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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War

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Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Conflict Studies Research Centre A102 Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War C J Dick Contents Background: The Forces, Terrain & Nature of the War 2 The Combatants 2 The Mujahideen 2 The DRA & Soviet Armies 4 Terrain 5 The Nature of the War 5 Mujahideen Tactics 6 Offensive Actions 6 Ambushes 6 Blocking Enemy Lines of Communication & Sieges 7 Raids 8 Attacking Strongpoints 9 Urban Combat 9 Defence 9 General 9 Cordon & Search Operations 10 Defence Against Raids 11 Fighting Against Heliborne Insertions & Attack Helicopters 11 Counter-Ambush 12 Conclusion 13 1 A102 Background: The Forces, Terrain & Nature of the War The Combatants The Mujahideen Afghanistan is little more than a geographical expression. Its borders were arbitrarily drawn by outside powers. Its population comprises a loose collection of antithetical tribes and nationalities, the most numerous of which straddle the country's borders, artificial demarcation lines that mean little to them. The basic social units and focus of loyalty are the family and the Qawm, a local grouping defined by kinship, clan membership, residence and adherence to one of Islam's sects. Thus, there is little sense of Afghan nationhood and patriotism has not figured particularly highly as a motivating factor. The grip of central government has normally been intermittent and weak and local issues generally dominated the political agenda for most people, especially in the countryside. Any semblance of national unity has historically been merely the consequence of outsiders trying to impose alien rule on the country, as with the resistance to British occupiers in 1838-42 and 1878-1880. The war started in the late summer of 1978 as a general uprising against the efforts of the communist Khalq government's efforts to force Soviet-style socialism on a deeply conservative, religious country. After little more than a year, it became clear that the government could not retain control and the USSR, in accordance with the "Brezhnev Doctrine", committed a "Limited Contingent" to assist, though it was soon to take over the direction of the war. Soviet intervention changed the nature of the struggle. Worried by Soviet expansionism, Pakistan, Iran and then the USA (especially), China and some European and Arab states began to supply money and arms to the Mujahideen. Most of this aid was funnelled through Pakistan, which distributed it to seven major Islamist factions; Islamabad favoured the four most fundamentalist of these. The religious leaders of the factions thus gained unprecedented political power, undermining the authority of tribal and village leaders. It was these factions that lifted the war from a myriad of local conflicts to something resembling a national struggle. The resistance was never united, however. Even common loathing for the Soviet occupiers could not accomplish this (except, it would appear, to an extent in Kandahar). There was never a central leadership and clear chain of command. Rather, disunity characterized the resistance, with old disputes and enmities continuing despite the war. Sometimes, factions (themselves more or less loose groupings of sub-factions) would join up temporarily to pursue some venture. Sometimes co-operation was refused, or broke down during an operation. Routinely, factions appropriated aid meant for others. Sometimes they actually fought each other. (The KGB exploited this disunity by creating false bands posing as CIA-supported mujahideen which were used to sow confusion, flush out real rebel groups and provoke infighting. Thus, unlike the Americans in Vietnam, the Soviets never faced a monolithic enemy under tight central direction and capable of exercising operational art. For the most part, the war comprised a series of prolonged, largely local conflicts. There was never a prospect of the resistance 2 Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War Conflict Studies Research Centre ISBN 1-903584-59-0 January 2002 A102 Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War proceeding in time to the classic final phase of revolutionary war where the enemy is fought in conventional battle by "regular" forces. Mujahideen commanders owed their position to their social standing, education, leadership abilities and commitment to their religion. They could not rely on military discipline to gain their warriors' obedience. Rather, they led by force of personality, moral persuasion and by achieving consensus. Not more than 15% of them were former professional soldiers; ex-officers were usually regarded as potential challengers to the authority of faction leaders and were therefore sidelined, especially by Islamic fundamentalists who distrusted those trained by the old regime. However, they made a significant contribution through their understanding of military-technical issues, planning skills and ability to train the fighters. The Mujahideen warrior fought for his family, his tribe and his religion. He did so out of a love of freedom and sense of duty, as a volunteer without pay. For the most part, fighters were local men with family responsibilities. As such, they were untrained and necessarily part-timers; the spoils of war (eg, weapons to sell in the bazaars of Pakistan) were important to them as a source of income. As the war dragged on, though, mobile groups emerged. These comprised mostly young, unmarried men, sometimes paid, with higher standards of training.1 Controlled by the major factions, these ranged over wider areas and made possible some larger- scale operations. In many ways, the Mujahideen rank and file were natural guerrillas. They were hardy, stoical, courageous, accustomed to the use of weapons in a land where conflict was endemic. They knew the terrain intimately in their own localities and could move rapidly over considerable distances. They were excellent in night combat (which was feared by their foes). They enjoyed the support of the population whence they sprang, with all that meant for the supply of recruits, food, shelter and intelligence. They also suffered from the drawbacks common in a guerrilla force. Enthusiasm was considerable, but discipline was generally poor. It was often difficult to persuade volunteers, who wanted their share of the honour, excitement and loot that came from fighting, to perform the unglamorous tasks of logistic support and flank and rear area security. Sentries could not always be relied on. Poor fire discipline sometimes compromised good plans. And prolonged operations were vitiated by the tendency of fighters to drift home after a tactical success (or, for that matter, a reverse, or through boredom); exploitation to build on a tactical victory was a rarity. The main weapons of the Mujahideen were the AK-47 (though the old British .303 inch Enfield, with its long range and power to penetrate Soviet flak jackets had its adherents), PK light machine guns and the RPG-7 anti-tank grenade launcher. As time went by, they acquired increasing numbers of heavy, crew served weapons. Most significant actions featured the use of 60mm, 82mm and sometimes 107mm mortars (the former described as the "guerrilla mortar"), 82mm recoilless anti-tank guns, BM-1 single 107mm rocket launchers, 7.62mm and 12.7mm heavy machine guns and sometimes howitzers; air defence was provided by 12.7mm and 14.5mm weapons, often surprisingly effective, especially in ambushes in mountains, and from 1988, the Stinger SAM, a show-stopper for Soviet aviation's low-level actions. 1 There were also some volunteers from the Middle East. The Afghans regarded these Arabs as little more than prima donnas, there for Jihad credit whose interest was less in fighting than in making videos glorifying themselves. 3 A102 C J Dick The Mujahideen were also enthusiastic proponents of mine warfare (during the war, the Soviets lost 1,191 vehicles and 1,995 men to mines). They mostly employed anti-vehicle mines (often piling three on top of each other for a catastrophic kill) and delighted in improvising huge home-made mines. Mines, sometimes command detonated, were usually covered by fire and dug up for reuse if not set off by enemy vehicles. The DRA & Soviet Armies The army of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) collapsed as an effective fighting force after the Soviet invasion, defections reducing it from about 90,000 men in 1979 to 30,000 in early 1981. The remaining troops were generally of limited combat value. They were ill-equipped and badly trained. Worse still, they were unmotivated. The government enjoyed little popular support to begin with, and that little was steadily eroded by the way it and its Soviet masters behaved. The Soviet attitude, increasingly evident as the war dragged on, that DRA troops were expendable and should be given the most dangerous jobs did not help. Some officers who apparently remained loyal to the regime often secretly supported the Mujahideen and provided the resistance with information and arms. Most others showed little enthusiasm for real combat. The soldiery, both regular and militia were even more unwilling (the latter defecting en masse in 1984). Morale was very low and conscripts rarely put up much of a fight. Indeed, on many occasions whole units either fled or deserted to the resistance. It was common for Mujahideen groups to give captured conscripts a choice between going home or joining the resistance (usually, initially, in logistic support roles). The Soviet Army that invaded Afghanistan was prepared only for a high tempo, mechanized war. Everything was geared to the demands of operational art within the context of strategic offensive operations. It was not equipped or trained for the sort of war it had to fight. It lacked an appropriate doctrine for counter-insurgency, and it took an astonishingly long time for the 40th Army (or rather, elements of it) to learn and adapt. Of course, adaptation was hampered by systemic limitations built in to an army designed for a single variant of warfare. Company-level officers were taught only basic tactics unsuited to conditions in Afghanistan and were unskilled in such tasks as adjusting mortar or artillery fire that were not normally expected of them.
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