Ghent. of Austrian Chancellor Metternich, Czar tions of the outcome: the old of the year for British strategy was the col- In 1813, British strategists had few Alexander I, and the Prussians, along with American claim that it was lapse of Napoleonic Spain. The battle of options. They had to keep up the naval the parochial concerns of Swedish Crown a victorious “Second War of Vitoria enhanced British diplomatic lever- blockade on the far side of the Atlantic Prince Bernadotte, led them to view Iberia TIndependence,” Canadian Prime Minister age with other European powers, and ended to deny American cruisers and privateers as a mere sideshow and the American war Stephen Harper’s Canadian triumph, and the need for American grain and flour. access to the sea, while an economic war as a distraction and a weakness they could British amnesia—for them 1812 was all The British government largely ignored wreaked havoc on the American treasury, exploit to limit British influence. about Napoleon marching on Moscow. the American war because the convoy but limited military manpower meant Lord Castlereagh’s diplomacy was By any calculation, Great Britain was very system succeeded in reducing commercial that anything beyond holding the Cana- dominated by Britain’s refusal to compro- busy in 1812, which was why President risk and loss to manageable levels, while dian frontier, the dominant military effort, mise on the issue of maritime belligerent Madison decided on war. The Royal Navy intelligence sharing between Lloyds and and Cockburn’s brilliant, extemporized, rights, the very core of the Anglo-American was running a truly global war to maintain the Admiralty ensured there were no un- small-scale high-tempo raiding on the struggle. He recognized that Russia was control of the seas, while the British army pleasant surprises. Rear Admiral George Chesapeake was simply impossible. At the anxious to re-open the subject—and not was committed to the liberation of Spain, Cockburn’s 1813 Chesapeake raids began same time, a rising tide of insurrection to Britain’s advantage—when a post-war the security of Britain and Sicily, and the the process of taking the initiative on the across the Spanish Caribbean and Latin European Congress assembled to redraw construction of an Indian Empire. Most littoral, and closing the American cruiser America was challenging the security of the maps and charters of the world. of the British troops in the Americas were ports. Although they paid the war little the British sugar islands. As a result, too Anticipating a future clash with Britain, tied up in the West Indies. British strat- attention, British ministers were always many troops were tied down in West Indies Russia wanted to push the American/ egy was global, over-stretched and under- looking to conclude this annoying side garrisons, ostensibly against the improb- French claim that neutral ships made the resourced. Consequently, the new conflict show. By late 1813, they accepted that the able risk of an American attack, but in fact cargoes neutral—thereby disarming sea with the Americans was most unwelcome, limited war strategy of isolating and target- to calm the nerves of politically powerful power. This had been the purpose of the and the government in London would have ing the Southern and mid-Atlantic states planters who feared a slave uprising. Russian offer to broker peace in 1813. been content to accept a status quo ante by economic blockade and coastal raids The political weight of the West Indies Castlereagh made the British position peace at any time before the abdication had not broken the Union. Consequently, remained strong: the Ministry depended very clear and did not hesitate to issue a of Napoleon in April 1814. They simply they stepped up pressure on Washington on the planters’ votes and their profits, scarcely veiled threat. “Great Britain may wanted the war to go away, so they could by translating the vital naval blockade of remitted in specie, to retain political power be driven out of a Congress but not out of address the main problem, the peace and New England into an economic offensive, and fund the European war. British stra- her maritime rights, and if the continental london gallery, portrait national stability of Europe. and increased the scale and tempo of coastal tegy would be bound by such calculations Powers know their own interests they Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh was the British foreign secretary charged with broker- In 1812 the British Government took raids. Even so, British options were limited. until Napoleon had been defeated. Strategy will not hazard this.” He also crushed ing peace negotiations between Great Britain and the United States at the close of the War several months to accept that the Americans As long as Napoleon remained in power, to fight America was bound by chains of Napoleon’s malicious suggestion that of 1812, while simultaneously serving as Britain’s chief diplomat in the Congress of Vienna, were serious, delaying vital strategic meas- few British soldiers could be spared for sugar and gold to the defense of West the Americans should be invited to any which redrew the political map of Europe in 1815 at the close of the Napoleonic Wars. ures, including the economic blockade. America, while fresh theaters were opening Indian commercial and territorial power. congress. In September 1813, Castlereagh Furthermore, every subsequent shift in in Northern Europe. West Indian complaints prompted Mel- restated the British position. There would French, American, or Russian attempts The Americans conceded Britain’s British policy would be driven by the same As Napoleon retreated westward, the ville to remove Admiral John Warren from be no congress until maritime rights had to alter the rules of war at sea. core war aims—maritime belligerent overriding European imperative. From early British saw an opportunity to destroy his his command of the West Indies and North been taken off the agenda, and he would Having secured their freedom to deal rights and impressment—at the start of 1813, the cabinet effectively ignored the naval arsenal and fleet at Antwerp. This American Stations and replace him with not allow the American war to be dis- with the United States and maritime negotiations: having failed to conquer war, leaving a profoundly unenthusiastic was the overriding British strategic inter- Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, cussed at a general European settlement. questions without European interfer- Canada, they had nothing to trade. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Melville, est; in comparison, reinforcing Canada Governor of Guadeloupe. Great Britain In December 1813, the cabinet instructed ence, the British could wait for Madison only question for the British was how far the to direct a minor naval war, along with or attacking America was insignificant. would not risk the sugar islands for some Castlereagh that if the European pow- to recognize the inevitable. American blockade and coastal operations could be Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State for War Antwerp, the casus belli in 1793, had be- fleeting advantage on the American main- ers raised the subject he could state that obduracy meant negotiations would be- translated into more positive outcomes. The and the Colonies, another minister with come a major French naval base, the fixed land. In consequence, the scale of coastal Britain was prepared to make peace with gin only after Napoleon had abdicated. cabinet showed little interest in anything more pressing duties, in his case support- point around which the British developed operations would be severely limited until the United States on the principles of the From an American perspective, it seemed beyond that. Castlereagh’s aim had been to ing the war in Spain. The loss of three their war aims and strategy. Yet, with the Europe was at peace. status quo ante bellum. These terms had obvious that once Great Britain escaped keep the American and European conflicts frigate actions in the autumn of 1812 main army in Spain, the Cabinet could Over the autumn and winter of 1813, been available, in fact, from the first day the overriding demands of the European in separate, hermetically sealed boxes. He caused a minor sensation, before the bril- only find a paltry 11,000 men—the opera- Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh spent of the war—the Americans would sign war, a bankrupt and beaten United States had no intention of allowing any Euro- liant Shannon-Chesapeake action restored tion failed. If Britain lacked the military every waking moment trying to keep the them on 24 December 1814. To this end, could not hope to secure improved terms. pean power to take a role in the process. British preeminence at sea. Instead, British force to secure existential war aims in nearby latest European coalition pulling together, Castlereagh carefully courted Austria as Having agreed to talks, the British Vice By contrast, Britain had little ability concerns in 1813 were dominated by the Belgium, there was no prospect that men using a combination of British economic a counterweight to Russia, making con- Consul forwarded the American mail to influence the negotiations at Ghent by crisis and collapse of Napoleon’s German could be found to pursue altogether less aid, military hardware, and diplomatic cessions to Vienna on Central European bag to London, to be opened and deci- military force.

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