British Strategy in the — the Balance of Power in Europe and the Perils of a Peripheral War

by Andrew Lambert, PhD in Spain and France paled into insignifi- cance alongside the massive allied armies he War of 1812 was a curi- tion, and the titanic only abdicated in April 1814—which gathering on the Rhine for the invasion of ous conflict with at least emphasized that the American war was a is why the Anglo-American peace was France. The central European perspectives three different interpreta- trifling, tedious distraction. The big event signed in . of Austrian Chancellor Metternich, Czar tions of the outcome: the old of the year for British strategy was the col- In 1813, British strategists had few Alexander I, and the Prussians, along with American claim that it was lapse of Napoleonic Spain. The battle of options. They had to keep up the naval the parochial concerns of Swedish Crown a victorious “Second War of Vitoria enhanced British diplomatic lever- blockade on the far side of the Atlantic Prince Bernadotte, led them to view Iberia TIndependence,” Canadian Prime Minister age with other European powers, and ended to deny American cruisers and privateers as a mere sideshow and the American war Stephen Harper’s Canadian triumph, and the need for American grain and flour. access to the sea, while an economic war as a distraction and a weakness they could British amnesia—for them 1812 was all The British government largely ignored wreaked havoc on the American treasury, exploit to limit British influence. about Napoleon marching on Moscow. the American war because the convoy but limited military manpower meant Lord Castlereagh’s diplomacy was By any calculation, Great Britain was very system succeeded in reducing commercial that anything beyond holding the Cana- dominated by Britain’s refusal to compro- busy in 1812, which was why President risk and loss to manageable levels, while dian frontier, the dominant military effort, mise on the issue of maritime belligerent Madison decided on war. The intelligence sharing between Lloyds and and Cockburn’s brilliant, extemporized, rights, the very core of the Anglo-American was running a truly global war to maintain the Admiralty ensured there were no un- small-scale high-tempo raiding on the struggle. He recognized that Russia was control of the seas, while the British army pleasant surprises. Rear Admiral George Chesapeake was simply impossible. At the anxious to re-open the subject—and not was committed to the liberation of Spain, Cockburn’s 1813 Chesapeake raids began same time, a rising tide of insurrection to Britain’s advantage—when a post-war the security of Britain and Sicily, and the the process of taking the initiative on the across the Spanish Caribbean and Latin European Congress assembled to redraw construction of an Indian Empire. Most littoral, and closing the American cruiser America was challenging the security of the maps and charters of the world. of the British troops in the Americas were ports. Although they paid the war little the British sugar islands. As a result, too Anticipating a future clash with Britain, tied up in the West Indies. British strat- attention, British ministers were always many troops were tied down in West Indies Russia wanted to push the American/ egy was global, over-stretched and under- looking to conclude this annoying side garrisons, ostensibly against the improb- French claim that neutral ships made the resourced. Consequently, the new conflict show. By late 1813, they accepted that the able risk of an American attack, but in fact cargoes neutral—thereby disarming sea with the Americans was most unwelcome, limited war strategy of isolating and target- to calm the nerves of politically powerful power. This had been the purpose of the and the government in London would have ing the Southern and mid-Atlantic states planters who feared a slave uprising. Russian offer to broker peace in 1813. been content to accept a status quo ante by economic blockade and coastal raids The political weight of the West Indies Castlereagh made the British position peace at any time before the abdication had not broken the Union. Consequently, remained strong: the Ministry depended very clear and did not hesitate to issue a of Napoleon in April 1814. They simply they stepped up pressure on Washington on the planters’ votes and their profits, scarcely veiled threat. “Great Britain may wanted the war to go away, so they could by translating the vital naval blockade of remitted in specie, to retain political power be driven out of a Congress but not out of

address the main problem, the peace and New England into an economic offensive, and fund the European war. British stra- her maritime rights, and if the continental london gallery, portrait national stability of Europe. and increased the scale and tempo of coastal tegy would be bound by such calculations Powers know their own interests they Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh was the British foreign secretary charged with broker- In 1812 the British Government took raids. Even so, British options were limited. until Napoleon had been defeated. Strategy will not hazard this.” He also crushed ing peace negotiations between Great Britain and the at the close of the War several months to accept that the Americans As long as Napoleon remained in power, to fight America was bound by chains of Napoleon’s malicious suggestion that of 1812, while simultaneously serving as Britain’s chief diplomat in the Congress of Vienna, were serious, delaying vital strategic meas- few British soldiers could be spared for sugar and gold to the defense of West the Americans should be invited to any which redrew the political map of Europe in 1815 at the close of the . ures, including the economic blockade. America, while fresh theaters were opening Indian commercial and territorial power. congress. In September 1813, Castlereagh Furthermore, every subsequent shift in in Northern Europe. West Indian complaints prompted Mel- restated the British position. There would French, American, or Russian attempts The Americans conceded Britain’s British policy would be driven by the same As Napoleon retreated westward, the ville to remove Admiral John Warren from be no congress until maritime rights had to alter the rules of war at sea. core war aims—maritime belligerent overriding European imperative. From early British saw an opportunity to destroy his his command of the West Indies and North been taken off the agenda, and he would Having secured their freedom to deal rights and impressment—at the start of 1813, the cabinet effectively ignored the naval arsenal and fleet at Antwerp. This American Stations and replace him with not allow the American war to be dis- with the United States and maritime negotiations: having failed to conquer war, leaving a profoundly unenthusiastic was the overriding British strategic inter- Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, cussed at a general European settlement. questions without European interfer- Canada, they had nothing to trade. The First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Melville, est; in comparison, reinforcing Canada Governor of Guadeloupe. Great Britain In December 1813, the cabinet instructed ence, the British could wait for Madison only question for the British was how far the to direct a minor naval war, along with or attacking America was insignificant. would not risk the sugar islands for some Castlereagh that if the European pow- to recognize the inevitable. American blockade and coastal operations could be Earl Bathurst, Secretary of State for War Antwerp, the casus belli in 1793, had be- fleeting advantage on the American main- ers raised the subject he could state that obduracy meant negotiations would be- translated into more positive outcomes. The and the Colonies, another minister with come a major French naval base, the fixed land. In consequence, the scale of coastal Britain was prepared to make peace with gin only after Napoleon had abdicated. cabinet showed little interest in anything more pressing duties, in his case support- point around which the British developed operations would be severely limited until the United States on the principles of the From an American perspective, it seemed beyond that. Castlereagh’s aim had been to ing the war in Spain. The loss of three their war aims and strategy. Yet, with the Europe was at peace. . These terms had obvious that once Great Britain escaped keep the American and European conflicts actions in the autumn of 1812 main army in Spain, the Cabinet could Over the autumn and winter of 1813, been available, in fact, from the first day the overriding demands of the European in separate, hermetically sealed boxes. He caused a minor sensation, before the bril- only find a paltry 11,000 men—the opera- Foreign Secretary Lord Castlereagh spent of the war—the Americans would sign war, a bankrupt and beaten United States had no intention of allowing any Euro- liant Shannon-Chesapeake action restored tion failed. If Britain lacked the military every waking moment trying to keep the them on 24 December 1814. To this end, could not hope to secure improved terms. pean power to take a role in the process. British preeminence at sea. Instead, British force to secure existential war aims in nearby latest European coalition pulling together, Castlereagh carefully courted Austria as Having agreed to talks, the British Vice By contrast, Britain had little ability concerns in 1813 were dominated by the Belgium, there was no prospect that men using a combination of British economic a counterweight to Russia, making con- Consul forwarded the American mail to influence the negotiations at Ghent by crisis and collapse of Napoleon’s German could be found to pursue altogether less aid, military hardware, and diplomatic cessions to Vienna on Central European bag to London, to be opened and deci- military force. Three weeks after the end empire. Battles at Lutzen, Bautzen, and important aims in America. Nevertheless, pressure. These tools were all the more vital issues beyond the reach of sea power. phered by the Post Office’s secret “Black of the European conflict, Melville advised Dresden, Austrian accession to the coali- the troops occupied Belgium when because Wellington’s military successes The Anglo-Austrian accord pre-empted Chamber.” Castlereagh that the Admiralty was short 14 SEA HISTORY 145, WINTER 2013–14 SEA HISTORY 145, WINTER 2013–14 15 of troop ships. Amphibious operations on given up.” To give the Americans an easy way In truth, Liverpool was bluffing; he would prefer the Vienna appointment. the American coast would tie down a large out, he suggested that, as peace in Europe had many reasons to avoid another year of While always ready to do his duty, the duke fleet of such ships, because the troops had rendered the subject academic, it could be war. He was not optimistic the Americans was anything but enthusiastic. Liverpool to be based afloat. British troop numbers dropped. Indian lands, border rectification, could be brought to see reason, directing did not insist. Within months, Welling- at Bladensburg and Baltimore were restricted and the Newfoundland fishery were open the cabinet to plan on the basis that the ton would be the Chief British envoy at by the logistical demands of a floating army. for discussion. The British negotiators were war would continue, and he was especially Vienna, and then Commander in Chief to stress that America had started the war, anxious that Russia and France might of an allied army at Waterloo. War on the Frontier and refused to discuss blockade, captures exploit the conflict. Nor was he convinced Following the defeat of the economic war made under the Orders in Council, and other the country would be happy finding an- America Concedes in the Atlantic, America’s only strategic maritime issues. The Americans conceded other £10,000,000 “for the purpose of The key to British victory lay not in option in 1814 was yet another invasion of maritime rights and impressment at the securing a better frontier for Canada.” If military might, but in the slow, remorseless Canada. Having mustered 27,000 regular outset—even if they had to be reminded of Europe had been settled, he could have pressure of the naval economic blockade. troops across the country, plus , to the fact a few months later—although they faced the American conflict “with some After December 1813, American economic oppose 12,000 British troops in Canada, were allowed some small comfort over Indian degree of confidence,” but the need to warfare, both internal measures to block any hope of an effective strategy was ru- lands and the Canadian frontier, these were, prepare for the new session of Parliament exports and attacks on British seaborne ined by quarrels over priorities at Niagara comparatively speaking, trifles. Having set with so much remaining uncertain preyed trade, were simply irrelevant. By contrast, and Washington. The American campaign the parameters, Castlereagh left London for on his mind. The most pressing con- the New England blockade beginning in was better handled than those of 1812 and the headquarters of the allied army bearing cern—securing a fresh government loan the summer of 1814 immediately pushed 1813, but no more successful. By winter ramezay of museum chateau collection courtesy down on Napoleon. on suitable terms—would be impossible as up commodity prices by 40%, devastat- all the Americans were once again back on General George Prévost In the summer, reports that Washington Robert Jenkinson, Lord Liverpool long as the American war continued, and ing national revenue and sending much US soil, but they were saved from worse had fallen were linked to a hint that the room for maneuver was limited by the Europe remained unsettled. His outlook of the capital into factories or across the by the ignominious debacle that overtook Peace Talks Americans should understand that the Vienna negotiations and the widespread was dominated by the alarming state of border into British government bonds. On the largest British land operation of the After Napoleon’s abdication, the American British “wish[ed] to terminate the present feeling among European powers that British France; credible intelligence suggested 4 October, the United States government war. General George Prévost, the cautious war became a source of growing diplomatic unfortunate contest on principles honour- interests at the Congress could be ignored Bonapartist fanatics planned to assass- was insolvent. On 11 November, it de- Governor General of , had embarrassment for the British government. able to both parties,” so far as the terms because of the American war. inate the Duke of Wellington, the faulted on payments due on the national been ordered to advance to Lake Cham- It left Britain looking weak and distracted did not risk the security of His Majesty’s While Earl Bathurst favored an Indian Ambassador in Paris. To remove the debt and the Purchase. The plain with 11,000 regulars. Before attack- just as her European partners were about to dominions. This last point was becoming buffer state, Liverpool recognized the duke from Paris without exciting suspi- national credit rating hit an all-time low, ing the heavily outnumbered American settle the political future of the continent. more important—during his lengthy jour- impossibility of making terms to cover cion, Liverpool considered sending him the full consequences of which were only defenders of Plattsburgh, , on Peace would allow the British to focus on ney across Europe, Castlereagh had been semi-nomadic peoples. In mid-September to Vienna to provide military advice to avoided by the . In June the western side of the lake, he directed his the bigger questions that were to be settled studying British economic policy and “the 1814, ministers sensed the circumstances Castlereagh or to command in North 1814, Albert Gallatin acknowledged that naval force to attack the American squad- at the Vienna Congress. In his instructions growing value of Canada.” He recognized might permit some useful minor border America, “with full powers to make peace the best terms available would be status ron. The British were defeated decisively, to the British Commissioners at Ghent that Canadian timber, forest products, and rectifications of a strategic character, but or to continue the war, if peace should be quo ante. Attacks on Baltimore and New and Prévost, who had manifested no enthu- early in 1814, Castlereagh focused on grain could reduce British dependence on instability in France and uncertainty at found impracticable, with renewed vig- Orleans were quite unnecessary to defeat siasm for the operation, retreated to Canada. maritime rights, impressment, and the Russia, amongst other benefits. Vienna made peace imperative. Battles our.” He had little doubt that Wellington the United States: the standard British His failure helped persuade the British to naturalization of seamen. The right to By 1 September 1814, the British knew and outcomes at Washington, Baltimore, strategy of sea control and economic accept the status quo in the negotiations search neutral merchant ships on the high the United States was bankrupt, but rather and Plattsburg mattered because Britain warfare had proven perfectly effective. at Ghent. seas in wartime, he instructed, “can never be than press their advantage for territorial needed peace with America to secure the When the draft Treaty of Ghent gain or humiliating terms, they preferred benefits of peace in Europe. The death of reached London, a relieved Liverpool to restore the European state system and re- Robert Ross and the humiliating fiasco at explained: “You know how anxious I was build Atlantic trade. On 11 September 1814, Plattsburgh broke the spell of Anglo vic- that we should get out of this war as soon Prime Minister Lord Liverpool observed, tory, bringing an air of reality to British as we could do so with honour.” Canada “I cannot believe that, with the prospect thinking. Prévost’s debacle at Plattsburgh could not be defended economically with of bankruptcy before them, the American proved hugely embarrassing and, far 7.5 million Americans and only 300,000 Government would not wish to make worse: it broke the run of success that was Canadians in North America. Faced with peace, if they can make terms which would pressuring the Americans into conces- such numbers, changing the frontier would not give a triumph to their enemies.” The sions. Victory in was hardly go- avail little. Liverpool was satisfied because enemies he had in mind were the Federalists. ing to win the war, but it might have been the Americans had waived their maritime With an eye on opinion in Parliament, enough to make the Americans concede. claims. “As far as I have any means of judg- Liverpool was anxious that the blame for Instead, the defeat at Plattsburg cost the ing our decision is generally approved.” any breakdown fell on the “impudent” British any leverage for border rectification He remained deeply concerned about the Americans. He well understood that Britain’s or attempts to create an Indian territory. negotiations at Vienna; “this considera- Liverpool moved quickly to limit the dam- tion itself was deserving of some weight (left) The Battle of Plattsburgh: General age: the Ghent commissioners must ensure in deciding the question of peace with Prévost’s defeat on affected that the Americans understood Britain America.” Fortunately, a secret article in

the outcome of British and American nego- would rectify recent failures and prose- museum wellington the Treaty of Paris had settled the future library of congress library tiations at Ghent in the fall of 1814. cute the war with more vigor. Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington of the strategically vital Low Countries. It 16 SEA HISTORY 145, WINTER 2013–14 SEA HISTORY 145, WINTER 2013–14 17 is indicative of the fundamentally mari- from the European conflict, and accept- threats, beyond an endless chain of massive time nature of British strategy that ing the status quo ante, British statesmen stone fortresses. As the maritime belliger- Liverpool did not feel it necessary to showed great wisdom, preserving the legal ent rights regime that won the war of mention the obvious lesson that Canada basis of sea power and reducing the risk 1812 had not been affected by the Treaty would be defended by the Royal Navy, not of future problems. Ghent maintained a of Ghent, America remained desperately a rectified frontier, fortresses, or an army. clear distinction between Europe and the vulnerable after 1815. America lacked the For the British, the War of 1812 had outside world, which suited the British, who military muscle to win a short war, and, always been a “tiresome, pointless distrac- controlled the communications and trade once the British troops had reinforced tion… a nuisance, but not a serious threat.” that bridged the gap. It helped maintain Canada, the imposition of an effective Little wonder that public reaction to the British global power for two generations at economic blockade quickly exposed Treaty of Ghent was muted; at least the a very low cost. Above all, British aims at Washington’s chronic lack of financial merchant princes of Liverpool and Bristol Ghent and Vienna were clear and consist- power. America could not pay for a long were content. With the war at an end, the ent—the restoration or recreation of a stable, war, even one conducted on strictly limited government could focus on Europe and peaceful world open to trade, one in which terms. The cost of war was a 200% increase impending domestic battles over taxation the British could prosper while they paid in the American national debt and a de- and expenditure. The connection between off the mountainous debts incurred wag- cisive shift away from oceanic maritime the epic peace process underway at Vienna ing war with much of the very same world enterprise. Back in Great Britain, peace was greeted with little pleasure; Sir Walter Scott la- mented the failure to administer America a stern lesson but admitted the country was unwilling to wage the war for such a nebulous object. As a world-class creator of fabulous stories, he realized the Americans had been given an opportunity to claim victory in print, and convince themselves they might try again. Scott understood the enduring legacy of 1812 would not be territory or rights, but a distinct American culture: he expected American pens would generate the victory that had eluded their swords, and this proved to be the case. The War of 1812 was not a second War of Independence in political terms, but it did mark the decisive parting of two cultures. It drove America to acquire a distinctive identity, one that was truly of the New

courtesy of the national archives of canada. archives of the national courtesy World. “A Hundred Years Peace,” the Signature of the Treaty of Ghent between Great Britain Andrew Lambert is Laughton Professor of and the United States of America—24 December 1814 by Sir Amédée Forestier. Naval History in the Department of War and the small-scale discussions at Ghent between 1793 and 1815. In the process, Studies at King’s College, London. His work had long been obvious. By the time news the British forced the Americans to look focuses on the naval and strategic history of of American ratification reached London at their own internal problems, problems the British Empire between the Napoleonic in late March, the domestic and interna- that would keep them divided up to 1865. Wars and the First World War. His books tional political landscapes had changed. On 17 January 1815, the National include: The Crimean War: British No one cared. Intelligencer, the quasi official outlet of Grand Strategy against Russia 1853-1856 The Treaty of Ghent upheld British the Republican administration, effectively (1990); The War Correspondents: The maritime belligerent rights, the funda- admitted that the War in 1812 had been Crimean War (1994); The Foundations mental bedrock of British power. While foolish, and futile. Such insight would of Naval History: Sir John Laughton, the many have seen the British position as inform the way America dealt with Britain Royal Navy and the Historical Profession overbearing and dictatorial towards neu- for the next century. British strategic lev- (1997); Nelson: Britannia’s God of War trals, there was no room for neutrality in a erage against America was a combination (2004); Admirals (2008); Franklin: total war, the alternative would have been of sea control, economic warfare, and Tragic hero of Polar Navigation (2009); Napoleonic domination of the Continent. small-scale, targeted coastal offensives. and The Challenge: Britain versus Amer- By keeping the American war isolated The United States had no answer to those ica in the Naval War of 1812 (2012). 18 SEA HISTORY 145, WINTER 2013–14