U.S. Citizenship Non-Precedent Decision of the and Immigration Administrative Appeals Office Services

In Re: 10924462 Date: FEB. 4, 2021

Appeal of National Benefits Center Decision

Form 1-360, Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile

The Petitioner seeks classification as a Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) under sections 101(a)(27)(J) and 204(a)(l)(G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (the Act), 8 U.S.C. §§ 110l(a)(27)(J) and 1154(a)(l)(G). The Director of the National Benefits Center denied the Form 1-360, Petition for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ petition), and the matter is now before us on appeal. On appeal, the Petitioner submits a brief, resubmits evidence previously in the record, and argues that he has established his eligibility for the benefit sought. The Administrative Appeals Office reviews the questions in this matter de nova. Matter of Christo 's Inc., 26 l&N Dec. 53 7, 53 7 n.2 (AAO 2015). Upon de nova review, we will dismiss the appeal.

I. LAW

A petitioner bears the burden of proof to demonstrate eligibility by a preponderance of the evidence. Matter ofChawathe, 25 l&N Dec. 369,375 (AAO 2010). To establish eligibility for SIJ classification, juveniles must show that they are unmarried, under 21 years of age, and have been subject to a state juvenile court order determining that they cannot reunify with one or both of their parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law. Section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 ( c ). Juveniles must have been declared dependent upon a juvenile court, or a juvenile court must have placed them in the custody of a state agency or department, or an individual or entity appointed by the state or juvenile court. Section 101 ( a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act. The record must also contain a judicial or administrative determination "that it would not be in the uuvenile's] best interest to be returned to the uuvenile's] or uuvenile's] parent's previous country of nationality or country of last habitual residence[.]" Section 101 ( a )(2 7)(J)(ii) of the Act.

SIJ classification may only be granted upon the consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security, through USCIS, when a juvenile meets all other eligibility requirements and establishes that the juvenile court order was sought to obtain relief from parental abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis under state law. Section 101(a)(27)(J)(i)-(iii) of the Act. See Matter of D-Y-S-C-, Adopted Decision 2019-02, at 2, 6-7 (AAO Oct. 11, 2019) (providing guidance on USCIS' consent authority as rooted in the legislative history of the SIJ classification and longstanding agency policy). II. ANALYSIS

A. Relevant Facts and Procedural History

The Petitioner, a native and citizen of Guatemala, entered the without inspection, admission, or parole in September 2013, when he was 15 years of age. InC] 2017, when he was 19 years of age, the District Court for th~I IDistrict of ( district court) issued an ORDER ADJUDICATING CHILD TO BE DEPENDENT AND APPOINTING GUARDIAN (SIJ order). In the SIJ order, and "after having examined the Petition and the other documents on file, and having heard the evidence and statements of counsel," the district court determined the Petitioner to be dependent and that it retained "jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of making such further other orders herein for the welfare of the child ... as may be found necessary." The district court further determined that reunification with the Petitioner's father is not viable because the Petitioner's father is deceased and has "abandoned the [Petitioner]." The district court also determined that it is not in the Petitioner's best interest "to return to or his parents' home country of nationality or country of last habitual residence as his father has abandoned him." The district court appointed the Petitioner's mother as his guardian and custodian, ordering that the Petitioner "remain under the care of [his mother] pending further order ...." The Petitioner submitted the SIJ order in support of his SIJ petition.

The Director denied the SIJ petition, concluding that the Petitioner had not met his burden of demonstrating that the Iowa district court, when issuing its SIJ order, acted as a juvenile court in making the SIJ determinations because the Petitioner was 19 years of age at the time of the issuance of the order and no longer a "child" or "minor" under Iowa law.

B. The Petitioner Has Not Established that the District Court Acted as a Juvenile Court for SIJ Purposes

For SIJ classification, a petitioner must have been subject to an order containing the requisite dependency or custody, parental reunification, and best interest determinations issued by a 'juvenile court," which is defined as a court "in the United States having jurisdiction under state law to make judicial determinations about the custody and care of juveniles." Section 10l(a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act; 8 C.F.R. § 204.ll(a). While the specific title and type of court may vary, petitioners must establish that the court had competent jurisdiction to make judicial determinations about their dependency and/or care and custody as juveniles under state law. See section 101 ( a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act (requiring that petitioners have been "declared dependent on a juvenile court ... or whom such a court has legally committed to, or placed under the custody ot: an agency or department ... , or an individual ..."); 8 C.F.R § 204.ll(a), (d)(2)(i) (stating that required, initial evidence includes a juvenile court order issued by a court of competent jurisdiction); 6 USCIS Policy Manual J.2(C),https://www.uscis.gov/ policy-manual (citing to Matter ofA-O-C-, Adopted Decision 2019-03, at 4 (AAO Oct. 11, 2019) and providing, as guidance, that "the court must have the authority to make determinations about the dependency and/or custody and care of the petitioner as a juvenile under state law at the time the order was issued").

Iowa law defines "minor" for purposes of guardianship as "a person who is not of full age" and "full age" as "the state of legal majority attained through arriving at the age of eighteen years." Iowa Code

2 Annotated (Iowa Code Ann.) § 633.3(18), (28) (West 2020). The guardianship provisions of section 633 of the Iowa Code Ann., under which the district court made its SU-related findings in this case, pertain to minors as well as individuals over the age of 18 years. Although the Petitioner asserts on appeal that he was under the jurisdiction of a juvenile court when his order was issued, the district court did not cite to or discuss in the SIJ order any statutory or legal authority under Iowa law as the basis for assuming jurisdiction over the Petitioner as a juvenile, because he was over 18 years old when the guardianship proceedings commenced. The Petitioner likewise did not submit into the record any additional evidence submitted to the district court otherwise establishing the same. Without such, the Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the district court exercised its jurisdiction over him as a juvenile under Iowa law or that the guardianship provisions under the Iowa Code Ann. otherwise alter the age of majority in the state. Because the Petitioner was 19 years of age when the order was issued and was accordingly no longer a juvenile as contemplated by Iowa law, the district court was not acting as a juvenile court for SIJ purposes when it issued the guardianship and clarifying orders.

The Petitioner asserts that Iowa district courts exercise jurisdiction over juveniles generally and that the fact that he was over the state age of majority is irrelevant for SIJ purposes, as long as he meets the definition of child pursuant to the Act. As a preliminary matter, we recognize that, as indicated by the Petitioner, Iowa district courts are courts of and may exercise jurisdiction over various matters. See Iowa Code Ann. § 602.6101 (West 2020) (stating that the district court exercises jurisdiction over "all actions, proceedings, and remedies, civil, criminal, probate, and juvenile ...."). However, to be eligible for SIJ classification, the Petitioner must show that the district court acted as a 'juvenile court" in his particular case; that is, it had jurisdiction to determine his dependency and/or custody and care as a juvenile under Iowa law. See section 101(a)(27)(J)(i) of the Act (requiring individualized determinations by a 'juvenile court"); 8 C.F.R. § 204.11 ( d)(2)(i), (iii) (requiring, as initial required evidence, a 'juvenile court order" making various judicial determinations specific to the petitioner). See also 6 USCIS Policy Manual, supra, at J.2(C) (explaining that the definition of juvenile court at 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 l(a) "means the court must have the authority to make determinations about dependency and/or custody and care of the petitioner as a juvenile under state law at the time the order was issued").

Moreover, the Petitioner's argument conflates federal filing requirements for SIJ classification with the requisite validity of a juvenile court order under the applicable state law. Petitioners must apply for SIJ classification with USCIS while unmarried and under the age of 21, as mandated by federal immigration law. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.ll(c)(l)-(2) (requiring SIJ petitioners to be under 21 years of age and unmarried); see also William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, section 235(d)(6), Pub. L. 110-457, 122 Stat. 5044, 5080 (2008) (providing age-out protections for SIJ petitioners who are unmarried and under the age of 21 at the time of filing). However, state law-not federal immigration law-governs the definition of "child," "minor," 'juvenile," or any other equivalent term that is applicable to the dependency or custody proceedings in a given case. See Matter ofA-0-C-, Adopted Decision 2019-03 at 4 (citing to 8 C.F.R. § 204.1 l(a) and (d)(2)(i), Perez-Olano v. Holder, No. CV 05-3604, Settlement Agreement ,r 8 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 15, 2010), andBudhathoki v. Nielsen, 898 F.3d 504,513 (5th Cir. 2018) ("Although the regulation permits an applicant for SIJ status to be someone who has not yet become age 21, what controls on eligibility for that status is the state law governing decisions over the care and custody of juveniles")). As discussed above, Iowa law defines "minor" for purposes of guardianship as "a person who is not of

3 full age" and "full age" as "the state of legal majority attained through arriving at the age of eighteen years." Iowa Code Ann. § 633.3(18), (28).

In further support, the Petitioner references R.F.M v. Nielsen, 365 F. Supp. 3d 350 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2019), a decision out of the Southern District of New York affecting certain SIJ petitioners whose SIJ orders were issued by the New York family court between the petitioners' 18th and 21st birthdays. The Petitioner argues that similar to the decision in R.F.M, the Iowa district court is a juvenile court, and made the requisite SIJ determinations that establish his eligibility for SIJ classification. He contends that USCIS' decisions to the contrary violate the AP A and his due process rights. Although we acknowledge the effect of the district court decision on its class members, the Petitioner's reliance on R.F.M is misplaced because he is not an R.F.M class member, as his SIJ order was not issued by a New York family court. Moreover, the statutory provision at issue in R.F.M, section 661 (a) of the New York Family Court Act (N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act), grants the New York Family Courts jurisdiction to appoint a guardian over a person between the ages of 18 and 21 with their consent and specifies that, "[f]or purposes of appointment of a guardian of the person pursuant to this section, the terms infant and minor shall include a person who is less than [21] who consents to the appointment or continuation of the appointment after the age of [18]." N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 66l(a) (McKinney's 2011). As explained above, the Petitioner has not established that Iowa law contains such a provision, nor has he otherwise shown that the district court exercised its jurisdiction over him as a juvenile under Iowa law at the of issuance of the SIJ order.

In the end, the Petitioner has not met his burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the district court was acting as a juvenile court at the time his SIJ order was issued. As the Petitioner has not established by a preponderance of the evidence that the district court acted as a juvenile court for SIJ purposes, he likewise has not established that a juvenile court made qualifying determinations concerning his juvenile dependency and/or custody and care, viability of reunification with his father, or best interest, as required by section 10l(a)(27)(J) of the Act.

III. CONCLUSION

While we acknowledge the unfortunate circumstances and hardships the Petitioner faced during his childhood, he has not established his eligibility for, and does not warrant USCIS' consent to his request for, SIJ classification.

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed.

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