Internal Colonisation, Development and Environment

ThirdWorld Quarterly, Vol22, No 1, pp 51 – 63, 2001

Internalcolonisation, development andenvironment

PETER CALVERT

ABSTRACT ‘Internal colonisation’is apoorlyde ned term, butno other phrase so accurately captures the full natureof the complexinteractions involved.Here the term ‘internal colonisation’is usedin abroadbut quite specic sense, to designatethe process bywhich, on the pretext of‘ development’, large parts of manySouthern states are still in effect beingcolonised by their ownruling elite. Theprocess parallels in all importantrespects external colonisationand is in essence the sameprocess, differentiated onlyby its geographicallocation. Just as towns formeda key link incolonisation, the use ofpolitical powerto bring aboutenclosure andencourage the growthof settlements gives the elite the ability todevelop both town and countryside. The urbanisation of the countryside andthe expansionof towns are therefore eachspecial cases ofthe desire to control landand use its capacityto generatewealth. The accelerated growth ofurban settlements inthe Southhas, however, serious implications for the environment.Thus the conceptof internal colonisationhelps explainthe distinctive natureof environmentalpolitics inthe South.

Theterm ‘internal colonisation’is notnew, but it has neverbeen particularly well dened and as aresult bothit andthe related term ‘internal colonialism’ havegained at least fourrather different meanings. 1 Theearliest sense referredto physical conquestwithin, not across, political boundaries.‘ Internal colonialism’was usedin this wayby Lenin in 1896to describe the Tsarist autocracy’s creation byforce of the Russian Empireas an internal market forcapital centredin St Petersburgand Moscow. 2 In a similar sense the NordicInstitute ofAsian Studies used‘ internal colonisation’in 1996 to refer to the physical conquestof the non-Hanpeoples in China by the governmentof the People’s Republic. 3 Bothbefore and since, however,states haveadopted the policyof colonisation of‘ unoccupied’lands withintheir ownnational territory. Byits advocatesthis has beencalled ‘development’but it toohas beentermed ‘internal colonisation’. As in Brazil in the 1960sand1970 s, sucha policycan serve adualpurpose as amethodof avoiding calls foreffective reformof land ownership. The relationship ofthis idea to the colonial contextwas madeclear byAdolf Hitler, whenin 1925he dismissed ‘internal colonisation’as asolution forwhat he saw as the approachingMalthusian crisis ofthe Reich,which had lost its overseas colonies as aresult ofthe Great War. 4 Instead hedemanded Lebensraum, ‘living

Peter Calvert is inthe Department of Politics, University ofSouthampton, Southampton S017 IBJ, UK.

ISSN0143-6597 print; 1360-2241 online/ 01/010051-13 Ó 2001 ThirdWorld Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/01436590020022574 51 PETER CALVERT space,’in which the Germanpeople could create anewexternal empire by establishing dominanceover their neighboursin Eastern Europe.Since landthat is ofany use to supporthuman li fe is veryrarely genuinelyunoccupied, this usageof ten implies the subjection ofethnic minorities to adominantculture. The notionof ‘ internal colonialism’as the dominanceof one race overanother appearsin adifferent contextwhen Stokely Carmichael andCharles VHamilton, writing in 1967,use it to describe the situation ofblack people in the USA,and evenmore recently indescriptions ofthe subjection ofminorities in Africa, notablyin Rwanda and Burundi. 5 Athird set ofmeanings derives fromthe dependencythesis anddescribes the wayin which, within a single set ofpolitical institutions anda unitarymarket, aperipherycould be subjected toan inferior economicstaus byadominantcore. Inthis sense it was usedby the USwriter Michael Hechterin 1975when in his Internal Colonialism hesoughtto argue that, inthe divisionof labour within the UK,Scotland(and Wales andIreland) had been denied full industrial development andbeen largely conned to the productionof food and raw materials. 6 AlthoughHechter himsel flater modied this thesis, it has beencomprehensively disproved:in fact Scotlandtook the lead inindustrial developmentin the 18th centuryand engineering and shipbuilding placed the Central Lowlandsat the ‘core’and not the ‘periphery’in the 19thcentury. 7 However,the thesis had alreadybeen adopted by some Scots Nationalists as anargumentfor separatism. Inrecent years aninteresting variant ofthe dependencythesis has emergedas ecologists havebegun to use the term torefer tothe ‘enclosure’of the commons bythe rulingelites ofThird World states. 8 Underthe heading‘ Fromcolonialism to colonialism’, TheEcologist has notedhow in IndiaNehru and his successors hadrejected the Gandhiandream of agrarian self-suf ciency. They set outto industrialise Indiaby export-orientedgrowth, and other new states in the course oftime soughtto do the same:

Aprocessof internal colonization, as devastating to the commons as anything that hadgone before it, was thusset in motion. Using the slogans of ‘ nation-building’ and‘ development’to justify their actions, Third World governments have employed thefull panoply of powers established under colonial rule to further dismantle (sic) thecommons. Millions have lost their homelands— or the land they made their home—to make way for dams,industrial plants, mines, military security zones, wastedumps, plantations, tourist resorts, motorways, urban redevelopment and otherschemes designed to transform the South into an appendage of the North. 9

But ofcourse the rulingelites whotake the decisions haveno intention of convertingtheir countries into ‘anappendage of the North’. Intheir eyes theyare simply makinguse ofthe powerthe international market affordsto consolidate their ownposition as anurbanised elite rulinga countrystill, after 50years of independence,largely rural.It is inthis last sense that the term ‘internal colonisation’is usedhere, to designate the process bywhichlarge parts ofmany Southernstates (andof the countrysidein some Northernones) are still in effect beingcolonised by their ownruling elite; whetherfor political oreconomic reasons doesnot matter, since the twoare inf act inseparable. 10 This is notjust ametaphorical usage,to beavoided because of the obviousrisk that it will 52 INTERNAL COLONISATION , DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT detract fromthe uniquenessof the colonial experience. 11 It is a colonial experience,though in anew(or revived) guise, and it is sucha useful term that its valuedeserves to bemuchmore widely recognised. The fact is that noother phraseso accurately captures the full natureof the complexinteractions involved. Why‘ internal’? Because,despite the widespreadtendency among environ- mentalists to blame the forces ofinternational capitalism forall that happensin Southernstates, theycould not act there at all if it werenot for the active co-operationof the indigenouselites. Thedependency theorists fully realised this. ‘Aneconomicclass orgrouptries to establish throughthe political process asystem ofsocial relations that permits it to impose onthe entire society asocial formof production akin to its owninterests; orat least it tries toestablish alliances orto control the othergroups or classes inorder to develop an economicorder consistent with its interests andobjectives’ . 12 Thesame processes ofindustrialisation, urbanisationand environmental degradation, moreover,took place inthe formerUSSR andEastern Europe,despite the fact that at the time theywere not part ofthe worldcapitalist order. Andwhy ‘ colonisation’? Thereare three keyreasons. It is the argumentof this paperthat: a) internal colonisation parallels in all important respects external colonizationand that infact theyare in essence the same process,differentiated onlyby their geographicallocation (the ‘bluewater’ fallacy); b)the key instrument ofcolonisation was the townor city andinternal colonisation is foundedon the relationship betweendevelopment and urbanisation; andc) we needthe term inorder better to understandenvironmental politics in boththe advancedindustrialised countries ( AICs) andthe South.Let us lookat eachof these inturn.

Internal colonisationas colonisation Internal colonisation parallels in all important respects external colonisation, characterised as it is bysettlement; extensionof political control; relations of superordination/subordination;implied oractual use ofcoercion. Althoughthe term ‘colonisation’actually derives fromthe Latin colonus, meaning‘ afarmer’, classical colonies werein fact daughtersettlements ofa self-governingcity state. Whenthey became cities themselves, theyexpected to gaintheir independenceand in the earlier stages ofthe process,they generally did so. Inthe modernage of colonialism, the notionof ultimate self-government seldom survived.Indeed, in large parts ofthe worlduntil after the SecondWorld Warit was assumed that the tutelage andhence superordination of the colonial powerwould be maintained indenitely. Onlysparingly was actual coercion used,since the keyto effective colonisation was still the city. The‘ NewLaws’ of15 42laid downrules forthe layoutand government of cities whichformed the basis forthe expansionand consolidation of the SpanishEmpire. Later, the African portcities suchas Dakar,Lagos, Cape Town and Durban and the Asian portcities ofBombay, Calcutta, Singaporeand Saigon, among others, were to formthe essential bridgeheadf romwhich the inuence of the imperial powers 53 PETER CALVERT couldbe projected inland. By the 19thcentury these hadbecome showcases of modernity,to beadmired, envied and emulated. Ininternal colonisation,the analogueof the colonial poweris anelite, nota country.Decolonisation has left it incontrol of a relatively small territory, while the establishment since 1945of the UnitedNations andregional organisations has created aworldorder in which expansion across national boundariesis severely restricted. Itthereforehas astrongincentive to makeuse ofits political controlto exploit the less-developedparts ofits national territory, especially since it is likely to benet disproportionatelyf romdoing so. Characteristically the focusof its political poweris acity, the primate city that almost invariablyhouses both the seat ofgovernment and the principal market forgoods and services. Theprocess ofcolonisation involvesnot only the subjection to central political controlof provincial cities andthe constructionof newones, but the morediffuse process bywhichthe city itselfexpands.This is the steady spreadof population into the countryside,both by the extensionof the urbanarea byin-migration,and though the out-migrationof the morewell-to-do intosuburbia. As settlement spreads,the central governmenttakes steps tobring it underdirect political controlf romthe centre.While adegreeof political freedommay be retained at municipal level, urbanareas, needingto enhance services, outruntheir tax base andbecome increasingly dependenton direct governmentgrants. The middle tier ofgovernment, the province,is brought underdirect rule.Classical federalism, involvinga distribution ofpowers betweenfederal andstate governmentsguaranteed by a written constitution, seldom survives the pressure forcentralisation. In the AICsthe process is almost complete andmost highand upper-middle-in- comestates are nowpredominantly urban. Some have very high rates of urbanisationindeed: Belgium and Kuwait 97% Uruguay 90 %,Argentina88%, Germany87%, Chile 86%,Denmark 85%, New Zealand, the UnitedArab Emirates 84%and the UK83%.More strikingly, ofthe 42countries listed in these categories bythe WorldBank in 1997,only three— Mauritius, Omanand Portugal—were less than50 %urbanised. 13 It is onlyrecently that the concentrationof population in this wayhas been questioned,despite the fact that it has implications forboth the city andthe countryside.Cities dooffer in-migrants jobopportunities, a widerrange of experience,entertainment andleisure; in aword,‘ civilisation’. Inthe past the city has beenthe acceptedcentre ofpolitical andcultural hegemony,given physical formin places ofworship, cultural centres andseats oflearning. The veryterm ‘civilisation’re ects the classical notionthat afull life is onlypossible inthe city. InNorthern Europe cities retained orregained their autonomyby a series ofbargains with local warlords,but warlords f oundeddynasties andfrom the 12thcentury onwards settled permanentlyin cities, creating the notionof a capital. Governmentattracted culture,generated jobs, created newcultural centres (in the 16thcentury Madrid, in the 17thVersailles, in the 18th WashingtonDC, in the twentieth NewDelhi, Abuja and Islamabad). The developmentof towns was initially the result ofgrain cultivation andthe need forprotected storage. Towns soon f oundthemselves forcedinto alliance or conict with local bigland owners for political power.Towns need a rural 54 INTERNAL COLONISATION , DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT hinterlandto ensure their feeding;what they can offer in return f oran alliance is areliable sourceof money. The long-term trend everywhere has been rst the expansionof towns and then the urbanisationof the countryside,as the capital came throughlegislation backedby forceto impose its ideas onthe rest ofthe country.This was shownmost forciblyat the time ofthe French Revolution,when Paris as the cradle ofthe Revolutionimposed its will onthe rest ofFrance, breaking down the oldprovincial boundaries, imposing the will ofthe central governmentand paving the wayfor the centralised Napoleonic state. But townsalso providean essential link betweenlocal elites andthe globalised worldof culture, diplomacy, banking and nance.It is throughthe social contacts possible withinthe city that these elites gainthe ability to use their international contacts topursue their ownpersonal agenda. It is all the more ironic thereforethat todayin the AICsthe tendencyfor people to seek the good life bymoving out of the cities into the nearbycountryside has beenbecoming moreand more marked. The situation is at rst sight quite different in the developingworld of the South.There the most striking feature ofthe past 25 years has beenurbanisation. The UN PopulationFund report, TheState ofWorld Population,1989 ,pointedout that ‘Theearth is rapidlybecoming an urban planet’.14 In1950only 29% of the world’s peopleslived in cities; in 1990three times as manypeople did so, and the proportionhad risen to 43%.But,more strikingly, in 1950only about half the world’s urbanpopulation was in Third Worldcities. Bythe year2 000the populationof cities in the ThirdWorld was expectedto outnumber that in the rest ofthe worldby more than two to one: 2251.4million to9 46.2million. 15 Hardoy et al criticise the widespreadassumption that inthe ThirdWorld ‘most ofthe problems(and much of the urbanpopulation) are in huge mega-cities’. 16 But it is hardlysurprising that in the First Worldpeople tend to thinkof urban areas in the ThirdWorld as mega-cities. In1950there wereonly twocities, Londonand New York, with a populationof more than eight million. In1990 there were2 0suchgiant cities, and14 ofthem werein the developing world.17 However,it is also true that in1990 only a third ofthe urbanpopulation ofthe ThirdWorld lived incities with morethan one million inhabitants. Infact in manyof the smaller and/orless populouscountries, hal fthe urbanpopulation lived incities withpopulations of less than100 000. Such smaller cities have also grownrapidly in recent years,and it is this rapidgrowth, rather thanthe overall size ofthe cities, that is associated with the problemsof urbanisation. Theproblems which urbanisation brings do not stem solely fromthe overall level ofurbanisation, which varies agreat deal fromone region to another.The most urbanisedpart ofthe developingworld is Latin America (73.7%)which is comparablewith Europe (73 .3%),but has some wayto go before overall it reaches the level ofNorth America (76.1%).Other parts ofthe ThirdWorld are muchmore rural: East Asia is only3 6.1%urban, Africa 33.8%,and South Asia 28.4%,but this is notlikely to last long. 18 Bangladeshis rural andhas only 17.7%of its populationliving in cities. Butit has infact ahigherpopulation density (935/km 2)thanThe Netherlands ( 457/km 2),the most denselypopulated countryin Europe,which has 88.9%of its populationliving in cities. 19 What is 55 PETER CALVERT most worrying,undoubtedly, is that countries that havethe fastest rate of populationgrowth overall also tendto havethe fastest rates ofgrowth of urban populations. Urbanisationhas effects bothon the city andon the countryside.Cities onthis scale, semi-plannedand yet still growingat unprecedentedrates, are anew phenomenonin human experience, and there would,therefore, be considerable doubtin anycase as towhether such large concentrationsof population are environmentallysustainable. Hardoy et al also criticise the assumption that ‘the highconcentration of population and production is amajor cause ofenvironmen- tal problems’. 20 However,cities doaff ect the environmentin anumberof obviousways, some moreharmful than others. They sterilise agricultural land, raise local meanair temperatures bysome 3 °C,generatesolid, liquid and gaseouswaste inhuge quantities, reducerainwater runoff,but increase the risk of ooding,create the needfor elaborate transport systems and,while offering jobopportunities, also create anapparently insatiable demandfor more cheap labour.21 Totake onlyone area ofconcern, the WorldHealth Organisation( WHO) andUnited Nations EnvironmentProgramme UNEP)jointly publishedin 1992a reporton air pollutionin 20of24 of the world’s megacities. Everyone of the cities studied hadat least onemajor air pollutant that exceeded WHO guidelines, 14hadat least two,seven cities hadat least three. 22 Historically, whenthe city has outgrownthe capacity ofits infrastructure, squalorhas always resulted. But todaythe alarming levels ofpollution that the newcities generateare not challengedbecause the city is seen as the onlymodel for economic development. Besides, weknow that rural as well as urbanpoverty is amajor cause of pollutionand environmental degradation. Thefact is that inmuch of the Souththe cities are notonly bigger but are also growingfaster thanany city inEurope did during the periodof most rapidurban growth,between 1850 and 19 20.Moreover,much of this growthis inprimate cities. Inthe year2 000half the world’s populationreside in cities. Inmost countries this means that most peoplelive in the capital, the centre fromwhich political poweris exercised.This is amatter ofconcern for political as well as environmentalreasons. Politically, urbanisationstrengthens urbanculture against rural,reinf orcingthe dominationof the capital andits tendencyto treat the countrysideand everything that is init instrumentally. It also increases unpre- dictability. Increasedpopulation density leads to asense ofovercrowding and henceto organisational instability. Urbanisationtherefore creates stress whichis likely to bereleased unpredictablyand the closer it is to the centres ofpolitical powerthe moreimpact it is likely tohave. 23 Thefact that the problemis notcon ned to the primate cities is astrong argumentthat it forms onlypart ofa muchbigger process. The traditional view was that bigcities wereengines of development, because of their economiesof scale. Aperceptivecritic has remindedus that this productivitycould simply reect the disproportionateinvestment that goesinto large urbanareas. 24 More couldbe done i fthe same incomewere to bedistributed in small and medium-sized urbansettlements. 25 Thereis nodoubt that the consequenceof these highlevels ofexpenditure has oftenbeen to create imposingand comfort- able habitats forhuman beings, and the Asian portcities all havein common the 56 INTERNAL COLONISATION , DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT fact that theybecame and continue to f unctionas major centres ofeconomic activity. But theyalso functionas major concentrationsof political power. Threestrategies havebeen used to try toresist the concentrationof wealth and powerin the capital city. Themost drastic is to movethe capital, asin the case ofNigeria changingits capital fromLagos to Abuja, but governing elites like their creature comforts andBrasi ´lia is still deserted at the weekendas legislators andgovernment of cials ytoRio. Nigeria, Co ˆte d’Ivoireand Senegal have also tried the secondapproach, consciously to try to developa numberof regional centres. Anotherstrategy has beensimply to try tostop migrants fromcoming in.However, none of these strategies has beenparticularly successful, andeach tends toaccelerate the urbanisationof the countryside. 26 Wheredevelopment has beenmost rapid,countries suffer fromboth the problemsof urbanisation and suburbanisation.For example, Penang in Malaysia, arelatively small island, has beentransformed out of all recognition:‘ Almost the entire island ofPenang in Malaysia is nowsemi-urban: tourism, free trade zones,housing for expatriates, golfresorts, roadand bridge construction have swept awaythe oldvillages and imposedupon Penang the aspect ofa sprawlingtownscape which has drowned the elegant oldcolonial capital ofGeorgetown.’ 27 Athird set ofproblems arises where,as so often happensin the South,there is atemporarybreakdown of public authority. Even before the recent civil war, achronicshortage of generating capacity meant that manyparts ofFreetown, Sierra Leone,were without electricity formuch of the 24hours (and also, incidentally, withoutrefrigeration). The result outside the city was the accelerated degradationof the mangroveforests in search off uelwood.But the impact ofcivil warbrought a drastic andsudden increase in the populationof the city aspeople edthe countryside,resulting inthe total collapse ofthe infrastructure necessary to sustain them.Freetown’ s populationhas balloonedto more than a million, while large areas ofthe countrysidehave been left derelict, virtually withoutgovernment and at the mercyof bands of former ghters whohave had notraining at all inthe skills necessary tosurvive in an ordered society.

Theconquest ofthe countryside However,the negativeeffects forthe countrysidestem fromthe environmental causes as well as the environmental consequences ofurbanisation, since the two are linked.City growthis causedby the same factors that create otherforms of environmentalproblem. Push factors includepopulation pressure fromdisplace- ment fromthe land,exacerbated by the concentrationof land ownership, and the inability to competeeconomically with the newindustrialised agriculture; pull factors includethe demonstrationeffect, the search forwork and the desire for the brightlights andheightened forms ofexperience. Cities growbecause they attract in-migrants. Within the city, therefore,the rulingelite seeks to foster industrialisation. However,not only does this lockit into atight spiral as the effort to providemore job-opportunities outpaces the relentless rise ofpopu- lation, butthe increase in the populationof cities is notjust asimple matter of peopledrifting totown in search ofwork. Migration takes place graduallyand piecemeal; newurban residents goback to places wherethey have come from. 57 PETER CALVERT

Thereis aclear two-waylink betweenurban poverty and rural poverty.With fewerhands available inthe countryside,poverty increases, andthe decline in incomeis onlyprecariously off set wherepossible byremittances fromthose scratching alivingon the edgeof the urbaneconomy of cities as far apart as MexicoCity andBangkok. The growth of cities directly affects the countryside. West Africa is oneof the poorestparts ofthe world;it also has oneof the highest rates ofurbanisation. In West Africa generallymuch of the nation’s manufacturingindustry is to befoundin the capital city; in additionthe central governmenthas tendedto concentrateits investment there.The same is true of Mexicoor Buenos Aires. However,in the latter cases signicant regionalcentres hadalready emerged bef orethe present century. Conict betweenthe interests ofcity andcountryside is in anycase boundto arise fromthe fact that advancedindustrial developmentis at least in part a positional good ,that is, somethingwhose desirability toothers stems fromthe fact that onlya fewpeople at atime canhave it. 28 Workdoes not just happen; norare peopleeither employedor unemployed. The inf ormal sector, longseen assomethingto be stamped out,is nowseen as sourceof entrepreneurial activity andgovernments are urgedto encourageit. 29 However,the effect ofsuch policies is to accelerate the drift to the cities withoutensuring that the industri- alists andshopkeepers who bene t fromit are preparedto payf orthe consequences.People migrate to cities fornegative reasons: ‘poverty,lack ofland to cultivate crops,low wages; the increase inpopulation in the countryside;natural disasters, oodsand droughts; deforestation, the needto market cropsat low prices becauseall growersbring their harvest to market at the same time; seasonal migration to supplementdeclining f arm income.’30 But theyrationalise their needto move by pointing to the possibilities forself-betterment that the city traditionally affords.The urbanisation of the townand the urbanisationof the countrysideare aspects ofthe process ofenclosure. The urbanisation of the countrysideand the expansionof towns is onlya special case ofthe controlof landand its capacity to generatewealth. The Industrial Revolutionin Europe was preceded,and made possible by,an agricultural revolutionwhich increased the productivityof a givenamount of land dramatically. Controlof political powerwas thenused to take productiveland away from country dwellers andto create orextendlarge estates ownedby the rulingelite. Fromthe pointof view off arm workers,the 18thcentury enclosures inEngland, and even more in Scotlandand Ireland, deprived them oftheir possibilites ofindependence and encouragedthem toseek workin the newfactories andtowns. Wherenecessary this process was backedup by force, as in the colonial settlement ofKenya or the Rhodesias (nowZambia and Zimbabwe). With the shift ofpolitical powerto anindigenouselite, the postcolonial settlement which has allowedEuropeans to continue to control large tracts ofland in both Zimbabweand South Africa is beingchallenged. At rst sight the situation in Zimbabwewould appear particularly outrageous,since some two-thirds ofthe best farmingland is still in the handsof some 4000f armers ofEuropean descent, most (thoughtnot all) ofwhom owe this advantageto the previousexistence of colonial rule.When he came topower in 1980President Mugabepromised each ofhis supportersa eld anda cow.As recent events in Zimbabweshow, 58 INTERNAL COLONISATION , DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT however,that promise was notkept and the outcomeis notat all likely to involvetrans ferringthe ownershipof land to those whowork it. Political pressures to rewardthe supportersof the regime in this case as in others run directly contraryto the ostensible economicgoal of transferring the ownership ofland to those whowork it.

Beforethis wave of occupations, the government [of Zimbabwe]redistributed land from some270 white-owned farms, butthe land was notgiven to war veteransor totherural poor. Among the 400 bene ciaries were severalnotable Zanu- PF gures, includingsuch implausible claimants as theattorney general, the mines and tourism minister,the speaker of the parliament, two high court judges and a retired general—none of them conspicuously either subsistence farmers orlandless peas- ants.31 Theprocess ofenclosure continues, although the paceof it has varieddepending oncircumstances. Wherethe landis ‘available’, landcolonisation is aninvalu- able alternative to agovernmentto real landreform: in the Mexicanstate of Chiapas,for example. But enclosurehas had,and continues to have,serious consequences,since this elite is generallyone of town dwellers whotend both to fear anddislike the countrysideand to seek their entertainment inwhat passes foran urban environment, or abroad in Paris orLas Vegas.The view from the capital involvesthe colonisation ofthe countryside,reducing it toorderly controllable form.The process was initiated bythe processes ofenclosure of the commonswhich began in Latin America as early as the 1870s, with the enactment oflegislation empoweringland owners to take overcommon land on the groundsthat it was notbeing ef ciently used,and has beencontinued in the postcolonial periodby a variety oflegislation facilitating the enclosureof ‘unused’lands in Asia andAfrica. Enclosure, however, is onlypart ofa wider phenomenonof internal colonisation. Resistance to this process has,as in the case ofexternal colonisation,been met byforce. As weakcivilian governmentswere displaced orsupplanted by the armedforces, military governmentsset aboutconquering their owncountries. Southernarmies typically saw the economicsituation confrontingthem as a military emergency,imperilling their ability todefend the state against its enemies. Theirmilitarism— whether in Asia, Latin America orAfrica— displayeda pridein their prowesswhich did not necessarily derivefrom recent combat,as, in manycases, forgeographical or other extraneous reasons, the opportunityfor such combat had not arisen. However,the fact ofindependence implied animportant historic role forthe forces.They had the role ofguardians ofthe state thrust uponthem, in their opinion,because they saw themselves as the oneswho had given birth to it. Sowhen the civilians failed to runthe country in the waythat theyexpected, they used the excuseof national emergencyto step inand to assume power.In Nigeria, for example, the military takeoverof 1966owed much to the persistence oftribal consciousness in the army,among the northernerswho felt excludedby the commercially active andpolitically dominantIgbo (Ibo). 32 Thefall anddeath of William VTubmanin Liberia in 1980was bornof resentment ofthe dominanttribes ofthe interior at the dominationof Americanised settlers onthe coast. As in the case ofexternal 59 PETER CALVERT colonisation,in the eventof resistance forcecan be and is usedto ensure compliancewith the dictates ofa governmentin the actions ofwhich those colonisedhave little orno say. Ofcourse in the case ofNigeria orZimbabweit is tempting to arguethat what wesee is the consequenceof colonialism rather thanof internal colonialism. The same cannot,however, be said ofBrazil, whichhas nowbeen independent for nearly180 years andwhose current president, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, was oneof the earliest andmost successful proponentsof dependency theory. It is true that the conquestof Brazil begunby the Portuguese500 years agois still incomplete.Today, however, the striking thingis notthat it continuesin the formof internal colonisation,nor that the colonisation ofAmazonia is being carried onbypowerfulinterests with the approvalof the governmentat Brasi´lia, butthat the means usedso clearly represent the continuingattempt toimpose on the countrysidethe requirements oftowns. This emerges,clearly ifcoinciden- tally, froman article written byJan Rochaon the occasionof the quincentenary: SuccessiveBrazilian governments have seen the rainforest’ s unplannedexuberance asa challengeand tried to discipline it with roads and settlements, subsidising the burningof the forest to make way for cattleranches; turning its giant rivers into waterwaysfor hugegrain barges; installing a free tradezone to swell the Amazon capitalof Manaus with a sprawlingcircle of shantytowns, peopled by migrantsfrom riversidevillages. 33

Colonisation,decolonisation andinternal colonisation Externalcolonisation in Europebegan just as the rst phaseof uni cation of Europeannation-states reacheda climax. Spanishsettlers soughtin the Indies the possibilities ofglory and conquest which the takingof Granada had effectively endedat home.The completion of the unication ofFrance in 1589and of Great Britain in 1603was similarly followedby a consciousroyal policy of following inthe footsteps ofSpain and Portugal and exploring the glittering possibilities ofextending their rule overseas. Just as external colonisation was aresponseto the apparentend of the possibilities ofinternal colonisation,the reverse is also the case. Theexpansion ofEurope was notintended to create dependenciesbut colonies, the principle alike behindPortuguese, Spanish, British orFrench colonisation beingnot simply the extensionof territory orthe exploitation ofits resources butthe actual replication overseas ofthe metropolitan social structure. With the collapse ofthe last ofthe Europeanempires, however,colonisation didnot cease. Alonglist of territorial claims reects the fact that the newstates are just asinterested astheir predecessors in extendingthe rangeof territory theycontrol. Indonesia has claimed inturn Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, Irian Jaya andEast Timor; Moroccothe Western Sahara; Ethiopiaand Somalia the Ogaden. However,given their numbers,most developingcountries havehad no alternative butto fall backon their ownresources andto try to extract more wealth fromthe area that theyalready control. In the AICsthe Industrial Revolutiongave rise totransport systems whichmade possible the conquestof the countrysideby town dwellers. Colonial powerssimilarly created transport 60 INTERNAL COLONISATION , DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT systems that enabledthem to extendtheir powersof control, although in general theycould rely onthe networkscreated byentrepreneurs to exportthe products offarm, factory, mine andplantation, on which they became increasingly dependent.Decolonisation, paradoxically, accelerated this process.The new governmentswere led bythe same logic as their colonial predecessors toseek to expandthe productionof minerals andcash cropsfor export. Only, unlike their colonial predecessors,they had much less choiceabout what to exploit and whereto exploit it. Thenature and degree of internal colonisation,therefore, explains the very different effect it currentlyhas inthe AICsas opposedto the South.In the AICs the process is nowso far advancedthat the countrysidecan be regarded simply asaconvenientand cheap place to plant newhouses and new motorways to get peoplequickly f romone town to another.With only2% of the British population engagedin agriculture, the farmers themselves havelittle votingstrength; their political power,when they have been able tomobilise it, stems fromthe historical fear offood shortages whichhas largely wornoff. Their sudden militancy inSeptember 2 000was effective becauserising oil prices brought them urbanand suburban political support. Inthe South,too, as controlby an indigenous elite has replacedexternal dominationby European (or other) powers, it has beenaccompanied by the industrialisation ofagriculture (agribusiness). Theimpact onthe environmentof the internal colonisation ofthe countrysidecan be plainly seen in the replace- ment oftraditional subsistence agriculture bylarge farms orplantations managed forthe exportand/ orcommercial sale ofa single productor limited rangeof products.This process was,of course, facilitated inthe Southby the fact that foreigncolonisation hadalready take place.On the pretext ofef ciency,colonial landownership was concentratedin the handsof an elite, whosecontrol both foreignand native ownershad an interest inmaintaining. Decolonisation of ten merely replacedforeign owners by local onesenjoying the keyadvantage of direct access tothe centres ofpolitical power,and the voguefor socialist-style economiesin the years followingindependence gave the rulingelite controlover the assets that theydid not themselves own. But the problemwith agribusiness is that it tips the balancebetween agriculture andenvironment decisively infavour of agriculture. Environmental change is nottaken into account in assessing the cost, noris there anyneed to assess inadvance the limits ofsustainable landuse. It is true that (in theory)more food will beproduced from existing landfor a considerabletime intothe future. However,this is nota solution,for three reasons.First, it requires highinputs ofenergy which the worldecosystem is just notcapable of providing. Second, it will exhaustthe soil, andonce that happensthe situation will get steadily and irremediably worse.Lastly, inthe meantime the existing levels ofinequality will haveto bemaintained. Inequality of land ownership, on its own,does not have anydirect relationship to the natureof a political system. But there must be concernthat the concentrationof ownership in the Southhas reacheda newlevel inthe past 25years with the industrialisation ofthe countryside,accompanied in the AICsbypolicies to stimulate agricultural productionthat haveresulted in heavysubsidies to farmers toaccelerate its destruction. 61 PETER CALVERT

Theeffect ofthis is the rapiddestruction ofrural habitat andecosystems. This process has beeneven more rapid in the South.It has alreadyreached an extreme inthe area surroundingManila inthe Philippines, yet the past twoyears have seen the wholesale destruction ofrural habitat in Southeast Asia andBrazil on ascale hitherto unparalleled—aprincipal drivingfactor ofwhich has beenthe desire to convertthe landto plantation agriculture forthe benet ofa small rulingelite. 34 Theruling elite hardlynotice it, as theyhave the wealth to ensure that theycan go elsewhere. For them urbanisationbrings only comfort and convenience.It is this urbanperspective that lies atthe basis ofthe environmental crisis ofthe South.However, it is onlythe relative wealth ofthe AICs that has enabledthem so far to avert the ecological consequencesof a process whichis alreadywell advancedfor them also. Power,of course, was the keyto the conquestof the countryside.But inthe process the international actors, TNCs, banksand lending agencies, had at all times the willing collaborationand even active encouragementof local commer- cial interests. Political elites, certainly, dependedin avariety ofways on the establishment and/ormaintenanceof international tradingpatterns. Inparticular, the maintenanceand indeed extension of plantation agriculture owesmuch of its vigourto the special role ofland as acombinedbadge of social distinction, insuranceagainst loss ofincome and hedge against ination. The growth of cash cropsfor export is muchmore pro table thantraditional subsistence agriculture andit doesrequire access to international markets to workat all. Therulers of the South,therefore, are particularly sensitive toany alteration in the terms of trade,but not to the extent that theyare willing to giveup their poweror their privileges, becausetheir ability tomake use ofthe outside worlddepends critically ontheir ability to colonise their owncountries. ‘ Urban-biasedpolicies seldom givemuch support to peasant cash-croppers:market prices are allowed to uctuate ortend to be kept low (to satisfy the city-dweller voters) [so] that the producersget inadequate,insecure returns andmay over-exploit the landto survive.’35 Thedi fferencebetween what they do and what the rulers ofthe AICs docanbe fully accountedf orby the stage ofeconomic development reached and the possibilities that are offeredf orthe exploitation ofthe country’s internal resources.If there are moreattractive possibilities elsewhere theywill beseized; if not, not.

Conclusion Weconclude that inorder to understand the relationship betweenenvironment anddevelopment we need to understandthat betweencity andcountryside, and to doboth we need a unifyingconcept. We further conclude that this canbe foundin the notionof ‘ internal colonisation’. It has beenargued that: a)internal colonisation parallels in all important respects external colonisation; b)just as the keyinstrument ofcolonisation was the townor city, internal colonisation is foundedon the relationship betweendevelopment and urbanisation; andc) the stage ofinternal colonisation reachedexplains the distinctive natureof environmental politics inthe South. Since the liberation ofthe countrysidefrom urban domination seems notto be 62 INTERNAL COLONISATION , DEVELOPMENT AND ENVIRONMENT apractical possibility, the problemf orpolitics is to ndsome wayin whichthe adverseenvironmental consequences of the process,for both town and country, canbe mitigated.

Notes 1 Afth,Habermas’ thesis of ‘ internalcolonisation of the lifeworld’ , lies outsidethe scope of this article. See Ju¨rgenHabermas, Theoryof Communicative Action ,Boston,MA: Beacon, 1987. 2 VladimirIl’ ych Lenin, TheDevelopment of Capitalism in Russia ,reproducedin CollectedWorks , Vol 3, London:Lawrence &Wishart,1960. 3 ‘Civilizingthe barbarians’ , NordicNewsletter ofAsian Studies,Nordic Institute of Asian Studies,4 December 1996:http:/ /nias.ku.dk/Nytt/tableoutline/html. 4 AdolfHitler, Mein Kampf,Vol1, London: Hutchinson, ch 4 ‘Munich’. 5 SCarmichael &CVHamilton, WhitePower: The Colonial Situation ,New York:Random House, 1967. See also inter alia JohnSaul, ‘ Thedialectic ofclass andtribe’ in Saul, TheState and Revolution in Eastern Africa,New York:Monthly Review Press, 1979;and Maria vanDiepen (ed), TheNational Question in SouthAfrica ,London:Zed Press, 1988. 6 MichaelHechter, InternalColonialism: The Celtic Fringein British National Development, 1536 – 1966, London:Routledge & KeganPaul, 1975. 7 See Inter alia Neil Davidson, TheOrigins of Scottish Nationhood ,London:Pluto Press, 2000. 8 TheEcologist, WhoseCommon Future? Reclaiming the Commons ,London:Earthscan, 1993, p 39. 9 Ibid. 10 SCalvert& PCalvert, Politicsand Society in the Third World ,Hemel Hempstead: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1996,pp. 158 –159. 11 GPLandow,‘ Themetaphorical use ofcolonialism and related terms’, http://www/misc/postov.html,1998. 12 FHCardoso& EFaletto, Dependencyand Development in Latin America ,transM MUrquidi,Berkeley, CA: Universityof California Press, 1979,p 15. 13 World Bank, WorldDevelopment Report, 1997 ,London:Oxford University Press, 1997,pp 230 – 231 Table 9,(Hong Kong excluded). 14 UNPopulationFund, TheState of World Population, 1989 ,New York:United Nations, 1989. 15 JEHardoy,D Mitlin& DSatterthwaite, EnvironmentalProblems in Third World Cities ,London:Earthscan, 1992, p 29. 16 Ibid, p 31. 17 UNPopulationFund, TheState of World Population, 1992 , New York: UNFPA, 1992, p 16. 18 UNDP, 1994. 19 World Bank, WorldDevelopment Report, 1999 ,London:Oxford University Press, 1999. 20 Ibid, p 31. 21 JAbu-Lughod& RJay,Jr (eds), ThirdWorld Urbanization ,London:Methuen, 1977; and Josef Gugler(ed), TheUrban Transformation of the Developing World ,Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996. 22 WorldHealth Organisation,1992. WorldHealth Statistics Annual 1992 ,Geneva: WorldHealth Organiz- ation. 23 M Leroy, Populationand World Politics ,Leiden:Martinus, Nijhoff, 1978, pp 71 – 72. 24 AGGilbert,‘ Theargument for very large cities reconsidered’, UrbanStudies ,13,1976, pp 27 –34. 25 JEHardoy& DSatterthwaite(eds), Smalland Intermediate Urban Centres: TheirRole in National and RegionalDevelopment in the Third World ,London:Hodder & Stoughton,1986. 26 ATSalau,‘ Urbanizationand spatial strategies inWest Africa’, inRobert B Potter& Ademola TSalau (eds), Cities andDevelopment in the Third World ,London:Mansell, 1990, pp 157 – 171. 27 J Seabrook, Inthe Cities ofthe South: Scenes froma DevelopingWorld ,London:Verso, 1996, p 165. 28 F Hirsch, TheSocial Limits to Growth ,London:Routledge & KeganPaul, 1977. 29 WArmstrong& TGMcGee, Theatresof Accumulation: Studies in Asianand Latin American Urbanization , London:Methuen, 1985. 30 Seabrook, Inthe Cities ofthe South , pp 25– 26. 31 Isabel Hilton,‘ Clingingto colonialism’ s wreckage’, Guardian,19April 2000. 32 R Luckham, TheNigerian Military 1960 – 67,Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1971. 33 Jan Rocha,‘ Whitemen bearinggifts’ , Guardian,19April 2000 (Society, p 4). 34 PBrown,‘ Man’s greedfuels global bon re’ , Guardian,17December 1997. 35 C J Barrow, Developingthe Environment: Problems and Management ,Harlow:Longman, 1995, p 115.