The United Democratic Front As Exponent of Mass-Based Resistance and Protest, 1983 - 1990

THE UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT AS EXPONENT OF MASS-BASED RESISTANCE AND PROTEST, 1983 - 1990

KEITH VINCENT CLARKSON

Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of

D. LITT. ET PHIL.

HISTORY

in the

FACULTY OF ARTS

RAND AFRIKAANS UNIVERSITY

Promotor : Prof. Dr. L.W.F. GRUNDLINGH

NOVEMBER 1997 Expression of thanks

I would like to thank the following persons for their contribution to this thesis :

My wife Martsan for her support, understanding and patience.

My parents for their support of my studies through the years.

My colleagues, friends and co-students for their support and encouragement. Thank you Gerrie Terblanche, Beer Duvenhage, Louis Siebrits and Willie Bernard.

The library personnel who was always willing to unearth another source. Thank you Christine Prinsloo, Alta Strauss and Nicolene Lubbert.

Karien Allers for the editing of the thesis. i

CONTENTS i

LIST OF ACRONYMS vii

SUM MARY x

OPSOMMING xii

INTRODUCTION

1. Approach to the study 3

2. Focus and aim 5

3. Background of the history of mass-based resistance 7

4. Structure of the thesis 11

5. Historiography 12

6. Methodology and sources 19 6.1. General sources 6.2. Primary documents 6.3. Other sources

CHAPTER 1 : THE CONCEPT OF MASS-BASED PROTEST

Introduction 26

Defining non-violent mass-based protest 30 11

3. Non-violent protest action 31 3.1. The nature and characteristics of non-violent protest action 32 3.2. Characteristics of protest 33 3.3. The roots of political power 37 3.4. Motives, methods and leverages 43

4. The methods of mass-based resistance and protest 45 4.1. Introduction 4.2. Mass-based protest and persuasion - Strategies and tactics 45 4.2.1 Political protest 4.2.2. Social protest 4.2.3. Symbolic protest 4.2.4. Economic protest

CHAPTER 2 : THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE UDF

Changing circumstances favouring mass-based action in the 1980s 80 1.1. Internal conditions 80 1.2. External conditions 85

Origin of the UDF 87 2.1. The run-up to the founding of the UDF 87 2.1.1. The Transvaal Anti-SAIC Committee 2.1.2. The Koornhof Bills 2.1.3. Increased activism by trade unions and students 2.1.4. The Tricameral system 2.2. The founding of the UDF 92 2.3. Launch of the UDF 94 2.4. Issues 95 2.5. Leadership - organisational set-up and profile 97 2.5.1. Leading personalities 111

2.5.2. Sectors and organisations involved

3. Character of the UDF 106 3.1. Background 106 3.2. The amorphous character of the UDF 108 3.3. The influence of the concept of "People's Power" 109 3.4. The UDF as an organisation 111 3.5. The UDF as a protest group 113 3.6. The UDF as a united resistance front 117 3.7. The UDF as a mass democratic movement 123 3.8. Ideology and its influence on the character of the UDF 126 3.8.1. Background 3.8.2. Ideological character of the UDF 3.8.3. Defining the ideology of theUDF 3.8.4. Ideological groupings within the UDF

CHAPTER 3 : THE RESISTANCE BASE OF THE UDF

1 Background 149

2. The UDF's resistance base 150 2.1. Youth and student groups 150 2.1.1. Defining terminology 2.1.2. Background 2.1.3. Composition of the UDF's youth resistance base 2.2. Civic organisations 159 2.2.1. Background 2.2.2. Origin and development 2.2.3. Membership, strength and support 2.2.4. Leadership 2.2.5. Problems iv

2.2.6. Impact, role and importance 2.3. Churches and religious associations 164 2.3.1 Background 2.3.2. Types of church groups 2.3.3. Role, impact and importance 2.4. Women's organisations 170 2.4.1. Background 2.4.2. Types of organisations 2.4.3. Leadership 2.4.4. Role, impact and importance 2.5. Trade Unions 174 2.5.1. Background 2.5.2. Types of trade unions 2.5.3. Leadership 2.5.4. Role, impact and importance 2.6. Racially-based organisations 181 2.6.1. Background 2.6.2. Types and groups of organisations 2.6.3. Leadership 2.6.4. Role, impact and importance 2.7. Academic, research and educational groups 189 2.7.1. Background 2.7.2. Types of organisations 2.7.3. Role, impact and importance

CHAPTER 4 : THE UDF's STRATEGIC APPROACH TOWARDS MASS PROTEST AND RESISTANCE

1 Introduction 200

2. Background to the protest and resistance from 1983 onwards 204 v

Factors influencing the UDF's strategic approach 208 3.1. General factors 209 3.2. The dynamics of the UDF's strategic approach 212 3.2.1. Leadership and decision making 3.2.2. Process to formulate strategy 3.3. The ability to adapt 213 3.4. Government initiatives which influenced the UDF's strategic approach 214

The UDF's strategic approach 217 4.1. Introduction 217 4.2. Permanent strategies 219 4.2.1. Mass-based approach 4.2.2. Anti-constitutional reform and pro-democracy strategies 4.2.3. Strategies aimed at socio-economic and civic issues 4.2.4. Strategies aimed at the youth and education 4.2.5. Non-violence as a strategy 4.3. Mobilisation strategies 223 4.4. Strategies to neutralise state power 225 4.5. Pro-active strategies 227

CHAPTER 5 : IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIES - THE UDF's MASS-BASED TACTICAL APPROACH

1 Introduction 234

Background 235

Tactics employed by the UDF 237 3.1. Mobilisation and organisation tactics 237 3.1.1. Tactics to mobilise support base 3.1.2. Mobilisation around tactical issues vi

3.1.3. Sensitising tactics to widen the Front 3.2. Protest and pressure tactics 247 3.2.1. Boycotts 3.2.2. Psychological and symbolic tactics 3.2.3. Pro-active, attacking tactics designed to discredit the government 3.2.4. Tactics aimed to build People's Power 3.2.5. Openly challenging the government through mass-based protest

CONCLUSION 299

SOURCES 309 vii

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADD Association of Durban Democrats AFRC Anti-Forced-Removals Committee ANC African National Congress ANCYL African National Congress Youth League AZAPO Azanian Peoples Organisation AZASO Azanian Students' Organisation BC Black Consciousness BCM Black Consciousness Movement BLA Black Local Authority CAHAC Cape Areas Housing Action Committee CAL Cape Action League CCB Civil Cooperation Bureau COSAS Congress of South African Students COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions COSAW Congress of South African Writers DHAC Durban Housing Action Committee DPSC Detainees' Parents Support Committee ELAC East London Action Committee FFF Five Freedoms Forum FOSATU Federation of South African Trade Unions FRA Federation of Residents' Association (Western Cape) FSAW Federation of South African Women GAWU General and Allied Workers Union GWU General Workers Union GCD Grahamstown Committee of Democrats GRADAC Grahamstown Democratic Action Committee JODAC Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee MCCD Mission of the Churches for Community Development MFCC Mass Funeral Coordination Committee NAYO National Youth Organisation NIC Natal Indian Congress NOW Natal Organisation of Women NP National Party NUSAS National Union of South African Students PAC Pan Africanist Congress PEAC Port Elizabeth Area Committee RMC Release Mandela Committee SAAWU South African Allied Workers' Union SACBC South African Catholic Bishops Council SACC South African Council of Churches SACTU South African Congress of Trade Unions SAIC South African Indian Council SAMA South African Musician's Alliance SANCO South African National Civic Organisation SARHWU South African Railway and Harbour Workers' Union SASM South African Students Movement SASO South African Students Organisation SAYCO South African Youth Congress SPCC Soweto Parent's Crisis Committee SOYCO Soweto Youth Congress SSRC Soweto Students Representative Council SUCA Students Union for Christian Action TAPCC Transvaal Anti-President's Council Committee TASC Transvaal Anti-SAIC Committee TIC Transvaal Indian Congress TYO Transvaal Youth Organisation UCC United Committee of Concern UDF United Democratic Front UDFWC UDF Women's Congress WARC World Alliance of Reformed Churches ix

WCC World Council of Churches WFP Women for Peace WPCN Women for Peaceful Change Now YCS Young Christian Students YCW Young Christian Workers SUMMARY

Non-violent mass-based protest and resistance by liberation groups have a long history in the South African context. Prior to the 1980s, they had achieved only minor and isolated successes. The formation of the United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1983 and its successful mass protest action against the state to 1990, changed the equation, however.

The UDF's origin could indirectly be traced back to attempts from the 1950s to launch mass-based protest and resistance against the apartheid state. Calls for the formation of a united front against the South African State were made by various persons and organisations since the 1950s, but it was only by the 1980s that circumstances allowed the formation of a united front. Demographic realities, urbanisation, the legalisation of black trade unions, an educated leadership, the growth of a grassroots-based civil society among blacks, all contributed to make the formation of the UDF a reality.

Protest against the government's tricameral system, initially provided the direct stimulus for the formation of the UDF during 1983 to 1984. By the end of 1984, the UDF had built up a wide support base to directly threaten the government's position. The result was several states of emergency through which the state endeavoured to crush the UDF-led opposition. The UDF's unique structure, which consisted of affiliates from all sectors of civil society, including black trade unions as an alliance partner, managed to survive the state's repressive measures, continued to pressurise the state so that by 1989, under a new head-of-state, the National Party "capitulated" and opened the door to real elections for a democratic South Africa.

The UDF's strategies were aimed to mobilise the masses and through its mass-based action, bring maximum pressure to bear on the government. This strategic approach was executed by employing various tactics, which related to the classic methods of mass-based non-violent action. In the end, the state's security apparatus proved unable to cope with the UDF's relentless actions, offset by its inability to act effectively against xi the UDF as an entity, mainly because of its amorphous structure.

Although other factors, such as economic recession, foreign sanctions, the ANC campaign to isolate South Africa, among other played a role, the UDF provided the crucial domestic impetus to illustrate to the South African government, that black resistance couldn't be suppressed and that the situation would continue to worsen. Seen against this background, it is unlikely that CODESA would have occurred as soon as it did without the activities of the UDF throughout the 1980s. xii

OPSOMMING

Massa protes en verset deur die bevrydingsbewegings, het 'n lang geskiedenis binne die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks. In die tydperk voor die 1980's, het hulle slegs beperkte sukses behaal. Die UDF se suksesse gedurende die periode 1983 tot 1990, het egter hierdie tendens vir altyd verander.

Die UDF se oorsprong en ontstaan kan indirek herlei word na pogings vanaf die 1950's om 'n massa gerigte protes en verset inisiatief teen die apartheid staat te loods. Oproepe vir die loodsing van 'n verenigde front teen die Suid-Afrikaanse Staat is deur 'n verskeidenheid persone en instansies gedoen sedert die 1950's. Maar dit was slegs teen die 1980's dat omstandighede gunstig was vir die vorming van so 'n verenigde front. Bevolkings realiteite, verstedeliking, die wettiging van swart vakbonde, 'n geskoolde leierskap en die opbloei van 'n gemeenskapsgerigte burgerlike samelewing in die swart gemeenskap, het alles bygedra om die vorming van die UDF 'n realiteit te maak.

Verset teen die regering se driekamer parlementere stelsel het die onmiddelike motivering verskaf vir die stigting van die UDF gedurende 1983 tot 1984. Teen die einde van 1984, het die UDF egter daarin geslaag om a bred ondersteunersbasis op te bou wat die regering se onmiddelike gesag kon uitdaag. Die gevolg was verskeie noodtoestande wat deur die staat uitgevaardig is in 'n poging om die UDF georkestreerde verset te vernietig. Die UDF se unieke struktuur, wat bestaan het uit verskeie geaffilieerde organisasies afkomstig uit al die sektore van die burgerlike samelewing, insluitende swart vakbonde wat die UDF se bondgenote was, het daarin geslaag om die staat se onderdrukkende maatreels te oorkom en hulle druk op die staat voort te sit en selfs te intensifiseer. Teen 1989, onder die leierskap van 'n nuwe leier, het die Nasionale Party basies "oorgegee" en die deur oopgemaak vir direkte onderhandelinge wat gelei het tot 'n verkiesing in 1994 om 'n demokratiese Suid-Afrika tot stand te bring. Die UDF het 'n deursiaggewende rol gespeel om hierdie situasie teweeg te bring. Gedurende die 1980's, was die UDF se strategiee en taktiese benadering daarop gemik om die massas te mobiliseer deur massa aksie, as deel van 'n plan om die regering deurlopend onder druk te pleas en daar te hou. Hierdie strategiese benadering is uitgevoer deur die aanwending van verskeie taktiese aksies wat gekenmerk is deur die gebruik van die klassieke metodes van massa verset en nie- geweldadige verset. Die uiteinde was dat die staat se veiligheidsmagte grootliks hulpeloos was om hierdie onversetlike druk onbepaald te weerstaan.

Alhoewel verskeie ander faktore 'n rol gespeel het om verandering in Suid-Afrika teweeg te bring, oa ekonomiese afplatting, buitelandse sanksies en die ANC se veldtog om Suid-Afrika te isoleer, het die UDF 'n deursiaggewende rol gespeel om die binnelandse situasie so te destabiliseer, dat die situasie tot 'n groot mate gedreig het om onbeheerbaar te raak vir die regering. Gesien teen hierdie agtergrond, is dit onwaarskynlik dat KODESA so you sou gerealiseer het sonder die bydrae wat deur die UDF gelewer is gedurende die tagtigerjare. 1

INTRODUCTION

AND NOW THEREFORE we, democrats assembled on this 23rd day of January, 1983, at the Selbourne Hall in Johannesburg, South Africa, do hereby unanimously

reject in their totality and without qualification the constitutional and reform proposals;

form ourselves into a united democratic front (UDF) to oppose the implementation of this devious scheme to divide the people.

We further undertake to work according to the following guidelines:

The mobilisation of our people for the rejection of these constitutional reform proposals should complement and reinforce the ongoing day to day struggles on basic issues which face workers, communities and students.

(Excerpt from the United Democratic Front Declaration - 23 January 1983)

The guidelines spelled out in the above-mentioned excerpt from the UDF Declaration, introduced the South African state to a new, unprecedented level of protest and resistance. The formation of the UDF introduced a new level of organised mass opposition to apartheid. Since 1976, fighting in the townships, labour unrest, classroom revolts, rent strikes, consumer boycotts, worker stay-aways and guerilla warfare, became increasingly familiar features on the South African political landscape.' From 1983, the UDF played a central role in this transformation of South African politics. The UDF inspired and mobilised people across South Africa to resist the state's institutions and policies, it helped build resistance organisations from the local to the national levels, it coordinated diverse protests and campaigns, it promoted the profile and 2 underground structures of the banned ANC and it nurtured a political culture that emphasised democratic rights and claims indivisible by race. 2

Black resistance in South Africa ebbed and flowed through the years. The struggle registered several peaks of resistance, but in every instance circumstances prevented the black masses to press their initial advantage, giving the state the chance to regroup. In every instance, the result was an increase in counter-measures by the state, which became evermore stringent. This led to the treason trials in the 1950s (after the Defiance Campaign of 1952), the banning of the ANC and PAC in 1960 (after the PAC's tragic Anti-Pass Campaign which resulted in the shootings in Sharpeville and elsewhere), the Soweto school riots in 1976 and finally culminated in massive resistance throughout the 1980s, led by the UDF and triggered by the government's implementation of the divisive tricameral system.

After the initial Declaration of Intent was accepted in January 1983, the UDF was launched nationally on 20 August 1983 in a community centre in Mitchell's Plain - Cape Town's largest Coloured residential area. The launch of the UDF initiated an era of unprecedented political organising. The UDF provided coordination and leadership to a wide range of organisations involved in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. All sectors of civil society were involved and the UDF's affiliates included civic associations, student and youth organisations, human rights groups, political groups, church and women's groups, ethnic groups and some trade unions. South Africa experienced an unprecedented period of protest and resistance in townships and in rural areas across the country. The UDF became the state's priority target and a series of major treason trials sought to convict the UDF's leadership and to criminalise the organisation.

The UDF played a significant role in forging a sense of unity and direction to the struggle, despite organisational limits to coordinate protest and the somewhat fragmented nature of localised township and rural protest groups and initiatives. The UDF's existence alone however, was cause for inspiration if compared to the somewhat 3 haphazard protest action and resistance tactics of the late 1970s and early 1980s. The UDF illustrated that there was space for resistance; it instilled hope; it injected defiance; it introduced new strategies and resistance which stretched the state's resources to breaking point; and, the UDF through its symbolic performances as much as physical coordination, helped to transform, on both real and conceptual levels, disparate local and sectoral struggles into a nationwide and explicitly political movement. In short, one can say that the central hypothesis in this study, is aimed at indicating how the UDF helped to transform and redefine the meaning and methods of mass protest and resistance in South Africa and how it organised and built organisations in all sectors and took the lead in mass protest and resistance politics throughout the 1980s. 3

1. Approach to the study

Jeremy Seekings (the official UDF historian and author of various papers on the UDF), asked himself the question if the UDF was an organisation, a front or a movement when planning the scope of his book. As the UDF's own leaders were never able to reach consensus among themselves, Seekings realised that the UDF meant different things to different people at different times and in different places. At any time in its history, the UDF was an alliance, a party, a front for the ANC, a civil rights movement and a national liberation movement. Seekings based his research on charting these different attributes of the UDF, and decided on an organisational approach, treating the UDF as a political organisation rather than a movement. Seekings felt that the UDF's creation of national and regional structures, and in some instances sub-regional structures, eclipsed what was originally just a front for coordination of joint campaigns by its affiliates. In time, the UDF evolved into a more party-like structure with employees and activities independent of its affiliates. The UDF's organisational set-up, therefore became, according to Seekings, the overriding factor of its existence, rather than the role it played as a loose political front that gave direction to protest and resistance in South Africa during the 1980s.4 4

Although this thesis and the research conducted by Seekings do have some points of contact and overlapping, the basic approach differs measurably. Where Seekings approached his documentation of the UDF from an organisational viewpoint with an chronological undertone, this thesis follows a more direct approach by concentrating on the role played by the UDF in organising mass-based protest and resistance, the different actors involved, the campaigns and the reasons for the UDF's successes in contrast with earlier attempts at mass-based resistance. This thesis also differs from the approach of Seekings, Lodge and Nasson, Hudson and others, in that a theoretical/analytical/historical approach is used, rather than a strict descriptive/chronological approach. The first approach is useful when an organisation or event is researched in a pure historical context. The second approach was deemed more appropriate for this thesis in that a specific aspect of the UDF was being analysed - it's mass-based protest and resistance - in order to explain the Front's successes in a historical context. A chronological approach is only employed in chapter two where the founding of the UDF is described. When deciding on which approach to follow, it soon became clear that the descriptive/chronological approach was largely the norm and that there was a dearth in analytical historical research. Several topics suggested themselves for further investigation - an analysis of the organisations/affiliates which formed the UDF, including the role played by gender, age, race and other issues, an analysis on the role of the world/South African economy in changing the face of South African political protest and the role it played in the formation of the UDF, an analysis on how ideological and class dynamics influenced the UDF's political profile, and so on. I decided that the one crucial factor for the UDF's successes, was that the Front managed to generate mass support which formed the basis of its success to engage the South African State through various mass-based strategies and tactics. This factor sets this thesis apart from previous studies on the UDF - nobody has focussed exclusively on the primary reason for the UDF's success, its mass-based approach towards protest and resistance. The historical context within which this discussion takes place is, however, of prime importance and it was endeavoured to keep a balance between the history of the UDF and the analysis of its actions. 5

2. Focus and aim

The struggle for black political rights and the eradication of apartheid in South Africa had a long history that was marked by several turning points, none of which was as crucial, dramatic and massive as those during the 1980s. The decade begun with widespread resistance against the black educational system, continued with the most sustained and determined black rebellion against white rule in South Africa's history, and ended with the release and unbanning of black resistance organisations and the release of imprisoned leaders. These events ushered in a new era of negotiations which led to free elections within a democratic South Africa in 1994.

This study focusses on the crucial role played by the UDF, through its mass-based approach, in the transformation of South African politics and its importance in the liberation struggle. More specifically, the mass-based methods, strategies and tactics employed by the UDF to mobilise people from across a diverse political spectrum which finally compelled the South African government to follow the road of accommodation rather than confrontation, will be focused upon. Walter Sisulu expressed the role played by the UDF concisely during 1991, prior to the disbandment of the UDF as follows :

"The formation of the UDF decisively turned the tide against the advances made by the P. W. Botha regime. ....The formation of the UDF captured the imagination of the masses and structures of the UDF literally mushroomed all over the country. ... The UDF struck great success in rendering the structures of apartheid unworkable. Moreover, it succeeded in placing the central question of political power on the agenda. ...Its achievements and its role must occupy a

prominent place in the annals of our heroic history. '6

This statement of Sisulu corresponds roughly to the focus of this study - the UDF's conduct, successes, failures and impact on the South African political arena will be evaluated. 6

The specific aim of this study is, therefore, to investigate :

The strategies and tactics related to mass action and resistance, as employed by the UDF from 1983 to 1990.

The UDF's origin, character and resistance base relationship and link to its mass-based approach.

The UDF's activities as a political front, which encompassed all sectors of civil society, which initiated a new type of political movement and phase of resistance.

The question of how the UDF fitted into a South African society in transition during the 1980s.

What contribution the UDF made to political change in South Africa by employing its mass-based approach.

The following supporting issues will also be addressed :

An in depth study of the concept of mass action, mass resistance and protest will be attempted.

The UDF's successful efforts towards exacting political change - in contrast with previous attempts by liberation organisations - will be highlighted and explained.

The question if the UDF was an ANC surrogate/front, will also indirectly be addressed.

The UDF's ability to continuously adapt its strategies and tactics to 7

counter new state regulations, and to adapt to an increasing and changing support base, foreign pressure and the increasing possibility of a negotiated settlement toward the end of the 1980s, will be evaluated.

The relationship between the state and the UDF, which forced both protagonists to adapt their approach towards resistance, will be investigated.

The UDF's achievement - to involve and to unite a diverse number of organisations, groups and people into a united front - will be investigated and evaluated.

The extent and impact of the UDF's mass-based campaigns and their impact on the economy of South Africa, will be evaluated.

The impact of the UDF on political change and its relative position in the history of black resistance in South Africa, will be debated.

The question if the UDF was the primary exponent of mass-based resistance and protest in the history of the liberation struggle in South Africa, will be investigated and a considered evaluation and conclusion submitted.

3. Background of the history of mass-based resistance

Mass-based protest and resistance form the underlying theme of this study. It is therefore necessary to investigate and describe the theoretical and strategic base on which mass-based protest and resistance is founded, as well as the dynamics of non- violent resistance and protest. Although, in South Africa, protest and resistance were more often than not violent, the basic principles employed by the liberation groups, including the UDF, can be traced to the classic strategies employed by Gandhi and 8 others.

In the South African context, although a non-violent approach was invariably followed by the liberation movements, violence was always lurking beneath the surface. Both the protesters and the authorities, turned to violence time and again. Because of the demographic realities of the South African population - a white minority group ruling a black majority - mass-based resistance and protest became the natural method of the oppressed black majority in resisting authority. Since the founding of the ANC in 1912, numerous spontaneous as well as organised protest actions were conducted along the lines of mass-based resistance. Such efforts towards resistance were, however, invariably reactive, restricted to a specific area or district with a limited number of protesters involved. The first national non-violent mass-based campaign being formally organised by a resistance group, constitutes the Defiance Campaign of the ANC during 1952. Although largely a failure, it did lay the groundwork for future protest action.

When the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) was founded in 1959, its president, Robert Sobukwe, realised from the start that the demographic reality in South Africa, namely a majority of blacks, were a prime tactical tool that could be used as leverage to counter the government's superior military and authoritative powers. Sobukwe was, however, a staunch supporter of non-violence and firmly insisted that the PAC's Pass Campaign of 1960 be run according to strict rules emphasising non-violence. The PAC even sent out flyers to its supporters instructing them on how to conduct themselves during the Pass Campaign. 6 Even then the reaction of the authorities could have been predicted. The fledgling effort at mass-based resistance was crushed and the ANC and PAC were banned, ultimately causing the liberation movements to turn to armed insurrection and a guerilla struggle against the South African government for the rest of the sixties and first half of the seventies.

This situation continued up to 1976 and the revolt in Soweto by schoolchildren which set the pattern for protest and resistance for the next 15 years. Although the revolt was suppressed by the government, it took increasingly more power and more repressive 9 means to keep order and the state intact. This situation escalated until the time was ripe for the formation of the UDF in 1983. By this time, the ruthless methods employed by the authorities caused such resentment, that resistance spread to include the broad spectrum of the South African society, aligning a true "democratic front" against the government and its apartheid policies.

Black political resistance in South Africa since the Second World War, can be divided into five historical phases, each of which broadly coincides with a different decade.

The first phase, the 1940s, was a time when a socio-ecological crisis in the countryside created increasing proletarianism and the demands of a wartime economy lead to an increase in the industrialisation process. These processes created a vast new urban political constituency. Political organisations had to come to terms with this changed situation and having to deal with problems such as the cost of food, the shortage of shelter and the lack of money. These new conditions forced the formation of a new, more militant political ideology and assertive nationalism in the black community.'

The founding of the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) captured this mood and in 1944, introduced a new approach to the black liberation struggle. These "young tigers" decided that the ANC had to amend its approach to resistance and protest if they wanted to pressurise the government into making concessions and reforms. The ANCYL drew up certain proposals suggesting a new modus operandi for the ANC. The ANC duly accepted these proposals which became known as the ANC's Programme of Action. The Programme of Action was in direct contrast to the ANC's previous reactive approach and called for a direct pro-active approach and to engage the state more directly. 8

The second phase introduced an era of mass political campaigning during the 1950's. This developed as the result of the incorporation by political organisations of the new social forces released in the previous decade. 9 The ANC and the South African Indian Congress (SAIC - not to be confused with the South African Indian Council, which was 10 a government created body) launched their Defiance Campaign on 26 June 1952, challenging the government's Pass Laws and discriminatory apartheid regulations. Acts of defiance continued throughout 1952 and thousands of people were arrested and received jail sentences. The campaign was generally conducted in a peaceful manner, until a series of riots broke out during October 1952. History is unclear on the causes for the riots, but the government used these riots as an excuse to suppress the resistance movements. This was enough to dampen the protesters' spirits and the campaign was called off. Although largely unsuccessful in forcing the government to amend its discriminatory practices, the Defiance Campaign's importance can be found in the fact that it showed the way forward for the black liberation organisations - that a mass-based approach to resistance and protest, will always be handled with difficulty by the minority white government. 10

The 1960s, the third phase, witnessed the transformation of black political protest from a loosely structured mass organisation to a clandestine insurgent revolutionary elite. This decade was characterised by the strict, suppressive measures by the state against internal political protest, including the banning of the major liberation organisations - the ANC and PAC - and the growth of the exiled black political organisations abroad."

The fourth phase, the 1970s, constituted a phase of internal resistance and an external guerilla campaign against the state, leading to a state of crisis for the South African government. A mixture of black political resistance and protest, coupled with an economic crisis, partially being caused by international sanctions against the country, appeared to set South Africa on the way to civil war. 12

This led to the fifth phase, the 1980s, where the pressures of resistance and protest, from domestic as well as international sources, forced the government to compromise and to modify the apartheid system, accommodating Indians and Coloureds into government by way of the tricameral parliamentary system. Far from abating black political protest, these reforms spurred on further resistance and protest. The massive resistance and protest initiated against the apartheid state, caused the concentration 11 and amalgamation of protest and resistance in South Africa and united into a single unit of political protest which ultimately manifested in the formation of the UDF in August 1983. 13

4. Structure of the thesis

The introductory chapter provides an overview of the aim and focus of the study, the structure of the thesis, the historiography, methodology, sources which impacted on the study and influenced its direction, as well as a short historical background, all pertaining to the study's main theme of mass-based resistance and protest.

Chapter one will provide the theoretical background that underlies mass-based resistance and protest, with special emphasis placed on theoretical concepts, such as models of resistance (Gandhian, Sharp - with a perspective on non-violence), the nature and character of protest and resistance, the nature and control of political power, as well as an overview of the methods of mass-based protest and resistance. The strategies employed by protest groups and history of mass-based protest and resistance will be discussed and explored as an introduction to the study, and to put the UDF's efforts into perspective.

In the next two chapters, elements of Seeking's approach will be incorporated, as the ideological character and resistance base of the UDF forms an integral part in understanding the approach and impact of the UDF. It will be indicated how the UDF developed from what was initially just a front for the coordination of joint and specific campaigns conducted by its affiliates into a more party-like set of structures with employees and activities independent of its supposed affiliates.

The main focus of the study is contained in chapters four and five, where the UDF's role as exponent of mass-based protest and resistance is investigated and its success as protest group is evaluated. The UDF's strategic and tactical approach towards mass protest and resistance will be addressed. The underlying theme that will continuously 12 serve as a focus point, is why the UDF's strategies and tactics were successful in contrast with previous unsuccessful attempts towards a mass-based approach by the liberation organisations. These questions will be addressed throughout the two chapters and summarised in the concluding chapter. External and internal issues (such as socio-economic and civic issues) which affected and shaped the trends of protest and resistance - and which changed throughout the 1980s as the UDF adapted its strategies and tactics in order to counter the state's efforts in suppressing resistance - will also be addressed. Broadly, the thoughts and viewpoints behind the UDF's strategies and its tactical expression in physical campaigns, will be discussed and evaluated.

In conclusion, all the main arguments will be consolidated and a final evaluation, encompassing all the main questions which were asked throughout the thesis, will be summarised.

5. Historiography

The history of the study of the black liberation struggles and apartheid has always been quite a contentious issue. Different schools of thought and ideological viewpoints, served to create different trends in South African liberation historiography. It differed from the viewpoints of the liberal historians of the 1920s, to a changed vision of history of the radicals of the 1980s. Included in this, one must take into account that "pro-state propagandists" also strove to present liberation history as part and parcel of a total onslaught waged by the Soviet Union and its surrogates against the then South African regime. The result was two contrasting styles and approaches, but which had the same result - a censured and biased style of history writing which became the norm. The researcher must be aware at all times of possible selective historical writing and commentary. Different authors' background, aims and approaches must therefore be continuously judged for impartiality. Two examples which can be mentioned to illustrate this, are the following : 13

■ Two books which were published during the same era - 1977 and 1976 respectively - addresses the same topic - the history of South Africa - differs markedly in approach and tone even though their structure is largely similar. The main difference between these books, T.R.H. Davenport's South Africa - A Modern History" and F.A. van Jaarsveld's Van Van Riebeeck tot Vorster, 1652 - 1974 15, is that Van Jaarsveld's book begins with the arrival of white settlers in South Africa while Davenport provides a more balanced approach in including an overview of the pre-1652 era and the history of the pre-settlement inhabitants of South Africa.

■ Political commentators and historians writing about P.W. Botha, prime minister and president of South Africa during most of the UDF years, also managed to produce widely differing commentaries on Botha and the impact and influence his tenure as head of state had on South Africa's political situation. Dirk and Johanna de Villiers' biography, PW 16, glorifies Botha and tries to explain the "context" of apartheid and link those opposing apartheid to the total onslaught being waged by the communist bloc against the country. In contrast, Brain Pottinger's book, The Imperial Presidency'', reviews the failure of Botha's reforms and the return to repression as the securocrats took control of the country.

These books are typical of the "liberal" versus the "conservative" approaches within the established historical milieu in South Africa and does not even take into account the major differences between white and black historians.

The history of Black protest politics in South Africa has seen a flood of publications and studies in recent years. Many historical works have been written by participants in the Black political struggle on aspects of the struggle, and many of these date from the 1960s and 1970s. Examples of these studies are : Albert Luthuli's autobiography Let My People Go18, and the ANC's African National Congress. South Africa. A Short 14

History.' These publications have the usual shortcomings associated with material of this nature where history is being used as a political weapon in the interests of black South Africans. Publications of this nature are, however, useful sources as they describe the thoughts and perceptions of those individuals and organisations who actively helped to shape the past stages of protest and resistance on which the UDF ultimately was formed. 26

Several acclaimed studies have appeared tracing the history of Black political protest in South Africa. The five-volume From Protest to Challenge : A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964 and From Protest to Challenge : A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1979 by Karis & Gerhart21 , consisting of documents and supporting text, is of a high standard. More recent studies are Black Politics in South Africa since 1945 by Tom Lodge 22, Jackie Grobler's A Decisive Clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-197623 and Benjamin Pogrund's Sobukwe 24, a study on Robert Sobukwe and the origin and early history of the Pan Africanist Congress.

In recent years, black scholars themselves have contributed a number of publications on this era of South African history. These authors were, however, almost without exception, themselves involved in the protest movement. Their approach was also invariably, a justification for the violent overthrow of white supremacy. Examples of these works are Mokgethi Motlhabi's The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid. A Social-Ethical Analysis 25, and The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa, by Bernard Magubane26, in which a Marxist model was used to analyse the formation of society in South Africa. 27

The problem for the student of contempory history is that few, if any, studies of black resistance in the 1980s, have been published. There are a variety of reasons for this. During the 1980s, the government's repressive security laws, the banning of organisations, censorship and the seizing of organisations' documents, were counterproductive towards contemporary history studies on this topic. Regarding the 15

UDF, Jeremy Seekings's "History of the UDF" (still to be published), constitutes one of the very first efforts in this regard. After the unbannings in 1990, the constitutional process also largely dominated studies up to multi-party elections in 1994. It can be expected that the 1980s, largely neglected by historians up to now, will be more intensely studied in the next few years because the major happenings during the 1980s, influenced the political process in South Africa during the 1990s.

With regard to the topic of mass-based protest and resistance, few works have been published concentrating on this specific aspect of Black political resistance in South Africa itself. Leo Kuper's Passive Resistance in South Africa 28 and The Purple shall Govern. A South African A to Z of Non-violent Action by Dene Smuts and Shauna Westcott29, serve as examples in this regard. The South African Institute of Race Relations also published several studies on mass-based political protest which were compiled in their Forum on Mass Mobilisation 39 Some papers were also published by historians, for example Teoretiese, Historiese en Politieke Aspekte van Protesoptogte in Suid-Afrika by J.A. Du Pisani, et a/. 31

The theory and dynamics of mass-based protest and resistance comes to the fore in several publications, although mainly secondary to the broad historical spectrum. Few authors studied the concepts of mass-based protest exclusively. The more general works in this regard include Norman Cantor's The Age of Protest. Dissent and Rebellion in the Twentieth Century32 while the most prominent authors investigating mass-based and non-violent action, include Gene Sharp's exhaustive three-part study The Politics of Non-violent Action. Part One - Power and Struggle, Part Two - The methods of Non-violent Action, Part Three - The Dynamics of Non-violent Action 33 as well as Social Power and Political Freedom 34, Civilian Based Defence35, and Richard Gregg's The Power of Nonviolence. 36 Several pamphlets and papers were also distributed by organisations like the War Resisters International's "Manifesto for Non- violent Revolution"' and Theodore W.Olsen and Lynn Shivers' "Training for Non- violent Action".38 16

The leading contemporary historian on the UDF, is Jeremy Seekings of the University of Cape Town's Sociology (Social Sciences) Department. He has written several papers on specific aspects regarding the UDF since the 1980's, concentrating especially on the UDF's organisational make-up. His papers included "What was the United Democratic Front?", "The United Democratic Front and the Changing Politics of Opposition in Natal, 1983-1985"," 'Trailing Behind the Masses' : The United Democratic Front and Township Politics in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Region, 1983-84", "The United Democratic Front in Cape Town, 1983-1986", "Shaping Collective Identities: The Rise and Decline of Rights-based Discourses in the United Democratic Front, 1983- 1985", "The UDF in the Eastern Cape and Border Regions, 1983-1985" and "Researching the History of the United Democratic Front". 39

Senior UDF leaders decided at the last meeting of the NEC, before the UDF disbanded on 4 March 1991, to commission an independent and critical history of the UDF. Seekings was commissioned by the UDF leaders and Ravan Press to conduct the research49 and to write the history of the UDF. 41 Although Seekings admitted that he was an "outsider", writing the UDF's history in a detached manner without the familiarity of an "insider", he believed that was what the NEC wanted in an effort to have a critically acclaimed history of the UDF written. One can understand this viewpoint, remembering the wide differences of opinions, ideologies and characters which constituted the UDF but remained united despite these differences. If any members of the UDF itself was to write the history of the UDF, a specific ideology/viewpoint would have been dominant. Seekings, however, managed to provide valuable insight of the UDF, of the different sectors and regions, and his research has proved invaluable - for this study - in terms of insight, material and an overview of the available sources.

A search into research catalogues turned up only three definitive studies done on the UDF, and none from an historical point of view. None of these studies had the aim of positioning the UDF as an agent of influence with regard to change in South Africa, nor as the exponent of mass protest and resistance during the 1980s. The three studies mentioned, include '''n Strategiese en taktiese ontleding van die UDF" by Heidie 17

Hudson42, "Mobilisation, contention for power and repression: the UDF, violence and the state : 1983 -1990" by Mark Donaldson 43 and sun Polisiekundige ontleding van die UDF" by Stanley Schutte."

These three studies have clearly been written from within the old paradigm of South African government-orientated propaganda, which has been spouted for decades. This places the activities of the liberation movements within a "total onslaught"-approach being waged by the communist forces against South Africa. Hudson and Schutte, describe the UDF as a "revolutionary movement" throughout their work. They, however, mean revolutionary in the sense of overthrowing the South African government, rather than revolutionary as in an entity helping to bring about change and renewal, a viewpoint I proclaim. Donaldson's work is a more balanced research effort. He concentrates on the theories on political conflict and violence, the character of violence and uses the UDF as a case study to illustrate his theories. These type of research efforts, complicated contemporary research into the UDF's ideological character. The whole discussion and argument regarding the UDF's ideological character, had to be re-evaluated, because, up to this point, basically two sources of information have been used by commentators and academics - both of which were tainted to an extent. These sources are, on the one side, the propaganda produced by the state and "legalised" by its supporters (media, government propaganda services like the security services and the Bureau of Information) in which the UDF was portrayed as part of a communist- inspired total onslaught bent on overthrowing the government. Unfortunately these ideas were given credence by universities and scholars, with two of the previous studies being done on the UDF, falling into this category.

Both Hudson and Schutte, followed this approach. 45 Hudson accuses the UDF of duplicity by camouflaging its communist ideology and motives in order to gain the support of the masses:* She applies Leaky's phased revolutionary model to the UDF's freedom struggle in order to prove that the UDF had a revolutionary ideology. She equates the masses' natural desire to better their socio-economic and material position (what the UDF strove to obtain) to the communist ideology, only because they are 18 based on the same broad principles. Hudson further quotes several UDF spokespersons as propagating revolution, but fails to realise that in a struggle such as was waged between the UDF and the South African State, propaganda and counter- propaganda, abounded. Hudson also fails to take into account that the broad spectrum of organisations affiliated within the UDF led to diverse opinions and statements at different times. 47 Of course there would have been some would-be revolutionary within such a collection, but to hang a revolutionary communist ideology on the UDF on such flimsy evidence, was typical of the type of establishment research done before 1994. Schutte is in the same class as Hudson. As a member of the SAP, he used his access to police dockets to prove his case - that the UDF was a revolutionary organisation which "serves as a symbiosis of the revolutionary ideology and realities of the South African situation". 48

On the other hand, articles and comments from prominent UDF activists and leaders, also paint a somewhat contrasting picture. All these persons spoke from a certain perspective which had to be analysed and balanced to fit into the broad picture of the UDF. Their views were published in various UDF newspapers, pamphlets, flyers and leaflets and distributed widely among their supporters. 49

Since the three studies were written and the UDF was disbanded, much has changed in South Africa. The South African governments' decades-long propaganda campaign has been exposed as a fallacy and a lie, putting a totally different reality of the years of black resistance to apartheid. Against this background, this study has originated and attempts to deliver a more viable, balanced view of the UDF years. Contrasting viewpoints have been evaluated and an attempt has been made to portray the "true" UDF, free from state propaganda and the narrow-minded viewpoints of certain activists. This thesis fill the gap of re-evaluating these theses and espousing a new viewpoint. 19

6. Sources

6.1. General sources

Widely differing sources of information have been used in compiling this study. There must also be differentiation between theoretical sources - those pertaining to the theory of mass action, protest and resistance - and historical sources to place the UDF-era into a historical perspective.

With regard to the theoretical background to mass protest and resistance, heavy emphasis was placed on prominent thinkers and philosophers of non-violent action, of which mass-based action forms an integral part. The works of Gandhi, Sharp and Coyle were prominent in the compilation of Chapter One where the concept of mass action is discussed and described. Several widely differing publications, such as the material from the War Resisters' Internationa1 50, research material of the South African Institute for Race Relations51 and the Centre for Intergroup Studies52, and earlier books such as the one by Kuper, were also used to investigate mass-based action as a historical phenomenon.

A large number of studies have been done on different aspects of the black liberation struggle in South Africa. For this study, the history of black resistance and protest before the formation of the UDF, is used mainly as background information, to place certain actions by the UDF into perspective and to illustrate the state of the South African nation and economy in the period leading up to the formation of the UDF. Sources like the documentary collection with supporting text - the five-volume documentary collection by Karis and Carter (From Protest to Challenge : Documents of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1979), as well as the Karis-Carter and Wallerstein Collections at UNISA Archive, were inter alia used as well as a wide variety of other books. 20

6.2. Primary documents

When researching modern and contemporary South African struggle history, obtaining reliable and original sources is somewhat of a problem (both primary as well as secondary sources were used to compile chapters two through to five). Where specific events were discussed, for example UDF campaigns and meetings, original material, press reports and UDF documents were used as far as possible. The "UDF Collection" at the University of the Witwatersrand's (WITS) Historical Papers archive, compiled by Tom Lodge, served as the primary source on UDF documentation while the Mayibuye Collection at the University of Cape Town, were used to a lesser extent, mainly by accessing information compiled by the Mayibuye Centre and stored on CD-Rom discs. Several UDF leaders were involved in court cases and these original transcripts are available and contain valuable information regarding the UDF's organisational set-up, leadership and activities, for example the "Delmas Treason Trial Collection", which is also at WITS.

6.3. Other sources

Other sources used during research, included :

Historical publications Various publications by prominent historians who specialises in Black politics in South Africa, were used. These include Lodge and Nasson, Bennett and Quin, Grobler, Cobbett and Cohen, and so on. Publications such as the South African Review53 also proved to be valuable sources. A large variety of other secondary sources which specialised on various individual themes, such as the youth, were also employed during the research effort.

Contemporary media reports Freely available, although subject to censorship and propagandistic viewpoints from both the state and the liberation movements' side. 21

Interviews The candidate himself also had access to several former UDF activists and ANC members and interviews were conducted with them while use was also made of interviews found within the "UDF Collection".

Official/Contemporary evaluations Access was also gained to official (confidential) evaluations on the UDF. Official secrecy classification, however, causes some problems with regard to the use of such documents and some had to be disregarded.

Magazines, pamphlets and other struggle related material Use was extensively made of sources such as magazine articles from publications such as Sechaba, Mayibuye, New Era, Work in Progress, Umsebenzi, ANC News Briefing, SA Labour Bulletin, Indicator, and grassroots newspapers.

Own collection I managed to compile a large collection of struggle related documents, pamphlets and related information which served as additional sources of information. This include publications by the ANC, SACP. COSATU, SACBC, UN, etc.

Other Other sources of information included video's, court transcripts, commission reports and other related documents. 22

References : Introduction

W. Cobbett and R. Cohen : Popular Struggles in South Africa, p. 90.

J. Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front?", p. 1.

Loosely based on papers of J. Seekings : J. Seekings : "Researching the History of the United Democratic Front", p. 1. J. Seekings : "Trailing Behind the Masses' : The United Democratic Front and Township Politics in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Region, 1983-84", pp. 1-2. J. Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front?", p. 1. J. Seekings : "Shaping Collective Identities : The Rise and the Decline of Rights- based Discourses in the United Democratic Front, 1983-1985", p. 1.

J. Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front?", p. 28.

UDF : "Walter Sisulu, address to the UDF's National General Council", Kwandebele, 1 March 1991.

T. Karis and G.M. Carter (Eds.) : Calling the Nation! No Bail! No Defence! No Fine!!! Flyer announcing the launching of the anti-pass campaign on 21 March, issued by R.M. Sobukwe, [n.d.], From Protest to Challenge III, p. 564.

T. Lodge : Black politics in South Africa since 1945, p. viii.

Unisa archive : Carter-Karis Collection, Reel 2B, 2: DA16 : 12/2, p. 1 : "Basic Policy of the Congress Youth League", Nd.

Lodge : Black politics, p. viii.

L. Kuper : Passive Resistance in South Africa, pp. 122 - 145.

Lodge : Black politics, p. viii.

Ibid., p. viii.

J. Grobler : A Decisive Clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976, pp. 175 - 176.

T.R.H. Davenport : South Africa - A Modern History. Southern Book Publishers: Johannesburg, 1977.

F.A. van Jaarsveld : Van Van Riebeeck tot Vorster, 1652 - 1974. Perskor : Johannesburg, 1976.

Dirk and Johanna de Villiers : PW. Tafelberg : Kaapstad, 1984. 23

Brain Pottinger : The Imperial Presidency. P.W. Botha, the first 10 years. Southern Book Publishers : Johannesburg, 1988.

A. Luthuli : Let My People Go. An Autobiography. Glasgow : Fontana Books, tenth impression, 1978.

ANC Publication : African National Congress. South Africa. A Short History, London : Publicity and Information Bureau, African National Congress, c1969.

Grobler : A Decisive Clash?, pp. 2-3.

T.G. Karis and G.M. Carter (Eds.) : From Protest to Challenge. A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1882-1964. Volumes 1-4. Stanford : Hoover Institution Press, 1973, 1977, 1977, 1978, and T.G. Karis and G. Gerhart (Eds.) : From Protest to Challenge. A Documentary History of African Politics in South Africa, 1964-1979. Volume 5. Unisa Press : Pretoria, 1997.

T. Lodge : Black Politics in South Africa since 1945. Raven Press : Johannesburg, 1983.

J. Grobler : A Decisive Clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976. Acacia Books : Pretoria, 1988.

B. Pogrund : Sobukwe and Apartheid. Jonathan Ball Publishers : Johannesburg, 1990.

M. Motlhabi : The Theory and Practice of Black Resistance to Apartheid. A Social-Ethical Analysis. Skotaville Publishers : Johannesburg, 1986.

B. M. Magubane : The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa. Monthly Review Press : New York and London, 1979.

Grobler : A Decisive Clash?, pp. 3-4.

L. Kuper : Passive Resistance in South Africa. Yale University Press : New Haven, 1957.

D. Smuts and S. Westcott (Eds.) : The Purple shall Govern. A South African A to Z of Non-violent Action. Oxford University Press : Cape Town, 1991.

A. Jeffrey (Ed.) : Forum on Mass Mobilisation. South African Institute of Race Relations : Johannesburg, 1991.

J.A. Du Pisani, M. Broodryk and P. W. Coetzer : "Teoretiese, Historiese en Politieke Aspekte van Protesoptogte in Suid-Afrika" in Journal for Contemporary History, Volume 15, Number 3, December 1990.

N. F. Cantor : The Age of Protest. Dissent and Rebellion in the Twentieth Century. Compton Printing : London and Aylesbury, 1969. 24

G. Sharp : The Politics of Non-violent Action. Part One - Power and Struggle, Part Two - The methods of Non-violent Action, Part Three - The Dynamics of Non-violent Action. Porter Sargent Publishers : Boston, 1973.

G. Sharp : Social Power and Political Freedom. Porter Sargent Publishers : Boston, 1980.

G. Sharp : Civilian Based Defence. A Post-Military Weapons System. Princeton University Press : Princeton and New Jersey, 1990.

R. Gregg : The Power of Nonviolence. Schoken Books : New York, 1971.

"Manifesto for Non-violent Revolution". War Resisters' International, 14th Triennial Conference, Sheffield, England, 22-27 July 1972.

T. W.Olsen and L. Shivers : "Training for Non-violent Action". War Resisters' Inbternational, 2nd International Seminar on Non-violent Training, Westmoreland, England, 27 June - 2 July 1970.

J. Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front". Paper presented at the Southern Africa Research Programme seminar, Yale University, 23 March 1994. J. Seekings : "The United Democratic Front and the Changing Politics of Opposition in Natal, 1983-1985". Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, Nd. J. Seekings : "Trailing Behind the Masses' : The United Democratic Front and Township Politics in the Pretoria-Witwatersrand-Vaal Region, 1983-84". Journal of Southern African Studies, Volume 18, Number 1, March 1991. J. Seekings : "The United Democratic Front in Cape Town, 1983-1986". Paper presented at the Africa Seminar, University of Cape Town, 7 October 1992. J. Seekings : "Shaping Collective Identities: The Rise and Decline of Rights- based Discourses in the United Democratic Front, 1983-1985". Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, Nd. J. Seekings : 'The UDF in the Eastern Cape and Border Regions, 1983-1985". Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town, Nd. J. Seekings : "Researching the History of the United Democratic Front". Sociology Department, University of Cape Town, March 1995.

All the UDF's documents were donated to the University of the Witwatersrand's Historical Papers archive, while the Mayibuye Centre at the University of Cape Town, also had some documentation available. Mayibuye Centre, however, concentrates more on older struggle documents which they have catalogued on CD-Rom.

Apartheid & the History of the Struggle for Freedom in South Africa. Mayibuye Centre, University of the Western Cape, Mayibuye CD-ROM Publications, Cape Town, 1994. 25

H. Hudson : "'n Strategiese en taktiese ontleding van die UDF". D. Phil., Political Sciences Department, University of the Orange Free State, 1991.

M. Donaldson : "Mobilisation, contention for power and repression: the UDF, violence and the state : 1983 - 1990". M.A., Political Sciences Department, University of Port Elizabeth, 1993.

S. Schutte : 'un Polisiekundige ontleding van die UDF". D. Litt et Phil, Criminology Department, University of South Africa, 1988.

Hudson : "Strategiese en Taktiese ontleding van die UDF". Schutte : "Polisiekundige ontleding van die UDF".

Hudson : "Strategiese en Taktiese ontleding van die UDF", p. 45.

Ibid., p. 46.

Schutte : "Polisiekundige ontleding van die UDF", p. vi.

See chapter two for a discussion on the various characteristics of the UDF - both real and imagined by individuals within the Front, and Sources for an exhaustive list of all the various UDF publications.

"Manifesto for Nonviolent Revolution".

Jeffery : Forum on Mass Mobilisation.

R. Winkler, H.W. van der Merwe and 0. Geldenhuys : An Overview of Peace Initiatives. Movements and Organisations in South Africa. CAPS Series Number 4, Centre for Intergroup Studies, August 1987.

South African Review 1-3. Ravan Press : Johannesburg, 1984, 1985, 1986. G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 4-6. Ravan Press : Johannesburg, 1987, 1989, 1991. 26

CHAPTER 1

THE CONCEPT OF MASS-BASED PROTEST AND RESISTANCE

1. Introduction

Mass-based protest and resistance is closely linked with the concept of non-violence where the great thinkers and innovators of non-violent protest in the past, invariably linked it with a mass-based approach in order to exert maximum pressure on their opponents. Although protest and resistance in South Africa largely followed the strategies and tactics of the leading figures linked to non-violence, violence invariably became interwoven with the struggle during the resistance era in South Africa. The UDF, however, used the strategies and tactics developed by scholars of non-violence in their mass-based approach to protest and resistance. This resulted in protest and resistance on a scope never before achieved in South Africa's struggle history. For these reasons, this chapter will focus on the dynamics of mass-based protest and resistance. The methods used by the UDF will also be addressed in detail as the UDF's strategies and tactics, described in chapters four and five, were based on classic mass- based approaches and techniques to resistance. This formed the basis of the UDF's successes throughout the 1980s.

The UDF's use of mass protest and resistance was based on a long history of similar type of protest action employed by oppressed groups worldwide. For example, in the mid-nineteenth century, passive, non-violent protest action was employed by Hungarians to protest against the Emporer Franz Josef s attempts to subordinate Hungary to Austrian rule. More recently, the famous non-violent campaigns waged in India early in this century against the British and the American civil rights campaign during the 1960s, inspired UDF's activists.' The original concept of mass-based protest and resistance was however, based on non-violent action. Although the UDF was largely unable to stay within the parameters of non-violence - in many cases the UDF and its affiliates were forced to react to the South African security forces' brutality and 27 violence - its broad strategies and campaign tactics were based by and large on the historical, classic methods used by the foremost exponents of non-violent, mass-based protest.

The value of non-violent action as a powerful tool for social and political change has been recorded as far back as ancient Rome. The principle of non-violent action, which implicitly includes mass resistance and protest, was applied independently by numerous seers and courageous people in many different countries. Among them were Lao-tzu, Buddha, the Jain Tirthankaras, Jesus, St. Francis of Assissi, George Fox, Henry David Thoreau, Leo Tolstoy and others. 2

The outstanding person in modern times, who worked out the theory of non-violence and applied it to mass movements in an organised fashion, was Mohandas Gandhi. He proved the validity of the methods for protest he conceived, developed and refined, and successfully applied during various campaigns and in difficult situations. 3

It was in South Africa that Gandhi first developed his philosophy of passive resistance, based on non-violent mass protest. The Indian minority in South Africa, under his leadership, initiated the use of non-violent mass action against the authorities between 1906 and 1914. They managed to achieve great improvements in their day-to-day existence through these protests. Non-violent mass action against discrimination and segregation was, however, not used again on a comparable scale in South Africa until 1946.4 These methods were also used by the ANC in the early years of its struggle, but invariably with little success. Passive resistance ceased as a method of struggle in South Africa from the beginning of the First World War - when Gandhi returned to India - until the end of the Second World War. Up till then, passive resistance was thought to be an Indian phenomenon and when the South African Indians revived passive resistance to protest against the so-called "Ghetto Acts" of 1946, it served to accentuate this line of thought.

Nelson Mandela paid special homage to Martin Luther King and Gandhi during his 28 tours of the USA and India in 1990 and acknowledged the major role their political philosophy - non-violence, which saw a remarkable resurgence in South Africa during the 1980s - played in changing South Africa.

Non-violent mass action was, however, sporadic with long periods of inaction. These periods of inaction did not stem from a strategic retreat by the liberation movements, but rather from their inherent weaknesses. The extra-parliamentary opposition in South Africa realised that this situation had to be reversed in order to make people and the political situation in the country conducive to effective protest. The main task was to strengthen the resolve of the people. Their determination and will to abolish apartheid had to be increased. Also, their organisational strength and ability to act spontaneously and in massive numbers had to be improved. Most importantly, their willingness to persist in defiance and resistance, despite repression, had to be strengthened. 5 The UDF realised early on that certain factors which could help strengthen the capacity of the people to resist, had to be implemented before a viable process of resistance and protest could be launched. People had to be mobilised in their masses and their confidence raised to a level where mass-based resistance and protest became almost second nature to them. These factors included :

Increased self-respect, which led to greater confidence, an interest in the UDF's activities and ultimately a willingness to form part of mass-based protest initiatives.

Strengthening of institutions and the capacity to act in solidarity. The UDF concentrated on first building their support base through its affiliates. Through these structures the ability to mobilise mass support for their mass-based protest initiatives, came much more easily than those of their earlier predecessors.

Dissemination of knowledge on the use of non-violent struggle and how to organise for group action. The UDF trained activists - especially youths 29

- to interact with the masses, educating supporters and mobilising this support for various actions of resistance and protest.

Awareness of the strategies and tactics used in struggles in other parts of the world. Activists formed discussion groups on local level where all kinds of debates were conducted. Although the contents were adapted to their specific audiences, the underlying aim was to educate people and to teach them the rudiments of resistance politics. 6

People must lead by example in order to inspire others to also resist. The UDF realised this and managed to present a wide and varied leadership to the masses.'

An imaginative leadership must be available (trained activists) to take the lead during protest situations. This the UDF also managed to do, also having depth in their leadership in contrast with previous eras. This enabled the UDF to continue with its resistance and protest in the face of widespread detention of their leadership.

New ideas regarding protest and resistance had to be implemented. New strategies and tactics were implemented throughout the 1980s. 8

People must be ready to seize the initiative during unplanned, spontaneous protest actions. Unfortunately, this invariably led to violence, but the UDF usually managed to manipulate such situations to their own advantage.

Protest and resistance does not have to be restricted to a few large campaigns - people must be ready to grasp any small protest initiative in order to increase the grassroots confidence in their capacity to resist. A large number of limited objectives won would increase morale and 30

prepare the way for larger initiatives. That is why the UDF launched a large variety of grassroots-based protest actions which, in time, built up a momentum of its own which the UDF could then incorporate into its national campaigns. 9

In his book, The power of non-violence, Richard Gregg asked the question - "How is mass non-violence possible?". He goes on to explain how non-violent resistance can be employed in order to protest against unjustness and names examples of successes which protestors achieved against the authorities. He also stressed that for every success, there were a dozen failures. 10 In the case of South Africa, although the concepts of non-violent resistance were known, mass-based protest action was, however, for the most part violent rather than non-violent. The reasons for this are numerous and will be addressed at a later stage in the thesis. Suffice to say, the UDF employed many of the strategies and tactics developed by authors like Gregg and Sharp, and built on a legacy of mass-based resistance and protest started at the beginning of the century by Gandhi and followed by the ANC and PAC during the 1950s to the 1980s.

2. Defining non-violent mass-based protest

Defining non-violent mass-based protest is not a simple exercise. Although the concept appears straightforward - protest against unjustness through non-violent, and if possible, mass-based means, various theories and definitions are in general use and academics and researchers, tend to accentuate and follow a specific line of argument of their choosing. In general, there are a series of definitions available, which together and in different combinations, might suffice to define non-violent mass-based protest. It must also be kept in mind that non-violent mass-based protest differs in different countries where local dynamics tend to dominate.

Different forms and types of non-violent mass-based protest can therefore be identified, which, individually or in combination with one another, over time, formed the basis of 31 non-violent mass-based protest in South Africa during the UDF years.

Forms of non-violent mass-based protest include indirect methods, such as protesting through the media. This include the spreading of the message of protest through the distribution of various mediums. In short, a propaganda approach. Also, Moral and physical support from external bodies which include moral support, funding, publicity, etc. More direct methods are also employed, such as hysical protest action, with the aim to keep it non-violent and mass-based."

Various types of non-violent mass-based protest are listed, such as non-resistance, passive resistance, moral resistance, active reconciliation, peaceful resistance, anti- authoritarian resistance, selective non-violence and non-violent direct social action. General terms employed further include pacifism, non-violence, non-violent action, non- violent protest, non-violent resistance, non-violent intervention, non-cooperation, civil disobedience, Satyagraha, non-violent revolution and non-violent defence. 12

For the purposes of this study, non-violent mass-based protest therefore refers to an initiative to protest against an opressive government, through a strategy, and a variety of tactics, based on non-violent mass-action.

Although the UDF's campaigns invariably degenrated into violence, this was usually caused by external parties. As far as could be ascertained, the UDF never planned aviolent campaign.

3. Non-violent protest action

"Some conflicts do not yield to compromise and can be resolved only through struggle. X13

The liberation groups(i.e. both the ANC and the PAC) realised this after the bannings of following the Sharpeville incident in 1960. Apartheid's rulers were clearly not 32 susceptible to a compromise and other means had to be employed to ensure freedom for the oppressed in South Africa. Violence was, however, not the only effective means of action in a conflict situation and although the black liberation groups turned to armed insurrection during the 1960s to achieve their goals, they soon realised that violence alone would not achieve that. They almost "naturally" came to follow the doctrines of a very different kind of struggle, namely mass-based, non-violent action."

Non-violent action is a generic term covering dozens of specific methods of protest, non-cooperation and intervention, in all of which the actionists conduct the conflict by doing or refusing to do certain things without resorting to physical violence. Non- violence is however not passive, it is an action that is non-violent. Conflict is not avoided, conflict is only attempted without violence. 15 The UDF largely tried to run its campaign in a non-violent manner, but circumstances and a violent state reaction, did not always make this possible.

3.1. The nature and characteristics of non-violent protest action

The nature of the political struggle in South Africa, largely centered on black resistance against white political power. Blacks were politically, socially and economically marginalised and found it extremely difficult to muster an effective opposition against the state without access to these three crucial aspects of society. This situation changed over time as blacks were slowly empowered within a changing South Africa. By the 1980s, black trade unions were growing, black economic power had increased significantly - to the point where a black boycott of businesses really hurt local economics - while socially, a higher education level than ever before had been reached. People were more complete individuals and better able to oppose the state more forcefully.

Therefore, as stated by Gene Sharp (one of the foremost thinkers on the topic of non- violent protest), the basis of the initial lack of success by the groups opposing the apartheid government, and the government's successes in repressing protest, was 33 because :

"...power is inherent in practically all social and political relationships and that its it 16 control is the basic problem in political theory.

It was therefore a question of the balance of power. Any group able to manipulate or enforce power, has the ability to instil its will on another group. This had been the situation in South Africa, especially since the Second World War. Prior to this period, black liberation groups had little influence, a small active support base and virtually no funds while the process of urbanisation was only just starting to change the equation to where sufficient concentrations of blacks occurred to make the concept of mass- based resistance and protest viable for the first time. 17 Initially the state was able to control its black population through its power, but by the 1980s, this situation started to change in favour of the black majority through the growth of socio-economic and political power.

3.2. Characteristics of protest

Social and political behaviour is not simply violent or non-violent. Conflict situations and people's response can be divided into action and inaction rather than violence or the lack of violence. Non-violence also does not imply passivity, submission or cowardice, but activity, challenge and struggle. Action ranges from peaceful institutional procedures backed by a threat of repressive measures to violence and destruction. The basic dichotomy of social and political behaviour is between action and inaction, rather than between violence and non-violence.' Non-violent action is a means of combat, as is war. Certain forms of it may be regarded as efforts to persuade by action, others contain elements of coercion. The UDF's boycott of white businesses fall into this category, for example. Another characteristic of non-violent action is that it is usually extra-constitutional and opposes the institutional procedures of the state and is traditionally mass-based.19 34

Throughout the twentieth century, instances of protest and resistance came to exhibit similar characteristics. Although social conditions and the unpredictable personal abilities of protest leaders and of the prevailing establishments can never be discounted, several common denominators regarding the nature and characteristics of protest, can however be identified :

Protest per se is neither good nor bad. It represents a common and

generally effective means of achieving societal change. In the case

of the UDF, it meant the destruction of apartheid and the creation of

a non-racial democracy.

Protest is a vehicle of both the Left and the Right - the virtues of any

particular protest movement should be judged according to who are

doing the protesting and what their aims are. Interestingly, the UDF's

resistance and protest during the 1980s against the tricameral

system, was mirrored by the rightwing in South Africa, albeit for

different reasons.

Protest movements offer release from repression and act as a vehicle

for the disenchanted individuals on grassroots level. The UDF

provided the vehicle for the thousands of grassroots-based

organisations active during the 1980s to affiliate themselves to the

UDF.

At its most intense, protest can fully consume the life of participants

- the struggle becomes a way of life, superceding idealistic aims and

goals, and even basic morals sometimes. The violent youths in the

townships, whose actions became largely uncontrollable by the UDF

during the late-1980s, might be classified as such.

Two broad types of protest have been identified. Generalised 35 intellectual dissent on the one hand and organised confrontation on the other. One also invariably springs from the other. An opposing ideology directly inspire the confrontation movement. The increased involvement of white liberals in the UDF's protest initiatives, served to balance street politics with a more sophisticated resistance effort.

Although the majority of protest actions of the twentieth century professed their aim as the liberation of the working class and the amelioration of their state of existence, protest movements have rarely been led by working class leaders. Protest is invariably a middle class phenomenon, backed by the musciepower of the masses. The UDF changed this rule to an extent with the influx of a large number of trade union leaders who played a leading part in various UDF structures and initiatives.

All protest movements center on moral issues as a consequence of its middle class domination. In this instance, the antipathy to apartheid and its immoral history, largely overrode all other considerations.

The middle class character of protest leadership and the primary role of moral issues tend to stir a sense of guilt in the establishment. Without this guilt factor present in those that hold power, protest movements could rarely succeed. In South Africa, the guilt factor could rather be ascribed to whites than to a specific class group. The introduction of growing numbers of white supporters, provided the

UDF with additional scope and resources.

All major protest movements of the twentieth century have relied on non-violent force. This is also true with relation to the UDF's activities - its mass-based strategies were aimed at forcing change on 36

the South African government.

Protest movements and their opponents have invariably demonised each other as part of a propaganda war. The UDF was portrayed as part of a "demonic communist total onslaught" against the South African State while the immorality of apartheid was declared a "crime

against humanity".

The rising effectiveness of protest movements have run parallel with the steady improvement of mass communication. This was especially true for the UDF. Its ability to communicate with a mass audience through the media and other publications, formed part of the basic

reason for the UDF's successes.

Protest requires enormous energy and sacrifice. That is why the majority of protesters are under thirty. The youth invariably plays a prominent role in protest movements as seen by the prominence of the UDF's youth affiliates in its various initiatives.

Protest begets protest. As one group is successful, it will inspire and encourage others to join in. Througout the 1980s, the UDF clearly illustrated a capacity for growth, culminating in the massive

campaigns of rolling mass-action of the late 1980s. 2°

Protest groups, in order to have any success, have to be able to exert some measure of pressure on their target - a government for example. While Western theorists and propagandists of Western democratic ideas pay lip service to the role of the masses, socialist, Communist and social revolutionary writers seem inclined to view the masses, under appropriate leadership, as quite capable of staging an effective assault on established rule. Attempts to organise mass action are therefore legion, but so are unsuccessful uprisings.21 37

In Africa, the reality is that no combination of segments of the masses can expect to overcome even a modest show of force by the established rulers. Even where mass protest action was seemingly successful, it was on the whole not difficult for the authorities to seek out and neutralise, the leaders of such actions. 22 This was also true for South Africa and of the UDF's actions up until 1989. At that point, other factors (like sanctions and a change of leadership within government), combined with the UDF's rolling mass action campaign, effectively caused the government to lose the moral and psychological determination to control the protest. From that moment on, when the government lost the will to use its full physical military power against its opponents, the extra-parliamentary groups have triumphed, although another five years were to pass before a new society was finally created.

3.3. The roots of political power

Protest and resistance had a long history in South Africa, but up to the years of the UDF, little success was achieved by the liberation movements. The question have been asked why this so? The question may partly be answered by the realities of political power, which is an interaction of state versus non-state power.

a. State power

Authority - The extent and intensity of the state's power. 23 After 1948, Apartheid laws gave the South African state the authority to enact supressive laws which were largely, if not accepted by the majority of people, suffered in silent rejection.

Skills and knowledge - A ruler's power is also affected by the skills, knowledge and

abilities of his supporters and opponents. 24 The NP government's process of empowerment included the upliftment of white people's skills and knowledge while ensuring that the black opposition did not receive the skills and knowledge which might have enabled them to challenge the minority group. By the 1980s, this equation had 38

changed with a large pool of educated black leaders available to lead the UDF's mass- based resistance and protest initiatives.

Material resources - The degree towards which the ruler controls property, natural resources, financial resources, the economic system, means of communication and transportation helps to determine the limits of his power. 25 Added to this, the NP used methods which regulated ownership of the land (the Land Acts of 1913), squatting, made use of forced removals, education, media control, public transport, taxis. The UDF addressed all these issues through its campaigns, attempting to change the past realities by creating alternatives to state-owned/run institutions and to empower their supporters to an extent.

Sanctions - The final source of a ruler's power is the type and extent of sanctions at his disposal - an enforcement of obedience. 26 The South African government employed a wide variety of repressive measures in order to keep power at all costs. These measures included arrests, detentions, state of emergencies, bannings, and even the killing of leading activists.

Fear of sanctions - Fear is widely acknowledged as a source of obedience. South Africa had its share of repressive laws and practices to ensure active repression, often by violent means, against transgressors. 27 This "rule by fear" was successful for eighty years, but a changing world order overhauled these practices, rendering past reactions to protest and resistance, ultimately futile. Resistance usually came from a small group and only when they achieved some success without severe sanction from the state, did they manage to attract additional support. When the state reacted violently, these "supporters" invariably disappeared again. The UDF realised this and their strategy and tactics were therefore aimed at undermining the power of the state, for instance by creating "no-go areas", thereby thus illustrating to the masses that the state did not really have the power to handle an overwhelming majority. By removing past fears to an extent, the UDF managed to attract, and keep, widespread support for their resistance effort. The mass-based nature of its support base, also ensured that the 39 state could never really stamp out resistance - only suppressing it temporarily before the UDF regrouped and launched a new initiative.

Moral obligation - Another reason for obedience is that subjects feel a moral obligation to obey. 28 When the UDF successfully erased this moral obligation (which was really rather a psychological/ideological mindset) to obey, from the minds of the "common people" the writing was on the wall for the minority government. The widespread rent boycotts of the mid-1980s and the massive marches of 1989, serve as examples in this regard. Also, whites increasingly started to question the state's moral stand, especially after the 1976 Soweto killing of school children during the riots. During the 1980s, therefore, an increasing number of anti-apartheid groups started to appear among the white population. This had two results - it broadened the resistance base of the UDF immeasurably and increased their financial position and potential influence, while it also started to undermine the state's "moral highground" as a legally elected government. When whites started to join the struggle in real numbers, and respected and influential individuals started to question the morality of the system of apartheid, it increased the pressure on the government substantially.

Self-interest - The state offered incentives, such as money, position and prestige to help procure obedience among the black population. 29 The appointment of black councillors, the tricameral parliament and the establishment of the bantustans, all formed part of the state's strategy to divide opposition. The problem for the government was that only a minority participated in these initiatives, thereby rendering the whole initiative unrepresentative and illegitimate, while also presenting the UDF with specific targets for mass-based protest.

Psychological identification with the ruler - Subjects may also obey and cooperate because they have a close emotional identification with the regime. 3° The government tried to create a black middleclass who "copied" white mannerisms. They were, in the end, however, too few to influence the masses ranged against them. Such people were, however, acting simply out of self-interest and were branded collaborators, and several 40 were necklaced, including black policemen and councillors.

Zones of indifference - Although subjects do not obey or agree with all the laws of a country with enthusiasm, it does not follow that those laws will be ignored or disobeyed, even without the threat of repression. 31 Thus, a majority of blacks in South Africa, although living under a repressive apartheid system, did not continuously disobey, resist and protest against these laws, but carried on with their daily struggle to make a living. Obedience, however, did not mean acceptance and when certain measures became too disruptive to bear, did they react. The liberation history is one long story of mainly reactive resistance and protest to specific incidents/situations (like passes) while pro-active actions were few and far between. The UDF changed all that by involving the whole of civil society and mixing pro-active with reactive campaigns with the overall, clearly stated aim of liberation from oppression.

Absence of self-confidence among subjects - Many people do not have sufficient confidence in themselves, their judgement and their capacities to make them capable of disobedience and resistance. 32 This was especially true of the South African situation where black people were patronised and repressed, psychologically depressed, exposed to Bantu education, portrayed as second class citizens during the petty apartheid years and generally abused. This continued for generations, breeding a gigantic inferiority complex among the black population, and created a situation not conducive to widespread protest and resistance. The Black Consciousness movement represented an effort to break out of this vicious circle, but was only moderately successful. The UDF also strove to change this situation, ie involving the churches, and tried to change people's perceptions - that the state's power was not really overwhelmingly powerful or permanent and that the withdrawal of such support by the people, coupled with massive resistance, would eventually topple the state. b. Non-state power

Rejection of authority - Although sporadic protests against specific issues were 41

conducted by relatively small groups of protesters prior to the 1940s, it was only when the ANC Youth League (ANCYL) was founded in April 1944, that the basic authority of the state was questioned. In the past, protest was within the system and not specifically aimed against the system. The ANCYL aimed to change this approach and called on the ANC to challenge the state more directly and even physically. 33

Human Resources - A ruler's power is affected by the number of people who obey him, cooperate with him, or provide him with special assistance, as well as the proportion of such persons in the general population and the extent and format of their organizations. 34 After 1948, the new National Party (NP) government embarked on a process of empowering the Afrikaner and consolidating power in the hands of the white minority. All the apparatus of real state power, the police, defence force, civil service and civil society, were adapted to ensure that power was consolidated in the hands of the white minority, excluding the black majority. Because of a lack of human resources, the majority could at this stage not oppose this transformation of society, although the foundations for later mass-based protest and resistance were laid during this time, for example the Defiance Campaign of 1952.

Psychological and ideological factors - Intangible factors such as habits and attitudes towards obedience and submission, and the absence of a common faith, ideology or sense of mission, also inhibits resistance from an oppressed group. 35 In South Africa, missionary schools impressed obediency and non-violence on their black pupils. Apartheid laws, like the pass system, further enhanced these submissive attitudes. The Soweto school riots of 1976 went a long way in changing this attitude among blacks in South Africa. The UDF's mobilisation initatives were also aimed to provide its supporters with the moral courage to engage the state without the fear which hampered earlier attempts at resistance. Their mass-based approach were an important part of this strategy with the old adage of "strength in numbers", proving to be quite true. The black population had for decades been ruled with a iron fist, their whole life regulated by certain laws, such as passes which controlled their movement. Repression and their reaction to it - the majority lived with it for decades - became a 42

"habit" to them. 36 When they reached a stage where they could break this habit with increasing confidence - with some help and motivation from the UDF - mass-based actions against the government became a regular occurrence.

Material resources - The UDF had access to funding from abroad which its predecessors never had. This enabled the UDF to spread its message of mass-based resistance to the masses and to counter state propaganda with their own message of resistance.

Increased support base - The situation in South Africa during the 1980s was thus that although power remained in the hands of the state, supported by the minority white population, the largely black opposing majority increasingly refused to submit any further. Mass resistance and protest became more than mere reactive activities. The protesters "withdrew" their tacit support of the system by creating alternative structures. They also gained the support of the vast majority of grassroots organisations and for the first time in the history of the liberation struggle, really managed to pressurize the state. This caused the state to react with all the sanctions within its power in an effort to crush the resistance. This they achieved only temporarily and ultimately only managed to increase the support base of the protesters. During 1989, previously banned mass action, became a fait accompli because of the vast numbers of protesters participating in the UDF's campaigns, forcing the government to legalise the right to protest, rather than physically try to stop overwhelming numbers, and when failing, presenting the liberation movements with the reality of a state which has basically lost its physical power to punish and thus its intrinsic right to govern.

The question to be asked is why did it take 70 years for the liberation movements to reach the point that the UDF reached during the 1980s? Resistance and protest ebbed and flowed during the preceding decades, but never reached the pinnacle of success that the UDF managed during the 1980s. Part of the answer can be found in the change which occured in the ability of the state to control the nature of its control of political power and the UDF's ability to erode these capabilities. Some of the specific 43 reasons could be found among the following :

3.4. Motives, methods and leverages

Motives for the use of non-violent, mass-based action differ widely. Violence is rejected because of considerations of expediency, religious, ethical or moral reasons, practical considerations or a mixture of reasons. 37 The UDF took a concerted decision, as a strategic decision, to shy away from engaging the state outright in a violent manner. During the late 1980s, as state violence increased, the UDF, however, did to an extent lost control of certain of its affiliates. The states of emergency inhibited the UDF's control over its organisational structures and especially certain of the youth affiliates' actions got out of hand in a violent manner. They took the ANC's call to make South Africa ungovernable literally and embarked on violent action, frequently clashing with the security forces and intimidating other township dwellers who refused to follow their agenda. Murphy Morobe, the acting national publicity secretary of the UDF after the detention of Patrick Lekota, in a speech to a IDASA conference in May 1987, quoted Zwelakwe Sisulu in this regard. Sisulu explained that the ANC's "ungovernability" slogan was a political slogan designed for those without access to political power. The rudimentary organs of people's power which emerged in South Africa, was an effort to escalate protest and resistance and had the effect of making the masses ungovernable. A situation of anarchy had to be avoided, however, as the liberation movements themselves foresaw that they would be unable to control it. Therefore, although the UDF's strategic approach towards resistance tended to non-violent methods, circumstances beyond their control, and partially because of state actions, brought violence into the equation. The UDF leadership strove to bring the "loose cannons" under control throughout the late 1980s, because they realised that the state could and did use the violence card against them. 38

The UDF's main motive was to create the necessary conditions for the emergence of a democratic process in South Africa, including the lifting of the emergency, the release of detainees, the lifting of the ban on organisations such as the ANC and the return of 44 all exiles in anticipation of the creation of a non-racial, democratic South Africa. Pressurising of the state was therefore part of their basic strategy, but an anarchic situation would not have served the UDF's basic aims at all.

In general, four broad methods are used by protest groups, namely symbolic actions (non-violent protest and persuasion, including marches, parades, vigils), the withdrawal/withholding of social, economic or political cooperation (non-cooperation, including strikes, boycotts), all of which include non-violent intervention (where the initiative is taken, including sit-ins, non-violent obstruction and invasion and parallel government). 39

Leverage is aimed to win sympathy and support in the opponent's camp, from a third party (for instance the international world), thus giving the non-violent group a capacity to influence - and at times to regulate - their opponent's power, by reducing it at its sources. This usually determines the final outcome of the struggle (like for instance the campaign for international sanctions against South Africa). 4°

Non-violent action does not necessarily imply that a long time period is necessary for victory. The strategy and tactics used will determine its success.'" Non-violence had a long history in South Africa, but with limited success. The UDF changed the "rules" and achieved more success between 1983 to 1990 than ever before in the history of the liberation struggle with their direct action, mass-based approach.

There is no substitute for genuine strength and skill in non-violent action - if the actionists do not possess them sufficiently to cope with the opponent, they are unlikely to win. The UDF learned the hard lessons of the past, and combined with a changed world order and increased pressure on the South African state, managed to pressurize the South African government as never before by implementing new strategies and tactics. 45

4. The methods of mass-based resistance and protest

4.1. Introduction

I coined the term, the Piet Retief Syndrome to try and describe the South African government's reaction to black resistance and protest. With this, I was trying to

emphasize the paranoia of the Afrikaner, their fear of being engulfed by a black

tidal wave (as happened to Retief and his men) and of keeping power at all costs.

This even caused a largely Godfearing nation to create something as ungodly as Apartheid. It also assured the same reaction, and the same result, to efforts

towards protest and resistance.

From the 1960s onwards, it took increasingly more power and more repressive means by the state to keep order and the integrity of the state intact. This

situation escalated until the time was ripe for the formation of the UDF in 1983.

Against this background, the methods used by the liberation groups in general, and the UDF specifically, can be scrutinised more closely. Although the methods

used varied from the non-violent to the violent, they were most often characterised by their mass-based nature. This constitutes a broad discussion of the UDF's strategies and tactics. In chapters four to six, these strategies and tactics are addressed more closely and chronologically, highlighting state reaction and the UDF's continuous adaption to the said strategies and tactics.

4.2. Mass-based protest and persuasion - Strategies and tactics

4.2.1. Political protest

Political non-cooperation involves the refusal to participate in the political process under existing conditions. Such acts of political non-cooperation are designed to exert pressure on the government in order to achieve a specific objective. 42 The UDF's 46 original reason for being was to protest against the implementation of the tri-cameral system. After that, all elections, state structures, etc were targeted for protest action because it did not address the rights of the disenfranchised black population.

Withdrawal of allegiance/refusal of public support - This method involves a refusal to recognise government as legal or morally deserving of allegiance: * Opponents of a government refuse to cooperate with its agencies, departments and structures. The refusal of blacks to wear passes during the 1950s, falls within this category." The UDF, by unbanning itself in 1989, rejected the government's authority of imposing its emergency laws on the UDF, and presented the government with a fait accompli. 45

Boycott of legislative bodies - In undemocratic systems, legislative bodies may be used to bolster the governments' legitimacy. Resistance movements may then decide to boycott such bodies. 46 In South Africa, the resistance to the implementation of the tricameral system formed the initial impetus which resulted in the formation of the UDF as a resistance front against the new system. 47

Boycott of elections - Where there is a refusal to recognise the authority of the regime or the legitimacy of an election, such an election may be boycotted: * The boycott of the elections for the new tricameral parliament, constituted the first major campaign launched by the UDF. This resulted in a very low turnout at the polls and the discrediting of the new system before it really started. 49

Changes in/severance of diplomatic representation - In order to express disapproval of the policies of another country, a government may recall its diplomats without breaking diplomatic relations. 5° In the case of South Africa, a large number of countries did indeed break off diplomatic relations because of South Africa's apartheid policies. The UDF aimed towards intensifying this effort, ie by sending out memorandums to call on countries to sever diplomatic relations with South Africa. 51

Refusal of membership in/expulsion from international bodies - Governments may 47 be refused membership by international bodies because of disapproval of such a country's policies, or may even be expelled as a member. 52 South Africa, for example, was refused the right to participate fully in the General Assembly of the United Nations and barred from several other international bodies because of its apartheid policies. In this, the ANC played a leading role, although their efforts were backed by the UDF.

Public speeches - Some public speeches may become significant acts of protest. Speakers use a public platform to denounce the government for example, or to call for certain reforms or to protest against government actions - like the states of emergencies. 53 The UDF used its high profile clerics, like Archbiship Desmond Tutu and prominent academics in this manner. They also used public forums to present their views and aims. 54

Declarations - Public declarations of intent by organisations are meant to pressurise a government and to propagate their intents, goals and aims among their followers. 55 The UDF issued numerous declarations giving their viewpoints on a multitude of issues, such as negotiations56, sanctions, the states of emergency, position towards the Freedom Charter and calls for the release of its leaders. 57 During August 1989, during a church service at St. George's cathedral in Cape Town, the UDF unilaterally unbanned itself. Videotapes were made of this declaration and distributed among affiliates national ly. 55

Letters of opposition - Letters as a method of protest and persuasion can take several forms. Letters can be sent to the person or institution responsible for the object of the protest. They may also be "open" letters written to a particular person but sent to the correspondence pages of newspapers, where the message will reach the wider public, creating publicity for the sender. The greater number of people signing the letter - and the more prominent they are - the greater its potential impact. The UDF used this method especially during the states of emergency in an effort to bypass the stringent media clampdown by the state. 48

Individuals wrote open letters to the newspapers where they called on the Minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, to release family members in detention without trial. Businessmen wrote open letters to their employees reacting on the political situation. In many instances they also called on the government to lift the state of emergency and end detention without trial. 59 The UDF's series of boycotts and strikes started to hurt business in South Africa, which motivated the business community into pressuring the government.60 The UDF also wrote open letters to township dwellers, addressed to the "head of the house", extolling people to "sacrifice now for freedom tomorrow". 61

Signed public statements - This is a method where a declaration is directed primarily at the general public, or both the opponent and the public, and is released with the signatures of supporters. These statements are meant to protest an issue and to persuade an opponent to change direction. 62 The UDF's One Million Signature Campaign, aimed against the implementation of the tricameral parliamentary system, could serve as an example in this regard. 63

Declarations of indictment/intent - Certain written statements of grievance or future intentions to produce a new situation, or a combination of both, are seen as an instrument to give direction to protest and resistance.' The UDF's inaugural Statement of Intent, was an example of such a document. 65

Group/mass petitions - Petitions may be signed by a large number of individuals or by members of an organisation representing a specific constituency. 66 The UDF used this tactic during its protest campaign against the new constitutional dispensation (tricameral system) which provided the impetus for the formation of the UDF in 1983. The One Million Signature Campaign was a propaganda exercise with as its main objectives the mobilsation of the masses, the propagating of the UDF's aims and principles, as well as a training function for activists. 67

Affidavits - Under conditions of repression and censorship, such as those prevailing in South Africa during the states of emergency, affidavits or statements given under 49 oath, offered a means of making facts/research part of the public record. In November 1984, the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC), a UDF affiliate, used affidavits and interviews as the basis for a book on Police Conduct During Township Protests, August - November 1984. The Black Sash also regularly made use of affidavits to expose state repression. 69

Press statements - In contrast with earlier protest groups, the UDF did have some access to the media and made full use of it, issuing hunderds of press statements. These press statements, for example, included comment on government actions'', announcements of campaigns'', messages addressed to their constituencies 72, etc. From 1985 onwards, when the first state of emergency was introduced, the UDF received less media coverage because of government censorship, but continued to release press statements, aiming it at a more sympathetic audience, such as the alternative press.

Expose - Exposing injustice or repressive actions by the state or its security apparatus, is a specialised form of political protest. It is especially important - and difficult - where censorship is used as a weapon by the state to suppress protest. Government statements or actions can therefore be challenged through the formal media, letters, posters, pamphlets and the courts. The exposé of apartheid dirty tricks police units and hit squad activity, were cases exposed by investigative journalists opposed to the state. 73

Information - To counter laws aimed at repressing freedom of expression, UDF affiliates such as the Black Sash stayed one step ahead of the law by producing clear and simple publications which set out rights of detainees and procedures to be followed in case of arrest and detention. 74

Surveys/studies - Surveys and studies can be used to highlight certain repressive issues75 which affects communities, for example to establish common needs and goals and to back representations to the authorities with evidence of concern. 76 Such a 50 survey was done by the community of Manenburg in the Western Cape during 1989 to establish an advice centre, scorning the official government councils. 77

Underground activities - When a government suspends the rule of law and imposes restrictions so that its opponents face detention, banning of meetings and communication, people are forced into either submission or secrecy. 78 In South Africa, UDF activists, such as Ash Belford who was in charge of the UDF's political underground printing press in Port Elizabeth, often went underground during the states of emergency imposed during the late 1980s, to ensure that the flow of information leaflets, which were used to coordinate campaigns, was not interrupted!'

Campaigns - Campaigns are usually launched as a method of protest and persuasion, aiming to mobilise people and opinions and used as a pressure mechanism. 80 This became one of the UDF's main weapons during its resistance against the state during the 1980s. During 1989, the UDF's rolling mass-based Defiance Campaign attracted such massive support that the government was forced to legalise mass action or face the ignomy of being unable to enforce its own laws.

4.2.2. Social protest a. Individual protest action

Social disobedience - This is the flaunting of social customs or the rules, regulations or practices of a non-governmental institution within the "camp" of the oppressor (a religious body, economic organisation, or the like). 81 Dr. Beyers Naude was suspended from the Dutch Reformed Church because of his reformist views and became one of the UDF's patrons.

Protest emigration (exiles) - Protest emigration is a deliberate emigration from the jurisdiction of the state.' In South Africa's case, members of the banned organisations left the country - especially since 1976 - in order to mobilise the struggle against 51 apartheid from abroad and to physically fight a guerilla war from neighbouring countries. Non-violent methods being employed by these exiles, included the call for sanctions/disinvestment against South Africa which culminated in the total economic and social isolation of the country.' These efforts intensified after the declaration of the states of emergency in South Africa during June 1986. The UDF played more of an indirect role in these efforts and basically formed the voice within the country that supported the ANC sanctions drive abroad."

Sanctuary - Sanctuary is an unusual method whereby an individual or a group of people withdraws to a place where the state's apparatus cannot touch them without violating religious, social, moral or legal prohibitions. 85 During the 1980s, churches in South Africa gave sanctuary to community leaders fearing detention. In 1988, the UDF's Murphy Morobe and Mohammed Valli Moosa and the NECC's Vusi Khanyile escaped from police custody and sought refuge in the United States Consulate in Johannesburg."

Quitting - This is a form of protest where government or elected officials withdraw from the system as an act of protest. 87 Dr. Van Zyl Slabbert, as leader of the official opposition, quit parliament on 7 February 1986 and became a "voice of resistance" within the white resistance grouping against the government's policies. He initiated talks with the then banned ANC in Dakar, an act which put severe pressure on the government." Although Slabbert was not part of the UDF, his action was hailed by the liberation groups and influenced the white community to rethink their own positions regarding apartheid. b. Group protest action

Defiance - Unjust laws are defied by the people by transgressing such laws in large numbers, making it virtually impossible for the authorities to enforce the law and to act against those who have broken it. The highlight of resistance during the 1980s, came with the Defiance Campaign of 1989 where the UDF, under the auspices of the MDM, 52 launched a major attempt to make apartheid laws unworkable. The state of emergency, petty apartheid, the Labour Relations Amendment Act and the tricameral system were targeted by the MDM while resistance structures were simultaneously rebuilt. 89

Selective stalling, obstructionism, non-cooperation by government personnel - Government employees, administrators and officials may collectively or individually, refuse to carry out particular instructions, quietly block the execution of orders or generally refuse to cooperate with government. 80 In South Africa this form of protest did not happen generally because government was mainly in white hands that, although not necessarily supporting the government, also did not actively oppose it. The UDF, especially its youth affiliates, got indirectly involved in these actions, ie by intimidating black officials to sabotage the system.

Withdrawal from government educational institutions - The withdrawal of students from public schools during a major resistance/protest campaign, happened frequently since 1976. This contributed to the formation of so-called "people's schools", disrupting of the status quo and providing the struggle with youthful recruits. 91 The UDF's campaigns invariably caused all township schools to be boycotted, while students played a leading role during protest campaigns. 92

Refusal of assistance to law enforcement agencies - When the security forces, by their actions, portray themselves as part of the state's apparatus being used to suppress the people, they will be refused all cooperation by the people. 93 Especially in South Africa, where the security forces were used for decades to suppress the people by being the enforcers of the apartheid state's unjust laws, township dwellers lost all faith in them, especially the socalled "kitskonstabels". 84 Throughout the 1980s, pitched battles were fought between protestors, especially from the UDF's youth affiliates, and the security forces, resulting in the death of several policemen and army servicemen. During 1984, the ANC called for police and soldiers to be killed (on Radio Freedom), even if they were at home, irrespective if they were in uniform or not. During 1987 alone, 67 policemen were killed. This strategy by the liberation forces invariably caused 53 the security forces to react in kind, transforming the townships into virtual battlefields. 95

Refusal to accept appointed officials - This constitutes a form of protest where local inhabitants of a township/region refuses to accept the status/legality of officials

97 appointed by the state. 96 During the 1980s, through UDF initiated campaigns, township officials were harrassed, chased from the townships and in several cases, killed by local inhabitants who refused to accept their role as the government's intermediary in the townships. 98

Creation of no - go areas - No-go areas are usually strife-torn regions rendered inaccessible by violence. During the latter part of the 1980s, UDF youth affiliates and self protection units made it virtually impossible for the security forces to enter certain "liberated zones" within the townships. All services also collapsed while the "comrades" ruled such areas with an iron fist, regularly dispensing jungle justice in so-called "kangaroo courts". 99

Slow compliance and disobedience - This is a situation where opponents of regimes do not feel able to resist unconditionally. They may postpone compliance as long as possible, or when complying, to do it in a slow and markedly unenthusiastic way.' The security forces were especially targeted. People ignored calls to disperse during demonstartions, taunted the police, toyi-toyi and in general, did their outmost to frustrate the authorities.

Sit-downs - These constitute a form of protest where participants actually sit down on the street, floor or building and refuse to leave voluntarily in order to protest a specific issue in a specific place, like the occupation of a government building in order to protest against unjust laws. 101 In South Africa, this tactic was somewhat less than successful because the security forces tended to use force against protestors, shooting them with rubber bullets, tear gas and let police dogs attack them. The UDF's protest actions therefore tended to be "more mobile" than stationary. 54

Anti-conscription - Opposition to conscription may result in a refusal to register as ordered or to report for duty. 102 The UDF affiliated End Conscription Campaign (ECC) during the 1980s saw several conscientious objectors jailed or leaving the country rather than serve in the SADF. The authorities restricted the ECC's activities during 1985, restricted it as an organisation during 1988, while its leaders and members suffered continuous harrassment and detention. 103

Civil disobedience to "illegitimate" laws - Civil disobedience is a deliberate, open and peaceful violation of particular laws, regulations, etc. which are believed to be illegitimate. 104 It is a low-profile form of defiance with people taking no notice of laws and just quietly carrying on their duties as they saw fit. Ministers who married couples forbidden to marry by the Prevention of Mixed Marriages Act during the early 1980s, were using this method. 105 During 1986, the UDF launched a series of actions where their supporters flaunted the segregation laws by embarking on whites-only buses, entering whites-only hospitals, libraries and other public amenities. 106

Picketing - The picket line has historically been the device of trade unions, developed to keep workers out of a targeted factory, or of informing the public about a strike and the issues at stake. During the 1980s, pickets were used in the traditional way by striking workers, but it also became a feature of the UDF's boycott campaigns. 107 Pickets were used at bus depots, taxi stands and train stations in the townships to physically keep workers from going to work during stayaways. They were used to keep children from going to school during the numerous school boycotts. They were also used to keep people from buying goods during consumer boycotts, where pickets inspected commuters for "illegally" buying goods that was then destroyed. 108

Picketing became one of the more notorious methods used by certain UDF affiliates in order to "mobilise" the masses. People were forced to comply. Youthful activists, nicknamed the "comrades", played a leading role in these actions. These activities also invariably turned violent with picket breakers having been assaulted and even in some instances killed by mobs.109 55

Placard Demonstrations - This type of protest entails groups of people staging a demonstration by displaying placards bearing a message of protest in order to raise public awareness and to embarrass the authorities. 110 The Black Sash, an UDF affiliate, was particularly well known for this type of protest. The Sash's membership make-up of well-to-do white ladies, also made the police more wary to act violently against them. Although they were frequently arrested, their activities invariably caused an outcry and brought welcome media coverage for the UDF. Although not being an affiliate of the UDF, their activities and protests overlapped. During 1983, the Black Sash launched a special week of protest against the Land Act of 1913, which formed the basis of forced removals. Early morning traffic was greeted by placard wielding members of the Black Sash protesting against the forced removals of families by the government. 111 c. Mass protest action

Overloading facilities - Overloading of facilities involves the deliberate increase of demands for services far beyond their capacity, in order to paralyze an institution (government department for example) for a specific time period." During 1989, the MDM distributed pamphlets detailing how to disrupt First National Bank's business throughout the country. This was done in retaliation against the Bank for its decision to ignore the MDM's opposition to the presence of a World XV rugby team in South Africa. The UDF also provided the public with the phone numbers of government ministers and encouraged them to phone in large numbers, protesting against security force actions. The idea was to totally tie up the phone lines to these departments.'

Stay-at-home - The stay-at-home is often applied in association with strikes, although it might occur after hours where the whole population stays at home for a set period, to illustrate a political point. It is usually organised but can also be spontaneous.'" This method of non-cooperation can have enormous impact when practised on a grand scale, as it acts like a barometer of political opinion. In South Africa "stay-aways" many times became "stay-at-homes" in order to reduce the chances of clashes with the security forces. During the 1950s and 1960s, there were several instances of stay-at- 56 home's, but the UDF generally organised stay-aways which culminated in violence as township dwellers were forcibly kept from going to work, causing clashes. 115 The UDF did, however, manage to organise several massive stay-aways in which millions participated. In May 1987, more than a million people stayed away to protest against the whites only election; 118 in June 1988, 1,9 million people stayed away in order to protest against the Labour Relations Amendment Bill, while more than two million people heeded the UDF and COSATU's call for a stay-away during September 1989, also in protest against the last whites only election."'

Marches - In non-violent revolutions against authoritarian rule in many countries, a moment of popular uprising was reached when people shook off their sense of powerlessness and began to act more forcefully and pro-actively. 118 The UDF's protests reached its highpoint with 1989's Defiance Campaign when several massive marches were held. At first the authorities reacted with force, like in Cape Town where protesters marched to parliament under the banner of "The People shall Govern". 118 These marches were ultimately legalised after the first ANC leaders were released, as the government had no real choice. 12° It was impossible to handle the massive crowds, and to keep a measure of the image of governing, the marches were allowed later as the other side of the coin meant ungovernability. Marches were one of the mainstays of UDF protest action during the 1980s. Marches that were forcefully broken up by the security forces became headline news and had great propaganda value. The same happened with successful marches - it strengthened the UDF and MDM's position. Marches, more than anything else, could be described as one of the UDF's main weapons in the struggle against apartheid.

Music festivals - To a large extent, the UDF's support base consisted of unsophisticated people. The UDF therefore adapted its mobilisation strategy to reach out and appeal to such people. Tactics such as music festivals were held to this end where the crowd was entertained, but they got the UDF's political message through the music, with many artists singing protest songs.121 57

Non-cooperation with social events - In South Africa, the cultural and sports boycotts propagated and initiated against the country by the ANC and UDF, 122 served as a major psychological weapon against the country's white inhabitants - like the protest against the All Black rugby tour in 1986. The UDF expressed its opposition to the tour123 and launched a campaign to protest against the tour. 124

Student strikes - Students and pupils may as a means of protest or resistance, refuse to attend classes. 125 In South Africa, student protests provided some of the most severe and widespread acts of resistance and protest. Since 1976, student protest became increasingly one of the resistance movements' main weapons against the state. Unfortunately, in contrast with the non-violent methods described by Sharp, these protests were invariably violent with tremendous damage to schools while hundreds of students were killed by the security forces. 126

Banners, posters, slogans and graffiti - Apartheid policies, which resulted in illiteracy, the impoverishment of black people and underdevelopment of townships and rural areas, ensured that resources for media production were out of reach for most communities during the 1980s. The grassroots community structures which organised under the auspices of the UDF during the 1980s, therefore used posters, banners, flags and graffiti to reach their audience. The showing of resistance messages during protest actions, became the norm during the years of UDF inspired resistance. 127

Short, catchy phrases that express hope, aim and principle are part of most resistance struggles. The trade unions in South Africa especially used slogans to emphasise points and as a means to educate illiterate members. Slogans such as "An injury to one is an injury to all" and "No taxation without representation" were used to good effect by the UDF's ally COSATU during the 1980s. 128 The UDF also used slogans to emphasise points contained within the Freedom Charter and to pinpoint campaigns, like the "Call to the Whites" campaign 129 and "From Mobilisation to Organisation".' During the states of emergency when censorship and suppression was a reality, words or messages painted on walls of public places, showed the defiance of the people and 58 served as symbols of resistance. 131

Leaflets, pamphlets, newspapers - Regardless of stringent and authoritarian conditions imposed by the state, the UDF enjoyed a remarkable degree of control in putting its message across by means of direct and indirect control over various means of mass communication. Several "community newspapers", pamphlets, leaflets, fliers and "alternative newspapers" were employed to cultivate a growing consciousness of a shared national political identity among the UDF's different constituencies, in order to reach a massive audience and to coordinate actions. 132

These publications included - community newspapers such as Grassroots in Cape Town, Ilize LaseRhini in Grahamstown, Ukusa in Durban, The Eye in Pretoria, Speak and National (published by the South African Students Press Union) in Johannesburg. The UDF also published their own pamphlets, which included Isizwe, a popular theoretical journal, UDF Update, a UDF newsletter, UDF Comment, a UDF discussion and comments newsletter, Noma Siyaboshwa, an information booklet on coping with detentions, etc. Several ad hoc publications like The UDF One Million Signature Campaign : An Organisers Handbook, pertaining to specific events and campaigns, were also regularly produced.

The UDF also benefitted from sympathetic journalists and mainstream commercial newspapers such as the Weekly Mail and Vrye Weekblad. These so-called "alternative" newspapers gave rise to a new genre of advertising by asking questions, conveying information, expressing solidarity, publishing exposes and highlighting the state's outrages. The liberal universities also played an important role with progressive SRC's providing the UDF with speaking forums and supporting and "advertising" UDF campaigns. Numerous cultural groups, writers, film groups, musicians, publishers, support organisations, churches, educational organisations and academic groups, committed themselves in print to propagate an anti-Apartheid stance that ultimately reinforced the overall ideological framework of the UDF.133 59

The foreign anti-apartheid movement also employed these tactics extensively by publishing thousands of these type of leaflets in order to support the UDF's initiatives and to further pressurise the South African government. 134 d. Religious protest action

Parades/religious processions - The UDF used prominent and well respected clergymen to lead protest marches in order to keep the state from forcefully acting against marchers. 135 UDF patrons such as Arcbishop Desmond Tutu and dr. Allan Boesak, Father Smangaliso Mkwatsa and others were regularly in the forefront of UDF marches, which usually started from the local church. 139

Political mourning/funerals - Mourning is a time-honoured method of protest and persuasion. In South Africa during the 1980s, funerals of victims of state violence became powerful occasions for the expression of protest and solidarity by the UDF. 137 It also became a method to bypass state of emergency regulations, which forbid mass meetings. The state, however, reacted by imposing stringent curbs, such as limiting attendance numbers, requiring that only ministers of religion should speak, forbidding posters, banners and processions on foot to the cemetery. A strong security presence became commonplace at funerals - as did defiance of restrictions. Mourning became a political weapon as stayaways were frequently called after funerals in order to mourn the victims. The UDF placed the government in a quandery by using high profile clergymen such as Alan Boesak to break the restrictions by giving political speeches during funerals - such as during the funeral of student Ashley Kriel of Athlone after he had been killed by police. 139

Prayer meetings - Prayer can also function as a force for political and social transformation. The UDF affiliated SACC's "Call to Prayer for an End to Unjust Rule" on 16 June 1986 highlighted the power of prayer as a force for political and social transformation and the "helplessness" of the state to counter such actions. 139 The community was also mobilised through prayer by linking it to certain of their campaigns, 60 for example the rent boycotts."

Witness - In September 1985, a group of church workers and theologians living and working in the townships, produced the Kairos Document in response to what they called the kairos or "moment of truth" for the church in South Africa. The document questioned the churches' failure to address the political crisis in South Africa, repudiated "state theology" that provided a biblical justification for apartheid and called for a "prophetic theology". 141 This marked a watershed for the church (excluding the three Afrikaner sister churches) as it started to support the liberation struggle with all means at its disposal and worked closely in conjunction with the UDF throughout the 1980s.

Vigils - Vigils became a regular expression of protest as well as a show of solidarity with the victims of state action during the 1980s. As these vigils were usually organised by and held under the auspices of some church body or other, it made it more difficult for the state to act in a violent manner against protestors. Especially during the states of emergency, the UDF employed vigils to bypass stringent regulations forbidding mass protest.' During 1987, a vigil consisting of 20 hours of prayers and discussions was held in St. George's cathedral in Cape Town to protest the detention of children. Vigils were also held regularly in memory of slain activists."

4.2.3. Symbolic protest

Questioning - Opposition to a system often begins with questions in individual consciences. When the asking of such questions is organised and asked publicly, it is a powerful means of reflecting resistance and protest against a repressive system.'" Especially when a reputable institution such as the church asks such questions, people tend to listen. During the 1980s, one of the major questions of conscience that were being asked centered around conscription and the involvement of conscripts in the townships.' 61

Toyi-toyi - The toyi-toyi emerged into public view during the marches and demonstrations of the youth that mushroomed into the Soweto Uprising of 1976. Since then, almost no protest action passed without the accompaning toyi-toyi, chanting and shouting of slogans. Toy-toying was also employed to raise feelings to feverpitch and to taunt the members of the security forces.'

Display/burning of flags - Displaying the flag or colours of a national, religious, social or political group is a common form of non-violent protest. Such displays usually raises deep emotions - both from the protesters and the authorities. In South Africa, with numerous organisations banned, the display of their colours at mass rallies, funerals, and other gatherings, in defiance of the government, was a powerful symbol of defiance for many people. As the authorities were largely impotent to act against people in a mass demonstration set-up, it created a feeling of power among the protesters and boosted morale, but also caused an overreaction from the authorities at times."' The UDF started displaying the ANC flag openly during the late 1980s after it became clear that the state was unable to cope with the movement's mass-based approach.

The burning of flags entails a more confrontational and violence related tactic. It is usually employed to show contempt or to dare the authorities to act forcefully. During the 1980s, students from the Universities of the Western Cape and Witwatersrand regularly burned the South African flag during protest rallies."

Symbols - Objects or actions symbolising a grievance can be used to focus and advance the views of protestors. The UDF used this approach extensively, in many cases mirroring foreign protest campaigns being run by the ANC and anti-apartheid groups.' Examples of this type of protest were the UDF support group, Free the Children Alliance, which used keys to highlight its 1987 campaign against the detention of children, as well as campaigns against the Bantustans and forced removals.'

New signs/names - The UDF and community organisations unilaterally renamed institutions, townships, black schools and even squatter camps. The Africanists went 62

so far as to rename South Africa Azania. This formed part of the struggle against apartheid where protestors, in a process to recreate themselves in their own image, took this first step to restructure society. Schools were renamed by pupils after banned ANC leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu and township names were Africanised. During October 1989, Mandela was awarded the freedom of Tongaat (Natal) - in spite of him being imprisoned and all references to him banned - and Tongaat's market square renamed Mandela Square l " while activists also renamed Stanger's (Natal) main street Luthuli Street. 152 This formed part of the UDF's initiative to create a new society from the old, while at the same time pressurising the government, The state was basically powerless to do anything about the name changes. 153

Clothes - Political dissent or protest may be expressed by wearing particular colours, badges or clothes. In South Africa, protestors attended court cases, marches and other protest actions wearing the green, black and gold of the then banned ANC. 154

Homage - Paying tribute or showing public respect can be a means of expressing or encouraging solidarity with a cause. The many honours bestowed on Nelson Mandela - from honorary degrees to naming streets and schools after him - ensured that he dominated the South African scene despite his incarceration. 155

Portraits - Public display of pictures of resistance heroes such as Mandela symbolised the aims of the resistance movements and strengthened political loyalties. 156

Targeting of individuals - During the 1950s and 1960s, members of the Black Sash used to silently "haunt" cabinet ministers at public places. In many cases this caused embarassment to the officials who would go to great lengths to avoid the protestors. 157

Black councillors became a major target of the UDF during the 1980s. 158 During the early years of UDF orchestrated protest, these councillors were ridiculed, pressurised and their businesses were boycotted. From the mid-1980s onwards, these attacks 63 turned violent and several councillors were killed by mobs - like the notorious Kinikini murders. 156

Assemblies of protest/support - Opposition to certain policies of the state, or support for certain policies, may be expressed by public assembly of a group of people 16° at appropriate points 161 , which are usually in some way related to the issue. These included places such as government offices, courts and prisons. 162 The UDF protested outside shops being boycotted, government offices in the townships and foreign embassies to great effect. They were usually arrested, which served its own propaganda value. The Black Sash specialised in placard demonstrations in public places, protesting particular issues. UDF activists also employed sit-ins as a form of occupation in order to register protest. 163

Protest meetings/rallies - Large protest meetings or rallies around one or the other symbolic issue, have long been a favourite of the South African liberation groupings. Such gatherings have also invariably been banned in South Africa. After the formation of the UDF in 1983, all open-air gatherings except sports meetings were banned. In 1985 indoor meetings pertaining to the school boycotts were banned as were meetings dealing with stayaways. 164 Protests on a variety of issues became the norm for the UDF throughout the 1980s, for example protests against the detention of activists under Section 29 of the Internal Security Act in 1990 165, against the violence in Natal 166, and various other issues. During the last years of the UDF, the government became incapable of keeping the UDF from holding massive protest meetings and rallies, such as those welcoming Walter Sisulu and other released ANC leaders. The government was forced to relax its strict measures which contributed to the unbanning of the ANC in 1990.

Anniversaries - Anniversaries can serve as rallying points around which campaigns can be launched and built. In South Africa, commemorations of days such as Sharpeville Day, Soweto Day, and a multitude of other state atrocities against black people, served as rallying points for the UDF to launch and sustain its campaigns.167 64

The UDF also commemorated days such as May Day, in solidarity with COSATU 168, and special days, such as National Detainees Day. 169

Ostracism of persons - A powerful form of non-cooperation is to refuse to form or to continue relations with a person or group, and of intervening against unacceptable behaviour." During the years of UDF initiated protest, ostracism was practised to its utmost extreme and was very successful, against so-called sell-outs within the black community. Shopkeepers who refused to support economic boycotts and members of the tri-cameral system were targeted, while black members of the security services were forced to move out of the townships where ostracism degenerated into mob violence during which several policemen were killed. 171 The UDF's campaigns against the government's "stooges" within the townships alongside the rent boycotts and stayaways, generated violence as several so-called collaborators were killed. Especially youth affiliates of the UDF were guilty of carrying ostracism too far and ended up killing hundreds of "collaborators" by necklacing and other horrendous

methods.' 72

Hunger strikes - This method of protest constitutes a refusal to eat with the aim of forcing the opponent to grant certain demands. A hunger strike may be undertaken for a set period of time, for an indefinite period or unto death if the demand is not granted.' Protestors in South Africa had some success with hunger strikes. The hunger strike of February 1989 by detainees was one of the most successful forms of non-violent protest ever undertaken in South Africa. It accomplished the release of hundreds of detainees and compelled the authorities to an unprecedented and more cautionary use of the practice of detention without trial. 174 During March 1990, the UDF used the hunger strike by Robben Island prisoners in order to internationalise their political issues when Popo Molefe (UDF General Secretary) travelled to London to launch an international campaign to mobilise support for the hunger strikers' and to further pressurise the government to release all political prisoners. 176

Occupation - This method of protest is characterised by the interference created by 65 people's physical bodies where they enter or refuse to leave some place where they are not wanted. Different methods include sit-in's, stand-in's, ride-in's, wade-in's, mill- in's, pray-in's and the invasion, occupation and obstruction of specific areas.'" During the Defiance Campaign of 1989, the UDF used these methods to wilfully break the petty apartheid laws pertaining to separate amenities.

Alternative structures - Protestors may also show their resistance to a specific system by creating their own, alternative structures. Such structures might even rival the government's official structures or become a vehicle where resistance movements might implement their own principles and ideas. 178 During the 1980s, when state repression became overwhelming, the UDF initiated a initiative during which they created their own social structures which embodied the better life they were seeking. Co-operatives, community clinics, legal resource centres, advice offices and even "people's schools" were formed. The UDF affiliated NECC launched a people's education campaign during which an alternative curriculum was introduced.' Street and area committees served as alternatives for local government and people's courts dealt with local disputes and crime.'

4.2.4 Economic protest

Economic forms of non-cooperation was much more common than social non- cooperation. It consists of a suspension of or refusal to continue a specific economic relationship - to boycott something. 181 Economic boycotts are usually organised although spontaneous boycotts do occur. Generally, economic boycotts in South Africa have been practised internally mainly in labour struggles (strikes) and the national liberation struggle (boycotts).

Consumer boycotts - A consumers boycott involves a refusal by consumers to purchase certain goods or services from specific institutions. t82 Several motives and reasons can be mooted for such boycotts, but in South Africa, it was used mainly as a weapon to pressurise the state indirectly. When white businesses were targeted, the 66 business community in turn pressurised the government to solve its political problems so that normal business relations could be restored. Especially in small rural towns, where white shop owners could not survive without their black clientelle from the townships, efforts were quickly made to accede to demands. As such, consumer boycotts have been successful in forcing talks at local level. The Eastern Cape boycott campaign of 1985/86, for example, resulted in historic meetings between black leaders and white business interests. All aspects of everyday life which affected township dwellers, were the focus of a consumer boycott at one or the other time during the 1980s, like bus transport 183 and white-owned shops 184 among others. Consumer boycotts during the 1980s were often marred by the coercion used to enforce them in the townships. The gains, however, usually outweighed the costs. 185

Rent boycotts - The rent boycott in South African townships, started in the Vaal Triangle in August 1984 and spread nationally to 50 towns by September 1986. By this stage, it was estimated by the Community Research Group at Wits University that 60% of the total black population was not paying rent, costing local authorities R1 million a day. 186 These boycotts served as one of the UDF's most succesfull coercion campaigns. The government was largely unable to enforce the paying of rent while defaulters could not be punished. The townships became virtual no-go areas during the late 1980s, making it impossible for the authorities to evict anybody.'

Strikes - The strike involves a refusal to continue economic cooperation through abstention from work. It is a collective, deliberate and normally, temporary suspension of labour designed to exert pressure on management/the government. The aim of the strike is to produce leverage to obtain certain demands. It has to be mass-based to ensure success.' It may be a symbolic, short-term demonstration of unity, or an attempt to stop production for a lengthy period and cause economic disruption in order to bring about accession to demands. Until 1979, black workers in South Africa did not enjoy the formal right to unionise or go on strike, although strikes did mushroom throughout the 1970s as the formation of several "illegal" black trade unions were accompanied by a series of strikes. The Wiehahn Commission's report led to the new 67

Labour Relations Act of 1979 through which black workers were granted the right to form trade unions. 189 The government hoped to curb illegal strikes through these measures, but in the end it provided the liberation movement, and the UDF, with an "army" of protesters. Some of South Africa's largest strikes took place the 1980s, in conjunction with UDF-led resistance and protest campaigns.

A token strike occurs when work is stopped for a preannounced period in order to illustrate workers' feelings on a specific issue."' The Prison Officers Civil Rights Union (POPCRU - the name only changed at a later stage to today's Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union) held lunchtime sit-ins during 1990 to protest against racial discrimination in prison services. 191

Special strikes involve a strike by a specific sector or group of the community, like farm workers, prisoners and mine workers."' Hotel workers for example, belonging to the Commercial and Allied Workers Union (CCWUSA) - an ally of the UDF - refused to serve the visiting English rebel cricket side at their hotel in Johannesburg on 22 January 1990. 193

A political general strike involves a widespread stoppage of labour by workers to bring the economy to a standstill for a given time, in order to exact some definite political concession from the government. 194 In South Africa, COSATU, which represented a variety of trade unions, managed to organise such strikes which were used as a weapon against the apartheid government. These rolling mass action initiatives, which took place in conjunction with the UDF, managed to put severe pressure on the government as the number of people involved, proved unmanageable and unstoppable. During the stay-away/strike in September 1989, the liberation movements managed to muster over two million people to take part in the strike."'

International boycotts (sanctions) - International boycotts serve to isolate a transgressing country and pressurise such a country to reform."' The UDF called for international sanctions against South Africa as early as 1985 with the adoption of its 68 basic resolutions. 197 Sanctions became an ongoing method by the UDF to pressurise the government, ie to isolate them from their foreign links. 198 In the case of South Africa, the economic isolation of the country did in the end succeed in almost destroying its economy and largely forced the government to accommodate black demands. Even after the unbanning of the ANC and other groups, the UDF continued to call for sanctions in order to sustain the pressure on the government. 199 The cultural, moral and sports boycott, which went hand in hand with the economic boycott, isolated white South Africans psychologically by making them pariah's the world over. The impact of these boycotts could never be underestimated.

Land seizures - This method of resistance entails the expropriation and utilisation of land which by statute belong to somebody else, with the intent of producing a de facto change of ownership and control. m In South Africa, landless people, in many cases forcefully removed from their former homes, occupied open areas through squatting. In many cases these informal settlements presented the authorities with a fait accompli with squatters gaining lawful ownership while the authorities upgraded such settlements with limited services, like water. By 1988, the Urban Foundation estimated that some seven million people were living in squatter camps in urban areas. Such poor socio- economic circumstances created a fertile area for political change and mass action against the government. 201 The UDF organised such a national land occupation campaign by squatters supporting the UDF from July 1990. 202 Its aim was to protest against the government's failure to provide housing to poor people and to pressurise the government by occupying "unused" white-owned land.'

Withholding tax - The refusal to pay tax or licence fees is a protest against a particular injustice related to the particular tax or licence. In 1987, the SACC supported COSATU's stand on "no taxation without representation" and investigated how to stop the practice of Pay-as-you-earn tax from workers' salaries. It advised church members that withholding tax was a "strong political act", but also warned against the equally strong penalties that may be imposed by the state against perpetrators.2°4 69

Alternative markets/transportation - The UDF organised regular transport boycotts and at the height of the violence, bus companies and even trains could not enter the township for extended periods. As township dwellers had to go to work, this formed a market niche for the creation of alternative transport systems. The same happenned during consumer boycotts - local businessmen opened shops inside the township. The creation of alternative channels of buying and selling supplies and a parallel transportation system, ultimately formed part of the boycott of official channels and systems.' The enormous growth of an alternative transport system through the minibus taxi industry in the townships, was a spinoff of the UDF's boycott of state-run transport systems. People still had to go to work during boycotts of government trains and bus services, and the taxi industry provided such a service. A further spinoff was the economic advances made by a new black-orientated industry. 70

References : Chapter 1

R.B. Gregg : The power of non-violence, pp. 16-19.

Ibid., p. 42.

G. Sharp : Social Power and Political Freedom, p. 12.

Ibid., pp. 172-173.

Interview with Ash Belford : General Secretary of the Westville Youth Movement (Port Elizabeth), member of the Student Planning Committee (University of the Western Cape) and underground UDF member (Literature distribution), 20 August 1997.

See chapter three.

See chapters four and five.

Ibid., p. 174.

Gregg : pp. 66-71.

"Vormen van Geweldlose Aktie". in Geweldlose Weerbaarheid, Centrum Voor Geweldlose Weerbaarheid, Amsterdam, 1974, p. 1.

Ibid., p. 2.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part One, p. 3.

"Manifesto for Nonviolent Revolution" : p. 23.

W.R. Miller : Nonviolence. A Christian Interpretation, pp. 62-63.

G. Sharp : The Politics of Non-violent Action. Part One : Power and Struggle., P. 7.

J. Grobler : A Decisive Clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa, 1875-1976, pp. 70-76.

P.B. Heyman (Ed.) : Towards Peaceful Protest in South Africa, pp. 2-3.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part One, p. 67.

N.F. Cantor : The Age of Protest. Dissent and Rebellion in the Twentieth Century, pp. 324-327. 71

Bretton : pp. 196-197.

Ibid., p. 197.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part One, p. 11.

H.L. Bretton : Power and Politics in South Africa, p. 196.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part One, p. 11.

Bretton : p. 197.

ibid., p. 19.

Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 22.

Ibid., p. 23.

"Manifesto for Nonviolent Revolution" : p. 21

"The Power of the Powerless" : pp. 242-243.

Unisa Archive, Carter-Karis Collection, Reel 2B, 2 : DA16 : 12/2, "Basic Policy of Congress Youth League", p.1.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part One, p. 11.

Ibid., p. 199.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part One, p. 19.

Ibid., p. 67.

M. Morobe : "Towards a People's Democracy", paper presented at an IDASA Conference, May 1987, pp. 6-7.

Miller : pp. 58-60, (a more complete discussion is available from heading 5 onwards).

Ibid., pp. 59-60.

T.W. Olson and L. Shivers : Training for Nonviolent Action, pp. 4-5.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 28 6-28 7.

43.Ilikl., pp. 287-288.

44. Smuts and Westcott : p. 113. 72

Beeld : 18 Januarie 1990, and Sowetan : 18 January 1990.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 289-290.

UDF : "Don't Vote for Apartheid", 1984.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 291.

UDF : "Don't Vote in Apartheid Elections!", 1984.

Ibid., p. 340.

UDF : "Selected Diplomatic Corps", 15 April 1986.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 346.

G. Sharp : The Politics of Non-violent Action. Part Two : The Methods of Non-violent Action, p. 119.

UDF : Steve Tswete, "The UDF and the struggle for National Democracy", Np, Nd.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, 122.

UDF : Murphy Morobe, "A Perspective on Negotiations", delivered by the Acting Publicity Secretary of the UDF to the TIC Consultative Conference, 30 July 1989, Durban.

UDF : "FREE OUR LEADERS!", February 1985.

Cape Times : 9 September 1989.

UDF : "Congress says - Stop Le Grange's Gestapo Bills", 1986, and Stop Le Grange's Law - No to a permanent Emergency!", 1986.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 78-79.

UDF : "TO THE HEAD OF THE HOUSE", UDF Eastern Cape, signed by H.M.Fazzie, UDF Vice-president, 1986.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part wo , p. 122.

UDF : "One Million Signatures Campaign", Various leaflets, 1984.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 123.

UDF : "United Democratic Front Declaration", 20 August 1983, and "Sign the UDF Declaration", 1984.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 99. 73

UDF : "Invitation to attend the UDF Million Signature Campaign", 9 May 1984, pp. 1-8.

SACBC Publication : Police Conduct During Township Protests, August - November 1984.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 17.

UDF : "Delmas Trial : UDF says release the 22", 3 September 1986.

UDF : "Christmas Against the Emergency Campaign", 2 December 1986.

UDF : "Message to the people of South Africa from the NEC of the UDF", 17 July 1986.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 52. ANC Pamphlets : We charge genocide!, and Torture is part of the system.

Police Powers, Parts 1 to 4, The Law Courts and You.

R. Monama : Is this justice? Study of the Johannesburg commisioners' (Pass) courts.

Uprooting a Nation. A Study of 3 milion evictions in South Africa.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 106-107.

Ibid., p. 142.

Interview with Ash Belford.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 34.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 198.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 211.

Smuts and Westcott : pp.11 9-1 20, 147.

UDF : "UDF Resolutions".

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 204.

Smuts and Westcott : pp.1 20-1 21.

Ibid., p. 107.

Die Suid-Afrik.an : September 1 98 7, pp. 23-25.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 45. 74

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 320-328.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 298-299.

UDF : "Open our schools!", 1986.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 298.

Municipalities employed "special constables" or socalled "kitskonstabels" (instant constables) in an effort to broaden the reach of the security forces which became quite thinly stretched as resistance to the states of emergency increased. Black "mercenaries" (including criminals) were employed who did not mind acting against fellow blacks for payment. The government also used the tactic of deploying Zulu constables in the Eastern Cape and Xhosa constables in Natal. The ethnic factor ensured that these constables acted with gusto against township dwellers. These special constables became objects of hatred in the townships and several were killed in confrontations with the local inhabitants, Black Sash Pamphlet : "Greenflies' Municipal police in the Eastern Cape", January 1988, pp. 1-44. UDF : "Comment on so-called 'special constables", 22 September 1986 and "UDF Comment on Kits Konstabels - Vigilantes in Uniform", Nd.

Kane-Berman : pp. 39-40.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 300.

UDF : "Local and Regional Government. State Strategy and People's Struggle", 1987, p. 14.

Kane-Berman : pp. 37-39.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 92.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 303.

Ibid., p. 310.

Ibid., p. 311.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 4, pp. 111-116.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 315.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 67.

Indicator South Africa : Volume 3, Number 3, Summer 1986, pp. 10-13.

Ibid., pp. 99-100. 75

J. Kane-Berman : Political violence in South Africa, pp. 33-37.

G. Straker, et al : Faces in the Revolution. The Psychological Effects of Violence on Township Youth in South Africa, pp. 19-20.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 100.

K Spink : Black Sash. The Beginning of a Bridge in South Africa, pp. 105-106:

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 393.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 97-98.

Ibid., pp. 199.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 1 25-1 27.

UDF : "UDF Position on the Whites-Only Election", 19 March 1987, "The UDF's message to all South Africans on the Whites-Only Elections of 6 May 1987", 19 March 1987 and "White Election results and Two Days of National Protest", 7 May 1987.

M. Bennett and Quin, D : Political Conflict in South Africa - Data Trends 1 9 84-1 988, pp. 1 3 0-1 31.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 13.

Ibid., pp. 81-85.

Die Burger : 30 January 1990.

UDF : "UDF Music Festival", 1986.

UDF : "UDF Resolutions" : Adopted by the UDF National General Council on 7 April 1985.

UDF : "National Statement on NZRFU decision to tour SA", 1986.

UDF : "UDF Says - Stop the Rugby Tour", 13 April 1985.

Ibid., pp. 1 9 6-1 97.

Straker : pp. 89-107.

Images of Defiance. South African Resistance Posters of the 1980s : pp. 2-3.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 124.

UDF : "Call to the Whites - Join us Now", May 1986. 76

Images of Defiance : pp. 41, 109.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 61.

Ibid., p. 100.

C. Longford : "South Africa. Black blood on British hands".

Smuts and Westcott : p. 83.

Die Burger : 2 August 1989 and Sowetan : 9 July 1990.

UDF : "Memorial Meeting - Peter Nchabaleng", 22 April 1984.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 57-58.

Ibid., p. 102.

UDF : "Rent Crisis - Day of Prayer", 14 February 1988.

The Kairos Document : A Summary, in South Africa in the 1980s : State of Emergency, pp. 68-72.

Smuts and Westcott : p.146.

Weekly Mail : 1-7 September 1989.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 105.

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 4, pp. 109-113.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 139.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 55.

Ibid., p. 55.

Ibid., p. 130.

Southern Africa Perspectives : Black Dispossession in South Africa : The Myth of Bantustan Independence. The Africa Fund, Number 2/84, New York : 1984, and MCC South Africa/Transkei program : Apartheid's Refugees : Mass Removals in South Africa, Np. 1984.

The Leader : 20 October 1989.

Vrye Weekblad : 27 October 1989. 77

Smuts and Westcott : p. 91.

Ibid., pp. 38-39.

Ibid., p. 63.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 101.

Ibid., p. 63.

UDF : "Local and Regional Government - State Strategy and People's Struggle", 1987.

Kane-Berman : pp. 37-39.

UDF : "People's Rally", 30 October 1983.

UDF : "UDF Mass Meeting - Emhlanganweni", 16 December 1984.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 163-164.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 99-100, 124.

Ibid., p. 111.

5Sir : 24 August 1990.

Sowetan : 9 July 1990.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 20.

UDF : "UDF Calls for 1 May as a Public Holiday", 1985 and "UDF Message to Workers on May Day", 1986.

UDF : "March 12 - National Detainees Day", 1986.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 95.

Kane-Berman : pp. 39-41.

1.12k1., pp.37-41.

Ibid., pp. 363-364.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 64.

Citizen : 1 March 1990.

Die Burger : 28 February 1990. 78

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 371-390, and Smuts and Westcott : p. 114.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 398.

G. Mashamba : People's Education, The People's Choice,1991.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 17-19.

Boycott - The practice of boycotting was perfected by the impoverished Irish land agitators a century ago and named after its first victim, Captain Charles Boycott, the land agent of the Earl of Erne (Pretoria News : 1 October 1996), and Smuts and Westcott : p. 24.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 221.

UDF : "Time for Action!", 1985.

UDF : "The CONSUMER BOYCOTT of all shops owned by WHITES & COLLABORATORS must continue!", 1986.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 28-29.

Ibid., p. 26.

Bennett and Quin : pp. 148-152.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 257.

Smuts and Westcott : pp. 127-128.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 259.

Indicator SA, Volume 7, Number 2, Autumn 1990, p. 25.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 261-267.

Indicator SA, Volume 7 Number 2, Autumn 1990, p. 25.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 275-276.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 126.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 119.

UDF : "UDF Resolutions".

UDF : Isizwe. The Nation, Volume 1, Number 1, November 1985, pp. 40- 41, and Volume 1, Number 3, September/October 1986, pp. 3-4. 79

Die Burger : 6 February 1990, and UDF : "Boycott Products of Apartheid", 1987.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, p. 405.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 125.

UDF : "Land for Squatters", 6 January 1991.

Die Burger : 24 July 1990, Beeld : 24 July 1990, Natal Witness : 19 July 1990.

Smuts and Westcott : p. 152.

Sharp : The Politics of ... Part Two, pp. 413-414. 80

CHAPTER 2

THE ORIGIN AND CHARACTER OF THE UDF

At the beginning of the 1980s, organised black opposition to apartheid embraced a wide range of different approaches - from the guerilla insurgents of the exiled political organisations to diverse resistance groups within South Africa. This chapter focuses on a description of the forces, issues and people which combined to fuse black political mass protest against apartheid in a "united front", which ultimately led to the formation of the United Democratic Front. The character of the UDF, in itself a mass-based entity which served as the primary vehicle for mass-based resistance in South Africa during the 1980s, will also be addressed.

1. Changing circumstances favouring mass-based action in the 1980s

1.1. Internal conditions

In the aftermath of the Soweto school riots, the South African government, on 17 October 1977, outlawed nineteen predominantly Black Consciousness-aligned organisations. By 1978, the Black Consciousness (BC) movement, however, resurfaced with the formation of the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO). Although the founders of AZAPO believed that they could both revise and remain committed to the basic precepts of BC, their continued emphasis on black racial identity undermined their ability to grow. The AZAPO leaders' ideological intransigence, limited its impact among the masses and also largely alienated more strategically minded activists. During this same period, a realignment of popular allegiances and ideas concerning internal resistance against the government occurred, beginning a process which largely side-lined AZAPO and the BC movement. A large number of students fled the country in the aftermath of the Soweto uprisings, both to escape arrest and to join the external struggle against the state. During the two years following the uprising, secondary school registration in Soweto dropped by almost 60 percent, with over 20 000 pupils 81 having disappeared from the rolls. According to A.W. Marx, by 1978, 250 students were fleeing the country each month, with the number dropping to about 50 a month by 1979. Although many of these students considered themselves BC supporters, they found that the only viable exile group to join, was either the ANC or PAC, if they wanted access to training, arms and support. With the PAC in disarray, most of these students joined the ANC.'

By the 1980s it was possible to discern a movement away from the BC ideology - which dominated the 1970s - to the ANC and its Freedom Charter. The ANC also declared 1980 The Year of the Freedom Charter2 and this, coupled with the launch of the Free Mandela Campaign, aided the process of a "return to Charterist principles". 3 Within this political realignment of the opposition political spectrum in South Africa - which was largely orchestrated by the ANC from abroad 4 - various rudimentary resistance groups and organisations began to take root by the early 1980s. The Charterist groups also received an influx of young activists who were released, after being imprisoned with prominent ANC leaders such as Nelson Mandela and Walter Sisulu on Robben Island. Of the 31 BC prisoners who arrived from Port Elizabeth on Robben Island during 1976, only five remained in the BC, one joined the PAC, with the remaining 25 all joining the ANC's Charterist camp. All of them were later involved in the UDF and achieved prominent leadership positions.' By early 1983 there existed youth, student, women's, civic and worker's organisations at different levels of development. Their position depended on factors such as regional location, resistance history and the availability of skilled leadership, like those provided by skilled and militant activists, such as the former BC leaders. Cooperation was, however, haphazard and black resistance against the government lacked a body to coordinate mass resistance.'

During this period, South Africa's Western allies became increasingly worried about the situation within the country. Sanctions seemed imminent with a black revolution a mounting possibility. Looking forward to the 1980s, the Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa, singled out six themes that it predicted would become the defining characteristics of black opposition and protest in South Africa for the 82 coming decade :

In the aftermath of the Soweto protests, there was a visible change among young people towards an acceptance of revolutionary violence;

young people also displayed a "growing interest in radical ideology". Discussions of Marxism, socialism, and class analysis, which was employed within their political education training sessions, largely muted the racial exclusiveness and the anti-white sentiment (of the previously dominant black consciousness groups) of the recent past;

an increase of Coloured militancy became a trend, especially among community organisations in the Western Cape. The Coloured community also provided some of the UDF's more prominent leaders;

a growing black unity also appeared, in contrast with the 1970s, with a narrowing gap between black students and their parents, between black students and black workers, and between Coloureds, Blacks and Indians. This reality and change from the past, was one of the reasons which made the UDF a possibility and in the the end a workable entity;

the legalising of black trade unions expanded the power of organised black labour and widened the potential resistance front against the government; and

the ANC showed a resurgence, both in its domestic support as in its

ability to isolate South Africa on the international political arena. '

From the vantage point of 1997, these viewpoints turned out to be substantially accurate. An additional factor, which played a major role throughout the 1980s, was the resurrection of a mass political organisation as the main dynamic of black resistance. 83

Although the guerilla activities of the banned ANC had a symbolic function in the 1980s, it did not pose a serious or immediate threat to the security of the state. (The armed struggle waged by the ANC and its alliance partners in the 1980s, was largely one of armed propaganda aimed to gain international sympathy for their cause. The UDF directly benefitted from this through media exposure and foreign funding.) The new trend, of mass-based internal extra-parliamentary opposition on the other hand, generated a definite crisis for the apartheid government. 8

Two other major influences, however, also contributed largely to shape the overall context in which black resistance in the 1980's was formed : a major economic recession and the government's programme of political reforms. The economic and social factors shaping black protest and the contradictions and tensions flowing from the interaction of these two forces, helped to create the black revolt of the 1980s.

The economic and social factors shaping black protest during the 1980s, were :

the recession that gripped the South African economy since the beginning of 1982, curtailed the brief, but relative prosperity experienced by urbanized blacks during the economic upswing of 1979-1981, causing frustration and a wish for economic empowerment;

a fall in the gold price beginning in 1982 and continuing through 1983 and 1984, which prolonged the recession;

the rising level of unemployment which rose steeply from 1982 to 1984, when 84 000 black workers lost their jobs;

at the same time, although the number of black graduates tripled, they faced long term unemployment;

the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, granting elected township bodies 84

control over basic services in an effort to project a measure of self- governance in the townships. This initiative of the government, however, largely failed and often led to corruption and mal-administration, causing widespread discontent.9

The economic changes and realities which confronted both the state and the opposition groups, played a crucial role in creating the climate for the formation of a real mass- based, internal resistance organisation. During the early 1980s, realities such as an occupational restructuring of black employment and the growth of a skilled black, technical and managerial class, created an increase of consumer power among black South Africans. Along with the growth of black trade unions, these realities formed the foundation and presented the tools, for example consumer boycotts, to enforce a change in society and to take political resistance onto a higher plane. 19

The second factor responsible for the rebirth of organised mass politics, was a shift in government policy. In the early 1980s, the government decided to strengthen its authority by abandoning direct coercion in favour of limited political and institutional accommodation of non-whites. To achieve its objective, the government instituted a series of reforms. The weakening of constraints on organised opposition (through legalised trade unions) was, however, an unintentional consequence of the government's reform programme. The reforms enacted, were :

■ the Industrial Relations Act of 1979, which legalised unions and regulated their conduct, with the aim of confining union activity to the workplace. The result, however, was quite different than envisaged by the government. The black trade unions expanded rapidly in the early 1980's, and their militancy increased despite the provisions in the Act designed especially to curb political activity;

■ the complex constitutional programme announced in 1983, which incorporated Indians and Coloureds into a tricameral parliament, but 85

excluded blacks. This proposal rapidly became a controversial issue between blacks and whites, and ultimately formed a major part in the formation of the UDF as the movement's first protest actions were aimed against the implementation of the tricameral system;

■ the reduction of the use of banning and restriction orders, thereby allowing the return to political life of a number of influential political activists of the 1950s, and the easing of censorship, making it possible for newspapers to devote more coverage to black protest. New, militant publishers also emerged and operated relatively unhindered, with newspapers such as Vrye Weekblad, Weekly Mail, New Nation and others forming a so-called alternative press, attacking the government's disinformation, restrictions and policies . 11

1.2. External conditions

Certain external dynamics also played a role. The independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980, put an insurgent nationalist movement, led by Robert Mugabe, in power. Mugabe's victory created a groundswell of popular expectation among blacks in South Africa, especially in the case of young people. His victory, against the odds, motivated black people in South Africa and reinforced a growing perception of the government's vulnerability against a mass-based programme of protest action and resistance. 12

The ANC campaign of armed propaganda also gathered momentum during the 1980s and sanctions, boycotts and other measures against South Africa increased both in extent and intensity, causing additional pressure on the government.

A balance of payment deficit generated by huge imports of capital equipment during the mini-boom of the late 1970s, creating an unprecedented level of foreign indebtness, causing the government to shift the fiscal burden to the poor by imposing a sales tax increase and further worsened the plight of poor black South Africans. 86

The years following the Soweto uprising therefore saw both internal as well as external issues converging, causing reaction from the population and helped to shape, create and change the climate and conditions in South Africa that would lead to mass activity. These changes played a crucial role in the formation of the UDF in 1983 and represented a turning point in the shift in the balance of power between the South African Government and the black opposition.'

Although the UDF borrowed from the traditions, symbols, iconography, and ideology of the ANC, it reinvented these issues to fit into its own image and expressed them with greater force and resonance. The UDF redirected popular anger at inequality and oppression in the 1980s as the ANC had done in the 1950s, but the changed constituencies that fuelled this anger had changed considerably. By the 1980s black workers had become the dominant force in manufacturing while in the 1950s they were largely confined to unskilled drudgery. New black trade unions were beginning to make an impact in the workplace and to shape the form and content of popular resistance. An ever increasing black middle class had emerged containing junior executive workers and a steady increase in black attendance figures at universities. Between 1965 and 1975 the number of black students attending secondary schools increased fivefold. All this helped to produce a highly politicised generation of black students. Thus, in the major cities, the UDF's constituents which formed the backbone of its resistance base, were increasingly educated participants from an advanced industrial society, rather than the lowclass, uneducated followers of the 1950s. The 1950s slogan, "Amendla ngawethu!"(Power is ours!), which then voiced an aspiration, was again applied by the UDF in the 1980s, but by then it had become an assertion."

Black townships in the early 1980s were fertile ground for a new opposing force to apartheid. The violent Soweto-era had largely ended, but the passions which had caused the eruption, remained. The government had also crushed most of the BC movements that had dominated resistance during the late 1970s, leaving a vacuum in political activity. The UDF was conceived as a means of hitching local mobilisation forces to national resistance objectives and to coordinate protests in response to state 87

reforms. As the UDF was wary of a recurrence of state reaction like those during the 1970s, care was taken to emphasize its independent nature and deny that it was in any way connected or controlled by the ANC, although its aims and declarations put it firmly within the Freedom Charter tradition.'

It was against this background that the UDF was formed as a mass movement, and from where it launched its mass-based protest actions against the government during the 1980s, culminating in the unbanning of black political organisations and the release of Nelson Mandela in 1990. The changes in society created the situation where mass- based resistance and protest became a reality, in contrast with the 1950s where it was only an idealistic goal.

2. The origin of the UDF

2.1. The run-up to the founding of the UDF

The earliest origins of the UDF can be traced back to the campaign waged against the government created South African Indian Council (SAIC) during the late 1960s to the early 1980s. The anti-SAIC campaign was originally waged by the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) and the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC) which, alongside the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), were responsible for the maintenance of the Congress Alliance after the banning of the ANC in 1960 and the Congress of Democrats in 1963. Dr. Yusuf Dadoo - former chairman of the South African Communist Party (SACP) and who also represented the NIC and TIC abroad' - made an appeal in 1969 for a campaign against the SAIC. Dr. Dadoo stated that such a campaign provided an ideal opportunity for mass mobilisation of South Africa's oppressed peoples. 17 Some years later, in 1978, dr. Dadoo - in an article published in World Marxist Review - called for the establishment of a so-called "United Front". 18 The idea to form a united front against the apartheid state, was however, not really new. The Congress Alliance, formed in 1955, could be seen as the frontrunner for a united front. Even the black consciousness groups endeavoured to form a unified front of likeminded 88

groups during 1983 under the leadership of Saths Cooper (AZAPO) and Neville Alexander (Cape Action League - CAL) who established the National Forum (NF). 16 The NF stated categorically that although black people in South Africa were of necessity united in their oppression, it was necessary to create "actual unity of effort in the process of struggle". 2° The view that a unified front needed to be created in order to effectively oppose the state, was therefore one that was held widely. It needed, however, a common catalyst to create the correct circumstances for the creation of such a front. 21 By 1983, the government's intentions of creating the tricameral parliament, presented the liberation organisations - both Charterist and Black Consciousness - with the impetus to form united fronts. Although the NF failed to go beyond their initial activities, the UDF grew in strength and became the major opposition to the state in the 1980s.

Publications such as the ANC's Sechaba, called on the Indian community to boycott the SAIC22 elections of 1981 to illustrate their rejection of the government's attempts to coopt the Indian community and to organise and mobilise for mass protest." The ANC declared 1982 as the "Year of Unity in Action" and referred to the anti-SAIC committees as "our boycott movements" and praised them for the role they played in mobilising people against the elections. The organisation further stated that " [Our] ...task is to present such a formidable front that the enemy and its puppets are defeated once more".24 The anti-SAIC campaign therefore resulted in a low voter turnout for the 1981 SAIC elections. Oliver Tambo (ANC President), in his New Year's Message for 1983, declared the year 1983 as the "Year of United Action" 25 The ANC also called for a "mass offensive" against the South African government26 and later appealed for the establishment of a United Democratic Front. 27 The call for the establishment of some kind of united front, therefore came from a wide variety of individuals, groups and organisations. It seems clear that by 1983, the political situation in South Africa was ready for the establishment of a united front against the state. 89

2.1.1. The Transvaal Anti-SAIC Committee

In January 1983, the Transvaal anti-SAIC Committee (TASC) held a congress in Johannesburg in which NIC officials played a leading role. It was during this meeting that the need for some type of protest body was identified. Those attending the conference identified two immediate goals :

■ There was a need for unity - the wide spectrum of geographical, economical and ethnic divisions, existing within the broad black population in general and liberation groups in particular, needed to be united within a broad, national entity where the liberation struggle as such, could be addressed from a unified platform.

■ An organisation was needed to consolidate the ideas developed during the TASC congress, into a viable programme of action. 28

It was also during this conference that Dr. Allan Boesak made an appeal for the establishment of a "United Democratic Front". 29 This suggestion was accepted by the congress and a steering committee, consisting of representatives from Natal, Transvaal and the Western Cape was appointed to organise the formation of such a front. The first UDF structure was formed in Natal, representing 40 organisations. Structures were formed nationally and representatives were appointed to attend the founding conference in Cape Town in August 1983. 3°

2.1.2. The Koornhof

An additional motivation for the creation of a united front to garner protest, could be found in the promulgation of the so-called Koornhof Bills. The Koornhof Bills (named after the Minister of Cooperation and Development, Piet Koornhof) originated from the Riekert Report regarding labour control measures. The government's proposals included the reform of the influx control system and the introduction of a new 90 constitution. The Koornhof Bills included:

Orderly Movement and Settlement of Black Persons Bill.

Black Community Development Bill.

Black Local Authorities Act of 1982.

The two Bills proposed new measures to control and regulate the presence of Blacks in urban areas, while the Act gave the corrupt and unpopular Black township councils a new range of powers and responsibilities. These new Bills and Act largely acted as catalysts for the UDF's birth - insofar as it contributed to focus resistance on the government's series of so-called reforms - although other political issues that affected the South African political spectrum, also played a role. The Koornhoff Bills played a direct role in igniting black protest - which contributed to the founding of the UDF - while its different regulations ignited black anger and numerous campaigns were organised by the UDF against specific issues covered by the Bill.

2.1.3. Increased activism by trade unions and students

The recently legalised black trade union movement, which originated in Durban in 1973, began to realise its potential power from 1979 and started to challenge state policies. Beginning in the industrial heartlands of the Eastern Cape and the Witwatersrand in 1979, it quickly spread throughout the country, with local organisations mushrooming in black, Coloured and Indian areas. They built up a mass base by campaigning against community-related issues - a base on which the UDF itself, later built. Increasing widespread protest by the youth also occurred, partially motivated by the widespread schools boycott which broke out in Cape Town in the early 1980s. For the first time, such a boycott resulted in coordinated action around education demands between students (under the leadership of the Committee of 81), teachers organised into Teachers Action Committees and parents, which were 91

represented by various area-based Parents Committees. Following that, mass-based community and labour struggles also broke out in the Transvaal during 1981-2. This included a resurgence of Indian politics with the said TASC's campaign against the government-created representative institutions in the Indian areas during whose conference the idea of a united front was mooted32 while an increase in the number of ANC-initiated military attacks, contributed to a revival of the nationalist tradition linked to the ANC. 33

2.1.4. The Tricameral system

By the early 1980s, the South African government proposed the most comprehensive constitutional reforms since 1910. Encouraged by material and political reforms on a local level, the government attempted to channel opposition activity in a less confrontational direction. By granting Coloureds and Indians direct power on a national and local level through the tricameral system and accommodating blacks' political aspirations through local black councils and "independence" in the bantustans, the government hoped to dampen black resistance. 34

The proposed tricameral constitution therefore served as the government's prime effort to modify apartheid and to lessen and divide resistance against the apartheid state from black political groupings. White domination over political decision-making would be preserved while, at the same time, the government would seemingly represent a racially diverse electorate. These moves by the government were interpreted by opposition groups that change was imminent, although the specifics of the change proposed by the state were far from acceptable to the populace. What the government did manage to achieve through its reforms, however, was to push national political issues to the fore of its opposition's agenda, where they were grafted onto local issues in a highly explosive mixture. The very suggestion of reform heightened expectations for further and greater change than was intended by the state, setting loose counter demands which later proved difficult to contain.35 92

The government's proposals were endorsed by former members of the South African Indian Council (SAIC) and the Coloured Labour Party, which had a more substantial following than the Indian parties. The new constitution was seen, however, as proof of the government's commitment to continue apartheid in a diluted form, rather than real reform. As the elections for the Coloured and Indian houses of parliament were only scheduled for August 1984, sufficient time was left for the opponents of the constitution to organise protest action and resistance against the implementation of the tricameral constitution. 36

Mobilisation against the government's proposals for the tricameral parliamentary system began on 22 January 1983, when the TASC held its first conference. This initial protest action quickly gathered momentum with both TASC and NIC spokespersons rejecting the President's Council report regarding the implementation of the tricameral system, calling instead for a national convention to devise a democratic constitution. 37

2.2. The founding of the UDF

Beginning early in 1983, an effort was made to draw together all of those interested in opposing the government's parliamentiary proposals. The BC-orientated groups launched the National Forum while the Charterists aimed to unite a wider, more representative group to oppose a common enemy. They did not insist on adherence to a narrow set of beliefs but welcomed all those interested in opposing a system of white supremacy and national domination, emphasizing that white people in general were not viewed as automatically being part of such a system.'

In February 1983 a conference was held in Cape Town where groups opposed to the state's reform proposals, met to discuss their plans to oppose these initiatives. Two thousand people attended the conference, which was opened by the veteran anti- apartheid activist, Helen Joseph. Other speakers included trade unionists Thozamile Gqweta of the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) and Samson Ndou of the General and Allied Workers Union (GAWU), NIC and TASC officials, and the 93

Reverend, Dr. Alan Boesak, president of the World Alliance of Reformed Churches (WARC). Boesak delivered the keynote address in which he condemned the constitutional reforms and the Labour Party's decision to participate in elections for the Coloured chamber. Boesak argued for the formation of a united front around "an unshakeable conviction in the creation of a non-racial, unitary state", and he called for "unity in struggle" of "all democrats regardless of race, religion, or colour" :

"Our response to the crisis facing us is a dialectical one. It is the politics of refusal, which has within it both the Yes and the No. We must continue to struggle for liberation, freedom, and human dignity of all people in South Africa; and so while we say Yes to this struggle, we say No to apartheid, racial segregation, and economic exploitation of the oppressed masses in South Africa... This is the politics of refusal, and it is the only dignified response black people can give in this situation. In order to do this we need a united front ... There is no reason why churches, civic associations, trade unions, student organisations, and sports bodies should not unite on this issue, pool our resources, inform the people of the fraud which is about to be perpetrated in their name, and on the day of the election expose these plans for what they are.' O9

After the conference, the next six months witnessed intense organisation to bring about the implementation of Boesak's suggestions. The TIC held its formal inaugural meeting on May Day 1983, and a Transvaal Anti-President's Council Committee (TAPCC) was established to consolidate opposition to the constitution in Johannesburg's Coloured townships. In Natal, Transvaal and the Western Cape, public rallies were held to create regional UDF committees and by August, committees were also in place in the Eastern Cape and Orange Free State. A national secretariat began functioning in Johannesburg at the beginning of August. Cape Town was chosen for the official launch of the UDF, reflecting the strength of local organisations, and because parliament was situated there. More organisations joined the protest, including the Western Cape's Federation of Residence Associations (FRA) and the Cape Areas Housing Action Committee (CAHAC). These organisations specifically advocated boycotts of any referenda or 94 elections held specifically for Coloured voters and demanded a unitary parliamentary system based on "One person, One vote". 40

Those who promoted the formation of a front described it as reminiscent of the Congress Alliance of the 1950s. The black consciousness groups were also welcomed, with Boesak acknowledging that they were building upon the achievements of these groups during the 1970s. In short, the overriding factor in the run-up to the formation of the UDF, was a conscious effort to include all possible groups and viewpoints within the front and not to alienate anyone by being prescriptive with regard to ideology and beliefs. In the end, the leaders of the movement to form the UDF, managed to unite a widely disparate group of individuals and organisations in a united front against the apartheid state.

2.3. Launch of the UDF

The official launch of the UDF took place on 20 August 1983, at the Rocklands Community Center in Mitchell's Plain, a Coloured suburb outside Cape Town. Between 6000 and 15 000 people attended the launch. Of these, 1500 were delegates representing over 500 organisations. It was stated that :

"Our historic task now is to bring together all these organisations and all freedom-loving people into one national UNITED DEMOCRATIC FRONT." 41

The conference decided that the UDF would fight both the constitutional proposals, affecting the Coloureds and Indians, and the Koornhof Bills, affecting blacks. The main organisational focus of the UDF campaign, it was concluded, would be

"...at the local and regional levels. Organisations affiliated to the UDF will run campaigns around certain aspects of the new Constitution that affect their membership in a direct way. This is to ensure that the UDF does not simply become a political protest group, but is able to build and strengthen nonracial 95

democratic organisations as an alternative to apartheid itself."'

During the launch, Frank Chikane (one of the conference organisers) proclaimed :

"Comrades and friends, this day today is ... going to go into the records of history as an important event bolstering the tide of the struggle, speeding up that day when people shall say, ' We are free, justice is here, when the people shall live

together as brothers and sisters, without ... exploitation and oppression." 43

The themes of freedom, justice and civil rights were further emphasised in the keynote address, delivered by Allan Boesak, who told the audience :

" We want all of our rights, we want them here, and we want them now." 44

2.4. Issues

Although the UDF's immediate goal, after its founding, was to launch a protest campaign against the elections for the tricameral system and the Koornhof Bills, the resolutions accepted during the conference showed the direction of thinking within the UDF leadership very early on. All the resolutions which were accepted, were aimed to mobilise grassroots support around bread-and-butter issues which affected common people. Poverty, discrimination and oppression were the central issues which the UDF vowed to address in the different sectors which affiliated with the UDF. 45 The UDF also gave a clear indication of its basic strategy when Frank Chikane stated :

"To me the UDF is a beacon of hope for effective mass opposition to stop the so- called 'reform proposals' of the racist regime.'

Women. The UDF concentrated special efforts in mobilising women. Especially in the rural areas - where most of the men had left to work in the urban areas - women played a leading role in the organisation of UDF campaigns. The more depressing aspects of 96 apartheid life in the townships also affected women in many instances more severely than men. Many had to run a household singlehandedly. Women as a group, were therefore specially targeted to get involved in specific protest campaigns while special upliftment programmes were also initiated to improve their positions. A UDF's Women Congress was founded in 1987 to ensure that all campaigns of the Front were organised in such a way as to facilitate the maximum participation of women. Women also played a crucial role in civic organisations, and were particularly active in the locally based street and area committees, for which a fair number were arrested throughout the 1980s. It was calculated that at least 12% of detainees (meaning at least 3 050) during the state of emergency of 1986/87, were women.'

Youth and education. The UDF stated clearly that it fully supported the struggles being waged by students and reiterated the demand for a single, non-racial and democratic system of education. The UDF also endeavoured to unite students, teachers, parents and community organisations in the struggle for democratic education. 48 Since 1976, the black youth played a prominent part in resistance against the government. Between 1983 and 1986, mass protest action by students reached an unprecedented intensity. In almost all campaigns of the UDF, black youths were at the forefront of events. Young activists were involved in politicising the community, engineering work stay-aways and enforcing consumer boycotts. The youth also bore the brunt of the state's retaliation and thousands were detained. They reacted with further violence, physically attacking state structures and fellow blacks perceived as collaborators. 49 Although the response by the youth was massive, there came a time when little was left of classic mass action tactics - resistance basically spiralled down towards a low intensity civil war between the youth and the authorities. Youth affiliates, were formed in almost every town and village of the country, and were centrally organised through the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), which was affiliated to the UDF. The UDF's aims with the youth were "to unite and politicise the youth; to channel their militancy and resourcefulness to the benefit of the struggle; ...".' The UDF also attempted to widen its powerbase among the youth by mobilising white, but especially English-speaking students. The UDF had some success with this with 97

organisations such as the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS), which affiliated with the UDF and supported its initiatives. 51

Housing. Problems with housing affected almost all of the UDF's supporters and the campaigns organised around this issue became one of the UDF's permanent focus points in its resistance and protests against the government. 52 Massive rent boycotts became widespread from 1984, which pressurised the state's economic abilities severely. 53 The UDF, through its affiliates and supporting organisations, launched campaigns against forced removals 54, the bantustans55 and segregated townships. 56

Workers. The UDF accepted a resolution to strengthen unity between the community and democratic trade unions. Although the majority of trade unions did not affiliate with the UDF, several campaigns, like massive stay-aways, were jointly organised and executed. The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), stated during 1984 that it strongly believed in unity among those belonging to the mass popular resistance movement against the government, and encouraged independent unions to affiliate with the UDF, although SACTU itself decided not to affiliate itself with the UDF, but rather formed an alliance with the UDF. 57

Detentions, political prisoners and exiles. The UDF accepted resolutions calling for the release of all political prisoners, the safe, unconditional return of exiles and the repeal of all security legislation. The UDF launched regular campaigns around these topics throughout the 1980s as its leaders were detained, banned and convicted by the authorities. 58

2.5. Leadership - organisational set-up and profile

The UDF was the first internal anti-apartheid liberation movement in decades to assemble a leadership of national stature. A varied leadership profile further enhanced the UDF's broad acceptability as a wide variety of interest groups and sectors were accommodated within the leadership cadre. 98

The UDF leadership was composed of a heterogeneous social and multi-classed grouping, with a large proportion of its leaders coming from a poor working class background and the other sectors (community, church, women's, youth, etc organisations) of civil society. The inclusivity of the UDF allowed for a diverse leadership with different views. Also, those leaders who had formed the UDF's constituent organisations, remained active mostly on a local level, with little direct, formal control over the national leadership. This structure allowed the leadership to remain flexible enough to respond to changing circumstances and to accommodate its diverse constituents and affiliates. The national leadership preserved unity by coordinating campaigns and local activities. 59

The UDF's national leadership therefore, came from a diverse background. Its composition, however, reflected the effects of enforced racial segregation and the lingering suspicion of some blacks towards whites, as the National Executive Committee (NEC) included no whites. In the regional executives, several whites were however, elected. The UDF's patrons - associated by name rather than actions - included a more representative mix of society. 6°

The UDF's leadership was dominated by middle-class professionals, which included teachers, lawyers, clergy and medical practitioners, but also included leaders with a working class background. The UDF's racial classification differed from previous profiles in that Coloureds and whites played a much more important role. Indians were again well represented within the leadership while Xhosas and Zulus dominated the black leadership contingent. 61

The UDF's different affiliates were based on local and constituent interests, with in most cases separate white, Coloured, Indian and black groups, which organised separately under their own local leadership. The UDF only managed to remain strong as long as these groups found that the pursuit of their specific agendas were advanced by cooperation with other affiliates and the UDF. The UDF managed to build a mass- based movement through the loyalty of grassroots-based affiliates which proved 99 stronger than individual allegiance to a political entity would have been.' That is the main reason why the UDF never had a personalised membership, but only a loose allegiance to the UDF's principles which were executed through the different affiliates, in many cases by grassroots leadership, which in turn enabled the UDF to truly become a mass-based front and to launch campaigns which touched the masses on a national basis. Were it not for the role played by grassroots and local leaders, the UDF would never have gained the prominence it enjoyed.

From its inception in 1983, the UDF launched an intensive national mobilisation campaign, featuring the above-mentioned leaders, making intensive and maximum use of the local and foreign media coverage. This initial high level of media coverage, coupled with the high profile type of leaders presenting the UDF to the populace, ensured that the UDF very quickly built up a large following while hunderds of organisations affiliated themselves to the UDF. 63 a. Veteran activists

The UDF's patrons, spokespersons and office holders, spanned four generations of black political protest. Veterans of the mass campaigns of the 1950s included old ANC stalwarts like Archie Gumede (his father was ANC president during the 1920s) from Natal and Oscar Mpetha (prominent ANC leader/SACTU trade unionist during the 1950s) from Cape Town, and women leaders like Albertina Sisulu (wife of Walter Sisulu). There were also survivors of the first Umkhonto we Sizwe guerilla offensive of 1961-65, like Curnick Ndlovu (National Chairperson of the UDF) and Steve Tswete (UDF Border Regional Executive). Several political activists who have served lengthy prison sentences in the 1960's and 1970's, also played prominent roles, like Joe Mati of East London and Anthony Malgas of Cape Town.' These veterans had the background and training to provide leadership and direction during the early part of the UDF's existence while a new generation of activists were being trained and identified. They also provided a link between the earlier protest campaigns of the 1950s and 1960s and helped to identify those aspects that caused previous campaigns to fail. 100

Indian activists

A proportionally large number of Indian activists played a leading role as UDF leaders. They were predominantly veterans from Indian Congress politics and particularly those responsible for the revival of the NIC in 1971 and the TIC during 1983. Although the revival of ethnic-based organisations were criticised in some quarters, the NIC and the TIC, and its leadership, played an integral part in the UDF insofar as organisation, financial administration and as a conduit towards white interests, were concerned.' Mewa Ramgobin and George Sewpershad from Natal, were two of the best known Indian leaders.

Black Consciousness Movement activists

Some of the UDF's best and politically sophisticated leaders graduated from the ranks of the Black Consciousness Movement (BCM), which reached its highpoint during the early and mid-1970s. These individuals included prominent UDF figures like Mkhuseli Jack from Port Elizabeth, and Curtis Nkondo, Popo Molefe, Terror Lekota and Aubrey Momoana from Johannesburg. A large number of the UDF's grassroots leadership, active in youth congresses, civics and trade unions, included people politicised by the BCM during the 1970s. Many had served prison terms, where they came in contact with veteran ANC activists, who by and large convinced them to drop the exclusivist black nationalism of the BCM and rather adopt the non-racialism framework of the Charterist tradition. 66 These younger, more militant leaders provided the drive and spark which the UDF needed to expand and to reach a wider support base. They were also not afraid to engage the state directly and served as an inspiration for the UDF's grassroots support base. d. Post-1976 activists

In the aftermath of the Soweto riots, a new generation of political leaders emerged whose first political experiences were derived from the construction of youth, 101 community, trade union and student organisations. These grassroots leaders played an increasingly important role in the UDF during the mid-1980s, as the authorities detained the more well-known and seasoned UDF activists. Student leaders such as Peter Mokaba (chairman of SAYCO), suddenly found themselves responsible for ensuring the continuance of the UDF's activities in an increasingly hostile environment and difficult conditions and played a decisive role in especially the street and area committees at a local level. 67 Students organised on a national basis through the UDF- affiliated Congress of South African Students (COSAS). Its leadership concentrated on short term issues affecting education as a basis for mobilising students and then used the level of organisation thus achieved as a platform for action on national political issues, invariably connecting with UDF-initiated campaigns. During 1984, COSAS also managed to increase its branches substantially and at the same time broadening its leadership cadre. These initiatives made COSAS for the first time a real mass movement, which slotted in neatly with the UDF-coordinated, national movement." e. Church leaders

Church leaders from the mainline churches, like Alan Boesak (former moderator of the Dutch Reformed Missionary Church) and Frank Chikane (South African Council of Churches - SACC), played a prominent role during the run-up to the founding of the UDF, and stayed involved with the UDF throughout the 1980s. In many cases church leaders took the lead during protest action and marches as the government, although presenting a hardline stance against protest action, was generally loath to act harshly against clerics. Other prominent clerics within the UDF's leadership structures included Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Anglican Church), Beyers Naude (Christian Institute) and Father Smangaliso Mkwatsha (Secretary-general of the South African Catholics Bishops Council - SACBC). Religious leaders from the Muslim and Hindu denominations also played a leading role within the UDF. Some of the Indian leaders from a TIC/NIC (Muslim/Hindu) background in particular, referred to Ghandist philosophy and took Gandhi's teachings very seriously and tried to implement his teachings into UDF activities.69 102

The rhetoric of the UDF's leaders from a religious background were on the whole more conservative than the radical utterances of the working class leaders. They referred and proscribed to divinely ordained human rights and liberal conceptions of individual liberty. 70 The churches were, however, accused of creating a climate in which people felt they could use violence, free from moral restraint, because certain church leaders felt that the activities of the radical youth was a necessary evil that had to be endured in order to rid South Africa of a greater evil - apartheid!'

Trade unionists

Although the majority of the UDF's leadership came from a strong middle-class background, part of its success could be attributed to its strong contingent of trade unionists which gave the UDF access to the massive black working-class group. These trade unionists included SACTU veterans like Oscar Mpetha, Billy Nair and Christmas Tinto. 72 Leaders with a trade union background were good organisers and hardened activists. They contributed to the development and strengthening the UDF's internal organisation, especially at grassroots level, which was a critical pre-condition for the UDF's ability to launch, and maintain, its campaigns of protest.

Regional leadership profiles

Mark Swilling (Head of the Business School, University of the Witwatersrand) used a sample of 62 UDF executive regional leaders and found the following distribution :

Working class - 33 Teachers/Lecturers - 16 Doctors/Nurses/Social workers - 4 Lawyers - 5 Priests - 2 Technicians - 2 Students - 2 103

This profile reflects a working class and intellectual/professional leadership, which differed from region to region. The UDF's leadership profile differed from the leadership profiles of other black political organisations such as AZAPO and lnkatha which had relatively few working class leaders."

The UDF's Eastern Cape leadership largely consisted of individuals from a poor working class background. The regional executive included the president Edgar Ngoyi, a painter and a political prisoner on Robben Island (he served 17 years after being imprisoned during the 1950s). It also included Henry Fazzie, the vice-president, who was a full-time trade unionist during the 1940-50s and served a sentence on Robben Island and Stone Sizani, the publicity secretary, a blue collar worker who became a trade union organiser. Michael Dube, the recording secretary, was a common worker at Nova Board. Only Derek Swartz, the general secretary and Matthew Goniwe (later killed by the security police), the regional organiser, were professionally employed, both in the teaching profession with Goniwe a headmaster. 74

The Western Cape regional executive had a slightly different profile. The president, Oscar Mpetha, who used to be a petrol pump attendant, was imprisoned for his political activities and after his release, remained unemployed and worked full time for the UDF. The vice-president, Christmas Tinto, originally a mineworker from the Transvaal, came to Cape Town as a migrant labourer and became an organiser for the ANC linked to SACTU. He was also imprisoned and remained unemployed after his release, partially due to police harassment. The rest of the executive consisted of teachers, lecturers, community leaders and students."

The Transvaal executive provided the most representative social profile of the UDF as a whole. It was the youngest group of the regional leadership structures and had an unusually high proportion of people (ten - like Popo Molefe and Mohammed Valli Moosa), who worked in youth organisations during the 1970s and 1980s. 76

The Natal leadership fell largely into a professional/middle-class category. They 104 belonged, however, in the intellectual rather than entrepeneurial middle-class. Mobilised youth were well represented on the executive, both generationally and with youth organisation office-bearers. Organised labour was under-represented in Natal - it was limited to two 1950s veterans - mainly because of the geographical distance between Natal and the contemporary mainstream trade unionism!'

These regions represented the main strength of the UDF. The other smaller regions, such as the Orange Free State and the homelands, had a more multifaceted leadership profile. These more rural regions played a lesser role and were not always involved in the high-profile protest actions organised in the urban centres.

It is therefore clear that the UDF had a varied leadership. Initially, the older generation of seasoned activists, played a leading role in the UDF. As these leaders were increasingly isolated (due to detentions and bannings), a new generation of leaders became more prominent. They were younger, more educated and consisted mainly of student leaders and trade unionists. 78 h. Ideological profile

The UDF's leadership reflected quite a heterogeneous class composition which was mirrored in the UDF leaders' ideological make-up. All the UDF's major affiliates subscribed to the national democratic programme of the Freedom Charter, which called firstly for the dismantling of the apartheid state and secondly for the establishment of a democratic, non-racial unitary state based on the fundamental principles adopted in the Freedom Charter. Although this programme also called for the dismantling of white capitalist power-structures, most of the UDF leaders were not socialist in their outlook, but rather anti-capitalist and reflected a concern to present the UDF's ideology in a way to reflect its multi-faceted character. At the same time, however, a debate raged in UDF publications, arguing that the extent to which the South African "revolution" culminated in a socialist order, depended largely on whether the working class managed to dominate the front and by doing so, steering the UDF-inspired struggle 105 towards a workerist, socialist solution. 79

Common adherence to the national democratic programme and strategies by the different UDF affiliates, did not rule out a difference of emphasis and interpretation. UDF leaders from a trade union background, openly depicted the anti-apartheid struggle as a class struggle with socialist slogans and viewpoints dominating their speeches. This was especially true of the Eastern Cape UDF leaders. 8° Several UDF campaigns, which included boycotts, were presented from a socialist viewpoint of an "injury to one is an injury to all", with an emphasis on the exploitation of workers by the bosses. Rent boycotts and strikes were presented to provide an explicit class analysis of the relationship between workplace and community. In a discussion paper distributed in the Transvaal, entitled "Organising for People's Power", this approach was clearly discernable:

"The growth of the labour movement and the emergence of worker leaders not only in trade union struggles but in relation to student and civic battles as well, highlighted the fact that our struggle is not only against the government but against the bosses who own and control the key sources of wealth and development. Their vested interests stand directly in the way of the needs and aspirations of the working class. ... For example, most people cannot afford to pay rent. The rents themselves are not that high however. They are only crippling because people are paid poverty wages. The fight for lower rents must

go hand in hand with the struggle for a living wage." 81

2.5.2. Sectors and organisations involved

The organisational foundation of the UDF was rooted firmly in local communities throughout the country. Beyond these local affiliates, the UDF's regional and national executives provided a set of national leaders, spokespersons, symbols, patrons and ideas that endowed local organisations with a national identity and worked out strategies, coordinated campaigns and served as a central, direction-giving entity. 106

Local struggles were presented by UDF leaders as component parts of the national struggle. Graeme Bloch, a member of the Western Cape regional executive of the UDF, stated:

"At the very least, leadership is responsible for thorough and ongoing political assessment at a national level and for outlining a range of options and responses that may be fed back into the various affiliates. This does not grow spontaneously in a simple one-way fashion from the day-to-day concerns of affiliates, and at its ideal serves to enhance and give direction to their ongoing

campaigns." 82

3. The character of the UDF

3.1. Background

Before the early 1980s, black resistance in South Africa relied more on mobilisation than on organisation. Protest was also invariably a more reactive than a pro-active effort to engage the state in an organised manner. The opposition organisations lacked the ability to organise on a national front, with the result that protest tended to gravitate around specific issues with charismatic leaders able to mobilise large numbers of people on the spot. The resistance movements were, however, unable to weld this following into an organised and disciplined movement which could seriously pressurise the government into change. They repeatedly discovered to their detriment that numbers are no guarantee for strength and success. Thus, although the resistance movements had the masses on their side, demographically speaking, the government was time-and-again able to crush their initiatives by acting against the leadership corps.'

A new approach began to emerge during the mid-1970s with the growth and formalising of the trade union movement. Part of their success was in their strategy to base the unions on a grassroots approach. They argued that the collective strength of their 107 members, in an organised and disciplined fashion, was a more effective guarantee of power than a charismatic leadership. The unions also eschewed high-profile campaigns in order to build a disciplined power base which could withstand repression and back demands with organised muscle. Bargaining became a key weapon in the union's attempt to wield collective power and union office-bearers developed skills which enabled them to fight more ambitious battles. As their organisational set-up was spread across a broad grassroots-based approach, the state could not immobilise the movement by arresting the leaders, as there was always a leader on a lower level available to step into the breach. Ironically the detentions suffered by the top trade union leaders in the end served them well as it automatically broadened the leadership base of the trade union movement, ensuring that the government could not effectively counter the trade unions. The UDF followed the same principle by employing the leaders of all the different sectors of its grassroots affiliates to ensure a continuous process in its actions against the government."

The support for the UDF was characterised by two basic factors which ensured its influence :

■ Firstly, it was perceived by both its supporters and opponents as the internal heir to the ANC tradition which gave it a powerful symbolic appeal. It also successfully used the media and the symbols of the Congress tradition to project itself as the standard bearer of the nationalist movement. This, largely, gave the UDF its substantial domestic and international influence.

■ Secondly, although some of the UDF's high-profile leadership sought to emulate the high-profile protest politics of the earlier Congress tradition, it also built an extensive network of civic, student and youth organisations which formed the frontline of militant resistance within the townships. Because of its grassroots approach, the UDF also managed to spread resistance to small rural communities that were politically dormant for 108

decades, thereby broadening the resistance base as never before in the history of resistance against apartheid. 85

The UDF realised that the masses were to be called up in large numbers and employed correctly if they were to triumph over apartheid. The whole concept of resistance had to be adapted to avoid the same fate as their predecessors. The concept of "people's power", therefore had to become a reality for the movement.

3.2. The amorphous character of the UDF

The character of the UDF was complex as it was described as an organisation, a movement, a protest group, a mass organisation, a grassroots movement, an expression of people's power and a front at various times. 86 Although the UDF's basic characteristic remained - as a resistance front - it was forced to adapt at various times as it evolved as an organisation and when forced to change strategies in order to counter state measures.

These characteristics together, and at different times, made up the UDF's character while its varied ideological character, also played a role to influence people's perceptions of the UDF at various times, culminating in different conclusions regarding its role in the struggle. For example, by being selective, the government was able to make a case that the UDF was a communist puppet bent on overthrowing the government. It is therefore almost impossible to present a clearcut character profile of the UDF. Because of the large variety of different people, groups and viewpoints accommodated within the UDF, it had, at best, an amorphous character. The one clearcut characteristic that can be identified, was that the UDF was committed to change South Africa by destroying apartheid. In this goal, they used their prime weapon extensively - the power of the masses. 109

3.3. The influence of the concept of "People's Power"

Before the 1980s, the concept of People's Power was just a slogan. During the 1980s and the era of UDF-driven protest and resistance, it became a reality, forcing activists to define it more specifically and practically. The struggle against the state was broadened to include all aspects of civil society, all those structures and entities that together, reinforced the state's political, social and economic status quo. Activists therefore saw the formation of grassroots-based civic organisations as a way to unite people in the struggle. Their activities were, however, somewhat limited. They were not consistent or programmatic and almost never had a clearly defined strategy. The process of politicising residents succeeded by raising the political consciousness of participants. A large number of civics already existed when the UDF was formed while numerous new civics were formed nationally, broadening the UDF's access to the townships. The UDF used these existing civics to gain access to the masses and built their campaigns and organisation on them and the other affiliates. 87

The UDF managed to unite the different sectors of society, as well as the trade unions, in a united front against the government. As the struggle spread and intensified, a pattern of resistance became clear. A confrontation would occur in a particular constituency - for example a school boycott by students - but would soon spread to involve other groups such as parents until it escalated into a township-wide uprising. The government would respond with violence and clashes would occur. What began as a student uprising would then have spread to involve the youth, parents and workers in a militant confrontation with the authorities. In the process the students' demands would be supplemented by national political demands - the organisational role provided by the UDF - which led to regional and national campaigns such as boycotts and stayaways. 88

This phase of the struggle (roughly about 1984 to 1987) was linked to the emerging culture of people's power, as well as the ANC's call for the people to make themselves and the country ungovernable. 89 This call for people's power formed a central part of 110 the ANC's ideology since at least 1985. During April 1985, the ANC called for " ... the replacement of the collapsing government stooge community councils with people's power" and on 8 January 1986 made the statement that "[77he seeds of people's power are beginning to germinate and spread their roots. People's committees, street committees and comrades' committees are emerging on a growing scale as popular organs in place of the collapsed racist stooge administrations. People's courts, people's defence militia and other popular organs, ....challenging the legitimacy [of the state]." 9° The ANC's slogan during 1987 further illustrated this initiative - it named 1987 as the Year of Advance to People's Power and built this message into all its propaganda, speeches and initiatives. 91

This issue of People's Power continued to be a central message from the ANC to the domestic organisations, and especially the UDF, to create alternative structures in order to make People's Power a de facto reality. Having suspended and in some cases destroyed apartheid control, students and residents were confronted with the challenge of prolonging their ungovernability - by governing themselves. The ANC's strategic call again proved to be spot-on. It called for the people to build "organs of people's power".92 These "alternative structures" became the norm in several townships around the country with the UDF playing an integral part in its conception and maintenance. 93

The concept of People's Power formed an intrinsic part of the UDF's ideological character. The collapse of township administrations during 1985-86 was the motivating factor behind the UDF's efforts to build and consolidate People's Power. UDF leaders used the term to refer to the assumption of administrative, judicial, welfare and cultural functions by local civic and youth organisations. People's power also manifested in modest local projects, like street cleaning by local residents' groups, the creation of "people's parks" named after heroes from the liberation struggle, and more ambitious projects, such as creating their own teaching syllabuses. 94 The UDF's efforts through its local affiliates to administer civil and criminal justice, the socalled people's courts, were direct challenges to the state's moral authority, and also caused the greatest backlash by the state.95 These strategies of the UDF will be adressed more thoroughly 111 in chapter four.

3.4. The UDF as an organisation

The UDF served as the organisational core of a vast political movement opposed to apartheid, giving direction to protest and resistance from a national through to a local level. From the very start the UDF illustrated its organisational capacity when members from local organisations throughout the country attended its inaugural conference. 96

The formal organisational set-up of the UDF ranged from a federation of regional bodies - each of which served as a front or umbrella structure for highly diverse affiliated organisations - to a coordinating structure on a national level. These affiliates were comprised of all the different sectors of civil society. They existed independently and remained fairly autonomous from the UDF. 97

The UDF was not a political party and therefore did not have any branches or allowed for individual or personal membership. It did, however, have structures at national, regional and sub-regional levels. These structures organised UDF campaigns, produced pamphlets and flyers, helped to build affiliates at local level as well as in the different sectors, channeled funds as well as playing a general coordinating role. The integral feature of the UDF, which causes trouble to scholars in clearly defining the character and nature of the UDF, was the fact that its structures and objectives were only loosely specified. 98 The UDF also never had a constitution, but instead adopted a Declaration and certain Working Principles which were relatively vaguely-worded. 99 This informality and lack of clarity on issues of strategy, accountability, direction and character, caused an ongoing debate within the UDF, which in time led to animosities between members which eventually hastened the dissolution of the UDF in 1991. 100 These dynamics, were however, largely suppressed during the years of the states of emergency when the UDF was fighting for survival. It was only from 1989, when the UDF had more freedom of movement, and the ANC was unbanned, that these diffrences became more prominent. 112

UDF leaders also saw the Front's roles to be different from its affiliates. They argued that the UDF's role was to provide the strategic vision to oppose state reforms while building an organisation in disorganised communities. This should not be the responsibility of local affiliates. The result was increased pressure on the UDF to develop structures, under the UDF's name, separate from its affiliates. The looseness of the UDF's structure and its role relative to those of its affiliates' were therefore important and useful as the UDF was continuously forced by state actions to adapt its strategy and tactics. 101

The organisational framework of the UDF was designed to allow for the acceptance and coordination of groups with diverse and changing views and to avoid potential destructive opposing ideological views from rupturing the front. General principles were also kept purposefully vague so as to make a coalition of various interest groups and affiliates from a wide variety of sectors, a working reality. Local leaders had little direct formal control over the national leadership, allowing the leadership to remain flexible enough to respond to its diverse constituents and to change tactics when necessary. 102 With its diverse leadership, coalition of groups and vagueness on ideology, the UDF managed to achieve cohesion in the manner of all popular fronts, and depended more on organisational affiliation than on individual beliefs. 103

The UDF's organisational structure and strategic focus also managed to facilitate fundraising and also included white affiliates which provided useful contacts. Fundraising became one of the main organisational tasks of the UDF's leadership. The UDF's access to massive funding made possible its strategy of mass mobilisation, the provision of services, publicity, the coordination of affiliates and appointment of fulltime organisers to coordinate national protest campaigns. 104

The UDF had resources which were denied to previous resistance efforts during the 1950s to the 1970s. Its organisational structures were activated to gain publicity and register protest successes, thereby encouraging the affiliation of many more local groups and coordinating resistance. Therefore, in contrast with previous resistance 113 groupings, the UDF had the resources to launch widespread protest and resistance and to ensure that the effort snowballed, after which the UDF's organisational structures just ensured that the effort stayed on track.

3.5. The UDF as a protest group

Protest was the key word in the UDF's origin. Initially the UDF was formed to present a unified protest front against the tricameral parliament, but later became the central coordinator of protest and resistance in South Africa against full democratic rights for the disenfranchised masses. The UDF was therefore also the embodiment of a protest group.

The basic characteristics of protest groups are twofold :

Firstly, protest groups claim to represent the rights of certain repressed individuals or groups within a specific political system.

Secondly, protest groups use specific strategies, tactics and methods to highlight their grievances, to pressurise the political powers and ultimately to force change and concessions. 1'

The UDF did both. It united the wide variety of groups active in the struggle against apartheid and embarked on a coordinated, planned strategy of mass action to enforce change in South Africa.

Political protest groups differ from small groups of disgruntled people to a mass movement when a substantial part of a group is exposed to the same situation, for example repression by the state as in the South African situation. Protest then changes from an effort to overturn a specific problem to an effort to transform a whole political system. Different factors influence the origin of protest groups. Factors like urbanisation, industrialisation, political systems and social mobilising, all play a role in 114 the formation of specific protest groups. Protest groups thus form around specific perceptions and thus have a certain relationship with the political powers. 106

Protest groups originate from clashes between political systems and the populace. When a situation arises where no compromise is possible, or the state reacts forcefully to protest, protest groups tend to become formalised, organised and more orientated to achieve a specific goal. A situation also arises where individuals are moved to join such a protest group in order to better their own positions. 107

In the South African context, protest was an ongoing process for more than seventy years since the founding of the ANC in 1912. Protest was on the whole however sporadic, restricted and reactive. Only once or twice did the liberation movements try to launch a bigger, pro-active initiave, like the Defiance Campaign during 1952 and the Anti-Pass Campaign of 1960. Both ended in failure, mainly because the general black populace did not join in the protests in any significant numbers. During the UDF years, the situation was quite different. As the states of emergency, bannings and detentions touched more and more peoples' lives, more and more became involved until the rolling mass action campaigns of the late 1980s could not be effectively suppressed by the government anymore and a change of the status quo was forced on the government.

Opposition against the system has the purpose of pressurising the authorities into granting concessions. A two-fold situation thus arises where protest groups and a political system interact, causing instability to the system. Firstly, the political system/state can grant initial concessions and launch reforms, only causing the protesters to demand more concessions that the government feels it cannot grant. The state then usually starts acting more authoritarian, causing polarisation between the state and the protesters. Secondly, initial reform can cause greater optimism among protest groups, causing them to pressurise the government more and more. Protest groups also become radicalised and join forces with revolutionary forces. The state is thus confronted with a unified front which is better organised and able to launch a campaign across a wide spectrum.108 115

This was the situation in South Africa during the final UDF years of protest. The UDF campaigned within South Africa while the ANC intensified the external struggle through sanctions, propaganda, and military activities, against the country. This campaign was coordinated to a certain extent and lines of communication existed between the UDF and the ANC (in which Steve Tswete - UDF leader in the Border region - played an integral role as UDF leader and ANC underground cadre)." With this joint external and internal resistance, the UDF and ANC managed to exercise maximum pressure on the South African Government, ultimately leading to the concessions and negotiations from 1990 onwards.

System stability is thus directly linked to the state's ability to neutralise protest groups, either by concessions or force, in order to prevent mobilisation against the system. If the state should fail, protest groups can force a change from a stable to an unstable system.' 1°

The UDF managed to orchestrate such a situation. The South African government was put in a position where the country was on the threshold of ungovernability. By a combination of force and concessions, the government was, however, for a period of time, able to forestall an all-out revolution and anarchy. In the end, however, the UDF managed to destabilise the system to such an extent, that the government's "capitulation" was inevitable.

Seen against the background of the reason for the formation of protest groups, an overriding solidarity and common cause is accepted. Protest groups' support base, although not affecting their influence, do contribute to their composition. The following determinants regarding the influence of a protest group, may thus be taken into account.

Firstly, its physical influence, such as size, composition, finances, logistics and infrastructure plays an important role. There is however some difference of opinion among scholars regarding these attributes. H. Eckstein (British academic who 116 researched pressure groups) lists the above-mentioned attributes as a major factor in the influences of protest groups', while P. Willets (British academic who researched pressure groups in the global system) argues that a protest group's influence does not necessarily correlate to its physical attributes, but rather to the techniques employed by such groups. He further makes the point that a protest group with several thousand members can be less successful than a group with only a handful of members that employs the correct protest techniques. 112 In the case of the UDF, both views were applicable. The masses the UDF had at its disposal, did play a role with regard to state reaction. The fear of black engulfment had for decades been a psychological factor in the undercurrent of the Afrikaner/white psyche. Elections have been fought, and won, on this theme. An overreaction to the UDF's mass-based tactics, was therefore not unexpected. In the end, the UDF's tactics and techniques, which underlied its mass- based strategy, proved too much for the South African government to counter indefinitely, leading to the 1990 settlement. 113

Secondly, the qualitative character of protest groups as a factor of influence, can be accentuated. The abilities of a protest group's leaders, are quite relevant.'" The leadership has the responsibility to politically organise and mobilise their supporters to join the protest group's activities. Good and effective leaders, can improve the influence of a protest group immeasureably. 115 The UDF had good and efficient leadership at the top, and more importantly, on all levels down to grassroots leadership. They also trained their own activists in the "mechanics of protest" and was therefore able to continue functioning after the government's clampdowns on the UDF started and many UDF leaders were detained or involved in orchestrated treason trials. The process of training activists had already started in the aftermath of the Soweto school protests so that when the UDF was formed, a cadre of experienced activists was available to take the lead and to train additional activists." 6

The access of protest groups to political figures and the community at large, constitutes a third factor of influence. Especially for mass-based protest groups, this factor is essential."' The UDF used its high-profile patrons to good effect. They were respected 117 and influential individuals who interceded on behalf of the UDF with the government, foreign organisations and governments, to obtain funding and moral support, pushed for sanctions and pressurised the government on a higher level.

A fourth determinant regarding the influence and characteristics of protest groups, is the measure to which the political authority allows protest action. The state's actions, policies, structures and attitude regarding protest, determines the type and channels of protest and the adaptability of protest groups. It will ultimately determine the protest groups' ability to survive state actions like arrests, bannings, detention of leaders as well as accommodation to a certain extent. A protest groups' influence in this regard can be measured in its ability to counter these type of state actions. 118

A dearth of quantitative as well as qualitative factors, coupled with government repression, can thus neutralise a protest group's influence and ability to enforce change. If however, a protest group can successfully counter these negative factors, and could still implement protest action in spite of these anti-protest measures, its influence will continue to grow and such a group will be successful. The UDF managed to do this. It managed to pressurise the government for almost a decade and managed to keep its agenda of protest and resistance alive despite two states of emergency and other additional reppressive state measures.

3.6. The UDF as a united resistance front

The idea of a single, united, mass-based political resistance front, had been a dream among anti-apartheid activists in South Africa for decades before the actual formation of the UDF in 1983. The UDF was in fact seen by those promoting the formation of such a front to resist the government, as a continuance of the Congress Alliance of the 1950s, which stood for unity in action and accepted the fact that all organisations coming together had differences of class, differences of ideology, differences of intent, but that all of them agreed that they rejected the reform proposals of the government. 118

Defining what a front represented, what its aims were and how it was composed, is relatively straightforward. What is complex, however, is the different undercurrents and ideologies affecting the direction and activities of a front. Sisa Njikelana (SAAWU official), during an argument on why the trade unions did not join the UDF, gave the following definition of a front :

"A front is an alliance of a broad spectrum of autonomous organisations of different class origins who come together having identified a common political grievance. It is a forum, a rallying point, providing the structural form which guarantees the broadest possible unity in action of different social groups. It is a mechanism that ensures the maximum concentration of energies and resources of organisations previously acting independently." 119

The call for a united front came to the fore early in the 1980s. The idea of such a front was discussed as early as 1981 among the black consciousness groupings such as the Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO).' The AZAPO leaders took the initiative and established the National Forum (NF) during the weekend of 11-12 June 1983. The NF was intended to be a "non-partisan, non-party-political national effort'. It was also intended to become a vehicle through which ideological differences could be resolved as well as to mobilise and to consolidate protest and resistance.' Ideological differences within the NF played a major role however, to inhibit its growth and influence. Also, the UDF - which was formed two months after the NF in August 1983, was critisized as a "popular front" which was committed to a "struggle for civil rights" rather than a "civil war", a view popular among the NF's more radical followers. Because of these inherent divisive issues, the NF was shortlived while the UDF managed to endure. One of the main reasons the UDF succeeded where the NF failed, was because the UDF managed to accommodate a wide variety of viewpoints and ideologies while the NF was destroyed from within by irreconcilable differences. 122

Alan Boesak's call for the formation of a united front in January 1983, was also not solely in response to the threat posed by the state and to protest against the tricameral 119 system, but also an attempt by the Charterist 123 leadership to secure the control of and to take the lead ahead of non-Charterist fronts, like the NF. According to Cassim Salojee (one of two UDF treasurers), everyone who was committed to a unitary South Africa could be included in the UDF. 124 During the UDF's Million Signatures Campaign in protest against the tricameral system, campaign organisers were advised :

"Remember there are many different points of view in the UDF. ...Try to find common ground in opposing apartheid, rather than points of difference. UDF unites us even though our views are not exactly the same." 125

The UDF started as a loose front, accepting a wide variety of groups and organisations. The UDF was therefore a movement of unprecedented pervasiveness and depth. It was a broad coalition of student groups, youth congresses, civic associations, woman's organisations, church societies, trade unions, and race and political organisations. At its peak as the major resistance front arraigned against the state, the UDF had a total support base of over two million, it claimed the adherence of over 700 affiliates grouped in ten regions, embracing every major population centre in the country. Its affiliates were also ideologically diverse, united only in their opposition to the government. 126

The most energetic constituents of the front, tended to be the most youthful - youth congress activists and unemployed recent school-leavers. The language of the UDF's socially eclectic leadership was ideologically ambiguous. Nonetheless, affiliation with the UDF implied a recognition of the ANC, and the organisation's claim to leadership, the armed struggle, socialism and expectation of revolutionary change. These were the values that carried the UDF through its most assertive and powerful phases and helped to build the front throughout the 1980s. The UDF's immediate political objectives were the overthrow of black local governments, the expulsion and sometimes assassination of collaborators with the white government, consumer boycotts, the development of street-based networks of neighbourhood organisations, and the institution of People's Power programmes directed at replacing state agencies in education, justice, and the municipal administration by alternative agencies.127 120

The need for political coherence emerged only much later. To maximise the impact and appeal of the UDF, its implicit association with the ANC and the Freedom Charter was, initially, formally denied by both the UDF leadership and the ANC itself, calling it a "historical development". In an interview in Sechaba, the ANC's mouthpiece, Mac Maharaj categorically stated that "The UDF is not a creation of the ANC'. 128 To "prove" this, even affiliates of the NF were invited to join the UDF coalition. 129 The strong partisanship of the UDF's leaders and affiliates to Charterism, effectively cancelled any enforcement of neutrality, foreclosing any change of broadening the front to officially include the black consciousness and other non-Charterist groupings as equals, although they were not barred from supporting the UDF's initiatives. 13°

The fact is that the UDF's founders had only a vague sense of what they were setting up - and did not really anticipate the scale of organisation the UDF would later become. That is the reason why the debate on the inclusiveness of the front continued throughout the 1980s and the reason why the UDF's scope as a united front to direct protest and resistance, continued to evolve.

During July 1984, the UDF entered a phase of debate on its future after the elections for the tricameral system in August 1984. A workshop was held for NEC members to develop common ground in understanding the functioning of a front and to discuss problem areas which put pressure on the formation of a true front.

During the workshop, the NEC spelled out its views on the UDF's form :

"The NEC notes that the structure and form of the UDF assumed at its inception were determined by conditions present at the time. The method of a tactical front was because of the need for the broadest possible unity. The NEC believes that it is still necessary to retain the UDF as a tactical front for it provides enough scope for the drawing (in] of more organisations particularly the unions. Nevertheless the NEC notes that, not wishes but conditions will finally tell if the UDF should transform itself into another type of front."131 121

The issue of the trade unions' position in relation to the UDF, became one of the main debating points in the discussion regarding the type of front the UDF was to embrace. In the end, the major trade unions decided not to join the UDF, but rather to serve as an alliance partner in the mass democratic movement. The main argument was that the trade unions had to adhere to their members' interests first, and could only thereafter consider supporting a political front. Although in the South African context, the UDF and the trade unions were committed to the same issue, trade unions felt that affiliation with the UDF was incompatible with their main reason for existence - the protection of and service of workers' rights. 132

The UDF achieved the delicate balance between groups that the Congress Alliance of the 1950s advocated, but which it failed to implement in practice. It also overcame the prejudices of the Africanists, and especially the views of someone like Robert Sobukwe133 of the PAC who was stringently against the formation of any fronts with non-Africanists. 134 The UDF ensured a continued role for itself after the initial emotive protests and resistance against the implementation of the tricameral parliament ebbed, by its success in drawing diverse organisations across the country into a front. The debate on its role and form, started during the mentioned NEC workshop, continued throughout the 1980s, with a much broader statement of objectives emerging by April 1985. The UDF evolved to a more formalised front to the extent that executive structures were established on a national, regional and sub-regional level. This went beyond the mere coordinative role as originally envisaged. The UDF therefore evolved from a loose tactical front consisting of various organisations and affiliates into a more formal front with an organisational structure. This changed situation came about because of three factors :

The UDF was committed to build an anti-apartheid organisation through which to direct protest against the government and to resist its policies;

the UDF had access to substantial resources (funding, media, etc.) which were channeled by foreign donors and the ANC (clandestinely) through 122

the UDF rather than through individual affiliates. The UDF had the responsibility to channel these resources into the Front's activities, which invariably included its affiliates; and

■ some of the affiliates were weakened as the UDF drew their leaders into its structures.'"

Confronted with the state of emergency and the persecution of its leaders, the UDF decided to again transform the Front to provide more effective leadership. The UDF's

NGC met in April 1985 to formulate measures to facilitate a quicker decision -taking process in order to ensure an effective line of communication and coordination to its affiliates which were engaging the state. From this meeting the UDF's Working Principles were formulated to give clear directions as to the broad aims and goals of the Front.'" The UDF's unwieldy executive was streamlined and the regions were more fully represented. The leadership, however, resisted transforming the Front into a party or a "democratic movement", or to align itself openly to the Freedom Charter."'

From 1987 onwards, the UDF however, changed its previous stance by openly advocating its support for the Freedom Charter and in effect, for the ANC. The ANC also started to refer to the UDF's domestic struggle in its publications and described the UDF as being in the "forefront of the struggle".'" Up until the disbandment of the UDF in 1991, the UDF de facto became the ANC's domestic front in South Africa. Articles in the ANC magazine Mayibuye referred to united struggle and gave considerable coverage on domestic protest action.'"

The UDF's shift towards an autonomous front, largely removed from its affiliates, was further accelerated by the escalating violence in the townships. The state held the UDF responsible for the violent protests which broke out in the townships - which led to a state of emergency - and charged the UDF leaders with treason. The truth was that although the UDF led the way in organising national protests and identifying specific themes of protest, its affiliates conducted local protest campaigns. Although the UDF's 123 contribution to township revolt was more indirect and inspirational than direct during 1983-84, it still managed to orchestrate the most impressive series of resistance against the government since 1961. 143 The UDF therefore went through a process of evolution as a resistance front, from being a coordinating body to being a domestic front for the ANC in exile.

3.7. The UDF as a mass democratic movement

Black activists realised early in the struggle against apartheid that although the government possessed the force of arms and the powers of the state, they had a weapon to their disposal that if handled intelligently, the government would ultimately, be powerless to counter. This "weapon" was their overwhelming numbers - the masses could be employed as a weapon as was shown with great effect by activists like Mohandas Gandhi.

The UDF built on the tradition of mass protest in South Africa and managed to create a situation which was missing during previous mass protest initiatives - the ability to successfully counter state reaction by continuously changing tactics and by establishing wide recognition among grassroots groups by regularly launching high profile campaigns. As the UDF was committed to mass action, campaigns with a high public profile was an effective way of radicalising popular consciousness. The UDF's leaders also realised that all the failures of previous decades hampered mass political action and therefore took steps to ensure that the UDF would endure. Popo Molefe warned the UDF leadership during a conference in Port Elizabeth in December 1983 that the UDF must not mistake the mass consciousness of the leadership as an indication that the same mass consciousness was present on grassroots level :

"This is important because we know that over the years, people have developed a sceptisism and a fear of politics. We cannot pretend that the excitement the UDF has created has put an end to these feelings. We must take the prevailing consciousness as a baseline and take people through a process that will 124

overcome their scepticism and fear.'

Molefe also urged the UDF leadership that to be successful, it was crucial for people to be drawn into the UDF. The UDF managed to increase its mass following and to keep up its resistance, regardless of the state's measures, by the very nature of its format. Mass campaigns enveloped all sectors of civil society, down to the smallest village, ensuring a continuous growth pattern which contrasted strongly with previous efforts of mass resistance. Throughout the 1980s, the UDF therefore managed to expand its support and to keep up its resistance. The UDF overcame the detention of its leaders, government orchestrated treason trials, states of emergency and even the killing of its members. 142

The UDF truly evolved into a mass movement with its involvement in the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). During February 1988, the UDF was effectively banned by the government through stringent restrictions placed on its activities. Again the UDF managed to change strategies and for the following two years, up to the unbanning of the ANC in 1990, the UDF operated largely under the banner of the MDM.

Previously, the UDF, COSATU and the various anti-apartheid groupings reared against the government in South Africa, were collectively referred to as a mass democratic movement. The term Mass Democratic Movement, used in the context of referring to a more specific entity, apparently has no definite origin. It was not founded or launched, but activists started to use the term in the course of 1988 as a means to describe the united front that was fighting against the South African government. The UDF and COSATU stated the reason for the formation of the MDM, quite clearly :

"It was clear to the UDF and COSATU that the survival of progressive organisations could only be guaranteed by the strength of mass organisation... [these] organisations were therefore forced to consolidate mass-based structures and all strategies were based on this objective."143 125

Broadly speaking, the MDM was an alliance encompassing the UDF and its affiliates, the trade unions, as well as a variety of other anti-apartheid groupings.'" The MDM described itself as a coalition of forces against apartheid, which included community and political organisations, as well as trade unions. Their unity was further enhanced by a united commitment to the Freedom Charter, a non-racial democracy, while they also openly accepted and referred to the ANC in exile. 145 Although united in their aims, the MDM was a structureless organisation with a collective leadership corps, with leadership figures within the UDF and COSATU playing the most prominent roles.' 46 Murphy Morobe (acting publicity secretary of the UDF), described the MDM as such :

"The MDM is that political movement which unites the broad masses of the oppressed from all classes and strata, together with democratic whites, in action around a programme of securing the transfer of political and economic power to the majority of the people. The UDF and COSATU as its 'strategic core' have been welded into a fighting alliance.... The main organisational task of the MDM is to rebuild those of our structures that have been smashed, to consolidate those that emerged under the emergency and to strengthen those that have

been weakened."' 47

From 1988 to 1989, the UDF and the MDM's activities essentially overlapped and meshed. The MDM in its official agenda, stressed that the UDF and COSATU must continue to take the lead in the MDM's campaign of mass action." In response to the organising of protest under the banner of the MDM, the ANC also proclaimed 1989 a Year of Mass Action for People's Power, urging those groups inside South Africa to further broaden the anti-apartheid front.'

The MDM launched a major campaign to coincide with the elections during 1989. The

ANC and SACP called on the MDM to launch the . Defiance Campaign in protest and simultaneously build the Anti-apartheid Coalition. 150 After 1990, the ANC and SACP were also included in the MDM which launched the massive rolling mass action campaigns of the early 1990s to pressurise the government during the CODESA 126 negotiations.

Because the MDM was without a formal structure and specific portfolios, it was difficult for the government to act against such an amorphous entity. When leaders were arrested or detained, the impetus of resistance was not blocked as other leaders took their places. The formation of the MDM therefore represents a further change of strategy by the UDF and trade union leaders to overcome the governments' security measures in order to continue their resistance to apartheid.

3.8. Ideology and its influence on the character of the UDF

3.8.1. Background

The UDF was associated with particular strategic and ideological positions, symbols and discourses which shaped popular perceptions of the broader movement, throughout its existence. How the UDF was therefore perceived by political commentators, as well as the government, was largely immaterial. Each group and each entity affiliated to the UDF, perceived the UDF as they wished, while the government decided to view the UDF as an ANC/communist-inspired entity. This "openmindedness" of the UDF enabled the front to build a nationwide political resistance movement, emphasising a mass-based pressure approach based on the concept of People's Power, to create a political resistance front able to engage the government of South Africa. Different factors therefore interacted, were interlinked and have to be considered jointly, in order to clarify the character of the UDF. 151 Because of the intricacy of the UDF's ideological make-up, this aspect of the UDF's character is discussed in much more detail than the previous characteristics.

Esterhuyse states that political history cannot be understood without understanding the character of ideologies. As ideologies played a crucial role and made its mark on the course of history, it is therefore necessary to analyse ideologies in order to understand political conduct of people, groups and organisations. Ideologies have been 127 shown to be more than theories and interpretations of reality. Ideologies like Nationalism, Marxism-Leninism and others, also have a practical function in that they influence people's behaviour. 152

Although different ideologies vie with one another for supremacy, all have certain common basic structural and functional qualities. These qualities have an impact on how ideology is handled and employed by those who support it :

Cognitive-normative function. Ideology provides a "window" through which the world is viewed, understood and interpreted. A certain ideology will to a large extent stipulate how people would view a certain situation and how to act on it. 153 Ideologies typically have a one-sided character, a fact that hampered protest and resistance in South Africa to a large extent prior to the formation of the UDF. The UDF's leaders, however, circumvented the potentially divisive problems of opposing ideologies by not overemphasising a specific ideology, but adopted a more laissez faire attitude and attempted to accommodate a variety of ideologies. This approach had much to do with the successes of the UDF in the struggle against the apartheid state.

Legitimising function. Legitimacy is a crucial concept in politics. The three basic questions with regard to legitimacy are if people underwrites the ideology of a specific institution, do people believe such an institution serves and protects their aspirations and interests, and do people have the necessary trust to serve under such an institution. 154 In all three instances, the answer is an emphatic no. Black people in South Africa was not served by the state and a basic ideological clash occured as the oppressed majority created and built on ideologies which stood in direct contrast with those of the conservative, Afrikaner dominated government. The UDF employed the question of legitimacy as a crucial strategic factor in its protest campaigns throughout its struggle against the government of South Africa.

Mobilising function. Ideology also has a practical application - the capacity to mobilise the conversion of ideas into social levers. An integral part of all ideologies is a 128 programme of action spelling out how to reach specific goals, and what such goals are envisaged to be. In order to be successful, the largest possible number of people are needed to support and organise such an initiative. Ideologies are therefore focused on mass mobilisation and their success rate are closely linked to their ability to mobilise and to inspire the masses. 155 This mirrored exactly the UDF's broad strategy, although no specific ideology dominated the front. The UDF managed to sell their ideals of a free and just society to a very broad sector of the population, enabling them to mobilise masses of people. This basic message formed the core of all campaigns and activities of the UDF and later became a self-generating message, making it impossible for the state to stop the mobilised masses.

Consolidating function. Certain elements are always present in all ideologies. In all cases, use is made of descriptive, normative, interpretative, emotive and imperative language and propositions. These elements form the system of an ideology. An ideology can be expansive in that it includes and encompasses a variety of ideas, concepts, prescriptions, convictions and expectations.' Although the UDF did not commit itself to a single ideology, it welcomed all people and employed these factors to bind people from different ideological persuasions into a united front, committed to a single goal - that of changing society. In time that goal became an "ideological" issue all of its own.

Ideology also refers to the state and civil society. The UDF challenged the state through civil society (churches, trade unions, civics, women and youth organisations, etc.). As civil society forms an integral part of the structure of the state, the foundations of a state might be undermined by eroding civil society. As the state equals political society plus civil society, a division between the two would cause political society to lose its way and its legitimacy. The basic premise of the UDF's strategy was aimed at alienating the different sectors of civil society from the state and then to reorganise and mobilise these structures as pressure groups aimed at undermining the remaining state pillar - political legitimacy.157 129

3.8.2. Ideological character of the UDF

Christopher Thorne (British academic who researched the interaction between ideology and power) stated in his study on ideology, that "the great majority of mankind are moved more by concern for their own material circumstances than by a steady allegiance to any transcendent belief'. 158 To a large extent this was also true of the UDF and its supporters. Although the UDF at a later stage associated itself with the premises of the Freedom Charter, it was initially formed almost "spontaneously" as a body to oppose the South African state's latest initiative to perpetuate the repression of black people. One can almost say the UDF was created because of pressure from grassroots aimed against the governments' efforts to "modernise apartheid" and to further make the entrenchment of "second class citizenship" of black people, with the implementation of the tri-cameral parliamentary system, a permanent fixture. Like Thorne implicates, people reacted because of their poor material position and the repression from the state and not from some lofty ideological belief. That does not mean that the UDF was not built around a specific ideological viewpoint, but that only came later after the UDF had been formed.

During its inaugural conference, the UDF did not "purport to be a substitute movement to accredited people's liberation movements'', in a veiled reference to the ANC and its uncontested position as the prime liberation vehicle for the suppressed majority in South Africa. The conference gave all regional formations and member organisations "complete independence", provided their actions and policies were not inconsistent with those of the UDF and they were committed to the UDF's policy declaration. This broad, inclusive approach was repeatedly emphasised by the UDF which stated clearly that the main thrust of the organisation was directed towards the participation of the workers and the community in the democratic struggle for freedom. The UDF therefore ensured that ideology did not dominate its basic functioning and affiliates could therefore launch campaigns under broad coordination and leadership from the UDF and without the inertia brought about by centrist planning or ideological rigidity. It also made it more difficult for the authorities to act against the UDF.159 130

3.8.3. Defining the ideology of the UDF

After its formation, the UDF at first did not define its ideology very precisely. The reason was that initially, the UDF only served as a vehicle which brought together different groups in opposition to the constitutional reforms of the government. Although it was generally understood and accepted that the UDF supported the ANC's Freedom Charters principles, this was more hinted to than formally stated during the UDF's early days, for strategic reasons. The UDF's loose structure also permitted considerable political and ideological diversity, especially noticable in the UDF's upper levels of organisation, while more conformity existed in the grassroots levels. The reason for this was that the leadership consisted of individuals from a wide variety of groups and organisations, while the affiliates on grassroots level, were more homogenous, like a women's group for example. 16° In the UDF's early years, this ideological tolerance also served to build the anti-government front from the widest possible sector of the community without the politics of ideology serving as a dividing factor.

What the UDF stood for ideologically was therefore complicated and determined by two considerations :

Firstly, the UDF included groups representing various sectors of the community with a variety of social, political and economic agendas.

Secondly, the UDF's character was to be more profoundly influenced by the beliefs of its grassroots following than by its ideologues. Thus, the bottom-up influence played just as strong a role as that of the top leadership, because the majority of campaigns were launched around local grievances."'

During August 1983, it was noted in Work in Progress, that the democratic front (the UDF) being formed in South Africa, might offer a viable alternative to an ethnic organisation. The author also for saw that if this front were to become an open internal 131

political movement, which combined organisational and individual membership, it could provide a forum that might unite the disparate ideological groupings involved in the liberation struggle in South Africa. Groupings such as white progressives which did not have a political home at that stage, could also be accommodated. It was also foreseen that the formation of a united front could lay the foundation for a real non-racial democratic resistance movement.'"

In an interview in Die Suid-Afrikaan, Johnny Issel (UDF Patron) described the UDF's varied ideological viewpoints as one of the front's strengths. He stated that the UDF had to be clear on the strategic direction of resistance and that the debates on ideology helped the process along. He identified however, two main broad ideological groupings:

A group that believed in the formation of a broad resistance-based alliance where workers would play an integral part; and

on the other hand a workerist movement because only workers were really able to bring about a socialist South Africa. 163

Although these two main directions of thought were in competition with one another, the broad alliance grouping seemingly won out with the formation of the MDM. This was in contrast with political commentators like Neville Alexander (of the Cape Action League - CAL) who thought of alliances as "political theatre" and felt that the only two viable poles in resistance is a military option or a workerist revolution. 164

The debate continued during 1986 with observers arguing that the UDF did indeed act as a political party while structured as a broad front. The reply from the UDF was that the front was organised and formed in a particular context and structured to operate in a particular period, with mass action and resistance forming the central strategy in their approach. The UDF agreed that they were initially neither ideologically nor organisationally prepared, but reacted to circumstances - basically giving form to an 132 almost natural resistance by the masses. The UDF took charge and endeavoured to enhance and give direction to their affiliates and their ongoing campaigns. The UDF however, never veered from the mandate and resolutions accepted during their national meetings during 1983 and 1985. In the end the UDF defered to the ANC and underwrote Charterism and refused to form an ideological alternative to the established liberation movements. 165

The leading UDF personalities' and leaders' viewpoints on ideology tended to dominate during different stages of control - as people were banned and detained, control of the UDF differed during the different stages ascribed to the UDF within this study. In February 1984, Patrick Lekota (UDF Publicity Secretary), described the UDF as "a process", a front that was formed to respond to government activities and therefore a protest organisation (indicating that ideology played a secondary role). 166 Trevor Manuel (UDF Western Cape Secretary) acknowledged during February 1985 that after 18 months of existence, the UDF was far from a monolithic front. Initially, after the formation of the front, ideological divisions were blurred, but different opinions and perspectives were starting to emerge. Manuel stated that the time had come to "do battle at an ideological level to define a clearer ideological stance (for the UDF)". He mentions that certain groups within the UDF had already adopted the Freedom Charter, while others have yet to reach that point. Lekota, in turn denied that the process of forging a coherent and disciplined ideological programme suggested the makings of a political party, as such an initiative would undermine the concept of the front. 167

To summarise, the UDF underwent continuous changes with regard to its ideological base from its formation in 1983 - especially during 1986 when tactical changes had to be made in order to counter state actions, including the first state of emergency - up until it was finally disbanded. It expressed itself in favour of non-racialism, a unitary, apartheid free South Africa with a black majority government based on one man-one vote. At this stage, the UDF as yet, did not formally accept the Freedom Charter as its ideological basis. 133

Because of the effects of the first state of emergency and the accompanying problems of openly mobilising the masses, the UDF moved closer to the ANC and its ideology of Charterism, from September 1986, and started to support the ANC more openly. UDF leaders made speeches and statements supporting the ANC, some visited the ANC abroad and openly associated themselves with the ANC. The UDF also started to call on foreign opinion-makers and eminent South Africans for greater understanding of the ANC's policy of violence. The UDF also began to consider the use of violence with legal avenues of protest and resistance being closed by the government through the state of emergency and other repressive security measures. The ANC and the UDF were however still loath to openly support one another, mainly to refrain from providing the South African government additional reason to act against the UDF structures and leaders. The ANC's annual "Calls to the People" however, largely mirrored the UDF's activities in South Africa. For example, from roughly 1985, the ANC urged activists to make the country ungovernable and to move towards People's Power.' The ANC clearly stated in its publications :

"Let us in an organised way spread the mood of total civil disobedience, including an organised campaign leading to nationwide refusal to pay all taxes

and rents". 169

This clearly referred to the UDF's rent boycotts in the townships. The ANC therefore exercised enormous moral influence on the UDF during the 1980s, but largely chose not to openly direct the UDF. 17° In fact, the ANC could not control the UDF from abroad (although they did have people like Steve Tswete who as an underground ANC leader occupied a leadership position within the UDF). 171

Within the UDF, the viewpoint of a neo-Marxist "revolution" led by students, clergymen and women, also started to fade during 1986. In its place, a more hardline, Marxist- Leninist approach began to emerge when workers and trade unions started to play a more dominant and leading role, because of the large number of UDF activists that were detained. The issue of socialism was avoided by the Charterists in order to attract 134 middle- and upper-class allies while radicals were placated by the assurance of the Charterists' continued commitment to socialism and that it would be considered after liberation. The UDF followed the same road in reinforcing the beliefs and ideologies of their different support groups which were on opposite sides of the ideological spectrum, in order to counter the emerging, more hardline attitude of the Marxist-orientated

groups.' 72

The chasm between the UDF and the trade unions, who were the prime exponents of a worker-orientated, anti-capitalist struggle in contrast with the UDF's political struggle, however, remained. This debate ranged throughout the existence of the UDF. During 1986, the workerist-orientated New Era claimed that there had been a shift among black members of the resistance movement and that most would see a socialist economic system as a better option for the country.'" The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) circulated a paper during 1988 in which it acknowledged the UDF as the main political voice of the oppressed masses. The NUM called on COSATU to affiliate with the UDF because "the need remains for a more disciplined and structured relationship arising from the recognition and acceptance that the working class is the mainstay of the struggle". 174 Other groups and individuals held different, opposing opinions. Alec Erwin (National Education Officer of FOSATU) mentioned the problems which arise when radicals called for a socialist economy. He warned that such calls impeded the growth of the alliance. Erwin also called on the protagonists to first ensure that South Africa is liberated before embarking on economic issues. 15 In this regard, the moderate viewpoint triumphed although the UDF linked itself in a strategic move to a workers class leadership at the end of 1986 with its so-called "fighting alliance" with COSATU and the launch of the National United Action Campaign. Although different and opposing ideological viewpoints were a reality within the UDF, the leadership managed to relegate it to the backburner while the alliance concentrated on its resistance against the government.

The UDF used the occasion of its fourth anniversary on 20 August 1987, to formally accept the Freedom Charter as its ideological base, policy document and basis for its 135 political programme. The reason for the official adoption of the Freedom Charter by the UDF, after downplaying any contact with the ANC since its inception, was twofold. Firstly, the UDF had to distance itself from the ANC in order to keep the state from acting against the UDF before it could get its resistance programme organised. Secondly, by 1987, the UDF was restricted severely by the authorities, its leaders were detained and a state of emergency further hampered its activities. It therefore had little to lose and much to gain by fully and openly embracing the Freedom Charter, and thus in effect, the ANC. It also became necessary for the UDF to provide direction to its supporters on a broader range of political issues. The changing pace of the struggle demanded a more comprehensive political programme while the unilateral adoption of the Freedom Charter by certain of the UDF's key affiliates, such as the South African Youth Congress (SAYCO), pressurised the UDF to follow suit. 176 The adoption of the Freedom Charter therefore served to confirm the UDF as the most prominent component of the Charterists' power base in South Africa and the internal freedom struggle. ' 77

From 1987, the UDF could ideologically be characterised as the legal and formal extra- parliamentary resistance group in South Africa. The UDF attempted to achieve change in South Africa by non-violent means according to the principles of the Freedom Charter. The only way in which the UDF differed from the ANC at that stage, was that it was active in South Africa, and paid lip-service to non-violence, 178 although in reality, protest action invariably turned violent after clashes with the security forces.

3.8.4. Ideological groupings within the UDF

The Freedom Charter, and therefore inherently the ANC, constituted a core component of UDF ideology. The interpretation of the Charter's meaning varied considerably within the UDF's formal leadership and intelligentsia, however. On the right were the middle- class nationalists179, which included most of the older generation of activists. Their ranks included the clergy, social notables and professionals whose leadership came to the fore in the vacuum after the 1976 Soweto uprising when thousands of youth 136 leaders left the country to join the ANC in exile. In the centre were the national democrats who supported the ANC/South African Communist Party (SACP) view of a "popular democratic" revolution with a strategically submerged long-term socialist objective to create a classless state and a workers paradise. To the left were the socialists, especially those aligned to the trade unionists, whose prime concern was that the working class should work toward their own objectives in conjunction and in alliance with the UDF against the state. 18° a. Nationalists

After the founding of the UDF, the nationalists played a prominent role in "bringing together all classes", the UDF's stated intent of unifying resistance against the state. They built on the history of earlier nationalist resistance of which they were part. The Release Mandela Campaign (RMC), for example, provided one of the prominent platforms for nationalist sentiment with Mandela being portrayed as a symbol and a pivotal factor in the struggle for liberation.

The nationalists also depicted the Freedom Charter as a sacred symbol and refused to accept opposition to the Charter. They saw this as a betrayal of the struggle and therefore discouraged debate on the Charter's different interpretations. Although the UDF's economic viewpoint was rhetorically anti-capitalist, it also was not socialist. One could, to an extent, describe the UDF's economic viewpoint as benign capitalism with a strong undercurrent of socialism. Some advocates of individual entrepeneurship within the UDF, like Dr. Nthato Motlano, however, came into conflict with youth congress activists because of these contrasting viewpoints as the youth became increasingly radicalised during the late 1980s.

The UDF managed to accommodate the nationalists as well as the more radically- inclined, socialist-orientated groups by focussing on the struggle rather than falling in the inertia of an ideological debate.181 137

National Democrats

The National Democrats in the UDF occupied the ideological center. They became a dominant force from about 1984 to 1985, with several of the UDF's prominent leaders belonging to this grouping. National Democrats was anti-capitalist, although they tolerated UDF members who was involved in business (such as Billy Nair - leading UDF leader in Natal), who were accepted within the UDF. National Democracy's true meaning was, however, rarely spelt out at public meetings, especially when leaders addressed unsophisticated township audiences. The National Democrats also interpreted the Freedom Charter as forming the basis of a class and social struggle. This approach was spelled out in a contribution to New Era, a publication affiliated to the Cape Town UDF:

"Democracy means, in the first instance, the ability of the broad working masses to participate in and control all dimensions of their lives."182

A point stressed in most UDF speeches and statements during this phase, was the democratic nature of the struggle and that leaders were merely the bearers of the popular mandate and were accountable to the organisations' membership. This viewpoint owed much to the influence of trade unionists' approach of a mandated leadership with limited decision-making authority. They also viewed the non- hierarchical organisational structures that emerged during the struggle, rather than elaborated social programmes, as the basis for a future class revolution.'

Socialists

The UDF also accomodated socialists within the organisation who described socialism as intrinsic to the process of national liberation. These socialists equated the liberation struggle to a class struggle. They argued that liberation will be a meaningless concept unless the economy is also restructured at the same time in order to guarantee significant and lasting improvements in the lives of the ordinary people. Students and 138

trade unionists were among the foremost exponents of socialist principles. Students were exposed to these viewpoints during the regular political education meetings which served as training schools for activists.' 84 This led to some contrasting views between especially the youth and the more conservative, older members, and caused some tension within the UDF. Although students were often the first to recognise the crucial role workers could play in bringing about change, youthfull activists were also frequently insensitive to the material considerations that sometimes inhibited workers from supporting militant political actions. This caused intimidation of workers and frequently led to violent clashes between the groups and proved divisionary and counterproductive to the UDF's cause. 185

Socialist ideas were often prominent among white students (who represented the UDF's main white constituency). These politics originated within the SACP and equated the South African political economy as that of an advanced "capitalist state" and a "special type of colonialism". The SACP was thus able to justify the alliance of a workers' party with a nationalist movement. Its broad view was that national liberation would precede socialism, which would be the ultimate liberation of the oppressed worker. 186

The finer points of the debate between the national democrats and the socialists did not evoke much popular interest among the rank-and-file membership of thre UDF. 187 Popular initiatives, however, played too important a role in the UDF's development for its ordinary supporters to be reduced to passive followers of one of the ideological groups or the other. What happened in effect therefore, was that the different ideological groupings, never caused an ideological split in the UDF - which happened before during the earlier years of the national liberation struggle. 139

References : Chapter 2

T. W. Marx : Lessons of Struggle. South African Internal Opposition, 1960-1990, pp. 88-93.

Mayibuye : Number 4, 1980, pp. 1, 3, 8.

S. Johnson : South Africa. No Turning Back. p. 173.

Marx : p. 95.

Ibid., pp. 98-99.

Johnson : pp. 172-173.

Study Commission on U.S. Policy Toward Southern Africa : South Africa : Time Running Out, pp. 199-203.

T. Lodge and B. Nasson (et al) : South Africa : Time Running Out. All. Here. and Now : Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980's, p.29.

Ibid., pp. 30-31.

J. D. Brewer (Ed.) : Can South Africa Survive? p. 186.

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 31-32.

Ibid., p. 32.

Ibid., p. 29.

Ibid., pp. 29-30.

M.D. Davis : Apartheid's Rebels. Inside South Africa's Hidden War, pp. 86-87.

E.S. Reddy : Dr. Yusuf Mohamed Dadoo, p. 297.

ANC Pamphlet : Freedom Fighters on the March, July 1983.

World Marxist Review : South Africa : Revolution on an Upgrade, July 1978, p. 12.

The NF was composed of existing political organisations based on the established ideological allegiance of black consciousness. They were, however, united more by their common efforts to agitate for immediate demands than by their ideological affinity. They found that the Freedom Charter unified many of their local demands under general categories and provided a framework for cooperation that justified cross-class aliances. The Charter's relatively pragmatic 140 demands and the ANC's (and later UDF's) tactical flexibility corresponded to their own views on state reform. The UDF's successful efforts in uniting a widely disparate group of liberation orientated groups, therefore attracted more and more black consciousness members into its spectrum and in time, the NF could not sustain a parallel but lesser initiative than that being offered by the UDF, and eventually disbanded (Marx : pp. 120-121).

Pamphlet : National Forum, p. 5.

Marx : p. 117.

The SAIC was formed in 1964 by the government in order to give the Indian community greater say (in theory) in matters of direct concern to them.

Sechaba : March 1981, pp. 4-5.

Mayibuye : Number 10, 1982, p. 1.

ANC Pamphlet : Oliver Tambo - New Year's Message, December 1982.

Mayibuye : Number 3, 1983, p. 1.

Dawn : Volume 7, 1983.

N.G. Patel : "The Road Ahead", Speech delivered during the TASC Conference, 22-23 January 1983.

Evening Post : 21 August 1983.

UDF : UDF News, Volume 1, Number 1, August 1983, p. 3.

Generally, a "Bill" is a new law that has still to be ratified by parliament, while an "Act" has already passed into law. For some, unexplained, reason, all references to Koornhoff s laws referring to labour control measures, uses the term "Koornhoff Bills", although these laws had been passed by parliament at the time.

W. Cobbett and R. Cohen : Popular Struggles in South Africa, pp. 90-91.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 35.

Marx : p. 114.

Ibid., p. 114.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 47.

Ibid., pp. 47-48.

Marx : p. 121. 141

TASC Document : "Congress 1983 - Speeches and Papers Delivered at the Congress", 1983, in Lodge and Nasson, p. 48.

Ibid., p. 48.

UDF : UDF News, Volume 1, Number 1, August 1983, p. 1.

"United Democratic Front - National Launch, Cape Town" : University of Cape Town Students Representative Council Booklet, 1983, in Lodge and Nasson, p.51.

Transcript of video recording of the National Launch of the UDF, Cape Town, 20 August 1983.

Ibid.

Grassroots Special : National Launch of the UDF, 20 August 1983.

UDF : "National Launch", 20 August 1983, p. 5.

Federation of Transvaal Women : A Woman's place is in the struggle, not behind bars, May 1988, pp. 3,4,21.

Grassroots Special : p. 2.

G. Straker (et al) : Faces in the Revolution. The Psychological effects of Violence on Township Youth in South Africa, p. 1.

City Press : 27 April 1987, p. 2.

Pretoria News : 29 November 1983, p. 3.

Grassroots Special : p. 2.

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 4, pp. 53-55.

Development Studies Group : Population removals, pp. 1-5, and TRAC : The Myth of Voluntary Removals, pp. 1-6.

E. Harsch : Apartheid's Great Land Theft, pp. 1-2.

Labour Research Committee : Ruling the Townships, pp. 35, 56, 47.

SACTU Solidarity Committee : We know no other path of struggle, p. 4.

Grassroots Special : p.2.

Marx : p. 135.

Ibid., 136. 142

Africa Confidential : Volume 26, Number 25, 11 December 1985, p. 4.

Ibid., pp. 136-137.

South African Review 3, p. 257.

Cobbett and Cohen : pp. 95-96.

"TIC Revived : The case for, the case against" : in Work in Progress, Number 26, 1983, p. 19.

Cobbett and Cohen : p. 96.

Ibid., p. 96.

Ibid., pp. 192-193.

Ibid., p. 99.

Kane-Berman : pp. 61-62.

Brewer : p. 207.

Cobbett and Cohen : p. 97.

Ibid., pp. 96-97.

Ibid., p. 97.

Brewer : p. 208.

Ibid., p. 208.

Interview with Sandy Africa : Representative of the United Committee of Concern (UCM) on the Natal Provincial UDF Structure, Acting Secretary of the UDF (Natal Region), 21 November 1997.

Cobbett and Cohen : p. 98.

Ibid., p. 98.

Ibid., p. 99.

Ibid., p. 100.

S. Friedman : The Increasing Resistance of Oppositional Groups in South Africa, p. 1. 143

Ibid., p. 2.

Ibid., p. 6.

J. Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front?", pp. 5-7, and Lodge and Nasson : pp. 34-35.

"Organising for People's Power" : pp. 1-2.

Ibid., p. 3.

Mayibuye : Number 1, 1984, p. 1.

ANC Pamphlet : African National Congress Advance to People's Power, 1987, p. 26.

Mayibuye : Number 1, 1987.

ANC Pamphlet : Advance to People's Power, 1987, p. 2., and ANC Pamphlet : United Action for People's Power, 1988, pp. 8-12.

"Organising for People's Power" : p. 3-4.

Mashamba, G. People's Education. The People's Choice, 1991.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 134.

Marx : p. 131.

Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front?", p. 5.

Ibid., p. 6.

UDF : "UDF Working Principles", Adopted by the UDF National General Council, 7 April 1985.

Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front?", p. 6.

Ibid., p. 6, the UDF's adaptation of its strategies and tactics will be addressed more fully in chapters four and five.

Marx : p.135.

Ibid., p. 136.

Ibid., pp 139-141.

G.H. Van Tonder : 'n Staatkundige evaluering van die Natal Indian Congress as protesgroep (1894 - 1985), pp. 35-36. 144

Ibid., p. 35.

Ibid., p. 36.

Ibid., pp. 41-42.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 190.

Ibid., p. 43.

H. Eckstein : Pressure group politics : The case of the British Medical Society, pp. 35-37.

P. Willets : Pressure groups in the global system - the transnational relations of issue-orientated non-governmental organisations, pp. 186, 193.

See chapters four and five for a more complete discussion on this issue.

Willets : p 186.

Eckstein : pp. 35-37.

The Role and Training of Development Activists and Spreading the Word.

R.E. Dowse and J.A. Hughes : Political Sociology, pp. 392-393.

Eckstein : pp. 35-37.

S. Njikelana : "Unions and the UDF", in Work in Progress, Number 32, July 1984, pp. 30-31.

"Let Us Build the United Front" , reprinted in CAL Documents, under the title "An early view on United Fronts", December 1984.

Speeches and resolutions in a booklet entitled National Forum, published by the NFC : 1983, pp. 62-64.

SARS : South African Review 3, pp. 266-276.

The term "Charterist" was used to describe, and place ideologically, all groups, organisations and movements which adhered to the ANC's Freedom Charter. In time it almost became a synonym for those groups finding themselves in the ANC's camp without direct reference to the ANC as such, in order to bypass the state's anti-ANC legislation.

Marx : p. 131.

P. Molefe : Document on the United Democratic Front, quoted from J. Seekings: "What was the United Democratic Front", p. 13. 145

Lodge and Nasson : p. 32.

Ibid., pp. 34-35.

Sechaba : March 1984, pp. 115-117.

Marx : p. 131.

Ibid., p. 133.

UDF : 'The Future of the UDF - Some NEC Views", Unsigned (but drafted by P. Molefe) and undated (but circa mid-September 1984) document.

S. Njikelana : "Unions and the UDF", in Work in Progress, Number 32, July 1984, p. 33.

PAC Pamphlet : Speeches of Robert Sobukwe, p. 23.

The PAC did eventually join the UDF and ANC in a Patriotic Front during the early 1990s, after PAC members and their black consciousness inheritors, tacitly supported the UDF during the 1980s.

Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front", pp. 15-16.

Ibid., p. 17.

UDF : "UDF Working Principles", 7 April 1985.

ANC Pamphlet : United Action for People's Power, p. 5.

Mayibuye : Number 4 and 5, 1988, and Numbers 1 and 2, 1989.

Seekings : pp. 16-17.

UDF : "National secretariat report to the UDF national conference", December 1983, p. 1.

UDF : Noma Siyaboshwa. UDF - Four Fighting Years. Volume 1, Number 3, August 1987, pp. 6-7.

South African Labour Bulletin : Volume 13, Number 2, February 1988, p. 53.

COSATU Pamphlet : Political Ideologies and South African Trade Unions : A Profile, Nd, p. B6-1.

Phambile : Number 3, November 1989, p. 3.

COSATU Pamphlet : Political Ideologies ..., p. B6-8. 146

UDF : Murphy Morobe, "Address to the Transvaal Indian Congress Consultative Conference", 30 July 1989.

Phambile : p. 8.

Mayibuye : Number 1, 1989, pp. 1,3,14.

Mayibuye : Number 4, 1989, pp. 3,5,8-9. and Umsebenzi : Volume 4, Number 3, Third Quarter 1988, p.1.

Seekings : "What was the United Democratic Front", pp. 2-6. Seekings : "Shaping collective identities : The rise and decline of rights-based discourses in the United Democratic Front, 1983-1985", pp. 2-3.

W.P. Esterhuyse (et al) : Moderne Politieke Ideologiee, p. 309.

Ibid., pp. 313-314.

Ibid., pp. 314-315.

Ibid., p. 316.

Ibid., p. 317.

Loosely based on Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies : On Ideology, pp. 46-47.

C. Thorne : Ideology and Power, p. 1.

South African Review 2, p. 42.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 127.

Ibid., pp. 127-128.

Work in Progress : August 1983, Number 28, p. 26.

Die Suid-Afrikaan : June/July 1988, Number 15, pp. 40-41.

Ibid., p. 41.

Work in Progress : April 1986, Number 41, pp.25-28.

Work in Progress : February 1984, Number 30, p. 4.

Work in Progress : February 1985, Number 35, pp. 13-14.

ANC Pamphlet : ANC Call to the Nation - 25 April 1985, 1985. ANC Pamphlet : Attack, Advance - 8 January 1986, 1986. ANC Pamphlet : Advance to People's Power - 8 January 1987, 1987. 147

Sechaba : December 1985, p. 2.

ANC Pamphlet : 75 Years of Struggle - 1987, London, 1987.

Interview with Pete Richer : ANC undergrund intelligence operative, Department of Intelligence and Security, based in Botswana, 1976-1985, and Zimbabwe, 1985-1991, 6 October 1997.

Lodge and Nasson : pp 190-191.

Marx : p. 127.

New Era : Volume 1, Number 1, March/April 1986, p. 21.

New Era : Volume 3, Number 2, May 1988, p. 10.

A Erwin : "The Question of Unity in the Struggle", in South African Labour Bulletin, Volume 11, Number 1, September 1985, p. 55.

UDF : Noma Siyaboshwa. UDF - Four Fighting Years, Volume 1, Number 3, August 1987, p. 6.

Ibid., p. 7.

UDF : "UDF Reaffirms Non-violent Position", 26 January 1987.

The socalled "nationalists" refered to the conservative, middle-class bloc within the ANC which had its origin during 1952 when a group of ANC members formed the socalled National Minded bloc which were in opposition to the ANC's cooperation with the South African Indian Council, which they felt brought a resultant communist influence on the ANC. This school of thought remained within the Charterist sphere and was also present within the UDF (T. Lodge: Black Politics in South Africa since 1945, p. 159.)

Lodge and Nasson : p. 129.

Ibid., pp 129-130.

New Era : March 1986, p. 38.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 131.

Interview with Ash Belford : General Secretary of the Westville Youth Movement (Port Elizabeth), member of the Student Council Planning Committee (University of the Western Cape) and UDF underground operative (Literature distribution), 20 August 1997.

Lodge and Nasson : pp 132-133. 148

Ibid., p.133.

Ibid., p. 134. 149

CHAPTER 3

THE RESISTANCE BASE OF THE UDF

1. Background

Between its formation in 1983 and its dissolution in 1991, the UDF managed to draw together into nationwide campaigns and coordination, a wide variety of local and regionally based organisations. The focus of this chapter falls on the UDF's success in organising a mass-based united front, the format of the front, a discussion on the different affiliated groups and organisations which made up the front and the dynamics which sustained the UDF's broad support base. From this mass-based support base, a resistance base was created which engaged the state throughout the 1980s on a wide front.'

In the history of black resistance to white rule in South Africa, the UDF was a movement of unprecedented pervasiveness and depth. It was a broad coalition of student groups, youth congresses, civic associations, woman's organisations, church societies, some trade unions, racially-based groups, academic, research and education groups and extra parliamentary political organisations. The UDF was originally created to coordinate organisations opposed to the 1983 constitution. At its peak, with a total membership of over two million, it claimed the adherence of over 700 affiliates grouped in ten regions, embracing every major center of population in the country, as well as the rural areas and although ideologically diverse, were united in their opposition to the government and aim of effecting change in South Africa. 2

Between its regional launch in July 1983 and its national launch in August 1983, the UDF was primarily involved in the development of sub-regional structures, 'assisting affiliates, and fundraising. There was some confusion regarding the nature of the front, but this issue did not keep the UDF leadership from their task of creating a united front with a national, regional and local resistance base. Although their resources were limited, and their leadership consisted largely of part-timers, the UDF leadership used 150 existing organisations from all the sectors of civil society, to build the Front. By early 1984, the UDF had built a set of organisational structures, through which campaigns and activities were coordinated. 3 Throughout its existence, however, the UDF's affiliates had the responsibility of organising UDF campaigns at the regional and local level, while these groups and their leadership, also bore the brunt of security force brutality and the state's attentions.

2. The UDF's resistance base

2.1. Youth and Student groups

2.1.1. Defining terminology

The category of youth in South Africa is a political rather than a sociological or demographic construct. Being young is of necessity essential, but young people must also be involved in political activity to be counted as youth. No specific age-limit is also set. Even older people, including students have been classified as youths. Different criteria have also been used by different commentators, with two main types of stereotypical views recurring. One is a hostile, apocalyptic view of the youth, identifying the youth with rebellion, violence and destruction, while the liberatory view, in contrast, is broadly sympathetic, seeing the youth politicised and militant, as the "comrades" or "young lions" who selflessly struggled for liberation and democracy. The predominant theme is that the view of who constitutes the youth has changed over time, with the youth of the 1980s being seen as in the forefront of the struggle and taking a leading part in protest and resistance. As resistance and conflict broadened during the 1980s, the understanding of who comprised the youth, also broadened. The physical militancy of township youths was interpreted as indicating a crude, underlying politicisation. Crime and politics also blended in some instances. Thus, in many instances, it was the youth who were physically involved in protest action and resisting the government. In time, youth referred as much to an attitude of mind as it did to age.4 151

The ANC Youth League (ANCYL) for example set its age limit originally at 30 and later extended it to 35 (This, however, only happened during 1990 after the ANCYL became a formal organisation). During the 1980s, no specific age restriction was imposed, and youth politics referred rather to "types of activities", rather than to a specific demographic group. The ANCYL intensively cultivated the youth throughout 1981, emphasising the role they can play in the struggle and aimed to provide them with the means to organise and encourage them to organise their ranks and to work closer together with the worker organisations.'

The composition of the youth during the 1980s era of revolt, is either avoided or inadequately dealt with in the existing literature. One can, however, state categorically that the youth of the UDF years, was not the same youth as those of Soweto and the pre-UDF era. Broadly, the term youth was used (within opposition politics) - in both era's - to refer to young people who appeared to be politicised and involved in activity focused on a political objective.' For purposes of clarity, the following definition will serve as a guide in the use of youth-related terms in this thesis :

Youth - Broad, generic term, which was used widely by liberation groups in South Africa to define young people. These included primary and secondary school students, university students, unemployed youths. During the UDF years, however, and for the sake of this thesis, youths are defined broadly as a group up to about 25 years of age.

Students - School and university students.'

2.1.2. Background

Although demographics during the 1980s were unreliable, it has been estimated by researchers that more than half of South Africa's black population of 23 million (1981) were under the age of 15.8 0f these, two out of every three young Africans lived in the rural areas. Most lived in the Transvaal self-governing territories and KwaZulu/Natal while the only metropolitan area with a significant proportion of young Africans, was the 152

Witwatersrand area. A growing number of young black South Africans were absorbed into the education system during the 1970s and early 1980s, with the number of secondary school pupils increasing threefold during the period 1975 to 1984. 9 This rapid expansion had three major consequences :

the failure of the authorities to improve the quality of schooling generated discontent within the schools; the economic recession meant that very few students managed to find employment after school; and the expansion of schooling involved an expansion of the most overtly politicised section of the population. 1°

Many lessons were learned from the riots of 1976. It became clear that the youth was a special grouping who, unlike workers, had few constraints on their political activities. They therefore formed an important link in the process of resistance against the authorities. The downside of the 1976 rebellion, was that it set protest organisation back considerably. It was realised that protest could not effectively take the form of spontaneous confrontation with the state, as happened largely during 1976-77. New strategies and new organisations would have to be developed. The happenings in 1976, however, instilled in the youth a heightened political consciousness, which again emerged during the 1980 school boycotts - although in a different form. 11

2.1.3. Composition of the UDF's youth resistance base

a. Background

Youth organisations had their origins in the conflict in the mid-1970s as young blacks were politicised through student organisations and youth clubs, and through their struggle in 1976-77. This did not mean that youths were politically inactive prior to the 1970s. They were politically active, but were not as clearly organised, characterised or identified as youth. The most important youth political organisation during the late 153

1970s was the Black Consciousness aligned South African Student's Organisation (SASO), which was formed by Steve Biko and others during 1969. The South African Students Movement (SASM), active among secondary school pupils, however, played a more prominent than SASO during the 1970s, with SASM activists forming the Soweto Students Representative Council (SSRC) which played a key role during the events of June 1976. Both SASO and SASM organised the small number of highly politicised students, forged closer links with the ANC during the late 1970s and increased their numbers significantly during the 1980s. 12

The early 1970s also saw the growth of many youth organisations. Despite harassment, detention and imprisonment of its members and leaders, it continued to grow and mobilise against the system and to expound their philosophy of black consciousness. This upsurge of militancy, was also largely mirrored by nation-wide strikes by the black working class." Youth clubs that were especially active during this era, were the Esukhayeni Youth Club of Soweto and the Young African Christian Movement - a front for the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). Youth clubs at local level played the role of exposing young people to political ideas, with many of these clubs being run by former SASO activists with the explicit aim of raising political consciousness among the youth. 14

Among the first of the new Charterist organisations to emerge in the aftermath of the 1976-77 uprisings - and one of the first to align openly with the ANC - was the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), formed in 1979 by former SASM activists. COSAS branches provided an organisational home to many non-student youths until 1982 when the organisation decided to limit its membership to school students. COSAS's main aim was to maintain the momentum of the student-led resistance of 1976-77. 15

A rival organisation was formed in 1981 when the Black Consciousness-orientated Azanian People's Organisation (AZAPO), which was hostile to the ANC, launched the Azanian Students Organisation (AZASO). Ultimately, Charterist students decided to 154

seize control of AZASO, rather than to "fight" them, and achieved this in June 1981. There still remained, however, a division between secondary and tertiary level organisations, and the non-schoolgoing youth. 16

A new wave of student protests during 1980 produced a new generation of student leaders. Difficulties encountered by COSAS leaders in coordinating action with non- school going youth, constant police harrassment and instructions from incarcerated ANC leaders on Robben Island and from exile, convinced the COSAS leadership to organise the youth, rather than students exclusively. The ANC also proclaimed 1981 as the "Year of the Youth"17 A command was issued from Robben Island that youth congresses should be formed. The ANC was, however, opposed to the idea, both for strategic and theoretical reasons, that the youth or students could be the backbone of the liberation struggle. The ANC therefore categorised "different groups of youth" within the wider category of youth. In this regard the ANC identified the "working youth, the student youth, the rural and peasant youth, the unemployed youth, intellectuals and exploiters". 18 The ANC called upon the youth to raise the level of their political understanding and their discipline. They were also commanded to use their talents and creative intelligence to formulate and propose new initiatives for the advancement of the struggle against apartheid. 19 b. Local youth organisations

During the early 1980s, several youth organisations were formed at the local level on which a national youth organisation was later built. A number of forms of organisations can be distinguished :

Local student (schoolchildren) structures;

several short-lived "youth" groupings were formed during 1980-81, essentially to recruit for Umkhonto we Sizwe; 155

■ longer lasting black, Coloured and Indian youth organisations, which were not considered to be overtly political. These included branches of religious organisations such as Young Christian Workers (YCW), and locally-based groups; and

■ following the COSAS decision to launch local and national congresses, the appearence of hundreds of local COSAS youth congresses. 2°

The major activities of youth organisations during the early 1980s were political recruitment and education, rather than protest. As a group they also came more directly in conflict with the authorities through their own involvement in the schools boycotts. From 1983 onwards, these youth congresses and organisations were affiliated to the UDF and adopted a national character. c. National youth organisations

From 1982 to 1984, attempts were made towards the formation of a national youth organisation within the Charterist movement. This effort was launched to coordinate the activities of regional networks of youth activists throughout the country. During the 1982 conference of COSAS, a committee was appointed to organise the launching of formal national and local youth organisations.'

COSAS membership was limited to school students with separate youth congresses formed for ex-students during the COSAS conference of May 1982. The ANC convened its own Youth Congress in August 1982 in Tanzania, with as theme "the role of the youth in the liberation struggle" which influenced youth congresses in South Africa and from which the local groups took their cue. 22 Youth congresses thus partly started to fill the void in the absence of a black political party, and started to take up civic issues. Older township residents also became increasingly involved in these youth congresses, which laid the foundation for a large part of civic-based protest of the 1980s.23 156

COSAS also played a vital role in organising unemployed youth and establishing youth congresses, which had a primarily political purpose. The recession which began to take effect during 1982 left many young people unemployed, while many more were excluded from schools because of the government's age restrictions. Starting in May 1982, twenty youth congresses were founded in the first year, after which they rapidly proliferated, forming a network which included even the smallest town. The majority of the youth congress leadership, came from the ranks of former COSAS activists, relatively well educated young people who were essentially middle class, and also included a number of veterans from the Soweto uprising. 24

National co-ordination remained a problem. A special COSAS committee was appointed during 1982 to look into this. From mid-1983 the UDF provided some regional and national co-ordination of youth groups. As most youths were also involved in the UDF's national resistance campaigns, little progress was made towards the founding of a formal national body for youth organisations. Towards the end of 1984 older activists from the UDF and South African Council of Churches (SACC) suggested that youth organisations should campaign during 1985 around the International Youth Year (IYY) called by the United Nations. The IYY would serve as focus in building a youth front, bringing the highly politicised youth within the UDF to work with less political groups. Disagreement between the different ideological groupings, however, caused a paralysis of initiatives to form a joint approach to youth activities. 25

In 1987 the ANC called on the youth to "act as the yeast, to energise and dynamise the people as a whole... ". 26 Only in 1987, during the height of township revolt and midst of a State of Emergency, was a national youth body at last formed. The South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) was formally launched in March 1987. It was restricted less than a year later, in February 1988, and its entire leadership detained under the nationwide state of emergency. At that time SAYCO claimed more than one million members and formed the backbone of the UDF's mass-based strategy.' 157

The leadership of formal youth organisations

Of those youth organisations which were affiliated to the UDF, the majority were formal youth congresses and COSAS branches. For the most part, this leadership comprised politically articulate activists, motivated by political idealism and working towards affecting political change in South Africa. Many of these leaders came from better-off households and were educated. These youth activists also invariably came through COSAS or semi-political youth clubs, were students themselves or former students, and were taught and influenced by older political activists.'

The increasingly violent character of township politics from the mid-1980s, transformed the initial leadership profile, with a second set of leaders emerging. These leaders - and their supporting organisation - were informal. The thinkers got replaced by the doers - those who preferred direct action rather than conceptualizing the struggle. 29 These groups became commonly known as the "comrades" and were involved in violent conflict, not only with the authorities, but in some instances also with their own communities. They were largely uncontrollable and damaged the UDF's reputation. The authorities also used their activities to label the UDF as a violent organisation and to act against the UDF.

Impact, role and importance

The youths in the townships formed the core of black resistance during the 1980s. These "children of Soweto 1976" acted as the vanguard and bore the brunt of the government's violent response. The systematic organisation of black school children, college and university students, began in 1979 in the aftermath of the Soweto protests and riots.

The newly formed youth organisations received their "baptism of fire" during 1980-1981 when thousands of schoolchildren and students took part in class boycotts between April 1980 and January 1981. The boycott, like the UDF itself, originated in Cape Town 158 and spread nationwide, receiving mass support in especially the Eastern Cape. By 1984, when the UDF was already on the move, COSAS had developed a well- organised structure with branches in nearly fifty centers, concentrated in the southern Transvaal and the Eastern Cape. 3°

The foundation for the later cooperation between different sectors of the community - which formed the basis of the UDF - had its roots in the early 1980s. Student leaders became convinced that they had to win the support of their elders, as tension between parents and children were proving counter-productive. COSAS and AZASO thus resolved to broaden their strategy and become involved in community issues. Consequently, COSAS led a protest march against rent increases in the Vaal in April 1981, and also helped to organise a national consumer boycott of Wilson-Rowntree Sweets during the end of 1981 to support members of the South African Allied Workers' Union (SAAWU) who had been dismissed from an East London factory. Educational issues however remained the main mobilisation target of COSAS and AZASO with COSAS also becoming involved in a campaign to draft an "education charter.'

The events of 1976-77 had turned children into the leaders. They took the lead in the mass resistance that became a feature of protest in the 1980s. Youths in the 1980s grew up in a "survivalistic" culture, in which violence was endorsed as a means of procuring scarce material resources, and where this culture/mindset also made its mark in the political struggle. 32 They slotted easily into the UDF set-up and in many cases took the lead in protest campaigns against the government and also bore the brunt of harrassment, arrest and detentions. More importantly, the youth formed a major part of the UDF's resistance base as they provided the UDF with the numbers, the storm troops, the readily available masses for protest action and were in the forefront of the direct action precipated by the UDF to protest and resist discrimination and repression throughout the 1980s. 159

2.2. Civic organisations

2.2.1. Background

Civic organisations played an active role in the political struggles of black South Africans during the 1980s. Civics were established to deal with civic issues such as rents, evictions, bus fare increases and other local matters affecting their membership.' They were formed mainly because local government institutions were seen as illegitimate and credible political parties were banned. During the 1980s civics were involved in numerous protest actions and boycotts under the banner of the UDF. 34

The basic strategy common to all civics was therefore to mobilise communities around concrete grievances or demands and to protest peacefully for redress until agreements could be negotiated. With this strategy, civics became the local political centres of the UDF which orchestrated resistance against the state through rent boycotts, consumer boycotts and mass stay-aways. 35

2.2.2. Origin and development

Civics evolved through several stages. They had their origin in the student protests of 1976. This created the radical edge that was later carried over into the civic movement. The next stage was the creation of mass-based organisations - the actual civics. The first black communities to develop broadly-based, popular, grassroots associations, were in the Eastern Cape in the black communities like New Brighton and Kwazakhele, and in the Coloured areas on the Cape Peninsula in the Western Cape. 36 The first two were the Soweto Civic Association (SCA) and the Port Elizabeth Black People's Congress (PEBCO). The next two stages, 1983-1984, saw the civics becoming more of a national movement. The first saw the formation of the UDF which created a national resistance front to which the civics were affiliated. Secondly, civics established a structure - the street-block-area committee system - which was able to mobilise large numbers of people at the grassroots and which was resistant to 160 repression, because of its very dispersed nature.'

Civic organisations played a major role within the UDF's resistance initiatives. They represented the cutting edge in the townships and bore the brunt of protest and resistance within the townships. Civic organisations consisted of different township groups with student and youth groups forming the backbone. 38

2.2.3. Membership, strength and support

Cape Town's Coloured suburbs were particularly politically active with at least 32 civic groups formed between 1980 and 1982. These civics were led by young, middle-class activists and thus also made a contribution to developing and schooling a new generation of leaders, many of whom attained great prominence at a later stage. The civics tackled local problems affecting the whole of the Coloured community. They also served as a cohesive factor within the Coloured community, and even published some local newsletters, for example the Logra News and Grassroots in Cape Town, and Umthonyama in Port Elizabeth. 39

During 1983 civics were founded in most parts of the country and by the time the UDF was launched in August 1983, civics were strong in the Transvaal, Western and Eastern Cape (because of the large urban centres found there) but weak in Natal and the OFS. During this period, 1983-1984, civics were formed around political concerns rather than social problems. The intensity of township conflict and the collapse of many township councils during 1984 - 1986, increased the prominence of civics. By early 1986, the state was forced to recognise the prominent role played by the civics in the townships. The result was that state institutions and business groups were forced to enter into negotiations with the civics. In certain townships, civics widened their support by the forming of grassroots-based street committees. The states of emergency largely paralysed most civics although struggles continued over rent and other social issues. Non-payment of rents and rates, became the cornerstone of civic-related protest and boycotts. By 1989 many new civics had emerged and continued to pressurise the 161

government with regard to rates boycotts. 4°

The strength of civics during the 1980s was primarily due to their drawing together of national and local issues and struggles. Some issues, such as rent increases, were a nationwide problem - because of poverty and unemployment, which moved the civics towards formal and informal coordination. From 1983, the UDF provided this coordination but still failed to launch a single umbrella civic organisation. The creation of a single civic organisation, the South African National Civic Organisation (SANCO), was only realised after the unbanning of the ANC and the disbandment of the UDF. 41

The support for civics during the 1980s, reflected a combination of conservatism and radicalism. Civics linked national and local issues, and launched numerous protest actions, boycotts and mass meetings, but most township residents remained averse to confrontation with the state. Although the civics had legitimacy and support, ultimately they were subject to the same constraints facing township councils - they had little power to really challenge government policies. Their successes can rather be described as those of watchdog organisations, supervising and pressurising government activities through protest action, rather than really influencing policy. Some civics did manage to broaden their activities and began to fulfil aspects of the role of local government. Through "people's power", alternative local government structures were set up - for example people's education and people's courts. In many cases this was, however, a transient phenomenon, rooted in the collapse of local government rather than the ability of the civics to "take over local government". 42

Throughout the 1980s, civics enjoyed considerable support. They formed one of the UDF's main pillars of resistance in the townships, bolstered by youth and other groups. Although street committees were formed in certain areas, the civics, largely failed to create a broad grassroots organisation. Civics' protest efforts were also largely localised and they were not really able to project their strength and support outside the townships. In this, they therefore failed to produce the so-called "rolling mass action campaigns" of the 1990s. Protest was limited to intermittant campaigns and reactive - 162 rent increases, local government elections and consumer boycotts - rather than pro- active.' This was, however, sufficient to make the townships largely ungovernable. Civics also became involved in campaigns for "open cities" or "one city", one non-racial municipality - basically a demand for the abolishment of the Group Areas Act and deracialisation of public facilities and residential areas." The pattern of civic activity could be traced to their failure to build a broader organisational base, and illustrated one of the UDF's main problems of maintaining the momentum of resistance and protest - it gave the state the time to hit back and was the reason why the states of emergency proved quite successful.

2.2.4. Leadership

The success of many civics throughout the 1980s could be traced to the broad range of people involved in the leadership. Civics involved people from different political backgrounds - black consciousness, students, ANC, former councillors, trade unionists, church leaders and former Labour Party members in Coloured areas. Each group brought different strengths, organisational skills and a different understanding of civic action to the movement. Leadership was generally broad-based and included traders and businessmen, blue-collar workers, public sector employees like teachers, although professional activists and white-collar workers dominated the leadership structures. The civic leadership was also overwhelmingly male. 45 The broad spectrum of township dwellers became part of the civics' support base and augmented, with the youth and other groups, mass support for the UDF's protest initiatives.

2.2.5. Problems

Problems abounded within the civics, which influenced their value. Infighting, jealousy and state repression inhibited growth. Most civics enjoyed considerable support, although in many areas such support tended to be passive rather than active. Opportunities for active public support were generally limited to public meetings and demonstrations, which often attracted massive support. Many civic leaders also made 163 the mistake of prioritising national rather than local issues while mass meetings were deemed as sufficient. This had the effect that may civics failed to build a significant local support base." Their support was also unevenly spread across township populations. The pattern of support reflected civics' leadership, predominant ideology and concerns. Civics were seen as representing the community, which in practice meant the stronger, more articulate and educated, less cautious township residents. The more timid souls tended to shy away from radical politics, which contributed to internal strive within communities. Especially the brutal enforcement of consumer boycotts, caused a rift within the community. This made it increasingly difficult for civics to launch township-wide issues. 47

2.2.6. Impact, role and importance

The state's inability to introduce new structures at local level and to manage them without popular consent, created the opening for the UDF to launch massive civic- based resistance." The UDF and the civics nevertheless largely failed to exploit this situation to its fullest consequences because they did not manage to create a national coordinated structure and failed to keep the momentum going when protest action did materialise. The UDF did, however, manage to use the civics by effectively causing the collapse of township- based local government structures and making the townships ungovernable. Especially during the second state of emergency, when the UDF was subjected to intense pressure from the state, these mass-based community organisations managed to keep a measure of resistance going. This meant that pressure on the government was continued, giving the UDF a chance to regroup." Although the civics never came close to overthrowing the state, they created conditions of general political instability. Routine township administration became impossible and rent boycotts plunged the black local authorities into a fiscal crisis. 50 The civics could have been more successful if they were able to operate as a single national movement, but their contribution towards the broad UDF- organised resistance on a regional and local level throughout the 1980s, proved incalculable. Their intiatives in the townships tied the security forces down and kept resistance continuously on a high 164 level throughout the 1980s.

2.3. Churches and religious associations

2.3.1. Background

Liberal Christian church groups, which include the Anglican, Methodist, Catholic denominations as well as smaller groups, have a long history of being closely linked to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. After much soul searching through the years, the church51 finally decided to fully support the struggle against apartheid :

"Christians are required in resistance and defiance to join others in struggling

against oppression." 52

The church acknowledged that it was not a political organisation and should not try to play such a role, but was there to encourage those opposing apartheid, to provide moral and physical support and to be the conscience of those practicing apartheid.' Also, those members of political groups and organisations involved in the struggle, were also members of the church whose well being had to be looked after, especially during arrest and detention.

2.3.2. Types of church groups

The church involved itself in the political struggle in South Africa on a wide front. Where certain national and local groups went so far as to affiliate with the UDF, umbrella groups and international groups played a crucial role in internationalising the UDF's struggle, supported the UDF financially and lent their support to implement sanctions and to pressurise the government with regard to detentions, forced removals and other repressive actions. 165

International groups

The major international church group which supported the UDF's initiatives, was the World Council of Churches (WCC). The WCC had been involved in efforts to end racism in South Africa since 1937, and since 1970, mainly through its Programme to Combat Racism. The Cottesloe Declaration of 1960, where Black people's right to own land, equal work opportunities and education and participation in government was accepted, the establishment of a Special Fund to Combat Racism in 1970 and the rejection of the state of emergency during 1985, were some of the actions the WCC undertook to protest against the South African situation.'

National and regional groups

Churches in South Africa itself, had played an increasingly important role within the liberation struggle since the early 1970s. Nationalist culture was often incorporated into religious liturgy, with liberation ideology, for example the Freedom Charter of the ANC was incorporated in church services. Churches and religious associations were thus a reinforcing factor in the revival of mass resistance during the 1980s. Especially the ecumenical South African Council of Churches (SACC), established itself as a supporter of militant anti-apartheid activity since its founding in 1968. 55 The South African Catholics Bishops' Conference (SACBC) also played a crucial role. For example, the president of the SACBC, Archbishop Denis Hurley was charged during 1983 under the Police Act of 1958 after accusing the security forces of atrocities in Namibia. 56

Other church denominations which played a crucial role include the Methodist, Anglican, Presbyterian, Lutheran and Reformed churches'', as well as religious groups such as the National Initiative for Reconciliation (NIR - addessed socio-political issues), the Belydende Kring NG Kerke (BK - the "black" Dutch Reformed Church groups that were formed as a 'Witness" against apartheid), Christians for Peace and Justice (CPJ - striving towards justice and peace in South Africa), the Institute for Contextual Theology 166

(ICT - produced the Kairos Document), KONTAK (interracial contact), REFORUM (breakaway group from the DRC). Regional groups such as DIAKONIA (support group for those opposing apartheid), International Fellowship of Reconciliation (IFOR - Interdenominational group committed to non-violence), LAMLA (a conflict management programme of the CIS), Pietermaritzburg Agency for Christian Social Awareness (PACSA - interracial activities), and Ecumenical Action Movement (TEAM - community education), supported the liberation struggle in specific regions." Religious community and student groups also supported the UDF's initiatives. These included the Mission of the Churches for Community Development (MCCD), Young Christians Students (YCS), Students Union for Christian Action (SUCA) and Young Christian Workers (YCW).

Other religious groups also became involved in the broad struggle against apartheid. These included the Muslim faith, with groups such as Muslims Against Opression Muslim UDF affiliates such as the Islamic Council of South Africa (ICSA), Muslim Judicial Council (MJC), Nizama Muslim Society (Pietermaritzburg) and Hindu UDF affiliates such as La Mercy Hindu Temple and Siva Soobremoniar Temple.'

2.3.3. Role, impact and importance

The church asked itself through the years how it could make a meaningful contribution to political change in South Africa. It was a major debating point and a theological/moral problem throughout the 1980s of where did the churches' loyalty lie - supporting the state versus supporting the oppressed population. It had to be decided which carried the heavier weight - the scriptures' command of loyalty to the state, or to act against injustice, and thus opposing the state. In the end, the church decided to act against the inhumane apartheid policies of the South African state. The church did not always take active part in the day to day protest actions of the UDF (although there were several instances where it happened), but rather used its power and influence to pressurise the government on another level. These actions took on many different forms and approaches and ranged from socio-economic to moral resistance : 167

The church decided to resist the system of economic and racial apartheid in concrete ways. Economic pressure was one of the mainstays of the churches' involvement. The World Council of Churches played a leading role in this regard. International sanctions became a major weapon in the hands of the opponents of apartheid, with the churches playing a significant role in the implementation of such sanctions.'

The church took it upon itself to deliver social comment on a wide variety of repressive state activities. These included arrests and detentions, forced removals, refugees and exiles, anti-conscription, the death penalty, unemployment, restriction of information, racism and violence. 61

The international church had to be asked for its support and assistance in devising a joint, international campaign against South Africa.

The church was to resist the apartheid system and support those that oppose it. Apartheid was to be shown to be in direct contrast with Christianity - a challenge to the Afrikaner churches which resulted in people like Beyers Naude being hounded from the Dutch Reformed Church.

The church realised that verbal pronouncements were futile and decided to engage the state more directly through concrete action. This included direct involvement in all non-violent actions of protest, strikes and civil disobedience undertaken against the state.

The church acknowledged that resistance was moving beyond the realm of legality which implied that the church would have to expose itself to prosecution if and when they support such actions. 62

The SACC's position found expression in the Kairos Document, a theological 168 commentary on South Africa's "situation of death", drafted by 152 clergymen in 1985 under the auspices of the Contextual Theology. The Kairos Document declared apartheid as unchristian, launched a scathing attack on the mainstream churches and stated that in the context of unjust laws, Christians and their churches had an obligation to rebel. The Kairos Document in effect called for the religious community to take sides. Although most mainstream churches rejected the Kairos Document, several high-profile theologians, like Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Reverend Alan Boesak, agreed with its viewpoints and became prominent figures in the struggle. They also played a prominent role as leaders in the UDF (for example Dr Alan Boesak, Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Reverend Frank Chikane). After the banning of political organisations, including the UDF, in 1988, church leaders helped to fill the leadership vacuum.'

During 1986, the WCC identified further specific forms of action the church was to embark upon to effect change in South Africa. The various forms of action included :

Monitoring, analysis and interpretation of each major political development, on which the WCC provided publication. This included issues such as refugees, relocations and forced removals and violence. Publications were also compiled in conjunction with the SACC. 64

Delegations were sent, reported and the WCC followed up their recommendations.

Pastoral visits to churches in difficult situations.

Teams were sent to study and report on particular situations, with the reports shared with churches, selected governments and inter- governmental bodies.

Confidential representations were made to certain governments with the 169

view of such governments influencing the South African government.

Financial and other support for action groups involved in the struggle.

Attempts to prevent possible conflicts before they occur. 65

Churches also provided a support system for detained activists and their families, which included guidelines on their rights during detention', visits to detainees to ensure their well-being and exposing excesses - like torture - detainees suffered in South African prisons.'

The most prominent protest action of the 1980s came with the Defiance Campaign in 1989 and the march on parliament led by prominent clerics. Dr Boesak stated after the march :

" Resistance will continue. It will continue until the state of emergency is lifted, until the detentions are no more, until schools are free of a police presence, until Nelson Mandela and others are out of prison, until unjust laws are removed from the statute books, until all South Africans are eligible to vote, until South Africa

is free." 68

Church services, whether normal services or funerals, served a special role in the time of the UDF. It was used as an organisational focus point to spread the word of resistance to the people, to organise protest activities, etc. Funerals especially served as a major mass protest and resistance medium. In the broader sense, the church became involved in a wide range of protest action against the state, and served as a support system for activists.

One of the WCC churches' major campaigns was the Programme to Combat Racism, which raised the question of apartheid/racism on a worldwide front. This programme basically coordinated the worldwide struggle against racism and became the foundation 170 of the churches' campaign against the South African government.'

The church supported the UDF from its inception. It defended the actions of the UDF by pointing out that all its activities were aimed against the repressive measures of the state. It also defended the UDF vigorously against accusations of violence. The state's security apparatus was accused of causing the vast majority of deaths. The church took upon itself the obligation to support the liberation struggle : principally to develop a high level of political sensitivity among its constituents. 70

2.4. Women's organisations

2.4.1. Background

Protest movements drawn from African women were particularly prominent in the popular resistance of the 1950s. Initially the migrant worker system saw men leaving the rural areas for the urban areas with women staying behind. This changed during the 1950s as a shortage of land and the requirement for women workers, led to large numbers of women following the men to the cities. In 1952, the Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents Act made provision for women to wear reference books like the men.' Although women took part in the Defiance Campaign of 1952 in great numbers, their protest against Passes during 1955-56 was one of the first times women organised nationally to protest an issue. 72 Women's protest followed a broad pattern of protest against issues which made their life difficult. Such issues were usually socio- economically related and were generally politicised. Women protested against forced removals, mass evictions, rent, freedom of movement, and other related issues."

2.4.2. Types of organisations

National and regional women's organisations and groups were involved in the political struggle in South Africa for decades. Such groups were also supported by international agencies such as the Anti-Apartheid Movement and the International Defence and Aid 171

Fund for Southern Africa (IDAF) who highlighted their struggles through publications and publicity. 74

a. National organisations

Structured women's political organisation dated from 1948 with the formation of the ANC Women's League. In the 1950s, women adopted a "Women's Charter" and launched a new organisation, the Federation of South African Women (FSAW) in April 1954. The FSAW was involved in the anti-pass campaign in 1956 with its highpoint the march of 20 000 women to the Union Buildings in Pretoria to protest against the carrying of passes. After the banning of the ANC and PAC during the 1960s, the FSAW ceased to operate.' During the 1970s, attempts were made to reactivate the FSAW, but without much success.'

During April 1981 the United Women's Organisation (UWO) was formed in the Western Cape. Several veterans of the struggle of the 1950s were involved. The UWO was inspired by the fact that a need existed for a specific women's organisation to struggle for the elimination of women's oppression within the context of the broader struggle against oppression in South Africa. The UWO seeked to unite women from all classes to play a role in the liberation struggle!'

The 1980s saw an increase in the role women played in community-based organisations and trade unions. Women also started to address the question of women's oppression as integral to the struggle for national liberation. Women thus started to agitate for a women's forum to protect their interests. After the formation of the UDF in 1983, an attempt was made to launch such a national women's organisation. A broad women's organisation was to be launched during 1986, but the state of emergency caused a postponement. A new women's federation, to coordinate national women's campaigns, the United Democratic Front Women's Congress (UDFWC) was officially launched on 25 April 1987. It brought together eight regional women's organisations affiliated to the UDF, which included the Natal Organisation for 172

Women (NOW), Federation of Transvaal Women (FEDTRAW), the Port Elizabeth Women's Organisation (PEWO), and the Western-Cape based United Women's Congress (UWC). The UDFWC represented a concerted attempt to bring women's issues into the UDF in a more forceful way, and to ensure that women's struggles formed an integral part of the broad political struggle. 78 b. Regional groups and other organisations

In numerous regions, local women's organisations affiliated with the UDF and took the lead in organising local protest initiatives. Such regional groups included the Cradock Women's Organisation, Durban Women's Group, United Women's Organisation, and numerous others in all parts of the country.

The Black Sash represented the most prominent white women's organisation supporting the UDF. Although the Black Sash was not affiliated to the UDF (because of some members' refusal to support the Freedom Charter and a critical viewpoint on the ongoing coercive and violent tactics employed by some groups within the broad UDF framework), most of the organisation's activities were aimed at promoting the UDF's aims. Sheena Duncan, the president of the Black Sash in the early 1980s, said that the Black Sash and the UDF had the same aim, and desired the same for the country although their tactics might differ. 79

2.4.3. Leadership

Women from all the different ethnic groups in South Africa played leadership roles during the 1980s although women tended to be sidelined in local organisations. Traditional gender roles within the black community, lack of education and assertiveness, played a role in this. Looking at political detainees during the 1980s, only 15 percent were women, further illustrating the point. 80 Women, however, played a prominent role in the national structures of the UDF and included as patrons Helen Joseph, Martha Mahlangu, Frances Baard and Dorothy Nyembe, Albertina Sisulu as 173 a National President, Cheryl Carolus and Sandy Africa as Regional Secretaries 81 , while women also played a leadership role on regional level. Of these, several women were detained or banned for long periods of time by the authorites, like Winnie Mandela, Janet Cherry, Sue Lund, and others. 82

2.4.4. Role, impact and importance

Black women lived a harsh life during the 1980s. Besides being exposed to economic hardship, unemployment and in many cases a responsibility to take care of their family without the support of a husband, large numbers of women also involved themselves in the UDF's structures. Although discriminated against in several instances, (because of black males chauvinistic attitudes) especially where leadership positions were concerned, they still managed to play a crucial role as part of the UDF's mass-based struggle. Especially on local level, women played a crucial role and provided the glue, which held structures together, especially during the dark days of the states of emergency. They were in the forefront of civic structures, parent-teacher organisations, street and area committees and of course in several local and national women's organisations.

Only small numbers of white women, especially those from a liberal background, were involved in the UDF's initiatives.The Black Sash, for example, involved itself in campaigns to discredit the government's legal structure, its unjust laws, forced removals, military conscription and detentions, while also being active within their local UDF structures. They also strove to convince blacks of whites' genuine commitment towards the freedom struggle. The Black Sash also launched campaigns with UDF- affiliated civics to discredit black local government management structures, installed so-called "advice offices" offering legal support to blacks, including launching investigations into SAP/SADF malpractices against blacks in the townships, supported the activities of the Release Mandela Committee and agitated for the unbanning of the ANC and other banned organisations. The Black Sash used its respected image and contact with foreign organisations and opinion-makers to build the image and credibility 174 of the UDF abroad, and foreign support and publicity for the campaigns launched by the UDF.'

Smaller organisations like Women for Peace (WFP) and Women for Peaceful Change Now (WPCN) and the Union for Jewish Women (UJW), mainly involved themselves with sensitising campaigns within the white community, by organising protest marches and petitions against specific government activities, like the states of emergency.

In the 1980s, women's organisations all over the country began uniting in regions. Women's issues were incorporated in those issues forming part of UDF-initiated protest. The launch of the UDF Women's Congress and FEDSAW, further increased the influence of women as an important sector which slotted into the UDF's national and local resistance efforts. The security forces' harsh actions, even against women, also caused further pressure on the government."

2.5. Trade Unions

2.5.1. Background

Trade Unions served as one of the UDF's main arms and their organisational strength formed the basis of several of the bigger stay-aways, strikes and mass protest rallies organised by the UDF.

The South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) was founded in March 1955. Apart from being the first non-racial trade union coordinating body, SACTU was also in the forefront of the political struggle for black rights in the country. 85 SACTU immediately allied itself with the other political resistance groups after its inception, became a partner in the Congress Alliance of the 1950s and 1960s, and took part in the Congress of the People in Kliptown in 1955 where the Freedom Charter was adopted. This marked the beginning of a close relationship with the liberation movement which was reaffirmed during the 1980s between the UDF and COSATU.86 175

From its inception, SACTU, as a member of the Congress Alliance, had its specific task in the struggle. This was the organisation of the largely unorganised workers of South Africa. Only by uniting all workers, would they gain the strength to present a mass front to the authorities and gain the power to win concessions from the state. 87

After the government legalised black trade unions in 1979, union membership grew rapidly over the next five years - from 808 053 in 1979 to 1 406 302 in 1984." Strikes became a normal part of the collective bargaining process. In contrast to historical precedents in other parts of the world where collective bargaining concessions were backed by expanded political rights, this was not the case in South Africa. This intensified the demand for national liberation and made the trade unions a natural ally of the UDF. When the UDF embarked on its massive campaigns of protest and resistance during 1984, trade unions were faced with a dual challenge - they were forced to face the question of national liberation, and had to relate to the youth-led civil war in the townships. This forced labour leaders to rethink the relationship between factory-based trade union struggles and the broader political struggle. As workers were part of a specific community in their daily existence, a natural affinity developed between trade unions and the community based civics and youth organisations, which all came together in joint UDF-led resistance and protest action.'

2.5.2. Types of trade unions

In March 1978, SACTU president Stephen Dlamini made the following statement :

We must counter [the state], by being more clever than he, by developing new forms of organisation, new ideas of struggle. 9°

The founding of the UDF in the 1980s, made Dlamini's words seem prophetic. The liberation movements did indeed employ new strategies and tactics, while COSATU was able to organise workers nationally, which culminated in strikes in which millions participated. Individual trade unions also organised localised protest action. Massive 176

labour action, including strikes and stay-aways, became one of the mainstays of the UDF protest action during the 1980s.

Relatively few trade unions affiliated themselves with the UDF, but many still played a major role in the UDF's origins. Unions often provided experienced leaders to a variety of the UDF's affiliates, especially when the government detained thousands of UDF leaders. The growing strength and influence of trade unions introduced a different approach and greater democratisation within political structures. A greater degree of leadership accountability, democratic participation and organisational structure became the norm. This contrasted sharply with the black resistance organisations of the 1950s up to the 1970s, where a more autocratic approach dominated. Political structures were generally run by a handful of middle-class elites, who "elected" themselves to speak for the illiterate masses. They served as spokespersons for black political sentiment in the absence of a large, mass-based resistance climate based on the broad, participatory democracy practiced by the UDF. 91

a. National based trade unions

The Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) represented the best organised independent union federation in South Africa during the early 1980s. It was established in 1979 and boasted a membership of 106 000 workers by November 1983.92 FOSATU's affiliates emphasised organisation and a professionalised leadership. FOSATU, in conjunction with the socalled community unions (which adopted a more political approach), joined forces during 1985 with the formation of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). 93

After the formation of the UDF, FOSATU encouraged its members to become involved in organisations affiliated to the UDF, but ruled out affiliation by FOSATU itself to the UDF for two distinct reasons. Firstly, FOSATU's main responsibility was to its workers and secondly, the UDF's multi-class nature made it difficult for workers to get involved and fully participate in its political activities. FOSATU, however, stated that it would 177 participate fully in UDF campaigns. 94

The founding of COSATU was the culmination of the massive growth of trade unions in South Africa and coincided with the activities of the UDF during the 1980s. The formation of COSATU in 1986 was welcomed by the UDF, which declared in a widely distributed pamphlet, "Let us join COSATU in our millions". 95

COSATU's position with regard to the UDF was always ambiguous. During a Central Executive Committee (CEC) policy meeting from 7 to 9 February 1986, COSATU, for the first time, tried to formulate its official stance with regard to participation in and position relating to the UDF and its activities. A clause was accepted that COSATU would participate in all campaigns of "progressive" organisations, in the interests of COSATU's membership. COSATU also decided not to affiliate to any political organisation, although individual union affiliation to the UDF was left deliberately vague. No union would also be asked to disaffiliate from the UDF as a condition of joining COSATU. As the resolution was never clearly defined, it was interpreted in a variety of ways. 96 From February 1986, meetings and consultations between the two organisations took place regularly. 97 Joint campaigns were launched 98 and statements made,' clearly stating that the UDF and COSATU acted as one.

COSATU, although not affiliated to the UDF was, because of their common policies and non-racial organisations, close "fighting allies". The UDF and COSATU each supported the others campaigns, like COSATU's Living Wage Campaign.' This was emphasised regularly and the joint struggle aspect, featured centrally in most of the documents pertaining to their alliance. 101 b. Individual trade unions

Some independent unions, like the General Workers Union (GWU), refused to affiliate to the UDF because it felt its main responsibility was to address workers' rights. Other unions, like the South African Allied Workers Union (SAAWU) argued for a closer 178 relationship while the Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA) did affiliate with the UDF. 102 Sisa Njikelana of SAAWU, warned during 1984 that the state was striving to introduce the new constitution in an attempt to co-opt sections of the oppressed majority and halt the advances made in the struggle for a democratic South Africa. He was in favour of a broad front to oppose the state. He described a front as a broad spectrum of autonomous organisations of differing class origins with a common political grievance. It is a forum, a rallying point to provide the structural form to guarantee the broadest possible unity in action of different social groups. It also served to concentrate the maximum energies and resources of organisations previously acting independently. Affiliated organisations within a broad front also strove towards compromise to achieve the broadest unity when taking up a specific political issue. Njikelana further stated that if the union leadership had its worker members' interests at heart, it would strive to lead them into the broad democratic front and active participation in all its structures. He did, however, foresee that the union leadership would ultimately take over the leadership of the front. In the end, several of the UDF's most prominent leaders were former trade unionists. After the state clampdown on UDF activists, several trade union leaders took the places of those UDF leaders who were detained. 103

2.5.3. Leadership

Many trade union activists came to trade unionism through their involvement in community structures, while the opposite was also true. On local level, many UDF activists were also involved in a trade union and used their expertise in trade union activism to launch local resistance initiatives in the townships where they lived.'"

2.5.4. Role, impact and importance

The economic recession of the early 1980s, brought a massive upswing in strike action. This labour unrest coincided with a general upsurge in black protest and resistance which increased after the founding of the UDF in 1983. As the police intervened aggressively in nearly half of the strikes, the political dimension was accentuated and 179 added to industrial conflict, politicising the workers.' Labour action thus became not only a struggle for a better living for workers, but a struggle for real democratic rights which involved not only workers, but the wider community.'

The tendency for workers to embark on strike action increased consistently over the period 1979 throughout the 1980s. This increase came at a time that the South African economy had entered into a period of sustained recession, typified by rising unemployment and a fall in growth rate. Increased strike activity coupled with the rapid expansion of black trade unions and a deterioration in the political climate, further undermined business confidence in the economy. 107

The International Labour Conference (ILC) noted during its Seventy-third Session in Geneva in 1987, that only three factors had saved South Africa from bankruptcy - loans by the international banking community, the sale of gold and credit by foreign banks. It also commented on the marked growth in membership in the black trade unions which had become one of the most influential opponents to the government's apartheid policies, and the growing understanding and willingness of the international community to impose sanctions against South Africa. 1°8 The power of the black worker became self-evident to the government and intense efforts were made to crush their activities and to limit their power.

In response to the violent action launched by the government during October 1984 to search the Vaal townships for "revolutionary ... criminal and intimidatory elements", the Federation of South African Trade Unions (FOSATU) and Council of Unions of South Africa (CUSA), joined the UDF to call a two-day stay-away on 5 and 6 November 1984. The result was what observers called the "biggest political strike in the country's history". Between 300 000 and 800 000 workers heeded the call, which initiated the use of industrial power as an element to back political resistance to apartheid. The mass approach, which clearly demonstrated the power of the black working class, became the UDF's trademark and a feature of a succession of protest campaigns and resistance throughout the 1980s. 109 Despite police harassment, bannings and 180 detentions, the black trade unions went from strength to strength and increasingly became one of the major forces of change. 11°

During the tumultuous 1980s, the trade unions had fewer key office holders detained than the UDF affiliates. Because of their stratified and dispersed organisational make- up, trade unions were less vulnerable to immobilisation by the state through a loss of leaders. Soldiers and police in the townships also did not interfere with union functions within the industry.'"

An ANC broadcast on Radio Freedom which called on COSATU to become more deeply involved in the activities of the UDF, led to increased attacks on the union by the state. COSATU's birth was followed by a wave of massive strikes, making 1986 a record year with the highest incidents of industrial action ever. 12

The political turmoil and mass uprisings which took place both before and after the launch of COSATU, played an important role in the shaping of COSATU and influencing its activities during its first six months of existence. A new phase in political resistance started during 1984 with the UDF uprisings which began in the Witwatersrand and rapidly spread throughout the whole country. These protest actions intensified throughout 1984 and 1985 and resulted in a state of emergency declared by the government. This formed the backdrop to COSATU's launch, with the federation formed in the midst of a state of emergency. It was both a product of worker organisation and political insurrection. COSATU's members took part in the stay-aways but played little real part in the organisational phase of the UDF's activities, although some of its leaders played a leadership role within the UDF. 113

Nevertheless, trade unions were continuously harassed. COSATU House was bombed on 7 May 1987, individual members' houses were burned down, especially in KwaZulu/Natal and a large number of trade unionists were dismissed from their work on spurious grounds. Thousands of trade union leaders and activists were detained throughout the years when the states of emergency were in effect, people were 181 intimidated and the government tried to undermine trade union unity through crude propaganda. 14

A key element of trade unions in general, and especially COSATU's role during the late 1980's, was the acknowledgement of the UDF as COSATU's principle ally. The number of workers provided by COSATU for the UDF's protest campaigns and joint resistance increased the political resistance and pressure against the government tenfold. Although Patrick Lekota, the UDF's Publicity Secretary, acknowledged that there was some friction initially between the UDF and FOSATU, this was largely overcome and while the bigger unions did not affiliate with the UDF, they jointly supported one another during protest campaigns. 15

2.6. Racially-based organisations

2.6.1. Background

The existence of so-called ethnic or racially-based organisations went against the grain insofar as the UDF tried to stand for non-racialism and was fighting against a racially- based apartheid system. The ANC went through the process of embracing multiracialism during the 1950s after the Congress of the People where the Freedom Charter was adopted. All four congresses involved in the Congress of the People formed the Congress Alliance. The African (ANC) organisations, Coloured (Coloured Peoples Congress - CPC), Asian (South African Indian Congress - SAIC) and White (South African Congress of Democrats - SACOD), together with the South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU), formed an unofficial alliance. Multi-racialism was then an accepted reality. It was felt that the different groups could play a more constructive role if they stayed apart. Several joint resistance campaigns were launched, with the different ethnic-based organisations supporting one another." 6

The Africanist breakaway during the late 1960s, was partly blamed on the ANC's so- called deprivation of rights for blacks as the ANC's "multiracialism", served to 182 perpetuate the psychological subservience and dependency on whites."' The Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), which was eventually formed, strove for non-racialism. During the 1970s, this argument continued without being solved satisfactorily. Neville Alexander stated in 1983 that organisations and writers, during the 1980s, who used to put forward the idea that South Africa was a multi-racial country composed of four "races", no longer did so. A non-racial viewpoint was preferred and supported. Unfortunately, people meant multi-racialism, even while speaking of non-racialism. Non-racialism could only be used when all notions of race were to be rejected, and led to anti-racism."' The UDF was founded against the background of these theoretical struggles. As they accepted the Freedom Charter, they basically accepted the fact that it was a self-evident and undeniable reality that there were four main national/racial/ethnic groups in South Africa. As the UDF attempted to create as broad as possible a front, all organisations that supported their ideals were welcomed, and allowed to keep their ethnic or racial character intact.

2.6.2. Types and groups of organisations a. Indian organisations

A relatively small, but very influential and leading group within the UDF, were the movements that grew out of radical Indian politics. The Natal Indian Congress (NIC), which was formed in 1894, provided several prominent leaders to the UDF and played an active role in formulating UDF policy. The NIC, which played an active role during the Defiance Campaign in 1952, became dormant in the 1960s after the banning of the ANC and the PAC. It was reactivated in 1971, partially in reaction to the emergence of Black Consciousness organisations in Natal. By 1978, the NIC had regained some of its previous stature when the movement became involved in local campaigns centered on housing and transportation. The NIC became involved in local politics and was instrumental in the establishment of the Durban Housing Action Committee (DHAC). In 1980, the NIC also became involved in the local schools boycott while its president, George Sewpersadh and ANC veteran Archie Gumede, played a leading role in the 183 formation of the Release Mandela Committee (RMC). In 1981 NIC and the DHAC led a successful six-week rent boycott which had the underlying aim of mobilising Durban's Indian population. 19

During 1981, the NIC launched a boycott of the long-postponed elections for the South African Indian Council (SAIC). The SAIC was an advisory body whose members had previously been appointed by the government - several of whom were later involved in the tri-cameral system - and abhorred by protest organisations like the NIC which rejected racially-based bodies to represent Indians. The election boycott was especially successful in the Transvaal where the Transvaal Anti-SAIC Committee (TASC) organised the boycott. The Transvaal Indian leaders also tended to be more radical than their Natal counterparts where the Gandhist tradition of non-violence still prevailed strongly. The boycott campaign included public meetings, house-to-house canvassing, distribution of massive amounts of leaflets, regular press releases arguing against the SAIC and prospective candidates for the SAIC threatened with embargoes and boycotts against their businesses. The boycott campaign proved successful with only an eight percentage election participation averaged nationally. 120

The anti-SAIC campaign provided a watershed in Indian politics. A movement could be discerned away from local affairs to national grievances, transferring the anger evoked by the government with the implementation of the Group Areas Act into a broader political sentiment.' Along with all the other factors mentioned, these activities by the NIC and the TASC, served to prepare the way for the formation of the UDF in 1983, while several of the NIC's leaders, as well as the leadership involved in the TASC, would also play a significant role as leaders of the UDF. 122 b. Coloured organisations

No Coloured organisations existed during the 1980s that could be compared to those active within the Indian and White communities. Coloured political expression was mainly limited to local civic organisations and trade unionists while several Coloured 184 clergymen, like Alan Boesak, played a leading role within the UDF. Part of the reason was that the violence that erupted during 1983-1984 in the Witwatersrand, only spread to the Western Cape (where the majority of Coloureds live) during 1985. A proposed march to Pollsmoor prison - to deliver a message of support to Nelson Mandela and other imprisoned leaders - by Athlone inhabitants, organised by the local community structure, culminated in violent clashes with the police. 123

Up to the formation of the UDF, resistance in the area had been peaceful and non- violent. After the police attack on the marchers, students and youths got involved in street battles with the police which continued throughout the 1980s. The schools boycott also gained momentum and two teachers' organisations were formed. The Democratic Teachers' Union (DTU) organised in the mainly black areas with the Western Cape Teachers' Union (WECTU) mainly in the Coloured areas. 124

Throughout the 1980s, these civic and schools-orientated organisations were in the forefront of the UDF's campaigns within the Coloured areas in the Western Cape. A similar situation unfolded in other parts of the country where concentrations of Coloureds existed and saw the emergence of Coloured pressure groups, such as the United Committee of Concern (UCC) in Natal, whose members played a leading role in the provincial UDF structures. 125

c. White extra-parliamentary organisations

When Frederik Van Zyl Slabbert, the then leader of the Progressive Federal Party and leader of the opposition resigned from parliament in 1986, he highlighted a trend which had become increasingly visible within the white community since 1985. More and more whites were beginning to look beyond parliament in their desire to oppose the regime. The mass struggles initiated by the UDF and which reached a high point during 1985, had a profound effect on the white community. More and more people began to question the governments' repressive policies and increasing numbers of whites were drawn into the liberation struggle.126 185

The division and confusion within the ruling white minority started during 1983 when the National Party (NP) suffered a split when the rightwingers within the party broke away to form the Conservative Party (CP). Big business suffered increasingly because of the innumerable stay-aways, consumer boycotts and a deteriorating financial situation and economic decline. Feelers were extended to the ANC and several delegations visited the ANC leadership in Lusaka. The PFP failed to distance itself from the parliamentary process, even though Slabbert called it an "irrelevant sideshoW'. Although the PFP did not manage to create any channels for extra-parliamentary whites in the struggle, democratic organisations active within the field of resistance, such as the End Conscription Campaign (ECC), the National Union of South African Students (NUSAS) and white area committees and affiliates of the UDF, made tremendous gains during 1985. 127

During the years leading up to the formation of the UDF, white "democrats" were therefore involved in creating a climate for a broad, non-racial resistance movement. Especially on university campusses organisations like NUSAS became involved in propagating an umbrella organisation for protest and resistance, while calling for a "non-racial democratic South Africa", "a non-racial democratic student movement/alliance", and "new democratic movement". NUSAS activists also called for the revival of a protest organisation among whites, similar to the South African Congress of Democrats which formed part of the Congress Alliance that was active during the 1950s. Although several whites were involved in the formation of the UDF, they had learned from their mistakes during the years of the Congress Alliance, and made certain that the UDF never appeared to be under the control of so-called "white liberals". Black leaders filled all the prominent and "visible" leadership positions while whites only played a supporting role (No whites served on the UDF's National Executive during its early years while only five served on the regional command).

Several white organisations were founded after the formation of the UDF in 1983. Many of these organisations stemmed from a specific sector, for example students, academics and civics. The most important of these organisations were the 186

Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (JODAC), Association of Durban Democrats (ADD), Port Elizabeth Area Committee (PEAC), East London Action Committee (ELAC), Grahamstown Democratic Action Committee (GRADAC), Grahamstown Committee of Democrats (GCD), Five Freedoms Forum (FFF) and the ECC.

2.6.3. Leadership

Several high profile UDF leaders were from the white, Coloured and Indian communities. Especially clergymen played an important role. Although more prominent Coloured than white clergymen were involved in the UDF, white clerics did play an important role within the UDF. These included Beyers Naude (General Secretary of the SACC and patron of the UDF), Archbishop Denis Hurley (President of the South African Catholic Bishops Council - SACBC) and Reverend Peter Storey (President of the Methodist Church in South Africa), to name but a few. 128 When the UDF launched its Call to the Whites Campaign, it is specifically used prominent leadership figures from its white affiliates, such as JODAC, to take the lead in the campaign.

2.6.4. Role, impact and importance

Mainly, these racially-based groups and organisations were employed by the UDF to reach specific support bases and groups not generally involved in resistance. Especially white groups, for example, played an important sensitising role within their own community. The role and function of these organisations within the UDF, were twofold:

They played a supportive role in UDF initiated resistance campaigns and activities ; and

they were used to politicise the white population, to subtly introduce them to resistance politics and to involve them in UDF activities, and to 187

increase activism within the Coloured and Indian communities.

These organisations continuously supported the UDF throughout the 1980s and during the late 1980s, showed a marked success rate as especially more whites came to the conclusion that apartheid was outdated and wrong and involved themselves in one way or the other with the UDF's campaigns. Several examples of the supportive role these organisations played, could be mentioned :

iii JODAC, ADD and PEAC's involvement in the Anti-Election Campaign of 1984;

their involvement in the UDF's Million Signature Campaign;

their propagating of the consumer boycotts organised by the UDF, especially the GCD's involvement in the Eastern Cape boycotts; and

the propagating of the ANC's Freedom Charter among whites on a continuous basis. The FFF particularly concentrated on this type of activity.

The Call to the Whites Campaign was launched in 1986 to lessen the fears of whites and if possible, win their support for the UDF's activities. 129 Additional aims were to instill a greater questioning attitude among whites regarding the government's atrocities towards blacks, to counter government propaganda, to openly abandon apartheid and to do their utmost to protect and support the UDF and its affiliates. 130

These so-called "democratic" organisations were much more radical in their approach to the freedom struggle than the white liberal organisations which were also active in protest politics. The fact of the matter was, however, that these different groups of white protest organisations regularly worked together and that overlapping membership was 188 quite common. So, in effect, the liberal organisations used the more radical organisations as a front to launch specific campaigns against the government, for example an anti-conscription campaign through the ECC. These organisations also had specific committees which organised and ran specific UDF projects. These included media, fundraising, culture and education committees. Ad hoc committees were also formed to run specific campaigns, for example the GCD's anti-All Black Rugby Tour campaign and JODAC's anti-New Dispensation campaign.

The ECC, under the leadership of Laurie Nathan, aimed its activities against the conscription of young white men to the SADF. The. ECC thus organised exclusively under the white youth of the country, at high schools and all the English-speaking universities. The ECC also supported the UDF by its sensitising campaigns under whites by concentrating on pointing out the repressive role the SAP and SADF played in suppressing protest in the townships, its role in Namibia and Angola, and the increased militarisation of the South African community. The ECC also encouraged conscientious objection by conscripts. A mutual propaganda war resulted with the South Arican government publishing counter-propaganda, encouraging and justifying conscription.'

UDF leaders made it clear that whites especially, played a significant role in the struggle for freedom. Curnick Ndlovu (UDF Executive Chairman), stated that the role played by whites was vital in the struggle for a non-racial and democratic South Africa. Their role in "generating ferment within the white ranks", had caused a greater white involvement than ever before, and a more "progressive" feeling within the white community than in the era of the Congress Alliance. The UDF, however, remained firmly against the so-called "white liberals" and viewed parties such as the PFP as opportunists and part of the system. Only extra-parliamentary organisations were acceptable to the UDF. UDF Area Committees in white areas therefore attempted to generate support for the UDF in the white community and develop broad-based action there. The UDF also tried to swell its ranks with white members through mass meetings, literature, house meetings and actions coordinated with other organisations. 189

Campaigns like the Call to the Whites Campaign, which appealed directly to whites to join the UDF, were launched. Slabbert and Borraine's resignations from the PFP and parliament led to the opening of extra-parliamentary politics in the white community, which was exploited successfully by the UDF. 132 Although relatively small in numbers, the influence of these white resistance groups, which largely served as a conscience for the wider white community and initiated wider acceptance of the apartheid struggle of black people, proved immeasurably important within the context of the broader resistance struggle.

Although there was some critisism for allowing racially-based groupings within the UDF, the UDF took the pragmatic approach and ignored such criticism. All these groups had some unique abilities and skills, contacts and access to funding for example, which the UDF gained access to. Non-racialism was therefore "ignored" in the interest of the broader struggle and racially-based groups were allowed to exist, for the greater good of the UDF. It was this capacity for positive adaptation to any situation illustrated by the UDF, which made their campaign of resistance so successful.

2.7. Academic, research and educational groups

2.7.1. Background

Organisations and groups falling within this category, did not actively became involved in physical resistance as such, but rather aimed their research and certain activities at enhancing human rights and supporting peace initiatives and reform in South Africa, and thus indirectly supporting the resistance groups.

2.7.2. Types of organisations

Organisations included had the following characteristics :

■ They were on the whole private, independent, non-governmental 190

agencies and were therefore not accountable to the state. University- based academics did, however, get into trouble to a certain extent.

They did not mobilise members or political decision-making directly, but organised discussion groups, studies, mediation programmes, analysed conflict and addressed single issues.

They usually represented national or major regional initiatives. 133 a. Academic organisations

In general, academics on the different campusses, and especially white academics, played more of a supportive and influencing role in the liberation struggle. In contrast, their students played a more active role in protest activities organised from these quarters. Academics were closely involved in the Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC), JODAC and the GCD. Some also served on regional UDF structures, like Professor Raymond Suttner of the University of the Witwatersrand. Another role played by these academics was to aim their research into unearthing the governments' weak points and to agitate and protest around such issues. Academics with a legal background, were used by the UDF for the defence of their members in political trials and to handle statements by the UDF. Organisations like the Legal Resources Centre (LRC), under the chairmanship of Advocate Arthur Chaskalson and the Centre for Applied Legal Studies (CALS) under the chairmanship of Professor John Dugard, played an active role in providing legal council especially for accused arrested under the stringent security legislation. They were also used to channel funds from abroad to support the accused and continuously waged a propaganda campaign against the legality of the state's legal structures.

If one takes their numbers (about 40 000) and their active support (distribution of pamphlets and holding of mass protest meetings) into account, NUSAS was one of the UDF's most prominent affiliates. Only the two states of emergency put a damper on 191 their activities when the average white, English-speaking student refused to become involved in the more violent activities prevalent within the UDF at that time. The exception was at Rhodes University in Grahamstown where both students and academics were very militant and were closely involved in UDF activities in the region through the GCD. 134 b. Research and educational groups

These groups, through research conducted and courses presented to students, provided main line information on certain aspects of the struggle in South Africa. Included were the Centre for Applied Social Sciences (CASS), at the University of Natal which published Indicator South Africa, the Centre for Intergroup Studies (CIS), at the University of Cape Town which concentrated on racial conflict studies, the Institute for A Democratic Alternative for South Africa (IDASA) of Van Zyl Slabbert, which focussed on aspects of South Africa becoming a non-racial society, the Institute for Futures Research (IFR), researching South Africa's long-term future from a business viewpoint, South Africa Beyond Apartheid (SABA), a USA-registered research foundation and the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR), which aimed at the fostering of a non-violent process of change in South Africa. 135

2.7.3. Role, impact and importance

Although those leading academics, researchers and other prominent people mentioned did not always "man the barricades" with the UDF's mass of supporters, they played an important role in spreading the UDF's basic message. Some openly joined the UDF, others gave their tacit support without going public.Through their work, however, they served as the conscience of the community (by exposing the state's brutal activities, for example the torture of detainees), they prepared the white community for black majority government (by countering the state's propaganda of presenting the ANC, UDF and other groups as instruments of communist terror), and organising meetings and inter-active experiences between the different race groups. In short, these individuals 192 and Institutes, played a crucial role in breaking down the barriers apartheid had managed to erect between the different race groups in South Africa.

Academic-based groups and individuals, therefore, like the racially-based organisations, played a unique and indivual role within the broader UDF-initiated resistance process. They used their influence and capabilities in a progressive manner as "agents of influence" to induce a capacity for change within the broad white community. 193

References : Chapter 3

J. Seekings : "The United Democratic Front in Cape Town, 1983-1986", p. 1.

J. D. Brewer (Ed.) : Can South Africa Survive?, p. 32.

J. Seekings : "The United Democratic Front in Cape Town", pp. 2-5.

Ibid., p. 9.

Forward : November 1981, pp. 1-2, 5.

J. Seekings : Heroes or Villians? Youth politics in the 1980s, pp. xi, 50-51.

Ibid., pp. xi-xiii.

M. Jupp : Children under Apartheid, pp. 17-20.

Higher Education Study Group : Students and the Struggle for Democracy, p. 4.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, pp. 12-13.

Higher Education Study Group : Students and the Struggle for Democracy, p. 4.

Ibid., pp. 21-22.

ANC Pamphlet : South Africa is coming back. Our Children, p. 34.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, p. 23.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, pp. 31-32.

Ibid., p 32.

Sechaba : March 1981, p. 10.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, pp. 7-8, 33-34.

Sechaba : March 1981, p. 10.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, p. 38.

Ibid., p. 36.

Sechaba : October 1982, p. 9.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, p. 35.

Ibid., pp. 36-37. 194

Ibid., p. 36-37.

Sechaba : February 1987: p. 10.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, pp. 51,55.

Ibid., p. 58.

Ibid., p. 60.

T. Lodge and B. Nasson (et al) : South Africa : Time Running Out. All. Here. and Now : Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980's, p. 36.

Ibid., p. 36.

Seekings : Heroes or Villians?, p. 15.

M. Matiwana and S. Walters : The Struggle for Democracy. A Study of Community Organisations in Greater Cape Town from the 1960's to 1985, p. 70.

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 6, p. 216.

Marx : p. 111.

!bid., p. 40.

Development and Democracy : Number 8, November 1994, p. 32.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 40.

Ibid., p. 40.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 6, p. 217.

Ibid., pp. 231-232.

Ibid., pp. 233-234.

Ibid., p. 226.

T. Botha : "Civil Society : The Case of Civics as Autonomous Organs of Grassroots Participation", in Local Government and Planning for a Democratic South Africa, p. 15.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 6, p. 227.

Ibid., p. 227.

Ibid., pp. 228-231. 195

T. Frankel, N. Pines and M. Swilling (Eds.) : State, Resistance and Change in South Africa, pp. 110-111.

W. Cobbett and R. Cohen : Popular Struggles in South Africa, p. 110.

Development and Democracy : Number 8, November 1994, p. 32.

When talking of "the church", it is meant the mainline Christian churches and organisations linked to these churches in South Africa which became involved in opposing the state's apartheid policies, either directly as affiliates of the UDF, or indirectly as a moral watchdog.

C. Villa-Vicencio : Civil Disobedience and Beyond, p. vii.

A. Nolan : God in South Africa. The challenge of the gospel, p. 216.

A. J. van der Bent (Ed.) : Breaking Down the Walls, pp. 10-20.

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 45, 112-113.

CIIR Update Number 2 : South Africa in the 1980s, p. 29.

SACC Pamphlet : Report on Conslultation of Church Representatives on Racism in South Africa, pp. 34-36.

R. Winkler (et al) : An Overview of Peace Initiatives, Movements and Organisations in South Africa, pp. 43-53.

CIIR Update Number 2 : South Africa in the 1980s, p. 13.

The World Council of Churches and Bank Loans to Apartheid : pp. 1, 10.

Church pamphlets : Ministry and Resistance, Refugees and Exiles, Relocations: The Churches' report on forced removals, The Rape of Peace, The Church and the Death Penalty, Breaking down the halls, South Africa : Unemployment.

E. Thema : "The Role and Importance of the Church for Future Political Development in South Africa", in Conflicts in South Africa Symposium, pp. 1-13. lid., pp. 112-113.

SACC Pamphlet : Refugees and Exiles and SACC/SACBC Pamphlet : Relocations : The Churches' report on forced removals.

WCC Pamphlet : The Role of the Wolrd Council of Churches in International Affairs, pp. 15-16.

V. G. Nyobole and P. M. Graham (Eds.) : Ministry and Resistance. 196

SACBC Pamphlet : The last affidavits, and BCC Pamphlet : Torture in South Africa.

Villa-Vicencio : p. xii.

A. J. van der Bent (Ed.) : World Council of Churches' Statements and Actions on Racism 1948 - 1979, pp. vi-viii.

CIIR Update No 2 : South Africa in the 1980s, pp. 14-19, 31.

Lodge : Black politics in South Africa since 1945, p. 140.

IDAF Pamphlet : You have struck a Rock, p. 17.

FTW Pamphlet : A Woman's Place is in the Struggle, Not Behind Bars, p. 2, the specific strategies and tactics employed in protesting such issues will be addressed in chapters four and five.

MM Pamphlet : Vrouwen tegen Apartheid and IDAF Pamphlet : You have struck a Rock.

Lodge : pp. 141-142.

R. Davies, D. O'Meara and S. Dlamini : The Struggle for South Africa, pp. 366- 368.

Ibid., pp. 368-370.

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 4, pp. 75-85.

K. Spinks : Black Sash, pp. 193-195, 211-212.

D. E. H. Russell : Lives of Courage. Women for a New South Africa, p. 24.

Interview with Sandy Africa : United Committee of Concern representative on the Natal UDF Provincial structure, Acting Secretary for the UDF Provincial Structure (Natal), 21 November 1997.

FTW Pamphlet : A Woman's Place is in the Struggle, Not Behind Bars, p. 25.

Spinks : pp. 220-236.

FTW Pamphlet : A Woman's Place is in the Struggle, Not Behind Bars, pp. 26- 36.

K. Luckhardt and B. Wall : Organise or Starve. The History of the South African Congress of Trade Unions, p. 25.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 4, p. 98. 197

Ibid., p. 98.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 38.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 4, pp. 216-218. ibid., p. 491.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 39.

D. Macshane, M. Plaut and D. Ward : Power. Black Workers, their unions and the struggle for freedom in South Africa, p. 38.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 39.

Macshane, Plaut and Ward : p. 127.

J. Baskin : Striking Back. A history of COSATU, p. 73.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 93.

Ibid., p. 94.

UDF : "Joint UDF and COSATU Press Release", 19 February 1986.

UDF : "Statement by COSATU and the UDF on behalf of the MDM", 10 October 1989.

Building friendship - Working for Freedom : p. 18.

UDF : "UDF Supports COSATU", 1986.

Freedom From Below. The Struggle for Trade Unions in South Africa : p. 177.

Sisa Njikelana : "Unions and the UDF", in Work in Progress, Number 32, pp. 30- 33.

Building Friendship - Working for Freedom : p. 46. A more comprehensive discussion on the role of trade unionists as leaders within the UDF can be found in Chapter 2.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 38.

An Injury to One is an Injury to All : pp. 2-3.

Industrial Action Monitor : p. 2.

International Labour Conference : Provisional Record, pp. 3-5.

South Africa : The Road to Revolution : pp. 27-28. 198

110. African Advisory Committee : Apartheid, p. 1.

M. Lodge and Nasson : p. 112.

Ibid., p. 77.

Ibid., pp. 87-89.

Building friendship - Working for Freedom : pp. 9-18.

"Lekota on UDF" in Work in Progress, Number 30, pp. 1-6.

J. Grobler : A Decisive Clash? A short history of Black protest politics in South Africa 1875-1976, pp. 113-114.

Lodge : pp. 83-84.

Work in Progress : Number 28, p. 8.

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 41-42.

Ibid., p. 42.

Ibid., p. 43.

See chapter two for a more comprehensive discussion on the role of the NIC and TASC in the forming of the UDF.

"Cape comes alive" : New Era, Volume 1, Number 1, p.17.

Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Interview with Sandy Africa.

"Beyond the big circus" : New Era, Volume 1 Number 1, p. 25.

Ibid., pp. 26-27.

A more comprehensive review of Indian leaders are provided in Chapter two.

UDF : "Proposal for a UDF Campaign around a Call to Whites by the ANC", 30 January 1990.

UDF : "UDF Call to Whites. The present climate", 1986.

In Whose Defence? Conscription and the SADF : pp. pp. 1-6, and P. S. Dreyer: Dienspligweiering. 'n Christen en Geweld, pp. 1-5..

New Era : Number 1, p. 28. 199

R. Winkler (et al) : pp. 31-33.

T. De Jager : "Blankes : Rol in Radikale Organisasies en Steun aan UDF- aktiwiteite", unpublished evaluation paper, 1987, p. 5.

Ibid., pp. 53-60. 200

CHAPTER 4

THE UDF's STRATEGIC APPROACH TOWARDS MASS PROTEST AND RESISTANCE

1. Introduction

During the early 1980s, protest and resistance in South Africa rested on three fundamental pillars of the extra-parliamentary movement : the trade unions with their base in the factories, the ANC with its international diplomatic network and substantial underground structures within South Africa and the UDF with its base in the communities. The focus in this chapter falls on the UDF's strategic planning and approach to unite the domestic angle of the resistance and to link it with the ANC's foreign programme of resistance as far as possible. The various strategies employed by the UDF will be addressed and discussed.

Strategy versus tactics? The UDF's strategic approach provided the Front and its affiliates with a broad blueprint for resistance. The UDF's basic goals were interwoven within its strategic plan. This basic goal was to transform South Africa from a discriminatory apartheid state to a non-racial democracy. This ideal was always kept in mind, even though the UDF broadened the scope of its strategic approach to incorporate various individual strategies. The UDF's strategies, therefore, represented the "what" while the different tactics employed , represented the "how" - the day-to-day aspects of the protest. The latter is discussed in chapter five.

The UDF grew from a totally different dynamic than the trade unions and the ANC. It was largely the result of the intersection of two critically important socio-political tensions which influenced the extent and scope of their protest and resistance initiatives throughout the 1980s and influenced their strategic approach.' The first social tension related to the impact of the new constitutional dispensation - implemented by the South African government during 1983 in an effort to preempt 201 growing resistance to apartheid by splitting the Black and Coloured/Indian groups - on Black political consciousness. The exclusion of the African majority from the reform process, coupled with the steady delegitimisation of the homelands, left the black majority without a channel through which to express political grievances. 2 The ANC, with the slogan of Year of Unity in Action, called as early as 1982 for a united approach towards protest. They rejected the National Party's President's Council - which was then investigating power-sharing with the Coloureds and Indians - and called on its supporters to build a broad democratic movement dedicated to the establishment of a democratic society in South Africa. The ANC further called on the people to urgently form such a mass based front in order to oppose the new tricameral system. The ANC urged people to show the same kind of strong opposition to the government's power- sharing proposals as that showed to the SAIC elections during 1981. 3 The UDF emerged to provide this channel of protest, with its whole strategic approach aimed towards ensuring a united front against the government. In so doing, it drew black political consciousness into a world-view dominated by ideologies, symbols and leaders whose roots lay in a long tradition of protest and resistance, stretching back to the founding of the ANC in 1912. 4

The second social tension which contributed to the emergence of the UDF and the evolution of its strategic approach, was essentially socio-economic in nature, created in part by the government's acceptance of the Riekert Commission's conclusions. The Commission's framework was premised on the acceptance of the permanence of urban blacks, including rights to permanent residence, intra-urban labour mobility, trade union association, property and franchise at local level through Black Local Authorities (BLA). These reforms were, however, implemented by the government at a time when the economy was slipping out of the 1979-82 boom and tumbling into recession. As a result of this the state did not have the funds by 1983 to finance reform at township level according to the principle of financial self-suffiency as suggested by the Riekert Commission. When township councillors tried to increase rents and service charges, a nationwide reaction was triggered during 1984-85. The introduction of the tricameral system (which included Asians and Coloureds and excluded blacks), introduced the 202 first range of protest action and resistance during 1983 that served as a precursor of the nationwide revolt of 1984-85, which was fueled to a large extent, by socio-economic tensions among township communities. 5

The South African government declared a state of emergency on 21 July 1985 in order to contain protest and resistance from the black community and opposition groups, especially the UDF and its affiliates. Wide ranging powers were granted to the security forces which they used extensively. During the emergency, nearly 8 000 people were detained by reason of its special provisions and an additional 3 600 under normal security laws. By August 1985, 45 out of 80 of the UDF's national and regional leaders were immobilised through detentions, trials and deaths, while the UDF's largest affiliate, the Congress of South African Students (COSAS), was banned. The UDF, however, managed to change its strategies and tactics and managed to continue with its resistance despite the security clampdown. Boycotts, stay-aways, alternative structures and protest campaigns were therefore continued regardless of the emergency. The UDF's strategy to use the emergency as a mobilising issue, also kept the pressure on the state. 6

The UDF's view that a victory was scored over the state with the lifting of the state of emergency in June 1986, was short-lived. A nationwide protest was organised for 16 June 1986, to co-incide with the tenth anniversary of the Soweto revolt. On 12 June 1986, however, the government imposed a second state of emergency. Before dawn on the 12th, police and army units raided the townships, and arrested thousands of known activists, which included men, women and children. This emergency covered the whole of South Africa and was applied with unprecedented harshness. It also seriously disrupted the UDF and other black opposition groups and remained in force until the end of 1990. This meant that the UDF had to learn to live with the state of emergency, plan according to it, and to organise their protest and resistance campaigns in order to counter the limitations placed on organised protest.'

Throughout 1988 it seemed as if the government, aided by the state of emergency, 203 detentions and other repressive measures, had succeeded in blunting the UDF's resistance. This was, however, not the case, since the UDF was merely dormant, using the period to reorganise and restructure and adapt their strategies and tactics to overcome the obstacles put in their path by the state. By the end of 1988, it became clear that repression was becoming an increasingly counterproductive aspect for the state. Far from suppressing resistance, political mobilisisation continued while racial polarisation was increasing. The black petty bourgeoisie was growing in size and confidence and clearly reflected the knowledge that it had international sympathy on its side. 8

FW De Klerk's appointment as State President saw an immediate change in the historic struggle between the state and the liberation groups. Under De Klerk's leadership the government granted permission for a number of large protest marches throughout the country, despite the fact that it clearly contravened the still in place state of emergency. In addition, a number of long term prisoners were released, including some of the senior ANC Rivionia trialists. The UDF had to adapt its strategies yet again in order to accommodate the recently released activists and to prepare for the imminent unbanning of the ANC, which implied a change of the political front in the country and another strategic adaptation. During the welcoming rally held for them by the UDF, massive support for the banned ANC and SACP was openly declared while a message from a "listed" person, ANC president Oliver Tambo, was read to the crowd without any repercussions. Petty apartheid laws were repealed and the security forces showed more restraint in enforcing emergency regulations than previously. Although De Klerk professsed to an open door approach, he was loath to immediately repeal the state of emergency in the face of the massive show of force being projected by the UDF/MDM/ANC. 9

These events provided the UDF and its affiliates with a lifeline after the immense repression they had suffered during 1985 to 1988. Although their broad strategy did not differ measurably from their previous aim of pressurising the government to a point where a democratic South Africa could be created, the state's "softer" approach 204 enabled the UDF to quickly rebuild its devastated structures and to launch immense mass action initiatives.

2. Background to the protest and resistance from 1983 onwards

The spiral of protest, resistance and violence in South Africa during the 1980s, has commonly been described by whites in general, and even certain writers of contemporary history (Schutte and Hudson) 10, as a communist-inspired rebellion, mob violence and irrational boycott tactics led by fiery incomprehensible leaders and communist agitators. Very few understood the logic of township protest, its trigger factors and that it had direction and that these issues fueled the UDF's strategic approach. 11

Although the Bantustans were the centerpiece of the state's policy, the urban black areas (the townships surrounding all towns in South Africa) were the main centers of political resistance. Most of the sophisticated black leaders, middle class and working class, were situated there. Since 1948, various systems were implemented by the government to keep these urban areas under control. The Black Local Authority (BLA) system, introduced during the early 1980s, was targeted by opposition groups from the outset. Far from curing the problems experienced by township dwellers, it rather exacerbated the situation, causing wide-spread resentment and resistance.'

Basically, the problems faced by township dwellers during the 1980s were old problems, but the circumstances within which they confronted these problems, were new. The government's deracialisation measures had implications far beyond those the government had intended and it followed upon a period of sustained and vociferous protest and resistance. The education system can be used as an example. There had been a tremendous increase in state expenditure on black education since 1976, but education only served as a means for militant mobilisation by more highly educated and politicised subjects, created by the state. Students realised that greater access to education did not mean that a similar opening-up of those political, civil and economic 205 priviliges normally associated with an educated society, were available to them. Similarly, the economic and demographic changes experienced by the skilled black community during the early 1980s, increased their economic and consumer power. The government tried to co-opt this black middle-class into its structures, but largely failed because the largest part of the black community were still poverty stricken."

Socio-economic considerations therefore characterised the protest and resistance during the 1980s. During 1960, the Defiance Campaign was quickly suppressed by severe state action. By contrast, the state of emergency declared in 1985 did not manage to neutralise the protest precisely because it had become so diffused throughout all aspects of black life."

Mark Swilling15 participated in an Urban Foundation study project during 1985, which studied township conflict between 1983-85, and found the following regarding protest and resistance within the townships which contributed in shaping the UDF's strategic approach towards resistance :

Grievances were expressed about appalling living conditions in the community. When councillors ignored such grievances, petitions were made by eminent persons representing the community. At this stage collective organisation had not yet taken place.

The authorities either ignored or rebuked the petitioners, frequently on spurious grounds such as bureaucratic procedure, or made promises that were never kept.

In reaction to such a response, leadership groups emerged to organise the different layers of the community. The communities responded through mobilising their only resource, namely their collective ability to disturb, disrupt and protest. This resulted in the formation and expansion of civic organisations, youth congresses, women's groups and other 206

similar stuctures.

Campaigns involving collective action took place, e.g. mass meetings, demonstrations, stayaways and consumer boycotts.

Collective action in the communities was met with repression as the state sent in its security forces to quel resistance. When security personnel overreacted and used excessive violence, the counter-response from the opposing township dwellers was even more destructive.

A spiral of violence erupted as structured and organised protest gave way to running street battles between militant youths and the security forces. When this was accompanied by the detention of civic leaders, the youth became uncontrollable and the spiral of violence was exacerbated.

Decentralised defence structures were established in the community which was transformed into street and area committees. By this stage, the rupture between the state and the community was virtually complete.

A stalemate set in as repressive action failed to break the resistance, and as the communities failed to find ways of getting the authorities to recognise their demands. 16

The political conflict in South Africa which raged throughout the 1980s - starting in earnest during 1983 with the founding of the UDF - appeared on the surface to be yet another chapter in the struggle by (mainly) black anti-apartheid organisations. From 1984 onwards however, it became clear that there was a significant difference in the conflict. The impact of the protest and resistance from 1984 onwards, could be measured on two levels. On the one level was the scale of the conflict. Measured in terms of its ferocity, duration and national spread, its scope was greater than ever before in South African struggle history. Also, if put together, in terms of the number of 207 people killed, those injured and detained, school and working days lost through stay- away actions and the value of public and private property damages during riots, the human and socio-economic losses far exceeded those sustained from the 1952 Defiance Campaign through to the 1976 Soweto education boycotts. At another level, organisational support and mobilisation by extra-parliamentary groups reached an all- time peak from 1984 onwards. 17 A clear evolutionary and growth pattern with regard to protest action in South Africa can be discerned from the 1950s to the 1980s. In intensity and mass participation, the 1980s represents the culmination of historical protest against the state.

The UDF provided the central coordination for the protest, shaped the resistance and channeled its support into a mass-based entity through which to oppose the government. After its formation during August 1983, the UDF spent the first half of 1984 laying the groundwork for the boycott of the tricameral parliament. Several campaigns centering on this topic, as well as other related issues affecting black people, were launched during the course of 1984. Overt resistance to the state however, began in earnest during August 1984, when town councils in the Vaal Triangle townships announced substantial increases in rents and service charges. Protest meetings, stayaways and boycotts were organised and escalated into violence during September 1984 when the state reacted harshly to the stayaway. Protest and resistance continued to escalate until mid-1985, when the government declared a state of emergency, enabling them to deal with the resistance more forcefully. 18

From 1985 onwards, protest became more generalised with previous so-called quiescent regions, also being affected. The character of township politics also changed in two almost contradictory directions - violent confrontations became more prominent while at the same time groups such as the UDF managed to form a more disciplined, organised, resistance-based front. Another development was the formation of regional organisational structures by the UDF and its affiliates, causing a more pronounced interaction of regional and local dynamics. The result was that the UDF's national protest initiatives continued, but that regionally based protest initiatives gained greater 208 prominence and individuality, especially as the state of emergency tended to limit nationwide initiatives. 19

Another reason for the increased protest and resistance was that resistance in the period was based on more highly-developed resistance organisation than previously. Certain of the UDF's affiliates, especially student organisations, played a leading role in organising and initiating protest, and more importantly, making sure that its impetus was upheld. 2°

The prominent role which students played in the UDF's campaigns can largely be attributed to the total breakdown of the black schooling system. During 1985, the slogan People's Education for People's Power was replaced by the slogan Liberation Now - Education Later, which heralded a new period of resistance in education. Pupils, having lost faith in the schooling system after two years of class disruptions, intimidation and assaults by the security forces, embarked on a fullout effort to effect change. Schools were no longer places of learning, but battlegrounds while students formed the vanguard of the UDF's resistance efforts. 21

The increased involvement of thousands of students in the UDF's protest initiatives, had a certain impact on the struggle, but also caused several difficulties that for years continued to affect the education sector and the UDF's control over youth affiliates. The role played by students during this period of UDF resistance, overshadowed by the limitations posed by the states of emergencies did, however, impact on the broad struggle against apartheid.

3. Factors influencing the UDF's strategic approach

The UDF gave an indication of their strategic approach towards resistance and protest during the founding conference in August 1983. In the "UDF Declaration", prepared by the delegates, it is stated that the aim aim was to mobilise the people for protest action, work for the eradication of discriminative laws, work towards the socio-economic 209

upliftment of poor blacks and to protest against the tricameral constitution as it failed to address any real democratic change in South Africa. The UDF only identified a broad range of general strategic objectives at this early stage. Its immediate aim was, however, to protest against the implementation of the tricameral parliament. The UDF reiterated its strategic objectives during 1984 and again stated that its aim was to unite people across colour, class, ethnic and organisational lines, and to coordinate the activities of all those opposing apartheid. 22

From 1983 to 1990, the UDF's brains trust, consisting of its provincial and national leadership, held regular meetings to give direction to and to coordinate its protest initiatives. It was a continuous and dynamic process with strategies adapted when necessary and new strategies implemented to counter state actions against the UDF.

The UDF's main, overriding and permanent strategy was to gain democratic rights for blacks in South Africa. To do that, a viable and strong, mass-based resistance movement had to be created and protest coordinated in order to pressurise the government to the maximum. The UDF realised that change had to be enforced, therefore much of their strategies were aimed at building the UDF into a strong force. Several factors, however, influenced the UDF's strategic approach. This included a variety of general factors, the people who initiated and developed the strategies, the manner in which such strategies were communicated and later, the UDF's capability to adapt their strategies to new situations.

3.1. General factors

These factors were those that the UDF were presented with as a reality of the day-today activities and situation in South Africa and to deal with, and use, as part of their mass-based struggle.

Growth of organisations. Many organisations increased their membership with the influx of young members. Youth organisations especially, mushroomed across the 210 country. These youth organisations strengthened the UDF, trade unions and community organisations. The growth of organisational structures was an important advance in the broad struggle for democracy during this phase of the struggle, while the widening of the UDF's support base, ensured its continued capacity to continue with its protest initiatives in the face of increased state repression under the states of emergency. The UDF's strategy to broaden its base of support, and therefore its potential for resistance, became a major strategic factor.

Resistance became nation-wide. Resistance spread across the country, involving rural as well as urban areas. The education struggle specifically, was able to reach people who, in the past, were far removed from the struggle. More people became involved and different organisations worked together. The UDF accentuated that the struggle's strength, by virtue of numbers, was one of its greatest strategic assets. 23

Pressure on the government. Student demands were linked to the broader political activity and struggle, resistance was better organised and more widespread, and involving different organisations, while the ANC also became more prominent during this time. All this combined to put considerable pressure on the government. The UDF interpreted the government's repressive measures as a "last resort" and that it was with its "back against the wall". 24

Because of the limiting effects of the states of emergency on nationwide protest initiatives, regional and local protest campaigns tended to dominate. This, as well as the increased high profile of the students' struggle, caused some difficulties for the UDF as they lost control, to some extent, of certain of their affiliates and constituencies. These problems, which were on the main centered within the youth affiliates, could be summarised as follows :

Youth militancy. The youth, because of their militancy were easy to mobilise. Once mobilised, their actions could be coordinated and directed towards any specific issue. The UDF used the youth extensively as part of a strategy to kickstart a campaign, and 211 thereafter, to sustain such a campaign. The youth, however, in time became more militant than other members of the community and alienated people when they forced their will onto others. The physical enforcement of school boycotts and consumer boycotts, inter alia by searching shoppers (and destroying their purchases) and preventing other students from attending school through violence and intimidation, caused widespread resentment and division within the townships. The holding of "kangaroo courts" and meting out of punishment to "offenders", caused division instead of building alliances and winning support.

Immediatism and breakdown of learning. The youth were also impatient for and over-confident of victory and thought the liberation groups were on the verge of winning their struggle against the government. The state, however, did not fall and slogans like Liberation Now - Education Later and The Year of No Schooling, which were based on the politics of Immediatism, caused long term damage to the education system and caused divisions within the black community. The continuing political protests also caused a breakdown in learning, as well as the culture of learning. Schools were physically destroyed, or became battlegrounds between students and the security forces. It became the headquarters of youth organisations, rather than schools. Many students experienced violence and detention, many were killed and these stressfull experiences changed the lives of many youths. This breakdown of schooling also had an impact on the broader community. Education, as the basis of learning as a social activity was destroyed, influencing the black communities for the worse. An increase was also noted in teenage pregnancies, drug abuse and gangsterism. 25 The UDF, however, managed to use these sentiments to their advantage and certain of their strategies were aimed to direct and channel students' anger into viable protest. The creation of an alternative People's Education was one such strategy. 26

Role and influence of black trade unions. An additional issue affecting the scope and direction of protest from 1985 onwards, was the successful merger of some of the major black trade unions into the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). The emergence of COSATU, broadened the UDF's strategic possibilities. COSATU insisted 212 that "the struggle for workers' rights on the shop floor [was inseparable] from the broader political struggle and the UDF actively worked towards incorporating COSATU's strengths, which included good leadership, a capability to organise people and coordinate actions, etc, into their broad resistance strategy. to27

The advent of COSATU increased pressure on the government tremendously. Labour- induced resistance campaigns, in conjunction with UDF campaigns, widened the front of resistance measurably. The labour organisations, as protest ally, also brought a knowledge of organisational structures, grassroots organising and strong leadership to the ranks of the UDF.

3.2. The dynamics of the UDF's strategic approach

3.2.1. Leadership and decision making

The UDF's National Executive Council was ultimately responsible for making policy and to coordinate all resistance. Part of their brief also included the formulation of strategy. In practice, the National Executive Committee (NEC) 28 and the National Working Committee (NWC) 29, who met more regularly, provided the leadership and strategic approach of the UDF on a day-to-day basis.

Because of the states of emergency, detentions and the regular disruption of UDF structures, the NEC and NWC showed regular changes in personnel. As leadership figures were detained, or went underground in hiding, others took their places until they too were neutralised by the state. The UDF's decision-making structure therefore enjoyed a varied membership which accommodated a wide variety of viewpoints and ideological beliefs. One positive result of this situation was, however, that the UDF's leadership base was forced to grow and by 1990, the UDF had a strong and diverse leadership which they spread nationally to widen organised resistance.'

Those leaders who played a major role in formulating the UDF's strategies, included 213

Patrick Lekota (Publicity Secretary), Popo Molefe (General Secretary), Azhar Cachalia (National Treasurer), Trevor Manual (Regional Representative - Western Cape), Steve Tswete (Regional Representative - Border), Mohammed Valli Moosa (Regional Representative - Transvaal), and Murphy Morobe (Acting Publicity Secretary). Although ideas and suggestions originated from a wide spectrum of local structures, affiliates and individuals, this group of people was some of the clearest thinkers in the UDF and played a leading role in transforming ideas into practical realities.

3.2.2. Process to formulate strategy

Workshops, debates, strategy sessions and conferences were regularly held on all levels, from single affiliates to regional to national level to discuss options and strategies. 31 From such meetings, various discussion documents 32 and suggestions originated which were discussed by the NEC and NWC and adapted into official UDF programmes of action 33, which included and outlined their strategic approach in general and to specific campaigns in particular. An example of this can be found in the strategic decision taken during 1984 to allow affiliates and regions a greater extent of tactical flexibility. 34 The UDF had the ability to realise that previous attempts to resist were in part defeated by a too rigid approach and central planning. When the organisational heart was neutralised by the state, protest invariably collapsed. Although the UDF's controlling structure decided on a specific strategy, it usually left the details of its tactical execution to the different regions and affiliates.

3.3. The ability to adapt

By early 1987, resistance was seemingly at an end as the UDF was faced with the full might of the state. It appeared that it was unable to counter the emergency and the repressive measures employed by the state. There was also an increasing danger of the UDF losing control of its constituencies. This situation was especially true with regard to school children. 214

Regaining control of their youthful activists became a priority for the embattled UDF leadership. To this end, the UDF took a strategic decision to generally streamline and centralise the UDF. Two national organisations were formed during April 1987 to take control of and to unite the youth and women affiliates and supporters. 35 The South African Youth Congress (SAYCO) and the UDF Women's Congress (UDFWC) were thus established. The UDF further aimed to bring organisational order to the front's farflung affiliates by forming additional national bodies. Following this, a succession of national bodies were formed. These included the Congress of South African Writers (COSAW), South African Musician's Alliance (SAMA), a national civic federation (which later became the South African National Civic Organisation - BANCO), and a Congress of Traditional Leaders of South Africa (CONTRALESA). 36 This initiative constituted another adaptation, for strategic reasons mainly, of the UDF's changing character throughout its existence and was contrary to the UDF's previous strategy of having a loose, affiliated structure, rather than a nationally-organised structure. Because of the previously stated circumstances, the UDF, however, had no choice than to become organisationally more formalised in order to keep control of its affiliates and to maintain its ability to organise in a coordinated manner on a national level.

With this new organised structure in place, the UDF largely managed to survive in the face of intense repression under the states of emergency and to continue to pressurise the state through various initiatives and tactics.

3.4. Government initiatives which influenced the UDF's strategic approach

From the second half of 1988 and especially during 1989, the UDF showed a remarkable upswing in its fortunes. It was becoming clear that the state's emergency regulations and security laws had failed to quell the liberation groups' resistance. The UDF and its allies had managed to survive the extreme repression from 1985 to 1988, while, for a variety of reasons, it became clear to the South African government that it was impossible for the country to continue indefinitely in a climate of repression and violence. 215

The major reasons for a rethink within government circles, were broadly based on the following realities and events :

Mass Democratic Movement (MDM). The UDF and other groups disregarded the government banning them and in a strategic move, continued to organise and protest under a different guise, the MDM. The MDM served as a loose umbrella resistance front which included the UDF, its affiliates and COSATU. After 1990, the ANC also became part of the MDM. With joint campaigns being organised by the UDF and COSATU, the government's security forces were stretched so thin that countering these initiatives, became almost impossible.

Economic reasons. Economic growth in South Africa fell to two percent during 1988. The government was cut off from foreign investment and borrowing because of the disinvestment and sanctions campaign. State subsidies to underwrite black urban infrastructure, a key part of the dual National Security Management Sytem (NSMS), could therefore not be sustained while the cost to finance the police and army in an almost permanent "war" against the black population, was proving to be astronomical. 37 The UDF realised this and used the strategy of rent and service boycotts to further undermine the government's economic position. Day-to-day clashes between especially students and the security forces, also served to tie these forces down while the SADF had to call up additional troops to support the police. This was a costly exercise and spread over months, putting a real strain on the government's finances.

Inability of the state to control black political organisations. After a presence of almost 70 years and the phenomenal growth and successes during the 1980s, black political organisations, and especially the mass-based UDF and its affiliates, were too deeply-rooted within communities to be simply eradicated through any repressive measures. These organisations had consistently articulated popular demands for better services and full political rights. No economic upliftment, which the government could not sustain in any case, was acceptable without direct political representation in central government. The UDF's support base was also so wide, resistance could never really 216 be suppressed. The government therefore realised that political conflict would remain endemic.'

Increasing white resistance. By the end of 1988, the government faced a situation where voices were being raised in protest against its repressive measures from its own white support base. Businessmen were tired of the regular stay-aways and boycotts which harmed their businesses. The call-up of white SADF conscript commando's for service in the black townships, also disrupted production and cost the state millions. White-orientated resistance groups were increasing and were pressurising the government through more sophisticated initiatives. 39 Against this background, the UDF strategically reached out to the white community for support.

Realists replacing the securocrats in government. Although the rightwing Conservative Party (CP) was increasing its support to the detriment of the ruling National Party (NP) to the extent that the CP became the official opposition in parliament, the realists within the NP realised a change in attitude and strategy was necessary to save the country. The government needed to avert an intensification of international sanctions, which had been imposed on South Africa by its major Western trading partners in 1986, and prevent an escalation of violent resistance. P.W. Botha, the hardline president was eased out and replaced with the more moderate F.W. De Klerk. The impact on resistance movements such as the UDF was immediate and for the better. By April 1989, the government released 900 UDF detainees, which included most of the UDF's leadership. The relaxation in the implementation of the emergency regulations on the flow of information and on mass action, gave the UDF the breathing space it needed to go the last mile towards political freedom. The UDF realised that the government had presented them with an opening and took a strategic decision not to let up on resistance, but rather to accelerate protest in order to maximise the pressure.4°

Call for negotiations. With Botha out of the way, it soon became clear that De Klerk's intentions were to shift the conflict between the government and the liberation groups 217

away from the security to the political terrain. From 1989, as the emergency restrictions were eased, the government took a new attitude towards political demonstrations and marches by groups such as the UDF. All these measures and events, gave new heart to the UDF and caused a resurgence in their path of resistance and protest, but they also started to view the possibilty of negotiations with greater gravity.'

The years 1988 and 1989 could therefore be seen as something of a watershed. The dynamics of reform overtook the governments' original goal of relieving pressure from the disenfranchised black majority. It proved impossible to embark on a reform progamme and simultaneously retain political power. The fact that a reform process was started, created a momentum in which limited reform led to substantial changes later, for example in the labour area, where the Wiehahn reforms created the space for more pressure on the government. The government's backtracking from reform through the states of emergency, had the opposite result than anticipated. Instead of suppressing resistance, the liberation groups in general, and the UDF in particular, overcame the governments' repressive initiatives to push home the advantage.'

The government's more tolerant approach continued throughout 1989, giving the UDF the chance to reorganise totally. This period also saw the beginning of the so-called rolling mass action campaigns as the liberation movements really started to flex their muscles in the face of the state's less repressive attitude. On 2 February 1990, the moment finally happened - De Klerk announced the unbanning of the liberation organisations.' On 11 February 1990, Nelson Mandela was freed. For the next few months, the UDF and the ANC basically merged their structures and the UDF as an organisation, took a back seat in the political process which followed.

4. The UDF's strategic approach

4.1. Introduction

The ANC welcomed the formation of the UDF and called on the front to unite all 218 democratic forces in South Africa in order to launch a concerted effort to end apartheid. During 1983, the UDF mainly concentrated to act against the government's constitutional proposals," but from 1984 onwards, the UDF managed to extend its membership and organisational effort to the rural areas and some of the bantustans. Although the trade unions initially resisted affiliating to the UDF - arguing that their first priority was towards their members - they agreed to support all UDF campaigns and particularly those against the new constitution. 45 Therefore, the UDF could take the width of its constituency into account when formulating its strategic approach and objectives.

The UDF's strategic approach was based on three issues which, although adapted throughout the 1980s, stayed basically the same :

Defend. The UDF realised that it was the target of a vicious attack by the state. They therefore endeavoured to broaden the Front into a true mass-based people's front in an effort to neutralise apartheid's forces to lessen their ability to act against the UDF's programme of resistance. It was argued that an organisation which is deeply rooted in the masses is difficult to crush. It was also essential to stand together as an isolated group could more easily be neutralised by the state than a united front.

Consolidate. The UDF also realised that it was essential to build on the organisational gains they had initially achieved in order to continue their mass-based protest and resistance. That is the reason why national structures such as SAYCO and the UDFWC were launched and an alliance with COSATU formalised - to consolidate the united front.

Advance. It was also important to keep on the offensive in the struggle for democratic rights. The masses therefore had to keep the initiative and the momentum of resistance going. 46 219

4.2. Permanent strategies

4.2.1. Mass-based approach

From its inception, the UDF stressed that it was strategically committed to a mass- based approach, calling for the mobilisation of the broad community to the struggle. 47The UDF acknowledged the potential power of the masses and sought to make them active participants in the struggle, stating that without the masses, there could be no hope for a successful victory. The UDF therefore organised its organisational activities in such a way that it ensured maximum participation by the broad masses.45 The UDF also discussed the issue of how to form the masses into an effective force for change. The answer was to first mobilise and then to organise the masses in a structured opposition front. The UDF's initial strategies were aimed at mobilising support for the Front, organising this support into structures (affiliates), create additional structures in order to become a national front and then to employ these structures in a coordinated manner to protest against apartheid and to resist the government's initiatives."

Although mass resistance was one of the UDF's permanent characteristics, it really came to the fore from the end of 1985. Three aspects particularly stood out from this phase - attacks on collaborators, the tactic of consumer boycotts and mass mobilisation. 5° This strategic approach had ironically been "directly" created by state repression, a process which began from 1977 onwards with the banning of political organisations, forcing politics into the communities where civics, youth, women and church organisations were formed. The formation of the UDF and the unifying campaigns against the tricameral system, provided the catalyst for the formation of a grassroots oppositional force, which was pushed to greater militancy and activity by the repressive state reaction during 1985, especially the state of emergency.' The UDF accentuated that the rebuilding of its structures, decimated during the states of emergency, remained a priority. From 1988, the UDF started this process from a local level and built towards restoring the UDF's national capability. 52 By 1989, the UDF was 220 able to launch massive protest campaigns against the government (partially aided by the "softer" approach of the De Klerk regime).

4.2.2. Anti-constitutional reform and pro-democracy strategies

The boycott of the elections for black local authorities during November/December 1983 and the elections for the tricameral parliament during 1984, formed the basis of the UDF's initial protest. Initial strategy was formulated to deal specifically with the protest initiative against the implementation of the tricameral system, with certain secondary motives. The UDF's strategy with regard to these protests were twofold. Firstly, they wanted to discredit and if possible halt the government's reform initiatives, and secondly, the UDF used these boycott campaigns to mobilise and build their support base. 53

During the period before the government imposed a state of emergency in 1985, circumstances basically dictated the UDF's strategic approach. Protest was aimed against the government's reform initiatives which the UDF rejected in favour of real democratic reform. It also forced the UDF to adapt its strategies to complement, support, direct and coordinate the protest and resistance which exploded during 1984 in the Vaal Triangle and quickly spread countrywide. The UDF called for a non-racial, united and democratic South Africa throughout its existence. During 1987, the UDF also called for a national conference of all anti-apartheid forces to determine the shortest possible route to freedom and peace. 54 These initiatives were the frontrunner of the negotiations which were to follow during the 1990s. The UDF, therefore, played a pro-active role by looking beyond the struggle. Its strategy of protest was only the first part of a broader strategy - that of reforming South Africa into a democratic, non-racial country.

4.2.3. Strategies aimed at socio-economic and civic issues

A large percentage of the UDF's protest campaigns could be linked to socio-economic 221 issues. These "bread-and-butter" campaigns had the dual purpose of mobilising the masses around issues which affected them on a daily basis and to solve certain of the problems which influenced township residents negatively. This strategy entailed to organise campaigns linked directly to socio-economic and civic issues and ranged from rent and transport to consumer boycotts, wage campaigns, access to medical facilities, unemployment, forced removals, etc. This grassroots-based strategy was very successful and the UDF was to keep campaigns, built around this strategy, going throughout its existence and even during the states of emergency. 55

The emergence of community organisations from 1979, presented township communities with another vehicle to organise protest. By 1983, these civics were well entrenched in township politics and took the lead in protesting against issues affecting the community. The UDF's strategy was aimed at using these existing structures and issues to organise its resistance efforts. The destruction of shacks, evictions, forced removals and especially rent increases, was a general cause of discontent. An increase in the General Sales Tax (GST) during 1984, coupled with the deepening recession, caused a worsening of township dwellers' economic position. When the government announced rent increases, organised protest action followed. The UDF's strategy of concentrating on organising campaigns around socio-economic "bread and butter" issues, through community-based organisations, formed the heart of their strategic approach and backbone of their resistance in the townships. 56 During the states of emergency, the civics also became an important strategic resource of the UDF. In many cases, specific civics were not banned and the UDF, which was banned, continued its activities through the civics.' Civics was used as a weapon to target Black Local Authorities and Councillors and played a central role in popularising the rent boycotts. The broad strategy was to overload the state's resources by targetting their local authority structures. 55 The amount of money which was owed (through the non-payment of rent and municipal rates), became astronomical and put the government and the economy under severe pressure, 59 exactly what the UDF aimed to do through this strategy. 222

4.2.4. Strategies aimed at the youth and education

During 1983, more than 10 000 students nationwide were involved in some form of class boycott or disturbances. Students were protesting against specific educational issues like the transfer of popular teachers, lack of facilities, age limit re-admission restrictions, corporal punishment and calls for autonomous Student Representative Councils (SRCs). By 1984, student protests assumed a more direct political content which were linked nationally to UDF-initiated protest campaigns. The UDF made strategic use of student protests by linking their demands to the bigger national political picture and by using the student masses, and their militancy, to stiffen up their own campaigns. 66 The broad spectrum of education related protest was addressed specifically by the UDF. A strategy was followed where national structures were formed to coordinate education related protest countrywide. The National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) played a central role in these strategies.'

From 1985 onwards, the UDF used the youth as the vanguard and catalyst of resistance. The COSAS-led school boycotts spread to large parts of the country and were used by the UDF to develop a strategic alliance of unity between students and parents/workers, from which several nation-wide stay-aways and campaigns were launched. Youths also physically took the fight to the security forces. This strategy, however, backfired to a certain extent on the UDF because in certain regions, control was largely lost with extreme violence as a result. 62

4.2.5. Non-violence as a strategy

Although the UDF stressed that it supported a non-violent struggle, and attempted to keep its supporters under control during protest initiatives, the state went out of its way to portray the UDF as a violent, revolutionary organisation. This formed part of the state's propaganda war against the UDF and was used partially as motivation for the calling of the states of emergency. Although the UDF did in certain instances, lose control over some of its youth affiliates, the Front generally aimed at a non-violent 223 struggle. The state also attempted to use the "civil war" raging between UDF and IFP supporters in Natal to link the UDF with a violent agenda. The revelations made during the Truth and Reconciliation hearings in 1997, however, proved that the state's security apparatus was largely responsible for instigating the violence. 63

The UDF strove throughout the 1980s to reaffirm its non-violent stance. Strategically, this was a very important issue for the UDF. It had to keep the moral high ground in its struggle with the state, while it also could not take the chance of being branded as a violent force of anarchy. The UDF's financial life-line to foreign supporters and funding, had to be preserved at all costs. the UDF therefore tried its utmost best and designed certain of its strategies, to counter the state's propaganda efforts. When the UDF adopted the Freedom Charter officially in 1987, it again had to defend itself strenuously against accusations of being an ANC front and had to deny that it was at the point of abandoning its non-violent strategy for the ANC's military option. 64 The decision in 1987 to formally adopt the Freedom Charter was again a conscious change of strategy, 65 just like the original decision in 1983 not to align the UDF openly with the Freedom Charter. Changed circumstances brought about a strategic adaptation - something the UDF proved to be particiularly adept at. The UDF also launched a campaign against the violence in Natal in order to further reaffirm its non-violent stance and to pressurise the IFP and the government. 66

4.3. Mobilisation strategies

During 1983 and 1984, one of the UDF's underlying, but important strategies was to build an anti-apartheid resistance front. The UDF therefore concentrated on grievances that provoked mobilisation to build a wide resistance front s' New and additional UDF- affiliated civics, youth congresses, women organisations and other protest-orientated groups were formed. By 1985, the UDF had affiliates and support groups nationwide which enabled them to fulfill their basic strategy, that of engaging and pressurising the state on as wide a front as possible in order to enforce change. 224

The UDF also started the process of politicising the broad black population. The UDF identified specific issues affecting specific areas and organised ad hoc campaign committees to create structures in these areas while organising local campaigns linked to national themes of protest. For example, the strategy to introduce and popularise the slogan "Forward to People's Power", was initiated during 1986 in an effort to regain lost ground, sufferred because of the intense repression brought about by the state of emergency.' The UDF used fuiltime, professional activists along with local volunteers to organise within a specific area, to train members, to sensitise the local population, to give information and to take the lead during national and local protest action. In the short term, this strategy served the UDF well and they were able to build it into a national front within a very short time period. In the long term, this decentralised approach caused the UDF some trouble as accountability was lost to some extent. Disciplinary problems also occurred on local level which hampered the coordination of the broader campaign of resistance and protest organised by the UDF."

The UDF adapted its strategy at the end of 1986 in order to respond adequately to the state of emergency. It concentrated on reorganising itself in order to be in a position to continue with its mass-based resistance and mobilisation, which was being hampered by the state of emergency. The UDF desisted for the time being from open, mass-based protest and resistance campaigns and started the formation and implementation of a semi-underground structure in order to protect its organisational structures.

As have the case with the youth, the UDF organised several campaigns in conjunction with trade union-organised stay-aways and strikes. 70 By strategically aligning themselves with trade union stay-aways and protest action, the UDF ensured a continuous presence and visibility among the broad black population. For example, during 1987, the UDF joined its trade union allies in a "Two Days of National Protest" Campaign to demand, among other things, the reinstatement of 22 000 South African Railway and Harbour Workers' Union (SARHWU). 71 The struggle in the townships was therefore broadened to include the factories and the mines.72 225

The UDF also made a concerted effort to broaden its mobilisation capability by extending its influence and support to the rural areas. 73 Protest was initiated against the imposition of Bantustans, influx controls and pass laws, forced removals and sub- standard education. 74 Another strategy entailed a call on the white community to join the democratic struggle, an initiative the UDF had some success with.' This strategy was one of the most thorough strategies formulated by the UDF. Several discussion papers and memorandums 76 were drawn up and distributed, discussing the ways and means of such a strategy. Details on how to approach white groups, how to organise in white areas and targetting those sectors within the white community which were thought to be the most responsive for potential recruitment, such as academics, students, etc, were documented" before the final strategy was implemented.'

4.4. Strategies to neutralise state power

The UDF's basic strategy entailed neutralising the state's power. Only when such a situation had been achieved, could the liberation groups hope for real democratic reform. The initial boycotts of the tricameral election strove to illustrate to the government that its reforms carried no legitimacy among the black population. The UDF also became involved in the creation of People's Power structures - alternative structures to illustrate its illegitimacy to the government. From 1985 onwards, the UDF's strategy to broaden the struggle on the international front, achieved numerous successes as the mass support for the struggle increased worldwide. In all, the UDF, in conjunction with the ANC, managed to increase anti-apartheid activity to the extent that even the reluctant Thatcher and Reagan governments, imposed limited sanctions, while the South African business sector came under increasing pressure.'

The UDF targeted BLA's unmercifully, especially from mid-1985. The UDF's strategy was twofold in the targetting of BLA's. It aimed to weaken the state's influence, presence and power in the townships and at the same time, strengthen their own structures, especially where they managed to replace BLA's with their own alternative structures. 8° By the end of 1985, this strategy proved quite successful as only three of 226 the 103 BLA's throughout the country still managed to function.'

The UDF was effectively banned by the authorities during 1988 while the clampdown on its leadership and structures, caused a reduction in its ability to mobilise effective resistance against the state. The UDF's broad strategy during this period, therefore revolved around re-establishing itself as the foremost resistance organisation in the country, remobilising its supporters and re-engaging the state on all fronts. The basic strategies followed by the UDF, were the following :

Expose the government's powerlessness. By 1988, the security forces were being stretched quite thin because of the dilemma of deployment. If the government did not saturate every ghetto with troops and police, minimally-patrolled neighbourhoods declared themselves "liberated zones". In an effort to remain in control of every small black enclave, the armed forces overstretched themselves, weakening their capability of suppressing resistance while their deployment became predictable to the UDF. 82 The UDF and its affiliates, especially youth groups, followed the strategy of exploiting this situation by continuously harrassing the security forces. The result was invariably protestors being killed or injured, further damaging the government's legitimacy and emphasising its powerlessness to eradicate resistance. The UDF, by unilaterally unbanning itself and announcing that it would operate openly, challenged the state directly. Although threats were made to act against the UDF, little could be done by the authorities, further enhancing the UDF's reputation among its followers. 83

Embark on mass defiance. The UDF took advantage of the De Klerk government's toning down of emergency regulations by launching a series of mass-based campaigns. These campaigns were organised under the auspices of the MDM in order to include COSATU and aimed to maximise the pressure on the government. From this alliance the Defiance Campaign was launched during August 1989. The UDF/MDM's strategy with this was to bring people out into open struggle against the government, re-build their confidence and a mood for the revitalisation of structures after the clampdown of the states of emergency.84 227

Exploitation of the government's concessions. The government was in an inenviable position - it could not act too harshly against the UDF and its allies as it was trying to set the scene for negotiations. The UDF exploited this by increasing its resistance campaigns to force further concessions. In the end, the government was forced to legalise mass demonstrations, release several long term political prisoners, release more than 900 UDF detainees, and in the end, unban all political organisations and release Nelson Mandela.

Widening of the resistance. The UDF embarked on a concerted effort to widen the resistance front against the government to become as inclusive as possible. The church and white UDF affiliates played a more important role in protest initiatives, the sanctions campaign was intensified, especially the sports boycott, apartheid laws were undermined through defiance campaigns and government institutions like hospitals were targeted to expose their discrimatory practices. After the unbanning of the ANC and other groups in 1990, the UDF took the initial lead of mobilising all mass political activity and to channel it into a single, joint protest action and all forms of protest and pressure was intensified. The strategic reasons for this was to give the ANC a chance to regroup and organise itself after being banned for thirty years and to force the government to accept the Harare Declaration as a basis for negotiations.' In short, the

UDF and its allies increased the pressure on the government to a level never reached before.

4.5. Pro-active strategies

Flowing from the previously mentioned strategy of neutralising the state, the UDF also embarked on various pro-active strategies to consolidate its successes. These strategies included :

Direct and open association with the ANC. The UDF took a strategic decision to openly adopt the Freedom Charter during 1987, thereby clearly indicating-that it placed itself in the Charterist camp." The UDF leadership also traveled to Lusaka to meet with 228 the ANC leadership, while UDF activities received wide coverage in ANC publications in contrast to the earlier "reticence" of the ANC to publicly acknowledge the UDF in order not to give the government an excuse to act against the UDF as an "ANC puppet". 87

From 1987, when the UDF openly accepted the Freedom Charter, closer cooperation became the norm. The ANC gave increasing publicity to UDF resistance campaigns and provided the tone for domestic resistance. For example, the ANC declared 1988 the "Year of United Action for People's Power 88, 1989 the "Year of Mass Action for People's Powee' 89 and 1990 as the "Year of People's Action for a Democratic South Africa". 90 The ANC also sent trained Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) cadres back to South Africa who infiltrated UDF structures and affiliates. The task of these cadres was to build the ANC underground and to mobilise the organisations they had infiltrated. It is not certain if the UDF leadership was fully informed about this strategy, but the influx of trained activists helped the UDF to overcome its organisational problems stemming from the states of emergency clampdowns. 91

After the unbanning of the ANC, the UDF initially continued to play a central role in coordinating protest. The UDF leadership, took the strategic decision of increasingly moving into the ANC camp and rather to organise protest actions under the auspices of the ANC, 92 mainly to present a united front to the government. In time, the UDF realised that it did not have any further reason for existence and disbanded during 1991. 229

References : Chapter 4

H. Giliomee and L. Schlemmer (Eds.) : Negotiating South Africa's Future, p. 64.

Ibid., p. 64.

Mayibuye : Number 10, 1982, p. 1.

Giliomee and Schlemmer : p. 64.

Ibid., p. 64.

T. Lodge and B. Nasson : All. Here and Now : Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, p. 78.

G. Adler : "Uniting a community", in Work in Progress, Number 50/51, pp. 72-73.

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 4, p. 496.

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 5, pp. xxiv-xxv.

S.H. Schutte : 'n Polisiekundige ontleding van die United Democratic Front, and H. Hudson : 'n Strategiese en Taktiese Ontleding van die United Democratic Front.

L. Le Grange : "Die ANC, SAKP en UDF : Wie gebruik vir wie?", Paper presented at the Institute for Political Studies, University of Potchefstroom for CHE, 1986, and N. Marais, "Effective Action Against the ANC", South African Forum Position Paper, Volume 6, Number 5, 1983.

T.G. Karis and G. M Gerhardt : From Protest to Challenge, Volume 5, pp. 234- 237.

J.D. Brewer (Ed.) : Can South Africa Survive?, pp. 184-186.

RILL, pp. 187-188.

Mark Swilling : 'The Extra-Parliamentary Movement : Strategies and Prospects", in Giliomee and Schlemmer.

Giliomee and Schlemmer : p. 65.

M. Bennett and D. Quin : Political Conflict in South Africa. Data Trends 1984- 1988, p. 7.

M. Hall : Resistance and Revolt in Greater Cape Town 1985, Paper prepared for U.C.T. Conference - Western Cape : Roots and Realities, Cape Town, July 1986, pp. 9-12. 230

Bennett and Quin : pp. 40-41.

P. Christie : The Right To Learn, p. 252.

!bid., p. 255.

UDF : Report of the Secretariat of the UDF National General Council, 1984, p. 2.

UDF : National Working Committee Conference Report, 29-30 May 1987, p. 6.

Ibid., pp. 5, 10.

Ibkl., pp. 256-260.

UDF : UDF Comment, Number 1, Crisis in the Schools, 5 August 1985, P. 2.

T. Lodge and B. Nasson : p. 84.

The NEC consisted of a national chairman, national publicity secretary, national general secretary, national treasurer and a secretary and member from each Regional Executive Committee (REC).

The NWC consisted of the NEC and an additional two members from each region.

Interview with Sandy Africa : United Committee of Concern Representative on the UDF Regional Structure (Natal) and Acting Secretary of the UDF Regional Structure (Natal), 21 November 1997.

Interview with Pingla Udit : Member of the Natal Organisation of Women, Natal Indian Congress, UDF (Natal) and underground ANC (MK) operative, 17 November 1997.

UDF : 'Taking the Struggle into the Ruling Bloc", Nd. and "The Immediate Tasks of the Democratic Movement", 1988.

UDF : "UDF Report of the National Working Committee Conference", Np, 24 and 25 May 1986.

UDF : "The Secretarial Report to the National Executive Council of the UDF", Np, 21 January 1984, p. 3.

UDF : "UDF Theme is Defend, Consolidate and Advance", 1987, p. 1.

Ibid., p. 103.

Bennett and Quin : p. 95. 231

Ibid., p. 95.

Moss and Obery : Review 4, p. 497.

UDF : "UDF National Executive Council evaluation of F. W.'s speech", 8 February 1990, p. 5.

G. Moss and I. Obery : South African Review 6, p. 27.

Monitor : June 1988, p. 17.

Address by the State President, 2 February 1990: p. 9-10.

Mayibuye : Number 8, 1983, p. 1, and Mayibuye : Number 9, 1983, p. 3.

South African Labour Bulletin : Volume 9, Number. 2, November 1983, pp. 47- 48.

UDF : National Working Committee Conference Report, 29 and 30 May 1987, pp. 32-39.

UDF : UDF Declaration, 20 August 1983, pp. 1-2.

UDF : Input at the National Executive Council meeting, "Political aspects of the Front", 10 and 11 November 1984, p. 1.

Ibid., pp. 2-5.

See chapter 5 for details on the UDF's tactical approach.

Ibid., p. 20.

UDF : "Analysis of the recent clampdown", 1988, p. 3.

Cobbett and Cohen : p. 70.

UDF : National Working Committee Conference Report, 29 and 30 May 1987, pp. 34-36.

The extent of this strategy and specific tactics will be addressed more completely in chapter 5.

Cobbett and Cohen : pp. 65-67.

UDF : "The Immediate Tasks of the Democratic Movement", 1988, p. 3.

Interview with Sandy Lebese : Member of the Mamelodi Civic Association, Publicity Secretary of the South African National Civic Association, 21 October 1997. 232

Interview with Reeves Mabitsi : Member of the Atteridgeville-Saulsville Residents Organisation, 22 October 1997.

Bennet and Quin : p. 7.

UDF : UDF Comment, Number 1, Crisis in the Schools, 5 August 1985, p. 2.

Ibid., p. 20.

A. Jeffery : The Natal Story. 16 Years of Conflict, pp. 773-776.

UDF : "UDF Reaffirms Non-violent position", 26 January 1987, pp. 1-2.

UDF : "Noma Siyaboshwa. UDF, Four Fighting Years", Volume 1, Number 3, August 1987, p. 4.

UDF : "Statement on Week of national Mass Action Against the Violence in Natal", 1990.

Bennett and Quin : p. 70.

UDF : "UDF Secretarial Report", Np, May 1986, pp. 5,9..

Lodge and Nasson : p. 58.

UDF : "UDF Supports COSATU", 1986.

UDF : "Two Days of National Protest", 27 April 1987.

Bennett and Quin : p. 21.

Ibid., p. 21.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 1, April 1986, p. 8.

UDF : "Call to the Whites", May 1986.

UDF : "Taking the Struggle into the Ruling Bloc", Nd, p. 2.

UDF : "Call to the Whites - The present climate", May 1986, pp. 1-6.

UDF : "UDF National Executive Council Meeting miniutes", Np, 21 November 1987, p. 5.

Bennett and Quin : p. 21.

UDF : "UDF and the Black Local Authorities", February 1985, p. 1.

New Era : Volume 1, Number 1, March/April 1986, p. 20. 233

Moss and Obery : Review 4, p. 498.

Sowetan : 18 January 1990, p. 1 and Star : 18 January 1990, p. 1.

Indicator South Africa : Volume 6, Number 4, Spring 1989, p. 50.

UDF : "UDF National Executive Council evaluation of F.W.'s speech, Np, 8 February 1990, pp. 2,5.

UDF : "Noma Siyaboshwa. UDF - Four Fighting Years", Volume 1, Number 3, August 1987, pp. 4-5.

Mayibuye : Number 1, 1989 , Sechaba : April 1988 and October 1989.

Mayibuye : Number 4 and 5 , 1988, p. 1.

Mayibuye : Number 1, 1989 , p. 1.

Mayibuye : Number 1, 1990 , p. 1.

Interview with Dumisane Nkabinde : ANC underground operative who infiltrated SASCO during 1988, 5 August 1997.

UDF : "Report and Decisions of the UDF National Executive Council meeting", Johannesburg, 28 July 1990, pp. 1-2, "Report of the National Executive Council of the UDF", Johannesburg, 22 September 1990, p. 1, and "Report and Decisions of the UDF National Executive Council meeting", Johannesburg, 17- 18 November 1990, p. 2. 234

CHAPTER 5

IMPLEMENTING THE STRATEGIES - THE UDF's MASS-BASED TACTICAL APPROACH

1. Introduction

The UDF's tactical approach could always be linked to the broad strategic concepts mentioned previously. This chapter focusses on the specific tactics which were employed during the different campaigns where the focus invariably was to support the UDF's broad strategic aims and goals. These tactics varied in scope, intensity and importance. Some tactics were aimed to mobilise a certain area, or protest a specific issue. The most important tactics were, however, those aimed at overturning apartheid as such by opposing the government's initiatives (elections), its lackeys (BLA's) and those tactics aimed at defending the UDF and its supporters (anti-detention, anti- emergency and anti-security forces). At the end of the 1980s, the UDF's rolling mass action campaign became the prominent tactic. Tactics, however, largely fluctuated according to a given situation over time.

The initial state of emergency lasted for eight months. Far from crushing the revolt and stifling political organising, it rather gave further impetus to both as people reacted with anger and vigour against the state's security measures. The UDF too was forced to change its tactics in order to counter the security measures brought about by the state of emergency. This phase in the UDF's evolution was marked by a wave of consumer boycotts and the proliferation of "street committees". 1 The renewal and extension of the state of emergency during 1986, which lasted until 1988, witnessed an era of supression unsurpassed in the history of political struggle. The government "securocrats", through the National Security Management System (NSMS), virtually "ruled" the townships with an iron hand. The government had two principal goals with this system - the suppression and controlling of political activism and the transformation of anger through the "upgrading" of local services. The army and police were used 235

extensively to provide the physical presence to enforce the state of emergency. These activities reflected a significant shift in government strategy. Up until mid-1986 the government had treated black opposition with a degree of tolerance. The government felt that the threat posed by organisations such as the UDF could be countered most effectively through propaganda, selective restrictions and the "defusing" of conflict by allowing outlets for political expression. It was felt that a measure of political freedom was necessary to enhance the legitimacy of the government's reform programme. By mid-1986, when the initial state of emergency was renewed and broadened, it was clear to the government that black resistance was on the increase rather than settling down. The "reformers" in the government were largely discredited while the securocrats gained the upper hand. 2

The states of emergency from 1985 to 1988, marked a turning-point in township politics. Severe repression and the tentative introduction of counter-revolutionary measures initially caused widespread organisational paralysis of the UDF and its affiliates. School boycotts and the embryonic structures of People's Power were also largely neutralised. The UDF and its affiliates and allies, however, adapted their tactics and the proliferation of rent boycotts, recurrent stay-aways and localised protest resurfaced on the same issues as during 1984. Although political organisation was disrupted through a combination of mass detentions, the prohibition of meetings and other constraints, the UDF largely managed to overturn the government clampdown, changed its tactics and continued its resistance. The process of mobilisation and

resistance was therefore transformed rather than suppressed. Protest persisted. 3

2. Background

The UDF's strategic approach of Defend, Consolidate and Advance formed the broad blueprint for all actions of protest and resistance launched by the Front. This broad strategy was aimed at creating an anti-apartheid consciousness among the masses by capturing the "hearts and the minds" of the people. At the same time, this newly awakened political consciousness was consolidated, concentrated and directed 236 through various tactics, to protest against the government's policies and to resist its attacks on the population. 5 Of neccessity, there was a close link between the broad strategic approach and the multitude of tactics used to implement the strategies. As with the strategic approach, a mass-based popular approach was also followed to mobilise, unite and channel protest and resistance.

The tactical approach, flowing from the broad strategic approach, can therefore be summarised as a continuing process, it was mass-based and it had as its ultimate aim, the democratisation of the South African society. It was a process aimed to mobilise, organise and to protest against the government's undemocratic and repressive activities, and finally to pressurise the government into real democratic reform.

Tactics were adapted to fit a changing political situation, for example the states of emergency. During interviews with various former UDF activists and operatives, it would appear as if there was no intensive planning, training and coordinating taking place with regard to the use and implementation of certain tactics during a specific time. Those UDF members involved in the planning processes, grew up and received their political training in what they termed, an "idealistic era". They received informal training as activists, which more than likely took the form of debates on various issues. 8 It would further appear that they built on the experiences of activists involved in protest campaigns during the 1950s to the 1970s. 7 Their execution of similar tactics as those used previously, was more successful because of a variety of reasons mentioned previously. 8 When the UDF launched certain initiatives, it was largely left to the different regions and affiliates to interpret the execution of a campaign to the best of their ability and knowledge. It depended on the background and improvisation skills of local UDF leaders which tactics were employed and how successful a campaign was. The result was that although the UDF managed to initiate protest and resistance on a national basis, the actual incidences of protest and resistance on the local level were far from uniform.

The authorities soon realised that the intensity and extent of protest and resistance, 237 which differed from region to region, could be linked directly to the local UDF leadership. It therefore became standard practice for the authorities to target the UDF leadership in order to neutralise resistance in a particular area, leading to the detention of thousands of UDF activists. The UDF had to adapt its tactics, especially during the states of emergency, to overcome this loss of its leadership. This had to be done not only to survive, but to continue to pressurise the government regardless of the repressive security measures brought to bear against the Front. This partially entailed really using the masses as an instrument of protest, to maintain cohesiveness in the face of the emergency regulations and even to use the government's own actions, like detentions, as a mobilising factor. 9 New methods of organisation had to be developed, which resulted in alternative structures like street and area committees being formed l° while a growing unity between different interest groups were cultivated to ensure the emergence of a united front which would be better equipped to continue protest under the emergency." UDF leaders concluded that the UDF had to embark on united mass- based action in order to be able to pressurise the government. 12 During the late 1980s, the UDF's tactics were adapted, they managed to mobilise the masses (largely because of Botha's ousting) which saw the beginning of several massive protest campaigns. This "rolling mass action" tactic contributed to the UDF finally being able to organise real, country-wide, mass-based protest.

3. Tactics employed by the UDF

3.1. Mobilisation and organisation tactics

Although the UDF organised certain campaigns with an ulterior motive, namely a mobilisation or organisation undertone, it must be remembered that all campaigns were ultimately organised to protest against the government's excesses. From 1983 to 1985, the UDF's underlying tactics were largely concentrated on establishing the UDF as a viable resistance front while from 1985 to 1989, these efforts were aimed at reforming those structures decimated by state actions during the states of emergency and to take the struggle to the government. Certain organisational guidelines were compiled which 238 related to decision making (a directive to ensure that the UDF consulted with its broad constituency on all matters), representation (of all constituencies), accountability (of all structures) and a constant evaluation and adaptation of their activities."

3.1.1. Tactics to mobilise support base

Tactics were varied and adapted in different townships in order to fit the local resistance profile - protest for example tended to differ between Coloured and black townships, and between campaigns built around student, women and other interest groups." Tactics also varied from the local, to the national and even the international level. a. Mobilisation in urban areas

In contrast with previous campaigns, the UDF's tactics were aimed at keeping the protest within the eyes of the community. They managed this by ensuring continuous media coverage and by printing their own pamphlets and community newspapers. 15 The UDF also held regular rallies and public meetings in order to keep the mobilisation of people on a high level of militancy."

The UDF strategy was, through these type of bread-and-butter issues, to keep the atmosphere of resistance alive and ensure that ongoing protest action on the various issues, provided the platform to launch national, politically based campaigns of resistance. The mobilisation of communities through the UDF's affiliated community organisations, (to unite in the struggle against apartheid) was, however, the UDF's main tactic :

"Community organisation is a process of organising people to confront their day- to-day problems in the places where they live through the establishment of popular democratic structures"." 239

The UDF described their tactics in the mobilisation of the masses clearly in one of their pamphlets. Firstly, activists used to sensitise and educate people wherever people congregate (sport, social) and then mobilise them to take an active part in UDF activities.'

A further tactic was to hold house-meetings with a small number of people. The meetings were more personal than large rallies and people could be cultivated more easily." The UDF had mixed results with this community-based strategy. The decentralising of local UDF affiliates to organise local resistance, sometimes failed to fit in and support national campaigns. The UDF continuously managed to mobilise a specific community on a specific issue, but largely failed to translate this support to the national struggle.

Million Signatures Campaign. During its first national conference held in December 1983, the UDF decided to embark on a "Million Signatures Campaign" in opposition to the new constitution. 2° The campaign was launched in Soshanguve, outside of Pretoria, on 21 January 1984, but only started to gain momentum during March of 1984. This delay was caused on the one hand by the time it took to train activists to run the campaign even though a sophisticated activists' training manual was produced. 21 On the other hand, it was delayed because of the debate that erupted amongst the principal Indian and Coloured affiliates of the UDF. This debate centered on whether to vote or abstain if the government should offer a referendum to the Indian and Coloured communities on the constitution. The government, however, never made such an offer, and set August 1984 as the date for Indian and Coloured elections to Parliament. 22

During the months leading up to the elections, the signature campaign gathered momentum. Two different tactics were used. Signatures were collected during popular mass gatherings, some of which were specially organised by the UDF for that purpose, like for instance rock concerts. As the campaign had another, complementing purpose, namely to educate and to build grassroots support for the UDF, a more systematic 240

tactic was also used, known as the "signature blitz". This tactic originated in the Western Cape and was also extensively utilised in the Eastern Cape. For each "blitz" a township or suburb was selected during a designated weekend. Activists postered the area beforehand and primed the people by visiting schools, churches and mosques, telling them about the campaign. Next, the area was split into zones and each zone assigned a coordinator to lead a team of canvassers, who visited each house in their zone, and tried to spend at least twenty minutes in each household, telling the people the rationale behind the campaign and eliciting their support. 23 This campaign was particularly successful in generating support in the Western Cape, but was also conducted around Durban, Johannesburg's Coloured townships, the Vaal and Port Elizabeth. In Soweto, the campaign was less successful, as the Soweto Youth Congress (SOYCO) regarded it as too moderate a tactic. 24

The Million Signature campaign as a tactic to engage the people, underlied the UDF's broad strategy for mobilising resistance against the new constitution. The UDF hoped to gain the following from the implementation of this tactic :

A propaganda function;

a sensitising function;

a training role (for activists);

an organisational and mobilisation role; and

an explorational function. 25

The propaganda function of the Million Signature campaign had a threefold aim. Firstly, the UDF used it to register their opposition to the new constitution. Secondly, they aimed to engage the masses and obtain some measure of political unity amongst the population. Lastly, the campaign was used to propagate the aims and objectives of the 241

UDF itself. The overall propaganda aim was therefore to expose the South African government of trying to implement the tricameral constitution without a real mandate from the population. This tactic was especially used abroad in order to obtain some measure of support against the government from foreign governments. Patrick Lekota (UDF Publicity Secretary) stated this position of the UDF unequivocably during an interview with the Natal Witness :

"We want to provide living proof through a million signatures that the people unequivocably reject this constitution."26

An underlying motive for the campaign was that if the UDF could get a million signatures on paper, it would have presented a show of force from the new organisation that it could muster such a following within a relatively short time-span. 27

The UDF also used the campaign in a purposeful way as a tactic to sensitise their supporters with regard to the aims and goals of the UDF. The opposition to the new constitution and the Koornhof Bills was used to lay the foundation for future mass based grassroots participation in UDF campaigns. At the same time, the UDF used the million signature campaign as a training exercise for activists. As stated before, a special training manual was published by the UDF to assist activists and volunteers in organising a mass based campaign. Because the UDF used the campaign to mobilise from the grassroots up, it was used to simultaneously establish organisational local structures. George Sewpersadh explained it clearly :

"The Million Signature Campaign has a mobilising and organisational component. It's not just a matter of getting signatures. We are going to encourage people to become more active in their community organisations." 28

The explorational role of the campaign can be linked to the organisational aims of the UDF as well as a test of their supporters' resolve to protest and the government resolve to respond. Local and regional committees were formed with the view to coordinate 242 future protest campaigns from a local level that could link up with national campaigns.

b. Mobilising in rural areas

Traditionally, political protest in the rural areas of South Africa was generally low key and rare. The UDF decided to extend their mobilisation and organisational efforts to these areas. The bantustans - the homelands and the nominally selfgoverning states and their leaders - were prime mobilising targets. The UDF also extended their influence to small rural towns and started a process of forming local youth, women and community organisations in every small community in the country. 29 The UDF realised, however, that special programmes, specifically adapted for the rural areas had to be developed in order to ensure the successful mobilisation of these areas. 39

The UDF therefore started to mobilise in the Southern and Northern Cape, the Karoo, the West Coast, in Northern Transvaal and in the homelands and selfgoverning states.' The basic tactic employed was the same as that used in the UDF's other campaigns - the linking of local issues to national campaigns. The UDF experienced some problems in this regard. The low level of political awareness in the rural areas and the low level of schooling of the people, resulted in low militancy and a difficulty to politicise them. An additional factor that complicated matters was the demographic inbalances of the rural areas. There was a large percentage of women, children and old people and an absence of men - a legacy of the migrant labour system. The traditional subservient role of women, especially relating to politics, also further complicated matters. In time the UDF, however, managed to create a viable resistance structure in the rural areas, partially by ordering the politicised menfolk to continue and to extend their own political structures (like those on the mines) to their own homes during times of leave. 32

The UDF also continuously attempted to discredit the bantustan leaders throughout the 1980s and labelled them criminals. The leader of the Zulus, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, was especially singled out and attacked by the UDF. 33 Although the UDF managed to 243 extend their organisational structures to previously non-politicised areas, their campaigns in these areas largely stayed reactive - local structures reacted to government actions rather than being able to launch pro-active campaigns that slotted into national campaigns.

3.1.2. Mobilisation around tactical issues

a. Socio-economic and socio-political issues

Although political issues dominated the UDF's whole reason for existence, the Front did not neglect to concentrate on socio-economic issues. These type of campaigns formed an integral part of their effort to mobilise the community. By concentrating on bread-and-butter and related issues - such as health and welfare, sport and culture, housing, squatting and forced removals, education and labour problems, the UDF managed to highlight the basic problems of township dwellers. As the UDF realised that these issues were important to local communities, they ensured that these campaigns received widespread support on which they could build a climate of resistance and maintain momentum for their protest actions. The UDF generated interest and support with local issues and drew that interest into their more high-profile, political campaigns. This had the effect that the groundswell of support continued to grow, enabling the UDF to launch real mass-based initiatives.

Campaigns linked to socio-economic issues formed a major part of the UDF's township- based resistance programme. The UDF did, however, organise specific campaigns with the goal of focussing interest on the poor socio-economic circumstances experienced by blacks in general. 34 The general tactic employed by the UDF in addressing socio- economic issues, was to link it with national political issues. Civic and women's organisations, especially, played a central role in the organising of local campaigns which the UDF organised into national campaigns, for example a protest gainst a lack of housing in a region linked to the national rent boycott. Specific tactics employed by the UDF had the basic goal of pressurising the state and business. It included 244 memorandums listing certain demands, publicity campaigns and meetings to highlight these demands, propaganda, the distribution of flyers, newsletters and pamphlets and the display of protest posters. 35

Bread and butter issues. The UDF, through its affiliates, organised numerous campaigns concentrating on bread-and-butter issues, especially on local community level. These include issues such as rent and bus tariffs, the price of food and General Sales Tax (GST), the poor standard of health services, sanitation, water and electricity supplies, which formed the basis of such campaigns. The campaigns gained momentum after the violence which flowed from the nationwide rent boycotts which started in the Vaal Triangle during September 1984. The harsh reaction from the authorities caused a reaction from the communities and enabled the UDF to lay the groundwork for linking socio-economic with political issues."

The Cost of Living/Living Wage Campaign was initiated by the UDF during 1986 and intensified during 1987. 37 The South African economic recession worsened from 1985 and especially after the implementation of the state of emergency and the increased repression of protesters. The economic situation affected black people in particular and the UDF organised a series of campaigns, under the auspices of the Cost of Living Campaign, to protest against the state's inability to contain the economy, rising food prices and the growing rate of unemployment." This campaign was later broadened to support COSATU in its Living Wage Campaign where better salaries for workers were demanded. Like almost all UDF campaigns, these campaigns had the underlying objective of mobilising support, the strengthening of grassroots structures, utilising real grievances in pro-active protest, to concretize the Freedom Charter in a grassroots campaign and to motivate the trade unions to participate in UDF-initiated campaigns.'

Campaign against forced removals. The campaign against the forced removal of people, became one of the UDF's main tactics of resistance after the boycott of the elections for the new constitution in 1984. The UDF strategy in embarking on this type of protest was basically to show solidarity with the affected communities and to gain 245 their support.4° Forced removals were also morally indefensible and the UDF could get a large measure of propaganda from protesting against such immoral activities by the state. The UDF formed the Anti-Forced-Removals Committee (AFRC) to organise resistance campaigns against the government forcefully relocating people.'" Organisations supporting the UDF, like the South African Council of Churches (SACC), also published pamphlets exposing the government's policy of forced removals. 42

3.1.3. Sensitising tactics to widen the Front a. Targeting the white community

Van Zyl Slabbed, former leader of the opposition Progressive Federal Party (PFP) resigned from parliament during 1986, stating that parliament was a hopeless cause for reform. This highlighted a growing trend in the white community which had been discernable from 1985. 43 White activists and human rights groups, in increasing numbers and from all sectors of civil society, joined forces with the UDF to fight the state of emergency from 1985 onwards. The alliance included more than 20 organisations which launched itself as the Five Freedoms Forum in March 1986." The UDF was quick to exploit this trend and even explained their tactics in a special publication, 45 while the ANC also gave substance to this initiative, calling for the struggle to be taken to the white areas. 46 Whites as a group were engaged in different forums and discussions. This tactic culminated during 1986 in the Call to the Whites Campaign.' The task of these "white" affiliates 48 of the UDF, was to make the white community aware of the impact and extent of state repression and to facilitate a more questioning attitude 49, to promote change and help hasten the negotiation process along and to address white fears of black domination.' Although these affiliates were small in numbers, they had considerable success in highlighting the activities of the UDF.

The UDF continued with this tactic of engaging the white community up to its disbandment, with the UDF's NEC being closely involved throughout in the initiative.51 246

Use of the media

As part of their tactic to build as wide a front as possible, the UDF strove to reach as many of their supporters and of the population as possible to get their message across. They did this mainly through the printed media and by publishing their own newsletters, pamphlets, flyers, posters and community newspapers. All this did not come cheaply however. The financial aspects and cost of running a national campaign of resistance, coupled with a lack of financial resources, were one of the main contributing factors which caused earlier campaigns in the struggle against apartheid to falter regularly. The UDF realised that if they were to reach the whole of the population and to keep up their momentum, people must be informed regularly of UDF activities. The UDF therefore, through its affiliates and in their own name, communicated with its support base and advertised meetings, rallies, campaigns and specific issues, such as a boycott action or stay-away. 52

Young activists were responsible for running several printing presses out of houses and old buildings. During the states of emergency, these printing presses went "underground" to hide it from the security police. In some instances, printing was done in the veld with the press being powered with a generator. 53 Through these localised printing presses, the UDF was able to produce its printed material on a continuous basis and keep its supporters informed of its activities.

Funding

Up until 1985, when the government really started to put the UDF under pressure, the UDF was able to generate wide funding, both from abroad, for example the Swedish government, and internally from organisations such as the South African Council of Churches (SACC) which acted as intermediary and distributed funds from abroad to the UDF (and other groups). The UDF also received funds from white South Africans, which although smaller amounts than the funding received from abroad, indicated a marked difference in the state-of-heart of sections of the white society, measured 247 against the pre-1983 history of resistance. Tony Bloom (chairman of a major service- industry conglomerate) formed a support group - Friends of the UDF - which raised substantial funds for the UDF and served as a conduit which arranged meetings between the UDF's leadership and prominent businessmen. 54 Membership fees were not nearly enough to finance their day-to-day activities. The UDF therefore organised several activities aimed at receiving funds while it also served as further mobilisation campaigns. Concerts and fetes were held where UDF T-shirts, pamphlets, stickers and placards were sold.'

Up until the middle of 1985, when the government declared the UDF an affected organisation and the state of emergency was declared, the UDF's financial position was quite strong. The UDF was able to run a headquarters with permanent staff which included professional organisers and secretarial personnel. It had vehicles, a communication system and office apppliances such as computers. This strong infrastructure served the UDF well in launching its initial campaigns and thereafter to survive during the states of emergency. 56

3.2. Protest and pressure tactics

3.2.1. Boycotts

Boycotts, in all forms and manner, became one of the major tactics employed by the UDF and its affiliates and allies during the states of emergency. The countless mass stay-aways, regional boycotts and local initiatives, enabled the UDF to continue with protest in the face of the emergency and to use these successes to ensure continued mobilisation of its supporters.

The UDF launched its campaigns opposing apartheid in 1983 during a period of near consensus among opposition groups about national political demands and militant modes of struggle. Political morale and confidence was high among the UDF and its affiliates. These groups had some success with the initiatives organised to protest 248 against the government's different actions. 57 Pressure was applied directly by boycotting its reform initiatives, and indirectly through economic-based boycotts and social boycotts.

Many of the boycotts were triggered by the trade unions, but widened in scope when broader community support - in many cases initiated by the UDF and its local affiliates - was mobilised. Boycotts became a favoured tactic of the UDF because :

it exposed protesters to relatively few risks;

it took the "struggle" in many instances out of the townships and into white areas;

it provided black communities with the power to negotiate from a position of strength with white authorities on a wide range of local and national issues; and

it was used as a catalyst to generate wider political mobilisation. 59 a. Boycott of elections

Boycott of the municipal elections of 1983. The campaign against the new constitution was preceded by the boycott of the municipal elections that were held in black townships during November 1983. The elections, based on the Black Local Authorities Act of 1982, one of the so-called Koornhof Bills, would reorganise black local government, giving greater powers to municipal councils including the authority and responsibility of holding elections for mayors and councillors. The UDF campaigned vigorously from September 1983 onwards, calling for the boycott of the elections. 59 The UDF held open-air protest meetings, made house-to-house calls and distributed anti-election pamphlets, like the UDF News. They also used the black media to popularise the boycott.69 249

An underlying tactic used by the UDF was to stress the result for black people should they take part in the elections. The people were informed that

"A vote for any person in these elections is a vote that supports these puppet councils. A vote for these puppet councils is most certainly a vote for higher rents, more evictions and demolitions. A vote for the councils is a vote that will make the government stronger. This will help them to keep on with apartheid, bantu education, the dompass and low wages. A vote for the councils is a vote that will tell the government we are happy for them to keep on taking away our rights and putting us under the bantustans. A vote for the councils is a vote for apartheid!!!"."

Superficially, the UDF succeeded in their anti-election campaign as massive voter abstentions became the norm, with an average voter turnout of about 21 percent recorded. In Soweto and the other Witwatersrand townships, percentages of 10 percent and 14,7 percent were recorded respectively. 62 The UDF saw these results as a victory and as proof that the people rejected the government's constitutional proposals. 63 In private, the UDF however conceded that they could not claim full credit for the low voter turnout - apathy played an equal role. The UDF secretariat further conceded that not all affiliates on grassroots level were successful in mobilising support for a boycott of the elections, while part of the successses that were reached, was because black council elections were traditionally poorly supported and many of the boycotts could be ascribed to spontaneous reaction from communities. The UDF however agreed that they managed to successfully mobilise large numbers of people around a cause which provided them with a platform for future protest campaigns. The failure of these elections provided the groundwork for the future destabilisation of the black local councils in the townships.'

On a negative note, the spectre of violence and intimidation - which became a major problem for the UDF at a later stage - first raised its head during these campaigns as people were in some isolated instances, prevented by force from voting by "overeager" 250

UDF members.'

Boycott of the elections for the tricameral parliament. From its conception, the envisaged tricameral parliamentary system was utterly rejected by the majority of Blacks, Coloureds and Indians. As early as 1980, the ANC totally rejected the new system as a hoax and described it as irrelevant to the voteless majority in the country. They also vowed to keep on struggling for a democratically-elected government, based on a one-man-one-vote franchise. 66

Early in 1984, the ANC again reiterated the formation of the UDF as an "historic achievement' in the struggle for liberation and called on the people to support the UDF in opposing the Coloured and Indian elections for the tricameral parliament. The ANC also called on the white population not to be deluded by the new constitution and to support the anti-apartheid forces opposing it. 67

In a Mayibuye interview with Reg September (senior ANC member), he again reiterated that the boycott of the tricameral elections was crucial. September further stressed that groups such as the UDF must go further than organising a mere boycott, if they wanted a successful campaign. He called on the UDF to ensure that the militancy of the people was raised so that the front would come out of the campaign stronger than before. September named the Million Signature Campaign" as the ideal mechanism to lay the foundations for a very widespread organisation. The UDF therefore had a dual tactical aim with regard to the campaign - resistance against the tricameral election and the mobilisation of the people."

The UDF embarked on its boycott of the elections for the Coloured House of Representatives on 22 August 1984 and the Indian House of Delegates on 28 August 1984. Although continuing the door-to-door approach employed during the Million Signatures Campaign, more emphasis was placed on a mass-based approach.' The UDF thus employed tactics such as public meetings and mass rallies to put across its message. UDF affiliates that enjoyed the most success with this approach, were the 251

NIC in Natal, the TIC and the Anti-President's Council Committee in the Transvaal, and local UDF groups such as the Cape Areas Housing Committee (CAHAC) in the Western Cape, because they could appeal directly to their own communities notto vote!' The campaign had a significant impact on voter turnout. 72

The success of the UDF to restrict voting rested on their tactic of propagating a large scale campaign to get people to boycott the elections by branding those taking part as sell-outs. Coloured and Indian leaders taking part in the elections were especially targeted in an effort to demoralise such leaders and their supporters :

"This month we are going to pass an important milestone - Botha's so-called elections. Our call is for the people to boycott these elections for the new apartheid parliament. This is a call for unity. It is a call against the sell-outs". 73

The UDF's tactics were aimed at ensuring a low voter turnout so that even the government could not accept the results of the elections as a clear mandate for the new tricameral system. The UDF felt that they had succeeded as this statement by Lekota indicated :

"UDF has thoroughly discredited the public institutions of the Government and its junior partners such as the Thebehalis, the Rajbansis and the Hendrickses through successful campaigns against the new constitution, the Black Local Authorities Act and the management system."'

Why did the UDF have such an impact on the elections? Their tactical approach was well thought out and imaginative. 75 The UDF managed to let their campaign impact emotionally on the general population. They used sobriquets such as sell-outs, traitors and puppets to demoralise those taking part in the elections while at the same time inciting an extremely negative reaction from the public. 76 Especially after the riots and clashes with the security forces in areas like the Vaal Triangle, the UDF was able to effectively win the propaganda campaign against the government : 252

"We want to say to ... Mr Hendrickse and Mr Rajbansi - This is your work. You are responsible for every drop of blood that stains the streets of the Vaal Triangle. You are responsible for the beaten and broken bodies of our children. You are responsible for every stone that has been thrown. Every puppet leader that has been killed.""

Intimidatory tactics were also employed to discourage voters from voting. Meetings of tricameral parties were disrupted, candidates received threatening phone calls, election posters were destroyed and petrol bombs were thrown at some of their houses. 78 Although the UDF did not overtly support this type of intimidation and violence, they let local UDF branches and affiliates organise their own protest actions within the broad national UDF gambit of protesting against the elections. Some of these groups were "overenthusiastic" in their acts of protest, which gave the government more motivation in branding the UDF as a revolutionary organisation bent on violence.

It also appears as if the government padded the elections results in order to show a mandate to implement the tricameral system. According to the UDF, only 17% of Coloureds voted for the House of Representatives (government percentage - 30%) and only 15% of Indians voted for the House of Delegates (government percentage - 20%).' The UDF took these numbers as proof of their success to initiate a new phase of sustained mass-based protest and resistance. They also managed to create resistance structures where none had been present previously and to spread protest against the government more evenly across the country, in contrast with previous protest action that tended to be concentrated in larger urban areas. Although it has to be accepted that not all people who did not vote were UDF supporters, the UDF did manage to use the general apathy and negativeness to their own advantage by running a highly visible campaign against the elections and claiming a large deal of credit for the low voter turnout. This raised the UDF's profile amongst the population and ensured an increase in their support base.

Boycott of the October 1988 municipal elections. The ANC called for a total boycott 253 of the October 1988 municipal elections in order to illustrate that the government's reforms were illegitimate." The UDF heeded this call and organised the boycott on the domestic front. As previously, the UDF linked their permanent demands to the boycott, namely the release of all political prisoners, the lifting of the bans on organisations and the withdrawal of troops from the townships. The UDF's white affiliates supported the boycott of the elections. The Cape Democrats called for a boycott and campaigned around the slogan "One City, One Future" which called for an end to separate race- based elections. 81 The Johannesburg Democratic Action Committee (JODAC) called the elections a political farce and exposed dubious voting procedures being applied in black areas, the fact that voting could hardly be democratic under a state of emergency and that no identification was necessary when voting. 82 The Five Freedoms Forum (FFF) also launched a boycott initiative and campaigned for a new Johannesburg with its One City - Open City Campaign.' These white affiliates, with relatively large budgets, reached a wide spectrum of white people with their campaigns, fulfilling the role the UDF envisaged when allowing so-called "white" affiliates to be formed. It made people think for a change and made them aware of the atrocities occuring daily in the townships surrounding their suburbs. b. Consumer boycotts

During 1985 to 1986, two national and countless regional and local consumer boycotts were organised by the UDF and its affiliates. From December 1984, a Black Christmas Campaign was organised annually.84 The UDF demanded that: the emergency be terminated and SADF troops removed from the townships; all detainees and political prisoners be released; and all black local government councillors resign. In December 1986, the UDF again launched a national consumer boycott with the same basic demands.' Added demands included the holding of elections for single multi-racial municipalities and an immediate end to rent evictions." UDF-affiliated civics supported these boycotts on a local level with the same demands as well as additional, local demands affecting specific townships. 87 In Port Alfred in the Eastern Cape for example, the jailing of 19 youths during September 1985, triggered a boycott, organised by the 254

Port Alfred Civic Association (PACA). The boycott was accompanied by various demands, which included a new school, the removal of troops from the area, the conversion of a local beer hall into a community centre, an end to segregated entrances to shops, a moratorium on rent arrears and the establishment of a non-racial municipal council. 88 It became standard practice to lump specific demands with specific protest actions - thus, demands were backed by force and mass action .

At least 33 towns nationally were affected by consumer boycotts from 1985 to 1988. Some of these boycotts had already started before the declaration of the state of emergency while others were organised to protest against the state of emergency. A Consumer Boycott Committee was usually formed to organise the boycott. For example, the consumer boycott called in Port Elizabeth as a protest against police behaviour and township conditions, consisted of local UDF leaders and representatives of PEBCO, COSAS, PEYCO, the Dance Association and two UDF-ffiliated trade unions, the Motor Assembly and Components Workers' Union of South Africa (MACWUSA) and the General Workers' Union of South Africa (GWUSA). Members of FOFATUSA initially held back and only joined the committee at the end of July 1985. 89

The UDF's national executive invariably threw its weight behind local boycott initiatives. The concept of the power of the masses also started to sink in into UDF thinking and planning. Alan Boesak stated that consumer power was stronger than violence and gave an indication of the UDF's tactics that was to be adhered to during the coming months:

"We will stay away until apartheid is on its sickbed". 9°

These claims were not without substance as the UDF had succeeded within a relatively short time-span, to achieve much. The successes of the consumer boycotts in the Eastern Cape, may serve as an example :

■ UDF-initiated consumer boycotts invariably succeeded in eliciting a 255

response from local (usually white) business people. In Port Alfred for example, as the boycott started to affect their businesses, a white employers' federation was hastily convened which promised to create jobs and to stop petty segregation in businesses and shops. The federation also undertook to make appeals to the authorities on behalf of the black communities over matters such as the rent arrears and stated their support for a single, non-racial municipality for the town. Rent arrears were scrapped, a lower charge for utilities for pensioners were instituted, and police behaviour improved after informal approaches by the Port Alfred business community. The boycott was suspended and boycott leaders were participating in a joint community working on a public works expenditure program.

The Port Elizabeth Chamber of Commerce, reeling from an 80 percent drop in sales, issued a manifesto that included a call for black participation in central government.

In East London, the boycott was conducted under the bitter slogan, "Industry and Government : Two sides of the Same Bloody Coin". The boycotters succeeded in the closure of sixteen shops in the city center. By the end of 1985, the business community was appealing for peace and concessions. As a first gesture, the municipality lifted an embargo on black vendors in the main commercial district.

In September 1985, merchants from sixteen Eastern Cape towns met at Cradock and agreed to send delegations to the government to argue the case of non-racial municipalities. 91

By November 1985, the boycotts were conditionally suspended in most Eastern Cape centres. Leaders delivered ultimatums containing a mixture of local and national demands to be satisfied by April 1986. This date concurred with the deadline set by the 256

Commonwealth for the commencement of sanctions against South Africa. The boycotts in the Eastern Cape were more successful than in other parts of the country. These successes reflected two features of the region : its recent economic decline and the nature of its urban concentrations. In contrast to the urban sprawl of the Western Cape and the Witwatersrand, the main population centres of the Eastern Cape were compact towns with centralised shopping areas. It was hence easier for relatively small groups of activists to discourage township dwellers from using the stores in the main commercial districts. In the other regions, the UDF had less success with the boycotts. The boycott leaders, for example, did not coordinate the boycott with the black shopkeepers in the townships to ensure they were well stocked to supply the demand for basic goods during the boycott of white businesses. The UDF was also reluctant to restrain youths who attacked trucks supplying township traders, or to prevent local traders from using their newfound monopoly to impose a 40 percent retail price increase. The common people were the ones who suffered, and the boycott quickly lost its popularity in certain areas. Rifts also occurred between trade unionists and the UDF's political affiliates, with the unions expressing their reservations about the way the boycotts were turning out, especially the extra financial hardship imposed on poor workers. They questioned whether the boycotts had a democratic popular mandate and complained that often they were not consulted. They also objected to the bullying tactics of the youths, who violently and brutally enforced the boycott. 92

The tactic of consumer boycotts had mixed results. Some proved to be quite effective in forcing local businessmen to intercede with the government in order to save their affected businesses. 93 Others were, however, less than successful. Especially in small rural townships, people in many instances had no alternative place to buy food and other necessities. Many people in the townships were also not prepared to be inconvenienced by a consumer boycott. This led to the use of violence to enforce a boycott and harmed the UDF's image in certain areas.' Although not uniformly effective and successful, consumer boycotts ensured a continued climate of resistance in townships, served as a mobilising factor for the UDF and even managed to obtain concessions from the authorities in certain regions. 257

Stay-aways

The MDM allies used stay-aways on a regular basis to protest specific state actions.' The three-day stay-away, organised to protest a variety of government transgressions, became a regular protest tactic during the late 1980s and early 1990s. 96 The Three Day National Peaceful Protest Campaign was, for example, organised to protest against the banning of the UDF, the restrictions on COSATU, the Labour Relations Bill and general repression. 97

Education boycotts

During the 1980s, UDF youth and student affiliates also invariably linked their educational grievances to an ever greater extent to wider community and political issues and grievances. They demanded the resignation of township councillors and supported rent boycotts. The increase in student protest and their clear identification with the wider democratic struggle, were the consequences of a number of developments. The political crisis of the state, the growth and spreading of resistance initiatives (especially the UDF and its affiliates), the weakening economy, the increasing strength of the labour movement, a growing number of attacks on .targets within South Africa by the liberation movements, and growing internal resistance, all created a political climate of resistance. It is in this context that the intensification of student protest must be seen and which contributed to the growth of student organisations such as COSAS. The formation of national organisational groups such as COSAS, further caused an increase in student mobilisation , organisation and an increase in support.' By the onset of the first state of emergency, it was estimated that well over 500 000 students had been involved in protests against the education system. The declaration of the first state of emergency in1985 also ensured that the chance for a negotiated settlement to the schooling crisis became remote. The banning of COSAS further exacerbated the situation and ensured that a large number of black pupils would not go back to school that year while an intensification of the schools boycott was also experienced. The state tried to force pupils back to school by using the powers of the 258 state of emergency, but 1985 year-end saw a massive stay-away from the examinations throughout the country. In many areas, black schooling had effectively collapsed. The mood of the student community at this time was also captured by the slogan, Liberation Now - Education Later. Pupils were prepared to sacrifice their schooling for the broader political struggle. The Soweto Parent's Crisis Committee (SPCC) tried to correct the situation, but only had limited success, with the schools remaining a crucial, and one of the main battle grounds, of the UDF."

An exacerbating root cause in the widespread revolt that broke out in the Vaal Triangle, and which occurred, in concert with the protest against the constitution, was the nationwide school boycott that started during April 1984. The boycott was the result of poor matriculation results and the refusal of the authorities to re-admit overage pupils and in the case of overcrowded schools, children who had failed their examinations. Under the leadership of COSAS, a UDF affiliate, a set of demands were drawn up and presented to the authorities. These demands included : the institution of elected Student Representative Councils (SRCs), an end to excessive corporal punishment, sexual harassment, and the age limit, free books and stationary and a ban on unqualified teachers.' The boycott began in Atteridgeville, outside of Pretoria, and rapidly spread to the other townships of the Witwatersrand and the Eastern Cape, involving more than 200 000 children. 101

These sporadic protests and boycotts within the educational sector were utilised by the UDF to spearhead and to give impetus to other campaigns. Parents and teachers, however, became worried about the children losing years of schooling and tried to lessen the disturbances of schools, but in vain. By the mid-1980s, students in general were very militant and became uncontrollable in many instances. Therefore, although the field of education saw wide boycotts, the UDF largely lost control of an important part of their constituency. Much of the violence conducted against innocent township dwellers, could also be laid at the door of the youth. 259 e. Rent boycotts

Rent boycotts, proved to be one of the UDF's most potent tactics throughout the 1980s. It was easy to mobilise people not to pay rent while the UDF managed to use the boycott as a mobilising issue and unifying factor.' The rent boycotts were invariably linked to other campaigns and political demands by the UDF, for example the municipal boycott during 1988. After the UDF accepted the Freedom Charter as its base document and openly declared himself an ally of the ANC, the ANC mirrored the UDF's campaigns and initiatives in its publications. On the October 1986 elections boycott, the ANC pronounced :

"The rent boycott is one of the most potent tactics we can use in our elections boycott campaign." 103

Rent boycotts became a central, ongoing resistance tactic in townships throughout the 1980s. It started in the Vaal Triangle during 1984 and spread to Mamelodi (Pretoria) during 1985. UDF supporters used the tactic of visiting every house in the township, explaining to the people the reasons for the rent boycott and asking for their support. The UDF had great success with this tactic and the majority of township dwellers joined the rent boycott.' After the first state of emergency, further rent boycotts spread rapidly throughout the country. By August 1986 the boycott affected 54 townships throughout the Transvaal and Free State. 1°5

The rent boycott was effective in several of the townships. Part of the success could be ascribed to the "comrades' who formed the vanguard in ensuring the success of the campaign. They protected householders from eviction and forced township dwellers to support the campaigns. Youth activism played a central role during the emergency and was largely responsible for the continuation of resistance in the face of draconian measures by government. The Soweto Youth Congress (SYC) played a central part in the resistance. As their leadership structure was never publicly identified, they were less vulnerable as targets for detention. Many of the SYC's leaders were also "veteran" 260 activists, with several having served sentences on Robben Island. 107

The rent boycott in Soweto lasted from 1986 to 1990, and was supported by between 50 and 80 percent of the householders. 108 Township dwellers, supported by youthful comrades, several times fought pitched battles with municipal police attempting to evict the boycotters. Several people were killed, which forced the authorities to be more circumspect. Court orders, the cutting off of electricity were employed rather than efforts of mass evictions. The authorities experienced more and more trouble in enforcing these measures. The civics moved people back when evicted and they reconnected electricity, a tactic called Operation Switch-On. 109 Other factors that helped sustain the boycott, were that a rent strike hardly had to be enforced, as human nature is such that by refusing to pay rent, more money was available for other uses. It also enabled the UDF to draw people into a pattern of non-violent resistance to the government. The groundwork was thus laid by these boycotts for further resistance, and these boycotts also served to largely blunt the state of emergency." ° f. Transport boycotts

Transport was the single issue affecting almost all black people in the era of enforced group areas. Townships were invariably constructed a considerable distance outside the white cities and towns, making it necessary for black workers to commute long distances to and from work every day on transport services that were often overcrowded, poorly maintained, unpunctual and crime-ridden. Disputes over fare increases and the quality of service, were seized upon by the UDF to organise transport boycotts. This was often done in conjunction with stay-aways - with no available transport, people were basically forced to support the stay-away.

The Soweto Putco Boycott Committee (SPBC), with help from the UDF in Soweto, organised a bus boycott during November 1986 to protest against an increase of 17,5 percent in bus fares. The UDF by this time had a more smoothly running organisational structure, and did not need a mass meeting to publisise the boycott in advance. They 261 rather printed leaflets which the comrades delivered house-to-house. Some violence occurred and four buses were firebombed. By the end of November 1986, the bus company, PUTCO, acknowledged that their earnings had dropped by 75 percent. The UDF however, did not have the means to keep the momentum of the boycott running, and the people again began using the busses in December 1986. Part of the problem was that the boycotters were exploited by the taxidrivers who doubled their fares to make full use of the monopoly suddenly presented to them. The trade unions were also angered by the UDF's failure to consult with them prior to the boycott.' g. Foreign campaigns

The UDF continued its contact with international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), Organisation for African Unity (OAU), World Council of Churches (WCC), anti-apartheid movements worldwide as well as specific foreign governments, like those of the European Community and the Scandinavian countries. The tactics remained the same as before. These organisations and countries sent letters of protest to the South African government, emminent people visited the country to monitor the situation, in the UN numerous resolutions against the South African government were accepted, and economic sanctions and disinvestment increased. The UDF, as the foremost domestic resistance group and the ANC as its foreign counterpart, kept these campaigns on line by continuously calling for all likeminded organisations and governments to increase the pressure on the South African government and economy. 112

Visits to and from South Africa. UDF patrons Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak invited US Senator Edward Kennedy on a factfinding mission in 1985 to see for himself the harrasment and repression suffered by blacks in South Africa, in the hope that he would organise some measure of pressure on the South African government from the USA. 113 The visit served to draw international attention to the Soutrh African Government's repressive rule, broadened the scope for sanctions and strengthened the UDF's international image.'" Mohammed Valli Moosa met with the United Nation's Special Committee against Apartheid in New York to put the UDF's case 15 while Allan 262

Boesak visited Australia and Desmond Tutu London with the same broad aim of mobilising support against the South African government."'

Sports boycotts. The UDF also launched an effort to isolate South African sport through an international sports boycott. The UDF sent reverend Arnold Stofile to New Zealand during June 1985 to meet with the anti-tour organisation, Halt All Racist Tours (HART) in an attempt to halt the planned All Black rugby tour." ? These type of tactics were aimed directly at the hearts of the governments' main supporters - white Afrikaners. The UDF attempted to disrupt that which was important to them, namely sport, in the hope that they may start to rethink their support for the government. At most, however, this was an underlying issue which was more of an irritant than a real reason for change.

Open letters and documents. At the end of 1983, the UDF distributed an "open letter" in Europe in which Inkatha, the Zulu party, and its leader Mangosuthu Buthelezi, were discredited as stooges of apartheid."' During August 1985 the UDF sent a document to foreign leaders, goverments and companies to bring the UDF's demands to their attention."' Memoranda were also prepared and presented to foreign diplomats and visiting groups such as the emminent persons group in March 1986. 120 This formed part of the UDF's efforts to concentrate foreign attention on what was happening in South Africa and to propagate its own role and position in the struggle.

3.2.2. Psychological tactics

Certain of the UDF's tactics were of a psychological nature and were aimed to undermine the government's actions by casting suspicion on its motives, to portray the government as immoral and evil and to attempt to gain the moral high ground at the cost of the government. This tactic entailed a "call to the whites" to open their eyes for the government's improper actions and to give wide publicity to emotional actions, such as the hunger strikes by detainees and to defy the ban on referring to Mandela and others in order to increase pressure on the government and to gain a moral victory. 263 a. Protest against the referendum

The UDF organised a so-called "People's Weekend" from 29 to 31 October 1983 to protest against the whites-only referendum (that the government laid on to test white reaction to the proposed new constitutional dispensation). 121 The UDF urged voters to reject the new constitution and not give it any legitimacy by voting "Yes", as it excluded blacks. The UDF's additional aims with this protest campaign were to protest against the Koornhof Bills as well as launching another mobilising initiative to broaden their support base. 122

Area committees in the Western and Eastern Cape, Natal and Transvaal worked together to link local and national issues and made an emotional call on whites to vote "No" in the referendum. During the People's Weekend various community gatherings were organised to protest against the referendum. 123 Resistance took the form of anti- referendum speeches, cultural events and all-night prayer vigils. 124

The ANC also urged people to oppose the referendum in order to nullify any mandate that the South African government may claim to have obtained from the white electorate to implement the tricameral constitution. It called on whites to vote "No" during the referendum. 125

Although the UDF did not inmeasurably influence the No-vote (the rightwing boycott of the referendum played a far greater role), the People's Weekend again played a major role insofar as it helped to introduce the UDF to more people - especially the tactic to address whites directly. The UDF's support continued to grow and UDF activists received another chance to practice organising a protest campaign, helping them to get their organisational set-up in place. b. Hunger strikes

Although the government released the majOrity of political detainees and prisoners, not 264 all were released at once. Those left in prison, organised a hunger strike which culminated in a nationwide campaign to get the hunger strikers released. Popo Molefe, the UDF's general secretary, launched an international campaign in support of the hunger strikers from London, broadening the protest greatly.' In the end, the government caved in and most of the last detainees were also released.

Honouring Mandela and others

The UDF launched a series of initiatives during October 1989 to, on the one side honour Nelson Mandela, and on the other side, to defy the government's restriction to even mention listed people. Mandela received the freedom of inter alia Tongaat (Natal)127 in absentia while a street was unilaterally renamed after chief Albert Luthuli, a former ANC president, in Stanger (Natal). 128

Religion-based tactics

Churches and religious organisations became natural instruments of mobilisation and organisation for the UDF whose channels for protest and resistance were increasingly limited by state action. The UDF, via religious organisations, tactically exploited religious meetings, services and activities as a mobilising opportunity. With this tactic, the UDF played on the conscience of Afrikaners in government and the security forces who were, on the whole, reticent to act against church leaders.

Funerals. During 1985 mass funerals were held in Kwa Thema, attended by 50 000 people, Cradock by 40 000, Port Elizabeth by 7 000 and Brakpan by 30 000. During these funerals the flags of the banned SACP and ANC were openly displayed in an effort to show their rejection of the government's authority. Funerals of unrest victims became the focus of a powerful psychological and political mobilisation effort until the state imposed a blanket restriction upon them. 129

Funerals further served as a symbol of injustice, to discredit the government and 265 security forces and to bind communities into the struggle. ANC, SACP and UDF flags were shown in defiance of the emergency regulations while slogans such as "Don't mourn, mobilise", was generally used. 13° During the latter stages of the emergency, when almost "open warfare" raged between township dwellers and the security forces, mass funerals became the norm. In certain flashpoint areas, like Alexandra in the Witwatersrand, a Mass Funeral Coordinating Committee (MFCC) was formed to organise these funerals. Speakers were smuggled through the police barricades and prominent UDF leaders such as Alan Boesak were regular speakers at funerals. 131

Vigils and prayer. In the Western Cape, the local UDF found a way around the stringent emergency regulations regarding public meetings to continue to register protest. Vigils were organised to show the community's continued will to resist. People in Athlone began burning candles during 1986 for one hour every Wednesday night in protest against the state of emergency and to show solidarity with the detainees. The idea soon spread to the rest of the Western Cape. Police, however, quickly acted against them, forcing them to put their candles out. In some cases, people were even arrested for "candle-burning". 132

Days of prayer were organised where the plight of detainees and hunger strikers, specific campaigns and other issues were highlighted while memorials were also held for activists killed by the security services.'

Refuge and sit-ins. Six UDF and NIC election boycott leaders avoided detention by taking refuge in the British consulate in Durban during September 1984. Although they were detained on their departure and indicted on treason charges, their presence in the consulate managed to raise tensions between Pretoria and London, eventually influencing South Africa's economic links with the international community. 134 Billy Nair, one of six involved, stated their reason with this tactic clearly :

"Our objective was to use the sit-in to demonstrate the iniquities of the apartheid system, particularly relating to detention without trial."135 266

3.2.3. Pro-active, attacking tactics designed to discredit the government

a. Tactics to protest against state security measures

Apart from the waging of campaigns of a political nature, as well as on the socio- economic front, the UDF also engaged the government directly" by opposing the string of security-related measures the government employed against the UDF and its affiliates. 137 Since the South African state first introduced its security legislation in the 1950s, over 25 000 people had been detained. The UDF's success and failures to adapt to, bypass and to implement new strategies in order to circumvent the security clampdown - which started in all earnest during 1985 - was extremely important. It had direct relevance on the UDF's abilities to continue its programme of protest and resistance, even in the face of severe security measures. This cycle of repressive security measures culminated in the declaration of the state of emergency on 21 July 1985. This first emergency, was declared on 21 July 1985. The emergency was a partial one and initially covered only 36 magisterial districts, situated mainly in the Witwatersrand, the Eastern Cape, and was later also extended to the Western Cape. These emergency powers of the state, amounted basically to martial law, and involved both the army and the police. They were given absolute authority to arrest, interrogate, detain, search homes, and confiscate possessions, declare curfews, close any property, regulate the news, and restrict access to any area defined by the regulations."' During the emergency, nearly 8 000 people were detained under the special detention provisions, while an additional 3 600 under normal security laws. Two-thirds of those arrested, were from the Eastern Cape, with the majority under the age of twenty-five. "Activists" as young as six years of age were detained. Of all those arrested, over two-thirds were activists of UDF-affiliated organisations."'

Within three months, the UDF and its affiliates had regrouped, adapted to the emergency by creating new structures, and political activity continued as before. The UDF called on its supporters to redouble their efforts to form resistance structures.' It was clear to the government that the intentions with the state of emergency had 267 failed. On Republic Day, 31 May 1986, the government announced a presidential amnesty - a six-month reduction in sentence for all prisoners except those convicted for political offences. Thousands of convicts were released with the majority black petty offenders with convictions for pass laws offences and such. The government had a sinister motive with this action. It was creating space in the prisons for a planned major clampdown on the UDF and other liberation groups."'

A second state of emergency was implemented during 1986. When State President P.W. Botha informed the nation on 12 June 1986 about the emergency, he stated that the government was pre-empting a major insurrection. The government had planned the second state of emergency carefully. The night before the announcement, the security forces raided black townships and detained thousands of UDF and other activists. By June 1987, more than 26 000 people had been detained. During a mere eight months of the second state of emergency, more people were detained than the total previously held for the past 26 years. 142 These measures constituted the most serious set-back that the UDF and its affiliates had suffered since its formation. The UDF, however, again amended its tactics. Those leaders who were not detained, for example went underground where they continued their activities. In time, the UDF emerged from this period and although hurt by security farce action, managed to continue their campaigns of resistance unabated as the security forces did not have the man power to keep all regions cowed. Campaigns against the emergency especially, became a continuous tactic." 3 b. Tactics against the states of emergency.

As mentioned previously, protest campaigns tended to blend into one another with regard to themes. Socio-economic and school protest campaigns, were invariably linked to national campaigns. They usually included demands that were linked to national UDF campaigns, for example to release the detainees and to end the state of emergency. This tactic was used to keep resistance going against the emergency, to reach as wide as possible to secure support for UDF campaigns and continuously to 268 broaden the struggle. The UDF launched a national campaign against the state of emergency which culminated largely in conjunction with their national rent boycotts, local consumer boycotts and school boycotts. The campaign against the state of emergency was also broadened as the ANC regularly published articles" to protest the emergency and also to call on the people to oppose and render the state of emergency ineffective. 145 Anti-emergency campaigns in various forms were launched from 1985 until the final lifting of the emergency during 1990. c. Campaign calling for the release of detainees.

Roughly 100 people were detained every month nationally after the implementation of the second state of emergency - a considerable increase in relation with previous years - under the detention sections of the ISA discussed previously. The pattern of detentions also changed. Before 1983, trade unionists as a group were the most severely affected by detentions, but after the formation of the UDF and its boycott campaigns of the tricameral parliament were launched, UDF activists and activists belonging to its affiliates formed the majority of those detained. During 1984, 33 UDF leaders were detained while another 15 leaders, belonging to UDF affiliated organisations like the NIC, were also detained. 146 This campaign became a continuous issue throughout the UDF's existence. Up to June 1985, only a relative small number of UDF activists were detained. After the declaration of the state of emergency in July 1985, many hundreds of UDF activists were arrested and detained. From this point on, the UDF waged a constant campaign against the detention of members, against the state of emergency and against treason trials.

The government was pressurised from abroad for its repressive actions. It therefore resolved to detain fewer people - or rather to appear to do so. In June 1984, the Protection of Information Act was invoked to restrain the press from publicising certain detentions, while detentions in the bantustans were disavowed by state statisticians. The UDF launched several campaigns to protest against state censorship."' From September 1983, police also began to intimidate and to harass activists. Fewer people 269 were detained under section 29 and rather held under section 50 of the Criminal Procedure Act which provided for criminal investigation in order to decrease the number of security detentions. Confessions were tortured out of detainees and political offences criminalised. This "hidden repression" affected 222 persons of 37 organisations surveyed during 1984 by the Detainees Parents Support Committee (DPSC). As no security legislation was used, there was no records of these interrogations. However, by mid- to late-1984, when the unrest started to escalate nationally, all attempts at subterfuge was dropped and section 29 was used to its fullest measures. 148

During March 1986 and 1987, the UDF organised a National Detainees Day. 149 The strategy behind this was to mobilise the population against the government's detention of activists and to show mass solidarity with the detainees. Two UDF-initiated committees played a central role in organising anti-detainee initiatives. The Detainees Support Committee (DSC) and the DPSC, in conjunction with the UDF, organised anti- detention initiatives throughout the 19805. 150

The UDF's strategy was to get the whole population and as many as possible sectors involved in protesting against the detention of activists. The families of detainees played a leading role through the DSC and the DPSC and called on churches, religious and community organisations and individuals to support the efforts to free the detainees. Tactics employed by the UDF and its affiliates included the holding of special prayer meetings, notes and letters of protest were sent to newspapers and to the government, and placard demonstrations were held at foreign embassies. Six UDF activists who escaped from custody and who seeked refuge in the British consulate in Durban in 1984, became the focus of the anti-detention campaign during 1984. The NIC, a UDF affiliate in Natal, published a pamphlet highlighting the plight of detainees and called on people to protest in the manner described above, and to join the UDF and the NIC. 151 A further crucial part of the UDF strategy, outside of getting their members released, was the tactic to inform their members and the outside world of the conduct of the South African government, hoping that foreign governments would bring 270 about pressure on South Africa. 152

The UDF strategy with the Black Christmas campaign of December 1984, was again a mobilising role, linked to a consumer boycott, to focus protest on fatalities and detentions during the uprisings which racked the townships since September 1984. Frank Chikane called on people to avoid parties during the festive season, and to rather have a low key, "Black" Christmas in solidarity with their suffering brethren. 153 During December the UDF organised vigils, distributed pamphlets calling for the release of detainees, and held protest rallies and services where the victims of the violence were mourned. The UDF did not achieve a great deal of success with this campaign as instructions were too vague and intimidation proved counter-productive. This campaign was, however, repeated every year. From 1985, the UDF had more success with this campaign by making it less restrictive to people's activities over the festive season and more of a exercise to show solidarity with the campaign against the emergency. 154 d. Campaign targeting the security forces

Because the SAP and the SADF were the government's main bodies of law enforcement, the security forces became the UDF's prime targets throughout the whole period of the UDF's existence. The UDF made no bones about the fact that they perceived the SAP and the SADF as their mortal enemies :

"[T]he SADF and the SAP are not our friends. They are our enemies. For they have declared war on an innocent people _ 11155

A further theme that the UDF stressed was that the security forces were the initiators and instigators of violence and that the UDF and its supporters were waging a defensive "war" :

"The Government tries to blame the people for the violence. But we are not 271

fooled. It is not the people who come with teargas, batons, bullets and caspirs". 156

The UDF's main strategy was therefore to show the world that although they strove to conduct a non-violent resistance campaign, they had no choice in reacting to the government's repressive actions with counter-violence in order to defend themselves. Although this was not strictly true, and the UDF was by no means blameless in the violence which racked the country, the government's actions in most cases, did cause peaceful demonstrations to deteriorate in violence. The UDF's tactics were therefore aimed to demoralise the security forces and to mobilise the general population against them. The SAP and SADF's violence ridden activities was therefore emphasised and they were depicted as murderers. Black policemen were especially targeted, depicted as traitors and many of them were killed by mobs in the townships. UDF affiliates and organisations supporting the UDF, like the Southern African Catholic Bishops' Conference (SACBC), played a crucial role in exposing the atrocities of the security forces.' The UDF's tactics entailed to target all aspects of the security force involvement targeted at the liberation organisations. This included black (mostly criminals) security officers who had been recruited by the state to take the lead in attacks against the UDF and its supporters. These included "special constables" 166 death squads and vigilantes (undercover attacks and intimidation of activists). 159 The government created a "third force" which employed a series of "dirty tricks" to neutralise those aspects of the UDF's initiatives that the state could not suppress through security measures, for example the UDF's popular support in the townships. By killing selected individuals, petrol bombing houses, intimidation, etc, these security force groups had a free hand to act against the UDF. The UDF's tactic to deal with these atrocities, was to expose these hitsquads (through the media). One example was the notorious Civil Cooperation Bureau (CCB) and the Vlakplaas group of Eugene De Kock. These efforts were, however, suppressed by the authorities and the true stories behind this campaign were only revealed during the TRC hearings in 1997.'60 272

e. Non - cooperation and symbolic protest tactics

The UDF strove from the very beginning of its campaign of resistance against the government, to obtain the moral high ground while simultaneously attempted to demonise the "illegitimate" South African government. A further tactic was to attempt to displace "illegal' government structures with "people's structures".

The UDF used specific themes that they were sure would raise emotions and put pressure on the government. If people felt strongly about certain issues, it is of course far easier to mobilise them for action against the authorities. The UDF therefore selected the themes of their protest campaigns with care to ensure maximum participation and support from their constituency and the general public. On the other side of the coin, by launching campaigns aimed at discrediting the government's reform process by showing that the broad community rejected it as a facade, the UDF aimed to pressurise the government into further reforms. The fact of the matter was that the moment the government started on its path of reform, it basically opened itself up to further pressure. The black community had had a hint of democracy and the UDF endeavoured to build on that emotion and to strengthen it through carefully organised campaigns. When the government backpaddled through stringent security legislation and repressive and violent suppressing of resistance, they basically further strengthened the resolve of the UDF and its supporters to resist.

Campaign against Republic Day - 31 May 1984. This campaign could also be classified as a trial run by the UDF. It was short in duration - only for the duration of the festivities around Republic day - and tactically it was aimed at addressing the government and white population directly. The UDF strove to show that regardless of the government's reforms, there was still a South Africa for Whites and another one for Blacks. 161 This tactic was also more of a sensitising exercise, with the UDF hoping to reach into the hearts of whites, rather than a real attempt to mobilise massive support. 273

Discrediting government officials. In the battle of propaganda and counter- propaganda, the UDF attempted to show that the UDF was in essence involved in a non-violent protest action but that the government's repressive measures, invariably led to violence. The UDF also questioned the government's commitment to reform, seeing their willingness to violently repress any protest action. 162

Another tactic of the UDF was to discredit prominent individuals within government. State president P. W. Botha in particular was targeted, comparing his government to that of the Third Reich. 163 In the months leading up to the September 1984 revolt, confrontation with the municipal administrations in the townships increased, spurred on by the UDF's municipal election boycott campaign. This campaign raised awareness and aroused opposition towards the councillors, whose subsequent behaviour, for example their corruption and nepotism in awarding liquor licences to themselves and family members, did little to dispel the communities' anger towards them. Widespread resentment against the local councils continued to build up throughout the winter of 1984. In July, during a "Don't Vote" rally, a call was made, for example, to boycott taxis and buses owned by local councillors. The UDF employed this strategy of discrediting the government - through its officials - throughout the 1980s. 164 As early as 1985, these MA's had largely collapsed 165 and by the late 1980s, the townships were virtually "no go-areas" for local Black officials.

Unbanning of the ANC and the release of political prisoners. The UDF's second national campaign, was launched during January 1987. The Unban the ANC Campaign', which kicked off during 1986, was a symbolic action which was largely aimed at restoring the morale of the UDF's supporters after the setbacks suffered during 1986. The UDF used the mainline newspapers by taking out an advertisement, calling for the unbanning of the ANC. Thousands of stickers and posters also appeared everywhere calling for the unbanning of the ANC. This campaign succeeded in bringing the UDF and its protest actions again under the attention of a wide audience. It also proved that the UDF still had considerable financial means at its disposal, and still received funds from abroad.167 274

3.2.4. Tactics aimed to build People's Power

The UDF's efforts to marginalise official state structures in the townships, saw the emergence of institutional structures of "organs of people's power". 168 The aim of this tactic was to create alternative avenues of democratic local government and a forum for popular participation in decision-making on national campaigns. 169 The division of many townships into various street, area and defence committees, the creation of civic associations and the like to replace the defunct local authorities forced onto townships by the government, created a situation where the state lost control of areas of traditional authority."° People's education, People's courts, and even People's parks and clinics, were formed."'

a. Street and area committees

The UDF originally endeavoured to increase the impact of its boycott campaigns with the implementation of a new form of grassroots organisation pioneered by Cradock activist Matthew Goniwe. Starting in late 1984, he organised the formation of street committees in the local townships. These street committees, however, only showed real growth after the implementation of the state of emergency in 1985, when local township dwellers were forced to organise themselves after the majority of the UDF's leadership was detained. The street committees provided local, low-profile leadership within neighbourhoods. They were highly resistant to detention and restrictions because of their widespread nature. These street committees also acquired legitimacy by taking over some of the collapsed local authorities' tasks, like for example organising street clean-ups. 172 The street committees also served as communications systems, an element that proved crucial in the success of the boycotts. The network of interlinked street committees, was linked to their local civic leadership through area representatives, making it easy to give commands to or to inform the community. According to Stone Sizane, a local organiser, "it takes an hour in a community of 20 000 for people to hear of a meeting or protest".1" 275

Street committees were also formed, partly, according to the UDF's Henry Fazzie, to overcome a "lack of communication between [the UDF and its affiliates] and the masses". 174 A further reason for the forming of street committees, was that local UDF leaders had trouble controlling the militant youth, who often ignored calls for non- violence during the consumer boycotts. By drawing them into these type of local structures, it was hoped that unilateral action by them could be prevented. The UDF hoped that street committees headed by elders, would ensure that the monitoring of boycotts would not rest in the hands of self-appointed, militant youth leaders.'

By 1986, the UDF had managed to organise the majority of townships in the country into a tight web of mass-based participatory organisations, organised in the street committee fashion. This structure largely formed the framework of future campaigns by the UDF. In certain instances, these street committees even attained a certain respectability and legality and began to establish a moral and political alternative to the collapsing black municipal authorities. In many townships, civics and youth organisations began to provide rudimentary basic services, and some instances, they even started to regulate crime through a system of "people's courts". 16 b. People's Courts

The people's courts formed by the UDF were part of a deliberate effort to replace the organs of the state and to transform political relationships.' People's justice, however, did not evolve in a cultural vacuum. It was shaped as much by traditional beliefs as by the ideological concerns of UDF activists - who rejected justice from a white/Western point of view. An Alexandra resident interviewed in The Star, described it as follows :

"A popular belief, deeply rooted in society, is that some problems in our townships are beyond the white man's law. Only the people's courts, guided by senior citizens, are competent to sit in trials. We do not understand why some white man's law should be applied in what are purely domestic affairs."' 276

The construction of an alternative system of justice thus appeared in many townships, stressing the widespread lack of confidence in the police and the state's justice system. 179 "People's volunteers" investigated crimes related to inhabitants' complaints, helped to resolve disputes and strove to build harmony and unity within their community. People courts were also meant to politically educate rather than to punish people. The UDF attempted to put the Freedom Charter stipulation of "The People shall govern", into practice by taking over one of the state's basic corner stones - its legal system. 18° Certain UDF-aligned civic organisations like the Atteridgeville-Saulsville Resident's Association (ASRO) in the Pretoria area, thus became the ultimate authority in the township areas. In many cases, however, the UDF's original idea behind and intention of these people's courts were corrupted after some of these structures were taken over by militants, and especially youths. These "kangaroo courts" began to inflict physical punishment on offenders in contrast with the traditional workings of the people's courts. 181 During the dark days of the states of emergency, these "courts" specialised in the conviction and elimination of so-called "informers", resulting in a number of people being "necklaced", especially in the Eastern Cape area. These activities by renegades, tended to politicise the people's court system and denuded its tactical impact for the UDF as it largely lost its social worth in the Black communities. It also forced the authorities to take strong measures against these structures, and through them, ultimately, the UDF.

UDF members were closely involved in these structures which were seen as a form of insurrectionary struggle and as a precursor of future, post-apartheid democratic organisation. 182 In contrast, for the state, people's courts were a barbaric instrument of intimidation and repression, used by township agitators to enforce the compliance of moderate township dwellers in sometimes unpopular consumer boycotts and other campaigns. 183 By August 1988, after widespread detentions and prosecution of people involved in people's courts, the head of the security police proclaimed that "so-called people's courts were almost totally eliminated".'"

These courts resurfaced from early 1990 in the wake of the state's relaxation of its 277 security measures. They were largely run by street committees and local-level youth groups. Especially the youth groups, which fell under the auspices of the UDF affiliated SAYCO, played a central role. Their brutality and summary sentencing of people, in many instances, however, embarrassed the UDF and turned certain communities against the Front.' c. People's Education

The entry of the UDF and its affiliates into areas of local government and justice, was matched and mirrored by a similar movement within the schools. Government response to the school boycotts at the beginning of 1985, did not satisfy the protesters and renewed school protests commenced in April 1985. The boycotts started in the Eastern Cape and by the end of the year, had spread to the whole country. Even among primary school students, a mood of protest emerged. The government's banning of COSAS in mid-1985, also had little effect on the unrest in black schools. New student organisations were swiftly formed to replace banned structures. The demands to reform schools also became irrelevant in the face of a new slogan that emerged during 1985, namely "liberation before education." 186

Parental anxiety because of the chaos within the school system, caused the formation of the UDF-affiliated Soweto Parents' Crisis Committee (SPCC) at a meeting called by the Soweto Civic Association (SCA). Similar crisis committees were soon established in many other regions. By December 1985, delegates from these committees, attended a national conference in Johannesburg. Prior to this meeting, the SPCC travelled to Lusaka to obtain the ANC's backing for a "back-to-school"-campaign. Although the parents wanted their children back in school, they asserted the right to assume responsibility for their children's schooling. The SPCC thus decided to implement a programme of "People's Education" in order to complement the emerging culture of "People's Power", 187 and to entice schoolchildren to return to their classrooms with a promise of a "struggle-orientated" syllabus. 278

People's Education could be linked directly to the education crisis that continued throughout the 1980s, and the broader socio-economic and political crisis in South Africa. The 1984/85 school boycotts, however, crystalised the idea of an alternative "black-orientated" curriculum and schools system. From this, the concept of people's education arose, which was inevitably coupled with the ongoing climate of resistance, and ultimately, formed part of the resistance against the system.'"

A second conference was held during March 1986, this time organised by the newly- established National Education Crisis Committee (NECC) and held in Durban. The NECC established a National Education Commission which had as goal to develop a new education policy within three months. The activists involved believed that the state was extremely vulnerable, thus the short time span allocated to the Commission. Zwelakhe Sisulu expressed the feelings of the NECC as follows :

"We are not poised for the immediate transfer of power to the people. The belief that this is so could lead to serious errors and defeats. We are, however, poised to enter a phase which could lead to the transfer of power. What we are seeking is to shift the balance of forces in our favour decisively".'

Throughout 1986, the NECC argued, in most cases in vain, for schoolchildren to return to school. They promised that this would exacerbate the creation of People's Power and the creation of a new system of popular education. After a NECC conference in March 1986, weekly "People's Education" classes became common in Soweto. School attendence was still uneven and when the authorities introduced a system of identity cards for pupils during June 1986, over 300 000 pupils again boycotted schooling. 190

The NECC was in a no-win situation. In order to implement people's power and an alternative, popular education, the schools had to be open. The NECC found itself in a difficult situation as they tried to assume some of the state's responsibilities, but without the power. Radicalised students, who had come to believe that the seizure of power was imminent, could see no reason to return to school under the old system. 279

The school boycotts from 1984 onwards, transformed schools and the education field into a leading sector of the national political struggle.The UDF initiated and supported protest campaigns while both parents and the community supported the students' demands. Boycotts, stayaways and protests by school children became one of the mainstays of UDF-orientated resistance against the state. This resistance spread so wide, that it was one of the main contributing factors to the imposition of a state of emergency in July 1985. By the end of 1985, the state had lost control of several schools with "Bantu Education" and further state reforms' legitimacy having been severely damaged. Students began to understand that a change in the school set-up was linked to a broader social transformation. Resistance by students and counteraction by the state intensified throughout 1986. COSAS was banned, affecting national student coordination. Nevertheless, resistance increased with 1986 named 'The year of no schooling". This came about through a widely-held view that students were prepared to sacrifice their own education in the more important fight against apartheid. 191

The concept of People's Education had a dual function. Centrally it arose from the need to resolve the crisis of school boycotts and to get the children back to school, but it was also a deliberate attempt to move away from reactive protest around education to develop a counter-hegomonic education strategy. It constituted a stand against the government, had propaganda as well as resistance value, and contributed to laying a basis for a future, post-apartheid South Africa. 192

People's Education represented a rejection of the apartheid-based Bantu Education. It had as goal a non-racial democratic future, it envisaged black control of and empowerment in the field of education, it strove to instill certain collective and creative values in the students, it called for new organisational structures to achieve these changes, and lastly, called for united action from parents, teachers, and students to support the implementation of these guidelines and community involvement to broaden the concept as a new education enterprise involving all the people in all spheres of I ife.193 280

The key features of People's Education, could be summarised as follows :

A rejection of Apartheid Education, which was education for domination.

An underlying assumption that education and politics are linked, and the struggle for change in both spheres cannot be separated.

It was both an educational strategy and a political strategy.

It was linked to other sectors - students were striving to attain a democratic education while their parents and the community had to strive to obtain national democracy.

It had to be controlled by and advance the interests of the masses.

It was intended to educate and empower all, not only school children.

It was intended to instill democratic values and stimulate creativity.

People's Education was intended to be a changing and dynamic process, with the longterm view of the post-apartheid era. 194

The demands pertaining to People's Education were discussed at an NECC conference in 1986, and an Education Charter Campaign was launched in an attempt to build and develop the concept. In late 1986, a National United Action Campaign was launched by the UDF, NECC and COSATU, aimed at exposing the effects of the state of emergency and to unite the people. Each organisation had to devise a programme of action in their specific field. Individual schools had to work out how to implement People's Education and how to take part in a national campaign, while 6 October 1986 was declared a day of National Students Solidarity. People's Education was thus linked to the broad initiatives protesting and resisting apartheid and the demand for a 281 democratic South Africa. 195

The struggle in the field of education, formed an integral part of the national democratic struggle for the UDF and its affiliates. It also became a fundamental part in their efforts to socially transform society. The concept of People's Education also emerged at the centre of popular resistance and organisation in the educational terrain. The NECC in 1986, however, strove to establish People's Power in the schools, rather than simply an alternative curriculum. At the heart of the project was the recognition that the real issue was the struggle to gain control of the state educational system by means of mobility and unity across all sites of resistance in education. The UDF, and the other liberation organisations, saw the national democratic struggle as the first phase of social transformation.

The state of emergency seriously disrupted the UDF and NECC as the majority of its leadership were detained. The momentum the education struggle built up during the preceding two years were seriously disrupted. Teacher organisations were also disrupted and the question of teacher unity receded. Teachers increasingly bore the brunt of an education system in collapse. Many new and progressive teacher organisations were formed during 1986-1987 which reflected the continued presence of localised dissatisfaction and militancy among teachers. New links were formed with the NECC. The role of the UDF and NECC was crucial throughout this whole period in the mobilising of resistance, organising structures and giving direction to campaigns. 196

3.2.5. Openly challenging the government through mass-based protest

During 1986 to1987, the UDF was under severe pressure in most parts of the country. The state of emergency was hampering political and protest activity while certain affiliates, such as the NECC, were decimated because of bannings and detention of leaders. The authorities had concentrated its most repressive measures on the UDF's strongest regions, notably the Eastern Cape and the Witwatersrand. Most of the 57 local affiliates were inactive, the majority of street committees had ceased to function 282 and even the student representative councils were inactive. The state had managed to get 45 local councils up and running again in contrast with the eighteen that had been running during 1986. The state felt that black opposition had been cowed for the time being and the army was largely removed and policing handed over to the municipal police. 197 In order to turn this situation around, the UDF launched two national campaigns, following one another, in an effort to mobilise support for a renewed resistance effort against the government. a. The United Action Against Apartheid Campaign

During October 1986 the UDF, in conjunction with the NECC and COSATU, announced the first national campaign, the United Action Against Apartheid Campaign.'" To counter state reaction, the details of the campaign were not spelled out precisely. The UDF ordered all its regional structures and affiliates to conduct local campaigns and to determine for themselves the form, issue and aim of their campaigns. The broad idea with this initiative was to create unity on local level between the different sectors, partly to heal the divide created by the actions of the comrades, and to make policing the campaigns as difficult as possible for the authorities. 199 The public meeting at the University of the Witwatersrand intended to launch the campaign was, however, banned by the authorities. The UDF launched a nationwide, ten-day-long campaign in its place. During this Christmas Against the Emergency Campaign, UDF supporters turned off their lights, burned candles, held vigils for detainees and sang Nkosi Sikele i'Afrika. This campaign was widely supported 200, even by disparate groups such as the National Soccer League and the National Taverners Association. In Soweto the campaign coincided with a consumer boycott of the Johannesburg central business district, the Black Christmas Campaign.' The aim of the boycott was to create a single non-racial municipality for the greater Johannesburg and an end to the state of emergency. The campaign was largely unsuccessful as it interfered with consumers' Christmas shopping, and lights were sometimes forcefully turned out against householders' wishes.' After a pitched battle between comrades and migrant workers from Lesotho in Soweto, when the comrades tried to force them to turn out their lights, 283 this part of the campaign was cancelled.

The UDF unbans itself

After being restricted for almost two years, the UDF decided to legalise itself during August 1989 as part of its nation-wide Defiance Campaign. 203 During January 1990, the UDF went a step further and decided to unban itself. The UDF leaders had been observing the state's softer approach towards political protest and decided to challenge the authorities. The UDF's acting publicity secretary, Murphy Morobe, stated :

"In what we see as a challenging period ahead of us we have decided to claim our rights, to engage in open opposition activity. X 204

Although the minister of Law and Order, Adriaan Vlok, threatened the UDF with action, nothing came of these threats and barely two weeks later, the government rescinded the bannings on all organisations. 2°

Defiance Campaign

In February 1989, the UDF formed an alliance with COSATU, calling itself the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM)206 and embarked on a Defiance Campaign which lasted for months. The UDF spearheaded the MDM's Defiance Campaign as part of a mass- based effort of civil disobedience to challenge segregated, government-controlled facilities such as schools and hospitals. 207 White hospitals were first targeted. On 4 August 1989, large numbers of blacks arrived at government hospitals, demanding treatment. To avoid confrontation, these people were initially treated. Whites-only beaches and swimming pools were invaded and whites-only busses boarded. In all, a nationwide campaign was launched to protest against racial segregation in all aspects of life. 208

It was also aimed to discredit the whites-only election which was sceduled for 6 284

September 1989. 209 UDF leaders, such as Murphy Morobe, Peter Mokaba and Moses Mayekiso, defied their restriction orders and played a leading role in organising these activities. During the course of the campaign, several people were arrested for public violence. The UDF/MDM, however, increased their efforts and the campaigns spread nationally.210 The ANC also called for an intensification of the Defiance Campaign and urged the people to participate in their masses. 211 Although the authorities still acted against protesters and restricted people who broke their restrictions openly 212, the intensity was far removed from previous years. After the election on 6 September 1989, which the government interpreted as a vote in favour of further reform, De Klerk called on the UDF/MDM to conduct their protest actions in an orderly and legal manner - indeed a far cry from government statements during the Botha era. 213

The Defiance Campaign's success could be measured against its ability to reconstruct popular resistance in a short timespan after the setbacks suffered the previous few years by the UDF. The targetting of segregated facilities was also a shrewd tactic, as most whites favoured the integration of facilities. On the whole, the government's "gentle" reaction to these activities and civil protest, also spurred people to join the protest in ever-increasing numbers, especially as the government indicated that it was quite willing to make concessions in certain areas. d. Conference for a Democratic Future

The UDF and its allies, as part of the anti-apartheid alliance MDM, held a Conference for a Democratic Future (CDF), during December 1989 in Johannesburg, in the face of emergency regulations forbidding mass meetings. The fact that the authorities let the CDF go ahead, illustrated to the MDM that victory was at hand. The CDF adopted a series of resolutions which laid the basis for a Programme of Action to unite the broadest possible front of anti-apartheid forces as well as the common people. It was also decided that the campaigns of mass defiance would be continued.' 285

Mass public meetings

The Defiance Campaign was accompanied by open-air mass meetings, which the authorities again seemingly allowed without disturbance. During September 1989, a meeting, however, got out of hand and the police killed twelve people in Cape Town. 215 This sparked a massive stay-away which was supported by approximately three million people nationwide. From this point onwards, the government was virtually powerless to stop these mass-based UDF public meetings and was forced to legalise such actions in order not to lose their remaining credibility.

Mass protest marches and demonstrations

After the UDF/MDM basically forced the government to legalise mass demonstrations, it became a regular part of their protest actions. These marches/demonstrations were usually linked to a specific topic. The march in Cape Town, protesting the ISA, was supported by about 35 000 people during January 1990. 216 During July 1990, tens of thousands of people marched in cities and towns accross South Africa at the end of the UDF's week of action against the violence in Natal. 217 This rolling mass action campaign saw a link-up between the UDF (MDM) and the recently unbanned ANC where they pushed their advantage to the fullest in order to exert maximum pressure on the government before negotiations started in earnest. 218

Occupation of land

The UDF launched a so-called Open Land Campaign and called on homeless people during July 1990 to occupy unused land and empty buildings. 219 This campaign was seemingly not cleared by the UDF with the now unbanned ANC and caught top UDF and ANC leaders by surprise. It seemed as if certain UDF leaders who felt marginalised after the ANC's sudden dominance of the political arena, wanted to regain their former prominent position as resistance movement. 220 Although the ANC in the end backed this UDF initiative "in principle", it never really got off the ground and represent one of 286 the UDF's poorer tactics.221 287

References : Chapter 5

1 T. Lodge and B. Nasson : South Africa : Time Running Out : All. Here. and Now: Black Politics in South Africa in the 1980s, p. 79.

2. Ibid., pp. 89-90.

3 M. Bennett and D. Quin : Political Conflict in South Africa. Data Trends, 1984- 1988, p. 44.

See chapter 4 for details.

Ibid.

Interview with Sandy Africa : United Committee of Concern Representative on the UDF Regional Structure (Natal) and Acting Secreatary of the UDF Regional Structure (Natal), 21 November 1997.

See chapters two and three.

UDF : UDF Interview with New Nation (Fourth Birthday Supplement), 1987, p. 1

Ibid., p. 3.

UDF : Interview with Murphy Morobe, UDF Acting Publicity Secretary, by Gavin Evans, 3 June 1986, p.3.

UDF : Interview with Azhar Cachalia, 1987, pp. 3-4.

UDF : National Working Committee Conference Report, 29-30 May 1987, p. 14.

UDF : The Secretarial Report to the National Executive Council of the UDF, 21 January 1984, p. 3.

For example Grassroots, Time for Action (UDF Pamphlet against busfares).

UDF : "UDF Says - Stop the Rugby Tour", 13 April 1985 and "Unbam the ANC Mass Meeting, 10 June 1985.

SASPU (State of the Nation) : August 1983, p. 14.

UDF Pamphlet : To community organisation, 1983, p. 21. 288

SASPU (State of the Nation) : August 1983, p. 14.

The million-signature campaign against the constitution mirrored the million- signature petition that had followed the drawing up of the Freedom Charter in 1955 - Lodge and Nasson : pp. 61-62.

UDF : UDF - The Million Signature Campaign : Sign. An Organiser's Handbook, 1984, UDF - The Million Signature Campaign : Sign. A Volunteer's Handbook, 1984, "Sign the UDF Declaration" and "Invitation to attend the UDF Million Signatures Campaign", 1984.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 60.

Interview with Ash Belford.

Ibid., p. 60.

Grassroots : Volume 5, No. 2, March 1984, p. 4.

Natal Witness : 7 June 1984, p. 24.

The final result of the campaign, however, in the end only yielded some four hunderd thousand signatures nationwide - Lodge and Nasson : p. 60.

Natal Witness : 7 June 1984, p. 24.

UDF : "Rural areas mobilise and organise", in UDF Update,Volume 2, Number 1, April 1986, pp. 8-9.

SASPU (State of the Nation) : February/March 1985, p. 9. and Financial Mail : 25 November 1984, Volume 90, No. 8, p. 49.

Grassroots : Volume 5, No. 4, May 1984, p. 3.

SASPU (State of the Nation) : February/March 1985, p. 9.

Die Burger : 23 December 1983, p. 11.

UDF : UDF Resolutions, 7 April 1985.

Cape Times : 30 June 1984, p. 11.

P. Frankel, N. Pines and M. Swilling (Eds.) : State. Resistance and Change in South Africa, pp. 205-215.

"Wage Campaign", 1986.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 1, Number 1, July 1985.

UDF : "Motivation for the Cost of Living Campaign", Nd., p. 1. 289

UDF : "We Stand By the People of Crossroads", 1984.

UDF Pamphlet : We Stand By the People of Crossroads, 1984.

SACC Pamphlet : Relocations : The Churches' report on forced removals, 1984.

New Era : Volume 1, Number 1, March/April 1986, p. 25.

Work in Progress : Numbers 50 & 51, October/November 1987, p. 54.

UDF : "Taking the Struggle into the Ruling Bloc", Nd.

Sechaba : December 1985, p. 2.

UDF : "Call to the Whites", May 1986 and "Call to the Whites - Join us Now", May 1986.

See chapter three for additional information.

UDF : "Call to the Whites - The present climate", May 1986.

Work in Progress : Numbers 50 & 51, October/November 1987, p. 55.

UDF : UDF National Executive Council meeting minutes, 21 November 1987.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 62.

Interview with Ash Belford.

Marx : pp. 139-141.

The Cape Times : 28 October 1983, p. 4. and Citizen :20 August 1984, p. 8.

Natal Witness : 14 August 1986, p. 3.

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 4, p. 33.

M. Bennet and D. Quin : p. 135.

UDF : UDF News, Volume 1, Number 2, October 1983.

Lodge and Nasson :p. 58.

UDF News (Transvaal) : November 1983, Volume 1, No. 1, p. 1.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 58.

Sunday Express : 11 November 1983, p. 13.

UDF National General Council : 1985, p. 16. 290

Cape Herald : 1 December 1983, p. 3.

Mayibuye : No. 4, 1980, p. 7.

Mayibuye : No. 1, 1984, p. 3.

See chapter 5 for full details of the campaign.

Mayibuye : No. 3, 1984, p. 1.

UDF : "Don't Vote for Apartheid", 1984.

UDF : "Don't Vote in Apartheid Elections", 1984.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 61.

UDF : UDF News (Transvaal), Volume 2, No. 1, August 1984, p. 1 and UDF News (Border) : Volume 1, No. 1, August 1984, p. 1.

Evening Post : 5 January 1985, p. 3.

UDF : "United Committee of Concern calls on the Coloured People - Stop Labour Party Now!", 1983.

UDF : Statement on the Apartheid Elections held on 28 August 1984 and related events", 1984.

UDF News : September 1984, p.2.

Beeld : 14 November 1984, p. 2. and Citizen : 29 September 1984, p. 15.

SASPU (National) : Volume 5, No. 5, p. 9.

Mayibuye : Number 4 and 5, 1988, p. 2.

Cape Democrats Bulletin : September 1988, p. 1.

Election Briefs. A JODAC Perspective :1988, pp. 1-4.

Five Freedoms Forum : July 1988, p. 1.

UDF : "Black Christmas - Nothing to Celebrate", 1984.

UDF : "Christmas Against the Emergency - Unity Pledge", 1986.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 3, November 1986, p. 1.

Bennett and Quinn : pp. 134 - 135.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 79 and Bennett and Quin : p. 136. 291

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 79-80.

Detainees' Parents Support Committee (DPSC) Pamphlet : Democratic Movement Under Attack, October 1985.

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 80-81.

A. Jeffery (Ed.) : Forum on Mass Mobilisation, p. 70.

UDF : "A Challenge to Foreign Governments, Foreign Business, and Organised South African Business", 2 August 1985.

Bennett and Quin : pp. 134-144.

tar : 24 August 1990, p. 1.

Interview with Dumisane Nkabinde.

UDF : "Assessment of the Three Day National Peaceful Protest", 1988, p. 3.

B. Nasson and J. Samuel : Education : From Poverty to Liberty, p. 29.

Ibid., pp. 27-29.

Bennet and Quin : pp. 30-31.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 66.

UDF : UDF Comment, Number 2, The Rent Boycotts, 11 August 1986, p. 1.

Ibid., p. 4.

Interview with Nava Pillay : UDF Secretary for the Pretoria Region, 22 October 1997.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 95.

Youthful activists who acted as the UDF's "stormtroopers"/enforcers and who engaged the security forces directly, became known as "comrades". In certain instances, the UDFlost control of these youthful "commandos" who committed several atrocities, including the murder of, in many instances, innocent township dwellers who were accused of being collaborators or informers, by the notorious necklace method.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 95.

Bennett and Quin : p. 152.

Interview with Reeves Mabitsi : Member of the Atteridgeville-Saulsville Residents Organisation, 22 October 1997. 292

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 95-96.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 96 and Bennett and Quin : pp. 146-147.

UDF : "UDF Statement on Foreign Investment in South Africa", 2 April 1985, Isizwe, Volume 1, Number 1, November 1985, p. 40 and Isizwe, Volume 1, Number 3, September/October 1986, p. 3.

Rand Daily Mail, 11 January 1985, p. 2.

UDF : 'The Gains for the Democratic Movement from the Kennedy Visit", 1985, P. 1.

Post Natal, 3 June 1984, p. 2.

The Star, 2 November 1984, p. 10.

The Star, 11 June 1985, p. 1.

Die Burger, 23 December 1983, p. 11.

UDF : UDF and the International Struggle, p. 49, and Sunday Tribune, 18 August 1985, p. 3.

UDF : "Selected Diplomatic Corps", 15 April 1986, "The British and European Community Governments", 21 July 1986 and "The Emminent Persons Group", 9 March 1986.

UDF : UDF News, Volume 1, Number 3, October 1983.

UDF News (National) : October 1983, Volume 1, No. 3, p. 1.

Cape Herald : 3 November 1983, p. 6. and Grassroots : November 1983, Volume 4, No. 9, pp. 6-7.

Lodge and Nasson : South Africa : Time Running Out, p. 60.

Mayibuye : No. 9, 1983, p. 1.

Citizen : 1 March 1990, p. 4.

The Leader : 20 October 1989, p. 4.

Vrye Weekblad : 27 October 1989, p. 2.

Bennet and Quin : pp. 9-10.

Journalist Solidarity Committee Bulletin : p. 2.

Citizen : 16 July 1985, p. 8. 293

New Era : Volume 1, Number 1, March/April 1986, p. 18.

UDF : "Rent Crisis - Day of Prayer", 14 February 1988 and "Memorial Meeting - Peter Nchabaleng", 22 April 1984.

UDF : "Call on British government to make representations on behalf of the UDF activists hiding in their consulate", 1984.

Die Vaderland, 14 September 1984, p. 4, Rand Daily Mail, 14 September 1984, p. 1, The Star, 15 September 1984, p. 1, The Citizen, 13 December 1984, p. 1, Sunday Tribune, 16 December 1984, p. 9.

UDF : UDF National Executive Council meeting minutes, 1986, p. 8.

These included : Public Safety Act (PSA) (No. 3 of 1953). This Act enabled the State President to declare a State of Emergency.

Internal Security Act (ISA) (No. 74 of 1982). In 1982, the government introduced the Internal Security Act (ISA) to streamline and consolidate existing security legislation. The ISA provided for the security of the state and the maintenance of law and order. The ISA superceded, and included major aspects of, the old Internal Security Act. The Act allowed the security authorities inter afia to declare certain organisations unlawful; outlaw meetings; prohibit the publication of certain newspapers and periodicals; restricted specific people from belonging to certain organisations; and outlawed the promotion of communism. The new legislation also included four sections providing for the detention of people deemed to be a danger to state security by the security police:

Section 28 - while not permitting interrogation, it allowed for indefinite, preventative detention.

Section 29 - an updated version of section 6 of the Terrorism Act. It empowered a police officer of the rank of lieutenant-colonel or above to detain for questioning a person the state believed was a threat to state security, had committed an offence endangering state security, or possessed information relating to the above. The detainee could be held indefinitely, or until he had answered questions to the "satisfaction of the police". Most detainees during the 1980s were held under this section, and extensive abuse, torture and killing of detainees took place.

Section 31 - empowered attorneys general to detain a person deemed to be a potential state witness. The government initiated several treason trials - which it did not really expected to win - and in so doing, removed several key UDF activists from circulation (for example the Delmas 14). Some of these trials ran for up to two 294

years, during which people were detained "to give evidence". The UDF used these trials to mobilise resistance against the government.

Section 50 - introduced a 14-day period of preventative detention. In practice, people held under this section, frequently were transferred to section 29 detention before the 14-days expired.

The government passed an additional series of security legislation to curb protest and resistance. This included laws restricting the activities of organisations, individuals and publishers :

Protection of Information Act (No. 84 of 1982).

Intimidation Act (No. 72 of 1982).

Demonstrations in or near Court Buildings Prohibition Act (No. 71 of 1982).

G. Moss and I. Obery (Eds.) : South African Review 4, pp. 141-142.

DPSC Pamphlet : Democratic Movement Under Attack, October 1985, p. 1.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 1, April 1986, p. 1.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 4, p. 142.

Ibid., p. 142.

UDF "End the Emergency", 1987 and "UDF Press Release" (on the state of emergency), 11 February 1986.

Sechaba : October 1985 and May 1987.

Mayibuye : Number 7, 1985 and Numbers 7 & 8, 1986.

South African Review 3 : p. 117.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 1, April 1986, p. 7. lbid p. 119.

UDF : "March 12 - National Detainees Day", 1986.

Grassroots : Volume 6, No. 2, March 1985, p. 6.

MC Pamphlet : The Story of the Consulate Six, 1984.

Sunday Tribune : 18 August 1985, p. 3. 295

Sowetan : 13 December 1984, p. 2., Grassroots : Volume 6, No. 11, December 1984, p. 1.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 3, November 1986, p. 1.

Counter Propaganda Committee Pamphlet : Dad, why are the soldiers here?, Western Cape, 1985.

UDF News, Volume 2, Number 4, 1985, p. 1.

British Council of Churches Pamphlet : Torture in South Africa. Recent Documents, 1983, and SACBC Pamphlet : Report on Police Conduct during Township Protests, August-November 1984.

UDF : "Comment on so - called 'special constables"', 22 September 1986, p. 1.

UDF : Azhar Cachalia, "Speech delivered at the FFF", Np, 26 September 1987, p. 11.

Star : 14 March 1997, p. 1, Beeld : 10 April 1997, p. 1 and Business Day, 11 April 1997, p. 1.

Die Vaderland : 22 May 1984, p.3. and Grassroots : Volume 5, No. 5, June 1984, p. 5.

Cape Times : 20 February 1985, p. 1.

P.W. Botha and his Gestapo regime, Daily News : 31 October 1983, p.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 66.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 1, Number 1, July 1985, pp. 1, 3.

UDF : "UDF Calls - Unban the ANC", 5 June 1986.

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 100-101.

See chapter 2 for the ideological background to the concept of People's Power.

UDF : Notes on National Working Committee's Conference, Valli Moosa's notebook, May 1986, p. 5.

Bennett and Quin : p. 104.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 1, April 1986, p. 16.

Work in Progress : Number 41, April 1986, p. 5.

State of the Nation : "Challenge of a New Phase of Struggle", October- November 1985, p. 13. 296

State of the Nation (Supplement) : "Eastern Cape Activist Speaks", October 1985, p. 14.

Weekly Mail :17 January 1986, p. 4.

Weekly Mail :20 June 1985, p. 11.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 2, June 1986, p. 10.

The Star : 25 April 1986, p. 1.

Work in Progress : Number 41, April 1986, p. 6.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 1, April 1986, p. 16 and Volume 2, Number 2, June 1986, pp. 10-11.

UDF : Isizwe. The Nation. Journal of the UDF, Volume 1, Number 2, March 1986, pp. 40-41.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 5, p. 119 and South African Review 6, p. 186.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 5, p. 119.

Moss and Obery : South African Review 6, p. 186.

Ibid., pp. 188-189.

W. Cobbett and R. Cohen (Eds.) : Popular Struggles in South Africa, pp. 155- 158.

Lodge and Nasson : pp. 83-84.

G. Kruss : People's Education - An Examination of the Concept, p. 6.

Z. Sisulu : "People's Education for People's Power", in Transformation (Durban), Number 1, 1986, p. 98.

Star : 30 October 1986, p. 1.

Kruss : pp. 6-7.

Ibid., p. 8.

G. Mashamba : People's Education. The People's Choice.

Kruss : p. 19. kid., p. 33. 297

E. Unterhalter, (et al) : Apartheid Education and Popular Struggles, pp. 121, 191-195.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 99.

UDF : UDF Update, Volume 2, Number 3, November 1986, p. 3.

UDF : "Campaign for National United Action - Unity Pledge", 1986.

UDF : "Campaign for National United Action - Declaration of Support", 1986.

Business Day : 1 December 1986, p. 1.

Weekly Mail : 12 December 1986, p. 5.

Vrye Weekblad : 18 August 1989, p. 3.

Sowetan : 18 January 1990, p. 6.

Beeld : 18 January 1990, p. 6.

Financial Mail : 4 August 1989, p. 42 and Vrye Weekblad : 4 August 1989, p. 5.

Video : The UDF's Defiance Campaign, produced by the VNC Collective, Cape Town, 1995.

Indicator South Africa : Volume 7, Number 2, Autumn 1990, pp. 22-28.

City Press : 27 August 1989, p. 11.

Argus : 17 August 1989, p. 1.

Mayibuye : Number 4, 1989, p. 3.

Cape Times : 16 August 1989, p. 3.

Argus : 13 September 1989, p. 3.

Mayibuye : Number 1, 1990, p. 7.

Argus : 13 September 1989, p. 3.

Die Burger : 30 January 1990, p. 2.

Sowetan : 9 July 1990, p. 4.

J. A. Du Pisanie (et al) : "Teoretiese, Historiese en Politieke Aspekte van Protesoptogte in Suid-Afrika", Journal for Contemporary History, Volume 15, Number 3, December 1990, pp. 41-43. 298

Daily Mail : 1 August 1990, p. 2.

UDF : Report and Decisions of the UDF National Executive Council meeting, 28 July 1990, p. 2.

Argus : 18 July 1990, p. 1, Natal Witness : 19 July 1990, p. 11 and The Leader: 20 July 1990, p. 3. 299

CONCLUSION

In retrospect, it may indeed be asked whether the UDF actually contributed to political change in South Africa. After reviewing the role played by the UDF in this thesis, it can be postulated that the UDF's role in organising, coordinating and leading the protest and resistance in South Africa did indeed hasten the final democratisation of South Africa.

When evaluating the factors relating to the success historians attribute to the UDF in shaping the road towards political change and democracy in South Africa, one need, however, to balance these factors against the UDF's failures, its strengths and its weaknesses, before a final conclusion could be made.

Therefore, the UDF's strengths will first be related to its successes :

The UDF successfully built up a mass-based organisation. Mass action formed the backbone of the UDF's resistance. It had a long history of being part of the political struggle in South Africa and has always been a strategy of the ANC. Since the UDF was dominated by Charterists, the mass-based approach naturally became part of the UDF's raison d'etre. Mass action also became important for the liberation groups because of psychological reasons. It was important for the people to see themselves as powerful and to create conditions beneficial to themselves in order to reach their goals. Because of the state's possession of a powerful military apparatus, liberation movements had to use that which was readily available to them - the people. By organising the greatest number of people, they were able to use them as weapon against the state.'

The UDF continued this tradition, only more effectively and in a coordinated manner which had not been matched by previous resistance efforts. The UDF's basic goals were to mobilise people and raise political consciousness in order to be in a position to maximise pressure on the government, in order to establish a democratic society. 300

With the UDF's formation in 1983, the character of mass mobilisation changed dramatically. Where the 1970s and early 1980s were primarily a period where a single issue - the school boycotts - formed the basis of mass mobilisation, this changed from 1983 onwards. The government's reforms, and in effect the future of the state set-up in South Africa, became the focus of the UDF's resistance and mass mobilisation. Mass mobilisation thus shifted from educational matters - where the youth were predominant - to wider political issues, involving a broader spectrum of the community.

The UDF had a strong and diffuse leadership. The UDF's leadership base was much stronger in depth than during the preceding decades of struggle. The result was that the government could not neutralise resistance quite as easily as in the past. During previous resistance initiatives, when the leadership core was detained, resistance tended to collapse. Because of the UDF's layered support base, it managed to continue protest and resistance unabated. New leaders emerged constantly from the grassroots and managed to continue the UDF's initiatives.'

The support provided by the ANC. The ANC provided both moral and logistical support to the UDF. This proved to be an invaluable element of the UDF's successes. The UDF was never an ANC front, although the ANC played an integral role in the UDF throughout its existence. Although the ANC did not control the UDF in any sense, it did play a major influencing role with regard to strategies, campaigns and other activities. This influence was two dimensional. Firstly, on an organisational level, the ANC had indirect influence on the UDF because of the logistical support it lend the UDF. For example, the funding for the launch of the UDF was provided by the ANC and smuggled into the country by its Intelligence Department. 3 Secondly, the UDF had to play the role of keeping the ANC alive in the hearts-and-minds of the masses. This happened through rhetoric, statements, the ultimate open acceptance of the Freedom Charter by the UDF, but more importantly, through ANC members within the UDF's leadership (including underground operatives who worked without the knowledge of the UDF's general leadership) on all levels. Apart from the obvious ploy not to provide the government with any evidence to act against members of a banned organisation, this 301 strategy was also followed to ensure that the UDF could include as wide a front as possible. The actual breadth of resistance that the UDF managed to create, would not have been so successful if the UDF had decided to operate as an ANC front. Even so, there was continual tension between the different ideological groups within the UDF. The Front, however, managed to overcome these tensions because of the wide base of its support. 4

The UDF had staying power. The UDF managed to continue with its resistance programme regardless of the state's repressive clampdowns. It had its high and low periods, but in the end, it adapted its strategies and tactics in order to counter state actions such as the states of emergency.

The UDF was a flexible organisation. The UDF was not a rigid organisation and accorded its affiliates and regions the flexibility to formulate their own tactics and broad approach to resistance.'

The UDF managed to extend its protest outside of the townships to the inner city and "white areas". The result of this was that the UDF's protest became visible to the community at large, leaving the government unable to contain the protest and resistance, in spite of its wide-ranging security powers.

The UDF managed to fulfil its strategic objective. The UDF's overriding strategic objective was "the realisation of a non-racial, democratic and undivided South Africa".' Specific strategies were formulated to address all the underlying objectives, such as the mobilisation of the masses, coordinating protest and pressurising the government.

The UDF's success of linking issues and sectors. When the 1983 Constitution came into force, a revolt broke out in the Vaal Triangle. The UDF stepped into the process and coordinated the longest and most widespread period of sustained black protest against white rule in South Africa's history.' The UDF managed, for the first time in the history of protest in South Africa, to successfully merge organised labour, students and 302 community groups, to protest in concert and to present the authorities with a united front. The UDF also managed to broaden the resistance nationally.

The UDF managed to evolve from protest to active resistance. Protest against the state during the early 1980s changed firstly from relative ad hoc protest action to a more organised form of protest after the formation of the UDF during 1983. Hereafter, political protest tended to be more goal orientated through local affiliates of the UDF, such as civic and related organisations. The focus of mass resistance also shifted from ideas spontaneously expressed, to mobilisation organised around material grievances. The masses increased their participation in community organisations, partly as a result of economic hardship, linking it to their political grievances. Their collective action increased the pressure on the government to a level never before experienced in the long anti-apartheid struggle. The state increasingly used more repressive measures to handle opposition. Opposition groups countered these actions by increasingly violent activities, generally forced upon them by security force actions. By 1985, the UDF and other opposition groups have largely managed to make parts of South Africa ungovernable, and to expose the government's inability to govern. Violent revolt was the result as a wider and more volatile constituency was mobilised which largely swamped the UDF's own structures set up to channel protest. To an extent, the UDF lost control of the cycle of protest and resistance it initiated. In the end, the government declared a state of emergency on 21 July 1985 to quell the unrest. 8 From here on, the UDF first had to survive, then it rebuilt its structures and began the process of engaging the state more directly. During the late 1980s, active resistance were the norm and reached its high point with the rolling mass action campaigns of 1989-1990.

The UDF exploited the security reform under F.W. De Klerk to widen and intensify resistance. When F.W. De Klerk became state president in late 1989, a number of fundamental shifts were immediately made to the state's security strategy, away from the "total onslaught" mentality and counter-revolutionary options of his predecessor, (with the emphasis to create a climate for negotiations), De Klerk liberalised security policy. This significantly lifted the pressure on the UDF while the MDM had relative 303 freedom to launch its final series of protest campaigns, before the unbanning of the ANC. 9

The UDF also displayed certain weaknesses which resulted in some failures :

A failure to transform mobilisation gains into a deeply-rooted organisational strength. The UDF managed to mobilise masses of supporters, but its basic organisational structures were uneven from region to region and it largely failed to incorporate its mass support in organised structures. This was partially due to the state's clampdown on UDF structures, but also to the unevenness of black demographics and the overwhelming up swell of grassroots support during the late 1980s. When the ANC was unbanned, the joint ANC/UDF leadership, however, filled this organisational need. 19

The question of violence. The ANC played a significant role in fuelling of violence during the campaigns conducted in the townships against black councillors and the tricameral elections. It openly advocated making the country ungovernable" and "advertised" the series of petrol bomb attacks on the houses of councillors as a concerted effort to destroy the government's organs of administrative rule. The ANC also called on the people (in effect the UDF, although the ANC was careful not to be linked to the UDF too closely at this stage in order to thwart state action against the UDF) to be ready to wage the greatest boycott campaign that the country has ever seen. The ANC linked the campaign against the tricameral system directly with the destruction of the community council system. 12 This atmosphere of violence raised by the ANC invariably influenced the activities of the UDF. The majority of UDF supporters also supported the then banned ANC. They read the ANC's newsletters like Mayibuye and in retrospect, even though the UDF called for non-violence during their campaigns, it was too much too expect for them to be able to conduct their protest campaigns without some of the more militant members being influenced by the ANC's continuous call for violence. This situation, coupled with severe state reaction, almost ensured that a majority of UDF campaigns ended in violence. 304

The UDF loses control of its youth structures. The economic recession which gripped South Africa during the early 1980s had a severe impact on the black labour force. Especially the younger generation was affected, with the percentage of

unemployed black youths increasing every month. By 1986, 70% of all youths under , 25 were unemployed. The UDF therefore had a ready-made group for protest available at a moments notice. The boycotts resulting from numerous education problems, had also hardened and trained youths in protest politics. The UDF therefore had to contend with a disillusioned, militant youth sector, and employed their "services" in stiffening up other community protest campaigns. By 1985, youths were involved on a regular basis with running battles with the security forces while their activities became increasingly more militant and violent. By 1985, the signs were already there that the UDF was losing control of certain of its youth affiliates, even though youths were playing an increasingly important part in daily protest politics." Their activities increasingly became difficult to control and by the late 1980s, caused the UDF being branded a violent organisation because of the youths' violent actions. The state, especially, used the youth's violent conduct in a propagandistic manner against the UDF.

When referring back to the introduction, the aim was to answer certain questions relating to the role played by the UDF as an exponent of mass-based resistance and protest in affecting change in South Africa. One can now conclude that the UDF did indeed play a major role in the democratisation of South Africa.

Between 1983 and the declaration of the state of emergency during July 1985, the UDF - through its broad strategy of protest and resistance and the various tactics employed to give direction and substance to this strategy - managed to pressurise the state as never before. The UDF's successes forced the state into such severe security measures, that it basically laid the groundwork for continuous resistance throughout the 1980s.

The UDF's successes and its high profile during the 1980's, was based on its ability to attract mass support and to mobilise this support into viable and sustainable protest 305 and resistance - the ultimate exponent of mass protest and resistance in South Africa's history of struggle for democratic rights for all.

Van Zyl Slabbert stated as early as 1987, that there was no doubt that the effectiveness of the mass mobilisation of the UDF managed to achieve a number of things which characterised the nature of the revolt that accompanied reform. Firstly, it located it as a struggle between an extra-Parliamentary executive (i.e. State President + SSC + Security Forces) and extra-Parliamentary opposition groups. Secondly, it forced the South African State to propagandise the ANC as the "vanguard" of the "total onslaught". Thirdly, it exposed the myths of apartheid and separate development as an ideological justification for white domination and fourthly, it totally exposed the "total onslaught" as a conspiracy of the securocrats to safeguard and enforce their power base. When strategically significant numbers of whites, and particularly Afrikaners, accepted that their future could not be ensured by continued minority domination, the tide largely turned in favour of the UDF and its allies."

The UDF's mass based strategies and tactics, in conjunction with the state's reform programme which unleashed major expectations among black South Africans, urbanisation, an increasing violent reaction to state repression, economical stagnation and a variety of direct and indirect issues, all played their role in ensuring political reform at last came to South Africa. Put simply, the South African government's options were neutralised in the face of an increasingly untenable position, largely orchestrated by the UDF's campaign of mass protest and resistance. The following quotation from Mayibuye, sums it up perfectly :

"The masses [were] central to the struggle for political power and for the transformation of society. This [was] the case because they [were] the victims of apartheid. They [were] the majority. They [were] the ones who [had] the most to gain from national democratic transformation. The struggle cannot be won by a few creative, skilful and heroic individuals. It must involve the masses throughout the length and breadth of our country, and at all levels of the political process. 306

It must combine the creativity of the masses with the abilities of the individuals

in leadership."' 5

The UDF, therefore, played a central, successful role in this spiral of political protest and conflict. During the late 1980s, the UDF had in many cases, in effect, taken political and ideological control of the townships, although they did not have the coercive control to turn townships into liberated zones in the true sense of the word. The state mistook township protest for revolution and reacted accordingly, although inappropriately. The states of emergency also only increased the levels of endemic violence. The use by the state of the states of emergency and special security legislation enabled the authorities to largely "bottle-up" resistance within the townships for much of the 1980s, but the state found to its cost that repression breeds radicalism and contrary to repressing resistance, the opposite occurred. 16

Without the crucial role played by the UDF to mobilise, initiate and coordinate resistance and protest during the 1980s, real democratic reform in South Africa, would not have occurred as soon as it did.

This whole era of the resistance struggle can be described as a period of action and counter-reaction. The government's reforms led to greater political resistance, which led to increasing repressing measures to counter this, leading to higher levels of political resistance, ad infinitum. The UDF and its affiliates and allies adapted their strategies and tactics continuously to counter increasingly repressive measures by the state. This cycle of violence continued to spiral until a state of near anarchy was reached at the end of 1988. The state realised that the economy could not survive such a state for far longer, while the UDF, and ANC, realised that although they had largely managed to make the country ungovernable, they did not have the capability to take over the government by force. The UDF's broad strategy was also not to take over the government, but to force the government into real reform. By the end of 1988, it was clear that a stalemate had been reached. A new approach had to be considered by both opposing camps. 307

Although the UDF started this phase in a disorganised way, almost leaderless and under severe pressure from the state's security forces, it entered 1990, rejuvenated with a series of successful campaigns against the government under their belts. The UDF had come a full circle. It started out in 1983 with great successes, managing to mobilise the greatest anti-apartheid front the struggle for democracy in South Africa has ever seen. During the mid-1980s, the state hit back with the most severe repressive measures ever employed against its opponents. The tide turned however, when the securocrats lost their power base in government and real reform started, belatedly after seven years of violence and resistance from the UDF and its affiliates and allies. With the unbanning of the ANC and the release of Nelson Mandela, the UDF had largely succeeded in its goals.

During 1990, the UDF functioned as an entity but also part of the broadened anti- apartheid alliance which included the ANC and other unbanned organisations. It helped to establish ANC structures, in many instances local UDF structures became ANC structures. The majority of the UDF's leadership was smoothly incorporated within the ANC's newly formed structures while the ANC took the lead in the mass action campaigns previously organised by the UDF. 17 During a conference held on 1 and 2 March 1991, UDF delegates representing its regions and affiliates met to decide on the future of the UDF. The decision was finally made, after a debate which started as early as December 1990, that a new broad democratic front led by the ANC and incorporating all former UDF structures and affiliates, be formed to take the struggle to its conclusion. 18

On 4 March 1991, the UDF's leaders announced the disbandment of the front, bringing to an end the most successful era of mass based protest and resistance against the apartheid state. 308

References : Conclusion

A Jeffery : Forum on Mass Mobilisation, pp. 43, 53, 75.

Interview with Pete Richer : ANC underground intelligence operative, Department of Intelligence and Security, based in Botswana, 1976-1985 and Zimbabwe, 1985-1991, 5 August 1997.

Richer himself, was responsible for smuggling in the money to pay for the launch.

Interview with Pete Richer.

UDF : "The Secretarial Report to the National Executive Council of the UDF", Np, 21 January 1984, p. 3.

UDF : "UDF Working Principles", Adopted by the UDF National General Council, Np, 7 April 1985, p. 1.

Lodge and Nasson : p. 65.

Marx : pp. 151-163.

Sunday Star : 4 February 1990, p. 2.

UDF : "The State of the Nation. The People's Camp : Strengths and Weaknesses", Np, 1990.

Mayibuye : No. 8, 1984, p. 1.

Mayibuye : No. 3, 1984, p. 2.

Frankel, et al : pp. 218-220.

F. Van Zyl Slabbert : The Dynamics of Reform and Revolt in Current South Africa, IDASA Occasional Paper Number 9, May 1987, pp. 1, 4.

Mayibuye : Volume 1, Number 1, July/August 1990, p. 4.

M. Hall., p. 67.

Mayibuye : Volume 2, Number 3, April 1991, pp. 7-8.

Business Day : 4 December 1990, p. 4. 309

SOURCES

Bibliographies

B6HMER, E.W. Left-Radical Movements in South Africa and Namibia, 1900 - 1981. A Bibliographical and Historical Study. Volumes 1 and 2. 1986.

List of South African Newspapers, 1800 -1982. State Library Pretoria, 1983.

List of South African Newspapers, 1983 - 1990. State Library Pretoria, 1991.