MQ-9 Crew Chief at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico, December 19, 2016 (U.S. Air Force/J.M. Eddins, Jr.)
early a year before the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United Beneath the N States flew its first unarmed remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) sortie against Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda Crosshairs in Afghanistan.2 In November 2001, following the terrorist attacks, the United States launched its first armed Remotely Piloted Airstrikes RPA kinetic strike against an al Qaeda leader in Afghanistan.3 Since then, the as a Foreign Policy Tool United States has executed more than 6,000 RPA strikes against a myriad of By Roderic K. Butz declared terrorist organizations and threat groups across the globe.4 The tactical value of RPA and their crews has proven to be, as Richard Pildes The key principles of the laws of war are necessity, distinction, and stated, “the most discriminating use of force that has ever been developed.”5 proportionality in the use of force. Drone attacks and targeted killings serve these principles better than any use of force that can be imagined.
1 Lieutenant Colonel Roderic K. Butz, USAF, —riChard Pildes wrote this essay while a student at the Army War College. It tied for first place in the 2020 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition.
36 JPME Today / Beneath the Crosshairs JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 While the proven utility of armed offers a series of recommendations for assassination.”10 Additionally, this legality RPA represents a significant evolution in the effective use of RPA in ODTAAC is not differentiated by the specific source military capability and the character of environments as a facet of national of authority, be it Title 10 or Title 50 of war, perhaps more important, it also rep- strategy. U.S. Code, whereby an approved AUMF resents a revolution in U.S. foreign policy. covers both traditional military and intel- Successful RPA strikes have led some to Scope ligence activities against external actors.11 believe their use allows “Presidents to America’s rapid expansion in the use Finally, within the scope of IHL, punt on questions of war and peace,” of armed RPA following the attacks the authorized rules of engagement for relying on tactical military capability to of 9/11 created a broad array of new U.S. military RPA strikes are consistent supplant strategy.6 Because RPA strikes legal, ethical, and political issues that with the concept of jus in bello, with a offer the unique ability to directly affect remain widely unaddressed today. These mandate of proportionality, distinction, strategic objectives with a low risk to issues include but are not limited to the humanity, military necessity, protection forces and a small footprint, policymakers employment of armed RPA through the of nonbelligerents, and a minimization may be tempted to resort directly to the lens of U.S. legal code, international of suffering for the victims of armed use of force to resolve complex security humanitarian law (IHL), military rules conflict.12 Critics posit that RPA tech- challenges.7 But RPA strikes are a tool, of engagement, and the legal authoriza- nology makes attainment of military not a strategy in their own right. They are tion for use of military force (AUMF). distinction and proportionality “more a facet of a broad effort to attain political First, analysis and examination of U.S. ambiguous and their achievement more ends through the concerted use of all military RPA strikes in ODTAAC theaters problematic.”13 On the contrary, accord- available instruments of national power. are based on the assertion that the use ing to Pildes, because of the networked Without a clearly identified endstate of armed RPA by the United States is human interface, legal insight during and coordinated whole-of-government authorized through established mecha- targeting, technological advances, and strategy, RPA strikes alone actually in- nisms within the Department of Defense, command-level oversight, RPA opera- crease risk to national policy objectives, the Office of the Director of National tions “serve these principles [of IHL] destabilize fragile regions, and isolate key Intelligence, and the national security better than any use of force that can be partners. establishment. In today’s counterterror- imagined.”14 Finally, this analysis on the A comprehensive study of the effects ism (CT) campaigns, authorization is efficacy of RPA strikes in the ODTAAC of RPA strikes on foreign policy would established through various classified and environment is at the unclassified level require vast background knowledge, unclassified permissions including Public and proceeds with the assertion that they unbiased analysis, access to classified Law 107-40, which declares: are both legal and ethical when autho- data, and a complex contextualization of rized through traditional national security the character of belligerents, geopolitical That the President is authorized to use all processes of the U.S. Government and relationships, and U.S. policy goals. This necessary and appropriate force against executed in accordance with approved article represents a more limited analysis those nations, organizations, or persons rules of engagement. and instead focuses on five topics within he determines planned, authorized, com- the context of U.S. military RPA strikes mitted, or aided the terrorist attacks Policy Evolution outside declared theaters of active armed that occurred on September 11, 2001, or To better analyze the implications conflict (ODTAAC). First, it outlines harbored such organizations or persons, in for U.S. policy of using armed RPA key assumptions and facts related to the order to prevent any future acts of interna- as a military tool, it is necessary to legality, authorities, and classification tional terrorism against the United States understand how the rapid expansion of RPA operations. Second, it explores by such nations, organizations, or persons.8 of this capability following 9/11 drove the evolution of U.S. policy on the the evolution of policy through three use of RPA over the past two decades Second, from a legal perspective, this Presidential administrations. The first and three Presidential administrations. article assumes the targeting processes operational use of the RQ-1 Predator, Third, it lays out the unique attributes and strike approvals are consistent with the successor to the widely proliferated of RPA operations that facilitate their an AUMF and U.S. legal code and do MQ-1 and MQ-9 Reaper, occurred in use as a foreign policy tool in ODTAAC not constitute assassination or extrajudi- 1995 over Bosnia. Employed primar- environments. Fourth, it analyzes the cial executions.9 Because of the character ily for intelligence, surveillance, and attributes of RPA strikes that alone may of CT targets and the authorized use reconnaissance (ISR) through use of its detract from national security objectives of force, RPA strikes do not violate the full-motion video, the RQ-1, according and lead to instability, governmental il- Ronald Reagan administration Executive to Richard Whittle, “played a key role legitimacy, and increased strategic risk, Order (EO) 12333, which states “no in helping [the North Atlantic Treaty including ineffective targeting theory person employed by, or acting on behalf Organization] bring key factions . . . to and mischaracterization of the opera- of, the United States Government shall peace talks,” enhancing the quality and tional environment. Finally, the article engage in, or conspire to engage in, quantity of targetable intelligence.15 In
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Butz 37 Enlisted pilot student, left, and basic sensor operator course instructor at 558th Flying Training Squadron at Joint Base San Antonio, Texas, conduct training mission utilizing Predator/Reaper Integrated Mission Environment simulator, July 17, 2018 (U.S. Air Force/J.M. Eddins, Jr.) late 1999, based on the success of the Laden was tabled. The primary reasons Clarke spoke of occurred less than 1 week RQ-1 in Bosnia, and in response to the for this delay were based on budget dis- after the meeting. growing threat of al Qaeda following putes between the Central Intelligence With only a handful of unarmed terrorist attacks in Tanzania and Kenya, Agency (CIA) and the Air Force, a fear Predators over Afghanistan in September the United States began efforts to arm among analysts of escalation in the event 2001 under the authorities of Operation the Predator. One year later, the United of an MQ-1 shootdown, and existing Enduring Freedom, the United States States commenced limited employment technological limitations on the reliability was not postured to execute immediate of unarmed MQ-1 sorties for ISR mis- of the hellfire missile.17 In an impassioned kinetic strikes against bin Laden and sions over Afghanistan, resulting in an response, Richard Clarke, the National al Qaeda, requiring a mobilization of assessed sighting of Osama bin Laden Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure thousands of intelligence and military in September 2000.16 For the next year, Protection, and Counterterrorism, de- professionals. Within 1 week of 9/11, though the concept of RPA strikes was clared to the U.S. Principals Committee, concurrent with President George W. proved as feasible, policymakers, mili- “decisionmakers should imagine them- Bush’s AUMF (Public Law 107-40), tary leaders, and intelligence officials selves on a future day when [they have] the United States commenced its first grappled with the formulation of a com- not succeeded in stopping al [Qaeda] armed MQ-1 sortie over Afghanistan— prehensive, multiyear counterterrorism attacks and hundreds of Americans lay harkening the evolutionary era of armed campaign to address the al Qaeda threat. dead in several countries, including the RPA operations as both a military tool Even though RPA strike approv- [United States].”18 Unfortunately, while and a tool of American foreign policy. als were granted through the National there is no evidence that a decapita- Subsequently, because of the pre-9/11 Security Council and aligned with U.S. tion strike against bin Laden during the policy disagreements and rapid expan- legal channels vis-à-vis EO 12333, on summer of 2001 would have prevented sion of this emerging capability following September 4, 2001, the plan to strike bin impending attacks, the future day that the attacks, the United States never
38 JPME Today / Beneath the Crosshairs JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 developed a coherent, comprehensive will be that of the “Drone President.”21 legal attributes of RPA strikes effectively legally based policy before conducting its According to the Bureau of Investigative ended with the inauguration of President first RPA strike on November 12, 2001. Journalism, over 520 RPA strikes Donald Trump. The operational demands of the war on occurred during the Obama Presidency, Upon taking office in 2017, terror necessitated emergency expansion a near 10-fold increase from the previous President Trump replaced the Obama of RPA operations, leaving Presidential administration.22 Additionally, sources PPG with his own Principles, Strategies, administrations, lawmakers, and military claim that the number of American and Procedures (PSP) that regulate leaders in a reactive position to analyze “drones” increased over 14,000 percent direct action CT operations, includ- policy issues, classification levels, depart- from approximately 50 in 2000 to ing the use of armed RPA strikes in mental authorities, strategic impacts, and over 7,000 in the arsenal by 2012.23 ODTAAC environments. According the long-term efficacy of this capability. Unfortunately, like significant portions to the New York Times, the new PSP Under the administration of of reporting on RPA, this claim is not loosened the requirements for target President Bush, aligned with theater entirely applicable to the discussion of selection, streamlined strike approval campaign plans, the RPA force expanded RPA strikes, as only 372 were armed RPA delegation, and removed the require- rapidly in both declared theaters of variants as of 2014.24 ment for high-level vetting, oversight, active armed conflict (DTAAC) and Regardless of the precision and and reporting.28 Coincident with a ODTAAC environments within the accuracy of such claims, due to wide significant increase in RPA strike opera- Middle East, Africa, and the Pacific. proliferation and technical advancements tions, including the campaign against Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, wherein of weapons, sensors, and platforms, the so-called Islamic State (IS), the new RPA were highly effective against al the use of armed RPA as a policy tool PSP meant that the threshold for when Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist increased dramatically under President to conduct strikes was lower and that networks, the Bush administration Obama. Concomitantly, under heavy there was not nearly as much high-level directed approximately 57 RPA strikes scrutiny regarding collateral damage and oversight of these strikes.29 Notably, supporting named operations against civilian casualties, the administration there remain significant levels of plan- declared terrorist organizations in undertook a comprehensive examination ning, operational analysis, legal reviews, ODTAAC regions in Pakistan, Yemen, of policies, authorizations, oversight, and and oversight at and above the combat- and Somalia.19 Under the auspices of the RPA employment practices. In 2013, ant command level. While the impact of war on terror, President Bush established this examination culminated in new the current administration’s changes is the foundational assertions of the legality, Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) that not yet known, the policy reversal away ethicality, and policy use of RPA that provided the legal framework for target from transparency, high-level oversight, evolved little in nearly two decades. identification, operational authorities, and reporting requirements restricts Though the corporate view of the CIA, and lethal strike approvals.25 Additionally, necessary evaluation and debate of the according to the International Journal President Obama signed a 2016 EO efficacy of this capability as a tool of of European Relations, was reluctant or further outlining the criteria for “near foreign policy. outright opposed to armed RPA strikes, certain” avoidance of collateral damage Though there has been a marked that position changed following 9/11. and civilian casualties, while mandating decline in strikes against IS in Syria as The attacks on 9/11 led the CIA to requirements governing employment, its territorial caliphate dissolves, the change its position, wherein it developed congressional oversight, and annual widespread use of lethal RPA strikes a deliberate targeting and strike system reporting of lethal strikes.26 against terrorist leaders, facilitators, that separated “targeted killing” from While the use RPA strikes under and fielded forces in other theaters has assassination “rather than defending President Obama expanded substantially increased substantially since 2017, with assassination itself.”20 While the Bush from 2009 to 2016, with a former CIA the Bureau of Investigative Journalism administration was successful in its officer declaring “phenomenal success” reporting over 5,500 strikes in the first 2 limited ODTAAC RPA strike campaigns, at diminishing terrorist organizations years of the Trump Presidency.30 While executing approximately 57 strikes, the worldwide, the administration took active the reporting of actual numbers of legacy lay in the policies that withstood steps to declassify, regulate, limit, oversee, strikes has become more difficult to as- the early years of the war and bolstered and report on the use of RPA strikes as a sess due to President Trump’s PSP, it is President Barack Obama’s dramatic tool of foreign policy.27 The move toward clear that this capability has expanded in increase of remote strikes as a foreign transparency, oversight, and limitations both frequency and territory, including policy tool. on the use of armed RPA under President the establishment of a new RPA base in While President Obama has Obama was a necessary first step in lifting Agadez, Niger.31 Categorically, the use been credited for significant military the veil of secrecy and normalizing the of armed RPA against terrorist threats drawdowns in Iraq and Afghanistan legal use of this critical capability. But the has increased substantially since the late during his Presidency, according to the constructive momentum to codify the autumn of 2001 and will likely continue. Washington Examiner, his true legacy employment, oversight, reporting, and While Presidential policy on the strategic
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Butz 39 Airmen with 91st Attack Squadron fly simulated training mission on MQ-9 Reaper at Creech Air Force Base, Nevada, May 8, 2014 (U.S. Air Force/Nadine Barclay) use of armed RPA continues to evolve, foreign policy tool to meet combatant weaponry, and aircrew expertise decrease preventing transparent analysis, debate, commanders needs in ODTAAC envi- the overall risk to successful tactical and foreign policy formulation, it is ronments. These characteristics include mission execution. This expertise and critical that lawmakers, military plan- perceived decreased risk, decreased decreased risk to mission is evident in the ners, and the public not conflate policy cost, and decreased deployed signature analysis of armed RPA operational effects challenges with the tactical prowess of compared to conventional, manned and their continuous improvements since the MQ-1 and MQ-9 enterprise, which strike assets. 9/11. For example, from 2013 to 2019, has proved extraordinarily effective as The primary reason lawmakers tend to a single Air Force RPA squadron of less a military capability. Furthermore, in support RPA strikes as a principal foreign than 100 U.S.-based personnel executed order to analyze the efficacy of armed policy tool to address security challenges is over 1,000 kinetic strikes against enemy RPA operations at the strategic level, it due to the relatively low risk to U.S. forces forces in seven countries.33 The results of is necessary to understand the unique combined with the tactical effective- these strikes were 2,592 enemy killed in characteristics of this capability that ness of the capability and low risk to the action with a staggering success rate of often drive policymakers to use it as military mission itself. RPA operations, 98 percent with zero loss of life to U.S. what Jacqueline Hazelton calls “the new by design, mitigate risk to U.S. forces by Servicemembers.34 While the combat face of US foreign policy.”32 protecting remote operators from the results of this squadron are unique and typical threats to air operations, includ- distinctive, this example highlights the The Unique Value of ing antiaircraft artillery and surface to low-risk effectiveness of RPA strikes Armed RPA Operations air missiles. Additionally, though current to support U.S. policy objectives. This The tactical use of RPA and kinetic RPA operations require a small footprint uneven combat risk between belligerents strikes represents a “means” and a of deployed personnel to support taxi, when using remote strike capabilities is a “way,” respectively, to meet strategic takeoff, landing, and aircraft maintenance significant evolution in the character of ends. Comprehensively, RPA employ- requirements, these forces typically remain warfare that leads toward policy preference ment is unique from both a resourcing beyond conflict zones and in lower threat to meet contemporary security challenges. and capability perspective. It is both areas and established installations. An added factor that drives a prefer- rational and reasonable to see how this In addition to the decreased risk to ence for RPA strikes as a policy tool is tactical means could be harnessed as a force, technological advances, precision the financial cost of deployment and
40 JPME Today / Beneath the Crosshairs JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 employment. Additionally, compared Figure 1. Requirements Comparison for 24/7 to a conventional strike capability, the Sustained Flight Operations deployed footprint utilizing RPA is decreased by nearly 94 percent.35 As Deployed Personnel Aircraft Inventory figure 1 highlights, to fulfill a sustained 700 30 (beyond 30-days) 24/7 kinetic strike capability, the decreased requirement for 600 aircrew and maintenance “boots on the 25 ground” makes RPA a preferable option to fulfill an operational need.36 500 These personnel savings manifest 20 themselves in significant financial savings from mobilization costs and deployed 400 financial entitlements as well as aircraft 15 operating costs. To support sustained 300 airstrike capability the hourly difference to operate an MQ-9 versus an F-16 is 10 over $17,000 and nearly 6,000 pounds of 200 fuel.37 Per diem, this results in a savings of nearly $420,000 and 187,000 pounds of 5 fuel with one MQ-9 sortie versus 24 F-16 100 sorties, according to a RAND study.38 Finally, in addition to the resourcing 0 0 and financial savings, it is necessary to MQ-9 F-16 MQ-9 F-16 understand the opportunity cost of RPA Operations Maintenance Munitions Inventory employment versus manned aircraft. As the United States shifts security focus Flying our Cost 24/7 Operations to peer/near-peer threats in contested $25,000 $600,000 environments, key capabilities such as multirole, manned strike aircraft must be apportioned and allocated appropriately $500,000 $20,000 to mitigate contemporary threats beyond the ODTAAC CT fight. Typical opera- tional requirements in the ODTAAC $400,000 environment to support ISR and tactical $15,000 airstrike capability,necessitate persistence, flexibility, and limited strike capability. $300,000 The fact that RPA can meet/exceed this 24-hour requirement with a typical force $10,000 package of three aircraft, vice 18-24 $200,000 F-16s according to a RAND study, pro- vides policymakers with greater flexibility $5,000 for apportionment of high-end, manned $100,000 capabilities to meet the challenges posed by rogue nations and revisionist pow- 39 ers. Necessary to annotate, while RPA $0 $0 provide extraordinarily precise, persistent MQ-9 F-16 MQ-9 F-16 strike capability, some situations demand Hourly Per Diem strike options that RPA simply cannot provide due to operating limitations aircraft from a resourcing standpoint, including advanced precision weapons, (satellite bandwidth/footprint, basing), RPA offer unique tactical capabilities as integrated communications, and multi- limited armament payload, and a lack of well that further support U.S. security intelligence fusion. defensive capability. policy. Specifically, modern U.S. RPA The current MQ-9 aircraft employed While this data drives policymakers employ diverse technologies that repre- across the globe maintains the ability often to prefer RPA to manned strike sent an evolution in airpower capability, to loiter over a single target for over
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Butz 41 20 hours, providing capability that niche weapons with lower explosive is critical that the concept be analyzed historically required multiple types and yield, MQ-9s are able to strike individual from a strategic perspective to identify quantities of various manned aircraft. targets in densely populated areas with no those characteristics of RPA opera- Highly trained crew employ technologi- collateral damage.40 Last, in contrast to tions that may actually detract from cal capabilities within the platform that the precision low-yield strikes, the MQ-9 U.S. policy objectives. Specifically, facilitate ISR collection through use also retains the capability to conduct this examination of RPA strikes must of high-definition infrared, short-wave massed attack against fortified positions identify factors that result in political infrared, and visual spectrum (electro- and large troop formations as seen in the scrutiny, socioeconomic instability, host- optical) full-motion videos. Additionally, 2016 strike against an al Shabab training government illegitimacy, and increased use of synthetic aperture radar and camp that resulted in 167 enemy killed in strategic risk. The primary factors that signals intelligence provides combat- action, the deadliest single-salvo airstrike often produce the above risks include ant commands with a broad array of since 9/11.41 Because of the niche tactical opaque U.S. policies on the use of capabilities to collect and disseminate competencies of RPA, the staggering dis- RPA, the destructive narrative of drone information regarding enemy personnel parity in risk and resource requirements, strikes, an incomplete characterization and capabilities. The communications and the opportunity costs associated of the enemy’s operating environment, suite on the current MQ-9 includes FM, with manned capability, RPA will con- and what author James Kiras explains UHF, VHF, satellite communications, tinue to be the primary option to meet as “the appeal of an apparent simple, voice over Internet protocol, secure operational requirements for ISR and air- direct and low-cost solution to a dif- Internet (at the secret and top-secret to-ground strike capability in permissible ficult strategic problem.”44 Collectively, level), and secure telephonic capability. ODTAAC environments. lacking an understanding of these Finally, the MQ-9 retains the ability to While RPA strikes often attain strate- factors and an active mitigation plan, carry an extensive variety of precision- gic effects, it is important to remember reliance on armed RPA operations as guided weapons including 500-pound that the tactical use of RPA and kinetic the core of a narrow security strategy laser-guided bombs, 1,000-pound strikes represents merely a means and may further destabilize fragile regions, GPS-guided munitions, and various a way to support policy objectives and isolate key partners, and detract from laser-guided Hellfire missiles. must not supplant formulation of effec- national security objectives. The combined capabilities of a single tive national strategy. Despite the myriad A primary risk factor in the use of MQ-9 offer military commanders and niche capabilities and the potential stra- armed RPA, and a consistent criticism policymakers an evolutionary cost- tegic effect of RPA strikes, they are often from both domestic and international effective tool to support the entire joint conflated as a strategy or policy in and entities, is the opaque nature in which targeting cycle to find, fix, and finish of themselves. As Jeremy Scahill states, strikes are authorized, executed, and re- (kill) enemy forces while concurrently “drones RPA are a tool, not a policy.”42 ported. This lack of transparency, from a exploiting, analyzing, and disseminat- Moreover, with overdependence on this policy and oversight perspective, restricts ing intelligence information. Examples highly effective capability as an often cho- necessary debate on the appropriate use, of these synergistic and diverse kinetic sen tool to address security challenges, legal framework, and strategic effective- capabilities inherent to the MQ-9 in- policymakers and senior leaders must ness of this niche capability as a policy clude previously infeasible strikes against understand those characteristics of RPA tool. While limited steps toward policy fast-moving targets in highly populated strikes that consequently detract from transparency occurred between the Bush areas, strikes using extremely low- national security objectives in ODTAAC and Obama administrations, the Trump collateral-damage weapons, and massed environments. administration’s rollback on these initia- employment against fortified positions tives increased opacity, resulting in what and enemy formations. The Potential Cost of Rachel Stohl argues is “a lack of clarity The evolutionary leap in airpower Armed RPA Operations over who represents a legitimate target, capability that the MQ-9 represents is The term drone carries a generally and greater secrecy regarding the ways displayed through a number of recent negative connotation with thoughts of in which operations are conducted, by strike, including the one against General killer flying robots, breaches of personal whom, and the results of such opera- Qasem Soleimani near the Baghdad privacy, and safety risks to aviation. tions.”45 This continued opacity increases International Airport, where MQ-9s The phrase drone strike may convey policy and strategic risks, wherein trans- were able to use multi-intelligence col- even deeper malice, conjuring images parency is both appropriate and necessary. lection, a robust command and control of civilian casualties, collateral damage, Though the assertion is made, and network, and niche weapons capability to assassination, extrajudicial killing, and necessarily so, that certain facets of armed execute a strike against a moving vehicle the militarization of American foreign RPA operations must remain classi- in a dense urban area with no collateral policy.43 While this view may simply fied (for example, collection methods, damage. Additionally, as reported from be a biased narrative based on current weapons capabilities, operating locations recent strikes in Syria, using modified literature and ill-informed reporting, it of deployed personnel), there is value in
42 JPME Today / Beneath the Crosshairs JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 transparent reporting of U.S. targeting Figure 2. Reported Combatant/Noncombatant Deaths efforts, strategic objectives, and the as- Target Civ/Unk Bureau of U.S. overnment sociated successes and challenges. Viewed New America Investigative Journalism Unofficial holistically, armed RPA operations are an Sample Size 200 N/A 7 024 5 096 5 389 18 975 9 755 11 026 2 490 2 617 100 evolutionary step in warfare and jus in 4 2 13 10 bello, resulting in greater discrimination 17 17 16 23 25 in the use of force, increased confidence 80 in effective targeting, and substantially decreased risk to noncombatants. Lacking
transparent reporting and accountability, 60 the extraordinary tactical effectiveness of 90 96 98 armed RPA operations (in both DTAAC 90 Total illed Total 84 87 40 83 83 and ODTAAC environments) is relegated 77 75 to a narrative of excess, illegality, immo-
rality, and destruction. This misinformed 20 narrative, resulting from the opacity of
U.S. policy, is further enhanced by an 10 overwhelming quantity of imprecise 0 The Intercept The Atlantic New America New America New America Bureau of Bureau of Bureau of 2016 Author’s media reports, individual editorials, (High Est.) (Low Est.) (Blended) Investigative Investigative Investigative ODNI Operational Journalism Journalism Journalism Report Experience books, movies, and an ineffective U.S. (High Est.) (Low Est.) (Blended) informational counternarrative.46 Critics assert that RPA advocates often The second risk factor to consider is of reporting periods differs among all highlight technological advances as the based on the malign narrative of armed sources, the reported sample size is in- main factor in assuring proportionality and RPA operations. For instance, reviewing cluded in the figure. discrimination. Sarah Kreps highlights this results of a simple Internet search of the Within these reports, even from point when quoting State Department phrase drone strike illustrates the over- within specific organizations, is a wide legal advisor Harold Koh, who stated whelmingly aspersive narrative surrounding disparity of data as expressed by author that RPA technology “ensures that only American use of armed RPA, with nearly Cora Currier, stating “the estimates are legitimate objectives are targeted, and that 80 percent of search results demonstrating largely compiled by interpreting news collateral damage is kept to a minimum.”47 negativity and disapproval. This narrative reports relying on anonymous officials Koh’s argument based on technology primarily highlights civilian casualties, col- or accounts of local media, whose cred- fuels critics, who assert that technology lateral damage, the (il)legality of targeted ibility may vary.”50 Additionally, because intrinsically confuses the “determination killings, and what Amnesty International the data range from some individual of legal or ethical legitimacy.”48 Both Koh terms American “imperial overreach.”49 sources (New America Foundation and and Kreps do not acknowledge the central While transparent and construc- the Bureau of Investigative Journalism) role of the human interface within the tive dialogue on topics such as legality, is so broad, the figure reflects low es- RPA operational framework. This include ethicality, unintended consequences, and timates, high estimates, and a blended oversight and review from national-level strategic use of RPA is critical to ensure sample that reflects the lowest total authorities to the combatant command effective utilization of this capability, it is number of personnel killed with the leadership, legal experts, operational too often imbalanced, unverified, and/or highest claim of civilian casualties.51 planners, all-source intelligence analysts, wholly inaccurate. A simple comparison With media reports of civilian casualties targeteers, and individual aircrew mem- based on data from various reporting ranging from 10 percent through 90 bers. While it may seem apparent, airplanes organizations reveals broad statistical percent of all strike deaths, compared to do not make decisions; when operated disparity, and when compared to a smaller ODNI and personal accounts of 4 per- by highly trained crews, RPA represent subset based on personal experience, the cent to 2 percent noncombatant deaths, a means to better inform and facilitate inaccuracies become even more apparent. respectively, the disparity of accounting human decisions. In fact, the RPA human Figure 2 analyzes sample data of is apparent.52 Additionally within media network is significantly more robust RPA strikes (comparing reported enemy reports, there is no distinction annotated than more traditional weapons systems, deaths to those of assessed noncomba- on how the recorded data was confirmed decreasing the ambiguity of distinction tants) from four media outlets, the Office as RPA strikes, vice any other type of and proportionality. As is the case with of the Director of National Intelligence air-to-ground or surface-to-surface all aspects of IHL, it is within this human (ODNI), and my own personal experi- engagement. Notably, in searching for interface that those legal and ethical deter- ence having commanded and directed accurate data through an Internet search minations are attained. over 6 years of RPA strikes across seven of “drone civilian deaths,” the openly countries. Of note, because the duration available ODNI report does not even
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Butz 43 Figure 3. Characterization of Strategic Ris “kind of antiseptic . . . like a video game in Armed RPA Operations . . . like Call of Duty.”55 Mark Bowden goes so far as to state that in war the use Effect/Ris Spectrum Effectiveness Ris of RPA strikes “ignores the spirit of the 56 Host Government Strong Governance Weak Governance contest.” These cultural implications of “remote death” drive a biased and U.S. Role to Host Nation Attributable Acknowledged Nonattributable Intrusive often false narrative. Without transparent, Host-Nation Population Opposes Belligerent Condones Belligerent Supports Belligerent informative, and accountable engage- Belligerent Organization Centralized Nodal Decentralized ment by the U.S. Government, the niche capability provided by armed RPA opera- Belligerent Motivation Political/State Financial Ideological Religious tions is vulnerable among both domestic Character of Conflict In Extremis Protracted Stalemate and international information spheres, Foreign Role of Targeted Leader Fighter State Military Proxy Criminal Insurgent Religious increasing the political risk of use when deemed appropriate. Furthermore, in Acceptable U.S. Cost Credibility Equipment Isolation Life Allies order to counter this malign narrative and International Support Sanctioned Tacit Support U.S. Unilateral Opposed maximize the strategic influence of armed Character of Theater DTAAC ODTAAC Unacknowledged RPA, policymakers and senior leaders must transparently assess the proper use of this capability and resist historical tendencies based on incomplete charac- Figure 4. Notional Ris /Effect Analysis terizations of the mission, the operating environment, and the policy objectives. Belligerent Organization There exists a third risk factor to the use of armed RPA that is even more criti- Political Ideological/Criminal Religious Strong cal than either the opacity of policy or the Increased Radicalization/Commitment/Willingness to Sacrifice malign narrative. This is the mischarac- terization of the operating environment Illegitimacy/Destabilization/Isolation Centralized that creates an inarticulate strategy, Inaccurate Reporting directs improper use of force (to include armed RPA), and detracts from policy ost overnment objectives. Reflecting on the conventional targeting theory prior to 9/11, we see Characterization of the concepts of effects-based opera- Operating Enviroment tions, John Boyd’s OODA Loop, and John Warden’s Five Rings.57 Because of
Belligerent Organization the rapid expansion of RPA operations (and CT strikes) in Afghanistan and Malign Narrative Iraq through 2003, planners and senior
Increased Effectiveness to Resolve Conflict leaders remained wedded to pre-9/11 Weak Belligerent Resiliency/Recruitment/Longevity concepts. This lag led to a dependence on
Decentralized decapitation strikes to support Warden’s Opposes Belligerent Condones Belligerent Supports U.S. Belligerent dictum that the enemy leader and his ost Nation Population command structure are the only entities capable of “determining a nation’s (or occur within the first 100 search items, to Paul Rich, media and feature films can group’s) will to fight.”58 But these as- further illustrating this narrative bias. be “highly influential in framing major sertions did not hold, and they relied on Unfortunately, the data from government political issues.”53 This is certainly the a mischaracterization of the enemy and sources is completely overshadowed by an case with the use of armed RPA and has the operating environment. After 9/11, ill-informed media narrative that results bolstered a malign narrative that, as il- the United States was no longer fight- from disparate reports, sensationalism, lustrated by Guardian columnist Henry ing a conventional highly centralized, and a lack of transparency. Barnes, “forgets there’s someone at the state-managed force. Instead, the United This narrative is further refined controls, emphasizing the alien nature States found itself matched against a through the use of popular media, to of a remote, robotic death.”54 This nar- disparate, decentralized, religiously based include television, books, and movies rative has been further bolstered by legal terrorist movement that garnered support that deal with drone warfare. According officials declaring that RPA strikes are from the indigenous population.
44 JPME Today / Beneath the Crosshairs JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 From the beginning of the war on The strategic risk model is not to belligerents and the targets represent terror, the United States became fix- intended to be a checklist-based exami- decentralized, religiously motivated ated on decapitation strikes and failed to nation on the efficacy and risk of RPA ideologies, creating a destructive cycle comprehensively assess the role of RPA decapitation strikes, but instead to pro- that actually detracts from policy goals. strikes to achieve strategic objectives vide analytical context to policy decisions. Moreover, while the preponderance of in support of policy ends. Moreover, The model asserts that an attributable scrutiny on RPA operations derives from without a coherent policy and war ter- U.S. strike against a leader within a civilian casualties, in this destructive mination criteria, military planners were strong bureaucratic state, sanctioned by cycle, even successful RPA strikes (that relegated to decapitation operations international support, within a declared is, targeted individual killed with no col- (including direct action special operations theater of conflict is likely the most effec- lateral damage) could result in blowback. and conventional operations) that did not tive and least risky type of decapitation For example, a successful U.S. RPA strike address root causes of the conflict. James strike. In contrast, the model asserts that against a belligerent leader often devolves Kiras captures this sentiment, asserting, the least effective (and highest risk) de- into a narrative that highlights U.S. “decapitation strikes are appealing pre- capitation operations are against leaders overreach, further delegitimizing the cisely because they compress the vertical of decentralized, religiously motivated host-nation government. This principle is and horizontal dimension of strategy organizations with weak host-nation gov- characterized by Mark Bowden, writing, into a single flat line in which actions, ernance and strong host-nation popular the “political message [of an RPA strike] unburdened by friction or imperfect support. Adding to the challenge, the emphasizes the disparity in power be- knowledge and unimpeded by politi- complex interactive relationship between tween the parties and reinforces popular cal considerations, achieve their effects risk and effectiveness is neither binary support for the terrorists, who are seen as against an enemy system in a preordained nor directly opposed; it is unique to each David fighting Goliath.”64 Without an ef- manner.”59 Unfortunately, decapitation operational environment, pointing to fective US counternarrative, this popular targeting theory does not target the a greater need for constructive analysis sentiment foments instability and isola- foundational principles that foment insta- and dialogue prior to commencement of tion of the host nation. bility and violence in contemporary CT/ decapitation strikes. In order to mitigate the potential counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns: Figure 4 represents this notional for blowback, and concurrent with any the malign ideology and its psycho-social risk/effect analysis portraying the proposal to conduct decapitation opera- influence on the host-nation population. complex interactions of the operating tions, policymakers must characterize the Political scientist Robert Pape captured environment based on 4 of the 10 prin- operational environment to understand this sentiment in 1996, stating, “decapi- ciples. In understanding and accounting the likelihood of success and its com- tation is not likely to coerce adversaries for inherent risks of RPA strikes (policy plex association with the strategic risk. and can be counterproductive.”60 opacity, inaccurate reporting, and malign While Warden’s theories of decapitation In order to fully assess the appropriate narrative), policymakers must deliber- strikes continue to drive contemporary role (or lack thereof) of RPA decapitation ately forecast and anticipate the effects airpower theory since 9/11, they do not strikes as a policy tool at the strategic level, on popular sentiment, the host-nation account for these characteristics within senior leaders must fully consider that government, the belligerent organiza- the operational environment. In today’s additional risk factors, such as social, politi- tion, and the belligerent’s motivation. CT and COIN campaigns, this mischar- cal, cultural, and economic characteristics, In this figure, we highlight those char- acterization often creates more instability, shape military responses.61 As a result of acteristics that increase strategic risk, host-nation illegitimacy, and strategic risk the mischaracterization of these risk fac- manifesting in potential unintended to U.S. policy goals. An expansion on the tors within the operating environment consequences and what the CIA refers theories of Warden and other advocates and false assumptions of the efficacy of to as “blowback.”63 of decapitation strikes must capture the decapitation strikes in current conflicts, the Figure 4 also highlights increased analysis of the operating environment U.S. Government has not provided a clear radicalization and host-nation illegitimacy prior to creation of strategy. explanation of how RPA strikes will be as the two greatest strategic risks associ- Expanding on the theories of coordinated with broader foreign policy ated with armed RPA operations. Within Warden, figure 5 reorganizes the risk objectives.62 Moving forward, before the contemporary CT/COIN operational characteristics, providing an analytical adoption of a national strategy that in- environments, these two factors manifest model to capture the risk characteriza- cludes leadership decapitation operations, in increased belligerent recruitment, tion of leadership strikes inherent in it is imperative that policymakers under- resilience, and commitment, while con- his Five Rings model. Because neither stand the complex interaction between comitantly delegitimizing and isolating model is prescriptive, policymakers effectiveness and the above risk factors. the host-nation government and security must understand the complex relation- Figure 3 details this interaction using an apparatus. Many of today’s CT/COIN ship between the likelihood of effective effect/risk spectrum based on 10 charac- environments are defined by weak gover- decapitation strikes and the oppos- teristics within the operating environment. nance, popular acquiescence, and support ing risk. While the models above are
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Butz 45 Figure 5. E pansion of Warden’s Inner Ring certain assertions can be made about the Host efficacy of a given strategy. For example, Governance based on the model’s additive score of Belligerent Host Organization Wea 22, the airstrike against Abu Omar al- Illegitimate Population Shishani, the IS minster of war, had a Supports Decentralized Strong Belligerent higher chance of success (in influencing Illegitimate IS) compared to a relatively lower risk Leadership Nodal to operational environment (blowback). System Centralized Strong Opposes U.S. Essentials Belligerent Legitimate Belligerent Military According to the U.S. special operations Motivation Intrusive Infrastructure Religious Role Ideological Bureaucratic task force commander that directed Population Criminal the operation, the death of Shishani Political Attributable Field Forces Targeted 1 2 3 4 5 resulted in a significant degradation Leader 65 FTF Credibility to IS military capability. In contrast, Military Equipment Pro y Life the strike against Taliban Emir Mullah Warden s Five Rings Religious Sanctioned Allies Akhtar Mansour in May 2016, with an Role of DTAAC In E tremis Acceptable Targeted U.S. Cost assessed score of 39, retained a high risk Leader Tacit Support ODTAAC Protracted of blowback (and failure to achieve last-
U.S. Unilateral ing effects on the Taliban), regardless Unac nowledged Stalemate of whether the strike itself was tactically
Character Opposed Character of successful. This objective postmortem of of Theater Conflict historic strikes using the model is useful International Support to assess proposed roles of military force in current and future conflicts. Because these models are designed for risk analy- sis at the policy and strategic level, they Figure 6. Decapitation Operation Case Study Effect vs. Ris deliberately avoid discussion of “risk to
Host Decapitation Case Studies force” and other tactical risk factors that Governance Effect Risk 5 50 emerge through joint operational and Belligerent Host Organization Population tactical planning. Understanding the 22 Shishani War Minister/Military Leader importance of strikes against leadership Foreign Terrorist Fighter Struck Outside Home Nation targets (akin to Warden’s model), these U.S. Internationally Sanctioned Belligerent Military models expand the analysis of the oper- Motivation Role 31 Soleimani Iranian IRGC Commander ating environment and highlight those State Military Leader unique characteristics that will likely Targeted 1 2 3 4 5 Struck Outside Home Nation Leader Acknowledged Theater neuter effective decapitation operations 39 Mansour from the strategic level. Taliban Emir Role of Acceptable Religious Leader Targeted U.S. Cost Though armed RPA will undoubt- Leader Struck in Home Nation Decentralized Organization edly continue to play a role in U.S. 42 Bin Laden foreign policy, the imperative for suc- Not RPA Strike Character Character of Religious Leader cess lies not in the hands of the RPA of Theater Conflict Struck Outside Host Nation operators, but in the characterization International Internationally Sanctioned Support of the environment and the strategy nested therein to support policy goals. primarily subjective, is flexible enough characteristics (including the highest Prior to decisions to use force, includ- to represent a more objective analysis by risk) from the operation to capture and/ ing armed RPA, policymakers must measuring the overall effectiveness/risk or kill bin Laden illuminate the need for examine and debate appropriateness spectrum based on the 10 characteris- subjective decisionmaking ability instead to a given situation based on informed tics. By assigning a weighted numerical of a purely objective analysis. analysis of the operating environment. value to each characteristic (situation- As the case studies show, using the Too often, without a comprehensive ally dependent), planners can inform weighted risk of each characteristic, whole-of-government effort (based on policy decisions based on likelihood certain aspects of decapitation opera- an understanding of the complexity of success versus inherent risk. Figure tions drive likelihood of success, while of effects versus risk), the tendency to 6 displays examples of four notable others drive risk. Whereas the decision employ RPA as the tool of choice alone decapitation operations. While three of calculus and interplay of these complex results in further instability and strategic the four were in fact RPA strikes, distinct relationships is difficult to ascertain, risk to policy objectives.
46 JPME Today / Beneath the Crosshairs JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Conclusion and armed RPA, as part of a comprehensive bellum-and-jus-bello-0>. 13 Sarah Kreps, “The Use of Unmanned whole-of-government strategy, provides Recommendations Aerial Vehicles in Contemporary Conflict: A While RPA represent an evolution in niche, low-risk strategic capability to sup- Legal and Ethical Analysis,” Polity 44, no. 2 military capability, they have revolution- port policy goals and mitigate immediate (April 2012), 261. ized the U.S. ability to project power. threats to our nation, our partners, our 14 Bowden, “How the Predator Drone In so doing, the use of armed RPA interests, and our allies. JFQ Changed the Character of War.” 15 Whittle, “Timeline of Key Events.” and decapitation strikes as an intrinsic 16 Ibid. policy, absent a whole-of-government 17 National Commission on Terrorist strategy, increases risk to national policy Notes Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 objectives, destabilizes fragile regions, Commission Report (Washington, DC: 1 and isolates key partners. With this Mark Bowden, “How the Predator Drone National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Changed the Character of War,” Smithsonian Upon the United States, 2004), 212, available approach, policymakers risk defaulting Magazine, November 2013, available at at
JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021 Butz 47 Drones Are Back,” Foreign Policy, March 26, com/2016/03/08/world/africa/us-airstrikes- tion Regarding U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes 2018, available at 48 JPME Today / Beneath the Crosshairs JFQ 100, 1st Quarter 2021