“The United Kingdom Genocide Act of 1969: Origins and Significance”
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ABSTRACT “The United Kingdom Genocide Act of 1969: Origins and Significance” by Prof. Frank Chalk History Department, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada and Co-Director, the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies ABSTRACT In his judgment on the Pinochet extradition case of 28 October 1998, Lord Chief Justice Thomas Bingham granted immunity from criminal and civil process to General Augusto Pinochet on the grounds that “a former head of state is clearly entitled to immunity in relation to criminal acts performed in the course of exercising public functions.” Justice Bingham contended that Parliament had signified this intention by deliberately omitting Article IV of the United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide from the 1969 United Kingdom Genocide Act. It was Article IV which provided that “Persons committing genocide . shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals.” This paper seeks to demonstrate that the provisions of the 1969 United Kingdom Genocide Act actually provided for the extradition and punishment of former heads of state and that key provisions of the Act were drafted by its authors to give effect to that principle. Based on archival research in the records of the Home Office, the Foreign Office, the Parliamentary Counsel Office, and the British Cabinet, as well as the Debates of Parliament, it proposes that the 1969 United Kingdom Genocide Act had always furnished adequate grounds for the extradition of former heads of state when prima facie evidence was submitted that they had committed the crime of genocide. In fact, Justice Bingham’s decision harked back to an earlier tradition in British law that the wording of the 1969 Genocide Act was intended to replace. While Pinochet was probably not guilty of the crime of genocide as it is defined by the United Nations Genocide Convention, Justice Bingham’s argument on the intentions of Parliament regarding Article IV, reiterated by Law Lords Slynn and Hadley in their opinions, and unchallenged by either the Crown Prosecution Service or the Law Lords who favored the extradition of General Pinochet, threatened to undermine one of Britain’s landmark legislative acts. 2 DRAFT OF 22 JANUARY 2002 Please do not quote or attribute material from this workshop paper, which is under revision by the author. This draft is intended to set out the narrative for readers interested in the archival record of the debate over the drafting of the U.K. Genocide Act and its relevance to the arguments in the Pinochet extradition case. Further papers will present an explicit analytical framework, fewer quotations from the sources, and a more concise narrative. In later versions, the author will also examine the discussion of the legislation in 1968 and 1969 by Parliament and the public. Permission to employ specific quotes from the records at the PRO, the Home Office, and the Parliamentary Counsel Office will be requested prior to normal scholarly publication. “The United Kingdom Genocide Act of 1969: Origins and Significance” by Prof. Frank Chalk History Department, Concordia University, Montreal, Quebec, Canada and Co-Director, the Montreal Institute for Genocide and Human Rights Studies ([email protected]) British diplomats played an important role in the debates that led the United Nations in 1948 to adopt the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.1 But like the United States, Great Britain failed to give effect to the Genocide Convention in its domestic law until many years after its promulgation, and this despite Article V of the Convention, which stipulated that: The Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or of any of the other acts enumerated in article III.2 It was not until 1969, eighteen years after the Convention came into force in 1951, that Parliament passed “An Act to give effect to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.”3 This eighteen year interval was hardly the consequence of an oversight. Rather, it reflected the difficulty of achieving the 1 The United Nations Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide is hereafter referred to as the UNGC. For an excellent and comprehensive discussion of the role of the British diplomats, and an in-depth review of the major debates to which they contributed at the United Nations, consult William A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), most especially pp. 44, 58, 59-60, 72, 74, 159-160, 233, 248-251, 269, 289, 373-374, 403, 419-423, and 513-514. 2 “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” United Nations, 9 December 1948, reprinted in Frank Chalk and Kurt Jonassohn, The History and Sociology of Genocide: Analyses and Case Studies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), p.45. 3 See Genocide Act 1969, Halsbury’s Statutes of England, 4th ed., vol. 12 (1994), pp. 541-543. It took the United States Senate even longer than Britain—thirty-five years—to ratify the Genocide Convention.. See “U.S. Senate Ratification of the UN Genocide Convention,” 19 February, 1986, ibid., pp. 49-50. The American law entered the Criminal Code of the United States in 1988. A retirement present from his colleagues for Senator William Proxmire (Dem-Wisconsin), who arose in every Congressional session to call for ratification, key provisions of the Act severely limited the application of the Convention in the United States by such means as narrowing the definitions in the Convention of terms like “incites” and “substantial part,” ibid., pp. 51-53. 3 breakthrough in British legal thinking that was needed before the British Government became willing to name genocide as a crime in British law. The radical alteration of British law symbolized by the 1969 Genocide Act barely penetrated public consciousness and was drafted in such a way that in 1998 Chief Justice Thomas Bingham of the Divisional Court in London could declare in his judgment denying Spain’s request for the extradition of General Augusto Pinochet that it was never the intention of Parliament to permit the extradition of former heads of state, even including those accused of a crime as horrific as genocide.4 Some of the responsibility for this lay in the opaque and concise wording of the United Kingdom Genocide legislation. The high priority assigned to economy in phrasing by the crafters of laws was a cardinal problem of the 1953 and the 1968 drafts of the Act. Thought to minimize the chance of anyone reading unintended implications into the Act, concision obscured from public view the intended meaning of a key provision of the Act. The Pinochet extradition case had its origin in October 1998 when Spanish Judge Balthazar Garzon requested General Augusto Pinochet’s extradition from the UK based on several charges against Pinochet, one of which was that of genocide intended to eliminate certain political and social groups in Chile and Argentina.5 Since some of those killed were citizens of Spain, Garzon claimed that Spanish courts had the right to try General Pinochet under Spanish and international law. Garzon based his charge of genocide on a convoluted legal interpretation of Spain’s domestic laws of genocide. He dropped the charge of genocide from the second of two provisional warrants for extradition presented to the High Court of Justice in London by the Crown Prosecution Service on behalf of Spain, but the original charge resonated throughout the hearing before Lord Chief Justice Thomas Bingham of Cornhill, and was referred to in the decision which he wrote, joined by Justice Collins and Justice Richards, concluding that Pinochet could not be extradited to Spain because he was a former head of state and was protected in the United Kingdom by British laws granting immunity from extradition to diplomats and serving public officials, as well as former heads of state. In Justice Bingham’s words: “a former head of state is clearly entitled to immunity in relation to criminal acts performed in the course of exercising public functions.”6 In his judgment, Justice Bingham noted that Mr. Jones of the Crown Prosecution Service pointed out, “In support of his argument that crimes such as genocide have a peculiar quality of horror” and that Article IV of the UNGC provided for the punishment of persons committing genocide “whether they are constitutionally responsible rulers, public officials, or private individuals.” But, continued Justice Bingham, “the difficulty for Mr. Jones’ argument is . that when partial effect was given to the Convention in the United Kingdom by the Genocide Act, 1969, Article IV [of the UNGC] was not incorporated in the statute.”7 The subsequent appeal decisions of the British courts and the opinions of the Law Lords of the British Parliament several times referred to the omission of the criminal liability for genocide of former heads of state under the UK Genocide Act of 1969. Although the 4 R. v. Bartle, ex parte Pinochet, Divisional Court, Queen’s Bench Division, 28 October 1998, para. 63 (retrieved from the Internet on 14 January 2002 at the following site: <http://www.ceri- fog.org/documentacion/dossiers/pinochet/houseoflords.htm>) [hereinafter Ex Parte Pinochet (DC)]. 5 For a useful summary of Judge Garzon’s extradition requests and his reasoning, see, Margarita Lacabe (Executive Director of Derechos Human Rights), “The Criminal Procedures against Chilean and Argentinean Repressors in Spain: A Short Summary,” Revision One, November 11, 1998 (retrieved from the Internet on 14 January 2002 at the following site: < http://www.derechos.net/marga/papers/spain.html>.