Risky Business: policy uncertainty, institutional insularity, and learning in Canadian provincial energy policy making 2006-2016.
Heather Millar [email protected]
Department of Political Science University of Toronto 100 St. George Street Toronto, ON, M5S 3G3
Prepared for the International Workshop on Public Policy University of Pittsburgh June 26th – 28th, 2018
Draft Working Paper: comments are welcome, please do not cite without author's permission.
Abstract
Policy learning scholarship has moved beyond describing typologies of learning to examine the dynamics of policy learning at micro, meso, and macro levels. Scholars have begun to theorize individual processes of cognition (Moyson 2016), linkages between individual and collective process of learning (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013), and organizational capacities necessary for policy change (Borrás 2011). Despite these advances, recent reviews have identified the need to specify necessary conditions of learning, particularly as to the role of knowledge claims and institutional structures in learning processes. This paper builds on Dunlop and Radaelli’s (2013) causal typology of modes of learning to operationalize measures for problem tractability and actor certification. The paper contends that problem tractability can be analyzed by measuring policy complexity and ambiguity, generating a typology of risk narratives that align with different modes of learning. To measure actor certification, the paper uses institutional insularity, suggesting that closed networks are more likely to support hierarchical and epistemic learning, while open structures facilitate more plural modes of bargaining and reflexive learning. Drawing on cases of hydraulic fracturing regulation in three Canadian provinces (2006-2016), the paper demonstrates that changes to institutional structures and/or risk narratives transforms dominant learning modes in each jurisdiction, resulting in changes to regulatory structures. The paper finds that while perceptions of complex risk can trigger processes of epistemic learning, resulting in result in more stringent regulatory frameworks, institutional openings generated by public consultations can prompt processes of reflexive learning or bargaining that foster radical precautionary regulatory change.
Introduction
Policy studies scholarship has long identified learning as a key mechanism of policy change. From early studies on lesson drawing (Rose 1991), social learning (Hall 1993; May 1992), and policy oriented-learning (Sabatier 1988) to more recent examinations of learning in policy diffusion and transfer (Stone 2017; Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007), research has documented the ways in which policy actors often use other jurisdictions as “laboratories of democracy” to inform policy formulation and design (E. R. Graham, Shipan, and Volden 2013). Yet reviews of the field continue to bemoan a lack of clarity regarding conceptualization and measurement, namely: what is learned, who is learning, and the conditions under which learning occurs (Bennett and Howlett 1992; Moyson, Scholten, and Weible 2017; Pierson 1993).
Recent theoretical work by Dunlop and Radaelli (2013, 2018a, 2018b) has begun to address this gap by systematically mapping the field of policy learning on the dimensions of problem tractability and actor certification. Problem tractability refers to the perceived uncertainty of a policy problem, while actor certification refers to the authority of information sources – for example whether there is one certified “teacher” or many. Together, these two conditions generate four varieties of learning: epistemic learning, reflexive learning, learning through bargaining, and learning in the shadow of hierarchy (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018a, 4). The typology is explanatory in that movement on either of the two axes – problem tractability or actor certification – helps explain the transition of a polity from one mode of learning to another. The framework thus provides a causal logic for explaining why different modes emerge at different times in a given policy area. As such, the framework provides an opportunity for scholars to develop testable propositions about sequences of learning and the causal drivers of policy change (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018a, 15).
This paper contributes to this policy learning framework in two ways. First I operationalize measures for problem tractability and actor certification. To measure problem tractability I build on findings from ideational studies on uncertainty and risk perception (Blyth 2009, 2013; Klinke and Renn 2012; Slovic 1987) to develop a typology of “risk narratives.” Drawing on concepts of policy complexity and ambiguity (Pierson 1993; Cairney, Oliver, and Wellstead 2016; Klinke and Renn 2012), I generate a four-part typology of linear, complex, uncertain, and catastrophic risk, suggesting that risk narratives help refine our measurement of problem tractability. To measure actor certification I propose an aligned concept of institutional insularity (Pierson 1993), proposing that open institutional contexts are more likely to generate contested legitimacy than those with a limited set of decision makers (Skogstad 2008). Second the paper’s findings suggest that identifying the sequencing of different modes of learning can help explain the content of policy designs, explaining why one jurisdiction implements more substantive policy change than another at different points in time.
This paper probes the plausibility of these propositions by examining processes of learning in provincial regulation of hydraulic fracturing in Canada. Hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking” as it is more commonly known, is an unconventional method of oil and gas production that has fundamentally transformed the oil and gas industry in North America (Neville et al. 2017). Through the use of new technologies enabling the combination of horizontal drilling and multi-
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 1 stage hydraulic fracturing1 both US state governments and Canadian provinces have been able to access previously untenable reserves of oil and natural gas, offsetting the decline of conventional reserves (NEB 2009; USEIA 2013). Despite these economic benefits, the extraction process has garnered a range of environmental critics from both academic and activist communities, as groups have raised the potential for groundwater contamination, habitat fragmentation, air pollution, chemical spills, and seismic activity, among others (The Council 2014; Neville et al. 2017). In both Canada and the US, sub-national governments have responded to these challenges by implementing a variety of regulatory frameworks, ranging from single issue regulation, to comprehensive frameworks, to moratoria and bans (Carter and Eaton 2016; Rabe 2014; Olive and Delshad 2017). As such, hydraulic fracturing is a policy field with variation in policy uncertainty and institutional insularity, as well as a range of regulatory outcomes, making it a useful test case for theory generation.
The study examines processes of regulatory development from 2006-2016 in three jurisdictions: New Brunswick, Nova Scotia and British Columbia. Drawing on evidence collected through in- depth process tracing (Beach 2016) I find that different risk narratives, together with different institutional contexts triggered different sequences of learning, resulting in more or less stringent regulatory designs. In provinces with more insular institutional structures, narratives of linear and complex risk prompted processes of hierarchical and epistemic learning respectively, resulting in single issue regulation on the one hand and more comprehensive regulation on the other. Alternatively, in provinces with more open institutional structures, narratives of uncertain and catastrophic risk triggered respective processes of reflexive learning and bargaining, resulting in moratoria and legislated bans. I find that while linear risk narratives and hierarchical learning can “lock-in” policy stasis, uncertain risk narratives and reflexive learning generate political uncertainties that are difficult for government officials to manage.
The paper proceeds in the following way. The next section reviews Dunlop and Radaelli’s (2013) theoretical framework of policy learning and proposes measures for the concepts of problem tractability and actor certification. I outline a typology of risk narratives, proposing that problem tractability can vary with regard to both policy complexity and uncertainty. I also review the concept of institutional insularity, suggesting that closed networks are likely to generate higher levels of actor certification than open networks. Section three demonstrates the applicability of these measures, examining the lock-in of hierarchical learning in British Columbia, the movement from epistemic learning to bargaining in New Brunswick, and from reflexive learning to bargaining in Nova Scotia. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the case findings for further theory building and development.
Modes of learning
Building on rich history in policy studies, research on policy learning has entered into a new stage of theoretical development. Moving beyond early conceptual work establishing types of learning (Hall 1993; May 1992), policy scholars have begun to theorize relationships between
1 Other terms for the process include “hydro-fracking,” “fraccing,” and “high volume hydraulic fracturing.” For the purposes of this paper I use the term “hydraulic fracturing” to encompass the entire process of extraction, including well pad construction, well drilling and completion, the transportation of water and chemicals to the well pad, the actual “frack” of injecting pressurized water into the well, and the disposal of produced waters.
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 2 individual and collective processes and products of learning (Heikkila and Gerlak 2013), micro- foundational models of cognition and individual learning (Moyson 2016, 2017), and organizational capacities and policy change (Borrás 2011). Despite these advances, recent reviews have identified the need for researchers to specify conditions of learning, particularly as to the role of knowledge claims and institutional structures on learning processes (Moyson, Scholten, and Weible 2017).
Dunlop and Radaelli’s (2013) policy learning framework has begun to address this gap by putting forward a causal typology. Drawing on a synthetic review of over 800 articles in a variety of sub-fields in political science, Dunlop and Radaelli develop a four-part typology of learning predicated on two key conditions: problem tractability and actor certification. Problem tractability refers to the degree to which actors have clarity regarding the dimensions of the policy problem, and by extension, their perceived interests (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018a). Conversely, under conditions of low tractability, actors experience “radical uncertainty” in which both the extent of harm and the probability of occurrence is undefined (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018a, 4). The second condition, actor certification refers to the legitimacy of the source of the “teacher.” In policy contexts with high certification, the source of knowledge is easy to locate and enjoys high levels of legitimacy, such as an international body or expert council. In policy contexts with low actor certification, control over the source and content of learning is more diffuse, making it difficult to identify one single primary, credible teacher (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016; Dunlop 2017). These conditions combine to generate four different modes of learning (see table 1).
Table 1: Schema of learning Problem tractability Low High
Low Reflexive learning Learning through bargaining Actor certification High Epistemic learning Learning in the shadow of hierarchy
Source: Dunlop and Radaelli (2013)
In policy contexts where policy issues are tractable, depending the degree of actor certification, we can expect to see learning in the shadow of hierarchy, in which learning is instrumental and occurs by in large within bureaucracies, or learning through bargaining, in actors know their interests but engage in strategic processes of bargaining to uncover the preferences of their opponents (Dunlop and Radaelli 2013). When uncertainty regarding the dimensions of the policy problem is high, we can anticipate more instances of epistemic or reflexive learning. Epistemic learning is predominantly a mode of technical learning in which policy makers rely on scientific expertise to identify causal drivers of policy problems – a process which is possible because of the high levels of legitimacy experts enjoy. But if the policy context is widened to include with a variety of knowledges, modes of learning are more likely to become reflexive, engaging with a broader spectrum of legitimate teachers (Dunlop and Radaelli 2016, 2018a). This explanatory typology provides a strong toehold for researchers wading into applying theories of policy
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 3 learning to empirical evidence. At the same time, measuring concepts of problem tractability and actor certification can be difficult: what is it about a policy problem that makes it more or less tractable? Why is it that some actors enjoy high levels of legitimacy, while others do not? The following section puts forward measures of risk narratives and institutional insularity to help researchers operationalize these concepts.
Measuring problem tractability through risk narratives Drawing on literature on the social construction of risk (Kahan 2015; Klinke and Renn 2012; Slovic 1987) and ideational work on uncertainty (Blyth 2009, 2013), I suggest that problem tractability can be measured through two dimensions: complexity and ambiguity. Policy complexity refers to ideas about the causal nature of the problem and the extent of potential harm; for example assessing the extent of harm and the probability of occurrence in risk assessment (Pierson 1993; Klinke and Renn 2012; Zinn 2008). Policy ambiguity however, can stem from a lack of consensus among officials, citizens, and interest groups as to the core dimensions of the policy problem and often the degree to which it is possible to calculate probabilities of occurrence (Wellstead, Cairney, and Oliver 2018; Blyth 2013). While policy complexity refers to the extent to which decision makers are able to calculate the extent of harms or the probability of occurrence, policy ambiguity refers to the degree to which there is consensus among actors regarding said knowledge. These two aspects generate a four part typology of different modes of uncertainty, which I term “risk narratives.”
Table 2: Risk narratives Policy complexity High Low
High Uncertain risk Catastrophic risk Policy ambiguity Low Complex risk Linear risk
Linear risks are narratives in which the causal drivers of the problem and appropriate solutions are easily identified. Complex risks are those in which the broad nature of the problem is understood, but the causal links between factors are intricate, making it challenging to isolate potential hazards (Klinke and Renn 2012, 275). Catastrophic risks are those in which the actual extent of harms is easy to estimate (e.g. a low probability of a severe harm), but in which actors disagree as to the construction of the policy problem and appropriate solutions, leading to contestation. In contrast, uncertain risks are those in which both the causal and normative dimensions of the problem are ambiguous, demonstrating radical uncertainty or “unknown unknowns” (Blyth 2009). Thus to measure differences in problem tractability, we can gather pattern evidence as to the degree of scientific certainty with regard to harms or probabilities as well as account evidence as to the degree of ambiguity or contestation among actors (Klinke and Renn 2012; Wellstead, Cairney, and Oliver 2018; Cairney, Oliver, and Wellstead 2016). This paper suggests that the above typology of risks presents a starting point to measure these differences.
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Measuring actor certification through institutional insularity
This paper also proposes operationalizing actor certification by measuring a related concept - the insularity of institutional structures. Conceivably, teachers in the model enjoy high levels of legitimacy in the eyes of learners because the policy subsystem is more insular, with fewer competing actors, resulting in a clear locus of authority. Examples of this kind of decision making occur within government agencies, for example within independent regulators, or in more formal arrangements with academic institutions or epistemic communities – for example through established advisory committees or task forces (Dunlop 2017, 2017; Haas 1992). Conversely in more open networks with a plurality of actors and institutional structures, authority is more diffused, leading to a rise in popular authority (Skogstad 2008, 2003).
This paper contends that there is an analytical linkage between risk narratives, institutional structures, and modes of learning (see table 3). Narratives of linear risk dominate when policy problems are certain and unambiguous. Together with closed policy networks, linear risk narratives generate modes of learning through hierarchy, in which bureaucrats engage in a limited degree of puzzling regarding means of instruments and settings. Yet if the decision making context opens up to involve a greater number of actors – for example in public consultations or hearing – we are more likely to see contestation. Even if actors deem the causal nature of the problem to be certain, they may disagree as to the extent of harms, or the appropriate solutions. When catastrophic risks are salient but contested, we can anticipate more polarized processes of learning through bargaining as actors seek to determine their opponents’ interests.
Alternatively, when the broad scope of the policy problem is unambiguous, but the drivers of the problem are under-defined, government officials are more likely to broaden their search to engage with a more limited number of scientific experts to reduce uncertainty. Elites will seek out “blueprints” for action through processes of epistemic learning (Blyth 2001; Dunlop 2017). Finally if the policy context generates strong complexity and ambiguity, uncertainty as to the appropriate means and ends can facilitate processes of reflexive learning in which both state and society actors engage in dialogue to collectively determine policy goals, instruments, and settings (Dunlop and Radaelli 2018b).
Table 3: Risk Narratives, institutional structures, and modes of learning
Problem Tractability Low High
Uncertain risk + open network Catastrophic risk + open network Low = reflexive learning = learning through bargaining Actor certification Complex risk + closed network Linear risk + closed network High = epistemic learning = hierarchical learning
Adapted from Dunlop and Radaelli (2013)
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This framework generates several testable propositions. First, reduction of policy complexity through scientific or non-traditional knowledges should prompt transitions to hierarchical learning or learning through bargaining, while an increase in policy complexity will move polities toward epistemic or reflexive learning. Second, changes to institutional structures that open up decision making processes should result in movement toward reflexive or bargaining learning modes. Conversely, more closed institutional networks with fewer actors should support epistemic or hierarchical learning. Finally, in cases in which risk narratives and institutional structures endures over time, we should see a lock-in effect generating an entrenchment in the predominant learning mode.
This paper examines the applicability of the above framework and measures through in-depth process tracing of policy making in three jurisdictions (British Columbia, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia) over a ten year period from 2006-2016. The study draws on analysis of existing primary and secondary documents, thematic and content analysis of over 800 news articles, and semi-structured interviews with 30 government officials, bureaucrats, industry representatives, and advocates conducted over the course of 2014-2018. To provide additional measures of problem tractability, I developed a database of articles gathered using keyword searches of terms “hydraulic fracturing”, “fracking”, “unconventional gas”, or “shale gas”. The search yielded 444 articles from the Times Transcript in New Brunswick, 220 articles from the Chronicle Herald in Nova Scotia, and 218 articles from the Vancouver Sun. Two researchers coded articles inductively using the qualitative software NVIVO, drawing out the thematic arguments used by different actors over the course of public debates. The media analysis provides pattern and sequence evidence for the content of different risk narratives put forward by different actors in the policy subsystems described below.
Regulation of Hydraulic Fracturing in Canada
Hydraulic fracturing is an unconventional method of oil and gas extraction that uses the technological innovation of combining horizontal drilling with high volume, multi-stage hydraulic fracturing to access reserves in low permeable rock, the most prolific of which has been natural gas from shale (The Council 2014; NEB 2009; Neville et al. 2017). Emerging out of technical innovations developed in the Texan Barnett shale in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the extraction of shale gas has transformed North American energy production, fundamentally restructuring global gas markets and positioning the US as a net exporter, rather than importer of natural gas (Ernst & Young 2013; Geny 2010; USEIA 2017). Canadian unconventional production has boomed in the north east of British Columbia in the Horn River and Montney Basins, the Duvernay Formation in Alberta and the Bakken shale in Saskatchewan (The Council 2014; Carter, Fraser, and Zalik 2017). Resources have also been identified in Quebec, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland, with much more limited potential in Ontario and Manitoba (The Council 2014; NEB 2009; USEIA 2013).
At the same time that hydraulic fracturing has proliferated across North America so too have concerns regarding environmental harms. Academic experts have drawn attention to a substantial degree of scientific uncertainty regarding potential groundwater contamination, seismic activity, habitat fragmentation, and increased GHG emissions resulting from the practice (The Council 2014; Howarth, Santoro, and Ingraffea 2011; Johnson and Johnson 2012; Schultz et al. 2018;
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Olive 2018). Environmental groups, local citizens, and indigenous governments across Canada have also expressed strong opposition to hydraulic fracturing, generating substantial ambiguity as to the perceived trade-offs between environmental harms and economic benefits (Neville and Weinthal 2016; Carter and Eaton 2016; Montpetit and Lachapelle 2017).
Regulatory responses among Canadian provinces have been varied, with western provinces generally pursuing development and eastern provinces delaying the process (Olive 2016). Saskatchewan has introduced very little new regulation, relying on its conventional framework, while Alberta has layered on a more comprehensive play-based regulatory approach over existing regulations (Carter and Eaton 2016). In contrast moratoria have been adopted in both Quebec and Newfoundland (Montpetit, Lachapelle, and Harvey 2016; Carter and Eaton 2016; Olive 2016). This paper focus on processes of regulatory development in three Canadian provinces: first, the adoption of single-issue regulation in British Columbia (2006-2016); second, the implementation of a comprehensive framework and subsequent moratorium in New Brunswick (2010 – 2014); and third, the adoption of a moratorium and subsequent legislated ban in Nova Scotia (2010-2014).
Hierarchical Learning in British Columbia
Regulatory timeline As one of the first provinces to engage in substantial production, British Columbia initially relied on its pre-existing regulatory framework developed for conventional oil and gas. Throughout the 2000s the government released several energy plans designed to incentivize gas development in the north east of the province through a range of royalties and tax credits (Government of British Columbia 2002, 2007; Simpson 2006, 2009b). In 2012, the government released two linked strategies pertaining to unconventional development in the province: the Natural Gas Strategy and the Liquefied Natural Gas Strategy (Government of British Columbia 2012a, 2012b). The Natural Gas Strategy positioned industry as a key driver of job growth and focused on streamlined regulation and royalty regimes to encourage sector growth. The Liquefied Natural Gas Strategy committed to the development of three liquefied natural gas (LNG)2 plants by 2020 with the aim of accessing Asian gas markets.
In 2012, the government also began to make changes to the regulatory structure to address environmental risks. In January 2012 BC Oil and Gas Commission, the independent regulator in the province, introduced a new mandatory requirement for producers to file the chemical composition of their hydraulic fracturing fluids on fracfocus.ca, a government website (BC Oil and Gas Commission 2011). In August 2012 the Commission also amended its drilling and production regulations to introduce new well spacing requirements to increase the allowable number of wells within a target area (BC Oil and Gas Commission 2012b). During this time the Commission also investigated links between hydraulic fracturing and increased seismic activity in the Horn River Basin (BC Oil and Gas Commission 2012a). In April 2013, the Commission released a report outlining its new “Area-based-Analysis” approvals process, which is intended to facilitate regional long-term development while addressing environmental and social outcomes (BC Oil and Gas Commission 2013).
2 Natural gas is converted to liquefied natural gas for transportation over long distances; some additional liquids are also often produced as a by-product during hydraulic fracturing (Hughes 2015)
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The above timeline illustrates the ways in which the British Columbia government has pursued an incremental approach to hydraulic fracturing policy and regulatory development. The government has largely pursued the gradual development of single-issue regulation (e.g. well spacing, chemical disclosure, seismic monitoring), complemented by broad pro-development policy directives.
Institutional insularity, linear risk and hierarchical learning Process tracing, interview data, and media analysis suggests that British Columbia’s pursuit of single-issue regulation was fostered through a process of learning through hierarchy facilitated by conditions of institutional insularity and linear risk. In contrast to jurisdictions in eastern Canada, where responsibility for oil and gas regulation tends to be split among ministries of natural resources, energy, or the environment, in BC regulatory authority has been delegated to an independent regulator. The BC government established the BC Oil and Gas Commission in 1998 as a crown corporation with the aim of being a “one-stop shop” to streamline environmental assessment, licensing, and other regulatory requirements for producers (BC Oil and Gas Commission 2014a; Parfitt 2011; N. Graham, Daub, and Carroll 2017). As such, the Commission is insulated from broad energy policy making processes at the Ministry level as well as from the provincial Cabinet (Jeakins 2015).
At the same time that hydraulic fracturing was emerging as a regulatory issue in the late 2000s, the government was also finalizing legislation (Oil and Gas Activities Act [OGAA], SBC 2008) designed to further delegate authority to the BC Oil and Gas Commission, enabling the Commission to amend and create new regulation. According to Paul Jeakins, Commissioner and CEO of the BC Oil and Gas Commission, the revisions to OGAA provided the Commission with the flexibility to consider substantial regulatory changes without engaging Cabinet or the legislature:
“It was absolutely serendipitous that that [the revisions to the OGAA] was already underway. When you look at that, 2007 was when we started to get a real inkling that this was going to change conventional [oil and gas development] to something called unconventional and [when] the Act was brought down in 2008 … all the regulations had the benefit of looking at the shale development” (Jeakins 2015).
The institutional independence generated by the changes to the OGAA provided actors within the Commission with the regulatory space to consider adapting regulation on their own terms, in support of, but separate from broad policy directions developed at the Ministry level. The increased delegation of authority to the Commission insulated bureaucrats from political interference (Jeakins 2015; confidential interviewee 2015) while also providing the opportunity to be more responsive to the demands of industry (confidential interviewee 2015).
The institutional insularity of the BC Oil and Gas Commission was complemented by framing strategies that emerged in the early stages of shale gas development. Media analysis finds that the driving normative arguments in favour of development centered on domestic job creation and international reduction of GHG emissions through trade with Asia. The majority of pro-
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 8 development arguments focused on economic benefits. For example, in March 2009, Minister of Energy, Mines and Petroleum Resources Blair Lekstrom commented:
“It’s about more than dollars and cents, but if we are talking about the revenue side of it, this is by far the leading economic engine in the province and I think we should be thankful we have it … the money is nice but the jobs it creates for the families in this province, in the northeast particularly, allow them to make a living and provide for their families and make their mortgage payments. So it’s a positive all around … I think we’ve reached a new level … Our royalty credit programs ... put us at the forefront of the competitive nature of this industry. We don’t compete with just Alberta or Saskatchewan. We compete with Texas. We compete with anywhere around the globe” (Simpson 2009a).
The assertion that natural gas development could position British Columbia on the world stage was complemented by arguments from industry that hydraulic fracturing was a safe, proven technology that had been used for decades. Figure 1 shows the claims put forward by elected officials and industry representatives, with both sets of actors drawing on arguments regarding economic benefits and the relative low risk of the technology. These arguments would be later complemented by pro-LNG narratives that highlighted the potential for LNG exports to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by facilitating other countries’ transitions to low carbon, primarily in Asia (Coleman 2013). Frames regarding clean energy were also linked with energy security, reinforcing the argument that unconventional gas production would lead to North American self- sufficiency (Vancouver Sun 2013).
Figure 1: Causal and normative claims by actor type in British Columbia debates
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Ministers and elected officials were also much more likely to use the term “LNG” to refer to overall policy goals of clean energy and investment, reserving “hydraulic fracturing” for discussion of specific regulation, such as mandatory chemical disclosure (Stephenson, Doukas, and Shaw 2012). My textual analysis of the 2012 Natural Gas Strategy and the 2012 Liquefied Natural Gas Strategy finds that LNG is mentioned 104 times, while “hydraulic fracturing” is mentioned only 14 times. These findings are in line with national survey experiment data with general populations in the US demonstrating that the frame “fracking” is associated with negative environmental harms, while “shale gas development” is associated with positive economic benefits (Clarke et al. 2015; Evensen et al. 2014).
These distinctions between LNG and hydraulic fracturing had a twofold interpretive effect. First, the positive framing of LNG bolstered the legitimacy of government policy at the Ministry level, generating ongoing support for the policy in the face of catastrophic risk narratives emerging from US media debates (Stephenson, Doukas, and Shaw 2012; Stephenson and Shaw 2013). Second, containment of discussion of hydraulic fracturing to technical complexities at the regulatory level served to further dampen public attention to the issue. The narrative of linear risk, namely that the harms (if any) of hydraulic fracturing could be managed deftly and competently by adequate regulation, enabled regulators to work slowly on incremental changes to regulation (confidential interviewee 2015a). The institutional delegation of authority to the Commission, intertwined with the ideational distance between LNG policy on the one hand and hydraulic fracturing regulation on the other reinforced the closed policy subsystem of industry representatives and experts within the BC Oil and Gas Commission.
Because of the distance between LNG policy developed at the Ministry level and the regulatory framework managed by the BC Oil and Gas Commission, political pressures on the regulator during this time were limited (Jeakins 2015). As a result, technical experts and policy analysts within the Commission developed regulatory responses at an incremental pace, beginning with well spacing in 2008 and moving on to seismicity and chemical disclosure by 2012 (confidential interviewee 2015; BC Oil and Gas Commission 2012b, 2011). In addition to learning from experiences of regulators in other jurisdictions, the Commission also strengthened in-house technical expertise through two major research projects: one examining induced seismicity in the Horn River and Montney Shale and the other mapping ground water resources through the development of the North East Water Portal. Working with data from Natural Resources Canada and in consultation with geoscientists from the University of British Columbia and the Alberta Geological Survey, the Commission released studies on the Horn River Basin and Montney shale in 2012 and 2014 respectively (BC Oil and Gas Commission 2012a, 2014b). Although these studies confirmed the link between fluid injection and seismic activity, similar to reports in Oklahoma (Andrews and Holland 2015), the empirical data did not prompt the same degree of spike in media attention as the Oklahoma study would in 2016. Instead, the British Columbia case reflects the characteristics of learning in the shadow of hierarchy: the structure of the Commission, facilitated by the 2008 amendments to the OGAA, created the space for bureaucrats to engage in incremental, relatively slow-paced policy learning generated predominantly by their own researchers in concert with industry.
Epistemic Learning and Bargaining in New Brunswick
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In New Brunswick, narratives of complex risk, together with a relatively closed institutional framework fostered processes of epistemic learning among elites, resulting in the adoption of a comprehensive regulatory framework in 2013. However, the subsequent opening up of institutional structures through public consultations, together with the emergence of catastrophic risk narrative facilitated a transition to learning through bargaining that culminated in New Brunswick’s 2014 moratorium on hydraulic fracturing.
Regulatory timeline In January 2011, newly elected New Brunswick premier David Alward (of the Progressive Conservative party) established a high level Natural Gas Steering Committee to coordinate the development of new rules for unconventional gas production. The government was responding to initial exploratory activity of SWN Resources Canada, a subsidiary of Southwestern Energy, a major US unconventional gas producer based in Texas. In 2010 SWN had been granted an exploratory lease for approximately 1.1 million ha, approximately one seventh of New Brunswick’s land (Government of New Brunswick n.d.; Stanec Consulting Ltd 2014). The government also established a staff-level Natural Gas Group to review regulatory frameworks in other jurisdictions and after a year of study the government released a formal discussion paper in early 2012 (New Brunswick Natural Gas Group 2012b). The discussion paper proposed a comprehensive regulatory regime designed specifically for shale gas management, setting out standards for well construction, waste management and flaring and venting, among others.
Following the release of the discussion paper, the government hired Louis LaPierre, a New Brunswick-based university professor with experience in environmental assessment, to head a two-month public consultation tour in the summer of 2012 (Huras 2012a, 2012b). Following the tour, LaPierre’s prime recommendation was to establish a New Brunswick Energy Institute, an arms-length organization that would provide peer-reviewed research to inform policy development (LaPierre 2012). The government proceeded to establish the Energy Institute in 2013 and appointed LaPierre to lead it (Mazerolle 2013a).3
In February 2013, the New Brunswick Government released Responsible Environmental Management of Oil and Natural Gas Activities in New Brunswick: Rules for Industry, a regulatory framework that included 97 new rules (Huras 2013a). The framework included regulations on a wide variety of instruments, ranging from seismic testing to well casing, wastewater management, transportation, and storage, GHG emissions, and well monitoring and remediation (Government of New Brunswick 2013a; Huras 2013b). The government followed up on the framework in May 2013, releasing its Oil and Natural Gas Blueprint which identified strategic action for implementation (Government of New Brunswick 2013b).
Anti-fracking protests, which had been building in the province since 2011, intensified in the summer of 2013, with increased participation of provincial labour unions and First Nations communities (Roberts 2013a). The leadership of Elsipogtog, a First Nation located in Kent
3 In a surprising turn of events, in September 2013, CBC Radio Canada investigated LaPierre’s scholarly credentials, finding that despite holding a professorship at the University of Moncton for over 30 years, he had long misrepresented his academic credentials (CBC News 2013a). LaPierre subsequently resigned from the Energy Institute and opposition parties called for a review of the shale gas consultation process and the Institute’s work (Berry 2013)
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County near to where SWN Resources was conducting seismic testing, began to mobilize to oppose fracking in their traditional territory, and by extension, seismic testing (Hobson 2013a, 2013b; Toogood 2013; Howe 2015). In October 2013 approximately 100 protestors barricaded SWN equipment near Rexton with the support of the Elsipogtog Council, establishing a blockade (Foster 2013b). Two weeks later, the provincial government called in the federal police (the RCMP) to dismantle the blockade (Babstock 2013b) and during the course of the altercation forty people were arrested, some injured by pepper spray and rubber bullets (Huras 2013c). Members of environmental and anti-fracking movements, as well as a broader network of Aboriginal groups, including the Assembly of First Nations, promptly mobilized, spurring rallies and marches in support of the Elsipogtog protesters across the country (Times - Transcript 2013; Morris 2013). Protests continued in Rexton for the remainder of the year (Cochrane 2013).
In 2014, the Leader of the Opposition, Brian Gallant, began to call for a moratorium on shale gas development. Shale gas emerged as a salient issue in the 2014 provincial election, with David Alward promoting hydraulic fracturing and challenger Gallant opposing the practice. Political observers concluded that the shale gas political conflict was a determining factor in Gallant’s success in the general election on September 22nd 2014 (Berry 2014a; Logan 2014). Shortly after taking office, Gallant announced that the government would adopt moratorium on hydraulic fracturing, which was implemented in December 2014 (CBC News 2014).
Complex risk, institutional insularity, and epistemic learning in New Brunswick The New Brunswick case demonstrates the ways in which complex risk narratives can drive modes of epistemic learning. Prior to the election, the Progressive Conservatives had landed on the mandate of “responsible development” with regard to the shale gas, signaling to energy producers that New Brunswick was open for business (PCNB 2010). The core policy challenge facing the provincial government was how to determine the appropriate regulatory instruments and settings that would ensure New Brunswick had a strong regime. Premier Alward recounted:
Post-election, we did a tremendous amount of work as a government … what became clear to us was that the regulatory work hadn’t been completed in New Brunswick adequately for a developed industry, so we took the next couple of years really to look at what the industry is, what type of regulatory systems are in place in the US and Western Canada, brought a very, what I believe was an outstanding team together to look at the regulatory regimes, what worked well, what hasn’t worked well, both from a public safety perspective, but also from a regime for revenue and that whole piece as well (Alward 2014).
One of the core challenges facing the New Brunswick government was that although the province had a history of oil and gas development, the existing legislative and regulatory framework was limited, without the variety of regulatory tools common in the larger oil and gas producing provinces (Leonard 2014; Coon 2014). From the perspective of decision makers, the key problem to be solved was one of policy complexity, namely how to capture economic benefits of shale gas development while also protecting public safety. Figure 2 presents the key claims and arguments put forward by government officials in New Brunswick media debates. Elected government officials and industry representatives consistently articulate a pro- development position. The distribution of claims reflects a distinct economic versus
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 12 environmental divide, with government officials lauding the benefits of increased provincial revenue and the anti-fracking environmental advocates and residents raising concerns with regard to a variety of environmental risks. Similar to British Columbia, arguments supporting development also asserted the proven safety of hydraulic fracturing and the benefits of clean energy. In contrast, those opposing development occasionally referred to the economic risks of development, calling into question the reliability of jobs and oil and gas markets. Anti-fracking actors also relied on normative claims, arguing that hydraulic fracturing represented a threat to the rural New Brunswick way of life.
Figure 2: Causal and normative claims by actor type in New Brunswick debates
The New Brunswick case demonstrates the ways in which institutional insularity can foster processes of epistemic learning. The staff appointed to the Natural Gas Group was seconded from Natural Resources and Environment and Local Government, creating an ad-hoc institutional bridge between the two historically disparate departments, which was institutionalized through the establishment of a new Department of Energy in 2012. Staff were able to build on existing north-south networks developed through New Brunswick’s participation in Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission (IOGCC) conferences as well as interprovincial forums such as the Energy and Mines Ministers’ Conferences (confidential interviewee 2014b; Energy and Mines Minister’s Conference 2013). Members of the Natural Gas Group embarked on a number of research delegations to meet with regulators, industry, and environmental organizations in a number of US and Canadian jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania, Arkansas, British Columbia, and Alberta (Foster 2011a, 2011b; Morris 2011; Northrup 2014). Consultations included in-person meetings as well as discussions of draft documents developed
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 13 by the Natural Gas Group (confidential interviewee 2014e, 2014d). The discussion paper released in 2012 draws on a wide range of regulatory frameworks from other jurisdictions, scientific research and policy reports issued by both industry associations and environmental groups (New Brunswick Natural Gas Group 2012a).4 In particular, the discussion paper draws heavily on Alberta regulatory frameworks in a number of places, with specific references to well construction, casing, venting, blowout prevention, well abandonment, and noise control Directives issued by the Environmental Resources Conservation Board (ERCB), the Alberta regulator at the time (New Brunswick Natural Gas Group 2012b). The subsequent Rules for Industry includes 12 references to eight different ERCB Directives, as well as reference to site restoration criteria developed by Alberta Environment (Government of New Brunswick 2013a). These aspects of the New Brunswick case demonstrate the role of epistemic learning within relatively closed policy networks. Faced with substantial policy complexity – i.e. how to modernize the existing oil and gas regulatory framework -- bureaucrats turned to the experiences of regulators (and technical experts) in other jurisdictions to shape policy design (confidential interviewee 2014e).
Public consultations, catastrophic risk narratives, and learning through bargaining At the same time, the New Brunswick case also demonstrates the ways in which modes of epistemic learning can transform into bargaining if institutional structures are opened up and policy uncertainty is reduced. Interviewees from both pro-development and anti-fracking sides of the hydraulic fracturing debate identify the 2012 public consultation headed by Louis LaPierre as a key institutional opening and focusing event for anti-fracking advocates (Alward 2014; Leonard 2014; Coon 2014). From the beginning, the public consultation was taxed with a somewhat conflicted mandate. On the one hand, government actors were aware that rules laid out in the discussion paper reflected a significant degree of technical complexity and were unlikely to be substantially modified following public input (confidential interviewee 2014d, 2014a). On the other hand, negative public opinion had escalated throughout 2011 and the government was aware of the need to respond. The resultant “listening tour” placed government actors in the uneasy position of presenting technical information without engaging in the relative merits of shale gas development as a policy goal (Leonard 2014; confidential interviewee 2014a). This position made the panel particularly vulnerable to attacks on the legitimacy of the entire consultation process, spurring numerous complaints as to the lack of government integrity (LaPierre 2012). As one observer noted,
“99% of the people who got up and spoke were opposed to the industry … it was amazing - people got up with papers, academic papers, and they had the lines highlighted that they wanted to read, because no one had had a platform to say what they knew about or what they had learnt, … it was too late in the game to have an honest, open, frank conversation before people got to the end of their rope, before they were so frustrated, before you couldn’t say anything that would change their minds” (confidential interviewee 2014c).
4 The discussion paper was released with a companion document of references that is 36 pages long, including references to legislation and regulation in Alberta, British Columbia, Colorado, Delaware, Maryland, Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Nova Scotia, Pennsylvania , Philadelphia, Quebec, Saskatchewan, Texas, West Virginia and Wyoming.
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The 2012 public consultations thus became a key venue for anti-fracking advocates to both widen the debate and to challenge the legitimacy of the government’s pro-development priorities. Anti-fracking actors thus shifted the debate from a targeted discussion regarding the viability of various policy instruments to a broader debate regarding the potential costs of development as a whole. The public meetings enabled anti-fracking advocates to expand the public debate to include potential environmental problems that could be caused by oil and gas development, often based on emerging scientific studies. Beginning in public meetings in 2011 and 2012 and continuing through to protests in 2013 and 2014, anti-fracking speakers raised a myriad of environmental, health, and economic risks connected to hydraulic fracturing. Figure 3 provides a detail of different risks frames used in the media from 2010 – 2014.
Figure 3: Environmental risk frames in New Brunswick policy debates
Although groundwater and drinking water risks were the most salient issue throughout the period, additional concerns emerged in 2012 regarding seismic activity and climate change risks due to GHG emissions. In 2013 concerns voiced in the media regarding health risks also began to climb. The multifaceted nature of anti-fracking causal beliefs served to facilitate ties among a broad range of actors, sustaining the issue in the public eye. An interviewee noted:
“I think there was something for everybody … if you’re an environmentalist, you’re concerned about climate change, if you’re a rural landowner, you’re worried about property rights, … if you’re a homeowner, you’re concerned about potential water problems … even if you are a promoter of economic development and your community is drying up, a lot of people saw through the jobs argument really quickly … the jobs are transient and the same people move around to where there is work. It wasn’t a solid enough argument, even on the economics front” (confidential interviewee 2014c).
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In contrast to provincial government actors operating under a narrative of complex risk, other residents and environmental advocates focused on the high probability of catastrophic harms. Anti-fracking actors drew on narratives of irreversible environmental harms to lend weight to the need for a ban, asserting that it would be impossible to protect against detrimental impacts of hydraulic fracturing (Huras 2013d). The high proportion of claims in the media regarding probability of drinking water and/or groundwater risks demonstrates that catastrophic risk narratives can drive up issue salience among the general public, prompting processes of bargaining between environmental advocates and government officials.
The findings of the New Brunswick case thus reflect the ways in which modes of epistemic learning can give way to learning through bargaining (Dunlop 2017). Anti-fracking actors were able to take advantage of the 2012 shale gas hearings to attract the public’s attention to the potential risks of hydraulic fracturing. By attacking both the legitimacy of the consultation process and the scientific credibility of government officials, anti-fracking actors were able to undermine the perceived viability of the government’s pro-development stance among the electorate. Gallant’s Liberals were able to exploit this vulnerability throughout the 2014 election campaign, ultimately resulting in their implementation of a moratorium soon after forming government.
Reflexive Learning and Bargaining in Nova Scotia
In Nova Scotia, conditions of complex risk fostered a limited process of epistemic learning that initially echoed learning modes in New Brunswick. But an increase in both scientific and political uncertainty, together with an institutional opening fostered by an external review, prompted a shift to a mode of reflexive learning among elites and interest groups. However, as in New Brunswick, public consultations provided a venue for anti-fracking actors to highlight the certainty of environmental harms, hardening opposition and leading to a more intensive process of bargaining.
Regulatory timeline In early 2011 provincial Energy Minister Charlie Parker, of the Nova Scotia New Democratic Party (NDP), began to meet with officials in other jurisdictions to explore potential regulatory frameworks for shale gas development (Baxter 2011). In April 2011, along with Environment Minister Sterling Belliveau, Parker announced that the government was launching an internal review on hydraulic fracturing (Government of Nova Scotia 2011a).
Throughout the spring of 2012 there were some local protests in Nova Scotia (Bruce and Beswick 2012; Chronicle Herald 2012), and in April 2012, the Nova Scotia government announced a two year “hold” on hydraulic fracturing to study the policy issue, formally extending the internal review process and indicating that it would not approve new applications for hydraulic fracturing (Government of Nova Scotia 2012; Canadian Press 2012a).
In August 2013, a few months before the general election, the NDP government commissioned a new independent external review of hydraulic fracturing, to be headed by Cape Breton University President David Wheeler (Gorman 2013a; Government of Nova Scotia 2013a).
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Despite the attention garnered by the independent review, hydraulic fracturing was not a particularly salient issue during the election (Davene 2013; Ross 2013) and in October 2013 the NDP lost to the Nova Scotia Liberals (CBC News 2013b). In December, the new government passed the Importation of Hydraulic Fracturing Wastewater Prohibition Act preventing import of fracking waste water from other jurisdictions (Gorman 2013b; Government of Nova Scotia 2013b) and affirmed their commitment to the external review.
Beginning in February 2014, the nine-member expert external review committee, headed by David Wheeler, began to release bi-monthly discussion papers focusing on different aspects of hydraulic fracturing (Ross 2014b). Town hall meetings were conducted in July in ten different communities throughout the province (Ross 2014c; Ayers 2014a). In August 2014, Wheeler released the independent review report, recommending a slow, incremental approach to policy development in full consultation with municipalities and aboriginal governments (Gorman 2014b).
In September 2014 Energy Minister Andrew Younger announced the governments’ intention to introduce legislation prohibiting fracking during the fall session of the legislature (Erskine 2014). On November 14th, 2014 Bill 6, An Act to Amend Chapter 342 of the Revised Statutes, 1989, the Petroleum Resources Act passed third reading in the House; the Amendment prohibits “high- volume hydraulic fracturing in shale unless exempted by regulation for the purpose of testing or research” (Government of Nova Scotia 2014).
Complex risk, institutional insularity, and epistemic learning The initial period of regulatory development in Nova Scotia reflects a limited process of epistemic learning, spurred by a narrative of complex risk. In the absence of a strong on-shore oil and gas lobby, the government faced weak economic incentives to develop a comprehensive regulatory framework for hydraulic fracturing (Black 2014). Nevertheless, throughout 2010, bureaucratic staff in the Energy and Environment ministries had begun to conduct informal internal research on hydraulic fracturing regulations in other Canadian jurisdictions (confidential interviewee 2014f, 2014h).
Interviews with key actors in the policy subsystem confirm that the mandate of the internal review was understood to be constrained to a technical review of potential environmental impacts and a regulatory review of different responses in a variety of jurisdictions (Government of Nova Scotia 2011b). In comparison to New Brunswick though, there was a higher degree of ambiguity at both at the political and bureaucratic level regarding the broader goal or purpose of the review (confidential interviewee 2014f, 2014g, 2014i). As one interviewee notes,
“The government at the time was of two minds about the process. It was an NDP government, so there was a strong environmental bent, but at the same time they also wanted to do some business development, but this wasn’t an existing business; the off- shore was quite big but the on-shore had never really launched. So they found themselves in this real grey area, so they wanted to do some work, but not to offend anybody” (confidential interviewee 2014f).
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Despite the lack of clarity regarding goals, the unspoken assumption for many policy actors was that the internal review was intended to neutralize the potential for public debate (Black 2014; confidential interviewee 2014f, 2014h). One of the dynamics of media debate in Nova Scotia was a close attention to anti-fracking activities in other jurisdictions: we coded references in the database to 18 different jurisdictions, including a range of US states, New Brunswick, Quebec, Newfoundland, France, the European Union and the United Kingdom, many of whom had implemented moratoria. Second, the distribution of claims made by elected officials was much less polarized in Nova Scotia, with government arguments aligned closer to the centre of policy debates, mediating between the relative safeties of the technology on the one hand and environmental risks on the other. By and large, government officials remained out of the public eye, with the majority of claims attributed to general arguments made by journalists (see Figure 4).
Figure 4: Causal and normative claims in Nova Scotia debates
The internal review team, led by staff from both Energy and Environment (Government of Nova Scotia 2011c) consulted with representatives from Alberta, BC, New Brunswick, Quebec, Texas, Ohio and Wyoming throughout the summer of 2011 (Precht and Dempster 2012). In comparison with the New Brunswick group, the review team spent less resources travelling to other jurisdictions, although the Department of Energy drew on its connections within the US Interstate Oil and Gas Compact Commission to identify potential contacts and informants for the review (confidential interviewee 2014h). The team also contracted two consultants, Paul Precht and Don Dempster, to conduct a jurisdictional regulatory scan.
From a political standpoint, limited epistemic learning at the bureaucratic level was counterbalanced by increasing external signals that the public was agitating for a moratorium or
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 18 ban. Throughout 2011 the Sierra Club and the Ecology Action Centre had continued to call for a ban on high volume hydraulic fracturing (Bundale 2011c). On the ground, members of an anti- fracking umbrella group had continued to mobilize, organizing a range of public actions, including lobbying MLAs’ constituency offices and bringing in scientific experts to speak on potential environmental risks (Minkow 2015; confidential interviewee 2014i; Gorman 2011). In the absence of strong indications from industry as to the economic viability of development, it made little sense for policy makers to take an electoral risk in the hopes of uncertain economic benefits, especially given the government’s commitment to renewable energy. Account evidence suggests that the perception of growing public pressure and unease was a key factor in the NDP’s decision to announce the two-year hold in April 2012 (Black 2014).
Uncertain risk, public consultations, and reflexive learning in New Brunswick Although policy decision makers anticipated that the de-facto moratorium would dampen public attention to hydraulic fracturing, throughout 2012, environmental advocates and local anti- fracking groups continued to raise concerns regarding the legitimacy of the internal review, increasing levels of policy ambiguity regarding hydraulic fracturing and generating a narrative of uncertain risk.
Within this context, the government began considering establishing an independent external review headed by Dr. David Wheeler, the President of Cape Breton University. Wheeler was known on both the political and bureaucratic levels in Nova Scotia because of his work leading earlier public consultations on energy efficiency and renewable energy (Adams, Wheeler, and Woolston 2011). From a political perspective, delegating responsibility for the review to an external body would inoculate cabinet from potential electoral risks (Black 2014). From a bureaucratic perspective, the external review also addressed concerns regarding trust deficits among the general public (confidential interviewee 2014h). The NDP formally announced the independent review in August 2013, prior to the kick off of the election campaign (Gorman 2013a). Although the announcement was supported by environmental groups in the province, hydraulic fracturing was a non-issue in the election campaign, as were environmental issues generally (Davene 2013; Ross 2013).
Once in power, the new (Liberal) government confirmed their support for the mandate of the external review in October 2013. The goal of the independent review was to convene a panel of experts, conduct public consultations on hydraulic fracturing, and conduct a literature review of potential risks. The external review also included health and socio-economic impacts (Wheeler et al. 2015; Atherton et al. 2014). Wheeler was experienced in designing public consultations on energy issues and included a range of mechanisms to incorporate public input, including soliciting suggestions for panel members’ skill sets and panel nominees, inviting general submissions to the panel, and gathering written feedback on specific discussion papers released online (Wheeler et al. 2015). The discussion papers covered a range of aspects such as potential economic benefits, health risks, socio-economic effects, well integrity and environmental impacts (Wheeler et al. 2015). After each discussion paper was released, the public had two to three weeks to submit commentary back to the panel, which was then incorporated into the final draft under the discretion of the expert who drafted the chapter (Wheeler et al. 2015; Ross 2014b). Beyond written input, the panel held two informational meetings on the general design of the review, three online forums on specific topics related to the discussion papers, and eleven
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 19 public meetings across the province on the full draft report and tentative recommendations, which took place in the summer of 2014 (Wheeler et al. 2015; Atherton et al. 2014).
The open and diffuse structure of the consultations, combined with an uncertain risk narrative, put Nova Scotia, at least in the early stages, on a path toward reflexive learning. In contrast to the New Brunswick consultations, the Nova Scotia independent review was decidedly precautionary in its tenor: the final report identifies a precautionary approach as a key guiding principle for the panel and defines precautionary in reference to the UN Conference in Environment and Development, and the Mi’kmaq concept of Netuklimk (Atherton et al. 2014). Prior to the release of the discussion papers, Wheeler asserted that the “quasi-academic” scope of the review provided the panel with greater flexibility to include a wide range of inputs, from technical expertise to traditional aboriginal knowledge (Ross 2014b, 2014a). As such, the terms and scope of the review reflect the characteristics we would expect with reflexive learning: a mode that incorporates a wider range of knowledges than epistemic learning and is less constrained with regards to both policy ends and means.
Public consultations, catastrophic risk, and learning through bargaining Despite the panel’s extensive efforts to engage the public in the independent review, throughout 2013 there were growing concerns among environmental advocates and local community groups that the panel was highly technocratic and top-down in its approach (confidential interviewee 2014g, 2014i). Environmental groups were disappointed in the first few reports that examined the processes of hydraulic fracturing, resource potential, and groundwater impacts, arguing that their perspectives had not been incorporated into the review (confidential interviewee 2014g, 2014i). After the independent panel’s release of the groundwater discussion paper, the Ecology Action Centre expressed concerns publicly that the panel’s reports reflected an industry bias and lacked scientific rigour (MacDonald 2014). Advocates’ frustration with the perceived lack of receptivity of the panel culminated in five different anti-fracking groups coordinating attendance at the town hall meetings in the summer of 2014 (Minkow 2015; confidential interviewee 2014i). In particular, the organizing team put together toolkits for residents attending meetings to be able to bolster confidence of speakers in commandeering scientific rationales in support of their arguments against fracking (confidential interviewee 2014i; Minkow 2015).
As a result of these mobilizing efforts, the Nova Scotia public meetings in the summer of 2014 became an ad-hoc venue within which anti-fracking advocates were able to reframe the debate and to challenge the legitimacy of the independent review, and by extension, the government. Despite the panel’s original intent to facilitate dialogue between opposing views (Wheeler et al. 2015), the majority of the public meetings were dominated by anti-fracking narratives that wove together concerns regarding the scientific credibility of the panelists and general apprehensions regarding the trustworthiness of the government to regulate environmental harms (Ayers 2014a; Campbell 2014; Gorman 2014a; Delaney 2014). Figure 5 illustrates the steady rise in arguments in the Chronicle Herald in 2014 referring to the need for public dialogue, lack of trust in government, and general public opposition to hydraulic fracturing. Early critiques of the discussion papers argued that the reports did not include available peer-reviewed evidence (MacDonald 2014), while later arguments levied attacks against the scientific autonomy of Wheeler himself (Ayers 2014b).
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Figure 5: Appeals to public opinion in Nova Scotia debates
The final report of the panel attempted to thread the needle between technical risk assessment and summarizing public opinion by acknowledging that the province was currently unable to accurately assess the risks of hydraulic fracturing, and that it was not the right time for rapid development, although the panel stopped short of recommending an outright moratorium (Atherton et al. 2014; Gorman 2014b). Nevertheless, shortly after the release of the report, Energy Minister Andrew Younger announced that the government would legislate a prohibition on the practice of high-volume hydraulic fracturing in Nova Scotia (Younger 2014a).
The speed and magnitude of Younger’s response to the Wheeler report suggests that the conditions fostered during the review had spurred a mode of learning through bargaining among provincial government actors and anti-fracking advocates. Media analysis finds that the two key arguments used by government officials to describe the government’s response were that 1) the government had listened to Nova Scotians (10 coded references in the dataset) and 2) found that they were not ready for development (26 coded references). Younger provided a clear example of this type of argument during the press conference announcing the ban, arguing that “Nova Scotians have put their trust in our government, that we will listen to the concerns and not allow a process that most Nova Scotians are just simply not comfortable with at this time” (Erskine 2014). Younger’s defense of the ban in the House focused on the lack of social license among Nova Scotians for hydraulic fracturing, referring to public opposition from concerned residents, the Mi’kmaq, and the Union of Nova Scotia Municipalities (Government of Nova Scotia 2014b).
Thus electoral unrest guided the attention of Younger and the government caucus away from reflexive learning to political calculations generated by learning through bargaining. The town hall meetings demonstrated a significant degree of public discontent that the government was unwilling to exacerbate, especially without the guarantee of economic benefits. Data also
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 21 suggests that Younger was monitoring events in New Brunswick and was aware of both Gallant’s position and the potential pitfalls of public unrest (Black 2014). As Younger commented to the Times and Transcript
“What I’ve learned from the New Brunswick model and from the history here is that I have a responsibility to show people we are listening to them … I’m concerned about how this issue is tearing certain communities apart” (Morris 2014b).
Although Younger was aware of arguments regarding scientific uncertainty and his personal beliefs were likely that the practice could be managed (Younger 2014b), he was keenly attentive to the hardening of public opposition. His remarks introducing the second reading of the ban in the House refer multiple times to the need for social license, namely to increase public trust in the government’s regulatory processes (Government of Nova Scotia 2014b), reflecting a strong understanding of the public’s policy preferences. Ultimately, the ban represented the government’s deft political calculation that the strength of opposition to hydraulic fracturing far outweighed potential economic benefits, reflecting a process of learning through bargaining.
Discussion
The cases examined in this study provide support for the theoretical proposition that changes in problem tractability and institutional insularity can shift dominant learning modes within a given jurisdiction. The above analysis demonstrates that problem tractability can be measured with regard to both complexity and ambiguity, generating different degrees of uncertainty. The research shows that the ways in which narratives of complex risk can foster processes of epistemic learning and that movement from uncertain to catastrophic risk narratives can trigger shifts from reflexive learning to bargaining. The cases also illustrate that changes in institutional structures can affect actor certification, creating opportunities for different groups to challenge the authority of particular scientific or government “teachers,” resulting in modes of reflexive learning or bargaining.
Moreover, the cases in the study begin to probe the causal effect of different interactions of learning modes in a given jurisdiction, and in particular the importance of sequencing when exploring the impact of learning processes on policy change over time (Moyson, Scholten, and Weible 2017). The cases illustrate three different dynamics: hierarchical “lock-in” in British Columbia, the irony of epistemic learning in New Brunswick, and the pitfalls of reflexive learning in Nova Scotia.
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Figure 6: Learning sequences provincial hydraulic fracturing policy
Hierarchical “lock-in” The British Columbia case provides evidence as to the conditions needed to “lock-in” learning in the shadow of hierarchy. In the absence of an institutional opening – for example if government had engaged in a comprehensive external review, or had established a public commission such as the inquiry conducted by the BAPE (Le Bureau d'audiences publiques sur l'environnement) in Quebec –anti-fracking opponents in British Columbia found it difficult to shift the locus of authority to a more plural structure, limiting the possibilities for reflexive learning or bargaining through learning. Moreover, the lack of traction regarding problem complexity undermined possibilities for epistemic learning between bureaucrats and external scientific experts, locking in the primacy of the technical expertise within the BC Oil and Gas Commission.
Irony of epistemic learning In New Brunswick, although the conditions initially established a process of epistemic learning among government officials and scientific experts, the structure of the listening tour provided anti-fracking activists with an opportunity to use of scientific evidence to bolster their arguments about the extent of environmental and social risks. This ultimately led to a process of learning through bargaining, both in public town hall events and during the election campaign. As such, the New Brunswick case reflects a pathway that Dunlop (2017) terms “the irony of epistemic learning.” In a study of mechanisms of epistemic learning in EU hormone policy, Dunlop finds that the “very lessons created by epistemic communities to reduce uncertainty may also increase the ability and confidence of decision-makers and stakeholders to create alternative and rival knowledge” (Dunlop 2017, 216). The New Brunswick case demonstrates the ways in which increasing the quantity of scientific information can often serve to exacerbate, rather than reduce polarization between groups, especially if actors have a fixed understanding of their principles or deep core beliefs (Pielke 2007; Montpetit and Lachapelle 2017; Neville and Weinthal 2016). The New Brunswick case also illustrates how policy decision makers are incentivized to kick the can down the road in the hopes that a more prolonged processes of bargaining may serve to bridge the divide between different advocacy coalitions.
Political pitfalls of reflexive learning Alternatively, the Nova Scotia case illustrates that opening up institutional structures through an external review, together with an uncertain policy narrative can move a jurisdiction from epistemic to reflexive learning. Although the external review as headed by David Wheeler included scientific experts, the precautionary scope of the review, together with the online and in person opportunities for public engagement, seemed to support a reflexive learning process,
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 23 especially in the beginning of the review. Yet the Nova Scotia case illustrates just how difficult it is for governments to maintain a truly uncertain position on both policy ends and means without facing challenges to credibility, legitimacy, or expertise. Although the external review was initially positioned as an opportunity for reflexive learning, through their participation in the consultations, residents became more confident and assertive of their interests, reflecting a shift toward bargaining. Ultimately bargaining through learning dominated provincial policy making as government officials recalculated their political interests and implemented a ban.
These three cases thus provide preliminary evidence for two complementary pathways to the irony of epistemic learning – hierarchical lock in and political pitfalls. Moreover, the study findings suggest a relationship between these pathways and degrees of regulatory change. In British Columbia, hierarchical learning facilitated an incremental approach to hydraulic fracturing regulation, resulting in changes to individual regulatory instruments. In New Brunswick, epistemic learning led to a much more stringent regulatory framework with a broader, more comprehensive scope. As such, the research supports micro-macro work parsing the link between instrumental learning and first and second order change (Hall 1993; May 1992; Dunlop and Radaelli 2017).
At the same time, the study finds that processes of bargaining in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia prompted more precautionary policy change as expressed in the adoption of moratoria and bans. These findings provide support for the assertion that progression from second to third order change is far from automatic and is often prompted by authority contests rather than accumulation of errors (Blyth 2013). Indeed, the cases suggest that processes of reflexive learning and bargaining may not change prompt changes in actors’ deep core beliefs about the causal nature of the problem. Instead, processes of bargaining are more likely to prompt actors to update their preferences with regard to the political feasibility of a particular solution, reflecting a process that is more rooted in political learning (May 1992; Radaelli 2009). More research is needed as to whether these links between precaution and processes of bargaining and/or reflexive learning are peculiar to the field of hydraulic fracturing or are generalizable to a range of policy contexts.
Conclusion This paper demonstrates that problem tractability can be measured by policy complexity and ambiguity, generating a typology of linear, complex, uncertain, and catastrophic risk narratives that align with different modes of learning. The study illustrates that institutional insularity can be used as proxy measure for actor certification, showing that in the case of hydraulic fracturing regulation, closed networks supported hierarchical and epistemic learning, while more open institutional structures facilitated more plural modes of bargaining and reflexive learning. The paper demonstrates that changes to institutional structures and/or risk narratives transform dominant learning modes in each case. The study documents different pathways to policy change, suggesting that the irony of epistemic learning on the one hand and the political pitfalls of reflexive learning can both lead toward more radical policy change. At the core of these learning processes are compelling ideas about risk; social constructed and deeply persuasive notions about the extent of harm and probable futures. These narratives set polities down particular policy pathways – in some cases tinkering around the edges of existing regulatory frameworks and in other cases engaging in wholesale reform. By charting the process by which
Millar - Learning & Hydraulic Fracturing Policy 24 knowledge claims and institutional structures intersect to foster transitions between different modes of learning this study brings us one step closer to developing a predictive theory of learning and policy change.
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———. 2014b. Personal interview conducted November 14th 2014 in Fredericton NB.
———. 2014c. Personal interview conducted November 17th 2014 in Fredericton, NB.
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———. 2014d. Personal Interview conducted on the afternoon of November 19th 2014 in Fredericton, NB.
———. 2014e. Personal interview conducted on the morning of November 19th 2014 in Fredericton, NB.
———. 2014f. Personal Interview conducted on November 24th 2014 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
———. 2014g. Personal interview conducted November 27th 2014 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
———. 2014h. Personal interview conducted November 28th 2014 in Halifax, Nova Scotia.
———. 2014i. Personal Interview conducted by phone December 17th 2014.
———. 2015. Personal Interview conducted the morning of July 14th 2015 in Victoria, BC.
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———. 2013b. “Fracking Waste Targeted.” The Chronicle Herald, December 3, 2013, online edition. http://thechronicleherald.ca/novascotia/1171407-fracking-waste-targeted.
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———. 2014a. “Aggressive Fracking Opponents May Be Hijacking Public Sessions: Younger.” The Chronicle Herald, July 24, 2014. http://thechronicleherald.ca/novascotia/1225050- aggressive-fracking-opponents-may-be-hijacking-public-sessions-younger.
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