Peripheral Influence: The Siniiiju Student Incident of 1945 and the Impact of Soviet Occupation in North Korea Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus
This article examines the North Korean clly ofSlnfJiju during the era ofSoviet occu pation. focusing specifically on the SlniJiju incident of 23 November 1945. A vlo lent clash between local youth and Communist securily forces, the incidiint revealed the combustible mixture offactors present in postcoloniol North Korea. The Soviet r military government's deadly response to the protests seriously threatened Korea's receptiveness to the Koreon Communist Party and to the Soviet Unton. andforced stronger control over both the clly ofSIniJiju andyouth nationwide. This article con siders the 1I1s1tthat Kim 11Sung (KIm nsang) madeto Sini1/ju In the qftermathof the incident. as well as subsequent North Korean policies in Sini1iju. Drawing on previ ously untapped.files from the Archive ofMilitary History ofthe Russion Federation, newly declassified CIA documents. and /(Qrean- and Chinese-language texts, this article examines a North Korean city whose peripheral Influence In the postcoioniol period has not yet been adequately undsrstood.
For the port city of SinGiju (located in what is now North Korea, or the Demo cratic People's Republic of Korea, DPRK), the twentieth-century brought 1nIns formation and tmuma. At a pivotallooation along the Amnok (Yalu) River, which connects Korea to Manchuria, the city expanded into a symbol ofJapanese ambi tions. Then Siniliju's moorings and signature bridges were nearly obliterated by U.S. bombs in November 1950, as American generals, under the oversight of Douglas MacArthur, assumed that the city would again be the default capital fur rulers fleeing Pyongyang (P'ylSngyang). After its encounter with the U.s. mill taty. SinGiju was flooded with ChiIiese People's Volunteers, Chinese militaty aid,
Adam Cathcart is assistant professor of hi.!ltory lit PaciJic Lulhem:n University in Tacoma, Washington. Charles Kraus. formerly ofthe NortH Korea International Documentation Project, is currently a Boren Scholar in China's National Security Education Program.
The.Jaurnal 0/Korean Studies /3, no. / (FaY 2008): /-28 :1
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The
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3 Peripheral Jrd/uonClt s Adam Cathcart and Charles Kraus 4 Soviet documents, it is possible that some Koreans likened Soviet actioos to the order without the aid ofa police force, and by 25 August was exerting control over feverish Japanese export of Korean rice at the height of the Pacific War.ynOther the entirety ofNorth P'yCmgan province." For two weeks following Japan's sur economic difficulties associated with the Soviets, including the plunder offactories render. Sinuiju's residents were masters of their own affairs. But, as in southern and poor raUroad transport, gave Siniiiju residents more reasons for agitation.28ln Korea, the appearance of Allied troops would bring with it heavy impositions. fall 1945, Soviet documents stated that ''reactionary forces" were using the ec0 The entrance ofSoviet troops into SinUiju on 30 August jeopardized the auton nomic difficulties as "justificatinn for opposing the Red Army. the Soviet Union, omous committee and shattered its ability to exert control over the province. The and the local democralic parties," distributing leaflets, and otherwise "terrorizing" Red Army, confronted by town elders who had deep political roots among North local authorities.~In this environment, no issue was so explosive as that of food. P'yCmgan citizens. immediately dissolved the wlnwiJnhoe and redirected provin In SinUiju the price ofrice had tripled from 30-40 wCmto 110 woo per mal under cial political energies by sponsoring a new people's Political Committee (pPC) 16 Soviet occopalion. Rumors circulated through the city that the Soviets were set to that privileged Communist leaders over conservative nationalists. expropriate more rice stocksfrom the surrounding countryside.30 The Soviets began the occupation with a rather open attitude toward religion As the first "winter ofvictory0>31set in upon the Korean Peninsula, democratic and religious parties. advocating a tolerant line in interest of stability.17But when and Communist parties continued to clash in Siniiiju via conflicting propaganda. partisan disagreements emerged amongthe Koreans, Soviet policy toward churches Pro-Soviet messages were broadcastby local radio and printed in publications; was reevaluated. After the wipwiJnhoe wasdissolved, on 9 September a number of city streets, public parks, and backyards were frequently littered with leaflets Presbyterian pastors in Sinuiju respondedby organizing the christianSocial Demo dropped from Soviet aircraft.l2 Working at cross-purposes, city churches main cratic Party (CSDP).ISSoviet military analysts rapidly bmnded the nearly one thou tained their activities within the city limits and moved to extend influence into sand members of SinUiju's newest political party as part of the "bourgeois social .the political realm. Conservative nationalists and Christian leaders alike effec stratum" and believers in the political platfonn of ''the landlord Class....I~In early tively used church pulpits to publicize political content, while a South Korean October the party dropped "Christian" from its name and. under Soviet pressure, Christian radio station known as Tongyang Pangsong (Far Eastern Broadcast merged with the ChoslIn Minjudang (Korean Democratic Party, KDP), led by char ing) was reportedly accessible to those tuned in on the northwestern Sino-Korean ismatic Christianspokesperson and political leader Cho Mansik.20 border." Into this environment, the Soviets sent an army captain named Gmfov While Christian nationalists operated as political competitors. the Soviet author from Pyongyang to investigate Siniiiju's ideological terrain. His 13 November ities also facedinevitable friction with Korean landlords. Aware ofthe connection 1945 report charscterizes prevalent trends in the city's newspaper market, and between landlords and the KDP, the Red Army, in its internal discussions ofland doesso with some alarm. Noting that Siniiiju had only two newspapers, Grafov reform. anticipated that problems would arise when agricultural social systems 21 critiqued the irregularity of their appearance, noting that "the People's Commit in Sinniju and North P'yi'lngan Province weN restructured.While much of the tee has published 19 issues [and] the Communist Party has published two issues... land had yet to be redistributed before spring 1946, fanners under Soviet protec Complaining that he was "unable to examine" the newspapers because of a lack tion pushed toward a steady erosion of landlords' social stature and standard of . ofcapable translators, the captain recommended that newspaper jolll.1lalistsin the living.22 As one of the most historically conservative sections of Korea, the area city should have frequent meetingswhere they turned over "all oftheir writings" around SinUiju was home to many disaffected landlords, who encouraged Korean to censors for approval J4 By mid-November, the People's Committee newspaper youth to protest the Soviet occupation and land reform. 23 Teusions between furm had become the only regular publication on Siniiiju newsstands, but even its con ers and the landed elit~edunder the Japanese colonial system-would. tents were not always strictly controlled by the Soviets.35 not be easily resolved in North p'yi'lngan. In early November 1945, commemorations of the high ideals of the Bolshe Political change promoted unrest, but the region's social instability most clearly 24 vik Revolution were jUlltaposed in Siniiiju against serious breaches of diacipline and consistently arose from acute agricultural problems. One Soviet report from among the rank-and-file of the occupation anny.16 A Red Army report investigat early October 1945 reveals the depth ofgrain shortages in North Korean cities, not ing the situation in SinUiju, dated 13 November 1945, described soldiers' viola ing that struggles against loeallandlords had disrupted gmin production at harvest tions ofall manner ofmilitary laws, including those forbidding public drunkenness time. Red Army administrators further statedthat their troops' claim to foodstuffs and robbery. The report drew attention to the rise ofvenereal disease within the was exacerbating Korea's hunger and heightening tension between the Soviets and Red Army ranks in Siniiiju, and noted that although twenty-two soldiers had urbaninte1lectuals. lS Following this rather ftank self-assessment, Soviet administra been arrested for visiting a local brothel, such visits were difficult to prevent.J'7 tors convened meetings in Pyongyang on 9 and 10 October, in which hoth Korean In Soviet-occupied Harbin, the Red Army resolved similar disciplinary problems fanners and intenectuals discussedthe region's agricultural problems andthe sen by executing the offenders and blaming their deaths on Japanese renegades.l8 If sitive issue of feeding the Red Army.24(Although the parallel is not extended in Peripheral Jnjhteru:e 7 Admn CQllwarl andCharles KI'QIl8 6 tion-the classrooms-elucidates the situation ofthe yooth. As their counterparts in fact the Soviets employed such techniques in SinlHju (and it appears they did would in the south in 1960 and again in Kwangju in 1980, Korean students in not), they were unable to staunch the flow of incidents in the city. In the face of North P'yllngan displayed their abilities not only to represent but also to roil the Soviet misbehavior between mid-September and mid-November 1945, the appar national consensus.46 ent complicity ofthe local Korean Communist party administrators galled Sinl1iju Occupation documents reveal confficting Soviet impulses in school governance. citizens. building momentum toward an eventual confrontation. While the Soviets declared eagerness to "'establish and employ an anti-Japanese Growing restlessness in North P'yllngan was further aggravated by the Red spirit among the high and elementary school teachers," by necessity they presided Army's suppression of Korean troops returning from China. In October 1945, over a school system that continued to employ large numbers of Japanese teachers an estimated two thousand Korean Volunteer Army (KVA) veteranS arrived in and "pro-Japanese" Koreans.47 Seeking to preempt possible opposition, the .Sovi Andong, Siniliju's Chinese counterpart directly across the Yalu River. These ets sought to communicate with principals, investigate personnel in schools, and Korean troops bad begun their journey in Shenyang the day after Japan's capitula otherwise work with education administrators.48 In the wake of student protests, tion, and thousands ofKoreans bad 60cked to their standard. 39 Chinese Koreans in the Soviets' inability or simple failure in this arena became clear. As the occupi the vicinity mpidly joined the KVA ranks as it became clear that the economic and ers saw student unrest grow, their internal documents more frequently noted "the food sitoation in Soviet-occupied Andong would not improve in the near future. anti-Soviet movement going underground."49 But with a series of actions in the On 24 October 1945, when the Chinese Guomindang succeeded in pushing the towns surrounding Sinl1iju, this student movement would emerge into the open. Chinese Communist party out ofAndong City (an act undertaken with the permis sion of the Soviets, no less) the entry of the Korean forces into Siniliju became more urgent. 40 Kim Kang and Kim Ho, both veterans of the Chinese 8th Route THE INCIDENT Army,led these two thousand soldiers and directed correspondence with the Rus sian command across the river in Sinl1iju, hoping to span the Andong-Sinl1iju Material conditions, swift social change, and Soviet missteps in North P'yOngan Bridge and return home. In mid-November, the troops crossed the bridge and at Province bad set the conditions for student unrest. The direct spark fur the Siniliju last reenteredKorea. Ueutenant General Bankowsky, however, demanded that incident came, appropriately, from a middle school in a small nearby town, than the commanding Soviet colonel prevent the troops from moving any farther Yongamp'o. The town's Susan middle school bad been subjected to the same the city limits of Sinl1iju. Confined to the city yet still proud to be within Korea's pressures as other schools in the region: it suffered from a lack ofteachers, evis borders, the Korean volunteers paraded through Sinl1iju's streets before returning cerated resources, and :linn Soviet control over curricula and personnel. Faculty to their bunks at a local high school. But their homeward-bound excitement was and students were particularly outraged at the local Communist party's efforts cut short when, that same night, the Soviet troops collected all weapons held by to minimize the importance of the wave of Soviet misbehavior.'" The school's The the Koreans. next day, the Soviets sent many back into the Manchurian bor lead administrator, identi:li.edin Chinese documents as "Principal Chu," had been derlands.41 Uttle documentation is available about the response of the students in called to Pyongyang, most likely to emphasize his responsibility for implement~ Siniliju to the appearance of a veritable Korean army in their midst, but, given the ing the Soviet reforms. Upon his return, Chu was removed from his poSition for circumstances, it is difficult to imagine anything other than excitement. In addi criticizing the Soviet soldiers and Korean Communists." Believing that Princi tion, it is worth recalling that Kim nSung had not yet appeared in Sinl1iju. pal Chu's intraosigence merited further steps, on 18 November 1945, the Peace While Korean troops from Manchuria likely excited the sensibilities ofSinl1iju Preservation Bureau arrested him.52 The arrest of the school principal became the youth, another group that bad entered from Manchuria-Japanese refugees-also catalyst for a series of bloody and disheartening clashes between students and agitated the students. Many of these refugees were housed in Korean schools armed Soviets and Korean Communists. in November 1945.42 Meanwhile, several thousand Japanese students remained News of Chu's arrest spreadquickly and students at several nearby schools enrolled in North P'yOngan's 604 schools.41Opening schools well after the tra organized their resistance.53 Pupils at a fisheries school in Yongamp'o held an ditional stal.t of classes in late August, Korean administrators struggled to elimi after-school meeting to debate their response, making comments highly critical of nate Japanese pedagogues and to employ a curriculum sensitive to both Korean 44 the incident and ofKorean Communists in general. At this meeting. organized by nationalism and the needs of Soviet occupiers. Beyond the persistenceof the the students and attended by local citizens, someone suggested that the students Japanese, news was circulating that Soviet troops were being garrisoned in local meet Yi Yonghilp, the then-chairman of the Yongamp'o Council of People's school buildings. Student frustration turned against the Soviets, who were seen .Commissars, and confront him with the issue of'freedom in their schools. $4 As he as simultaneously responsible for both wrenching changes and a frustrating lack was the best-known local Communist representative, the students did not antici of change.4SThe presence of Soviet troops inside the sanctum of Korean educa~ 8
pate force Yi
away Siniliju a bands
the After the determined events
required
municating headquarters November, from nists
in Soviet were
a request
mination
commission. sleep, of
immediately, confirmed Hakkyo November.
and crowd
The Korean fidence
disbanding cessful.
in
centered A
local
Yonghilp."5S
The
the
students
students-scions
The Ch'oe
great
farmers' Siniiiju
or
to engaged represented
the they nonetheless
Sovie-ts
evening,
imd
taking
the
and
restaumnt, North
the police
Siniiiju,
for of swelling
against
60
Democ:mtic Communists.
that (First
results
to
students' returned
Nakto, propelled
Soviet on Among
about wait
in
revenge. thirteen to with
had "with
Each
local
revolt, of
union
place
they After
had a P'y6ngan
in a
delegating threatened escalate
the Technical
When
final
the
"5<\ helped
charismatic
the
prompting
a from
a local
mnks,
able
one
army," where
tried executive
school's religious
hammers stmtegy
students could
collective
Communist
the
in to friendly a
conviction
student
59 Ko~
regardless
secret
Youth
of by
few
Yi
their hundred Yongamp'o The to
the
Christian student Communists
to their
to
the
which
Students'Association the
set the
mount could
Adam
specific recalled
School). short
to prevent
organize meeting.
students'
conference
representative of
were homes
political
League
executives bourgeoisie-giving "dozens up latter
Communists to
of
figure and
arrest
sound
resistance.
body
student
Cathcart
Soviet troops leaders
was a
numbered nighttime Party not to of
the
a
influence
secret
pulled
clubs
responded
targets
one
Christian challenge disrupt
the
At and of as
be
them. strengthened
student such
a and
of "Without
organizations, growing
in
of
to
Christian seven
evidence
Ch intimidation.
found,
participant, were actions and at
drums
meeting
classrooms, from in
an
Y into
a
students
In
a
as 'oe's for
ongamp'
hours
Communist
and
decided The their
between the Charles fueled
student effort
association Siniiiju
schools,
Christians a Cho pastors
positively
specific
to the and Koreanand
a radicalism
farm
the restraints student
and home,
of
student
rumor
hands," coalition that
the with became
that
association
by
the Mansik. to to
KrQIIS
a
new them
to 0, boarder's "the
gongs, worker's
but
privileged
five Communist-sponsored Before
a a the
itself, from broker stack
may
bolstered fellow
rapid accompanied
take groups
predawn the
political
official. spread
roadblock.
occupying
such to
this association
students
injured an
at
then
hundred
from
active
can
that students or Communists
the
defending
part
up
growth With Siniiiju's
students
the "inevitable"
arriving
was
a students
may
as
rode assembly, house of
be Yongamp'o
wordlessly
that
logs might compromise.
the
Again, in power
student demonstration meeting
group
Chang
students, at students
seen not
youth went
not
the
and
a he
power. armed
of decided
this Wearing
by
on
at
representatives
truck completely at
looked
ultimately
at the Cheil
the attack. have
was
in
of the an one 10 approached out
the
Yongamp'o Toy6ng,
leaders'
time, assembled
1
from
after
at
their
:30 beating. students
movement
executive appeared Soviet a.m.
set 58 a security
Commu
running from students'
the-home to
road
included thnusand
to
decision Kong6p
inquiry On a.m. to head
which meet
upon
com several deter
revolt
on
was
the
con
the have
who to
suc
22
and
51
in 23
by
'
.
,
jumped
that ~, years of who mates of was and, "stones estimate military prompting rose specific gees-indicates to crowds, tml-west period student (These duing officer and First three main impact Second Soviet"6Z the of Headquarters and both into other
Soviet
.
.Each
By the
the Communist
A their
"Stalin
words
twenty-three
handguns
a
the shouting,
up
the
whn
Technical later Korean consortium
building. old schools, different the
student
streets that
the
of soldiers on
shot estimates
picked
numbers from minds.- from
groups
report-presumably Technical
driving
school students
is crowd
part
end
at
physical all
the The fled
students,
largely
hurmhl" reflected the of
the
him
and state from
the the
of
Communist
named of one
and
streamed
into
students the
cheers
to up
Communist The and
School
had time, and
had
that the
some
the
third of of basement students
Soviet in are
began
Seoul
Students
on students would that
accord
participant, the
both Party.
Schools struggle, the
casualties, the
afternoon, students
students
gathered in the some Soviet
to
decided
city)
about
the
Chang
15--24 remembers
for
to floor Peace
seven the crowds,
had
prevent complicity to
directly sides
flags head. and
piling
seek road.
Stalin, One
with died run movement
recalls
of
work
approached
one
and
later soldiers
to
were bureaucmcies.
student
Korean
W6nbong, assembled
a headed Preservation then
hundred
to whom
as
in
of
from
refuge "64
participant escape
the
the better source and With
those "to
dispersing over
began
hundred attacks
cover, to take of Peripheral however, front
the
recalled
This
that that
delegated
attacked protest
gmvity violence
of the
a show
Scalapino
the
soon
deaths protest
number the were and
organizations the
of in in
part the
automatic
"e-veryone
students most
of
third group
beating
building. they
the
North the
from two at
who
sound
wall
students Korean
Soviet the
that that what
joined
of in Influence
in 2 quickly armed the Bureau,
Peace the had
cold
Students
floor of 67 and
approached
p.m.
than
the student
the the
of
of North
was
the
and
guards
a Korea U.S. we into protestors.
the
the
building.
were they
dmwn
students
others of
Soviet
gunfire. attack protest security
task 168-350 waters
A just
of
the Communists.61 U.S. on attack.
Preservation
said with
Lee, died were
protestors students
gave gunfire,
the
few extending to intelligence
the
P'y6ngan's
saw
participants 23 wounded.
should
Korean
of
ran
of with
commemorate about
intelligence were
to
on compound rocks. aircraft as building.
in
students November
and of
not way
Tong the
was striking as Machine
Hwang
The
have forces
away
injuries.ya well
the
this
the
machine
the
armed were
People's seriously its not
saying
three
to unhindered
with
Communists
Normal
the
Meanwhile, revolt.
70 Yalu
Middle
died fucility
Bureau potentially as
depredations
strafed as
a
services be
began Communist
Regardless Changha. were
The in
anned the cry
that
thousand confrontation
if
gun
63 their
or
minimized.
security
1945.
the when
we
River.66
they
69 guns,
After
of But headquarters Committee's first
student the
injured,
said
of
(in
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The local Korean Communists and Red Army soldiers made few inimediate Kim's remarks indicate the presence of dialogue between students and the efforts to acknowledge the deathsof the students. Aside from one flyer sent out leader, revealing that, during the meeting, Kim had at least momentarily sup within Siniiiju, the Communists directed their energy toward removing all evidence pressed his customary volubility. But if the students had indeed told Kim that ofthe incident In November 1945, Communist authorities removed another Chris "they had been misled" into protesting, such a disingenuous response indicates tian leader, Ham S6kMn, head of education in the Provincial People's Committee an unwillingness to express legitimate grievances to the new leader in the after (PPC), and imprisoned him after a severe beating.?1 A wave ofarrests in the locale math of the protests. Recent events, after alI, had shown that complaints would ensued, with a credible account alleging that up to one thousand individuals were be met with further retribution. Kim's rerJllllks following his return to Pyongyang imprisoned in one day alone. Although most were released within a week--aru:l. appealed to a positive conception ofa unified Korean nation. As Kim noted: "It is told by their Soviet captors that only Kim nSung's personal intervention had saved deeply regretted that such a disturbance took place at a time when all the people them-the arrests inaugurated a political cleansing in northwest North Korea. 72 should be uniting in the causeof nation-building. The Siniliju student incident The date 23 November 1945 came to represent the largest single demonstration reveals that our nation is not yet uni!ed.'180Kim's rhetoric of unity, though laced ofanti-Col1lIJlunist sentiment during the period of"hberation," revealing underly with paternal shame,was more likely to appeal to the students than a reproach ing social rifts in the nascent proletarian state. Within this contex.t, Kim nSung for having "been misled. .. Offering an oblique self-criticism of his party, Kim was soon forced to confront an undercurrent of anti-Communist public opinion directed more opprobrium toward the "rogues lurking in the Communist Party when he visited the shaken river city. and government organs. "III This is the first recorded criticism ofintraparty traitors in his public works. In later years, as he sought to expose various factional plots to challenge his leadership, Kim would repeatedly mention the negative forces KIM'S VISIT ."behind the scenes." . Primary sources that deal with Kim's arrival in Siniiiju are scarce, making it In an effort to reconcile the region's youth to unpleasant realities and make his difficult to assess the factnality of his memoirs.82 But it appears that Kim did first show of leadership along the northwestern border, Kim n Sung boarded a tempomrily soothe tensions and calm the local population. The Siniliju incident Soviet aircraft and flew to Siniliju on 26 November 1945.13 While Kim II Sung appears to have been a catalyst that enabled Kim to fully employ the potent tool carmat be directly blamed for the outbreak of student unrest, as he has been by of nationalism for use in public talks and propaganda. In his addressto Siniliju several authors, he can be credited, at least in part, fur its resolution.'4 As students students, Kim wisely emphasized his anti-Japanese past and even moved to align and their families waited nervously, no apology was forthcoming from Kim. For himselfwith the adulated Korean fighters who had entered the city from Manchu the Communist leader, civil strife could not be tolerated anywhere in North Korea, . ria in mid-November. In subsequent propaganda aimed at students, Kim stressed and obstacles to the state's economic and social redevelopment had to be elimi his own nationalism and the need for youth to follow in his footstepS.83 nated. Siniliju's strategic position along the Chinese border nmdered the recent Kim's reprimand of those who had been influenced by pro-Japanese elements upheaval all the more serious. The importance ofhis visit is highlighted in Kim's and anti-Communist educators finds rich parallels in Soviet documents. Nikolai official autobiography, which indicates that "local [Siniliju] authorities said only Georgievich Lebedev, major-general in the 25th Army, claimed that the Siniiiju Kim II Sung could save the situation. ''75 Upon landing in the city, Kim posed for incident and subsequent protests were organized by an underground rightist student a photograph, wearing a Westem-style suit and displaying a cunning smile.16 He organization sent from Seoul to provoke turmoil.84 But the Soviet military govern then proceeded to a series of assemblies at Siniliju schools.17 ment took a more critical line than Kim, suggesting that the Korean Communist During a meeting with organized student groups on 27 November, Kim· Party was leaning too far to the left and had not yet taken steps to ensure coopera addressed the incident He denounced the bloody collision, and laid down the. tion with the so-called bourgeois democratic camp. Soviet sources also indicated gauntlet against civil strife: "Shooting between our people is not only a disgrace; that ''reactionary lectures"-Iike those delivered at schools in Yongamp'o---bad to the nation but also a serious hindrance to nation-building.-After returning to influenced the students and the democratic party in Siniliju to oppose the Com Pyongyang, Kim recalled his remarks: munist Party and the People's Committee.as Such analyses blamed the local Com . munist Party, not the impressionable students. I asked the students why they acted like that and they answered that they had been The most detailed known ex.tant Soviet report on the incident gives an in-depth misled quite unawares. The incident had not been conceived by the students them and somewhat more objective assessment of the origins of the strife in Siniliju. selves hut triggered offby naive students under the influence ofreactionary wirepull .This report blames the Korean Democratic Party for the incident, and states that ers behind the scenes." . "two or three groups of student instigators from below the 38th parallel had been 12 Adam Cmhcart and Charles Kraus PBrlpheraJ lilf/tJence 13 sent to Pyongyang and SinUiju to encourage resistance among student popula fis.ctionalismand merge all youth organizations into a single, cohesive, and disci tions. The first group, the report noted, arrived in Pyongyang only to be arrested. plined organization under the auspices of the Democratic Youth League (DYL). The group that traveled to SinUiju found at their disposal an already restless and In Kim's words, "Just as an army lacking iron discipline cannot win battles, so easily provoked population. After assessing the causes ofthe incident, the report an undisciplined youth organization is up to no good."8lI Through internal regula directed several passages directly to students, written from the perspective of a tion, goals, statistics, and stem advisers, the DYL took steps toward becoming an fellow student This section of the report was apparently intended as the basis organization known for its "iron discipline." The regime's efforts to mobilize an for leaflets or educational materials in Siniiiju schonls. Linking the protest to the estimated one hundred thousand North Koreans in Pyongyang on 6 JanWll.'y1946, Japanese defeat, the document chastises the students in Siniiiju for fil.iling to con at the "Solidarity and Support ofthe Moscow Conference," were correspondingly struct an independent nation. According to the report, the clash gravely interfered intense, and included the arrest of the Christian political leader Cho Mansoc 89 with nation-building in Korea's transition period: Despite "Solidarity and Support'" and other internal campaigns, public senti ment opposing the Soviet occupation remained strong in both North Korea and Classmates, you must be the persons who study knowledge, not the persons who northeast China. On 22 February 1946, a wave of student demonstrations broke engage in politics. Those ofyou who engaged in political adventurism, you suffered out in Chinese cities to protest the Soviet occupation of Manchuria. Triggered a bloody punishment,committing a heinous crime which any responsible soeiety hy revelations of the secret Yalta accords and probable Soviet involvement in would not accept. It must be pointed out that in New Korea's lIansition period, a the murder of a Chinese government representative in Fushun, the protests put bloody clash should not oecur. You ought not to become the opportunistsof false additional pressure on the Soviets to withdraw from Manchuria. \II) As with the patriotism. Take 10 the streets and approve of Communism!Whether or not you are present in the struggle for the laboring people's liberation and whetheror not you are SintUju student protests, a seemingly small spark in the Manchurian coal center a genuine Communist,you should not fear sacrifice. ,of' Fusbun-itself a peripheral city-had ignited anti-Soviet indigrtation. These The people were enslaVedby Japan for 36 years, and on August 15 finally won student protests caused great concern among Soviet administrators in Manchu the liberation and began 10 feel proud and elated. You, however,did not go [to the ria and, from the perspective of occupation officials in North Korea., their tim streets] to construet an independent country, but iustead participated in a bloody ing could not have been worse. On 25 February 1946. a report originating from clash.86 Chongqing briefly alluded to the Siniliju incident. A broken translation, which ended up in the hands of U.S. State Department officials, reads: ''00 the Decem Even though it does not mention the emerging North Korean leader, the lan ber oflast year a great number ofinnocent and patriotic Korean students had been guage in this document closely mirrors Kim II Sung's rhetoric in Siniliju. killed fur no reason in Sinyechow [sic] in North Korea by Russian soldiers and To explain why farmers were drawn into the incident, the report diverges Korean Communists. The details will be published later:>9l As the I March 1919 from other reports on student-farmer confrontations and asserts that the farmers demonstrations in Korea had inspired China's "May Fourth Movement" of the opted to contain the violence rather than challenge it. In the conclusion, the report same year, the above document suggests that swift Korean student resistance to demands that the students yield to the needs ofnewly liberated rural communities Sovietoccupation in Siniiiju provided similar impetus for Chinese student pro and express their sympathy with agricultural workers. Such appeals had two out tests in spring 1946. comes. First, they diverted blame from the Soviets for appropriating grain from The resonant anniversary ofthe March First (Samil) Movement was approach the countryside. Second, they strengthened the contemporaIy case for viewing the ing. Soviet occupiers in the north. like their American counterparts in the south, social unrest in Siniliju as an outcome of long-standing strife between landlord faced the significant challenge of how to handle the popular sentiments that the families and farmers. anniversary would inevitably stimulate. Despite intense Korean Communist Party efforts to reinterpret March First as a Bolshevik-led movement, Christian and student rallies, and their accompanying cries for political representation, IMPACTS . culminated on I March 1946.92On 28 February, schools throughout Pyongyang were.practically empty. as many students stayed away from school in order to The incident in Siniiiju: inspired similar student protests in Pyongyang voice their upposition to the staged Samil celebmtions. After some students were WCmsan, making student unrest-and its blatant anti-Soviet overtones-a :iorced to march in a Samil parade, a huge crowd of Christians assembled at a of life for Soviet and Korean authorities in· the coming months.117Taking Pyongyang Presbyterian Church to protest Under the close watch of Soviet sol to reverse growing public distaste for Communism. whether Soviet or ,diers,the crowd lingered until 3 March. Occupation leaders responded to these
Kim II Sung used the theme of nation-building to demand that students ~pmtestsby closing schools for several days and by holding private meetings 14 Adam Catlwtut and Charles KI'tl/lS PUlpherallriftuence IS with school principals. Even then, however, students issuedstatements ignoring Middle School, whose students had participated in the 23 November student Soviet orders.93 movement. The South Siniliju Peace Preservation Corps Officers' School bunked Amid the tension, a report,. "Korea Under Russian Regime: Reign of Death. three thousand Siniiiju students by the third graduating class. While instruction in Famine and Chaos," surfaced. Months earlier, in December, the Returned Korean military training was primary, political classes stressed the anti-Japanese strug Student League (RKSL) had prepared this report in Chongqing. 94 Before exposing gle, the history ofthe Red Army, and self-criticism.1ol Through rigorous training, the Siniiiju incident and the Soviet "massacre," the league chastised the Korean many students in Siniliju had been oriented toward Soviet-style military discipline Communists for abusing Siniiiju's population, stealing Japanese goods for private via the poandae (security force) school, founded in Pyongyang in 1945, which use, and vowing obeisance to Marshal Stalin and the Soviet Union. "These Korean diminished any chance offurther open resistance. communists love the Russian Red flag more than their own Korean National Flag," By spring 1946, Kim nSung and the Soviets were actively engaged in organiz wrote the students. "These Korean Communists," they repeated, "even defended ing youth into various Communist organizations, as Kim railed against what he for the Russians about their plundering ofKorean foodstuffS, properties, the rap called the misleading and traitorous behavior of Christian ministers. 102 Siniliju ing of Korean women and massacre of Korean students. - The Siniiiju incident and North P'yoogan Province, although now in the background ofthe nationwide remained a potent symbol, and added to the challenges that both the Soviets and unrest, still produced churchmen eager to disagree with Communist authority. As the North Korean regime faced in commemorating March First. a result, these areas saw much anti-Christian activity on the part ofKorean Cotn munists. In the wake of nationwide church protest movements urging more reli gious fteedom. three churches in Siniiiju were reported1y burned to the ground. In DISCIPLINING AND CONSOLIDATING SIN(JIJU nearby Yongamp'o, where the Siniiiju incident had been sparked, local forces tore ;II Presbyterian church to the ground, carted it away in pieces, and later executed For the remainder ofthe Soviet occupation, special measures were implemented in the church leader. In Oiju, only II. short way up the Yatu River, the Methodist schools to ensure that organized student unrest would be near impossible in North church was torched, and its minister forced to tug an oxcart through town carrying P'yllngan. The educational bureaucracy shuffled letters ofreference. autobiogra the label of"national traitor."lm phies, investigative reports, and other detennining files on teachers-including A list ofrequests to Pyongyang from the Soviet military representative in North ioformation on their social class and role under Japanese rule-back and forth .' P'yllngan Province called for a counterespionage unit to curb infiltrators from from Pyongyang to the ftontier province.96 Because of the paucity of trained the south in the aftermath of the Siniliju incident. (Whether the needfor such a appropriately experienced teachers who were not associated with the Japanese, in, force was real or simply a means to reconclIe bad Red Army behavior remains 1948 and 1949 several stodents who had participated in the anti-Soviet demon unknown.)104When U.S. presidential representative Edwin Pauley visited Siniliju strations applied to be teachers. These individuals were expected to explain how in spring 1946, his Soviet guides, following standard protocol, were not anxious their attitudes had changed since the heady days ofNovember 1945.97 Iftea-I. to let Pauley's team speak: directly to the people of Siniliju. Perhaps the unbe were to be filtered out and remolded, students would also experience similar coming events that had taken place several months earlier in the city made the tic changes and undergo the same types of investigations. Accordingly, the Soviet guardshesitant to allow any direct contsct with local Koreans, particularly was closely watched, with careful attention paid to members' social class the student-workers who were industriously running factory machinery. When history.98 This rapid and often undifferentiated absorption of youth and Pauley asked about general living conditions. however, one ofthe Soviets plainly into party organs was performed in the name ofsecurity in the wake ofthe stated that the people were underfed. Food was scarce, workers received less than incident, but it would later result in problelDll for the Workers' Party in the mandated ration. and their spouses ate only a portion of the worker-mtion.1OS P'yoogan.99 Soon after, American agents in Pyongyang reported that refugees from northwest Many students would in fact be drafted into the army and trained as Korea, some Japanese, were tlowing in increasing numbers into Manchuria and nist soldiers. The Peace Preservation Officers' School was soon formed ,South Korea, as food mtion probleJDll continued.106 Pauley's report, despite its youngest, most able individuals were chosen for enlistment. Upon being .JI~upationwith economic data, depicts II. disheartened and devastated city. the students underwent rigorous daily field training and "thought inspection" .. While Pauley's nigh-mandatory bouts with the vodka urged on him by his Rus ducted by the top Soviet officials. Ch'oe Yongg6n, who rose to leadership in hosts may have prevented him from engaging the Soviets deeply on the sima KDP, led the Peace Preservation Bureau Corps Officers' School, fulfilling ",,;;1!1i!9JJin.SinCiju,American spies were more diligent. As Soviet military control over ential roles across the board of Communist enterprises.1OONot surprisingly, deepened in 1946 and 1947, documents filed by American spies increased
section of the Officers' School was stationed in the former Siniliju Commerci~~i':dn:number. According to these documents. passengers arriving at the SinCiju train 16 Admn Cathcart tmd Charles Kraw Perlpherallnftuence 17 station were routinely inspected; passengers traveling from the Siniliju station The Siniiiju incident was a pivotal event in the emerging North Korean state's to Cb'oogju underwent three separate inspections. The Pyongyang~Sinilijuroute early history. The persistence of churchmen and students to protest against Com was even more intensive, with two inspections invariably given before aniving munist policy and to provoke open outbreaks ofprotest in the early months oflib in Siniliju, and additional inspections given before and after departure. Public eration led the Soviet Union, Kim II Sung, and other Korean Communists to shape buses in the Siniiiju area were also seen as likely targets for security inspections their own policies in ways that minimized dissent. As student unrest continued and questioning by the poandae. as were the overcrowded vehicles traveling the several months after the Siniiiju incident,. the Communists responded by stamping l frequented route to nearby Oiju. O'7 Three Soviet infantry companies, two heavy out sources ofresistance and redirecting youthful energies. The latter goal influ machine gun companies, one quartermaster company, and one medical unit were enced Kim nSung's rhetoric and drew the young lesder out ofPyongyang on his reportedly stationed in Siniiiju. "Anti-Aircraft Rapid Firing Guns" surrounded first-ever inspection tour. the city-three on the Yalu River, one at the city's highest point,. and two border The Japanes~exodus had created a political vacuum that was too volatile to ing the coveted Siniiiju airfield to protect Soviet ai.remft. The city had become a permit a coalition government north ofthe 38th parallel. Student and church par highly policed and militarized zone, intended to deter enemy forces, although it ticipation in the SinUiju incident,. and the distressing aftermath of the protests, was sometimes unclear who the enemy was.IOB offered the first clear evidence that cooperation between Communist and dem One final element that contributed to the SinUiju incident came from across the ocratic parties was unlikely. Indeed, the Communists' consolidation of power border in China. In an order from the Provincial Committee in Andong dating from involved suppressing church influence, revamping the educational system, and the week after the SinQiju incident. the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) noted building a sustainable youth following. ongoing prevalence ofJapanese "fascists and special agents" in the area.and spurrea • The Siniiiju incident also revealed rifts between rural adherents to the revolu on local cadresto make revolution among the mobile massesof Korean and ,tiQnand the scions of the landed classes-tlle student elite-in the early years of nese migrants, a population the CCP saw as critical to "aiding the organization the occupation. Similar societal rifts and methods ofpower consolidation existed the North Korean people" across the Yalu.I09 Like the North Korean cadre, the inmany other Communist states in the early postwar period. The SinUiju incident CCP was working hard to overturn present social structures by convincing peonle. was unique insofur as it provided a test case for Kim II Sung's leadership and of the old pro-JaPanese landlords' ''traitorous crimes."110Although exchanges accelerated his use ofpersonalized nationalism. cooperation among Asian comrades along the Manchurian-North Korean border). The Siniiiju incident did not mushroom into a larger social movement requir were fairly intense,the North Koreans remained naturally wary ofthe Chinese, ing suppression by Soviet tanks (as in Prague in 1948), but the incident never ticularly given the fuct that the Soviets maintained that infiltrators had provoked theless had a lasting impact into the late 194Os. It stimulated further abortive Siniiiju incident. The North Korean reginte kept a vigilant eye on the Chinese, protests against the Soviets in North Korea, increased tensions surrounding the grouped them under "externalmanagement" along with the Japanese in survei1lanc~March First commemorations in 1946, and was clearly instrumental in spark files. Over several years, the Korean Communists producedthousands of pages ing a patriotic Chinese student movement in neighboring Manchuria that spring. documentation on Chinese residents in Uiju county (lam) alone.lII Based on Ultimately, the SinUiju incident had its greatest impact in the way it acceler sources, further research on Siniiiju's role in the North Korean revolution ated North Korean state power. Having been imperiled in peripheral Siniiiju, certainly considerthe Chinese connection more thoroughly. the Korean Communists went on to place the city within a matrix ofdiscipline whose centralizing power would withstand and outlast even the savagery of the Korean War. CONCLUSION
In stark contrast to the spontaneous and raucous protests of November NOTES the heavily militarized city of Siniiiju staged an organized celebration in the week ofJune 1947. Soviet soldiers and Siniliju citizens took joint part in 1. A well-researched discussion of localized areas diverging from both Seoul and events, parades, and other activities to strengthen Soviet-Korean friendship .;~gyangcan be found In Bruce Cumings, The Origins ofthe Korean War. voL 1. LIb express gratitude to the Red Anny and the Soviet Union.I12 From 1947 until the Emergence of Separate Regimes. 1945-J947 (Princeton. Nl: Princeton opposition forces were rooted out and remolded, student unrest never Press, 1981). See also Allan R. Millett, The War for Korea. 1945-J950: A and the general populace of Sinlliju moved toward acceptance of the 'ng (Lawrence, KS: Universityof Kansas Press,2005). On the Cheju rebel changed way of life. see 10hn Merrill, "The Cbeju-do Rebellion." Journal of Korean StudIes 2 (1980), 18 Adam CaJhcart andCharles Kraua Perlpherailnjluence 19
139--97; see also United States National Archives and Records Administration, Record 8. SO Tongman, PuleChos6n sahoeJuQlch 'eJe 1I6ngnipsa, 1945-1961 (The Forma GroUp (hereafter RG) 59, Everett F. Drumright to the Secretary of State, "Transmitting tion ofthe North Korean Socialist System, 1945-1961 )(Seoul: SOnln, 2005), 84, 397. Report ofDevelopment ofCheju Island." 7 Janumy 1949,895.00/1-749. 9. Kim Ha-yong (Kim Hayoog), "The Formation ofNorth Korean State Capitalism," 2. For reference to "terrorist acts," unemployment, starvation, corruption, and sepa tnIDS. Owen Miller, International Socialism: A Qumterly Journol of Socialist Theory ratist tendencies in Ch'Ongjin and North HamgyOng in 1946 and 1947, see Kim n Sung.
Conscience, and Religion in North Korea," November 2005
Westem borderlands. See Steven M. M'mer. Stalin s Holy Ww: Religion, Nationa/ism, 26. "Collected Report Concerning the Proceedings and Situation of the Local PPC and Alliance Politics. 1941-1945 (Chapel Hill. NC: University ofNot1h Carolina Press, Conference,"13 October 1945,ADMRF. 2003). n. IeIIlIgIl&buro, The Paclfie Ww, 1931-1945: A Critical Perspective on Japan's 18. On the symbolism of9 September in East Asia, see Reo Jun, RifuRiqiao Da Gut- Role in World Ww 11(New YoIk: Pantheon Books, 1978). fan (Great Repatriation of Japanese Prisoners and Overseas Japanese) (Nanjing: NlUliing 28. "Concerning the Japanese War Indusll)' in Korea and the Situation Report on Cbubanslu; 2005), 25-44. Heavy ManufiIctorlng," December 1945. Russian Presidential Archive. Presidential Envoy 19. "Investigative Report Concerning the Not1h Korean Political Situation," Russian Edwin Pauley, the only major figure in the Truman administration to visit the city during Presidential Archive. F.013, 0.7, D.4,D.46, 8. the occupation period, provides further data on the Soviet extmetions from Sinlliju. See 20. The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State, I October Edwin W. Pauley, Report on JapfUle$e Assets in Soviet-Occupied Korea to the:President 1945, FRUS. 1945: The BriJlsh Commonwealth. The Fw East, vol. 6, 1066; USCIRF, of the United States. June. 1946 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, "Thank You Father Kim nSong," 69-70: Kang, Christ and Coesw in Modern Korea. 156; 1946), 56-58. See also the Acting Secretaty ofState to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union United States National Archives and Records Administration. Records of the Army StaJt: (Harriman). 26 December 1945, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945: The Brlt- Assistant Chief of Stqjf (G-l), Intelligence Administrative Division. DOCU11IentLibrarY. Ish Commonwealth, The Fw East, vol. 6 (Wasbington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Branch. "P" Flies. /94--1951. RG319. Box 1862, Intelligence SummaryNorthern Korea Office. 1976). 1149. (INSK), 1 December 1945. ' 29. "Investigative Report Concerning the Not1h Korean Political Situation," Decem 21. "Written Report Concerning the Not1h Korean Land Reform Work Situation, ber 1945. Russian Presidential Archive. F.013, 0.7, D.4. D.46, 13. II November 1945, ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, 0.433847, D.l, 216--18; Ignatiev, "Report Con 30. 0-2 Periodic Report #87, 6 December 1945. G-l Periodic Reports. Headquarten. ceming the Question of Providing Personnel." 12 November 1945. ADMRF, F.Usta 7th IqfontryDivislon (1945.9-1947.9~vol. 9, 388. 0.433847, D.1, 170-72. For a detailed report on the history of the landlord-tenant systeni 31. The phrase is borrowed from Allyn IltId Adele Rickett, Prisoners of Liberation in Korea, see "Evaluation Report Concerning the Inhabitant Social Hierarchy," 30 Octohe. '(NewYork: Cameron Associates, Inc., 1957). 188. 1945,ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, 0.433847. D.I. 106-18. 32. The Political Adviser in Korea (Benninghoff) to the Secretary of State, I October 22. Kuksa P'yOnch'an WiwOnhoe, eds•• Pukhan kwon 8)Ie saryoJip (Historical M 1945, FRUS, 1945: The British Commonwealth, TheFw East, vol. 6, 1066. rials on Not1h Korean Relations), vol. 12 (Seoul: Kuksa P'~neh'anWiwOnhoe. 1989 33. USClRF. "Thank You Father Kim n Sung," 46. For available international radio 340-82. For analysis, see Vi SOgyun, "Pukltan sahoejuilii ch'eje iii sOngnip kwa nongch'o: broadcasts in Not1h Korea, see Arma Louise Strong, In North Korea: First Eye-Witness kyongje kOusOOe kwakhan yOn'gn" (A Stody on the Formation ofthe Not1h Korean 800' Report (New York: Soviet Russia Today, 1949), 13. ist System and the Establishment ofthe Rural Economy after Liberation), (master's th .: 34. Captain Grafov, "Report to General A. A. Romanenko Concerning Deficiencies in KyOngnamUniversity, South Korea, 2001), 84. For extended comparison ofilltld policy' Translation Work," 13 November 1945, ADMRF. F.Ustatsk. 0.343253, D.2. III. Soviet-occupied Korea with that in the occupied Baltic states, see Yi Cbaehiii, "Pukhan tl 35. On the August 1945 publication and later suppressinn of tbe Sinllijn wlw6nhoe's t'oji kaehyOk e kwakhan~n'gn" (A Study on the Land Reform in Not1h Korea), (mas~Apkang000 ("The Yalu River Daily''). see Kim Ha-yong, "The Formation ofNot1h Korean thesis, KyOngnam University, South Korea, 1997). stateCapitalism," n. p. 23. Ryoo KihI-Jae (Ryu Kilchae), "Pukban Ili kukka kOnsOIkwa inmin wiwOnhoe 36. Soviet military admlnistmtors apparently concluded that public commemors yOkhal" (A Stody ofthe People's Committees in State Building in Not1h Korea, 1945-194 tions of the Great Soviet October Revolution could help the Kurean people understand (Ph.D. dissertation, KoryO University. Kaesong, Not1h Korea, 1995), chapters 3-4; e., • Sovietjustice. Documents about these extensive commernorstions, usually written by enmmunication with Dr.Ryoo K.ihI-Jae, 10 August 2007; Cbulho Awe. with Herl:Ien,; : ;;jf!)liticalofficers in individual cities, nover acknowledged that suchceremonies might have Webster, Decision at Dawn: The Underground Christian WUness in North Korea (Londo; , ~~ Koreans living in cities where Communist organizations had barely taklm root Hodder & Stoughton, 1965).25. For more on the intransigent attitudes ofmercbants in D~ ·lRll!ese populations were eager to resume Korean, rather than foreign, festivals In their cit In an earlier period, see Sun-Hee YQOn(yun SOnhlli), "Migrsnts, Captives and Ho . ;~.See"Report on Local Work in the Period from October 10 to October 28, 1945," 28 The Making ofNot1heastAsia in the Seventeenth Century," paper presented atAssociati h~ber1945. ADMRF, F.Ustatsk. 0.343253. D.2,14-15. for Asian Studies Anmtal Meeting, Atlanta, 5 April 2008. See also Sun Joo Kim, "M .. ", 37. Captain GraCov."Report to General A. A. Romanenlm Concerning Deficiencies in alized Elite, Regional Discrimination, and the Tradition of Prophetic Belief in the H. {\:1t1;lltlSIationWolk," 13 November 1945, ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, 0.343253,0.2, 110-11.
KyOngnae Rebellion" (Ph.D. dissertation, University ofWashington, 2000). 17-30, 12),: ·i~'';i,.3.8. Aecording to a British observer, between15 March IltId 23 April 1946. "One hun 24. For confirmation of this statement in a contemporary context, see Stephan ~~~and twenty Russian soldiers were shot by order of the Russian Command in Harbin gard and Marcus Noland, Famine in North Korea: Markets. Aid, and Reform (New Y "t~ this period for various offences against public order." See United States National Columbia University Press, 2007). f~h.ltivesand Records Administration, RG59, "British Report on Manchuria," 893.00
25. "Collected Report Concerning the Proceedings ofthe Local PPC Conference.~,:~~CHURIAI7-1546. Recorda 0(the l!'S, Department ofState Relating to the Internal October 1945. ADMRF, F.l72. 0.614630. D.9. 42-43. 'c'M'.qJrsofKo1'elJ. 1945-1949, Decimal File 895.00. 22 AdamCatheart and Chorle3Krau8 Per/plulrallrif/1lefu;e 23
39. Kim Tonggil writes: "On October 12, 1945, the leader of the pioneer group 0 51. On the scheduled convening of Korean school principals with Soviet educational Korean Volunteer Anny. Han Cheong, led the pioneer detachment ofthe KVA to enter in adrninisll:ators, see "Report Concerning North Korean People's Provisional Committee the Korean middle school in Sinuiju across Andong and negotiated with the Soviet R Representative Meeting," 1-25; and "Report Cooceming the Situation ofPublic Education Anny. But the latter rejected the entry ofthe KVA into the North Korea, saying that 'onl in North Korean Localities," 20 October 1945, 60-61. the presence ofthe Soviet Red Anny rather than any other military forces is in accordan 52. According to two student refugees Who arrived in Seoul from Sini1iju in early with the international regulation.' Twenty days later the pioneer detachment of the KV December, Chu's IWtual destination had been Seoul, and the principal bad been am:sted bad to return to Shenyang from Sinuiju." (Kim Tonggil, "Re-examination of the after his return to Siniliju because he bad overtly dilWllSSedAmerican laws in Seoul. See of the Ethnic Korean Divisions in the PLA to North Korea," unpublished paper.) Seea 0-2 Periodic Report #88, 7 December 1945, G-2 Periodic Reports. Hem:Jquarter$,7th ChunglUlgJlbo. Plrok, vol. I. 148-54. IrI!antr:YDivision (1945.9-1947.9), vol. 9. 388. 40. Odd Ame Wested adeptly addresses the complexities of Chinese Ouomindan 53. Scalnpino and Lee, Communism In Korea. Part l, 3360. Soviet relations in Manchuria at this time in Cold War tmd Revolution: Sovlet-Amer 54. One ofthe most detailed sources on the incident incorrectly states that Yi ordered Rlvahy lUId the Orlglm o/the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946 (New York: Columbia U his armed guards to encircle the scbool at this time, arresting all students and faculty versity Press, 1993). See also Robert Levine, Anvil 0/Victory: The Communist Victory involved in the debate. See United States Natinnal Archives and RecordsAdminisll:ation, Manchur/Q,1945-1948 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). R059, Returned Korean StodeDl League, "Korea Under Russian Regime: Reigu ofDeath, 41. Kim Tonggil, "Re-examination," and Scalnpino and Lee, Communism In Kore' Famine and Chaos," 3 December 1945, enclosed in Park Soon to President Truman, 3 Part 1,333. March 1946, 895.0113-346. 42. United StateS National Archives and Records Adminisll:ation, RG319. Box 186 ' 55. Testimony ofYi Tomyilng, quoted in Chungtmg [lbo, Plro/c, vol. I, 164. ISNK, I December 1945; Chungang Ilbo, Plro/c, vol. 1. 163. ; 56. Testimony ofYi Tomyilng, quoted in ChunglUlgDbo, Ptrok, vol. I, 164. 43. More than one thousand Chinese students were also enrolled in the provinci 57. Testimony ofYi Toinyilng, quoted in Chungang [lbo, Plro/c, vo\. 1,164. high schools. See "Report Cooceming the Situation of Public Education in North Ko 58. United States National Archives and Records Adminisll:ation, R059, Returned Localities," 20 October 1945, ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, 0.433847, 0.1, 60-61. Korean Stodent League, "Korea Under RussIan Regime: Reign of Death, Famine and 44. "Data Sheet Concerning North Korea's National Education Situation," Chaos." 3 December 1945. While the city of Yongamp'o is not included in this report, ber 1945, ADMRF,F.Ustatsk, 0.433847, D.I, 76-79. For more general information the ~'s descriptinn of Lung-Ai-fu fits the description that Scalapino and Lee offer education reforms in this period, see H. C. Kim and D. K. Kim, HUl1II1nRemolding, ofYongamp'o. The reason behind the differing city names could simply be a problem of North Korea: A Social History 0/Education (Lanham, MD: University Press ofAmen , translation and romanization. For instance, the romanization of Siniliju in this report is 2005),50-63.' , "Sinyechow," clearly a fOIIIllIIizationof the Chinese, Xinyizhou. and not the often contem 45. United StateS National Archives and Records Adminisll:ation, RG319, Box 186 porarily utilized Korean romanization "Sinuiju." Furthermore, the removal of Principal ISNK, I December 1945; Chungang l/bo, Pfrok, vol. I, 163. , Cbu fits well into other IWCOunts,Which also state that the People's Committee removed a 46. Sheila Miyoshi Jager, Narratives 0/Nation BUilding In Korea: A Genealogy,; local school principal. Unlike other accounts, however,the report ofthe Returned Korean Patriotism (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), and Oi-Wook Shin and Kyung Moon H ' ,Student League recounts the events that preceded23 November as more tumuItuOUlland eds., Contentious Kwangju: The May 18 Uprising In Korea's Past tmd Pruent (La JI!much greater detail. MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2000). 59. Reminiscence ofKim Ind6k, quoted in Chungang Dbo, Pfro/c, vol. I, 164-66. 47. "Report Concerning North Korean People's Provisional Committee Rep '.' 60. The Returned Korean StudeDt League asserted that the pastors themselves were tative Meeting," 13 October 1945, ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, 0.433847, D.I, 22. For,killedorwounded.Othersourcesdonotbearthisout. SeeUnited States National Archives anti-Japanese rhetoric, see Kim II Sung, Works. vol. I, 266. For extended trea ',;WRecords AdminisII:ation, R059, ReturnedKorean StodentLeague, "Korea UnderRUlI of Soviet use of educated Japanese in occupied Dalian, see Christian Hess, "F ,.:_ Regime: Reign ofDeath.Famine and Chaos," 3 December 1945. Imperialist En~miesto Socialist Friends: The Japanese in Dalian. 1945-1949," pa~ ';]11\61. Chang later became a general ia the ROK Anny. See Kang, Christ tmd Caesar in presented at Midwest Conference on Asian Affairs, Madison, Wisconsin, 22 OclQli! " ModemKDreo, 156. 2006. " ",;,,62. Chungang Ilbo, Plro/c, voL 1. 167.
48. "Report Coocerning North Korean People's Provisional Committee Represeil ':il~,,';63.Testimony ofYi Tomy6ng, in Chungang Dbo, Plrok, vol. I, 164-66. live Meeting," 13 October 1945, ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, 0.433847, D.I, 19; "Report cl "64. ChunglUlgJlbo,Plrok, vol. 1,167. ceming the Situation of Public Education in North Korean Localities," 20 October 1', /;;,,65. Chungang [lbo, Plro/c, vol. 1,167.
ADMRF. F.Ustotsk, 0.433847, D.I, 60-61. ,;~\~::',66.United States National Archives and Records Administration, ROS9, Returned 49. "Report Concerning Investigation ofthe Cooditions ofNorth Korean Local Po ~~~ Stodent League, "Korea Under Russian Regime: Reign of Death, Famine and cal Departments," 30 October 1945, ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, 0.433847. D.I, 45. ;. ~~" 3 December 1945. See also testimony of Kim Ind6k, in ChunglUlg llbo, Ptrok, 50. Chungang Ilbo, Pfrok, vol. I, 164-66. ~~;I'iI65.Although the allegation that Soviets used aircraft to suppress the prutest may 24 Adam CtJ/hcor'/and Chmles Kraus Perlpherallnjtuence 25 appear unlikely. Soviet documents indicate that only two weeks before 25 November. th 83. CMngno, 21 December 1945, and CMngno, 26 December 1945. reprinted in local Provincial People's Committee (PPC) bad requested pelTllission to begin the work 0 Kuksa P'y6nch'an WiwOOhoe,eds., Pukhml kwan 'gye saryoJip (lflStorical Materials on clearing complete damaged Japanese planes from Siniliju's coveted airfield. See "R North Korean Relations), vol. 32, 80-82. to Soviet Military Representatives in All Provinces Regarding Deficienc\e/I in Tmnslatio 84. Van Ree.Socialism In One Zane, 117. Work," 13 November 1945,110--12. 85. "Investigative Report Conceming the North Korean Polilical Situation," Decem 67. "Special Issue: Siniliju Student Revolt," 25 November 1945, ADMRF,F.Usta ber 1945, 4-13. 0.343254, D.2, 194. 86. "Special Issue: Sinl1iju Student Revolt," 25 November 1945, 194. 68. Chungang 1100,Pirok, voL 1,168. 87. United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG319, Box 1863, 69. United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG319, Box 186 ISNK,20 Maroh 1946. ISNK, 1 December-I 5 December;and "Special Issue: Sinl1iju Student Revolt," 25 Nov 88. Kim II Sung, ''On the Occasion of Formation ofthe Democratic Youth League of ber 1945, 194. North Korea: Speech Delivered at the Conference of Representatives of the Democratic 70. See Erik Van Ree, Socialism In One Zone: Stalin's Policy In Korea. 1945-19 Youth Organization in North Korea," 17 January 1946, Worlu. vol. 2. 18. (Oxford:·Berg Publishers Ltd., 1989). 117; and Scalapino and Lee, Communism in Kore 89. United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG319, Box 1862, Part I, 3360. l JSNK, 18 January 1946. 71. See Kim, Ham SiJkhlJnp 'ylJnjlJn(Biography of a Korean Quaker). 87-88; Culf! 90. See Adam Cathcart, "Chinese Nationalism in the Shadow of Japan, 1945-1950," Ings, Korea's Ploce in the Sun, 230--31; and Cumings, Origins. vol. 2,319. For a ~ Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio University, 2005, chapter 2. See also Chinese Press Review, U.S. that targeted similar religions leaders in South P'y6ngan, see Kim nSung, "Speech Deli" Information Service, Chungking, China, no. 366 (26 January 1946), and no. 5 (18 March ere(22ApriI2oo8),1732. 94. The article's tmnslator, and the paper in which It was originally published (if 76. Chungang 1100,Plrok, vol. I, 166. For an a1moatcertainly fBbricated, Imt n. ;.;~)arcomitted from the document. For more information on the relationship between theless interesting, account of Kim's conversation at the Siniliju aiIport with a relativ,'}€ljiomindang-controlled Chongqing and the varions Korean exile groups (including pub well-to-do pilot worried about his class status, see History ufthe Revolutionary Activi '~~!OOngregulations). see Ku Daeyol (Ku Taeyc:ll)."China:S Policy toward Korea during of the Great Leader Comrade Kim nSung (Pyongyang: Foreign LanguagesPublis ',~OrJdWar D: Restoration of Power and the Korea Question," Korea Journal 43, un. 4 House, 1983), 196-99. .y~nfer2003). 238; and Choe Dot Sin (Ch'oe Ti)kllin). The Nation and J (Pyon1!Yang: 77. See Armstrong, North Korean Revolution, 62-64; and Cumings, Origins. vo: ii:'~Languages Publishing House, 1987), 15-16. 319.·~iii;9S. United States National Archives and Records Administration, RGS9, Returned 78. Kim II Sung, "Which Path Should Liberated Korea Take? Speech at a MIllIS~i:'fean Student League.. "Korea Under Russian Regime" 3 December 1945, 2. While it is in Slnl1iju," 27 November 1945. Works. vol. 1. 397. '.. ·;~~tofthemost detailed sources on the incident, this document incorrectly states that Yi
79. Kim nSung, "Students Should Actively Help in Building a Democmtic COUll :.l~etedhis armed guards to encircle the school, and that he arrested all students and faculty Speech Delivered at a Great Lecture Meeting ofthe Young Students from Middle Soh :~:lp;W);vedin the debate. and Schools ofHigher Levels in Pyon1!Yang,"7 December1945, Works. vol. 1.411. 'I: :'f~~6,United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG242, National 80. Kim II Sung, "Students Should Actively Help in Building a Democmtio Coun·~fjJyesCollection of Foreign Records Seized, 1941-, Records Seized by U.s. Military 7 December 1945, Worlu. vol. 1,41 t. ; FQ!,C?sIn Korea. SA2006, 2/8. These sources contain personal histories. autobiographies, 81. Kim II Sung, "WbichPath Should Liberated Korea Take? Speech a Mass Ra i*~"ofinquiry,and letters ofestimation ofemployees for 1949 from the Teachers Tmin- Sinuiju," 27 November 1945. Works. vol. 1, 397. ~.,~hool,North P'yOngan Province, North Korea. For similar files, see also RG242. 82. Kim II Sung, With the Century. 1732. ".mOOS,8/4. which contains personal histories and autobiographies offeachers and written 26 Adam CaJhcart and Charles Kraus Peripheral Influence 27 opinions ofprincipals (1946, Songnim I st and 2nd High School and Songnim Girls' Schoo. 105. See PllUley, Report on Japanese Assets. 126--28. See also CREST, Korea Office, Hwanghae-do); RG242, SA2005, S/6, which contains personal histories and autobiogra "Economic Information: Food Conditions in North Korea; Commodity Prices in Pyong phies ofjunior high school teachers and written opinions of principals (1946, Educatio ' yang," 10 July 1947, CIA-RDPS2-00457ROO0700340002-9. Bureau of Sariw6n); RG242, SA2005, 8/7, which contains personal histories, autobiogra 106. CREST, Korea Office, ''Economic Information: Food Conditions in North Korea; phies, and application of candidates for high schoollitemture teachers (1947, Pyongyan Commodity Prices in Pyongyang," 10 July 1947. Special City); RG242, SA2005, S/16, which contains personal histories and autobiographi . 107. CREST, Korea Office, "Political Information: Controls Encounteredon a Trip of teachers and the written opinions of the principal (1949, Chaeryong High School fo through North Korea," 13 June 1947, C1A-RDP82-00457ROO060068000s-7 and CREST, Girls); RG242, SA2006, 214, which contains personal histories, brief autobiographies, an Korea Office, ''Economic Information: Transportation in North Korea," 24 June 1947, records of investigation of candidates for teachers of Central Education Leaders' Tminin CIA-RDPS2-00457ROO0700050002-1. School (1949, Ministry ofEducation); and RG242, SA2006, 2125, for the "Register ofHi lOS. United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG319 Box, IS63, School Teachers in North Korea" (1950, North Korean Educational Bureau). .( /SNK. 22 June 1946; and CREST, Korea Office, "Military Information: Soviets in Simliju, " 97. United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG242, SA200 2 June 1947, C1A-RDPS2-00457R0006004S0002-5. 218, which contains personal histories, autObiographies, letters of inquiry, and letters \ 109. "Andongsbeng gongwei guanyu ziqian kaizhan chunzhong yundong de zhishi" estimation of employees (1949, Teachers Tmining School, North P'y6ngan Provin' (Andong Province Working Committee Concerning Instructions for the Present Unfolding North Korea). Mass Movement), I December 1945, in Zhonggong Liaoning Shengwei Dangsbi Yanji 98. United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG242 SA20': ushi Zhonggong Dandongshiwei Dangshi Yanjiushi (Chinese Communist Party Liaoning 4/17S, Roster of Youth Association members and personal histories of staff of the No ' Pro~ceParty History Research Office, Chinese Communist Party Dandong Municipal Korean Democmtic Young Men's League, January 1946, North Korean DemocmticYo; Party History Research Office), Jie fang zhan zheng 8hi qi de an dong genju dl (The Men's League, SUilch'on Branch, North Korea. Andong Base Area during the Libemtion War Period), (Beijing: Chinese Communist Party 99. Kim n Sung, "Tasks of the Party Organizations in North P'yilngan Provin ' 'History Publishing House, 1993), 34. Speech at a North P'y6ngan Provincial Party Conference," 7 April 1956, Works. vol.:1 110. Conversely, in December 1945, members of the Guomindang and the Andong- January-December /956. 116. ' Korea Society published a bilingual report that pmised Jiang Jieshi's stance toward China 100. See Central Intelligence Agency Records Search Tool (CREST), Korea Offi" and an independent Korea. This report provides further evidence of the cultural and pro "Military Information: Peace Preservation Corps Officers Schools in North Korea," Sd' paganda warfare that was taking place on the Sino-Korean border. See Andongjiancbaju, tember 1947, CIA-RDPS2-00457ROOOSOO840007-S;Van Ree, Socialism in One Zone, l~ Andongshi siweidui, Andong Chaoxian xiehui (Andong Police Department, Andong Self- CREST. Korea Office, "Military Information: North Korean People's Army or Peace P' Defense Team, Andong-Korea Association), "Zhi Cbaoxianren he Zhongguoren de huyu ervation Corps Officers Schools," 3 November 1947, CIA-RDP82-00457ROOIOO045000! (kouhao)" (Appeal [Slogans] to Korean and Chinese People), December 1945, ADMRF, S. , F.Ustatsk, 0.343253, D.21, 115. 101. CREST, Korea Office, "Military Information: Peace Preservation Corps Offie III. See United States National Archives and Records Administration, RG242, Schools in North Korea," September 1947; and CREST, Korea Office, "Military Info, i.$A2005, 911, "List of Resident Chinese Nationals in Diju-gun, P'yongan Pukto," 26 July tion: North Korean People's Army or Peace Preservation Corps Officers Schools.":~\949.Documents Section of North Korean Foreign Affairs Ministry; and United States I 02. See Kim n Sung, ''The Results of the Democmtic Elections and the Immed;\~ationalArchives and Records Administration, RG242, SA2006, 1158, "Resident Chinese Tasks of the People's Committee: Speech Delivered at the Third Enlarged " . Provisional People's Committee ofNorth Korea," 25 November 1946, Works. vol. CREST, Korea Office, "Military Information: Soviet Troops in SinUiju and Uiju and Kim n Sung, ''Speech at a Conference ofthe Organization ofSlInch'iln County, 2 September 1947, CIA-RDP82-00457ROOOSOOS90008-2. P'yilngan Province, of the Workers' Party ofNorth Korea," 24 January I94S, Works. 4, JOflUfJl')'-December/948, 49. 103. See CREST, Korea Office, "Political Information: Persecution of North Korea," 2 June 1947, CIA-RDP82-00457ROO060044000S-3. See also National Archives and Records Administration, RG319, Box 1398, G-2 Periodic USAFIK, Seoul, Korea, Eastern Asia, Opemtional Intelligence, Glenn Newman, cal Trends #28, S April 1946. Newman's intelligence reports from Seoul tend to be accurate and less hysterical than others also included in the G-2 series. 104. Lieutenant Colonellgnatiev, "Report from the Soviet Union Military tives Concerning Red Army Behavior," December 1945, ADMRF, F.Ustatsk, D.2, 99-107.