Regionalism and Changing Regional Order in the Pacific Islands

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Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 312–324 doi: 10.1002/app5.27 Original Article

Regionalism and Changing Regional Order in the Paciﬁc Islands

Sandra Tarte*

Abstract 1. Introduction

Institutional developments in Pacific Islands Institutional developments in Pacific Island regionalism have been dramatic in recent regionalism have been dramatic in recent years. These include the changing role of the years. Within Melanesia, the Pacific’s largest Parties to the Nauru Agreement, a grouping of and most economically dynamic island states eight ‘tuna-rich’ Pacific Island states that is have ramped up their cooperation through a transforming the dynamics of regional fisher- strengthened Melanesian Spearhead Group ies; the emergence of a more activist Melane- (MSG), which has expanded its purview to sian Spearhead Group, which comprises the include climate change and security, and is four largest economies of the Pacific Islands leading the process of regional economic inte- and is leading the process of regional eco- gration. This has triggered the formation of the nomic integration; and the establishment of Polynesian Leaders Group in 2012. In the key the Pacific Islands Development Forum, which tuna fisheries sector, the Parties to the Nauru promises a more inclusive ‘regionalism Agreement (PNA) have emerged as a force for through partnerships’ approach in addressing change, asserting a tuna management and climate change and sustainable development development agenda that is transforming the issues. This new dynamism is driven by the dynamics of regional fisheries. Meanwhile, at discontent of a growing number of island the United Nations (UN), Pacific Island states states with the established regional order, achieved an historic victory in the renaming of defined by prevailing institutions, power and the regional bloc to which they belong, now ideas, and by a desire to assert greater control the Asia-Pacific Small Islands Developing over their own futures. Against the backdrop of States grouping, and have caucused as the an increasingly dynamic geopolitical and geo- Pacific Small Islands Developing States economic landscape, Pacific Island states are (PSIDS) group on issues of sustainable devel- using alternative regional frameworks to opment and climate change, rather than as the develop new approaches to the challenges Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) group. Long facing them. regarded as the region’s peak political body, with Australia and New Zealand as members, Key words: regionalism, regional order, the PIF has in recent years been shaken by the Pacific Islands, tuna fisheries, Melanesia absence of its host country Fiji (following its suspension in 2009 for failing to hold elec- * School of Government, Development and International tions), and by reviews in 2012 and 2013 that Affairs, Faculty of Business and Economics, University of highlighted the need for a major overhaul of the South Pacific, Suva, Fiji; email Ͻ[email protected]Ͼ. the Forum, if it is to retain its relevance. The

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University. This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, which permits use, distribution and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited and is not used for commercial purposes. Tarte: Regionalism and Changing Regional Order 313 inauguration in 2013 of the Pacific Islands ‘tuna-rich’ Pacific Island states; the emergence Development Forum (PIDF) is potentially the of a more activist MSG, which comprises the most significant challenge to the PIF to date. four largest economies of the Pacific Islands; Established by Pacific Island leaders in Fiji, it and the establishment of the PIDF, which is based on a radically new approach to region- promises a more inclusive ‘regionalism alism that includes Pacific Island state and through partnerships’ approach in addressing non-state actors, and aims to become the insti- climate change and sustainable development tutional voice of PSIDS—at the global and issues. wider regional levels. This article also addresses the question of Within academic and policy circles, how to explain this transformation. The however, opinion is divided on the broader and reasons for the recent changes in regional poli- long-term significance of these developments. tics are contested. Most commentary has One view is that these new institutions fill a focused on the rise of China and the growing gap in the region’s architecture, but do not interest of new external players in the region as challenge the dominant position and authority the prime explanation (see Firth 2011; of the PIF. May (2011, p. 7) has argued, for Haywood-Jones 2013; Wesley-Smith 2013). example, that ‘it seems unlikely that the MSG Some have also emphasised the role of Fiji’s or some other MSG Plus grouping poses a new diplomacy, following its suspension from serious challenge to the Pacific Islands the PIF in 2009. A third view sees the ‘new Forum’. In similar vein, Poling (2013) argued Pacific politics’ as a response to failures of that the PIDF ‘is not and is unlikely to become existing regional institutions to address devel- a competitor to the Pacific Islands Forum... opment issues for the Pacific (Morauta 2013). as the coordinating hub for Pacific develop- Fourth, Pareti (2013a) highlights ‘unhappi- ment’. Another view is that these develop- ness’ on the part of Fiji and other island states ments are largely transitory and short-lived. at the perceived ‘undue influence on Pacific For example, Lal (2012, p. 87) predicted that Islands Countries issues and affairs by Austra- the PSIDS group ‘will slide into oblivion once lia and New Zealand’. Fiji rejoins the Forum’. Other commentators, This article argues that the causes lie in the however, see these developments as having interaction of these forces with a broader dis- deeper significance. Herr and Bergin (2011, p. course of change in the region. It suggests that 2) refer to a ‘rising sub-regionalism’ that is much of the new regional dynamism is driven testing the ‘coherence and robustness of the by the discontent of a growing number of regional system’, while Maclellan (2013) island states with the established regional describes the erosion of ‘Australia’s long- order and by a desire to assert greater control held influence’ as Pacific regionalism is over their own futures. Against the backdrop of ‘transformed’. an increasingly dynamic geopolitical and geo- This article addresses the question of economic landscape, Pacific Island states are whether these regional initiatives are a series using alternative regional frameworks to of unrelated developments or part of a more develop new approaches to the challenges fundamental process of change. It argues that facing them. This recalls an earlier quest for they do constitute a deeper transformation, not self-determination through regionalism, which just of the regional architecture, but of the coincided with the decolonisation of the regional order itself.1 The focus is on three Pacific Islands region four decades ago.2 key institutional developments. They are the To provide a baseline to evaluate the signifi- changing role of the PNA, a grouping of eight cance of the new regional politics, the article

1. Regional order refers to the prevailing institutions, 2. Fry (1981) discussed how developments in South power configuration, and ideas and norms that shape inter- Pacific regionalism, initiated by Pacific Island countries, national relations within a given geographical region (Fry affected the nature of international relations within the 1993; Sorensen 2006). new, post-colonial system.

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 314 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2014 begins with a description of the post- the United States, Australia and New Zealand. independence regional order and the role of Important regional agreements negotiated regionalism within that order. under the auspices of the South Pacific Forum included a multilateral tuna treaty with the United States, the Lome Convention with the 2. The Post-Independence Regional Order European Union (EU), and the South Pacific Regional Trade and Economic Cooperation The decolonisation of the island countries and Agreement with Australia and New Zealand. territories in the 1960s and 1970s saw the Through collective diplomacy, Pacific Island emergence of new regional order. states were also able to advance their interests This post-independence regional order was on security and environmental issues, such as defined, first by an extensive network of inter- the declaration of the South Pacific Nuclear connected regional institutions. The most Free Zone in 1985 and the Wellington Conven- important of these institutions was the South tion banning driftnet fishing in the region in Pacific Forum, formed in 1971. Later renamed 1989. the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), this comprised For the former colonial powers, regional the political leaders of all independent and self- institutions helped maintain the Western hege- governing states, together with Australia and mony over the Pacific Island region, a legacy New Zealand.3 Given this membership, it of the colonial era. This was possible through became the preeminent regional body of the their membership of some or all of the key Pacific Islands, coordinating policy and action regional organisations. Australia and New on the major political, economic, security and Zealand held a special place in this regional environmental issues facing the region. The PIF order as the only non-Pacific Island members built on an existing regionalism, established of the PIF and its secretariat. This gave them during the colonial era. The largest regional privileged access to, as well as influence over, body—in terms of membership—was the regional actions and policy. In exchange, they South Pacific Commission (SPC), formed by provided the largest share of funding for the colonial powers in 1947 and comprising all regional program and operating budget of metropolitan powers and their territories, as the PIF Secretariat and related regional well as emerging independent island states. agencies. However, this also led to a marked Later renamed Secretariat of the Pacific asymmetry within regional institutions and Community, SPC focused on (technical) coop- a growing dependence on donors, fostering eration in a range of economic, social and sci- what Firth (2008) described as ‘patron-client’ entific areas. Other more specialised regional regionalism. institutions were formed out of the SPC and The inclusion of Australia and New Zealand Forum, dealing with fisheries, environment, by Pacific Island leaders in regional institu- geoscience, tourism and education. tions (particularly the PIF) was based on the Regional institutions and frameworks belief that they were needed as partners in this played a central role in the maintenance of the regional endeavour: ‘for part of the ambitious Pacific regional order. For Pacific Island states, plan of the Forum was no less than to alter the they were an important mechanism for assert- whole balance in the terms of trade’.4 Australia ing their newly acquired sovereign identities and New Zealand, for their part, supported the and claiming their rights as sovereign states. idea of ‘equal partnership’ within regional These institutions were also central to facili- institutions as well as in bilateral relations, and tating post-colonial ties with former metro- were sensitive to appearing too dominant in politan powers—such as the Britain, France, regional affairs (Ball 1973).

3. PIF membership is Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 4. Comment by Ratu Sir Kamisese Mara, Prime Minister Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, of Fiji, Grail Address, Corpus Christi College, Suva, 15 Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga. Tuvalu and Vanuatu. January 1973.

The post-independence regional order was divide Forum members (although all had origi- built on the idea of Pacific Island ‘ownership’ nally agreed to adopt the ultimatum leading to of regional organisations. As Greg Fry (1981, this suspension). Challenges arising from the p. 468) argued, regional organisations ‘were effects of climate change also became an not just created for the practical results they increasing concern for Pacific Island states might achieve, they were also seen as symbols (especially the smaller island states most of an indigenous assertion of control over vulnerable to the effects of sea-level rise). regional decision-making and activity’. This However, PIF Communiques remained at odds was reflected in the articulations of a common with agreed positions taken by these states. For regional identity: the Pacific Way. Especially some, this created an imperative for more evident in the early post-colonial era, the assertive Pacific diplomacy on the world stage. Pacific Way asserted Pacific cultural values As the Kiribati President Anote Tong put it in and practices, which in turn provided a basis 2012: ‘We have no choice but to engage even for regional solidarity and empowerment. more aggressively internationally because the By the early 2000s, some tensions and con- key to our survival will depend on whether tradictions inherent in this Pacific regional international action is taken on climate change order began to surface, eroding its political or not’ (Tong 2012). legitimacy and integrity. One trend that Criticisms of the PIF Secretariat’s role, became increasingly pronounced was the ten- especially in trade negotiations, were evident dency of Australia and New Zealand to assume in the 2012 review of the organisation, which a more dominant role in regional affairs. This also pointed to ‘weak’ engagement between has been described by (Firth 2008, p. 122) as the Secretariat and its members. The subse- ‘a shift to a new, Australian-directed regional- quent review of the PIF’s blueprint for regional ism’, especially evident in the security and cooperation, the Pacific Plan, referred to a economic/trade domains. ‘palpable frustration’ within the region at the Disquiet at this trend was voiced by various failure of existing institutions and processes to leaders—including one of the founders of the meet the region’s development needs (Morauta Forum, Ratu Mara. Reflecting on the PIF’s 2013). 30th anniversary in 2001, he confessed to a Against this backdrop, Pacific Island coun- ‘sense of disappointment with our metropoli- tries have increasingly pursued their interests tan members...that they have sought to through alternative regional mechanisms and impose their solutions in an insensitive way, venues. The first to be examined relates to the when left to ourselves we could work things management of the region’s most lucrative out in what we have called the Pacific Way’ shared resource, its tuna fishery. (Mara 2001). The push by Australia and New Zealand to fast-track trade negotiations with 3. An Independent PNA and the New the Pacific Island countries, especially in 2009, Tuna Politics drew criticisms of bullying tactics and abuses of process. According to one study, ‘such The significance of the region’s tuna wealth behavior appears to be condoned, if not has long been acknowledged. The central and actively facilitated, by a Forum Secretariat that western Pacific Ocean accounts for the world’s many Pacific Islanders increasingly regard as largest non-depleted stocks of commercial being in the pockets of Australia and New tuna. The exclusive economic zones (EEZs) of Zealand’ (Penjueli & Morgan 2009, p. 5). eight Pacific Island states collectively account Another key factor that exposed cracks in for one third of global canning supplies, valued the regional order was Fiji’s suspension from at about US$3,000 million annually. What has the PIF and its Secretariat. The decision to also been long acknowledged, and long suspend Fiji in 2009, following its failure to decried, is the failure of Pacific island states to hold elections despite an earlier undertaking translate their marine tenure rights under inter- to the Forum, was unprecedented and served to national law into real and substantial economic

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 316 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2014 benefits (Aqorau 2012). Foreign licensing that ‘in order to secure greater economic ben- arrangements—with Japan, the United States, efits and control of their tuna resources the Korea, Taiwan, China and the EU—yielded on PNA shall strengthen the institutional arrange- average about 4–5 per cent rate of return or ments for their cooperation...through the about US$60 million annually. Nor was the development of additional mechanisms’ region able to benefit from on-shore operations (Parties to the Nauru Agreement 2013a, p. of the tuna industry since most of the product 110). was off-loaded directly at canneries in South To this end the ministers agreed to establish East Asia. a PNA office in Majuro, Marshall Islands, The potential for Pacific Island coastal from the beginning of 2010. This marked a states to improve returns through leveraging turning point for the group, as it asserted its control over access to their tuna stocks has independent institutional identity for the first been greatest for the eight countries whose time. In the past, one of the factors holding zones account for the bulk of the Western and back the move to a separate organisation was Central Pacific’s purse seine fishery.5 These funding constraints. This problem was over- tuna-rich states first joined forces in 1982, come with the offer from Papua New Guinea signing the Nauru Agreement Concerning (PNG) to fund the start-up costs of the PNA Cooperation in the Management of Fisheries office. PNG’s head of fisheries explained his of Common Interest. The group, known as the country’s role in PNA in the following terms: Parties to the Nauru Agreement or PNA, has ‘PNG is big enough to pursue its national fish- been described as a ‘natural alliance’ due to the eries agenda on its own. But the PNG govern- fact that they had the largest concentration of ment recognizes and takes seriously its tuna fishing activity in the region. They also responsibility as a “big brother” of the other shared a common tuna stock (skipjack tuna) PNA countries. . .’ (Pareti 2011).7 and an interest in coordinating their approach The establishment of the PNA office was to foreign-owned fishing operations in their made necessary in part by the move taken by contiguous EEZs. They came together out of PNA in 2007 to adopt a radically new frustration with the broader regional fisheries approach to managing access to their EEZs. body, established by the South Pacific Forum What is known as the Vessel Day Scheme in 1979—the Forum Fisheries Agency (FFA).6 (VDS) effectively created a limited number of While initially there was speculation that fishing days within the entire PNA region and PNA would fragment the wider group and a standardised minimum fee per day. Days ‘dilute’ the impact of the FFA, PNA was not were distributed among PNA members (and conceived as a breakaway bloc. Instead, it could also be traded among themselves), and operated as an integral part of the FFA, with fishing fleets were compelled to compete the latter providing administrative and techni- against each other for a share of this pool of cal support to PNA. Over time, the PNA group vessels days.8 emerged as a ‘trendsetter’ among FFA coun- This new system has dramatically increased tries, with many of the PNA policies and ini- the value of access and income earned by the tiatives being extended to, and adopted by, coastal states, as well as the value of the FFA membership as a whole. However, the fishery. The benchmark fee of US$5,000 a day, tensions were never far from the surface, and set by PNA, equates with 10 per cent of the in 2009 a PNA Ministerial meeting resolved value of the catch/or rate of return. According

5. Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall 7. PNG also funded the pre-assessment exercise for Islands, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Marine Stewardship Council Certification of the PNA Islands and Tuvalu. skipjack fishery. 6. Comprising 15 countries, FFA was slow to make deci- 8. As the VDS was to be run along commercial lines, it sions on fisheries management. It was also perceived to be could not be managed within the FFA structure; hence the dictated by the interests of states who did not have signifi- need for a separate entity (PNA, pers. com., January cant tuna resources within their EEZs (Doulman 1987). 2014).

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University Tarte: Regionalism and Changing Regional Order 317 to PNA data, revenue earned from purse seine foreign owned but they have to obey our laws, fisheries by PNA members has increased from give jobs to our citizens and sell their catch to US$60 million in 2010 to US$249 million in canneries in our region’ (Pala 2011). 2013. Meanwhile, in the same period, the total PNA’s new assertiveness has been strongly value of the catch has risen from $1915 million resisted by some distant water fishing nations. to $3,888 million, yielding greater profits The EU has refused to recognise PNA mea- to the industry (PNA 2013b). sures, such as the VDS, holding out for ‘unfet- PNA states also leveraged access to their tered access’ to PNA waters as part of a combined EEZs to impose measures aimed at regionwide Economic Partnership Agreement curtailing stock depletion. In 2008, the group (Pareti 2013b). This is similar to the position resolved (through their Third Implementing of other distant water fishing, such as the Agreement) that vessels wanting to fish in their United States, although the latter has agreed to EEZs would be banned from fishing in adja- accept the VDS formula as part of a new tuna cent high seas ‘pockets’. In 2009, this was treaty being negotiated with the FFA member amended to prohibit vessels licensed to states. It has also acquiesced to regional operate in PNA waters from fishing in a 3.2 demands for an increased fee payment under million km2 area of international waters called the new treaty: the US government and indus- the Eastern High Seas. To support these more try will make a combined annual payment of encompassing management initiatives, the $63 million for access, up from $21 million PNA agreed in 2011 to establish an Observer under the previous treaty (Aqorau 2013). Agency to coordinate their on-board observers Significantly, given the changing geopolitics and to set up an online fisheries information of the Pacific, PNA relations with China have management system, with a data centre based been more cordial, and in 2012, during the in PNG. PNA’s 7th Ministerial meeting, the keynote Funding of these activities has been largely address was delivered by a representative of met through cost-recovery measures and levies the China Fisheries Bureau. Although China’s rather than donor funds. This independence fleet only numbered 16 purse seine vessels by has enabled the group to explore other innova- 2012 (out of 225 vessels in total) unlike other tive approaches to maximising returns on their fishing nations, China has supported invest- tuna resources. In December 2011, the PNA ment in on-shore fisheries development successfully attained Marine Stewardship (mainly in Marshall Islands and PNG). Council (MSC) Certification for skipjack tuna China’s Exim Bank has also offered to provide caught in free-swimming schools: a ‘world a soft loan (of US$74 million) for the devel- first’ for a tuna purse seine fishery to be given opment of the Pacific Marine Industrial Zone this prestigious eco-label. To help achieve the in Madang, PNG. It is anticipated that these hoped-for economic benefits and to strengthen investments will help secure China’s future its marketing power, PNA established a brand fishing operations in PNA waters, due to name—Pacifical—under which an MSC- PNA’s strategy of favouring arrangements labelled skipjack tuna caught in PNA waters with fishing nations that engage in PNA would be marketed (PNA 2013a). domestic tuna industry development (FFA These initiatives have been described as part Trade News, May/June 2012, p. 12). of an ambitious and bold agenda to transform PNA initiatives over the past 5 years have the dynamics of regional fisheries. According transformed the management of the (purse to the head of PNG Fisheries, ‘PNA’s goals are seine) tuna fishery. They have created new simple. These include stopping the decline of dynamics in relations between Pacific Island the world’s major stocks by forcing countries coastal states and the distant water fishing to fish less, and to increase the proportion of nations, allowing PNA members to assert revenues generated by the fishery that stays in greater control over their resources and wield our region. Our long term goal is to have all the greater influence as a negotiating bloc in wider purse seiners based in the region. They can be regional forums. These initiatives have

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 318 Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies May 2014 improved economic returns and created new In 1988, PNG, Solomon Islands and development opportunities for PNA members Vanuatu formalised the MSG partnership with to exploit. PNA leadership in purse seine the signing of the Agreed Principles of Coop- fishery management has also had spillover eration among Independent States of Melane- effects for other regional fisheries arrange- sia. In 1996, a new set of agreed principles was ments, as well as for economic integration signed, which put greater emphasis on eco- moves within Melanesia, discussed in the fol- nomic cooperation, in addition to the ongoing lowing section. support for Kanak self-determination and pro- motion of Melanesian cultural values and identity. Fiji joined the group at this time, primarily 4. An Activist MSG and the New to capitalise on the anticipated benefits of the Melanesian Regionalism proposed preferential trade arrangement within the MSG (Crocombe 2001, p. 597). As Just as the members of PNA are the ‘tuna-rich’ a way to strengthen cultural ties, the Melane- states of the Pacific, the five countries that sian Arts Festival was inaugurated in 1998. form what is classified as Melanesia are the For the first two decades, the MSG operated ‘land-rich’ countries. The five—PNG, as an annual meeting of foreign ministers and Solomon Islands, New Caledonia, Vanuatu and officials, with biennial meetings of leaders. Fiji—account for 98 per cent of the Pacific Beginning in 2005, a number of steps were Islands’ land area, 90 per cent of its natural taken to enhance the institutional and legal resources and biodiversity, and 87 per cent of standing of the group. Following a review of the region’s population. They have been MSG goals and objectives, a formal constitu- described as the ‘dominant forces in Pacific tional structure was adopted with the signing politics and economics’, and as ‘largely in 2007 of the Agreement Establishing the responsible over recent years for the growing Melanesian Spearhead Group. This gave the Chinese and European interest in the Pacific’ MSG legal standing in international law for the (May 2011, p. 1). first time. The agreement also provided for a A common Melanesian identity and permanent secretariat to be established, which approach to regionalism among three of these opened in 2008, in the Vanuatu capital Port countries had emerged by the early 1980s. This Vila, led by a director general appointed by the had cultural and political foundations: a shared MSG leaders. This began a period of increased use of Pidgin language by Solomon Islands, activism by the MSG, leading to a range of Vanuatu and PNG, and what has been referred collective agreements as well as the fostering to as the ‘wantok spirit’ (Nanau 2011), together of stronger bilateral ties between individual with stronger opposition to colonial and MSG members. nuclear activities in the region. Despite its On the political front, there has been European origins, the term Melanesia was an intensification of MSG high-level embraced as a focus of identity and became a diplomacy—including two leaders’ summits source of political empowerment (Lawson in 2011, a special leaders’ summit in 2012 and 2013). The MSG was conceived in 1983. Like a summit in 2013 (to mark the 25th anniver- the PNA before it, it was not intended to be an sary of the MSG). An inaugural Environment alternative or breakaway bloc to that of the and Climate Change Ministerial meeting was Forum, but was formed to give Melanesian held in 2012 to develop an MSG position on countries a greater voice—and more clout— global climate change negotiations. Security within the Forum. The MSG’s primary focus and law enforcement cooperation has been at this time was support for the Front de stepped up with the development of a frame- Liberation Nationale Kanak et Socialiste work agreement for sharing of information on (FLNKS), a coalition representing the pro- transnational crime and other law enforcement independence Kanak (Melanesian) population issues. Police commissioners have met regu- of New Caledonia. larly and agreed to a range of initiatives,

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University Tarte: Regionalism and Changing Regional Order 319 including regional policing and peacekeeping the MSG Secretariat, these negotiations have operations. Within the MSG Secretariat, made some progress, but crucial obstacles to departments were formed to support MSG finalisation include labour mobility and devel- action on climate change, decolonisation opment cooperation. Also problematic has (especially relating to New Caledonia) and been the non-participation of Fiji, and accord- security. On cultural heritage, MSG members ing to a former chief trade advisor the ‘lack of developed and signed the MSG Framework an agreed vision’ regarding the type and direc- Treaty on Traditional Knowledge and Expres- tion of regional economic integration (Noonan sions of Culture in 2011. 2011). It has been in the economic area, however, For MSG countries, tensions in the where MSG cooperation has perhaps been PACER-Plus negotiations provided a catalyst most significant. Moves to dismantle barriers for their intraregional economic cooperation. to trade under the MSG Trade Agreement had PNG’s Trade Minister alluded to this when initially proved unsuccessful. In 2005, a series he declared in 2013, ‘What’s the point in of retaliatory and protectionist measures going into a trading arrangement with Aus- imposed by Fiji, Vanuatu and PNG against tralia and New Zealand? There’s nothing to each other’s products signalled a low point in be gained for us, so let’s focus on what’s MSG trade relations (May 2011, p. 3). But this important for us and that is the MSG trading was also the year that relations started to bloc’ (Pratibha 2013). While such a statement improve, when member countries agreed to may underestimate the continuing importance adopt a negative list approach to the MSG of Australia and New Zealand as trading part- Trade Agreement (Tabureguci 2012a). In ners, it demonstrates a desire to control the 2009, MSG leaders tasked their new secre- pace and direction of these trade negotiations. tariat to develop a roadmap for the creation of Moves towards an MSG economic union also a common market and to undertake a review of reflect members’ intention to lead the way in the MSG Trade Agreement in order to facili- regional economic integration, in line with tate this process. This culminated in the adop- the group’s relative weight in the region. tion by MSG leaders in early 2011 of a broad Also generating momentum in MSG eco- vision on the future of MSG’s economic inte- nomic integration has been MSG’s largest gration, to also include labour mobility and member, PNG. The resources-led boom in the services. By 2013, three MSG members— PNG economy has fuelled demand for ser- PNG, Vanuatu and Fiji—were trading duty vices and manufactured goods that countries free, while Solomon Islands announced their like Fiji and New Caledonia have the poten- commitment to liberalise and remove all tariffs tial to tap into. There has also been a drive by on MSG countries by 2017. MSG also agreed PNG to exploit investment opportunities in in 2012 to the implementation of a Skills the MSG region, particularly in Fiji’s tourism Movement Scheme to facilitate investment and sector, as well as to become the hub of promote job creation. This would focus on regional fisheries processing and trans- meeting skills shortages within the MSG shipment (with the development of the Pacific region. Marine Industrial Zone in Madang). Under As a result of these measures, intra-MSG the leadership of Prime Minster Peter trade and investment is poised to increase, O’Neill, the PNG government has embarked although at present this remains a small share on a process of fast-tracking MSG trade of overall trade and investment for MSG coun- liberalisation. According to Prime Minister tries. More important for now is the political O’Neill, ‘We can look after ourselves better if significance they represent, particularly with we work together...Melanesian countries respect to the PIF-led trade negotiations are the biggest in the Pacific and once we are known as PACER-Plus. With technical advice able to engage more actively I think the rest provided by the Office of the Chief Trade of the Pacific can follow us’ (Tabureguci Adviser, located in Port Vila with support from 2012b).

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 320 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2014

Political cooperation has been energised by the region’s newest regional initiative, the Fiji’s exclusion from the PIF and by Melane- PIDF, dealt with in the following section. sian solidarity with Fiji against Australian and New Zealand criticism (as well interference with the MSG). As a result of its suspension, 5. The PIDF and the New Fiji invested leadership and resources into the Pacific Diplomacy MSG and chaired it through its particularly active period beginning in 2011. According to In August 2013, an international conference in the FLNKS representative in 2013: ‘Fiji has Fiji established a new regional body—the initiated a lot of institutional and regional Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF). issues pertaining to MSG countries and has Its membership was confined to Pacific Island increased the influence of Melanesia in the states and territories—but it attracted observ- region...Without Fiji I think it would have ers from over two dozen countries, many not taken longer to achieve what Melanesia has normally part of Pacific regional processes. done’ (Fiji Sun, 20 June 2013). The driving force behind the PIDF was Fiji’s This increased activism and assertiveness by Bainimarama-led government. Suspended MSG has been backed by new players in the from the PIF and the Commonwealth in 2009, region, namely China and Indonesia. China Fiji embarked on a campaign to broaden its funded the Secretariat headquarters in international partnerships as well as build Vanuatu, as well as the salary of the director closer ties with Pacific Island neighbours. The general, while Indonesia has pledged funds for MSG was one element of this regional diplo- the MSG Police Academy in Fiji. In 2013, the macy; a second was an annual summit dubbed MSG Secretariat was invited, by Indonesia, to the Engaging with the Pacific Meeting the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Minis- (EWTP), begun in 2010 and which subse- terial meeting in Bali ‘as a Guest’. Indonesia quently became the PIDF in 2013. (along with Timor Leste) has Observer status Despite being a Fiji-led process, not in MSG, on the basis of its Melanesian con- embraced by all Pacific Island countries, the nection through West Papua. However, this EWTP attracted a steady following. By the relationship with Indonesia has also proved a time the inaugural PIDF was convened, there difficult and divisive one for MSG. Popular was widespread interest in, and high expecta- support for West Papuan independence within tions of, this new regional body. Part of the the MSG member states remains strong, and attraction for many Pacific Island countries the West Papuan independence movement has attending the Forum was its promise of engag- petitioned MSG for membership, so far unsuc- ing in alternative discourses of development cessfully (May 2011, p. 5). and regionalism. In other words, the PIDF was MSG has emerged as the driver of economic seen as ‘stepping outside the box’ and moving and trade integration in the region, as well as away from ‘business as usual’. For leaders and an alternative site for political and security their representatives attending the inaugural cooperation. The two dominant players within PIDF, this initiative provided an opportunity to MSG—Fiji and PNG—have been instrumental influence the development agenda post-2015, in promoting MSG’s enhanced role in regional and find new approaches to the environmental affairs. Driven by new confidence and opti- and economic challenges they faced, including mism about their economic growth potential, the challenges of climate change. As the Min- both states have used the MSG to strengthen isterial representative from Marshall Islands relations with each other as well as with other put it, ‘We need to do something new about MSG partners, and to promote a form of climate change. This organization can take the South-South cooperation, based on their cul- lead in that and stop the rhetoric’. To carry tural affinity as Melanesians as well as Pacific the work forward, the conference agreed to Islanders. This emphasis on cultural identity establish a Secretariat in Suva, funded initially and connections has also found expression in by Fiji (Tarte 2013).

The PIDF conference was distinguished by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, as well the prominence given to Pacific private sector as China.9 organisations and civil society actors. Non- Although still in its formative stage, PIDF state actors are seen as an integral part of the has been portrayed as a more genuine Pacific PIDF’s proposed structure and operations. Island regionalism to that of the PIF and its This is in line with the agenda of the new Secretariat. Its supporters have described it as forum, which is sustainable development and epitomising the Pacific Way of consultation Green Growth, an approach that ‘advocates and consensus. Its promise and potential have inclusivity, consultations with all stakeholders, yet to be realised, but its strength and relevance equity and fairness and justice’ (Fiji Business, lie in the ‘distinctive Pacific voice’ that the October 2013, p. 6). In fostering what has been regional grouping seeks to articulate. For its described as ‘regionalism through partner- members and proponents, PIDF represents an ships’, the PIDF is presented as a very differ- assertion of Pacific Island ownership of their ent type of regional mechanism to the development process, of both the development established institutions, especially the PIFS. It challenges and their solutions. This is a was described by Prime Minister Bainimarama common thread running through each of the as being the antithesis of expensive top-down three regional institutional developments dis- bureaucracy. cussed above. While perhaps not amenable to becoming a regional negotiating bloc or treaty making 6. A Transformation of Pacific body (in the way that MSG, PNA or PIFS Regional Order? operate), the PIDF does provide a venue for ‘inter-island dialogue without Australia and The rise to prominence of new and alternative New Zealand in the room’ (Maclellan 2013). regional institutions and mechanisms is more This reflects developments at the United than a short-term development in regional Nations, where Pacific Island diplomacy, espe- politics, as suggested by Lal (2012). Rather, it cially around issues of sustainable develop- reflects a longer term and more fundamental ment, now excludes the two developed transition occurring in Pacific regionalism and members of the PIF. Following its suspension the Pacific regional order. While the suspen- from the PIF, Fiji mobilised other Pacific sion of Fiji from the PIF has accelerated this countries at the UN to form an alternative transition, for the most part these changes were caucus grouping: PSIDS. This group has effec- already underway, and in the case of PNA were tively taken over the role of the PIF group at unrelated to the political dispute within the the UN, especially when caucusing on envi- PIF. These institutional developments have ronment and development issues (including challenged the long-standing dominance of the liaison with the UN High Level Forum on Sus- PIF and, contrary to claims made by some tainable Development). At the inaugural PIDF commentators, have increasingly become the meeting, it was agreed that ‘PIDF is how focus of regional initiatives. They are also PSIDS connect to the international level’ increasingly the focus of engagement with new (Tarte 2013). development partners. This represents a diver- The PIDF is also providing opportunities for sification of regionalism, where subregional building new international partnerships for the and regional groupings claim equal place and region. Prominent among the observers to the priority in the diplomacy of Pacific Island inaugural PIDF were special envoys from the states. governments of China and the Russian Federa- The new regional institutions are also facili- tion, who both conveyed their governments’ tating fundamental power shifts in the region. support for the PIDF initiative as well as readi- 9. Pacific ties with Arab states have strengthened since ness to commit funds towards its Green 2010, when Pacific Island states at the UN supported the Growth agenda. Meanwhile, financial backers United Arab Emirates’s successful bid to host the head- of the inaugural PIDF were the governments of quarters of the International Renewable Energy Agency.

© 2014 The Author. Asia and the Paciﬁc Policy Studies published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University 322 Asia & the Paciﬁc Policy Studies May 2014

This is in at least two ways. First, they are instruments for Pacific states as they seek to paving the way for closer relations with new position themselves and their region within an and emerging (non-Western) powers (such as evolving global order. This recalls the role of China, Russia, Indonesia and countries of the Pacific regionalism as a foreign policy and Middle East). MSG, for example, is projected development strategy in the emerging post- as a ‘stepping stone and bridge to Asia’s colonial regional order of the 1970s. However, growing economies’ (Melanesian Spearhead the configuration of power, institutions and Group 2013, p. 7). This is curbing the influ- ideas that shaped that order no longer prevails, ence of (and dependence on) traditional donors challenged by forces both external and internal and partners (Australia, New Zealand and the to the Pacific. This has created opportunities EU). Second, and perhaps more importantly, for Pacific Island countries to influence and the new regional mechanisms are changing shape the regional order, in line with their own power relations between Pacific Island states interests and aspirations. In what is described and their foreign partners. PNA is perhaps as a ‘paradigm shift’ by the President of Kiri- most significant in this respect. While ‘divide bati, Pacific Island states have recognised the and rule tactics’ continue to be deployed by the need to become more active participants in fishing states, PNA initiatives have ‘turned the global debates on sustainable development, tables’, forcing fishing fleets to compete for climate change and ocean governance. The access. Through MSG, Pacific states are new and alternative sites for regional coopera- increasingly calling the shots on the pace and tion aim to provide mechanisms for Pacific direction of regional economic integration. Islanders to influence these global and regional These developments reflect new thinking in agendas. the region, in particular about the possibilities for countries to assume more control over their April 2014. affairs, via islander-controlled regional mechanisms. The idea of ‘helping ourselves’ reso- nates throughout the new regional politics. It References implies taking ownership of both the problems and their solutions, and challenges dominant Aqorau T (2012) Maximising Economic Ben- development paradigms. It also eschews being efits from Tuna Resources: Why Are We Still directed or controlled by others. The current Asking the Questions? Paper prepared for focus on regionalism ‘for Pacific islanders, by Korea-South Pacific Fisheries Forum, 17 Pacific islanders’ is in line with this notion. October, Suva. This represents a shift away from the post- Aqorau T (2013) Reshaping International colonial practice of including former metro- Fisheries Development: Assimilating the politan powers in regional endeavours in order Treaty on Fisheries between the Govern- to effect positive change. ments of Certain Pacific island States and Within this changing regional order, the United States under the PNA Vessel Day however, new power asymmetries are emerg- Scheme (VDS). The International Journal ing that have the potential to create future ten- of Marine and Coastal Law 29, 1–25. sions and problems. These include the Ball M (1973) Regionalism and the South dominant roles of PNG and Fiji in the new Pacific Commonwealth. Pacific Affairs 46 regional institutions—as drivers and principal (2, Summer), 232–53. beneficiaries of regional cooperation. As the Crocombe R (2001) The South Pacific. Univer- new regional bodies increasingly attract exter- sity of the South Pacific, Suva. nal support (from both traditional and new Doulman D (1987) Fisheries Cooperation: The partners), there is also the potential for them to Case of the Nauru Group. In: Doulman D lose their current autonomy and independence. (ed) Tuna Issues and Perspectives in the These concerns notwithstanding, PNA, Pacific Region, pp. 257–77. East West MSG and potentially PIDF are important Center, Hawaii.

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