The Skeptical Position: Is It Tenable?
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The Skeptical Position: Is It Tenable? JOHN BELOFF John Beloff, a psychologist at the University of Edinburgh, has for several decades been one of the most prominent lead- ers in the field of parapsychology While it might seem unusual for us to publish an article by a parapsychologist. we think this one is appropriate and may stimulate some useful interaction. We follow it with short responses by sev- eral well-regarded critics of parapsychology —The Editor If the 'skeptical position' y the "skeptical position" I shall here mean regarding parapsychology the view that there is no evidence, as yet, is to be tenable, says Bthat would justify acknowledging any phe- Beloff, It must apply not nomenon as "paranormal." On this view parapsychology nly to the latest ontal evidence— is, at best, a potential science, concerned as it is with where repeatability on claims that still await authentication. Moreover, given demand may forever elude the fact that attempts to clinch such claims have now investigators—but also to been going on for at least a century, the prospect that any historical cases. phenomenon will in due course be universally recog- nized as paranormal must be considered increasingly unlikely. The "skeptical position," so defined, is today widely held among the scientific community with, inevitably, unfortunate practical consequences for para- SKEPTICAL INQUIRER • MAY/JUNE 1995 19 psychology, especially when it comes to make no difference what evidence the more rational to doubt the testimony funding. It is the aim of this paper to parapsychologist might adduce; an of the witnesses than to accept the mir- consider whether or not this position absolute skeptic could always nullify it acle as a (act. We must note, however, is, philosophically, defensible. by invoking some general principle, that there is a subtle difference between The skeptical position, as I have stat- such as consistency with known physi- a miracle, as Hume understood the ed it, represents what 1 shall call de facto cal laws, as in Kurtz's example, or some term, and what we now call a "para- skepticism. A "de facto skeptic" is an other cherished criterion. There are not normal event." A miracle contradicts empiricist who is willing, in principle, to many among our critics, I may say, only certain universal expectations as abide by die evidence but is not satisfied who profess absolute skepticism in this to what can or cannot happen. A para- that the evidence in this case is coercive. sense; yet, in practice, it provides a fall- normal event, on the other hand, is Paul Kurtz voices die attitude of die de back position when de facto skepticism anomalous with respect to the entire facto skeptic when he writes: begins to look shaky. Although conceptual framework of science as we "Philosophers have analyzed die coher- absolute skepticism could be described know it. Hence, to call something ence between physical theories and as a form of dogmatism, we must not paranormal is, as Kurtz highly insists, alleged extrasensory functions in order dismiss it as irrational. All of us, after to call into question the universality of to determine whether die latter are con- all, are absolute skeptics about certain the prevailing scientific worldview. sistent with physical laws. I submit that claims that overstrain our credulity. Hume conceded that, if a miracle one should be dubious about purely a Speaking for myself, I would have to could be regularly repeated, we would priori formal methods of evaluation, confess to being an absolute skeptic be forced to believe in it, but then it because if the phenomenon is found to when it comes to claims that extrater- would ipso facto cease to be a miracle! be genuine it is the antecedent conceptu- restrial aliens have visited the earth. No A paranormal phenomenon, on the al system that will have to be modified. matter how many eyewitness reports other hand, would still be paranormal The data must not be sacrificed at die might be pushed under my nose, I even after the umpteenth repetition so altar of preconceived notions of logical would still decline to credit them. For long as no scientific explanation was coherence" [my emphasis] (Kurtz it would always strike me as more like- forthcoming. Repetition is, of course, a 1992:145). His subsequent remarks, ly that the reports were misleading key issue for the skeptical position, and however, reveal that what he is, in fact, than that the claims were valid. Of we shall be returning to it later. Antony open-minded about are "anomalies." course, even absolute skepticism is Flew (1978) endorses Hume with Parapsychological findings may, Kurtz never absolute in the logical sense, respect to all past claims of a paranor- concedes, in due course be taken at face inasmuch as we could always envisage mal kind and so could be classed as an value but always with the tacit under- some hypothetical example that would absolute skeptic with respect to the his- standing that they can eventually be rec- force us to change our mind. No doubt torical record, but even he concedes onciled with a physicalist worldview. if I myself were to have a close that, if parapsychologists were able to Hence he specifically rejects the term encounter with an extraterrestrial alien, satisfy repeatability on demand, we paranormal if this is taken to imply any I presumably would have no option would then, indeed, have to revise our kind of "spiritual, mental, or idealistic but to change my mind. So long, how- assumptions. dimensions" (p. 149). Kurtz, we might ever, as I regard such a hypothesis as an Some critics, who may be de facto say, is a "de facto" skeptic about the para- academic exercise, I would still count skeptics with respect to parapsychology normal in the weak sense of an anomaly as an absolute skeptic with respect to as a whole, may be absolute skeptics but an "absolute" skeptic about the para- claims of this sort. Likewise, even the with respect to certain classes of psi normal in the strong sense in which it most dismissive of skeptics would pre- phenomena. For example, some who has inspired so many parapsychologists. sumably change their tune in the face are open-minded about extrasensory His position, I may add, is by no means of some overwhelming manifestation perception (ESP) may take exception idiosyncratic; it is, on the contrary, wide- of the paranormal, but, pending such to psychokinesis (PK). Others, who are ly shared by members of the scientific an eventuality, they would qualify as prepared to accept micro-PK, may and academic communities. absolute skeptics with respect to the draw the line at macro-PK. Flew has, parapsychological evidence. throughout his long career as a skeptic, The pioneer of absolute skepticism consistently rejected precognition as Absolute Skepticism with respect to what he called "mira- nonsensical (cf. Flew 1987). He does For an "absolute" or "a priori" skeptic, cles" was, of course, David Hume so on the grounds that it implies that a evidence is simply irrelevant. It would (Hume 1777). His argument was sim- cause may occur after its effect. And he ple. A miracle, by definition, contra- is perfectly correct, of course, in saying John Beloff is in the Department of venes our past experiences. At the same that precognition implies backward Psychology at the University of time, we all know to our cost that liars causation. Where he goes astray is in Edinburgh, George Square, Edinburgh and deceivers abound. Hence, even if thinking that backward causation is EH8 9JZ, Scotland, U.K. miracles did occur, it would always be somehow logically objectionable— 20 SKEPTICAL INQUIRER • MAY/JUNE 1995 however offensive it may be to our required to produce this result may be between the subject and the target sys- common sense. If one were to follow highly complex. Thus one is confront- tem and so it cannot be subsumed Flew, one would have to dismiss all tra- ed with the paradox of an input con- under an epiphenomenalist view of ditional beliefs in prophecy and fore- taining minimal information issuing mind. In other words, it is the concept knowledge as not just false but literally an output that is informationally rich. of the paranormal as such that really meaningless—which seems odd to say Or, as Humphrey puts it, the problem bothers Humphrey, as it bothered the least! Even odder is the fact that, is "how the supposed psychic powers Kurtz. To a dualist-interactionist like faced with one such instance—let us can have the 'targeting' and 'indexical' myself, on the other hand, this analogy suppose Flew were to dream consis- properties they must have if they are to between what goes on in normal vol- tently of the winner of tomorrow's do their job" (Humphrey 1993). untary behavior and in a successful test for PK is profoundly suggestive and horse-race—he could not call his This feature of the psi process, to illuminating. In both instances, as we dreams "precognitive"; at most he which Humphrey rightly draws our see it, physical processes are brought could express surprise at his astonish- attention, is familiar to parapsycholo- into play in order to fulfill a specific ing run of luck. Coincidence has, of gists as the "goal oriented" aspect of wish or intention. If that is "magical course, always been a logical option psi. The concept of goal orientation, however, is by no means confined to thinking," then so be it; the evidence where any psi phenomenon is con- from parapsychology demands no less. cerned, but the science of statistics has psi phenomena. When I write some- thing down, for example, I think and So much for absolute skepticism.