MILITARY INTELLIGENCE PB 34-05-3 Volume 31 Number 3 July-September 2005

Staff: FEATURES Commanding General 10 OIF II: Intelligence Leads Successful Counterinsurgency Operations Major General Barbara G. Fast by Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, Colonel William J. Tait, Jr., Deputy Commanding General, and Major J. Michael McNealy Reserve Component Brigadier General Edward A. Leacock 16 Wartime “2”: Ultimate Duty for an MI Ofﬁcer Deputy Commandant for Futures by Colonel William “Jerry” Tait, Jr. Mr. Jerry V. Proctor Deputy Commander for Training 20 Teach, Coach, and Lead: Our Responsibilities as Intelligence Colonel Kevin C. Peterson Leaders to Develop Future Leaders Director, Directorate of Doctrine by Colonel Keith G. Geiger, Lieutenant Colonel Orlando W. Ortiz, Colonel George J. Franz and Major J. Michael McNealy

23 Challenges in Recruiting Military Intelligence Warrant Officers MIPB Staff : by Chief Warrant Officer Three Stephen Beckham Managing Editor Sterilla A. Smith 26 Defining the Role of the Warrant Officer Design Director by Chief Warrant Officer Five Michael Guzy Sharon K. Nieto Design and Layout Team 32 Focusing on the Critical, Not the Urgent SGT Ivan M. Rivera by Jack Kem, Colonel (Retired) SPC Hala H. Ereifej Cover Design: 36 Leading the Light Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s Military SGT Ivan M. Rivera Intelligence Company Issue Photographs: by Captain Jerry Moon Courtesy of the U.S. Army 38 Indications and Warning Post 9/11: Analyzing Enemy Intent by Scott Swanson Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelli- gence Center and Fort Huachuca 41 Military Epistemologies in Conflict (USAIC&FH) publishes the Military by Major David W. Pendall Intelligence Professional Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the provi- sions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents 50 Effects–Based Targeting at the Brigade information designed to keep in- by Captain Kyle Teamey telligence professionals informed of current and emerging develop- DEPARTMENTS ments within the field and provides an open forum in which ideas; con- 2 Always Out Front 62 Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes cepts; tactics, techniques, and pro- 4 CSM Forum cedures; historical perspectives; 64 Contact and Article problems and solutions, etc, can be 8 Technical Perspective exchanged and discussed for pur- Submission Information poses of professional development. 55 Training the Corps Inside Back Cover Disclaimer: Views expressed are 59 Language Action MI Memorial those of the authors and not those of the Department of Defense or its elements. The contents do not nec- By order of the Secretary of the Army: essarily reflect official U.S. Army Official: positions and do not change or su- persede information in any other U.S. Army publications. SANDRA R. RILEY PETER J. SCHOOMAKER Contact Information for MIPB is on page 64. Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff 0531401

July - September 2005 1 Always Out Front by Major General Barbara G. Fast Commanding General, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca

Leadership Development in Military Intelligence: Mentorship

The Importance of Mentorship dum, Leaving a Legacy Through Mentorship, 14 July As a lieutenant colonel, I wrote an article for MIPB 2005, General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff of entitled, Mentorship: A Personal and Force Multipli- the Army, restated the idea that: er. With the Army fully engaged in combat operations There are many honorable ways to leave in Iraq and Afghanistan, I fi rmly believe that the con- a legacy; our focus for 2005 is on leaving cept of mentorship is even more important today than a legacy through mentorship. Mentorship it was then, as intelligence plays such a critical role is an extremely powerful tool for personal and professional development; it improves in current operations. As our operations tempo has technical and tactical competence, leadership increased, and we fi nd ourselves busy with immedi- skills, self-awareness, and morale. The ate requirements and missions, it is critically important Army’s defi nition of mentorship is the that all leaders make the time to develop their subordi- voluntary developmental relationship that nates and to mentor the next generation of intelligence exists between a person of greater experience leaders. and a person of lesser experience that is characterized by mutual trust and respect. For some, the mentor is an individual who was infl u- ential in our lives: a coach, a teacher, a military super- Characteristics of Mentorship visor, or role model. For others, it may be the concept There are several characteristics that form the ba- of a general offi cer or a sergeant major who brings sis to the mentor-protégé relationship. Such a rela- “chosen” subordinates up through the ranks guiding tionship may have both career and psychological them towards the “good jobs” to achieve promotions. aspects to it. The career aspect of mentorship in- Senior leaders must be a guiding force, building com- volves sponsorship of the protégé. The mentor pro- bat experienced junior Soldiers into the leaders for our vides the protégé exposure and visibility. This might future MI Corps. be done by involving the subordinate in briefi ngs and meetings, or allowing the individual to accompany Mentorship in the military has enjoyed mixed suc- the mentor to conferences and other events. Men- cess as leaders and institutions have struggled to tors help their protégés fi nd challenging assignments defi ne and formalize it. In 1985, General John C. which will allow them to progress in their careers. Wickham, Jr., then Chief of Staff of the Army, pub- Most mentors are in a position to know what types of lished a White Paper which designated “Leadership” assignments and actual operational experience are as the Army Theme of the Year. In the paper, he out- right in terms of career and personal growth. This is lined eight principles which established a framework not to imply that Army leaders make sure the best for building more effective leaders. His fi rst principle jobs are given to a select few; the individual’s job per- challenged every leader to be a mentor to subordinate formance and demonstrated potential, as written in Soldiers. The idea was that sharing your knowledge the formal evaluation by supervisors, are the basis of and leadership would be the greatest legacy that you the promotion. Where mentors play an infl uential role could leave to your subordinates and the U.S. Army. is in helping their protégés help themselves to suc- That is still a vital theme for us today. In his memoran- ceed, not in causing success.

2 Military Intelligence Throughout the re- the Army. They are relationship, the mentor spected by their peers, coaches the protégé. possess the requisite The mentor provides knowledge of the Army, advice and construc- have proven them- tive criticism, working to selves during times of maximize the protégé’s crisis and operational strengths and minimize challenges, and main- weaknesses. Some of tain a network of re- this is done through sources. Mentors who sharing experiences, meet these criteria are but frank and honest not threatened by their discussions and obser- protégés’ potential to vations are at the heart equal or surpass them of the relationship. The in there careers. protégé must feel able to freely discuss personal and professional dilem- Mentorship in Military Intelligence mas as the mentor provides opportunities for gaining The need to work with subordinates in order to pro- knowledge, skills, and competence. fessionally and personally develop them is particularly important in Military Intelligence (MI). Our career fi eld Another characteristic of mentorship is psycholog- does not have a single career pattern for success; we ical. This consists of role modeling, counseling, and have multiple specialty areas which collectively cre- acceptance and confi rmation of the protégé. Mentors ate the MI fi eld. Each offers different operational and lead their protégés, not just professionally, but person- leadership opportunities. The types of jobs in which ally. The mentor lets the protégé see how they lead we serve vary greatly in scope and the types of knowl- and make decisions. Mentors impart values, moral edge required. A senior MI leader can be benefi cial in and ethical responsibilities, and standards of conduct helping MI Soldiers sort through personal professional by which they live. development needs and working to establish career Mentor-protégé relationships are geared toward the and personal goals. It is even more critical to have a longer term. This permits true development of the pro- coach in certain assignments such a battalion S2, who tégé. Working together, they develop a career path operates outside of the sanctuary of an MI unit. Here, which incorporates schooling, assignments, profes- where individuals are normally more junior yet have sional development, operational experience, and how signifi cant responsibility, a coach can be instrumental to balance a career with one’s personal life. to the success of both the individual and the operation It should be apparent that there are differences be- as whole. tween being a leader and being a mentor. Most of us MI must use mentorship as an important tool to pro- will be leaders at one time or another or nearly always. vide the best professionals possible. Leading and Leaders develop coach, advise, and motivate subordi- mentoring are more important than ever before as nates as an important part of their duties. This is part our Soldiers, noncommissioned offi cers, and offi cers of normal professional development and should not be fi ght the Global War on Terrorism. The complexities, confused with mentorship. The rater-ratee relationship shortened decision cycles, and demands placed on is an example of this type of leadership. From this pro- the Intelligence Community have increased the roles fessional interaction, the special chemistry that can be for senior leaders in shaping junior leaders for suc- found in a formal mentoring relationship can develop. cess. Even though technology allows us to provide un- So what does a mentor look like? A mentor, in the precedented intelligence support, the ability to think traditional sense, is usually 8 to 15 years older than critically, analyze, synchronize and fi ght Intelligence, the protégé. This translates to someone who is at least Surveillance, and Reconnaissance—all higher-level two ranks senior. Normally, mentors are successful skills—is imperative to success in the current operat- and upwardly mobile, enjoying high rank or position in ing environment. ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

July - September 2005 3 CSM Forum

This quarter’s CSM Forum highlights critical events and contributions made by the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps’ senior noncommissioned ofﬁ cers (NCOs). From its inception in 1987, the MI Corps Command Sergeants Major (CSM) have taken the responsibility and the lead in ensuring that all MI soldiers were trained to meet the intelligence missions.

CSM Robert H. Retter —July 1987 to February 1989 Driving force behind the development and implementation of the Operations and Intelligence (O&I) Course. Noncommissioned Ofﬁ cers Academy (NCOA) is established on 1 July 1987, consolidating all MI Advanced Noncommissioned Ofﬁ cer training at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Develops and implements the Pre-Assignment Course for all MI CSM and SGM.

CSM David P. Klehn —February 1989 to January 1991 Training is developed to provide prescriptive tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for Intelligence personnel involved in the Department of Defense (DOD) Counter Narcotics Program. Leadership Assessment Development Program is implemented in the NCOA based on a Program of Instruction (POI) developed by the Sergeants Major Academy. Changes come to Career Management Field (CMF) 33, Electronic War- fare/Intercept (EW/I) Systems Maintenance. Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) 33P10 EW/I Strategic Receiving Subsystems Repairer and MOS 33Q10 EW/I Strategic Processing and Storage Subsystems Repairer are consolidated into MOS 33Y10, EW/I Strategic Systems Repairer in October 1991. Changes come to CMF 96. MOS 96U, Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Op- erator, is created. MOS 96H, Aerial Intelligence Specialist is restructured to Ground Station Module (GSM) Operator for Joint STARS. The UAV platoon is deployed to the CENTCOM AOR.

4 Military Intelligence Contributions to the Military Intelligence Corps through NCO Support

CSM James A. Johnson —January 1991 to July 1993 MOS 97L, Translator/Interpreter, is created for Army Reserve Compo- nent (RC) linguists. The Language Working Group is established at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Doctrine for the handling of Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) is revised. Revolution in MI: Doctrinal and training focus moves to low intensity and regional confl ict. Emphasis in the disciplines shifts from Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) to Human Intelligence (HUMINT). MI training courses are transferred from Fort Devens, Massachusetts, to Fort Huachuca. The UAV Task Force is established to coordinate all UAV issues for Fort Huachuca; UAV master plan is developed to serve as a guide for a national UAV training center. The NCOA is accredited. The newly built NCO academic complex is dedicated. CSM Robert T. Hall —July 1993 to January 1995 The All Source Analysis System (ASAS) is fi elded. ASAS training is incorporated into selected Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and Basic Noncom- missioned Offi cer Courses (BNCOCs). The Army Family Team Building Program is implemented. MOS 97L, Translator/Interpreter, created for Army Reserve Component (RC) linguists. Environmental Awareness training is added to the BNCOC Common Core. More emphasis is placed on language skills in the BNCOC and Advanced NCO Courses. Changes come to CMF 98. MOS 98D, Emitter Locator/Identifi er, is merged into MOS 98H to become MOS 98H Morse/Non-Morse Communications In- terceptor/Locator.

July - September 2005 5 CSM Randolph S. Hollingsworth —January 1995 to April 1998 Assisted in establishing and selecting the fi rst G2 SGM for the Army. The Intelligence XXI Vision is implemented wherein with the concepts of the commander drives intelligence, tactical tailoring, split-based operations, intelligence synchronization, and broadcast dissemination are emphasized. MOS 96B, Intelligence Analyst, is identifi ed as the “fl agship” MOS in In- telligence Training XXI. There is intense evaluation and design to create “Cradle-to-Grave” training strategies to train 96Bs in all aspects of the 21st century battlefi eld. All MI MOSs undergo Cradle-to-Grave studies to review training methods and POI content, eliminate redundant training, and ensure that all training builds upon previous training. Implemented the Sergeant Audie Murphy Club and the Dr. Mary Walker Programs. Reinstated the Post Soldier of the Year and NCO of the Year Recogni- tion Programs.

CSM Lawrence J. Haubrich —January 2001 to December 2005 Developed selection criteria for the MI branch to ensure high quality and combat veteran NCOs were assigned as instructors to the NCOA and the MI Initial Military Training at USAIC and Fort Huachuca. Brought lessons leaned from Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM and Guantanamo and integrated them into POI. Pursued the approval of bonuses for critical MI MOSs, thus ensuring recruitment and retention of critical skills and specialities in the MI Corps to include the UAV External pilots. Spearheaded campaigns for the Combat Action Badge to be awarded to all combat support and combat service support MOSs when the badge was ﬁ rst introduced and the Global War On Terrorism Expeditionary Medal

I wish to thank Lori S. Tagg, Command Historian, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca and CSM (Retired) Randolph S. Hollingsworth for their research. —The Editor.

6 Military Intelligence CSM Scott C. Chunn —April 1998 to January 2001 NCO training is dramatically revised based on the Cradle-to-Grave studies. The primary focus shifts from Common Leader training to advanced MI technical training. Thirteen MI MOS speciﬁ c courses are established. The NCOA is chosen as the test bed for the new Common Leader training. The POI developed and validated during the pilot program conducted at Fort Huachuca would be used at 88 NCOA. The intelligence companies of the Initial Brigade Combat Teams (IBCTs) begin Cadre/Cohesion, Operational Readiness Training (COHORT) at Fort Huachuca. CMF 98 is restructured. The restructure includes the creation of MOS 98H (Hybrid) to replace MOS 96R, Ground Surveillance Systems Opera- tor, and to eventually become MOS 98M Multi-Functional Collector.

to be awarded to all service members stationed at Guantanamo Bay and Co- lombia, South America. Instrumental in the critical assignment of UAV personnel to ensure qualiﬁ ed soldiers went to Hunter UAV units. Created a tracking process for Hunter Opera- tors upon graduation; ensured 3 to 6 students remained for the External Pilot course to maintain the External Pilot strength. The Tactical UAV (Shadow 200) platoon trains and deploys directly from Fort Huachuca to the CENTCOM AOR. Instrumental in the restructure of the NCOES.

ALWAYS OUT FRONT!

July - September 2005 7 Technical Perspective by Chief Warrant Ofﬁ cer Five James J. Prewitt-Diaz U.S. Army Military Intelligence Corps

A Warrant Offi cer is not a Warrant Offi cer is not a Warrant Offi cer . . .

Just as our Army is changing to meet future threats, they possess the ability to learn, the eagerness to tack- the Warrant Offi cer (WO) Corps is changing to meet le challenges, and the potential to contribute to the Ar- the requirements of the transforming Army. Many ac- my’s mission as an offi cer, leader, and technician. tions and initiatives have been instituted to fi x, improve, Of course everyone remembers the way it used to and ensure the long—term health and relevance of the be. Twenty-fi ve years ago the Army accessed WO1s WO Corps. The Army’s transformation demands that from senior noncommissioned offi cer (NCO) ranks who our leadership take proactive actions to ensure that the had well over 10 years in the service. The expectation WO cohort remains as a viable portion of our Army. was that the more senior the NCO, the more experi- In almost every briefi ng regarding the WO program ence that individual would bring to the WO ranks. This that I attend there are recurring obsolete ideas about WO did not require training because he brought exper- what a WO should be. These outdated opinions are tise gained from a long career in the NCO ranks. The nested in the past but unfortunately continue to remain problem was that a WO accessed under this sys- appear and must be clarifi ed before effective future tem often reached retirement age as a Chief Warrant change can occur. My intent and purpose of this col- Offi cer Two (CW2) or CW3. The Army could only keep umn is to set the record straight on two of the most a WO under this system for 6 to 8 years of WO ser- pervasive misconceptions regarding WOs. The fi rst is vice before the offi cer made the decision to retire. This that a Warrant Offi cer One (WO1) is an expert and the practice compounded the senior WO shortages that we second is that a WO1 is interchangeable with senior have today. WOs. In order to obtain more WO service years and to fi x Myth: The WO1 is an Expert the shortage of senior WOs, the Army has started to ac- The philosophy that an individual, upon cess WO at the fi ve to eight years in service. Although appointment to WO1, is fully technically there are concerns about the lack of technical exper- competent is not valid. The latest release tise from this younger accessions, the fact of the mat- of the DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned ter is that no less than fi ve WO studies have concluded Offi cer Professional Development and that younger accessions is the logical approach to fi x- Career Management, dated 14 October ing several of the challenges faced today. The Army 2005, describes a WO1 as an “entry” lev- has made a conscious decision to invest in the future el offi cer. Today’s WO1s are accessed by accessing WOs earlier and allowing them to grow younger in their careers with an average into CW4s or CW5s before retirement age. So, the new of two assignments (one being in com- WO1s do not have the experience base that a WO1 ac- bat). They are chosen for the WO program, not be- cessed in the 1980s had—they are not supposed to, cause they have a vast experience base, but because they are not experts.

8 Military Intelligence Myth: A WO1 is interchangeable In conclusion, a WO is not a WO, is not a WO. WOs with a CW3/4 differ in levels of experience (indicated by rank), education, and specialty. The progression to positions of Another misconception is that since greater responsibility commensurate with grade, edu- a WO1 is an expert, he is thus inter- cation, training, experience, and seniority is as valid changeable with a CW3 or CW4. This for the WO as it is for the commissioned offi cer. The erroneous belief permeates our Army assumption that grade is interchangeable in WO po- culture and stems from the time in the sitions, regardless of echelon and the qualifi cations 1960s and 1970s when Army force required, results in misuse and a waste of personnel structure documents specifi ed all war- resources and the expertise gained as the result of rant offi cer requirements as “WO”; that years of training and experience. It is also detrimental is, not graded. Up to that point, WO po- to the morale of the WO Corps and mitigates incentive sitions had not been graded because to improve professionally. the methodology had not been developed to determine the differences between positions based on skill, experience, authority, and responsibility. Although this management system provided signifi cant assignment and utilization fl exibility, it also permitted the poor distribution, ineffi cient employment of skills and experience, and did not document career progression.

Since the 1966 Warrant Offi cer Career Program Study, thirteen related studies have concluded that WO position identifi cation should be stated in terms of grade required in addition to specialty. In 1984, the Total Warrant Offi cer Study (TWOS) recommended the grading of WO positions as W1 and W2 to be at the junior level, and W3 and W4 to be senior level positions. TWOS refi ned the position grading methodology and was in fact the fi rst comprehensive grading effort based on skill, experience, authority, and responsibility. These fi ndings were later validated by the Army Development System (ADS) XXI in 2002 and later the Army Training Leadership Development Panel (ATLDP) in 2004 and further recommended the assignment of WOs by grade.

The advantages of position grading are that it provides clear upward progression and utilization of skills and provides commanders with a positive indication of experience level. In addition, grading more accurately reﬂ ects Army requirements, reduces assignment sub- jectivity by establishing a degree of experience, and provides a more equitable distribution of experience.

“Remember the past but look to the future”

July - September 2005 9 OIF II: INTELLIGENCE LEADS SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCYCOUNTERINSURGENCY OPOPERATIONSERATIONS

by Lieutenant General Thomas F. Metz, Colonel William J. Tait, Jr, and Major J. Michael McNealy

When III Corps deployed to Iraq in January 2004, we From small unit to theater level, intelligence provided the knew that intelligence was key to victorious operations. basis for every mission. As we refl ect back on our thirteen months in Operation The demands of a new insurgency battlefi eld height- Iraqi Freedom (OIF) II, fi rst as the core of Combined JointJoint ened our dependence on intelligence. While we had, and TaskTask Force 7 (CJTF-7) and then as Multi-National Corps-Corps- still maintain, robust technological advantages over the Iraq (MNC-I), that was clearly the case. Intelligence was insurgents, the counterinsurgency battle requires a deep the most important and challenging aspect of every en- human intelligence (HUMINT) capability to understand the deavor. This article is intended to share some of what we enemy, his intentions, and how to take the fi ght to him. We learned about intelligence during our tour in Iraq. still need the technological advantages of our systems in The challenges we faced were perhaps most daunt- the counterinsurgency fi ght, but our intelligence must le- ing as we transitioned from CJTF-7 to MNC-I on 15 May verage a signifi cantly greater HUMINT capability. 2004. Both Shiites and Sunnis were fi ghting us on the Our intelligence capabilities during standard Cold War battlefi eld, testing newly arrived formations. Further- operations were quite effective in determining the enemy more, many of the Iraqi security forces had folded; the intentions, situation, and likely courses of actions. The Abu Ghraib detainee abuse controversy was occur- rigid nature of these operations allowed our systems and ring; the insurgents were attacking Iraq’s infrastructure intelligence personnel to apply templates to probable ac- (including our logistics lines); the Coalition Provisional tions and maximize the collection capabilities of our tech- Authority (CPA) was culminating; and a sovereign Iraqi nological systems. However, in the counterinsurgency government was a month away. Less than nine months environment (see Figure 1), our technical superiority in later, MNC-I had a series of major victories against the collection capabilities is somewhat marginalized and we insurgency leading up to the very successful elections on become more dependent on collecting the enemy’s in- January 30, 2005. Across our area of responsibility, coali- tangible human dynamic which requires a heavier focus tion forces had battled the growing insurgency in myriad on HUMINT. Within the insurgency environment, a high- ways, during countless engagements, and with absolute er number of hard-to-predict events will occur, as occurs determination. Many factors contributed to the victories, daily in Iraq. Assassinations, Improvised Explosive Devic- but intelligence proved to be the key to all. Never before es (IEDs), Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices has intelligence driven operations as effectively as in OIF. (VBIEDs), and ambushes are less likely to be picked up

10 Military Intelligence as many levels as possible given both �� security requirements and availability of communications. This collaborative � �� environment allowed for a great deal � � � � �� of cross-talk throughout the coalition in �� Iraq, setting a precedent for the future. � �� Collection Management, Coalition’s 2X (C2X), the C2 Systems Section, Foreign � � � �� Disclosure Ofﬁce, and Special Security �� Ofﬁce were among the other functions we shared with MNF-I—providing syn-

�� ergy between the echelons. As we de-

�� parted Iraq, the intelligence architecture �� was continuing to evolve, but the prem- �� ise of collaborating and sharing intelli- �� gence both vertically and laterally was alive and well. Figure 1. Under the Intelligence Umbrella. through our Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and Signals In- The intelligence effort in Iraq is a “bottom-up” process, telligence (SIGINT). Rather, we are dependent on HU- however, with battalion and brigade S2s performing key MINT to gather this information through interrogations, roles. These officers and their sections are inundated dai- interaction with the community, and other means. ly with information from their areas of operation. Interro- gation reports, tips, and other intelligence pour into the The key to the future of Military Intelligence (MI) is to units at a rapid pace and require a tremendous amount retain the old capabilities while providing for the new of diligence and professionalism. In more cases than not, challenges. As we continue to transform our Army in con- intelligence drives most of the battalion and brigade-level sideration of the contemporary operating environment, operations; in a counterinsurgency environment we have we will still have a significant need for our established to take the fight to the enemy in a very direct manner. In technological capabilities to deter and counter potential contrast to the standard Cold War major combat opera- foes like China, North Korea, and Iran; but we will also tions resulting in securing terrain and/or defeating conven- see a growing dependence on HUMINT. Models of how tional units and weapons, counterinsurgency operations the enemy will fight become more ambiguous as adver- must target specific people and/or places which would saries continue to develop and evolve their own systems have little significance to an operational ground war. The and tactics—especially in a counterinsurgency. We must critical variables and dimensions of this operational envi- be prepared for both major combat operations and coun- ronment create a daunting array of factors for which we terinsurgency possibilities, knowing that our nation’s en- must plan and adapt to in the counterinsurgency (see Fig- emies are studying what we have done in Iraq to better ure 2). However, very few of these variables are collect- prepare them for a future conflict against us. ible with our intelligence systems and must be addressed We benefited from a shared intelligence structure in through HUMINT and good old-fashioned homework. Iraq, leveraging both the Intelligence Fusion Center (IFC) Actionable intelligence is hard to come by or act upon in and the Coalition Analysis and Control Element (CACE). Iraq. Without a doubt the complex nature of the insurgen- Although the IFC was on the Multi-National Force-Iraq cy is the most significant impediment. Compartmentalized (MNF-I) Joint Manning Document (JMD) and the CACE cells operating throughout a specific area make collec- was on the MNC-I JMD, both organizations supported tion on these groups very difficult and inhibit our ability all levels of command—providing intelligence from the to discern who is directing and facilitating insurgency op- four-star level down to maneuver battalion command- erations. Another significant issue is that the sensor-to- ers in an environment that did not dictate strict intelli- shooter link is often cumbersome, fragile, and untimely. gence roles. Intelligence vital for the MNF-I commander While we have worked to streamline our intelligence re- could be just as important to a battalion commander on porting to enable action, there are still significant chal- the ground. As such, we disseminated the intelligence to lenges in terms of timeliness of intelligence and, at times,

July - September 2005 11 accuracy. As previously mentioned, the daily fight at the action. The lingering effect, however, was the ill will it cre- battalion and brigade levels is the core of our intelligence ated with the Iraqi people. In an environment where we work; the nature of the decentralized fight complicates in- needed to win the hearts and minds of good Iraqis, the telligence collection and coordination between echelons. Abu Ghraib scandal severely impacted the cooperation of Furthermore, the coordination between intelligence citizens with soldiers, THTs, and other intelligence collec- agencies is sometimes complicated by competing focus- tors—adding to the already existing cultural and language es, which is a historical challenge. Without going into de- challenges. tail, the integration of some HUMINT organizations was What Worked in OIF II initially difficult because their missions were to locate During OIF II, countless intelligence successes serve weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and high value tar- as examples of how to do things right. Of note, HUMINT gets (HVTs) rather than support the local fight in which and SIGINT collection provided significant intelligence combat units were embroiled. For the Tactical HUMINT upon which we executed operations against the enemy. Teams (THTs), the challenges included insufficient pre- One reason for this success came from the C2X portal deployment training in combat skills, communications, which streamlined and databased HUMINT reporting, and advanced source handling; they also had no organic which was available to all the major subordinate com- security which made them dependent on whichever commands (MSCs). Additionally, we surged Mobile Interroga- bat unit they were operating with for security. Additional- tion Teams (MITs) to assist with detainees from successful ly, and this is a recurring theme in the intelligence arena, operations throughout the area of operations (AO). This they had insufficient linguistic capabilities. Intelligence re- flex of resources allowed for the quick and efficient col- strictions, over-classification, and limited sensitive com- lection of additional HUMINT for future exploitation. Our partmented information (SCI) connectivity also impacted document and media exploitation greatly supported tar- efficient intelligence sharing down to the brigade and bat- get development and execution. The integration of civil- talion level. ian-trained technicians from the Reserve and National Unfortunately, the Abu Ghraib controversy negatively Guard assisted forensic study and targeting efforts. Fur- impacted interrogation operations for a time. One result thermore, the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) proved a of the scrutiny prompted by the revelations about Abu vital resource for target and situation development at all Ghraib was the reluctance by some to effectively exploit levels. In terms of analysis, we successfully integrated detainees, but that was by and large a temporary overre- national level subject matter experts (SMEs) into the analytical process across the command, and the bilateral interrogation operations with Iraqi National Intelligence Service (INIS), Ministry of Interior (MOI), and Ministry of Defense (MOD) proved an incredible success, garnering specific and vetted intelligence on insurgents throughout Iraq. The “INTS” in OIF II SIGINT: Our SIGINT collection was the most spectacu- lar intelligence discipline on the battlefield, as we were able to collect on many targets cued by other intelligence disciplines. Trusted and useful, SIGINT provided an abundance of intelligence on insurgent networks, named persons of interest, and enemy operations. SIGINT is a critical area where continued development of linguists, not only in skill but in numbers, must occur. IMINT: IMINT was the most dependable of the intelligence disciplines in Iraq, and the UAV was the key to IMINT. In the past, commanders have offered to trade

Figure 2. Critical Variables and Dimensions of the combat power for UAVs. Our experience in Iraq demon- Operational Environment.1 strated why. Commanders up and down the chain of com-

12 Military Intelligence mand cannot get enough UAV coverage and will always higher degree of success. MTTs, academic courses, and want more. A battalion level UAV is clearly needed so that other training events were executed to develop our sol- commanders are not dependent upon brigade or corps diers’ cultural awareness. We expected everyone, regard- and above platforms—and can get the IMINT support less of rank or position, to exhibit this awareness. they need. At corps level, we used UAVs to significantly In conjunction with cultural awareness, language pro- weight the fight for the commanders on the ground, espe- ficiency was, and is, a critical factor in THT success and cially with the Hunter, I-GNAT, and Predator. There were proved to be one of the greatest challenges. Across the countless times when we had to make the tough calls on battlefield, a soldier who has Arabic language skills pro- which MSC would receive the I-GNAT or Predator cov- vides an invaluable service to his/her unit in terms of erage for the day; most days several MSCs shared the HUMINT capability. However, we will always be short Ar- coverage, splitting up the support. However, even at the abic linguists. This shortage is one reason the Army is Corps level we would lose our I-GNAT and Predator cov- reviewing our language programs, promoting the growth erage to higher priority users, leaving the MSCs signifi- of our own Arabic, Chinese, and Farsi linguists in the cantly unsupported. long term. UAV coverage allowed the commanders to view in- As we develop our HUMINT, it is critical we share our surgent operations, infiltration routes, protests, and a intelligence laterally and up and down the chain of com- myriad of other events. UAVs provide a significant abil- mand. Again, in the counterinsurgency environment, the ity to instantly provide the commander the critical situ- distinctions between enemy areas of operation are not as ational awareness he needs to make decisions. A force clear as in the traditional major combat operations; there- multiplier which greatly supported targeting across Iraq, fore, we must understand there are no intelligence hando- IMINT has fast become a force multiplier. However, we ver lines, rather intelligence sharing lines. As we work the still have some challenges in how we operate our UAVs. intelligence situation in our specific AO, it is highly prob- For example, commanders must weigh how they will able that the intelligence may also bear fruit in another employ their armed UAVs—as an ISR platform or a tar- AO. geting platform. We face the challenge of time when we develop our HUMINT: HUMINT was so dedicated to targeting that HUMINT. However, time is exactly what you need to de- often not enough was left for situational understanding velop HUMINT capabilities not only at home station but development. Rather than using HUMINT to understand also in country. Over time, relationships must be forged the enemy as a whole and development of the insurgen- with contacts, and as units rotate through Iraq, we must cy across the country, it was largely focused on target examine how well we transfer these built-up relationships after target. In Iraq we had roughly 132 THTs working in between rotations. In the Iraqi and Muslim culture, rela- support of MNC-I and subordinate MSCs. Whether the tionships with others—through religion, family, tribe, or teams worked in a general support role to answer the work—are paramount to all other issues. MNC-I priority intelligence requirements or in direct support to the brigade combat teams (BCTs) developing ac- One emerging practice, which showed promise in Iraq tionable intelligence, they were the critical intelligence and HUMINT, was the use of telephone hotlines. Tele- discipline for the counterinsurgency—helping us to de- phone hotlines allowed Iraqis to anonymously telephone velop long-term and short-term sources, identify enemy in tips to the MSCs. The tips did not always provide the intentions, and cuing other intelligence disciplines to col- necessary actionable intelligence; however, it was an- lect on people, places, and events. We could never have other method to develop our HUMINT in the country. The enough THTs. biggest challenge was working through the false tips, the As part of the Corps concept of “Every Soldier is a misuse of the tip line to get back at another Iraqi or, in a Sensor,” we focused a fair amount of training on cultur- few cases, the attempt to set up Coalition forces in an am- al awareness prior to deployment. Undoubtedly, our sol- bush based off a deceptive tip. However, this new practice diers need to know the intricacies of Muslim life, the Arab warrants continued attention and support as it served us mind, and how Iraqis view our American culture. Only well in Iraq. then can we effectively operate in Iraq knowing how the Directing and planning intelligence operations in a coun- Iraqis will perceive our actions, understand our environ- terinsurgency is a very difficult process the commander ment, and integrate our mission into the battlefield with a must address, not just the “2.” Before we can collect, ana-

July - September 2005 13 lyze, and disseminate the intelligence to the forces we “Intelligence is an operation. You have to fight for Intelligence.” must first have a direct and precise plan on how we can — LTG Raymond T. Odierno, January 15, 2005 gain our intelligence. As LTG Odierno commented during a visit to MNC-I in January of 2005, “Intelligence is an operation. You have to fight for Intelligence.” How many Conclusion times have we seen a great deal of time and effort put into Intelligence played a critical role in our success in a tactical operation and then watch as the intelligence OIF II. IMINT, SIGINT, and HUMINT all contributed to collection plan is briefed as a supporting event instead of the commander’s ability to understand the enemy and the main event it should be? In the HUMINT-centric en- the situation. As we continue to fight the counterinsur- vironment of a counterinsurgency battle, the intelligence gency fight, our dependence on HUMINT will continue. mission often must become a mission unto itself, receiv- Critical to understanding the decentralized insurgency ing the same kinds of support and resourcing as a tac- fight, HUMINT provides the situational understanding tical operation. Otherwise, tactical operations will likely we need to effectively engage the enemy on our terms. display the attributes of a movement to contact—not the If we fail to develop our HUMINT to a higher degree, optimal situation. then our fight will become a battle of attrition as the en- SCAN-FOCUS-ACT emy’s mantra appears to be to simply fight another day. We must, however, continue to keep our technical intel- During OIF II, the MNC-I promoted the “Every Sol- ligence capabilities sharpened as the major combat op- dier is a Sensor” concept with the SCAN-FOCUS- eration threats still remain in the world. ACT Program. The soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines needed to understand that not only were they the eyes and ears of the Coalition but they were also capable of making a difference to save the lives of their comrades and, in some cases, their own lives through the simple process of scanning their area, focusing on what was not correct, and The 12 Major Victories of OIF II acting. The program was not only specific to what 1. Karbala. The 1st Armor Division and the Multi- the troops were doing while out on patrol or in their National Division-Central South (Poles) were able to movements in Iraq but also what they came across control the Shia Uprising in Al Kut and Najaf Provinc- in their daily jobs. One example is a young intelli- es and defeat it in Karbala. gence staff sergeant who worked in the MNC-I Joint Operations Center (JOC). The staff sergeant, in ex- 2. Al Kut. Special Forces, a Stryker Battalion Task ecuting his shift duties, was about to pass on a re- Force and Corps enablers defeat the insurgents in port about a suspected VBIED in Baghdad. Rather Al Kut. than simply passing the report on to the respective 3. Najaf. The Najaf operation required most of the MSC, he reviewed the report and saw something month of August, but in the end we defeated Sadr’s that did not make sense. Plotting the grid coordi- militia, gave the Interim Iraqi Government its first ma- nates, he realized the coordinates could not be cor- jor victory, and launched Najaf to follow Karbala as a rect. Instead of passing the report on, he contacted model province. the report originator, shared his concerns about the grids, and found out that indeed the grids were in- 4. Tal Afar. The Stryker Brigade took on the enemy correctly annotated in the report. As a result, a new in Tal Afar and gave the city back to the free Iraqis. report was issued and sent down to the respec- 5. Samarra. The 1st Infantry Division was able to tive MSC which in turn sent a patrol out to find the take back the city of Samarra from the enemy after VBIED, which they did shortly afterwards. The staff a carefully planned and prepared operation was ex- sergeant’s actions were exactly in line with SCAN- ecuted with overwhelming power and precision. FOCUS-ACT and directly contributed to denying the 6. Sadr City. This victory was ours, by virtue of the enemy his ability to use a VBIED against Coalition brilliant leadership and management of the 1st Cav- and Iraqi forces.

14 Military Intelligence Iraq from May 2004 to February 2005 and previously Deputy alry Division as they defeated the enemy in Sadr City Commanding General, Combined Joint Task Force Seven, both not just militarily, but also politically, economically, and headquartered in Baghdad, Iraq. He graduated in 1971 from the in the battle for information and public opinion. United States Military Academy at West Point and holds a Master’s Degree in Mechanical Engineering from North Carolina State 7. Fallujah. The combined Coalition fight which the University. He also holds a professional engineer’s license from the Marines spearheaded with the support of the 1st Cav- Commonwealth of Virginia. His military schools include the Infantry alry Division and British forces was a textbook urban Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Command and General fight. Staff College, and the Army War College. 8. Mosul. The forces of MNB-NW took on the sur- viving elements of Fallujah who fled to Mosul before, during, and after the Fallujah fight. COL Jerry Tait is currently assigned as the G2, III Corps at Fort 9. North Babil and South Baghdad. The daily fights Hood, Texas. He served as the Multi-National Corps-Iraq C2 for LTG Metz during OIF II and was “dual-hatted” as Deputy C2 of Multi- to secure these areas paid large dividends as the elec- National-Force-Iraq; prior to that he was Deputy C2 and Chief of the tions drew near. Intelligence Fusion Center for Combined Joint Task Force Seven. 10. MND-SE. The sustaining fight the British forces A 1980 graduate of the University of Alabama, he also earned fought throughout their AO kept the insurgency from Master’s Degrees from Boston University and the Air War College. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Officer Basic returning to this once volatile region. and Advanced Courses, Combined Arms and Services Staff School, 11. MND-NE. The Korean brigade deployed to the Command and General Staff College, and Air War College. northeast provided continued pressure on the insurgency. 12. The elections on January 30, 2005. 8.5 million Major J. Michael McNealy currently serves as the Executive Officer Iraqis voted in free and fair elections. for the 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. He previously served in Iraq as the Battle Major of the C2 Watch Desk in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Joint Operations Center. A 1992 Endnote graduate of the University of Virginia, he also holds a Master’s 1. FM 2-0, Intelligence, May 2004, 1-24. Degree in Information Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His military schools include the Military Intelligence LTG Thomas Metz is Commanding General, III Corps and Fort Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Hood. He was Commanding General, Multi-National Corps- Staff School, and the Command and General Staff College.

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July - September 2005 15 Experiences and Hints from Counterinsurgency Operations in OIF II

By Colonel William “Jerry” Tait, Jr.

Serving as the Senior Intelligence Officer (SIO) for a I will do my best to avoid reinventing the wheel or warfighting commander during combat operations is rehashing what others have said about what it takes what it’s all about for a Military Intelligence (MI) Offi- to be a good “2,” but will recommend two previous cer. At whatever level—S2, G2, J2, C2, or C/J2—the publications and then add my advice. Aspiring Army SIO job in wartime is the most relevant duty an MI of- intelligence officers should read the writings of MG ficer can perform. It is something I spent twenty-four Richard J. Quirk III and MG (Retired) James A. “Spi- years preparing for before actually being able to per- der” Marks for tips on being a “2.” MG Quirk, then form it in a combat zone. As C2 for the Multi-Nation- a colonel, wrote “Intelligence for the Division—A G2 al Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) while deployed with III Corps Perspective” as his U.S. Army War College Military for thirteen months during Operation Iraqi Freedom Studies Paper in 1992 that was based on his expe- II (OIF II), I got my chance. What a professionally riences as G2 of 24th Infantry Division in Operation and personally rewarding experience it was. I want Desert Shield/Desert Storm. MG Marks, after serving to share my experiences as MNC-I C2 because they as C2 of the Coalition Forces Land Component Com- represent the challenges facing SIOs at every level— mand during Operation Iraqi Freedom, coauthored from maneuver battalion to Combatant Command J2. “Six Things Every ‘2’ Must Do—Fundamental Les- The purpose of this article is to emphasize the preem- sons From OIF” with COL Steve Peterson (MIPB, inence of the “2” job and provide some hints for doing October-December 2003). The advice of these war- it in today’s environment. time SIOs together provides an excellent reference for MI professionals. Because of my experience as a G2 and Analysis and Control Element (ACE) Chief, I have been in- Although my points are similar to some of the vited to brief at the G2/ACE Chiefs Course at Fort things written by Generals Quirk and Marks, they Huachuca on numerous occasions. I always tell the were shaped by a combat environment that they did class that being a “deuce” is the hardest and best job not experience—full-spectrum counterinsurgency an MI officer can have. And it’s true. I have spent a operations. The similarities therefore validate what a significant portion of my career in troop-leading as- “2” should do in all settings, and the differences high- signments, and rarely have they compared with SIO light the challenges of a new paradigm. Again, these work in terms of difficulty and job satisfaction. For the are hints rather than a complete guide to succeeding most part, command was more fun. After all, leading as an SIO. troops is the traditional role of an Army officer. But Be the Commander’s Alter Ego the responsibility of being the SIO for a command— The “deuce” should be as close, if not closer, to the providing vital analysis of the enemy situation and commander than any other officer on the staff. Intel- orchestrating critically important intelligence opera- ligence drives and leads operations—especially in a tions—is “Job One” for intelligence officers. And do- counterinsurgency fight—so the commander and his ing it in combat is the pinnacle of our business. “2” have to be tight. It’s all about relationships, so

16 Military Intelligence this is often dependent upon the chemistry between Team with the “3” two people—and sometimes their previous service This relationship is second only to the one with the together. In an era when commanders may have little commander. As a Division G2 for two years, I had a or no influence over who is assigned as their “2,” this great rapport with the two G3s with whom I served. can be problematic. But cultivating the commander to They ensured that everything, and I mean every- a “deuce” relationship is something that is critical for thing, related to intelligence went through me—not as the success of both officers—and the command. a “stovepipe,” but to ensure that intelligence opera- The common denominator I saw among command- tions and actions were synchronized. As a Corps G2, ers who had outstanding intelligence organizations I have that same relationship with the G3. That was and operations in their units during OIF II was that important for both of us when we served as C2 and they empowered their “2” to truly be the synchronizer C3 of MNC-I, because intelligence not only drives and and orchestrator of intelligence. MI unit commanders leads operations in Iraq but also often is an operation had key supporting roles, but the “2” was the focal unto itself. The “3” was my battle buddy, roommate, point and trusted agent for all things related to intel- and best friend. I saw the same closeness in many ligence and played a key role in most other aspects subordinate units. of unit activities. In Iraq, I was fortunate to work for This relationship may be more difficult to forge at LTG Tom Metz, whom I have known for many years lower levels when the “3” is significantly senior to and served with in various settings. Our shared ex- the “2,” but remains imperative. For example, a ju- periences and long-standing rapport made it easy for nior MI captain serving as S2 of a maneuver battalion us to bond as Corps commander and G2 prior to de- must cultivate a real bond with the combat arms ma- ploying—a relationship that naturally grew stronger jor serving as S3—and it behooves the S3 to recip- as we served as Commanding General and C2 of rocate. The best situations I have seen are when the MNC-I, respectively. Despite being frustrated by the S3 treats the S2 like a protégé and favored younger challenges of intelligence collection and analysis in a sibling. Prudent S3s never treat the S2 like a subor- complex counterinsurgency environment, LTG Metz dinate, and good commanders and executive officers always knew and trusted that we were doing the best will not tolerate it when they do. Incidentally the C3 of possible job considering the circumstances. I attribute MNC-I, COL(P) Dennis Rogers, was far senior to me that not only to his insight but also to the closeness of and was selected for promotion to BG while we were our relationship. He certainly empowered me to lead in Iraq, but we were like brothers. the entire Intelligence Battlefield Operating System in MNC-I. That kind of empowerment is essential be- Team with Intelligence Unit cause, otherwise, the “2” is simply another staff officer Commanders with awesome responsibility and no formal authority. I This is obvious when there is a habitual support had the freedom to travel with the CG whenever and relationship between the “2s” headquarters and an wherever I wished, which greatly enhanced my ability MI unit—such as a brigade combat team and its MI to orchestrate intelligence operations throughout Iraq. company, or a corps and its MI brigade. But it is less There is no substitute for personal interaction, and I clear-cut for the “2” of a combat formation which rou- recommend that “2s” at all levels get out with their tinely associates with no MI headquarters at its level; commanders whenever possible. usually the case with maneuver battalions and now The bonds that develop between commanders and occurring with two-star modular divisions. In those sit- their intelligence officers are often so special that uations, the “deuce” must develop good relations with they cause the senior officer to choose the MI officer intelligence unit commanders at other levels. For ex- for other positions of trust. Currently, at least two MI ample, maneuver battalions in Iraq sometimes have colonels are executive officers for four-star generals Tactical HUMINT Teams (THTs) in direct support; for whom they previously served as SIOs—and there those S2s should team with company and battalion are many more examples. The bottom line is that the commanders of the MI units that provide those THTs. commander and “2” have a symbiotic existence and The reality is that many SIOs must team with several must be close for the unit to succeed, especially in a intelligence unit commanders to be successful. While combat zone. in Iraq, I worked closely with COL Foster Payne, the

July - September 2005 17 504th MI Brigade Commander. As the only two MI to higher and lower level “2s,” but even battalion S2s full colonels in III Corps, we had a strong relationship had such challenges. I remember visiting maneuver when we deployed that grew stronger throughout OIF battalion S2s in Multi-National Brigade-North (Task II. The affiliation between the “2” and his or her pri- Force Olympia) and marveling at the partnerships mary supporting intelligence unit commander is one they had developed with a host of supporting intel- of the most natural and special partnerships on the ligence agencies. Army and Marine Battalion S2s in battlefield. But in Iraq, there were numerous other in- other locations I visited—like Baghdad, Fallujah, Ra- telligence unit commanders with whom I dealt in my madi, and Tikrit—had achieved similar success. role as MNC-I C2—from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM), sister services, Cultivate “Bottom up” Intelligence and elsewhere. Of course, I also had dealings with Reporting commanders of Army and Marine intelligence units in This is a major difference between major combat subordinate commands. Not only does the “deuce” operations and counterinsurgency operations. In the rely on all supporting intelligence unit commanders former, high-tech intelligence systems from national but also they rely on him or her to interface with the (top) down are key, while the latter depends on hu- senior commander on their behalf. In Iraq, it was me, man intelligence (HUMINT) to paint the enemy pic- not COL Payne or the other intelligence unit com- ture. Commanders have traditionally required their manders, who saw LTG Metz multiple times a day. “2s” to assist with satisfying lower echelon units’ pri- Our teamwork ensured the intelligence effort was ority intelligence requirements (PIRs), but in a coun- synchronized and correctly represented to the MNC-I terinsurgency lower-level units can greatly assist in commander via me as his SIO. I saw the same meth- meeting the senior commander’s PIRs. Timeliness, odology work in major subordinate commands. accuracy, and dependability are the keys to success when it comes to “bottom up” reporting. Achieving Team with Higher, Lower, and Adjacent good results is difficult even with THT reporting, but Intelligence Staffs overwhelmingly so when it comes to reporting from This is common sense and may appear simple, patrols and individual soldier reporting. “Every Soldier but the truth is that it’s often complex and difficult to a Sensor” is a prudent philosophy, but does little good achieve. In Iraq, for example, I had to work closely unless the information gets into the intelligence sys- with the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) C2, U.S. tem. SIOs must focus downward to harvest good in- Central Command (CENTCOM) J2, CENTCOM telligence from all collectors at lower echelons. When Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) Intelligence this happens right, the results are impressive. Without Chief, the “2s” of some Special Operations Forces getting into the classified realm, I can say that combat units, senior representatives of several U.S. and Co- raids based on “bottom up” intelligence grew exponen- alition national intelligence agencies, and the G2s/ tially in number while we were in Iraq and maintained C2s/J2s of our major subordinate commands. Most an incredibly high success rate—capturing the prima- of those relationships came easily and were mutually ry target in the vast majority of cases. That is a tribute beneficial. For example, the intelligence staff at the to outstanding intelligence collection and reporting at CAOC relied on us for the ground commander’s in- the lowest levels, leveraged by higher headquarters telligence perspective and reciprocated with unprec- to facilitate victorious combat operations. Integrating edented cooperation from the air component. But a that “bottom up” reporting into the analytical process few counterparts were less cooperative at times and at higher levels—using the full spectrum of tools in- had to be coaxed into close cooperation. Again, it’s cluding Analyst Notebook—was key to developing all about relationships, and we ultimately succeed- useful assessments for our commanders. ed at achieving the requisite good will. It may not be surprising that complex associations had to be de- Build the Intelligence Staff veloped at the corps and theater levels, but is often The staff under the immediate control of the “2” is overlooked that such relations with other intelligence obviously important to the SIO’s success. A small staffs had to be groomed at lower echelons. Division subset of the overall intelligence team, this group is G2s and brigade S2s certainly had to deal with na- an extension of the SIO and must operate on his or tional agency representatives and others in addition her behalf and that of the commander. There are two

18 Military Intelligence aspects to this: first, assembling the personnel; and, second, developing them. Whenever possible, it is beneficial for an SIO to have some people on his or her staff that he or she already knows and trusts. I believe this is particularly important when the unit is des- COL Jerry Tait has been the G2, III Corps, since June tined for a combat zone and will receive many of its 2003. During that time, he deployed to Iraq with III Corps personnel shortly before deployment; they must fall in headquarters for 13 months, initially serving as Deputy C2 on a cadre of intelligence soldiers who are in synch and Chief of the Intelligence Fusion Center for Combined Joint with the “2.” The lower the echelon, the more difficult Task Force Seven, then concurrently as C2 of Multi-National it is for the “deuce” to influence who is assigned to his Corps-Iraq and Deputy C2 of Multi-National Force-Iraq. His previous assignments include two years as G2 of 4th Infantry or her staff, but it is worth the effort to get even just Division; Commander, 104th MI Battalion; III Corps ACE Chief one known and proven individual assigned. and G2 Planner; MI battalion S3 and XO; and two MI company commands. A 1980 graduate of the University of Alabama, Developing the intelligence staff is probably the he also earned Master’s Degrees from Boston University and “2’s” most important pre-deployment endeavor. Mak- the Air War College. His military schools include the Military ing every individual—regardless of rank, experience, Intelligence Officer Basic and Advanced Courses, Combined or prior affiliation with the SIO—an effective member Arms and Services Staff School, Command and General Staff of the intelligence team is imperative. This requires College, and Air War College. going beyond the normal training and exercises to coach and mentor folks to achieve their potential. When this is done effectively, the intelligence staff will gel so that the newest members of the group will feel and perform similar to those known and trusted personnel originally brought on board by the SIO.

In III Corps, I had the good fortune of influencing the assignment to G2 of a few officers and NCOs with whom I had worked previously. They were joined by others who were soon up to speed because of close cooperation between the old hands and new personnel. When we deployed as the nucleus of the intelligence staff for Combined Joint Task Force Seven (before transitioning to MNC-I), we were a cohesive group ready for the mission. Conclusion Serving as a “deuce” at any level can be down- right painful, especially during peacetime exercises and training. One former G2 was in the spotlight so much during a series of major exercises that he said, “I wouldn’t get out of an electric chair to do this again.” At the National Training Center and during Battle Command Training Program Warfighter exercises, the after-action reviews (AARs) are frequently so focused on intelligence that it is often joked that the “2” might as well keep the microphone or pointer for the entire AAR. But the emphasis on intelligence reflects its incredible importance, and the contributions an SIO can make to achieving victory and sav- ing soldiers’ lives in wartime are beyond words.

July - September 2005 19 teach, our responsibilities as intelligence coach, leaders to develop future and lead: leaders

by Colonel Keith G. Geiger, Lieutenant Colonel Orlando W. Ortiz, and Major J. Michael McNealy

Today’s Army faces a tremendous retention challenge. Each one of us has a responsibility to develop our sub- Deployments, high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and ordinate officers; that is, all our subordinate officers not reduced personnel and resources personify the fu- just junior officers. All too often leaders overlook the de- ture of the Army. As we undergo continuous changes in velopment of the senior captains, majors, and lieutenant the Army structure, our life in the military has become colonels; our responsibility to develop our leaders does a growing challenge even for seasoned professionals. not stop at the company grade level. Senior officers in our While a single stopgap measure does not exist to ad- organizations should accept and embrace the opportunity dress our problem, one important and singularly impact- to grow and nurture future leaders through direct dialogue, ing effort to retain our officers and noncommissioned exposure to professional challenges, and active involve- officers is through a focused professional development ment. Contrary to sometimes unconscious thought, there and mentorship program—a program that goes beyond is no magic crossing line an officer passes after which the standard counseling, reading program, and profes- he or she no longer needs active mentorship, develop- sional “to-do” checklist. The program should contain ment, or attention from senior officers. The traditional role component elements of officer professional development in combat arms units, that brigade commanders are re- in rank and grade stages and be overseen by a senior sponsible for training captains, and battalion commanders officer who has invested himself into the development of are responsible for training lieutenants should not serve the subordinate officer. as, and is not, the only paradigm for professional devel- The Intelligence Leader opment. This is especially true in Military Intelligence (MI) Few concrete descriptions of an intelligence leader ex- units where a brigade commander may not exist in the ist, and most officers invariably hold different ideas con- chain of command. Professional development should be cerning the requisite qualities of an intelligence leader. an active and combined effort with every rank, in various However, most would agree that an ideal intelligence capacities, participating in the development of officers ju- leader holds the line in terms of standards, is acutely in- nior to their rank. formed of intelligence capabilities and processes, focuses on the mission, and selflessly leads his or her team What’s the Program? to success while demonstrating the core Army values. “We have to care enough to make it hard for them, This ideal leader also recognizes that he must develop to challenge them beyond doing their regular jobs; to the leaders beneath him. He realizes that our legacy is grow.” that of tomorrow’s leaders. As a part of good leadership, focusing on the active development of our younger of- There is no definitive program that we should subscribe ficers is a key attribute that all intelligence leaders must to in order to develop our officers. Each officer is different demonstrate. Without this attribute, we will leave an un- and has different needs. The Army has a great product: fulfilled legacy and compound retention challenges as the Junior Officer Development Support Form (JODSF). younger officers, feeling isolated and alone, seek more However, we use it only for our junior officers and warrant fulfillment, certainty, and predictability outside the U.S. officers. While we are not proposing a mandatory version Army. for captains and field grade officers, this is the structure

20 Military Intelligence we should have in mind when we develop our senior cap- and chain of command. Military courtesies should not be tains, majors, and lieutenant colonels. The senior intelli- overlooked. gence officer at each level should assess his subordinate Conversely, as intelligence leaders look around for offi- officers to identify strengths and weaknesses, establish a cers in need of guidance and leadership, younger officers blueprint for continued development, and then work with have the responsibility to likewise search for intelligence the officer to build a history of success. leaders around them and identify potential mentors. Men- The Officer Evaluation Report (OER) Support Form (DA torship is not a given practice within the Army; officers Form 67-9-1) is also an excellent tool that leaders have at should seek out senior leaders and begin to develop a their disposal to work with their officers and address these professional relationship with them which may in turn be- issues. Unfortunately, rather than being an active docu- come a mentorship experience. Regardless of whether a ment, intended to be revisited no less than four times per mentor relationship evolves, as younger officers seek out year to assess and revise, the OER Support Form has mentors, they will develop networks within their own intel- become a passive document, outlining initial goals and ligence community which will, at the minimum, provide a then, when an OER is due, retroactively capturing what- great deal of professional support and development. ever successes occurred through the normal course of the year. We, as leaders, need to emphasize the OER Conclusion Support Form as a living document and a significant tool The Army faces a long-term challenge to recruit and re- for us to use as we develop our subordinate officers. The tain officers; MI is no exception. New initiatives are under proper use of the OER Support Form will provide regu- consideration to entice our newest officers to remain in lar intervals for formal sit-down counseling which we can the Army longer and in a more stabilized fashion. These then augment through the normal course of business with initiatives are in most part the result of trying to stem the informal counseling. flow out of the Army. What we need to do as intelligence leaders is care enough to develop our officers into our fu- MI Islands ture leaders who will stay for the long-term. We must take However, the point of this article is not to emphasize the time to build our younger leaders; to acknowledge our re- senior rater to ratee relationship. While this relationship is sponsibilities and take action, providing insightful guid- the cornerstone of the intelligence professional develop- ance and recommendations to subordinate officers that ment system, we have a large number of MI officers who personalize professional and personal goals in the midst do not have an intelligence leader in their rating chain. of great uncertainty. However, in order for our efforts to These officers, a majority of which make up the MI Corps, be successful, the younger officers must mirror our active need to be brought into the MI “fold.” Consider this, who participation; taking the initiative to seek out mentors they is working on the professional intelligence development identify with and soliciting their guidance. They must show of an Infantry Battalion S2? If you answered the Brigade as much interest in their own development as we do. Ded- S2, assisted by the Division G2, that’s great—if it is oc- ication on behalf of both elements will undoubtedly pay curring. But in reality, the major professional development long-term dividends for the Army as a whole. that the Battalion S2 receives will be from his maneuver battalion commander, who may or may not know how to develop an intelligence officer. The fact is we have to look up above our “organizational cubicles” and see who else is out there who can use some mentoring, coaching, and intelligence leadership. If we don’t, then our legacy Colonel Geiger is the Commander of the 504th Military Intelligence will not be in our hands. Look around, there are more Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas. Previous to command, he served as the folks out there in need of intelligence leadership than you Chief, Counterintelligence Section, Supreme Headquarters Allied would expect: the brigade S2 of the separate brigade at Powers Europe (SHAPE), Allied Command Operations, Mons, the corps level who rarely interacts with other organiza- Belgium. While there, he also served as the C2X for CJTF-7 and tions, an MI captain serving in a recruiter command po- Multi-National Corps and Force-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom. The former 82d Airborne Division G2 and Commander of the 313th sition, or the MI company commander in a BCT. While Military Intelligence Battalion graduated from Washington State no one needs permission to connect with these “islands,” University in 1982 and holds an MA in International Relations from care and finesse should be exercised when reaching out the University of Belgrano, Buenos Aires, Argentina, and an MS to an Intelligence officer in an established organization in Strategic Studies from the US Army War College. His military

July - September 2005 21 While the Army has established Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) task sets for each enlisted rank, there are no prerequisite for what “career skills” each ofﬁcer rank should be able to demonstrate. Below you will ﬁnd recommended skills and tasks to consider incorporating into your professional development program.

Lieutenant  Become familiar with the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) process.  Develop your professional book which will include  Develop briefing skills. (but not limited to): Officer Record Brief (ORB), OERs,  command philosophies, awards, orders, etc. Continue to develop your S2 “how to” kit.  Develop counseling techniques for your lieutenants.  Update and maintain your ORB to include use of  proper position titles; overall appearance. Present an OPD.  Review your anticipated career pathway; discuss the  Develop a professional reading program incorporat- post command job. ing the Chief of Staff of the Army’s reading list, the MI  professional reading list, as well as recommendations Revisit inventory procedures. from the chain of command and personal intellectual  Prepare for Executive Officer, S3, brigade S2 posi- initiative. tions.  Write a book review on a quarterly basis. Major  Create a military journal of daily activities to capture  Write a professional book review, submit to MIPB. accomplished work, lessons learned, and other infor-  Attend intermediate level education (ILE) in some ca- mation. This journal may be of significant value in lat- pacity. er years when developing younger officers.  Continue the professional reading program.  Develop a “how to” on conducting inventories.  Develop reviewing and editing skills at the graduate  Prepare an Intelligence OPD. level.  Develop your anticipated career pathway.  Develop counseling techniques for company com-  Develop your company command philosophy. manders.  Learn the TDY process.  Review career pathway; discuss career enhancing  Develop your S2 survival kit. positions, joint assignments, etc.

Captain Lieutenant Colonel  Continue professional book reviews.  Continue professional book review.  Continue the military journal; develop a command  Prepare for command, G2, or other senior level MI book to track all work, issues, lessons learned as a positions. company commander.  Prepare for the Army War College. education includes the Military Intelligence Ofﬁcer Basic and Advanced Courses, Defense Language Institute Basic Spanish Course, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and the Army War College.

Lieutenant Colonel Orlando Ortiz is the Commander of the 303d Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. During Operation Iraqi Freedom II, Lieutenant Colonel Ortiz served as the Chief of Operations, C2, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and assumed duties as the Chief of Operations, G2, upon his return in February 2005. He is a 1987 graduate of the Saint Johns University ROTC program and holds an MS in Aeronautical Science from Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Ofﬁcer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Major J. Michael McNealy currently serves as the Executive Ofﬁcer for the 163rd Military Intelligence Battalion, Fort Hood, Texas. He previously served in Iraq as the Battle Major of the C2 Watch Desk in the Multi-National Corps-Iraq Joint Operations Center. A 1992 graduate of the University of Virginia, he also holds a Master’s degree in Information Science from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. His military schools include the Military Intelligence Ofﬁcer Basic and Advanced Courses, the Combined Arms Services Staff School, and the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

22 Military Intelligence Challenges in Recruiting Military Intelligence Warrant Officers Recruiting In the past, re- by Chief WarrantWarrant Offi cer Three Stephen Beckham cruitment of future The program to apply for and become a U.S. warrant offi cers was Army WWarrantarrant Offi cer is considered to be quite accomplished by war- challenging, not to mention the day-to- rant offi cers through word- day duties of being a technical expert of-mouth. Today,Today, the U. S. in any Military Intelligence (MI) fi eld. Army Recruiting Command YouYou will know that the lives of men (USAREC) sponsors a six-per- and women of our Armed Ser- son team of three warrant offi cers vices could be in the balance and three senior NCOs at Fort Knox, waiting on your reply when giv- Kentucky.Kentucky. Their fulltime mission is to ac- ing that important piece of in- tively recruit between 1,300 to 1,400 soldiers telligence to the commander. for fourteen of the branches through email, tele- Knowing the challenges, what phone, and recruiting trips worldwide in order to maintain could motivate the MI non- the entire Warrant Offi cer Corps. I currently represent the commissioned offi cer (NCO) to become a U.S. Army MI MI Corps at USAREC. Through maintaining MI represen- Warrant Offi cer? tation at the Headquarters USAREC, it ensures that the There are usually just over 11,600 active duty warrant MI mission for warrant offi cer accessions has an agent on offi cers. That number nearly doubles when counting the the inside. warrant offi cers in the Army Reserve and National Guard. The Application Process This number, constituting about 2 percent of the total Army The application process itself is quite easy although strength, is spread over fi fteen branches. The MI Warrant sometimes it can be very time consuming, especially for Offi cer Corps is the third largest branch with about six to those soldiers who are deployed or have elements of their seven percent of the total Warrant Offi cer Corps. unit deployed. The most diffi cult part of the process could It is no secret that MI soldiers are well known for want- be getting the physical examination and letters of recom- ing the “why” answered before making decisions. After mendation, especially once deployed. Most MI missions all, it is one of the fi ve “Ws” that we develop our intelli- require some separation of the command and its support gence around. My purpose in this article is to try to give elements and there are very few facilities available to ob- the MI enlisted soldier the reasons “why” I became a war- tain a complete physical examination in the CENTCOM rant offi cer. Before I go into my reasons, I want to offer region. So if you are thinking about applying and your unit some background into the largely unknown efforts to fi ll is due to rotate, you should start work on both of these the ranks of the smallest corps in the Army. items.

July - September 2005 23 USAREC has already made it easier for applicants to Officer Corps through better pay, better training, and a apply while deployed worldwide. The most recent change more defined role as a fully integrated commissioned offi- was to allow applications to be sent to USAREC via Digi- cer in today’s Army. It will take several more years before tal Senders. The physical has been removed as part of the recruiting effort will feel the effect and benefit from the application packet and replaced with a physical cov- these suggestions as they are implemented throughout ersheet for the applicant’s privacy. The Department of the the Army. Army (DA) photograph can be made at a professional It is incumbent upon the leaders within the Army to get studio in lieu of a DA Visual Information facility or soldiers involved up front so the NCO receives the support need- can include a photograph in Desert Camouflage Uniform ed to make the decision to apply. Through surveys we if they are already deployed. Several other initiatives in- have found that up to 48 percent of the applicants ap- clude accepting facsimile (fax) copies and documents ply because a senior warrant officer or commander ap- sent by email and allowing applicants to resubmit their proached them and suggested they were warrant officer packets immediately after the second non-selection. The material. It is very inspirational for soldiers to hear from overall goal is to have a totally paperless process by FY their senior leadership that they are respected, that they 07. have officer potential, and that someone senior has rec- Applicants should keep these considerations in mind ommended they should apply to be a warrant officer. This when submitting their packet. First of all, neatness in a is where we need our leaders to step in and fill the gap packet should always be a priority. A packet or packet until the full effect of the ATLDP is felt in the field. updates should not be submitted by fax if there is ample The Target Audience time to complete the process through regular mail. If you The most qualified to apply are usually resubmit your packet, be sure to update photographs, Senior NCOs. those senior NCOs who have the most experience and Enlisted Record Briefs and resumes. The process was leadership time, but who usually feel that it will be like not simplified so soldiers could take shortcuts, but to starting over or going backwards in their career. It is im- make it easier for soldiers to follow through while in com- portant to explain to them that it is still a step forward no bat zones. matter how secure they are in their current status. Some Making the Decision wait because the timing is not right; they want to see the So, if it is easier to apply now and the MI fields have results of the next promotion board; or they feel that they had very high selection rates, you might wonder where may not be qualified; some may have had youthful indis- the major problem with the recruiting mission lies. Most of cretions that they feel automatically disqualifies them— the attention for the program is focused on the three DA the list of reasons goes on. Unfortunately these NCOs wait until they are too far along in their careers when the controlled processes (which are covered in DA Circular Army will not let them transition. Although they may be 601-99-1, Warrant Officer Procurement Program, 23 April 1999): more qualified due to the experience, there is a very important balance in the recruiting of the senior NCO. The  Application processing. Army has a stated goal of accessing these soldiers be-  The selection board. tween their sixth and eight year of service.  The Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS). Junior Troops. There are many junior troops who ap- The fourth, the most important part of the overall pro- ply who will not yet have the experience to be fully quali- cess, is the decision by an NCO to put the application fied. Most will apply and become discouraged when they together. It is sometimes taken lightly by leaders, but are “non-selected” and turn bitter towards the program. could be the hardest part for some soldiers since this de- These individuals need to find a way to accept the evalu- cision involves their future, their family, and many other ation they went through and find ways to improve their unknowns to include the possibility of rejection from the chances for a future opportunity. This may include educa- selection board. tion through correspondence, college, or online training This is where the Army has no control or input; it cannot courses; seeking the hard jobs; and seeking out a senior just make a policy that will inspire soldiers to apply. The warrant officer as a mentor. Army Training and Leader Development Panel (ATLDP) Mid-grade NCOs. Then there are the mid-grade NCOs made over forty-four suggestions to improve the Warrant who meet all the qualifications, but are at that awkward

24 Military Intelligence stage between seven and ten years of service. This is the and higher over the last three years. I do not want to “should I stay or should I go” phase of every soldier’s ca- suggest that money is a good reason, but the retire- reer. We approach that magical tenth year where we de- ment pay difference between an enlisted and warrant cide to become a “lifer” or decide to get out and go back offi cer rank made a big difference in my decision. into the civilian work force. This is the target audience that  Job satisfaction. I always enjoyed working in the main- the Army is fi nding the most problems with in retention but tenance shop as a 33T (EW/Intercept Tactical System it is also the target audience from which the best selec- Repairer). As I moved up through the ranks, I expe- tions for the warrant offi cer program are made. rienced the responsibilities of Platoon Sergeant and The challenge for the recruiting team is to reach out to Staff Sergeant. There is nothing wrong with moving these career soldiers in this seven to ten-year range and up through the senior NCO ranks, but it took me away convince them to apply. It is even more challenging in the from that which I joined for and desired to stay in— MI, Special Forces, and Criminal Investigation branches. electronics maintenance. After becoming a 353A (In- These soldiers are offered other opportunities to include telligence and Electronic Warfare Technician), I have high paying civilian jobs, special incentive duty pays and, been in a maintenance role in every assignment until in some cases, quicker promotion opportunities in their my assignment to USAREC. enlisted fi eld. Coupled with the avoidance of the dreaded  Pride, respect, and the knowledge that your voice is WOCS and given the sometimes more comfortable en- heard. As an NCO I rarely witnessed command re- listed careers, these soldiers see the warrant offi cer pro- spect for NCO experience and recommendations the gram as an easily avoided hassle. way I saw it happen with warrant offi cers. I often witnessed the warrant offi cer with the right answers re- Other Challenges ceiving the respect and sometimes envy from every Another challenge comes from bitterness of those who level of soldier in the room. were non-selected and now speak out against the program. Those who do not get selected should realize that So what does your future hold and where do you fi t in? it was nothing personal against them or their packet. The Are you a leader who can infl uence a great NCO with his fact that their packet made it through the board process or her decision? Are you that NCO who cannot make the means that they were qualifi ed; about 25 percent of the fi nal decision? Are you the Advanced Individual Training application packets are returned to soldiers, never reach- (AIT) student who wants to set a four to fi ve-year goal to ing the board. These soldiers should get with a senior become eligible and apply once qualifi ed? The key at this warrant to review their packet and try to discover what point is communication, planning, and follow through. may have held them back, fi x the issues, and then reap- Any interested soldier can contact me at USAREC at ply. 502-626-0271 or DSN 536-0271 or stephen.beckham@ usarec.army.mil. Other challenges come from a senior NCO opinion that “going warrant” means abandoning the NCO Corps. Many Sergeants Major and commanders have benefi ted from having a squared-away NCO “go warrant” and then came back to be a leader, a mentor, a continuity piece for those sections that had junior NCO leadership.

Personal Thoughts I truly believe in the warrant ofﬁ cer program and there are several reasons to apply, but it isn’t right for everyone. The top three reasons I can give from personal experience but which may not apply to everyone are— CW3 Stephen Beckham is an Intelligence and Electronic Warfare  Promotion potential. Promotions for SFC, MSG, and Maintenance Technician. He is currently the OIC, Special Missions CSM have been at or below 30 percent, 14 percent, and Boards Branch, USAREC, Fort Knox, Kentucky. Mr. Beckham and 11 percent respectively. Promotions for CW2, is in his eighteenth year of military service and his seventh year as CW3, and CW4 ranks have leveled off at 90 percent a Warrant Ofﬁ cer.

July - September 2005 25 by Chief Warrant Ofﬁcer Five Michael Guzy

Two major events have occurred within the Warrant Of- with specific levels of technical ability. They refine their ficer Corps recently that have changed the perceived technical expertise and develop their leadership and role of warrant officers (WOs). These events were the management skills through tiered progressive assign- commissioning of WOs into the various branches of ment and education.” 2 the U.S. Army and the significant rise in numbers of technical WOs. Recommendations These events (and a few others), without a more The following is the stated definition of the WO by defined Army follow-on plan for WO roles and profes- rank and my recommendations for role and task en- sional development, have clouded the understanding hancements to that rank. of the new roles of the WO. DA PAM 600-3, Com- Warrant Officer One (WO1). An officer appointed missioned Officer Professional Development and by warrant with the requisite authority pursuant to as- Career Management, dated 14 October 2005, makes signment level and position given by the Secretary of a good start at addressing these WO roles. This ar- the Army. WO1s are basic level, technically focused ticle will offer a recommendation expanding the stated officers who perform the primary duties of technical roles of the WO by function and task in several critical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, and 1 areas for each WO rank. sustainer. They also perform any other branch-related The current definition of a WO as stated in DA PAM duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guid- 600-3 is “The Army WO is a self–aware and adaptive ance, resources, assistance, and supervision neces- technical expert, combat leader, trainer, and advisor. sary for subordinates to perform their duties. WO1s Through progressive levels of expertise in assign- have specific responsibility for accomplishing the mis- ments, training, and education, the WO administers, sions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army commander, the collective or organizational responsi- systems and equipment across the full spectrum of bility for how well their command performs its mission. Army operations. WOs are innovative integrators of WO1s primarily support levels of operations from team emerging technologies, dynamic teachers, confident through battalion, requiring interaction with all soldier warfighters, and developers of specialized teams of cohorts and primary staff. They provide leader devel- soldiers. They support a wide range of Army missions opment, mentorship, and counsel to enlisted soldiers throughout their career. WOs in the Army are accessed and NCOs. 3

26 Military Intelligence My additions to the entry level WO skill sets are— and, if assigned as a commander, the collective or or- Communicator. Applies basic military writing structure, ganizational responsibility for how well their command grammar, style, and content to produce information pa- performs its mission. CW2s primarily support levels of pers. Creates information briefings using multimedia. operations from team through battalion, requiring inter- Applies the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) action with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. They for problem solving. provide leader development, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, other WOs, and company-grade Trainer. Instructs technical subjects at the entry level branch officers. 4 and applies automated system skills to classroom instruction. My additions to the intermediate level WO skill sets are— Operator. Applies basic skills to operate systems and perform activities in support of organizational mis- Communicator. Analyzes and interprets military doc- sions. uments, essays, and mission briefings. Conducts re- Maintainer. Supervises maintenance personnel to search to aid in problem solving. keep equipment and systems in a state of operational Trainer. Executes training in technical fields, trains all readiness. aspects in specified work environments, and develops Administrator. Applies basic understanding of per- training materials. sonnel, logistics, information management, orga- Operator. Applies technical expertise based on equip- nizational operations, training support, and budget ment, activities, and systems in support of organiza- management. tional missions. Manager. Applies basic understanding of regulations Maintainer. Applies maintenance standards for equip- and policies governing the Army. Manages assigned ment and provides technical knowledge to command- projects. Applies risk management procedures. Assess- ers. es readiness. Stays abreast of evolving technology. Provides input to the immediate chain of command. Administrator. Applies supervisory skills and utilizes existing regulations necessary to execute assigned Integrator. Coordinates basic functions and interoper- missions. ability of Army systems at the unit level. Advisor. Provides technical and tactical advice in their Manager. Applies management principles by monitor- related fields of expertise to the immediate command ing unit readiness, risk management, and new technol- structure. ogies. Utilizes basic budget management procedures, available supplies, and equipment to accomplish the Leader. Influences others by providing purpose, direc- mission. tion, team building, and motivation. Integrator. Supervises incorporation of new technol- Mentor. Expands on professional development through ogy and ensures interoperability at unit and staff level. increased responsibilities and develops basic mentoring and counseling skills. Advisor. Provides technical and tactical advice utilizing staff procedures to provide information to the ap- Chief Warrant Officer 2 (CW2). A commissioned propriate level of command. officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assignment level and position as given by the President of Leader. Applies increasing leadership skills, identifies the United States. CW2s are intermediate level techni- duties and responsibilities at the intermediate level, cal and tactical experts who perform the primary duties and utilizes the ethical decision making process. of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, main- Mentor. Promotes professional development and per- tainer, sustainer, and advisor. They also perform any formance of soldiers as well as provides feedback other branch-related duties assigned to them. They through individual counseling. provide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to perform Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3). A commissioned their duties. They have specific responsibility for ac- officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assign- complishing the missions and tasks assigned to them ment level and position as given by the President of

July - September 2005 27 the United States. CW3s are advanced level techni- of soldiers and their compliance to mission require- cal and tactical experts who perform the primary duties ments. of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, main- Implements counseling and mentoring net- tainer, sustainer, integrator, and advisor. They also per- Mentor. works and career development programs. form any other branch-related duties assigned to them. They provide direction, guidance, resources, assis- Chief Warrant Officer 4 (CW4). A commissioned tance, and supervision necessary for subordinates to officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assign- perform their duties. CW3s have specific responsibility ment level and position as given by the President of for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to the United States. CW4s are senior level technical and them and, if assigned as a commander, the collective tactical experts who perform the primary duties of tech- or organizational responsibility for how well their com- nical leader, manager, maintainer, sustainer, integrator mand performs its mission. CW3s primarily support and advisor. They also perform any other branch-re- levels of operations from team through brigade, requir- lated duties assigned to them. They provide direction, ing interaction with all soldier cohorts and primary staff. guidance, resources, assistance, and supervision nec- They provide leader development, mentorship, advice, essary for subordinates to perform their duties. CW4s and counsel to NCOs, other WOs, and branch officers. have specific responsibility for accomplishing the mis- CW3s advise commanders on WO issues. 5 sions and tasks assigned to them and, if assigned as a My additions to the advanced level WO skill sets are: commander, has collective or organizational responsibility for how well their command performs its mission. Communicator. Conducts research based staff stud- They primarily support battalion, brigade, division, ies, publishes results, and briefs at appropriate com- corps, and echelons above corps operations. They mand levels. must interact with NCOs, other officers, primary staff) Trainer. Establishes training time requirements, devel- and special staff. CW4s primarily provide leader de- ops performance objectives and training aids to con- velopment, mentorship, advice, and counsel to NCOs, duct courses of instruction. other WOs, and branch officers. They have special mentorship responsibilities for other WOs and provide Operator. Applies staff level tactics, techniques, and essential advice to commanders on WO issues. 6 procedures (TTPs) in support of organizational missions. My additions to the senior level WO skill sets are— Maintainer. Executes supervisory responsibilities and Communicator. Writes executive reports for studies establishes work priorities that comply with technical on Army issues and project proposals. Prepares and requirements, presents senior level briefings. Administrator. Applies skills necessary to effect multi- Trainer. Implements training in the technical field, uti- dimensional coordination between staff agencies. lizes TTPs to train and evaluate subordinates, and employs the train-the-trainer methodology. Manager. Manages staff projects and production of reports, plans, and briefs. Coordinates organic and non- Operator. Implements operational standards utilizing organic assets and executes command intent. TTPs to accomplish higher echelon missions. Integrator. Integrates and evaluates staff level sys- Maintainer. Maintains proficiency in existing systems. tems, functions, and processes in technical fields. Implements emerging technologies for the Objective Force. Advisor. Conducts research and participates in staff functions to provide information to the appropriate level Administrator. Applies executive level skills neces- of command. Employs problem solving techniques to sary to plan, organize, and control all assigned proj- evaluate outcomes and determine courses of action. ects or missions. Utilizes training support, personnel, and budget and procurement systems. Leader. Fosters soldiers’ abilities to lead, build teams, and evaluate performance. Implements force protec- Manager. Manages personnel, resource allocation, tion and risk management measures to ensure safety support activities, and technical systems.

28 Military Intelligence Integrator. Integrates new technology into existing op- Administrator. Executes and manages in a multi- erations at the senior level. Ensures interoperability of dimensional environment at the Department of the systems, functions, and processes. Army, Major Army Command, Joint and Multinational levels. Reviews, validates, and writes policy recom- Advisor. Provides advice through systems planning and coordination, analyzes current trends and predicts mendations and serves as systems planner. future requirements for command review. Interfaces Manager. Serves as program or project manager, and between the proponent, the research and development monitors critical readiness indicators to support over- (R&D) community, and the user. all command readiness. Manages personnel, resource Leader. Serves in command and staff positions, devel- allocation, support activities, and technical systems at ops and implements leadership programs, and imparts Department of the Army, Major Army Commands, and critical skills to subordinates. joint/combined service levels. Mentor. Develops and executes the counseling pro- Integrator. Manages and evaluates systems integra- gram for leader development. tion at the highest level. Chief Warrant Officer 5 (CW5). A commissioned Advisor. Provides subject matter expertise for objec- officer with the requisite authority pursuant to assign- tive force integration. Advises senior commanders on ment level and position as given by the President of issues relevant to the integration of Army, joint servic- the United States. CW5s are master level technical es, and allied forces systems, equipment, personnel, and tactical experts who perform the primary duties of and procedures. technical leader, manager, integrator, advisor, or any Provides WO representation at senior levels. other particular duty prescribed by branch. They pro- Leader. Commands unit and task forces. Provides leadership vide direction, guidance, resources, assistance, and and organizational continuity and solves problems at supervision necessary for subordinates to perform all levels. their duties. CW5s have specific responsibility for accomplishing the missions and tasks assigned to them. Mentor. Manages the professional development pro- CW5s primarily support brigade, division, corps, ech- gram pertaining to assignments and utilization. elons above corps, and major command operations. They must interact with NCOs, other officers, prima- Professional Development ry staff and special staff. They provide leader devel- The Army has developed additional leadership train- opment, mentorship, advice, and counsel to WOs and ing for WOs over the last twenty years, but few addition- branch officers. CW5s have special WO leadership al technical training or other opportunities to maintain and representation responsibilities within their respec- and expand their technical capabilities and their place- tive commands. They provide essential advice to comment in assignments. It is my hope that with this infor- manders on WO issues. mation that the Army can focus the development for Additional master level WO skill sets are— both leadership and technical training, as well as assignment placement for WOs, similarly to the career Communicator. Executes and manages the compo- development program established for the traditional nents and elements of military writing and briefing pro- Branch officer. gram at all levels. Trainer. Develops and manages training standards in I would further suggest that if the Army, after almost proponent and related MOSs. 100 years, cannot specifically define, train, develop and task the WO by grades, that it should consider what the Manages operational standards of the Ar- Operator. U.S. Air Force (USAF) did in 1959. “WOs are not suf- my’s equipment, activities, and technical systems. De- ficiently flexible for utilization outside of their tech- velops policy and guidance for systems operation at all nical specialty . . . Furthermore, officers provide levels. the flexibility for use in a broad span of manage- Maintainer. Integrates the Army’s equipment and main- rial and career broadening assignments, which are tenance support. Identifies systemic problems and im- necessary to meet requirements . . .” As a result, the plements solutions. USAF determined that structure, training, and retention

July - September 2005 29 requirements were best served by “eliminating its WO 3. Ibid. program.” 4. Ibid.

5. Ibid., 15.

6. Ibid.

Endnotes

1. These recommendations were the result of a team project for the Warrant Chief Warrant Officer 5 Michael Guzy is a U.S. Army Reserve officer, Officer Senior Staff Course in 2002. having served in both the U.S. Army Reserve in Psychological Operations (PSYOP) units and in the California Army National 2. DA Pam 600-3, Commissioned Officer Professional Development Guard for almost 30 years. Readers may contact him via email at and Career Management, October 2005, 14. [email protected].

The 2006 Army National Guard G2/S2 Workshop– Applauding Military Intelligence, A Total Team Effort

The Army National Guard will hold the 2006 Army National Guard G2/S2 Workshop on 7 and 8 April 2006, hosted by the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. The focus of the workshop is “Military Intel- ligence–A Total Team Effort.” This workshop will applaud the successes of Military In- telligence (MI) in the Army as the Army National Guard, U.S. Army Reserve, and the U.S. Army Active Component teamed up to meet and fulfill mission requirements on the battlefield. The workshop will also explore ways to maintain these successes in the future. Keynote addresses are scheduled to be provided by the Director of the Army National Guard, and the Deputy Chief of Staff, G2, Department of the Army. Insights will also be provided by the Commanding General, USAIC&FH, the Command Sergeant Major of the MI Corps, and the U.S. Army Forces Com- mand G2. Briefings will be provided by a Division G2, a Brigade Combat Team S2, and a Tactical Exploi- tation Battalion commander from the Army National Guard, all of whom have recently redeployed from Iraq. Teamwork is an essential ingredient for the success of any operation. A key component in this team effort is the support provided by all staff sections. Each staff section in an organization must not only understand the desired objectives but also how to achieve the end state. Cohesiveness among all staff sections is paramount to ensure mission success. This workshop will also focus on all the staff sections in the Army National Guard that enable MI mission success. Presentations are scheduled to be provided by Strength Maintenance, Training, Force Structure, Acquisition, and Operations organizations within the Army National Guard. Each of these organizations provides a valuable service to the readiness of MI in the Army National Guard. Conference information and registration are available on the Guard Knowledge Online by accessing the Army National Guard link to the Operations Division, Intelligence and Security Branch web site or by contacting Major Jaime Castillo at [email protected].

30 Military Intelligence Seeks Original Essays: Winning papers will be carefully researched, analytically oriented critiques, proposals, or relevant case histories Get Published, that show evidence of imaginative, even unconventional, thinking. Submissions should be 3,500 to 5,000 words Win Money, long. First prize is featured publication in the May-June 2006 Contribute to the Cause edition of Military Review, a $500 honorarium, and a For the 2006 General William E. DePuy Professional Mil- framed certificate. Second and third prizes offer publica- itary Writing Competition, Military Review seeks original tion in Military Review, a $250 honorarium, and a certifi- essays on subjects of current concern to the U.S. Army. cate. Honorable mention designees will be given special This contest is open to all. consideration for publication and certificates. The Global War on Terror, evolving threats, force re- Essays should be submitted with an enrollment form not form, insurgency and counterinsurgency, cultural aware- later than 1 April 2006 to Military Review, ATTN: Compe- ness in military operations, tanks in urban combat, tition, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027- transitioning from combat to stability and support opera- 1254, or via email to [email protected] tions, ethical challenges in counterinsurgency, historical (Subject: Competition). For a copy of the enrollment form parallels to current operations, better ways to man the and additional information, visit Military Review’s website force—the possible topics are limitless. at http://www.leavenworth.army.mil/milrev/.

Announcing the Inaugural Combined Arms Center Commanding General’s 2006 Special Topics Writing Competition: “Countering Insurgency”

“The ‘expert’ thing just kills me. I thought I understood something about counterinsurgency, until I started doing it.” - LTC John A. Nagl, author, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam The Army absolutely needs to understand more about counterinsurgency (COIN)—nothing less than the future of the civilized world may depend on it. If you have something smart to contribute, submit it to the Combined Arms Center Commanding General’s 2006 Special Topics Writing Competition: “Countering Insurgency.” The possible topics are near-limitless: relevant historical studies, cultural considerations, gaining and sustaining public support, ethical challenges, enhancing COIN coalition operations, transitioning from combat to nation-building, tactical and strategic issues, armor in COIN, winning hearts and minds, the battles for Fallujah, “lawfare,” etcetera (for more ideas, see the contest rules, enclosure 3, at militaryreview.army.mil). Winning papers will be well-written, carefully researched, analytically oriented critiques, proposals, or relevant case histories that show evidence of imaginative, even unconventional, thinking. Submissions should be approximately 3,500 to 5,000 words long. First prize is $1,000, featured publication in the Combined Arms Center’s Military Review, and a certificate of recognition signed by the commanding general, LTG David Petraeus. Second prize is $500, publication, and a signed certificate. Third prize is $250, publication, and a certificate. Fourth prize is $250, special consideration for publication, and a certificate. Essays should be submitted with an enrollment form not later than 1 April 2006 to Military Review, ATTN: COIN, 294 Grant Avenue, Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1254, or via email to [email protected] (Subject: COIN). For a copy of the enrollment form and additional information, visit the Military Review website or call (913) 684-9330.

July - September 2005 31 The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Departments of the Army and Defense, or the U.S. Government. by Jack Kem, Colonel (Retired) warfighting tasks were put on the back burner, and visible appearance issues became the priority for “When you focus on the urgent tasks at hand, the some units. No doubt that’s not what the general critical tasks fall behind.” meant, but it’s what he got because of his stated definition of a great unit. There simply isn’t enough time to do everything that we want to do—so we must focus on the things that we must The real question is how do units focus on the critical? do. This is the prevailing idea that underpins several of Here are some steps to help maintain that focus: our concepts in the Army, especially the concepts of the  Commander’s involvement. The PIR cannot just Mission Essential Task List (METL), the Commander’s be what the intelligence officer developed; they have Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs), and the spe- to be approved by a commander who is actively in- cific intelligence related concept of priority intelligence re- volved in the development of the PIR. After all, they quirements (PIRs). Each of these concepts are developed are the commander’s, not the staff’s PIR. Command- by the staff and approved by commanders to provide fo- ers have to be deeply involved in METL development; cus and unity of vision in a unit, describing the tasks and they have to ensure that the METL is an accurate re- requirements that must be met. flection of the truly important tasks for the mission. Frequently, however, commanders and staff alike de- In the same way, the CCIR has to be what the com- velop these great tools to provide focus on the critical mander truly needs to know for mission accomplish- tasks and then get consumed with the urgent tasks, the ment. 25-meter targets that continually “pop up” and need im-  Keep the critical lists (METL, CCIR, PIR) to a mini- mediate attention. Focusing on the urgent tasks, or even mum. Preferably the METL and PIRs should be no worse yet, trying to get everything done, ensures that the more than five to six different items, which is a num- critical “must do” tasks will take a back seat. When every- ber low enough that they can be easily communicated thing seems to be the priority, there are no priorities. and remembered. CCIRs (which includes PIRs and Friendly Force Information Requirements, or FFIRs) At the beginning of his tenure, one of the generals should be no more than ten items. Staff officers should on post stated that “great units do everything be able to give the METL of a unit off the top of their well–the grass in the unit areas is cut, the motor heads; intelligence analysts should be able to tell you pools are policed, PT scores are high, and soldiers what the PIRs are without having to refer to a piece of look good.” Net result: training and the important paper. Battle Captains and Battle Staff NCOs should

32 Military Intelligence be able to tell you what items are on the CCIR. If This helps to ensure that the reassessment is con- these lists are not inherently known or understood, tinual and provide a constant reminder of the priorities then the risk is that the focus will be lost in training in the unit. and operations. Mission Essential Task List (METL)  Identify non-critical tasks. Tasks which are not crit- Field Manual 7-0, Training the Force, provides the ical have to be explicitly identified. This is the hardest doctrinal basis for determining the METL. Paragraph task, as well as the task that is rarely done. To ensure 3-1 in FM 7-0 states “the commander must identify those that you do not focus on everything, it is wise to de- tasks that are essential to accomplishing the organiza- termine those things that can be handled by a stand- tion’s wartime operational mission.” Tasks are kept to a ing operating procedure (SOP), or are tasks of lesser minimum; paragraph 3-3 states that “the METL develop- importance (such as Intelligence Requirements, or ment process reduces the number of tasks the organi- IRs). It’s also not a bad idea to identify those tasks zation must train and focuses the organization’s training that simply will not be done because they detract efforts on the most important collective training tasks re- from the real priorities. There will never be enough in- quired to accomplish the mission”; paragraph 3-16 states telligence assets to provide surveillance everywhere, that the commander “narrows down the list of all derived so it makes sense to identify where there will be in- tasks to those tasks critical for mission accomplishment.” telligence gaps. You cannot train on everything, so Doctrine also addresses those tasks that are “urgent, but it is best to identify those areas you simply will not not critical” in paragraph 4-16: commit training resources and time to. Command- ers also have to be involved in this process. In some Senior leaders at all echelons eliminate cases, this will involve risk; in other cases, it is a case nonessential activities that detract from METL- of common sense. If commanders don’t get involved based training. In peacetime, however, certain in determining priorities and where risk is assumed, activities occur that do not directly relate to an subordinates will do it by necessity. organization’s wartime mission but are important to other Army priorities. Senior leaders limit these peacetime activities to the maximum extent At the monthly G3/S3 conference at the division possible. Those that are absolutely essential headquarters, the division Commander addressed are included in long-range planning documents. the S3s throughout the division and told them, When assigned these activities, commanders “I know I’ve given you a hundred balls to juggle continually seek mission related training and keep up in the air—but you don’t have the opportunities. authority to drop a single one of them.” For the remainder of the CG’s tenure, the standard Finally, there must be constant reassessment and re- greeting among S3s in the division was “hide the minding of the METL within an organization. Paragraph dropped balls.” 3-4 states that applying the METL development “provides a forum for professional discussion and leader devel-  Reassess continually. Priorities change, and so our opment among senior, subordinate and adjacent (peer) lists of priorities must be continually updated. METLs commanders concerning the linkage between mission must be assessed continually—not just for training and training; enables subordinate commanders and key status but also for relevance to the wartime mission. NCOs to crosswalk collective, leader and individual tasks to the mission; and leads to ‘buy-in’ and commitment of PIRs and CCIRs must also be assessed continually, unit leaders to the organization’s training plan.” as some requirements are fulfilled and other requirements become more important. The assessment Commander’s Critical Information must be continual, and there has to be a set time to Requirements (CCIR) address whether or not the priorities are still correct. Field Manual 3-0, Operations, and Field Manual 5-0,  Remind constantly. Even though staff officers Army Planning and Orders Production, provide the doc- should be able to recite the METL off the top of their trinal basis for determining CCIRs. Paragraph 11-39 in heads, it’s also best to keep constant reminders evi- FM 3-0 states, “the commander’s critical information re- dent. PIRs should be posted in prominent places. quirements are elements of information required by com-

July - September 2005 33 manders that directly affect decision making and dictate As noted above, paragraph 3-79 of FM 5-0 provides the successful execution of military operations.” Para- specific information by stating “the CCIR should be limit- graph 11-40 in FM 3-0 states that “CCIR directly sup- ed to 10 or less at any given time to enhance comprehen- port the commander’s vision of the battle, commanders sion.” Since PIR are a subset of CCIR, this leaves the “fair develop them personally,” while paragraph 3-26 in FM share” of PIR to five or six requirements. One way to keep 5-0 states clearly that “CCIR belong to the commander this number down is to ensure that PIRs are specifically alone.” Paragraph 11-40 in FM 3-0 defines CCIR as “two associated with a decision to be made by the commander types of supporting information requirements: friendly (FM 2-0, paragraph 1-32). force information requirements (FFIR) and PIR,” although Identifying non-critical tasks is probably the most diffi- Joint Doctrine in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Revision cult in PIR development. Intelligence requirements (IR) First Draft) on page III-41 states that for CCIR “the key are developed and the critical requirements, in the eyes subcomponents are priority intelligence requirements, of the commander, are designated as PIR. The tendency friendly force information requirements, and essential el- is to develop a detailed list of all of the possible require- ements of friendly information (EEFI).” ments and then to send these requirements out to the Doctrine also addresses keeping the CCIR to a mini- collectors, who in turn feel that they have been tasked to mum. JP 3-0 (RFD) states that CCIR “are normally lim- “collect on everything.” The key issue is that collectors ited in number.” FM 5-0, in paragraphs 3-25 and 3-26, need to know when to move on to the critical, and leave states that “in all cases, the fewer the CCIR, the better the urgent (or even worse, the available) behind. the staff can focus its efforts and allocate scarce resourc- Reassessment of PIR should also be continual. The use es” and to “keep the number of recommended CCIR to of the “latest time information is of value” (LTIOV) helps a minimum.” Paragraph 3-79 of FM 5-0 provides specific to assist this process. PIR and IR should be continually information by stating “the CCIR should be limited to 10 updated to reflect when requirements have been met or or less at any given time to enhance comprehension.” when the requirement no longer exists.

CCIRs should also help to determine those items that Summary are not critical; paragraph 3-29 in FM 5-0 states “CCIR These steps should help you focus on the critical tasks also help screen the type and amount of information re- at hand and not dwell on the urgent: ported directly to the commander.” Both FM 3-0 (para-  Commander’s involvement. graph 11-41) and FM 5-0 (paragraph 3-29) emphasize  Keep the critical lists (METL, CCIR, PIR) to a mini- focusing on critical information by stating that “CCIR mum. must be focused enough to generate relevant informa-  Identify non-critical tasks. tion. Unfocused requests, such as “I need to know if the  Reassess continually. enemy moves,” may provide data but not much useable  Remind constantly. information.” Paragraph 3-79 in FM 3-0 also indicates the coordination that is inherent in CCIR by helping to “focus These steps will not always keep you focused, but the efforts for his subordinates and staff, assist in the al- they will go a long way to keep priorities straight. The location of resources, and assist staff ofﬁcers in making Army’s Leadership Manual, FM 22-100, states in para- recommendations.” graphs 5-28 and 5-29 that—

Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR) As a leader, you must also set priorities. If you Field Manual 2-0, Intelligence, provides the doctri- give your subordinates a list of things to do and nal basis for determining PIR. As a subset of CCIR, PIR say “They’re all important,” you may be trying to also belong to the commander. Paragraph 1-32 in FM 2- say something about urgency. But the message 0 states that “the commander designates intelligence re- you actually send is “I can’t decide which of these quirements tied directly to his decisions as CCIR,” while are most important, so I’ll just lean on you and see paragraph 1-33 states that the PIR do not become CCIR what happens.” Sometimes all courses of action “until approved by the commander.” Since PIR belong may appear equally good (or equally bad) and to the commander, paragraph 1-33 also recognizes that that any decision will be equally right (or equally “the commander may unilaterally designate PIRs.” wrong). Situations like that may tempt you to sit

34 Military Intelligence on the fence, to make no decision and let things work themselves out. Occasionally that may be appropriate; remember that decision making involves judgment, knowing whether to decide. More often, things left to themselves go from bad to worse. In such situations, the decision you make may be less important than simply deciding to do something. Leaders must have the personal courage to say which tasks are more important than others. In the absence of a clear priority, you must set one; not everything can be a top priority, and you can’t make progress without making decisions.

References  FM 2-0, Intelligence, 17 May 2004.  FM 3-0, Operations, 14 June 2001.  FM 5-0, Army Planning and Orders Production, 20 January 2005.  FM 7-0, Training the Force, 22 October 2002.  FM 22-100, Army Leadership: Be, Know, Do, 31 August 1999.  Joint Publication 3-0 (Revision First Draft), Doc- trine for Joint Operations, 15 September 2004.

Colonel (Retired) Jack Kem is an Associate Professor in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served as a Battalion S2, G2 Plans Ofﬁcer, DTOC Support Element Chief, and Battalion XO in the 82d Airborne Division; as a Brigade S2 in the 3d Infantry Division; as a Company Commander and Battalion S3 in the 3d Armored Division; and as the Battalion Commander of the 319th MI Battalion, XVIII Airborne Corps. Colonel (Retired) Kem graduated from MI Ofﬁcer Advanced Course, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Air Command and Staff College, the Joint Forces Staff College, and the Army War College. He holds a BA from Western Kentucky University, an MPA from Auburn University at Montgomery, and a PhD from North Carolina State University. Readers may contact the author via email at [email protected].

July - September 2005 35 Leading the Light Infantry Brigade Combat Team’s Military Intelligence Company Photo provided by PFC Kelly K. McDowell, PAO. Team 2nd BDE Combat by Captain Jerry Moon We, as the collective Military Intelligence (MI) Corps quirement for the collection, analysis, production and must resist the urge to morph the Brigade Combat dissemination of the BCT’s tactical intelligence. Team (BCT) only company grade “green tab” MI leader, the MI company commander, into just another staff Leadership is intangible, and therefore no weapon ofﬁcer. ever designed can replace it.

No leader ever managed a unit to take a hill…they —General Omar Bradley were lead there. —General Nathan Forrest, Having recently completed a Mission Rehearsal Ex- U.S. Confederate Army ercise (MRX) rotation at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) reinforced the importance of the “Out Under the current Modified Table of Organization Front” placement of the MI company leadership on and Equipment (MTOE) of a Light Infantry BCT, we today’s non-linear battlefield. Any MI team that con- have witnessed an incredible growth in the number of ducts deliberate mission planning and preparation MI officers assigned to the BCT S2 shop. We are now must be afforded the adequate time and diligent over- authorized six officers within the S2 Section with ex- sight by their respective leaders. Without this direct pertise in multiple disciplines to include Human Intel- leadership involvement in the mission planning cy- ligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), and cle, disastrous results are predictable that could well All-Source Intelligence (ASI). When coupled with the mean loss of life or a compromise in our intelligence noncommissioned officers and enlisted soldier num- mission. MI company leaders are obligated to ensure bers, the team grows to twenty knowledge hungry all tactical intelligence team members of the MI com- intelligence professionals. This group, which now in- pany are conducting comprehensive Pre-Combat cludes the Analysis and Control Team-Enclave (ACT- Checks (PCCs) and Pre-Combat Inspections (PCIs). E) (in the MI company under the previous MTOE), While the PCCs are the business of team leaders, more than meets the maneuver commander’s re- the PCIs are clearly the duty and responsibility of the

36 Military Intelligence MI company commander and the ﬁrst sergeant. An the while, the SIGINT Platoon is scanning and search- objective look at the currently employed contempo- ing increasing numbers of ever-changing targets in rary operating environment highlights the importance an effort to guarantee both the assured destruction of mission rehearsals and back-briefs, the conduct of of enemy forces, as well as assist in the “no-fail” mis- battle drills, the development of a contingency plan, sion of protecting our forces. While all of these mis- and so forth. sions are in various states of operational planning, one thread knits all of these loose ends together— When in war, men must die, they can’t be managed Leadership. It is leadership alone that ensures the MI to their deaths, they must be led. company is “ﬁring on all cylinders” and that the company is properly trained, equipped, manned and re- —Colonel Dandridge “Mike” Malone, hearsed during the various critical stages of each of U.S. Army, Infantry these complex and diverse intelligence missions.

A workable balance must be found between the The fact is that younger leaders [not generals] brigade S2’s understanding of the MI company cur- are the ones who really make history. They earn rent level of readiness, as well as the separate intel- medals for valor and achievement. They are the ligence discipline collector’s unique capabilities and ones who get things done and make the Army limitations. It is the responsibility of the MI company great. commander to inform the brigade commander and his staff of the company’s current status. He must also —General John A. Wickham, Jr. assist the battalion level commanders, and their re- Army Chief of Staff, 1983-1987 spective staff by recommending employment of what is often the BCT’s single collection platform within If we look to develop today’s MI officers for positions a specific intelligence discipline. Experience in both of increased leadership responsibility within the new Iraq and Afghanistan has proven to me that many BCT’s Brigade Troops Battalion (BTB), we must begin missions are doomed from the start due to the simple this much needed development at the MI company lack of leader involvement in the critical tasks of re- level with our platoon leaders, company executive of- hearsals and inspections; all of which take place be- ficers and, of course, our MI company commanders. fore the MI company soldier has even left the Forward If we fail to do this, the critical pool of officers qualified Operating Base (FOB) front gates. to be future battalion commanders will dwindle pre- cipitously and our competitive edge will be lost. People cannot be managed. Inventories can be managed, but people must be led. Lead, follow, or get the hell out of the way!!! —Ross Perot —Unknown

Given the current mission profile of the BCT’s MI company, company level leadership is a critical component to successful execution of the BCT’s intelligence requirements. In concert with the brigade staff, the MI company leaders must be able to plan, re- hearse, collect, and report information of value, often all at the same time. As an example: While a Tacti- cal Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (TUAV) is flying in sup- Captain Jerry Moon is the commander of Bravo Company (MI), port of an Infantry Company’s cordon and search just 311th BTB, 2nd Brigade Combat Team of the 101st Airborne south of the Yarmock Circle, a Tactical HUMINT Team Division (Air Assault). He earned a BS degree from Western (THT) prepares to depart the FOB, with the nuclear, Illinois University and an MS from Murray State University. He has served as a SIGINT Platoon Leader, an HHSC Executive biological, and chemical (NBC) Reconnaissance Pla- Officer, a Support Platoon Leader, a Battalion S3, a Division toon providing security. They are in search of a key Collection Manager, and a Battalion S2 in both the 10th piece of information needed in order to verify a fellow Mountain Division (LI) and 160th Special Operations Aviation intelligence collector’s single-source information. All Regiment (ABN).

July - September 2005 37 Indications and Warning Post 9/11: Analyzing Enemy Intent

by Scott Swanson With terrorist attacks against the Western interests in the and improve their reliability by moving from an empha- last few years, there has been a massive shift in how the sis of simple cause-and-effect relationships to more intui- world is viewed with regard to enemies both known and tive, non-linear associative forms of pattern recognition to unknown who continue to undertake devastating, surprise understand the enemy. action without prior declaration of war or other conventional warning. Further, the decentralized organizational Warning Analysis and operational structure of terrorists and their activities Warning analysis accepts the presumption of surprise further complicates threat mitigation for both law enforce- and incomplete intelligence and requires exhaustive re- 1 ment and intelligence agencies alike. While numer- search upon which to build the case for specific warning. ous efforts have been made to develop the appropriate Within the research there is a requirement to understand concepts, processes, and tools to prevent surprise acts the attitudes and disciplines of potential adversaries as of aggression toward the U.S., these approaches have well as their capabilities, their history, their culture and typically been focused toward politics, diplomacy, military, biases. This means that perhaps the easiest task in an science, and economics. Indications and Warning (I&W) effort is assessing the adversarial capabilities, but the linchpin and most difficult Despite the years of improvements toward a work- task is predicting the intentions and will of adversaries. ing methodology and practice of spotting indicators and To understand the adversary, research and analysis creating early warning, failures persist and new evolv- cannot merely be a compilation of facts; it includes an ing threats shift faster than those improving models can intangible abstract perception and belief but based on detect the many threats on the rise. Speculation would a comprehensive intimate understanding of the adver- have it that many missed indicators were due to a sary. Religion and its influence on behavior and belief failure to fully understand the enemy and its intentions structures is a perfect example. Today’s terror threats are from the enemy’s view and removing the biases built in directly linked to religion, culture, doctrine, tradition, and to some analysts’ or field collectors’ views. Most efforts ideology. The will of any social group comes from the to correct the errors have focused on restructuring the culture of the people and is inherent to the belief system warning system and have ignored potential problems in of those people or within the individuals contributing to a the analysis or collection tasking. group. While will is deeply driven, it can shift with a new Whether past challenges have been due to faulty understanding of concepts or new experiences, and can models, overwhelmed analysts, poor collection, or uninter- be suppressed through means of instilling fear or new ested policy makers, this article’s intent is to address some enlightenment upon an individual’s will. The influenc- viable go-forward components to construct new methods es, however, if it has permeated the foundational belief and approaches to analysis requirements for Early Warn- system, can be so deep that suppression and changes in ing. The focus is to identify critical processes and analyt- experiences may never fully override the core will of an ics used to see threats and understand hostile intentions, individual or the group they are embedded within.

38 Military Intelligence Belief as Enemy which a group defines its distinctive political identity and 4 Understanding that mind makes reality; one must then aims. Some ideologies—particularly separatism and understand why belief itself can be the actual enemy a politicized religion, but others as well—may include el- nation must fight. Hitler, Stalin, and other dictators real- ements of historical, semi-mythical, and supernatural be- 5 ized that through controlling what people believe there liefs. What is important is that ideology provides a motive becomes a method of oppression better than armies or and framework for action. criminal penalties. Those who can get others to believe There may be a distinction between the professed in an ideology have power through controlling “reality.” ideology of a group and the actual beliefs of individual Intelligence analysts who recognize certain ideological members. The leaders of political groups usually have principles—norms, morals, ideals—will find that it is not a fairly specific ideology with clear political objectives, disparaging to see that some are indeed practices of but for many of their followers a sufficient motive for malicious social control. belonging to the group is provided by adherence to the Beliefs pertaining to authority, divine right, etc. are par- group or an intuitive dislike of an “enemy.” What this means ticularly useful for political, economic, and social control. to intelligence analysts is that even in small cells, opin- We are seeing this today. Beliefs about the natural world, ions and beliefs may differ as well as the degree by which unlike beliefs about the social world, are given stronger one is willing to go in an attack. This can also be a consid- truth-claims, due to the ideological nature. Terrorists fol- eration for military, security, and intelligence profession- lowing this pattern are rarely mindless or indiscriminate als operating in the field. Whether through observations, in their attacks, although they may appear to be so to ob- interviews, or interrogation, certain indicators that may servers who have not examined their ideological beliefs. be apparent in one who is prepared to die would be different for another who favors making an escape, one There are also a number of other variable factors which who is willing to participate only to a certain point, or one need to be considered when trying to explain or under- who is entirely unaware that they are even involved in an stand the selection of targets or intent by any terror- attack plan. ist group such as the security environment within which they operate, the desire to maintain traditional sources of Mindset on Beliefs 2 support, and the situation of the group’s logistics. Nev- When biased contemporary Western perspective is ertheless, even after taking these reservations into used to gain ideological insight on religious extremism, account, it is still ideology, which provides terrorists with the it time and again misunderstands the impact that religion moral and political visualization that inspires their has on belief foundations. Experienced strategic ana- violence, shapes the way in which they see the world, lysts are mindful of this dynamic, which is gained through and defines how they judge the actions of people and extensive regional research, direct ground exposure, or institutions. This in turn forms their views as to who or interaction and more communication with specialists in what may be seen as a legitimate target, and to a degree it the focus area. This consideration in I&W analytical meth- allows the terrorists to dehumanize those individuals whom odology is more of a mindset from a linear thinking pattern they intend to harm, seeing them as symbols rather than to include more abstract “out of the box” creative think- as flesh and blood human beings. By establishing such ing and active participation in an area of interest that will parameters, the influence of ideology is crucial in embrace a combination of both intuitive and structured 3 determining the range of terrorists’ potential targets. methods to fully examine the potential scenarios and the Ideology—The Power Behind Belief views of ever-changing free will and perceptions that alter indications and nullify possibilities. Mindset does become Like scientists, there is great value in intelligence ana- more formalized when it is employed in the use of Red lysts also understanding the basic concepts of the mind’s Team exercises. capabilities to shape reality. Psychologists are beginning to understand how cognitive, motivational, and behavior- To avoid surprise, a formal yet creative approach with al structure (personality, attitudes, preconceptions, world- Red Teams is used for studying adversaries. (“Red Team” view, socialization, repertoire, value questioning, habits, comes from the Cold War practice of assigning some etc.) shapes the perception of reality. An ideology is the officers to play the part of the Soviets.) In this approach collection of beliefs, values, principles, and objectives by teams try to analyze adversarial motives and methods,

July - September 2005 39 trying to learn how they operate and how they think. international criminals are constantly evolving so too must This is done by developing full mind-immersion in an analytical methods across the entire Intelligence Commu- adversary’s thinking to enhance the authentic signature in nity. Leveraging influencers such as social, cultural, and mock attacks against critical infrastructures and national political indicators to create insight to the terrorist intent assets in order to understand events, improve security, through beliefs also creates insight to their most basic prioritize mitigation, and provide actionable information thought and planning process. Therefore even at ground for decision makers. Offices within the Central Intelli- level when collectors come across inferences and indica- gence Agency have been very proactive in the expand- tors along these less empirical lines, those findings can ed use of outside substantive experts to generate and still be pushed up as valuable intelligence relating to criti- test analytic assumptions. Analysts have increased their cal nodes or links in analysis. Field intelligence inferences use of techniques such as Red Teaming, Devil’s Advoca- and a continued study of adversarial behavior systems cy (deliberate challenge of another team’s strongly-held brings an analyst that much closer to actually thinking like analytic views), and Team A–Team B Analysis (compet- the enemy in order to help preempt the next terrorist or itive assessments) in order to focus greater attention insurgent threat and transforms an intelligence product to on High Impact-Low Probability threats to U.S. national a more useful actionable intelligence warning. security interests and reduce mirror-imaging biases of the analysts. Other government agencies prior to 9/11 were con- cerned about the hijacking possibility by terrorists and Endnotes had speculated in their analysis about various scenarios. 1. Cynthia Grabo, Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, The difficulty for some of them was to flesh out those sce- ed. Jan Goldman, (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic Research, Joint narios, then figure out a way to turn a scenario into practi- Military Intelligence College, 2002). cal action. Regrettably, it never happened to the extent of being a conceivable option. Similarly, today’s terror 2. C.J.M. Drake, “The Role of Ideology in Terrorists’ Target Selection,” attacks against commuters and insurgent attacks against Terrorism and Political Violence, 10, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 53-85. defense positions have been noted in threat assessments, 3. Ibid. but to defend against disparate individuals operating largely on their own initiative is quite difficult to diminish as 4. Walter A. Rosenbaum, Political Culture (London: Nelson, 1975), 120. a constant threat. Many of the surprise events in the history of global conflict have been far beyond range of the 5. Martin Kramer, “Sacrifice and Fratricide in Shiite Lebanon.” Terrorism and targets’ comprehension. To address new hostile intentions, Political Violence, 3, no. 3 (Autumn 1991), 32-33. a bolder freethinking analytical thought pattern should continue to be encouraged throughout intelligence groups Scott Swanson specializes in strategic and tactical operation intelligence collection and analysis for both the public and private and can be used in conjunction with an unprecedented sector. He has given a number of presentations and published knowledge of what makes the adversary tick. articles on Counter-Terrorism, Cultural Intelligence for Tactical The vague perceptions of what adversaries are think- Operation Support, Situational Understanding and Precognition, ing, feeling, and how important the current issues are Globalization, Human Asset Development, I&W Threat Analysis, Intelligence Requirements Definition, and Maritime Security to them is fundamental to an I&W system’s ability to Vulnerability/Threat Assessments. He is also a strategic advisor at understand what threats are at large by the knowledge or the California University of Protection and Intelligence Management recognition that an adversary has decided to do some- in the area of propaganda and covert action. His latest research thing and what their intentions may be. includes piracy in the Malacca Strait, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) “Sea Tiger” activities, and threats within North Conclusion Africa. His educational background consists of a BA in Culture and In presenting an approach to employ and encourage Communication (Languages studied: French, Arabic, and Spanish) and an MS in Strategic Intelligence and is currently pursuing a PhD regular out-of-the-box emphasis on history, religion, in Behavioral Social Psychology. Readers who wish to read the and culture to leverage intelligence analysis for a better research paper from which this article was extracted can find the understanding of the enemy and their intentions is not to link at www.delphiresearch.us and can contact Mr. Swanson at say that it is not being done today. As terrorists and other [email protected].

40 Military Intelligence Military Epistemologies in

The views expressed are the personal views of the author and do not necessarily reﬂect the ofﬁcially held views of the Department of Defense by Major David W. Pendall or the U.S. Army.

cures than plants and rest. Humors remained an underly- Introduction ing truth of medical science.3 Military Epistemology? Epistemology is nothing more Sir Isaac Newton synthesized many of the scientific than the study of how we know what we think we know. theory and insights in the 17th century to create the foun- It is a justified belief. Justified beliefs drive how military dation of modern physics and mathematics. Newtonian force is best applied and how military forces are best de- science explains our physical world, the universe, and veloped. In the military lexicon, this can also be called shapes much of our Western philosophy. Yet Newtonian doctrine, rooted in military “science.” 1 science cannot explain quarks, theories of relativity, or Collective belief in the Ptolemaic solar system, based the properties of photons. It seems quantum physics is upon the truth that the earth was the center of the uni- also true. Rather than replacing Newton, however, quan- verse, lasted 1,500 years even during the emergence of tum theory has its own place in explaining truth and the scientific evidence to the contrary. As scientific explana- meaning of phenomenon. tions disputed this truth rather than change it, modifica- For Newtonian science and quantum physics to both be tions were made to Ptolemaic theory and subsequent different and yet true, we realize we lack a universal theo- explanations of this truth were made to accommodate the ry in explaining our world and the varied contexts we live 2 incremental advances of science. within. In a new science world of Chaos and Complexity The father of medicine himself, Hippocrates, was the Theory, network science and biological science, we begin first to attribute disease to natural rath- to think that just maybe a Brazilian butter- er than supernatural causes over 2,300 fly can cause a storm in Texas, six or less years ago. Hippocrates’ theory of the Four people may link me to you, or that wasps Humors, or four essential body fluids, ex- really do follow three simple rules in the plained that all illness was due to an im- creation of vast and efficient colonies. Just balance of these fluids. He often prescribed maybe. herbal treatments and bed rest. It was not Truth has a date-time stamp. It always until the 16th century that an alternate theory has. A review of civilizations reveals the emerged, asserting that disease came from truths of the age more than likely reflect- outside the body, disputing much of the Hu- ed the mainstream science and social be- mors theory. However, 18th century medical liefs of that age. Breakthroughs in science, “advances” revealed bloodletting and purg- which may better explain the world around ing of even the anemic patient were better Sir Isaac Newton us, gain acceptance over time.

July - September 2005 41 A Basis for Acting Relating epistemology to the “Intelligence” discipline is simple and fundamental. How we think determines what we consider to be true. What is considered true provides a basis for action. In foreign policy and national security matters, intelligence provides truth about adversaries to the policy maker and the warfighter. Intelligence drives action. Sometimes intelligence becomes the justification for action. In a complex, interconnected, increasingly ambiguous and dangerous world, “actionable” intel- From left, J.F.C. Fuller, Antoine Henri de Jomini, and Carl von Clausewitz ligence gets premium billing. to be true were false, then do we have actionable stupid- What we consider to be true also depends on, and is ity? derived from, the standards of thought applied and accepted by peers and institutional culture. Truth, then, is Epistemology and Military Science, or nothing more than what the peers vote on as “true.” In Rather, How to Act intelligence, the meaning from observed fact or actions Military “science” lags the “real” science of the world. comes from the body of previously applied evidence and Said another way, military epistemologies follow the so- peer acceptance of the analysis. The standards of con- cial and scientific “truths” of the greater society rather ventional intelligence analytical rigor may prove to be than leading them. The military science predominant in inadequate to base our actions upon in the future. This the U.S. military is firmly rooted in Newtonian science. becomes particularly relevant as new or different meth- Carl von Clausewitz, the most prominent Western mili- ods of assigning value or meaning turn into accepted tary theorist, was the first to use analogies to Newtonian practice in the greater society. science and metaphors about physical matter to describe The correlation of observed facts may not always trans- warfare. Clausewitz, J.F.C. Fuller, and Antoine-Henri de late into meaning. Ambiguous facts or activities may im- Jomini each constructed military theory by applying por- pede appropriate action; other times it may prompt action; tions of Newton’s scientific theories to the theory of con- 5 other times it may prompt action against the wrong target. ducting war. Lack of “actionable intelligence” limited the U.S. in acting Subsequent interpretations of Clausewitz’s abstract decisively against alQaeda prior to September 2001. Air theories on war imbued military planners and practitio- strikes in 1999 against a Yugoslav military facility in Bel- ners with desire to control the battle space of physical war grade hit the location as planned but the actual tenant was by applying linear calculation and cause-effect planning the Chinese Embassy. 4 The 1998 missile strike against a against enemy forces. Ironically, Clausewitz emphasizes pharmaceutical plant suspected of producing precursors the unpredictability of real war, the impact of chance, sys- for VX nerve agents in Khartoum may Table 1. Differences in science and belief characteristics. 6 well have been justified, however, dual- use technologies and materials raise the level of ambiguity for intelligence analy- Epistemology Systems View Characteristics Natural State st Direct Observation 1 Wave Independent sis and meaning to a higher level. Given Agrarian Natural Rhythms Lore/ Nature Natural Order Observed Entities that the U.S. has a preemptive National Age Religion/Customs

Security Strategy focused on the threat nd Science/Scientiﬁc Method 2 Wave Independent of weapons of mass destruction and ef- Industrial Induction/Deduction Closed Equilibrium Age Analysis/Synthesis Complex fect, conﬁdence in acting on intelligence Discern Behavioral requires understanding of both the facts rd Disorder 3 Wave Patterns Multi-Systemic Interdependent Information Open Continous and the meaning, beyond the peer vote Exchanges Emerging Complex Age Adaptations standard. Characteristics

Actionable intelligence is some set of actions taken on temic views, and introduces the notion of fog (inadequate the basis of what we believe to be true. If what we believe intelligence) and friction. 7

42 Military Intelligence The dominant themes of current mili-  Advertisers use Small-World Theory tary theory continue with these analogies to create a “buzz” for new product and and describe war and the interaction of services by targeting connectors and combatant armies and supporting na- weak ties within networks. tions as a clash of closed systems. War  Human Genome Project insights lead planning is an attempt to sub-divide war pharmaceutical companies to create and warfare into delineated battle space new drugs and treatments operating and frameworks. Distinct start and stop at the level of the genetic code. times schedule actions across planned  Micromechanical computing, super- and controlled phases of operations. computing, and advances in chemical This is a reductionism approach, de- molecular engineering drive emerging composing opposing elements and their nano-molecular construction of new properties to understand them (obser- materials. vation, induction, and deduction), to Non-military professions embraced determine where to apply force. These new sciences because of their improved behaviors are consistent with second explanatory power. New applications wave or Industrial Age scientifi c princi- provide increased levels of confi dence in ples. the actions they take. These professions The ultimate effect and target of recognize required change when dealing military operations remains oriented on with the external environment consisting imposing will. As Clausewitz says, “war of open, complex systems. For instance, is an act of violence intended to compel Network Theory helps identify where our opponent to fulfi ll our will.” 8 Using key intersecting links or clusters exist. Newtonian science-based theories of Connectors, whether human or not, war, the path to affecting the will of the provide disproportionate infl uences to a enemy is by destroying the enemy’s supporting mass and given phenomenon or network. Random links and so-called physical capability to continue the fi ght. weak ties also provide stability to networks and resilience New Military Science in the face of deliberate or random disruptions. The point is, by fi nding the inherent order in a chaotic world, smarter Network Centric Warfare (NCW) and Effects Based choices are made. By more completely understanding the Operations both address new science theories such as phenomenon, as it exists, better predictions can be made cybernetics and the interdisciplinary Chaos Theory and about how it will act and adapt. Traditional decompositions Complexity Theory. Service Battle Labs incorporate Arti- and analysis of the parts cannot explain the emergent fi cial Intelligence, Neural Network Theory, and Advanced behaviors of the whole. 10 Simulation Modeling into weapons system components, sensors, and planning systems. Other professional dis- NCW is achieving growing cultural acceptance in U.S. ciplines have incorporated new sciences and theories military. Effects Based Operations has not yet induced much earlier and more deeply than the military. Examples signifi cant change in service doctrines and cultural views of how these professions have adopted new science to toward war, yet it is creating niche activities and “cells” drive many of their actions include the following: within staff structures and Command and Control nodes. Even so, the incorporation of advanced technologies and  Transaction analysis assists investigators looking for the introduction of new science have been applied in the fraudulent fi nancial exchanges, helps sales and mar- context of adapting them into the Industrial Age precepts. keting departments discover new or emerging con- Even with the adoption of Information Operations and sumer buying patterns, and supports stockbrokers in Information Warfare, the basic approach to the analysis evaluating stocks and business mergers. of targets and effects are linear and attempt to fi nd the  Epidemic models for disease outbreaks are now us- adversaries’ informational “centers of gravity.” 11 For the ing agent-based modeling and behaviors as well as mainstream military, little has changed in the world of mili- network theory to improve assessments of outbreak tary science since the age of Napoleonic campaigns; the potentials.9 military incorporates many elements of the Information

July - September 2005 43 Age capabilities into the Industrial Age epistemologies of ment, munitions, organizations, and information systems. war. In a period of continuous change and rising ambigu- Information warriors and cyber terrorists attempt to disrupt ity in the actions of our current and potential adversaries, second-wave institutions and cultivate first-wave fears. can we afford this latency in the application of potential The First Wave tools or thought as we prepare for and conduct war? In the first-wave society, truth came from direct observa- Conflicting Epistemologies tion of the physical environment and the behavior of other The underlying “science” of the first, second, and third men and animals. Gaps in understanding were filled by wave societies differs in regard to how we know what we tradition, religious precepts, social taboos, and tribal lore. know. This challenges what is considered to be the truth For the first-wave warrior or chieftain, the observation of or conversely untrue. What we believe to be true leads us the enemy clan, tribe, or army provided a truth and a ba- to take action. sis for action, especially when combined with understanding of the seasonal timing and social history between the As briefly described, the basis of truth lies in the under- combatants. He could see his enemy directly or through lying knowledge structures and beliefs about our physical the eyes of his scouts and spies. He could count the men world and the world of human behavior. Epistemologies and objects of war. The objects of war for the most part themselves can be in conflict. Meaning can be the ref- were extensions of the man and required muscle power erent of an object or fact. This usage contains implica- to achieve a killing effect. He related these facts to the tions based on language. A “lady” has different meanings understanding that the harvest was complete and that and implications ranging from deep respect to an epithet. his tribe had sacked the enemy last season. He created The propositional usage of meaning adds context and ac- meaning from these direct observations and the under- counts for the structural environment for which the object standing of human behavior. The knowledge required for or fact resides. “It is raining” is meaningful only if it is, in making war on an enemy included very basic elements fact, raining. These become key determinants in what is such as intention, time, location and numbers. considered true in meaning. 12 As the first-wave world ceded totemism, taboos and Truth has been assumed to have an absolute quality, simple human observation to second-wave “scientific” one of verifiability or at least the presence of objective explanations of disease, the universe, and the terrestrial fact. Mathematical certainty, the scientific method, and world, truth changed for civilizations. It seemed Newton observations leading to explanation of cause and effect trumped the superstitious chieftains and clerics in all shape the idea of what we believe to be truth. explaining how the world really worked. Epistemologies of times past filled gaps in the mental The Second Wave framework of men by explaining remaining uncertain- In the second wave, science and philosophy ruled ties in the face of science. 13 The truth, similar to beauty, the mind of man. Industrial production required mass therefore can be found in the eye of the beholder as often education, standardization, and engineered solutions as it is present in the laws of Newtonian physics. And, just to complex (but solvable) problems. From the atom to as truth can vary, epistemologies vary as well. the Milky Way, things could be analyzed, reduced to Thinking in Waves its basic elements and characterized according to the The world is tri-sected. 14 However, we cannot clear- appropriate scientific discipline. The second wave was ly delineate the boundaries between First Wave, Sec- an age of deconstruction and reassembly. Unexplained ond Wave, and Third Wave environments, nation-states, phenomenon, if it existed, was reformed to fit into mental or societies (see Table 1). Somali tribesmen use cell frameworks and made to conform to the science that best phones; Microsoft engineers still rely on agriculture for explained it. The expansion of science, bureaucracy and daily bread. The steel worker watches CNN as he surfs warfare in the industrial age represented this topology. the World Wide Web. And so on. Even tri-sected military Science sprouted into separate disciplines and “schools worlds co-exist. Tribesmen use machetes with deadly ef- of thought.” Bureaucracies developed to plan and control ficiency as helicopters ferry peacekeeping troops to re- ever increasing collective efforts of man. mote areas of Rwanda. Coalition partners in Operations Warfare theorists established separate theories of DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM demonstrated control and application of science onto segmented bat- second- and third-wave characteristics in terms of equip- tle space. The Industrial Age was characterized by the

44 Military Intelligence dominance of machines over muscle. When second-wave the destruction of the combined capacity of the military armies turned on each other in the 20th century, the mass and supporting industry to conduct war. destruction and killing power inherent in these war ma- The Third Wave chines became self-evident, disturbingly so. No longer did a man face his opponent solely on a discreet field of The third-wave world represents yet another shift in the battle and look into his eyes as he wielded a close com- science and philosophic underpinnings of truth. Informa- bat weapon. Increasingly sophisticated machines, under tion—who has it; how they got it; and, most importantly, the control of man, delivered the munitions and effects to how they use it—changes the characteristics of power. 16 kill other men and destroy machines. Some man-machine Information substitutes for capital and for violence in 17 weapons attacked the production capacity of the enemy. the third wave. Individual humans and social groupings The quest in preparing for and conducting war became a gather, process, and create knowledge from disparate 18 quest of enhancing firepower and the efficiency of deliver- data and convert it to power. ing massed violence and destructive effects. Attrition war- The ability to rapidly turn data into information and sub- fare gave way to annihilation warfare as the Industrial Age sequently into knowledge becomes the “sine qua non” of systems matured; it was the time of the “war machine.” winners in the third-wave competitive environment but Embedded technologies within the killing systems en- only if the potential winner is able to act appropriately hanced their “combat power” and provided the operational based on the knowledge created and do it faster than the edge on the battlefield. Men learned to produce, employ, loser in relative terms. Actors operate with outcomes in combine, sustain, and repair these systems which were mind, self-organize, and self-direct actions to accomplish specifically designed for war. Science led to extensions those outcomes. Increasingly, actions are taken without of the human senses through radar, sonar, electronic sig- detailed orders or strict controls imposed from the top. nal intercept, and advanced optics. Medical science led Continuous innovation is required to keep winning. to industrialized chemical and biological weapons. For- The third wave complicates the notion of truth by re- mations respond to commands from the top. Commands inforcing the idea that meaning can exist separate from flow through a standardized hierarchy and through stan- truth or the existence of objective facts. Power structures dardized communications systems with standardized pro- are more reliant on knowledge than force. Third-wave en- cedures and protocols. Operational executions adhere to tities are more conscious of the importance of information strict schedules and occur within “lines of operations.” 15 as a commodity and recognize networks as transaction The truth, or rather the intelligence supporting Industrial arenas or marketplaces for the negotiation of truth. Mean- Age war, focuses on the enemy’s offensive production or ing may come from how information is exchanged, who killing capacity available in weapons produced in his in- exchanges information, and why the information is being dustrial base. We seek the Center of Gravity. The loca- assembled. The ability to link specific brains to other spe- tion of killing systems and the size of military formations cific brains for specific purposes become increasingly im- still matter, as they did in the first wave, but on an expo- portant. nentially larger scale. Intelligence requirements expand to Ambiguous Will include enemy campaign objectives, technical characteris- Identifying or counting hostile means in the third-wave tics of weapons, training proficiency, support systems, and world cannot determine hostile will. Unique military war- his lines of operations and logistics. Also of keen interest fare systems, controlled by a hierarchy, are competing are his production capacity and its location within the na- with equally dangerous flat networks of “Super Empow- tion to support the war. Observations from men and ma- ered Individuals”. 19 Moreover, the knowledge and tech- chines provide objective facts. nologies involved in creating the super empowering Meaning also comes from the assembly of facts about the capabilities flow through open communication channels enemy military-industrial complex, its proficiency, defense and come from commercial and often dual usage com- spending, and through an assessment of the political aims ponents. Proliferation activities, as well as the actual pro- and objectives a nation-state may have in regard to its own duction, hide within legitimate commercial or academic 20 security or interests. Posturing of capabilities indicates activities. hostile intent or hostile will to conduct hostile acts. The The rise of dual use technologies and materials increas- means to destroy the will of the nation-state focuses on es ambiguity and changes the meaning of many things

July - September 2005 45 relevant to second world intelligence analysis and mean- Examples of second-wave methods failing to predict ing. Box cutters, commercial airplanes, computer code, adversarial behaviors and limiting necessary action range live small pox strains and nitrogen-based agricultural fer- from failure to predict the rapid collapse of the Soviet tilizer all have legitimate use. With dual use comes dual Union and the attacks of 9/11 to the rise of terrorism and meaning. Observation of the underlying objective facts disorder in Iraq following the end of the Saddam regime. (their holistic context), attendant connections to people Second-wave science and analysis missed the key links and organizations, and systematic discernment of pat- among the 9/11 cells and murderers. Policy and non-in- terns of behaviors offer a greater certainty of the truth tegrated information systems prevented the sharing and with meaning. collective analysis of intelligence data in disparate, non- Newtonian science still makes sense of much of our integrated databases. Limited analysis for operations in universe. Nuclear medicine still drives many medical Iraq following the end of major combat operations did not treatments, and rational actor theories continue to drive provide the insight to what the power vacuum following some economic and political theories. Quantum phys- the destruction of the Ba’ath regime would lead to. ics, the Human Genome Project, holistic medicine, and Recommendations: Complexity Theory all explain phenomenon applicable to the universe, health, economics, and political behavior Master the New Sciences as a Community. New theo- in their own right. New sciences create new insight and ries and commercial tools offer great capabilities. Many of shape how industries compete. The old science, by itself, them have three- to five-year track records in large-scale doesn’t explain as much as it used to. data pattern analysis and anomaly detection. Human in- Figure 2. This figure describes the influences of the various epistemologies across teraction leaves signatures. Type or the three waves. characterize these identified signatures World Key Power (Element as “markers” and share them broadly Organization Actions View Influence Dependency) across the analytic community. These sig- Wealth-Land 1st Family/ Controlled by natures may be different than the second Cooperatives Local Violence-Man Wave Tribe Phenomenon Knowledge-Observed wave science expects to find, but they are Wealth-Industry likely to be there just the same. Network 2nd Nation- Attempt to Control Hierarchy Regional Violence-Mass Wave State Phenomenon theory describes the places to look and Knowledge-Science Wealth-Knowledge the behaviors to look for. Analyst training 3rd Transna- Attempt to Exploit Network Global Violence-Information and development is part of this. Infusing Wave tional Phenomenon Knowledge-Networks the community with skilled professionals from the fields of financial analysis, risk First and second-wave epistemologies remain valid management, biological science, and pathology offer an- in the trisected world. Rather than replace the first and other approach. Show customers how these techniques second-wave thinking, third-wave science should act to meet their needs. Link these analysts to the emerging con- complement, challenge, and provide additional insight to cepts. inform actions. Table 2 describes the influences of the Broaden the Analyst Pool. Third-wave, second-wave, various epistemologies across the three waves. and first-wave sciences are all valid. Anthropologists and Shortcomings of “Actionable Intelligence” complexity theorists can explore tribal patterns and influ- in the Third Wave ences on behaviors. Computer science experts can mod- 1. It is Not Predictive Using All the Science of Our Age. el these hypotheses and run scenarios to determine likely behaviors and adaptations to our operations. Hire and de- Except for small (but growing) elements within selected velop broad skill sets from across these wave sciences. organizations, intelligence analysis continues to rely on Retirees, even working from home with secure, biometric non-integrated databases populated by sensor feeds from and encrypted systems, can assist in analytic surges or traditional collection disciplines. Much of the information work long term, non-time sensitive reviews. Academia, inis in the form of “data,” collected and processed in such dustry, and selected partners can provide expertise when a form that it loses the surrounding context in which it required or, more importantly, when asked. was sensed or collected. Relationships among the data and the conversion of data or knowledge are difficult to Integrate New Technology. Integrate the technologies determine. of the new science with the human analyst trained in the

46 Military Intelligence newest theories. Automation and smart filters assist in Unite Operations and Intelligence. The closer an ana- the volume problem. Artificial intelligence and modeling lyst is to the supported customer or customer set, the bet- assists in the prediction process. Humans will still control ter the product will be. Presentation formats add mission these tools. specific relevance and require less manipulation at the 2. It Presents Point Solutions and Sub-Optimizes. end user level. This enhances speed of action. Opera- Current Intelligence methods are based upon the intel- tors who know what intelligence can and cannot do will ligence cycle. 21 Much like the first-wave man, governed plan actions accordingly. Intelligence will drive many op- by the seasons and the daily solar and lunar schedules, erations in the future and sets the pace for current con- so are many single “INT” analysts. Collection orientations tinuous operations. Intelligence supports operations and affect some analysts by making them overly dependent operations supports further intelligence. This is an in- or overly confident in one type of collection or collection creasingly symbiotic relationship. It is time to integrate. system. The daily “take” becomes the focus of effort in 3. It is Produced by Industrial Age Processes and analysis and often presents the analyst with only a nar- Systems. row view of target. Narrow views on the input often lead Admiral James Ellis, former Commander of the United to a narrow range of analytical perspectives. Narrow per- States Strategic Command said, “…if you apply comput- spectives in the analysis process lead to limited outputs ing power to a flawed process, you merely get the wrong and “INT” centric view of the truth. Actions taken on these 22 “INT” centric products may limit the full range of options answer faster” Intelligence hierarchies and collection otherwise potentially capable. Thus, intelligence is subsystems are functionally organized based on structures optimized and actions are oriented on point solutions. akin to the five senses. Hierarchies form within each domain. Peer factors limit the range of outputs. Analysts Persistent collection and time-sensitive targeting also may be risk adverse. Worst-case analysis and caveats creates pressure to produce actionable products in tight- fill the gaps and cover uncertainty. Reaching the wrong er and tighter response times. The linear process is too conclusions while using accepted analytical practices is slow. Moreover, it produces that which it can, rather than accepted more readily than being wrong by using innova- that which it must. Analytical focus on the collection of tive analytic practices. Automating or applying new tools facts and the observed truth can miss the underlying pat- without rethinking the structural changes and budget pro- terns or characteristics that may actually provide better cedural changes required to break down cultural barriers targets and result in more effective actions. limits the ability to achieve desired outcomes. Recommendations: Recommendations: Create a Community Culture Versus an “INT” or Network The Community and the Customer. Speed Agency Culture. Charge into the future as an army of the demand to response times. Allow customers to inter- analysts rather than a confederation of “INT” minded ana- act with the producer. Integrate new customers with de- lysts. Increase the cross-discipline exchanges by design mands for new types of intelligence. The culture should rather than by individual preference. Champion success change to view analysts and customers as one integrated stories that are multi-INT and customer focused. Opera- tional elements deployed to support military operations group. in places like Afghanistan and Iraq quickly become solid Expand the Application of Scientific Tools. Many tools teams and informally task-organize to support missions are already proven in other professions. Integrate them without the interference of rice bowl concerns or paro- into intelligence. Commercial systems should increasing- chial bias. Learn from them and advertise their great suc- ly be applied to the analytic environment. Demands from cesses. Single source or single “INT” successes reinforce the intelligence analytic community should drive some the point solution and sub-optimization problem. commercial ventures. Reorganize Community Programming and Budget Network Global and Local Experts. Organize analysis Processes. Shift the bulk of programming funds into col- into phenomenon and regional teams using multiple ana- laborative analytic ventures. Increase funding to cooper- lytic approaches. For example, the global drug trade is ative projects leading to operational successes. Limit the one phenomenon. Some characteristics or patterns of be- analytic funding for single INT focused systems or archi- havior from drug traffickers operating from Asia’s Golden tectures. Partner with the customer and make him an ad- Triangle may have commonality with drug trafficking from vocate of the analytic funding to specific programs. Latin America. Some patterns may not. Regional experts

July - September 2005 47 can use the expertise from the phenomenon experts and apply broader analytical techniques to their own regional requirements. 23 In essence, what will occur is a culture of cross-cueing leveraging multiple analytic insights or techniques. An approach like this fosters learning, adap- tation, and “teams” multiple analytic perspectives against discreet problems. Endnotes

Support Diversity in Analysis and Among Analysts. 1. JP 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 12 Patience and visible support for alternative methods and April 2001, 141. backgrounds will be required. Traditional analysis and analysts are not being cast aside. Identify risks inherent to 2. Robert P. Pelligrini, The Links Between Science and Philosophy and each analytical approach. Customers require confirma- Military Theory: Understanding the Past; Implications for the Future (Maxwell Air Force Base: School of Advanced Air Power Studies, tion from multiple sources; why shouldn’t they inherently Air University, June 1995). This paper traces the evolution of military demand analysis from multiple sciences? science and presents the impact of Newtonian science and Kantian philosophy on Carl von Clausewitz. Conclusion: Resolving Conflicts of the Mind 3. Chris Rohmann, A World of Ideas: A Dictionary of Important Theories, Our preemptive National Security Strategy really has Concepts, Beliefs, and Thinkers (New York: Balantine Publishing a knowledge gap to cross if we are to go from detection Group, 1999). of hostile intent or hostile will to actions involving glob- 4. See the transcript, Cohen Briefing on Chinese Embassy Bombing, al manhunts and the preemptive application of force (vi- 10 May 1999, U.S. Information Service, Washington File at http:// olence). The ability to describe the assembly of hostile usembassy-australia.state.gov/hyper/WF990511/epf203.htm. capabilities by observing the production chain from the “foundry to the foxhole” does not cover dispersed, net- 5. J.F.C Fuller, The Foundations of the Science of War (London: worked minds and the simultaneous engineering of the Hutchinson and Co., Ltd., 1926), 33-47. Chapter 2 reflects Fuller’s interpretation of the Scientific Method and Darwinist theories new tools of warfare. Discerning exactly which brains and establishing a framework for Fuller’s theories of warfare and strategy. knowledge processes are connected to what other brains and knowledge processes matters. Focus shifts to dis- 6. This table depicts the author’s synthesis of the scientific descriptions cerning the locus or the nexus rather than focusing solely and comparisons found in this article’s two main references. See Alvin increased collection and the presence of details. Rath- and Heidi Toffler, The Third Wave: The Classic Study of Tomorrow (New er than replacing second-wave military theory, perhaps York: Bantam Books,1990) and Mark Buchanan, Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking Theory of Networks (New York: W.W. Norton these third-wave concepts should at least broaden the and Company, Inc., 2002). The Toffler’s Wave Theory of explaining thinking and provide alternatives to traditional analysis. dramatic change and upheavals in human history is used throughout More than one perspective (science/theory) is required this article as a framework to describe differences in perspectives of the world. Also see M. Mitchell Waldrop, Complexity: The Emerging to examine potential dangers in a tri-sected world. There Science at the Edge of Order and Chaos (New York: Simon and is no universal military theory and analytic perspective to Schuster, 1992). enable action. Military and analytic art should match the circumstances of the problem presented, be it a first, sec- 7. Carl von Clausewitz, On War (London: Penguin Group, 1962). See ond, or third wave. This is like matching Newtonian sci- Chapters II (122-137) and VII (164-166). ence to the right physical science problem, while at the 8. Clausewitz, 101. same time, recognizing when to apply quantum physics to other problem sets found in our universe. 9. See the Center for Disease Control and the Santa Fe Institute Limiting or constraining the application of new and paper “Applying Network Theory to Epidemics: Control Measures for Mycoplasma Pneumoniae Outbreaks” at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/ emerging knowledge structures and technology limits our EID/vol9no2/02-0188.htm. ability to assert confidence in the resulting “truths.” Resul- tant actions, based on our belief of what is true, therefore, 10. Mark Buchanan, Nexus: Small Worlds and the Groundbreaking may be incomplete, inappropriate, or just plain wrong. Theory of Networks (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc., 2002).

48 Military Intelligence 11. JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 9 October in terms of data quality, context, and of course meaning. The community 1998, V-5. will need to address this with the customer.

12. Rohmann, 255-256. Meaning actually has multiple definitions. 22. Remarks at the 34th Annual Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis/ Meaning can be the referent to an object, a propositional or contextual Fletcher Conference: Security Planning and Military Transforming After meaning, a definitional meaning, or a particular cultural or historical Iraqi Freedom, 2 to 3 December 2003, Washington, D.C. Available on meaning. line at http://www.ifpafletcherconference.com/transcripts.htm.

13. Ibid., 410-411. See Concepts of Truth. 23. The term “phenomenon” is used to describe a particular kind of problem set or issue for intelligence. It could be transnational such as 14. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn of proliferation, terrorism, or drug trafficking, or it could be intra-national the Twenty-first Century (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1993), such as tribal wars, political competition and organized crime. The 35-96. idea is that some phenomenon will have characteristics, behaviors and patterns common at the global, regional, and local levels, and 15. JP 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 10 September 2001, III-16. also distinctively different patterns at the same levels, based on the originating culture or sponsoring organization, environmental factors, 16. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Powershift: Knowledge, Wealth, and specific histories, etc. Broader understandings come from approaching Violence at the Edge of the 21st Century (New York: Bantam Books, phenomenon for multiple perspectives and result in greater confidence 1990), 1-19. Power is composed of three elements—wealth, violence, for taking actions. and knowledge. These elements have differing relationships and characteristics across the different wave periods.

17. Alvin and Heidi Toffler, Creating a New Civilization: The Politics of the Third Wave (Washington, D.C.: The Progress and Freedom Foundation, 1994), 35-40. Major Pendall is currently assigned as a G2 plans officer with 18. Ibid., 42. Headquarters, Multi-National Corps-Iraq. He is a graduate of the U.S. Army’s Command and General Staff College and 19. Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: Understanding School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS). Major Pendall Globalism (New York: Anchor Books, 2000), 14-15. served as a strategic plans officer within the National Security Agency and within the U.S. CENTCOM Forward 20. Anthony H. Cordesman, “Intelligence Failures in the Iraq War,” Headquarters during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. He has Center for Strategic and International Studies, 16 July 2003, 306-324. served as a Military Intelligence Battalion S3, a Brigade Combat Team S2, an Armor Battalion Task Force S2, and 21. See JP 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, a Division G2 Plans Chief. His experience also includes 28 September 1998, I-2. The associated concept of Task-Process- command and staff positions during unit deployments to Evaluate-Disseminate has changed to Task-Post-Process-Use. This Bosnia, Korea, Kuwait, and the three Army maneuver training will cause the analytical process to change as well, becoming much centers. He holds a BA from Ohio University, an MS from more timely, distributed, and decentralized. Users will interact with Central Michigan University, and an MMAS from the Army data vs. analyzed reports, in many cases. Custom products for specific Command and General Staff College (Advanced Military operations can be assembled and disseminated inside operational Studies Program). Readers can contact Major Pendall at elements much faster than before. This will still present some problems [email protected].

July - September 2005 49

by Captain Kyle Teamey

Conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, Targeting in COIN differs greatly from that in conven- Afghanistan, and elsewhere forces tactical intelligence tional operations. Soldiers often find themselves con- personnel to operate in novel ways in order to deal with a ducting a wide variety of tasks ranging from direct fire flexible, adaptive threat. One of the more important tasks engagements to support to local governments and sup- of tactical intelligence personnel is to support targeting. In port to reconstruction operations. In this environment of conventional military operations, targeting is focused on full spectrum operations, intelligence personnel must pro- an opposing military force and revolves around the doctri- vide support to a huge variety of missions including the nal Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess targeting cycle. Intelli- targeting for deliberate attacks, raids, cordon and search gence personnel are a very important part of this process operations, psychological operations (PSYOP), informa- as they identify High Value Targets (HVTs), develop col- tion operations, and civil-military operations (CMOs). This lection plans to detect enemy High Payoff Targets (HPTs), task is often more demanding of tactical intelligence per- collect intelligence on the effects of munitions delivered sonnel than is the conduct of conventional operations as on targets, and provide assessments on an enemy force’s it requires a much greater depth of understanding about remaining capabilities. the enemy and the operating environment (OE). It also requires that intelligence personnel work closely with civil affairs (CA), PSYOP, and other personnel with whom they do not normally work. In addition, COIN operations may occur in an environment where there are multiple targets available, not enough resources to address all of the targets, and limited windows of opportunity for affecting the targets. This means the decision of which target to address at which time is crucial. The Targeting Cell The differences in the OE mean that the targeting process differs as well. The targeting cell in a maneuver brigade will normally consist of a representative from S2, S3, S5, fire support officer (FSO), PSYOP, CA, public affairs, and possibly personnel from subordinate battalions and division headquarters, Special Forces, and/or the other governmental agencies. This variety is necessary in order to ensure that the entire spectrum of friendly operations is covered and the 2nd and 3rd order effects of operations are accounted for. Although the A civil military affairs officer makes friends with an Iraqi boy cell itself may only meet once a day or once a week, S2 during a medical services mission in Saba Al Bor. personnel should make an effort to continuously interact

50 Military Intelligence with others involved in targeting in order to ensure they Complicating the task is the fact that people will make maintain a common operating picture. false claims against individuals they do not like and may also misrepresent themselves as having more influence The COIN Targeting Process than they actually do. This means that multiple source The phases of the targeting process vary from con- reporting is necessary to ensure that a target is really a ventional doctrine. Rather than Decide, Detect, Deliver, target. In addition, there are multiple kinds of targets that Assess, the process often changes to Detect, Decide, can be identified, and not all of them are the enemy. The Deliver, Assess. This alteration of the process was brief- brigade will also have to target its CMOs in order to en- ly outlined by Captain Brian Gellman in “Lessons Learned sure they have the desired effects. The kinds of targets a from OIF: An SF Battalion S2’s Perspective.” 1 Intelligence unit will prosecute can be broadly differentiated as target personnel in Iraq generally detect a wide variety of targets personalities and target areas. at any given time. They have to work with other person- Target Personalities (also called HVTs or High Value In- nel involved in the targeting process in order to prioritize dividuals) which targets to expend resources on, how to expend those resources, and to make changes to the collection  Kinetic targets: insurgents or leaders who can be cap- plan in order to support the brigade’s priorities. tured or killed.  Non-kinetic targets: personnel who can be engaged through negotiation, meetings, contracts, information operations (IO), etc. Target Areas  Areas controlled by insurgents.  Areas where insurgents commonly operate.  CMO opportunities, areas where the population may be receptive to CA projects or PSYOP. A technique for simplifying the Detect phase is to split up targeting tasks by echelon. For instance, a maneuver battalion would be responsible for tracking target personalities such as cell leaders and below, localized community or city leaders and below, and area targets within their area of operations (AO). The brigade would have responsibility for tracking insurgents from the cell leader to fa- A Soldier passes out pro-coalition flyers to the citizens of Fallujah, Iraq, during Operation Salm. cilitator or regional leader level, community leaders up to the provincial level, and area targets that cross battalion Detect boundaries. This separation of tracking greatly lessens The Detect phase, constantly ongoing and similar to In- the load of battalion and brigade S2 sections and ensures telligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), is done on that they are still capable of supporting the targeting deci- a continual basis and requires a great deal of analytical sions of their commanders. work by tactical intelligence personnel. The S2 and the It is also very beneficial to have an officer or noncom- Analysis and Control Team (ACT) (in legacy brigades that missioned officer in the S2 section or the ACT who does still have an ACT) have to go through reams of all-source targeting and plans full time. This soldier should not be intelligence reporting to determine the validity of threats responsible for day-to-day operations, but focused com- and how important different potential targets actually are. pletely on identifying and keeping track of targets. This This requires an understanding of tribal networks, so- allows them the time to sift through the large amount of cial networks, insurgent networks, insurgent actions, and reporting coming in daily, analyzing it appropriately, con- community atmospherics. Products that aid in this are link tinuously fusing the information with other members of the diagrams and “target folders” containing summaries of in- targeting cell, and considering the next move of enemy formation on a target and the reporting associated with personnel. Poor target identification leads to wasted ef- the target. fort by soldiers in the field as they raid the wrong house or

July - September 2005 51 establish ambushes in the wrong place. Therefore, hav- will also have to determine appropriate means for dealing ing personnel dedicated to doing it right is extremely im- with each. The key to these decisions is an understanding portant. In addition, because detection of a time-sensitive of the operating area that allows for a reasonable idea of target may occur at any time, it is best if target information the effects of friendly actions. is continuously maintained, readily available, and easily The S2 section must provide information on the rela- briefed. This ensures personnel involved in the target- tive importance of different target personalities and areas. ing process can aid the commander in coming to a rapid The intelligence available to the S2 section and the ACT is course of action decision when one is necessary. often complementary to information that maneuver com- Decide panies and battalions, the S5, CA, and PSYOP maintain. This greatly adds to understanding the effects that an op- The Decide phase is the culmination of previous intel- eration will have. For instance, the S2 may have identiﬁed ligence work and arguably the most important phase of an insurgent leader. Using link analysis they will have an the targeting cycle in COIN. The targeting cell will use idea of the effects on insurgent networks, tribal networks, its knowledge to try and achieve effects consistent with and social networks that detaining the leader will have. the brigade’s campaign plan and the commander’s intent. The maneuver company or battalion responsible for the This is where a thorough understanding of the OE be- area in which the insurgent leader is operating may know comes very important to predictive analysis of the effects the popularity of the insurgent there. CA and PSYOP may of friendly actions. Personnel in the targeting cell will make have speciﬁc atmospherics information on the neighbor- recommendations on how to use the limited resources of hood that give an idea of how locals feel about insurgents the unit to address multiple threats or opportunities. They and the means for winning support after the insurgent

Soldiers, from the 346th Psychological Operations Company, and paratroopers of the 82nd Airborne Division’s 505th Para- chute Infantry Regiment, conduct a dismounted patrol in Al Fallujah, Iraq.

52 Military Intelligence leader is detained. Fusion of this information allows for place for how to achieve the desired effects. Intelligence prioritizing various target personalities and target areas. personnel support this by providing background informa- As the targeting cell determines the relative importance tion on the personnel who will be at each meeting. of various targets, it also must determine the best means Deliver for addressing each. Inappropriate targeting decisions The Deliver phase of COIN targeting differs only from can have major negative effects. For instance, an area conventional operations in that a very wide variety of supportive of insurgent activity may be easily won over operations are undertaken. In order to support these, with a CA project or turned even more pro-insurgency by intelligence personnel must adapt the collection plan ap- a cordon and search operation. In another area, a CMO’s propriately. approach may only embolden the insurgents. The correct course of action must be taken with each target, and it Assess must be focused on the effects of the course of action. The Assess phase differs from conventional operations There are a wide variety of ways a target can be pros- in many ways. Intelligence personnel must look for report- ecuted in order to achieve the positive effects: ing that indicates the effects on insurgent networks and Target Personalities the community due to an operation. Depending on these effects, commanders may choose to expand the opera-  Capture or kill. tion, maintain it as is, halt it, change to a branch or sequel  Threaten (must be credible and backed by appropri- plan, or try to contain the damage of a mistake. Metrics ate action). often include—  Subvert.  Changes in atmospherics.  Offer surrender terms.  Changes in intelligence provided by individuals or  Negotiate terms for normalized relations. groups.  Use IO to build or undermine legitimacy.  Changes in the economic or political situation of an  Conduct leader engagement to build rapport. area. Target Areas  Increases or decreases in enemy actions.   Deliberate attack. Captured or killed enemy personnel.  Counter-battery.  Captured equipment and documents.  Cordon and search operations. Raids often provide a wealth of information that must  Ambushes. be rapidly exploited. Intelligence personnel in the brigade  Establish outposts. often must be prepared to do a great deal of exploita-  Patrolling. tion work. Though arduous, it is worth the time committed.  Provide support to security forces. Exploitation of documents and detainees often provides  Distribute PSYOP materials intelligence of enormous value on the structure of local insurgent organizations and may create a “snowball” effect  Build or rebuild infrastructure. whereby additional insurgents can be captured.  Provide job programs. At the end of the Decision phase, there is a prioritized Conclusion list of targets and a recommended course of action as- Maneuver brigades have a unique position when in- sociated with each. As the Detect phase is similar to IPB, volved in COIN operations. By doctrine, a unit should al- the Decide phase is similar to an abbreviated form of the ways understand what is occurring two echelons above it Military Decision Making Process (MDMP). Fragmentary and two echelons below. The brigade is therefore monitor- Orders by the S3 planner often come about as a result of ing what goes on at the company level and at the corps/ the Decide phase of the targeting process. It should be theater level. In many ways, this makes the brigade staff noted that meetings between indigenous leadership and a link between day-to-day tactical operations line soldiers commanders must also be targeted. The targeting cell and the theater-level campaign. For intelligence person- should identify and prioritize who to meet with and how of- nel, it means they are looking at everything from local in- ten. They should also look at the desired effects for each surgents to major regional ﬁnanciers and organizers who meeting with local leadership and have a basic plan in may cross international boundaries.

July - September 2005 53 The targeting decisions made by the brigade staff not Endnotes only have local effects, they may have strategic effects on 1. Published in the April-June 2004 issue of MIPB. the conduct of a war. The success or failure of the brigade will be tightly linked to the manner in which it conducts targeting. An efﬁciently run, full-spectrum targeting process can help ensure the brigade meets goals outlined in its campaign plan. A poorly run targeting process can undermine the war effort for an entire theater and unnec- essarily cost the lives of soldiers. It is therefore crucial that intelligence supports the targeting process by pro- Kyle Teamey works as a civilian analyst in the Central Iraq Team, viding a robust, comprehensive understanding of enemy RAO-5/J2. He is also currently the lead author for the Intelligence forces, the indigenous population, the local economy, so- chapter of the upcoming Army and Marine Corps Field Manual on cial and political organizations, political leaders, and how Counterinsurgency. He previously deployed for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM from August 2003 to September 2004 with the 1st they all interconnect. Further, intelligence personnel must Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, serving as the Brigade understand their OE well enough that they are able to rec- Assistant S2 for Targeting/Plans and the S2X in Ar Ramadi, Iraq. ommend targets and means of engaging those targets in Readers may contact Captain Teamey via email at kyle.teamey@us. order to achieve desired effects on the battleﬁeld. army.mil.

A Soldier, from 361st Psychological Operations Battalion, hands out literature and shakes hands with Iraqis in Mosul.

54 Military Intelligence Training the Corps 21st Century Infrastructure Meets Military Intelligence Training by Andrea Malone and George Stemler

The Global War on Terrorism has substantially increased the Army’s demand for Military Intelligence (MI) Military Oc- cupational Specialties (MOSs) 96B10, Intelligence Analyst, and 97E10, Human Intelligence Collector. Both MOSs are trained at Fort Huachuca, Arizona, by the 309th MI Battalion, 111th MI Brigade. The two courses are the largest of the ﬁve Initial Military Training (IMT) courses and one functional course trained by the 309th MI Battalion.1 The Army Train- ing Requirements and Resources System (ATRRS) projects the 309th MI Battalion will train substantially more sol-

Battalion Commander

S1 S2 S3 S4

A Company B Company C Company D Company E Company F Company 96R/98H/ Instructor 96B 96B 97B/E 97B/E Reclassifying Cadre Students Students Students Students and Hold Over Students �

Figure 1. 309th MI Battalion Reorganization. diers in Fiscal Years (FYs) 2006 and 2007 than previous years. To meet the increased annual student throughput, the 309th MI Battalion was reorganized (as depicted in figure 1) from three to six training companies FY 05. Fort Huachuca modified its training infrastructure to provide the 309th MI Battalion orderly rooms for A and C Compa- nies, student housing, multi-purpose classrooms, and field training exercise (FTX) Tactical Operation Centers (TOCs) for course Capstone exercises. Open-bay barracks are employed to provide housing for students assigned to A, C, and F Companies. Each soldier is assigned a wall locker containing a personal pull-out desk, which provides each soldier personal space to write letters and work on school assignments. The student housing is wired to provide a modern telephony capability. Other buildings house 32 general purpose classrooms with seating for 992 students. In addition, other buildings provide the 97E10 course with space for over 100 questioning and interview booths. Each general purpose classroom contains up-to-date audio visual (AV) equipment enhancing the instructor’s presentation of course material. The AV suite includes manual projection screens and ceiling projector units connected to the instructor’s desktop. All classrooms were installed with network drops sufficient to handle the maximum student capacity for each classroom. For a number of years the U.S. Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca (USAIC&FH) sought the capability to tie together the Capstone exercises conducted by certain MOS-producing courses trained within the 111th MI Brigade. While the 309th MI Battalion is the architect for MOS training, the Digital Training Office (DTO) is the architect for the infrastructure to execute the training plan. The DTO’s efforts to upgrade and modernize the communication infrastructure at field training Sites Papa, Uniform, and Maverick have made this a realistic goal. The 97E10 course uses field training Sites Papa and Uniform for their Capstone FTX; while the 96B10 course uses field training Site Maverick. The

July - September 2005 55 309th MI Battalion soldiers training in the field. newly installed digital communication infrastructure gives the two courses at the three FTX sites, the ability to digitally communicate with each other and other 111th MI Brigade courses. Sites Papa and Uniform are literally “across the street” from one another, but to connect the two sites approximately 6,900 feet of fiber-optic data and 50-pair copper voice communications lines were required. The 6,900 feet of fiber-optic and 50-pair copper voice cable were installed in an aerial configuration, using existing power poles. An additional seven poles were installed expressly for aerial communications cabling. The installation was conducted by members

11th Signal Brigade soldiers installing aerial fiber optics. of the 504th and the 69th Signal Battalions, 11th Signal Brigade in conjunction with the Sulphur Springs Valley Electric Cooperative (SSVEC). By performing the aerial installation, the Signal soldiers received real world training from experienced SSVEC linemen that will be invaluable during future real world deployments. The 309th MI Battalion and the DTO benefited from a drastic reduction in installation costs estimated to be at least $70,000. To achieve data and voice connectivity from Site Uniform to the Fort Huachuca garrison, line-of-site microwave ra- dios are employed. The microwave radio site is located above Site Uniform; the other end is located on the roof of Greely Hall, 5 to 6 miles away. To complete the connectivity between these sites, an aerial installation of fiber-optic cable was installed from the microwave radio site to an operations building located inside Site Uniform.

56 Military Intelligence Site Uniform’s microwave radio site. Future communication work includes installation of switches and network cabling to all training buildings located on both sites to support network connectivity. In addition, both Sites Papa and Uniform are scheduled to receive Informa- tion Processing System (IPS) safes and encryption devices. Site Maverick is configured to replicate eight TOCs. Sufficient network drops were installed in the TOCs to support the increased 96B10 student load throughout the course’s ten day FTX. Connectivity to the existing Fort Huachuca data backbone was extended to Site Maverick in the 3rd Quarter FY04 by the Fort Huachuca Director of Information Management (DOIM). The Site Maverick communications network is distributed via fiber-optic cabling from the main

309th MI Battalion soldiers training in ﬁeld. communications closet located in an existing building through manholes to each of the eight TOC buildings. This communications closet currently houses racked switches for complete network connectivity, the IPS safe and encryption device. Change is a constant feature in today’s training environment, adapting to change is necessary in order to take advantage of lessons learned and to incorporate advanced technology. Increased student loads, a new digital communication infrastructure, and the aggressive incorporation of lessons learned have provided the 309th MI Battalion and the DTO numerous opportunities to improve and enhance the training experience. By taking advantage of change, a rare opportunity now exists to utilize three cutting edge IMT training facilities to incorporate relevant lessons learned with a world class communications infrastructure.

July - September 2005 57 Endnote

1. The other courses trained by the 309th MI Battalion are 96R10, Ground Surveillance Systems Operator; 98H10, Communication Locator Interceptor; 97B10, Counterintelligence Agent (until February 2006). The 3C-35E/351B/244-97B20, Basic Counterintelligence Special Agent Course replaces the 97B10 course effective 1 October 2005. The functional course is 3C-F17/244-F9, Source Operations Course.

Ms. Andrea Malone is currently employed by Northrop-Grumman as the DTO Installation Projects Manager. She has 15 years of active duty experience with the U.S. Army, and 7 years of civilian information technology experience. She holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Western International University in Management Information Systems and a Master of Science degree from the University of Phoenix in Computer Information Systems. Ms. Malone can be contacted at 520-538-0190 or via email at [email protected].

Mr. George Stemler is the 309th MI Battalion’s Senior Civilian Training Specialist. Mr. Stemler has worked as a Training Specialist since retiring from the United States Army 1999. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Wayland Baptist University in Business Management and a Master of Science degree from the University of Phoenix in Computer Information Systems. Mr. Stemler can be contacted at 520-538-7027 or via email at [email protected].

Read Any Good Books Lately?

We weclome reviews of books related to intelligence professional development or military history. Please email or mail your book reviews with your phone number, address, the title, author, publisher’s address (listed on the book’s copyright page). Please send your reviews to [email protected] or mail them to ATTN: ATZS-FDT-M USAIC&FH, 550 Cibeque Street, Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017.

58 Military Intelligence Language Action Update: Notes from the Military Language Conference, Foreign Language and Culture: Force Multipliers, 8 to 9 November 2005 by Peter A. Shaver

The joint U.S. Army and Intelligence Center and Fort Survival language and cultural knowledge required by Huachuca (USAIC&FH) and the Defense Language In- unit soldiers stitute Foreign Language Center (DLIFLC) Military Lan-  Recommend Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) th guage Conference was held in Washington, D.C. on the 8 direct organizations to outline their efforts relating to th and 9 of November 2005. Around 240 government, mili- cultural expertise. tary, academic, and industry linguists attended. The event  Improve screening and training of translators and was jointly sponsored and supported by USAIC&FH and interpreters. MITRE Corp. in McLean, Virginia. Some of the keynote  speakers included Ambassador John Negroponte, Direc- Provide electronic dictionaries accessible from Word tor National Intelligence; The Honorable Rush Holt, Rep- documents and develop more automated means of resentative from New Jersey; Lieutenant General H.P. providing feedback to translators and editors. Osman, Director, Manpower and Reserve Affairs Marine Accuracy of information and intelligence derived from Corps; and Major General Barbara G. Fast, Command- translated documents ing General, USAIC&FH.  Improve user training and screening of translators and Groups were organized to discuss the use of military interpreters. and contract linguists; survival language and cultural  Improve Defense Language Aptitude Battery (DLAB) knowledge; accuracy of translated documents; coalition presently based on English grammar models to im- language requirements; linguist proficiency maintenance; prove the capability to recruit native speakers to serve professional skills integration; surge language capabili- as translators, interpreters, and language instructors. ty; the education system in support of the Department of  Improve training in source and target culture and lan- Defense (DOD) language requirements; non-linguist guage proficiency. devices such as the Phraselator; civilian language corps; national language priorities, and Reserve Component Coalition language requirements (RC) language issues.  Identify coalition languages that require support early Major Recommendations of the and often. Discussion Groups  Leverage coalition partners to provide additional translators and interpreters. Use of military versus contract linguists  Develop language and cultural strategies that will im-  Design a multifaceted approach to support opera- prove the accuracy of communication between the tions including linguists from the military, government U.S. and coalition forces possibly through profession- civilians, and contractors. al military education (PME).  Define various roles, missions, and language do- mains. For each role, mission leaders must determine Maintaining linguist proficiency whether these could best be supported by military,  Use DLI Lingnet and Langnet as a training clearing- government civilian, or contract linguists. house.

July - September 2005 59  Use the National Virtual Translation Center Language (ACTD) and DOD labs such as the Army Research Technology and Resource Nexus (LANTERN). Lab (ARL), the Army Research Institute (ARI) and  DLI refresher and immersion training to improve DARPA to collect user feedback and evaluations on linguist proficiency in the target language to meet automated language translation and interpretation the 2/2 requirement and, in some cases (as for the aids such as the Phraselator and post them for gov- National Security Agency), a 3/3 requirement. ernment personnel.  Expand Language Training Detachments (LTDs) to  Acquaint military personnel early, as in initial training, more locations making them easily accessible to mili- that this technology is available. tary linguists.  Increase development of tactical language products Recommendations on National Language such as the USAIC&FH Language MOS Enhance- Priorities for DOD and Intelligence ment Program and the DLI Language Familiarization Community Planning training; translation diagnostic aids from private com- Executive Branch panies such as MITRE, as well as other training de-  Presidential emphasis needed. veloped at the Regional SIGINT Operations Centers  Create a special advisor to the President for language (RSOC), and the I Corps Foreign Language Training and cultural awareness. Center (FLTC) at Fort Lewis, Washington.  Establish a national language policy:  Add colloquial (informal) language training to the DLI  Implement strategy for language education in the basic course. U.S. school system, K–12.  Wider use of diagnostic assessments and Individual  Provide scholarships for immersion and experi- Language Training Plans (ILTP). ences at university level.  Synchronize DOD language priorities to the U.S. Education system in support of military and DOD lan- university system. guage requirements  Identify and involve second generation foreign  Think globally; act locally. Tailor efforts to respond to language speakers (the Heritage community); local communities and local foreign language support provide incentives such as citizenship. opportunities.  Ensure that all language learners receive strictly de- Legislative Branch fined high quality instruction based on current foreign  Support the Executive Branch. language instructional methodology.  Provide funding and authority.  Rethink the teaching and learning paradigm of “one  Recruit and sponsor foreign language teachers, pro- teacher serving one group of learners.” vide incentives such as accelerated visas and citizen-  Expand the use of technology and share tech- ships. nology resources across the language education  Provide grants to education; develop and implement community. programs based on a foreign language assistance  Provide context for language learning. Show rele- program model to fund kindergarten through high vance beyond college admissions (career paths). school language education.  Broaden support base beyond DOD for making lan-  Pass a new “Lodge Act” to recruit non-U.S citizens guage and cultural competence a national priority. with critical language skills into the U.S. Army.1 Non-linguist devices such as the Phraselator  Develop national testing standards for students and  Provide links to the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation certification requirements for language teachers. Command (ATEC) and the Defense Advanced Re- State and Local Governments search Projects Agency (DARPA) on the DLI and For-  Establish language learning centers in Heritage eign Language Resource Center (FLRC) websites to enclaves and in language pioneering school districts. access the results of evaluations of devices.  Concerted effort on the part of the Army Civilian  Research current successful grades K–12 language Training Education and Development System (ACT- programs—replicate success. EDS), Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration  Implement funding, grants, and incentives.

60 Military Intelligence  Integrate DOD language requirements with univer-  Benefits to private industry such as more accurate and sity programs. timely contract negotiations, improved product quality and sales through concept exchanges, and enlarging  Link language programs and proficiency to success- markets. ful positions in private industry and government. RC Language and Cultural Priorities Academic Community  Use of Army Reserve Intelligence Support Center  K–12 language programs need to be standardized. (ARISC) for classified and unclassified language train-  Use scholarships for overseas experiences as an ing. incentive.  Implement practical, constructive interactive language  Establish visiting professor programs. training and immersion.  Seed money to Academe to start language pro-  Balance CTT and specified language training time. grams.  Explicitly state expectations for language proficiency  Expand Title 6 (International Education) programs skills. and review return on investment.  Improve Open Source Information System Document  Develop certification program as a way to provide a Exploitation (OSIS-DOCEX). pipeline of linguists which will assist DOD and other  Adjust incentive programs. government agencies to meet foreign language re-  Merge tuition assistance, Foreign Language quirements with standardized, proficient linguists. Proficiency Pay (FLPP), and higher education offerings Get money, produce product to a standard, or lose to motivate soldiers toward off-duty study and long- funding. term sustainment training.  Establish incremental performance-based grants and  Reduce unit commander’s training accountability; multi-year programs. transfer to senior NCOs.  Provide incentives to colleges and high schools to  Offer reclassification to become Military Occupational increase output of foreign language teachers. Specialty (MOS) 09L, Interpreter/Translator.  Increase scholarships to capture teachers (2 to 5  Establish Department of the Army G2 as the single year grants). source visibility for all linguist training opportunities re-  Promote use of language and technology in educa- gardless of proponent or school. tion.  Units provide language training during battle assem-  Mandate language proficiency skills across academ- blies. ic disciplines.  Units provide four hours of language training every Private Sector other drill. Encourage and provide incentives for linguists to study at home.  Implement corporate language sponsorship with uni-  Encourage and provide incentives for linguists to at- versities. tend 8 to 16 hour language events i.e., communi-  Microsoft / Computer Science – Chinese, Hindi, ty support for immigrants, lectures, fairs, tutoring on Urdu. weekends other than battle assembly weekends.  Exxon Mobile / Shell – Arabic, French African.  Language employment options/track to provide private industry with the best possible solution to linguist requirements and provide linguists with foreign Endnotes language career opportunities. 1. The “Lodge Act,” more properly known as Public Law 597 and named after  Provide internships with multi-national corporations Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the bill’s sponsor, was passed in 1950. This (Coca-Cola, SC Johnson). law provided for the recruitment of non-U.S. citizens with critical language skills into the U.S. Army.  Language Technology development to provide more accurate machine language support that will assist Peter Shaver is the Chief of the Culture, Foreign Language Integration linguists in producing a more accurate translation or Center (CFLIC) and the 09L Translator/Interpreter Course Manager. interpretation and assist non linguists in understand- Readers can reach him via email at [email protected] ing basic language meaning. and by telephone at (520) 538-1042 or DSN 879-1042.

July - September 2005 61 Intelligence Philatelic Vignettes Intelligence Activity on Pitcairn Island by Mark Sommer

Pitcairn Island lays claim to a secret space satellite program featured on a July 7, 2000 souvenir sheet. The accompanying text to the sheet mentions a secret program that was initiated in 1966 to build an airstrip on Henderson Island, a small uninhabited island near Pitcairn. The base was to be used for planes recovering ﬁlm canisters de- tached from spy satellites circling the earth.

Although U.S. Air Force planes did indeed catch jettisoned satellite ﬁlm con- tainers in mid-air over the Paciﬁc for many years, the aircraft were based in California and the idea of an airbase in the Pitcairns was never approved. It is unlikely that the scene depicted on the two stamps—that of survey and supply operations—ever took place.

The souvenir sheet was released on the opening day of the World Stamp Expo 2000 show in Anaheim, Califor- nia. Like many of the other stamps and souvenir sheets issued in conjunction with the World Stamp Expo, this sheet reﬂects the show’s space theme.

Mark Sommer holds a BA in Political Science from Yeshiva University and an MA in International Relations from Fairleigh Dickinson University. He teaches at Stevens Institute of Technology in the Humanities Department. His published works in the intelligence ﬁeld include: “Getting the Message Through: Clandestine Mail and Postage Stamps,” MIPB, October-December, 1992 and “Undercover Addresses of World War II,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Fall 1993.

62 Military Intelligence Directorate of Doctrine, USAIC&FH, Points of Contact

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July - September 2005 63 Contact and Article Submission Information

This is your magazine. We need your support by writing and submitting articles for publication.

When writing an article, select a topic relevant to the  A Public Affairs release if your installation or unit/agency Military Intelligence community (IC). requires it. Please include that release with your sub- Articles about current operations and exercises; tactics, mission. techniques, and procedures; and equipment and training  Any pictures, graphics, crests, or logos which are rele- are always welcome as are lessons learned; historical per- vant to your topic. We need complete captions (the who, spectives; problems and solutions; and short “quick tips” on what, where, when, why, and how), photographer cred- better employment or equipment and personnel. Our goals it’s, and the author’s name on photos. Please do not are to spark discussion and add to the professional knowl- embed graphics or photos within the article’s text, attach edge of the MI Corps and the IC at large. Propose changes, them as separate files such as .tif or .jpg. Please note describe a new theory, or dispute an existing one. Explain where they should appear in the article. how your unit has broken new ground, give helpful advice on  The full name of each author in the byline and a short a specific topic, or discuss how new technology will change biography for each. The biography should include the the way we operate. author’s current duty assignment, related assignments, relevant civilian education and degrees, and any oth- When submitting articles to MIPB, please take the fol- er special qualifications. Please indicate whether we lowing into consideration: can print your contact information, email address, and  Feature articles, in most cases, should be under 3,000 phone numbers with the biography. words, double-spaced with normal margins without em- We will edit the articles and put them in a style and for- bedded graphics. Maximum length is 5,000 words. mat appropriate for MIPB. From time to time, we will contact  Be concise and maintain the active voice as much as you during the editing process to help us ensure a quality possible. product. Please inform us of any changes in contact infor-  We cannot guarantee we will publish all submitted ar- mation. ticles and it may take up to a year to publish some ar- Send articles and graphics to [email protected] or by ticles. mail on disk to:  Although MIPB is theme driven, you do not need to ATTN ATZS-DCF-DM (Smith) “write” to a theme. U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca 550 Cibeque Street  Please note that submissions become property of MIPB Bldg. 61730, Room 124 and may be released to other government agencies or Fort Huachuca, AZ 85613-7017 nonprofit organizations for re-publication upon request. If you have any questions, please email us at MIPB@hua. What we need from you: army.mil or call 520.538.0956/DSN 879.0956. Our fax is  A release signed by your local security officer or SSO 520.533.9971. stating that your article and any accompanying graphics and pictures are unclassified, nonsenstitive, and releas- Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin able in the public domain. Once we receive your article, Upcoming Themes for Article Submission we will send you a sample form to be completed by your security personnel. Issue Theme Deadline  A cover letter (either hard copy or electronic) with your Apr-Jun 06 Cultural Awareness 15 Apr 06 work or home email addresses, telephone number, and a comment stating your desire to have your article pub- Jul-Sep 06 Counterinsurgency 01 May 06 Operations (COIN) lished.  Your article in Word. Do not use special document tem- Oct-Dec 06 National Agency Support to 01 Jul 06 Intelligence Operations plates.

64 Military Intelligence