CASE PROGRAM 2008-64.2

Reorganising Police’s approach to crime (B)

Although the level of gangland violence had subsided by mid-2004, was still under considerable public and political pressure. (then Assistant Commissioner of the Crime Department) and his colleagues realised that some fundamental changes had to be made, but he also believed that taking a defensive stance was not the way forward. With the support of Chief Commissioner , he organised a two-day summit attended by the Premier and senior state government officials, international police experts and criminologists. In a move that surprised many, the summit was open to the media and included guests who had been publicly critical of Victoria Police. “I think people privately thought I was mad,” recalled Overland, “but they also saw that I was probably carrying the risk around that. We were very honest about the situation and that we hadn’t picked up on it early enough which really took our critics by surprise. It also showed the government that we were prepared to think differently going ahead.”

Soon thereafter, the state government allocated funds for a reorganisation. The search for a suitable consultancy firm began in late 2004 and a Police team was established to oversee the project, headed by Detective Superintendent Paul Hollowood. Although they weren’t clear at this stage what they would do, the team was clear on what they didn’t want: an off-the-shelf model borrowed from another jurisdiction and tweaked slightly to suit Victoria Police. Following a competitive tender, the Boston Consulting Group (BCG) was chosen, in part, noted Hollowood, because they seemed more prepared to listen and approach the problem with a fresh perspective.

BCG’s main clients were large corporations such as financial institutions and airlines, however, in recent years the company had expanded into public sector consultancy at

This case was written by Marinella Padula, Australia and New Zealand School of Government, for Professor John Alford and Professor Amanda Sinclair as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The assistance of Christine Nixon, Simon Overland, Paul Hollowood, Craig Howard, Toni Campbell and Larry Kamener is gratefully acknowledged, however they are not responsible for the content herein. Cases are not necessarily intended as a complete account of the events described. While every reasonable effort has been made to ensure accuracy at the time of publication, subsequent developments may mean that certain details have since changed. This work is licensed under Creative Commons Attribution- NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International Licence, except for logos, trademarks, photographs and other content marked as supplied by third parties. No licence is given in relation to third party material. Version 7-05-2008. Distributed by the Case Program, The Australia and New Zealand School of Government, www.anzsog.edu.au.

both the state and federal level. Although aware that policing had many special characteristics, BCG Partner Larry Kamener believed that insights gained from the private sector could be successfully applied to the Force. Upon BCG’s appointment, a joint BCG-Victoria Police team was established at the St Kilda Road complex, comprising four full-time BCG consultants working alongside eight detectives from Victoria Police.

Questions and more questions

One of the first priorities, according to Kamener, was to get a handle on exactly what the police did. “Not only did they not know how their resources were being deployed,” he said, “they also had no way of classifying different crime types in any useful way. Many other organisations like hospitals for example, do triage which allows them to assess the degree of complexity or urgency of a particular medical case. That didn’t exist in the Police.” Data was limited and where data existed, it was overly complicated and of little value. He and his team began by spending time shadowing detectives to get a feel for the nature of their work. They decided that instead of collecting detailed time and motion information, which police were in any case reluctant to supply, they instead simply asked detectives to estimate the percentage of their working week spent on each of each of their current investigations. This, they argued, would provide sufficiently powerful management information with little intrusion.

At the same time, BCG conducted intensive focus group and interview sessions within Victoria Police and with its key stakeholders to pinpoint problems and possible solutions. They were particularly interested in tapping into the thoughts of opinion leaders within the Force – in other words, those individuals who commanded the most peer influence and respect. Kamener was well aware of the historic distrust towards management. Indeed, as Business Services Manager Toni Campbell recalled, “Many people didn’t believe that we didn’t already have a model and that we were asking them questions and genuinely interested in the answers.”

Yet despite widespread misgivings, Kamener and his team received a better reception from police than anticipated: “We were expecting a very high level of suspicion but it wasn’t as much of a problem as we thought. We were very upfront about the fact that we weren’t there because we were police experts. It might have been refreshing for them for people to come in from outside without fixed views on how to do police work.” Kamener was also careful not to encourage false hope:

“You go and interview people and they want more of everything – more equipment, more specialists, more covert surveillance – and all of those specialist resources were always quite scarce. In the original communication about the project it was made quite clear that this was not a project designed to determine the right level of resources for police. It was a project designed to say: ‘Given the level of resources we’ve got, what is the best way we should organise ourselves?’ We were able to manage people’s expectations and government was comfortable that it wasn’t simply a bid for extra resources. It also encouraged people to think more creatively rather than get the shopping list out.”

2 Model building

While the interviews provided many valuable insights, there was still a great deal of work ahead. “Most people interviewed could identify where the problems were in the Force but not how to solve them,” noted Hollowood. But one positive discovery was that members generally recognised the need for change and were prepared for it to happen. One of the biggest problems for the Police-BCG team was how to build flexibility into Victoria Police instead of throwing resources at problem after problem. What they wanted was a model that was more strategic, dynamic, collaborative and developmental. It needed to be a model that could better anticipate future needs and accommodate a degree of continual improvement, obviating the need for larger overhauls. During 2005, there were many discussions around how the new Victoria Police should work. Kamener outlined some of the options:

“The models we looked at ranged from something like the status quo to, at the other extreme, disbanding all the squads and turning the Crime Department into a pool of several hundred detectives that could be allocated to any investigation. In the middle, we had a number of other models, including the one we ended up with which was the notion that there would be squads but that they would be quite fluid. That was pretty contentious even though there was some relief that we weren’t getting rid of squads altogether. There was a lot of nervousness amongst police about anything that might touch the squads because for many police your number one allegiance is to the squad.”

Victoria Police was keen to retain teams because, as Hollowood pointed out, the nature of modern policing meant that it was very difficult for a single detective to pursue a case completely independently and also because, “if you pull individuals together it takes time to figure out strengths and weaknesses and for them to bond.” They also wanted to ensure that domain-specific expertise wasn’t lost. Ultimately, they decided that the Crime Department divisions and some squads would be abolished but that detectives would still be assigned to a specific workgroup. These would be either a squad based around a specific crime type such as homicide, or a tasked workgroup that would act like small taskforces in response to emerging areas of need. This, they hoped, would foster the development of what Kamener described as “T-shaped” investigators: detectives with broad, generalist skills, as well as a deeper understanding of one or more specific areas.

In terms of specialist resources, BCG suggested the creation of centralised “crime desks” that were organised according to particular crime themes and staffed by experts who were able to provide support and advice to detectives in the Crime Department and the regions. The crime desks would also act in a strategic capacity, monitoring trends and developments and helping to determine future resource allocation (Exhibit A). Another key part of the plan was a new system to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the Crime Department in relation to the regions. Called the Accountability and Resource Model (ARM), it outlined who would lead what type of investigation and what mix of resources would be used (Exhibit B). Under the new model, for example, straightforward homicides would be investigated by the regions with support from the crime department. Another feature of the new system was increased capacity to review investigations on a regular basis and re-classify them accordingly.

3 Implementation

In June 2005, the plan was signed off, and the implementation phase began in July that year. By this stage, Assistant Commissioner Overland observed that officers were tired of being consulted and keen for the organisation to simply “get on with it.” Although they never anticipated an easy ride, a few extra obstacles cropped up. The Police Association (TPA) had been involved from very early on, however Union Secretary Paul Mullett had been away for most of the plan’s development. Instead, police management dealt with his deputy, Bruce Mackenzie, and the consultation process had gone well, with five separate meetings between the TPA and the BCG-Police Team in the period February to May 2005. However, when Mullett returned the TPA’s approach had changed, becoming more combative. One reason, explained Hollowood, was that theoretical plans were now becoming reality and starting to have an impact. Another related to different expectations about the change process. Said Detective Inspector Craig Howard: “Our enterprise bargaining agreement says we must consult with the union. It’s the classic problem of misunderstanding the term ‘consult’. Everyone thinks the term consult means permission. You can consult with them, go away, put something into place that doesn’t quite satisfy their ends and they say, ‘Well you didn’t consult us.’ But we did.”

An additional complication was the Armed Offenders Squad. In mid-2006 the Office of Police Integrity (OPI, established in 2004 to investigate police corruption) raided the headquarters of the Armed Offenders Squad. The squad was subsequently disbanded and replaced by Taskforce Emerald. As the Armed Offenders Squad had been one of the squads under review as part of the change process, the OPI investigation became erroneously conflated with the change process. This, members of the team recalled, gave TPA extra leverage to oppose the changes and fostered unnecessary fear and suspicion. Not long after the Armed Offenders drama, Simon Overland was promoted to the position of Deputy Commissioner. He was replaced as head of the Crime Department by a board of management. While this was always part of the plan, Overland conceded that it might have happened before they were fully ready.

There were also problems around getting Crime Department and regional detectives to understand the nature of the changes. Even though a great deal of care had gone into their communication strategy, it wasn’t until implementation that the Police-BCG team made an important discovery: their message wasn’t getting through properly. Although they had consulted widely in the project’s early stages, they had concentrated later efforts on managers, believing that they were best placed to pass on the organisational message as they enjoyed the trust of their subordinates. “We spent a lot of time working on crime managers,” recalled Howard, “but as a result they controlled the flow of the message almost completely and sometimes fed misinformation.” Added Hollowood, “We also discovered that people don’t like reading things. You can have as many emails and newsletters as you want but nothing replaces face-to-face communication.”

On the plus side, Campbell noted that they had removed a degree of line control from the organisation. Instead of constantly referring decisions up, detectives were more empowered to make their own decisions. Some adapted well, others were more resistant but as a whole she observed that the organisation was moving on. Added Detective Inspector Craig Howard: “We had many debates about minimising disruption versus changing everything all at once. We found that groups that changed in size, management and location embraced

4 change better than those only endured one or two changes. I guess because it becomes harder to revert to old ways.” Two years on from the changes, Hollowood observed that Victoria Police was starting to reap the benefits from the reorganisation. One of the factors he felt contributed to the project’s success was the steadfast commitment of people such as Overland and Nixon: “In a lot of other organisational changes, when things get rocky the people at the top will start distancing themselves from it.” BCG Partner Larry Kamener also commented on the quality of the team Overland had put together to participate in the project.

In Kamener’s assessment, the project had achieved a great deal but, like Overland, he felt that the change process could have gone further. And although improvements had been made regarding collaboration between the central Crime Department and the regions, Overland considered there were still cultural barriers between them. Campbell wanted to see yet more flexibility within the Force, perhaps even the introduction of an internship type program to provide more widespread work experience. But ultimately the government was satisfied by the outcome and Victoria Police was experiencing an interesting new phenomenon: organisations from other jurisdictions were now booking study trips to Victoria to help inform their own changes.

5 Exhibit A: Proposed Crime Department Structure

AC Crime

Strategy Strategy Major Strategy A Business B, C & D E & F Crime Portfolio Manager Portfolio Portfolio Strategy Manager Manager Manager Manager

T&C Major Manager Crime Desks Crime Intelligence Operations Tasking & Coordination Support And Operations Monitoring

Squad Operations Tasked Operations Manager Manager

Squad Operations Tasked Operations

Specialist Resources (eg Forensic accountants and lawyers, analysts)

Members of the Major Crime Tasking and Coordination Group

Source: Boston Consulting Group, ‘A major crime management model for Victoria Police’, June 2005.

6 Exhibit B: Proposed Accountability and Resource Model

Crime Categorisation Investigation Prioritisation

Lead Accountability For Investigation Prioritisation Of Investigations Resource Accountabilities

Example 1 2 3 Priority Priority Considerations Primary Secondary Resource Level Mix Crime Region Region • Murder • Murder/suicide • Burglary • Life threatening • Investigators • High community • Intelligence officers • Police • Suspicious • Theft (minor) impact/or profile • Physical and shooting/death disappearance A • Identified organisation financial in custody • Assault priority • Support personnel • Aggravated • Suspected terrorism • Expert/local advice • Arson or burglary • High victim impact explosion • Assist with enquiries • Firearm assisted (extensive • Expert/local advice violence damage) B • Access intelligence • Recidivism • Investigators • As needed human • Organised crime • Intell. Officers and physical support involvement • Specialist support • Transnational/cross- • Accommodation jurisdictional • Physical and • Links to other agency financial • Facilitate enquiries investigation C • Expert/local advice • Complex or protracted • Access intelligence nature • Need for high level expertise or resources

D • Otherwise routine • Expert/local advice investigation • Access intelligence

Source: Boston Consulting Group, ‘A major crime management model for Victoria Police’, June 2005.

7 Exhibit C: Victoria Police Organisational Structure, 2007.

MANAGEMENT - Implement Victoria Police strategy, policy & position CHIEF COMMISSIONER Office of - Manage area of responsibility within corporate policy framework Chief Examiner - Improve service delivery - Seek to collaboratively contribute to corporate goals & objectives - Leadership and development of staff - Communicate strategy, policy & position Office of the Chief Commissioner

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR DEPUTY COMMISSIONER DEPUTY COMMISSIONER CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER Sanjib Roy Simon Overland Kieran Walshe Valda Berzins

Region 1 Region 2 Region 3 Region 4 Region 5 CMRD Crime Asst Commissioner Asst Commissioner Acting Asst Commissioner Asst Commissioner Asst Commissioner Commander Board of Management Gary Jamieson Sandra Nicholson Tim Cartwright Bob Hastings Paul Evans Terry Purton

Operations Intelligence & Covert Specialist Support Forensic Services Traffic & Transit Safety Ethical Standards Legal Services Co-ordination Support Commander Director Asst Commissioner Asst Commissioner Director Commander Commander Jim Hart Alistair Ross Ken Lay Luke Cornelius Findlay McRae Ashley Dickinson Dannye Moloney

Counter Terrorism Education Corporate Strategy & Media & Corporate Airlie Leadership Coordination & Acting Assistant Human Resource Performance Business Management Communications Development Centre Emergency Management Commissioner Board of Management Director Board of Management Acting Director Acting Director Asst Commissioner Kevin Scott Jenny Peachey Nicole McKechnie Dianne Hardy Stephen Fontana

Source: Adapted from Victoria Police www.police.vic.gov.au, accessed, October 2007.