The COVID-19 Pandemic's Evolving Impacts on the Labor Market: Who's Been Hurt and What We Should Do
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Upjohn Institute Working Papers Upjohn Research home page 2-11-2021 The COVID-19 Pandemic's Evolving Impacts on the Labor Market: Who's Been Hurt and What We Should Do Brad J. Hershbein W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, [email protected] Harry J. Holzer McCourt School of Public Policy, Georgetown University, [email protected] Upjohn Author(s) ORCID Identifier: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2534-8164 Upjohn Institute working paper ; 21-341 Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers Part of the Labor Economics Commons Citation Hershbein, Brad J. and Harry J. Holzer. 2021. "The COVID-19 Pandemic's Evolving Impacts on the Labor Market: Who's Been Hurt and What We Should Do." Upjohn Institute Working Paper 21-341. Kalamazoo, MI: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research. https://doi.org/10.17848/wp21-341 This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The COVID-19 Pandemic’s Evolving Impacts on the Labor Market: Who’s Been Hurt and What We Should Do Upjohn Institute Working Paper 21-341 Brad J. Hershbein Harry J. Holzer W.E. Upjohn Institute McCourt School of Public Policy, for Employment Research Georgetown University Email: [email protected] Email: [email protected] February 2021 ABSTRACT In this paper, we shed light on the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labor market, and how they have evolved over most of the year 2020. Relying primarily on microdata from the CPS and state-level data on virus caseloads, mortality, and policy restrictions, we consider a range of employment outcomes—including permanent layoffs, which generate large and lasting costs—and how these outcomes vary across demographic groups, occupations, and industries over time. We also examine how these employment patterns vary across different states, according to the timing and severity of virus caseloads, deaths, and closure measures. We find that the labor market recovery of the summer and early fall stagnated in late fall and early winter. As noted by others, we find low-wage and minority workers are hardest hit initially, but that recoveries have varied, and not always consistently, between Blacks and Hispanics. Statewide business closures and other restrictions on economic activity reduce employment rates concurrently but do not seem to have lingering effects once relaxed. In contrast, virus deaths— but not caseloads—not only depress current employment but produce accumulating harm. We conclude with policy options for states to repair their labor markets. JEL classification codes: E62, H12, J15, J21, J68 Key words: COVID-19, employment rates, inequality, pandemic recession, recovery Acknowledgments: This paper was prepared for the conference on Uneven Outcomes in the Labor Market, organized by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Bank, February 1, 2021. The authors thank Shane Reed and Steve Yesiltepe for capable research assistance; all errors are the authors’ own. Upjohn Institute working papers are meant to stimulate discussion and criticism among the policy research community. Content and opinions are the sole responsibility of the author. The broad outlines of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic on the U.S. labor market have been known for months, and are apparent from the Employment Situation Reports published each month by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. For instance, we know that the labor market experienced a very steep decline, beginning in March and sharply accelerating in April, with over 20 million jobs lost. The recovery began in May and picked up steam in June; employment growth remained strong in the summer, but monthly increases began diminishing in magnitude by the fall and flatlined after October. Unemployment increased broadly in March and April, but the jump was especially steep for African Americans, Hispanics, and workers in retailing, leisure, and hospitality. Labor force participation also dropped, and involuntary part-time employment rose. All of these measures began to show improvement in May, but at increasingly modest rates over the summer; as of late fall, long-term unemployment rates have risen, as has the share—and number—of layoffs that are permanent. Though these broad patterns are well known, many questions remain. For instance, to what extent are the worse employment outcomes that workers of color have experienced caused by their lower average educational attainment, their concentration in low-wage service jobs, or something else (perhaps discrimination)? As many indicators improve, but permanent layoffs and long-term unemployment rise, who is still showing progress, and on which dimensions—and who is suffering longer-term dislocations? Most importantly, we know that the path of the COVID-19 virus has been quite nonlinear and uneven across states and regions, as have its labor market impacts. On the one hand, the shutdown in economic activity in March and April was truly national (Forsythe et al. 2020a), even though some states were hit harder than others (especially on the coasts and those with very 1 large metropolitan areas like Chicago and Detroit). But the virus surged in some states (especially in the South and Southwest) over the summer, and then in the Midwest and Plains in the fall, while mostly staying under control in the states hit hardest earlier. Beginning in late October, cases began to rise nearly everywhere, and by the end of the year remained at record- high levels. It is likely that this uneven virus path has affected labor markets differently across states and regions, as well as across occupations, industries, and demographic groups. Yet the published national data tell us little to date about these patterns or how they have changed over the past several months. Of course, COVID-19 papers have become something of a cottage industry among economists; a search of the term COVID-19 on the NBER working papers website yielded 487 papers released between March 1 and December 15, 2020, at least 60 of which relate to labor markets, with most of these coming before the fall and focusing on the initial period of job losses rather than more recent trends.1 In this paper, we seek to shed light on how the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on the labor market have evolved over time. We pay particular attention to patterns of decline and recovery, with rapid and then slowing improvements, in different states. We investigate differing impacts on multiple employment outcomes across demographic and education groups as well as occupations and industries, and how these have varied from the spring to the fall as COVID case and mortality rates—and state restrictions on economic activity—have changed. We employ monthly microdata from the Current Population Survey (CPS) through December 2020, supplemented with other sources. After describing our data and our methods at 1 Two exceptions are Gallant et al. (2020) and Forsythe et al. (2020b), both of which stress the unusually high share of temporary layoffs in the current recession as complicating standard job search models, but differing in interpretation of existing labor market slack and the likely rate of recovery. Neither focuses on subgroups or regional variation. 2 greater length in the next section, we provide graphical (and tabular) time trends in key employment outcomes: in the aggregate, for different demographic and wage groups, and then separately by groups of states defined by the timing of peak virus caseloads. We then more systematically investigate the role of COVID-19 severity and economic restrictions on employment, allowing for contemporaneous and lagged effects. Finally, we summarize lessons learned and implications for employment policy in the months and years ahead. We begin our analysis by compiling summary monthly data from the CPS through December 2020. Although several papers (e.g., A. Bartik et al. 2020, Cajner et al. 2020) have used alternative private-sector employment data from sources such as Homebase and ADP, the advantages of these data in timeliness and geographic detail come at the expense of representativeness and demographic detail, for which the CPS is still the gold standard. We limit our analysis to individuals aged 18–64 and focus on select, summary measures of employment— including an adjusted employment rate described below, the share of individuals reporting permanent job loss, and total weekly hours worked—although we also briefly report more conventional measures, such as labor force participation and unemployment rates.2 Our adjusted employment rate measure modifies the more typical employment rate (or employment-population ratio) to exclude individuals away from work for “other” non-specified reasons (e.g., besides vacation, own illness, personal leave, etc.). The share of workers absent from work for “other” reasons skyrocketed in April and has only gradually come down, and the Bureau of Labor Statistics believes most of these individuals should have been classified as unemployed (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2020). We further modify the employment rate to exclude individuals who report working part-time involuntarily due to economic conditions, 2 We have calculated numerous additional measures, available on request, but we believe the ones described in the paper adequately summarize employment trends and their evolution during the pandemic. 3 either on a “usual” basis or specifically during the reference week of the survey. The adjusted employment measure thus captures changes in work at both the extensive and intensive margins. As a related summary measure in aggregate analyses, we also analyze the total weekly hours worked for a group, which can capture more subtle hours changes than the adjusted employment rate. Finally, we regard the share of people (and not just of the unemployed) with permanent job loss as particularly important, since to date it is the best measure we have of long- term employment disruption associated with the pandemic, and research has shown the enormous social costs it imposes on workers (Davis and von Wachter 2011).