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Beyon Islamists & Autocrats PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL REFORM POST ARAB SPRING Beyon� Islamists & Autocrats Party—accepted the invitation, as did the Muslim Broth- Egypt’s Occasional erhood. Unlike the activists, these opposition groups Non-Islamist Reformists had pursued reform, rather than revolution, throughout Mubarak’s three-decade reign. Despite their (sometimes n ERIC TRAGER severe) ideological differences with the Mubarak gov- ernment, they worked within the existing political system, N FEBRUARY 6, 2011, Egyptian president Hosni using whatever limited space the government afforded Mubarak was on the ropes. During the previous them to achieve whatever minor influence they could. Otwo weeks, an unprecedented mass uprising had shaken Once the January 2011 uprising began, however, the his government to its core: the Egyptian police had col- leaders of these groups relented to pressure from their lapsed, protestors now occupied central squares across younger members and joined the demonstrations. But the country, and the military had assumed control of the they never ceased contact with the authorities. In this streets. Meanwhile, the government’s supporters were sense, they occupied the rare middle ground between in disarray: the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) the government and the revolutionaries.1 Their Febru- failed to mobilize a significant response during the first ary 6 meeting with top Mubarak government officials, week of the uprising, and Mubarakists’ February 2 as- therefore, produced a predictably middle-of-the-road sault on protestors in Cairo’s Tahrir Square ended in compromise: a committee would be formed to amend defeat. So with much of the country now demanding the existing constitution; the prosecutor-general would Mubarak’s ouster, Vice President Omar Suleiman and investigate crimes committed against the demonstra- Prime Minister Ahmed Shafik invited opposition groups to negotiate a political transition. While the youth activists who organized the upris- 1. This paper focuses on reformists and distinguishes them from revolutionaries. Reformists are those who work within political ing’s initial protests rejected the meeting as a betrayal systems to advance change and, in Egypt, include legal opposi- of the revolution, Egypt’s most prominent legal opposi- tion parties such as the Wafd, Tagammu, and Nasserist Parties. Revolutionaries work to promote change by overturning existing tion parties—the nationalist Wafd, socialist Tagammu, political institutions and, in Egypt, include organizations such as and pan-Arab nationalist Arab Democratic Nasserist the April 6 Youth Movement. © 2016 THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY A series that explores how non-Islamist Arab political actors might facilitate progress toward reform and democratic transition. Beyond Islamists & Autocrats tors since the uprising began; and Mubarak would re- cal force in post-Mubarak Egypt, and they are mostly in- main in office until new presidential elections were held distinguishable from today’s pro-government stalwarts. in September.2 This paper seeks to account for the relative weakness of The proposed transition process, in other words, fa- reformist actors within Egypt’s non-Islamist camp, and vored reform over revolution: the constitution would be traces the relevant groups’ evolution from the Mubarak amended rather than overturned, and power would be era through the tumultuous events of 2011–2013 and transferred gradually rather than immediately. With the onward to the present day under the government of Pres- benefit of hindsight, some have argued that this ap- ident Abdul Fattah al-Sisi. proach might have enabled a more orderly political transition, rather than the political uncertainty, polar- TRAPPED REFORMISTS5 ization, and autocratic resurgence that followed. But at By the time of Mubarak’s ouster, Egypt’s non-Islamist the time, this proposed transition program was dead on reformist parties were widely seen as extensions of the arrival. The revolutionaries absolutely refused to end leadership itself, and with good reason. They existed their uprising until Mubarak was toppled, and a critical only with the government’s permission; worked within mass of Egyptians appeared to share this sentiment.3 the government’s institutions, which overwhelmingly fa- The following day, the Muslim Brotherhood backed vored the ruling NDP; and in some cases were even cre- away from the reformist transition plan, threw its to- ated by the government. They criticized the government tal support behind the revolution, and started chart- mildly, if at all, and showed deference to Mubarak and ing its post-Mubarak political strategy.4 Four days after his security services. that, on February 11, 2011, Egypt’s military toppled To be sure, the reformist parties contained many stri- Mubarak and assumed control. dent opponents of the government. The leftist Tagammu The reformists’ irrelevance at the height of the 2011 Party, which President Anwar Sadat established as the left uprising wasn’t surprising. To some extent, of course, it “platform” of his own ruling party in 1976, incorporated reflected the excitement of the moment, and a broad many members from the secret communist organizations desire within Egypt for Mubarak to leave as quickly as of the 1960s, and actively protested Sadat’s economic possible. But the reformists’ weakness also reflected policies and outreach to Israel during the late 1970s.6 the Mubarak government’s success in constraining The nationalist New Wafd Party, which members of the their growth during the previous three decades. While pre-1952 Wafd Party established in 1984, opposed the the Muslim Brotherhood emerged from the uprising as Mubarak government’s autocratic abuses and demand- Egypt’s preeminent political force and briefly served as ed the cancellation of the peace treaty with Israel.7 And the country’s governing party, non-Islamist reformists still the Nasserist Party, which was established in 1992 after have not established themselves as a meaningful politi- Nasserists broke from the Tagammu Party, similarly criti- 2. Nihal Shoukry and Hany Ezzat, “Agreement between Politi- 5. Adapted from the author’s forthcoming book, Arab Fall: How cal Forces and Omar Suleiman” (in Arabic), al-Ahram, Feb- the Muslim Brotherhood Won and Lost Egypt in 891 Days (Wash- ruary 6, 2011, http://www.ahram.org.eg/archive/The-First/ ington DC: Georgetown University Press, 2016), pp. 81–85. News/61506.aspx. 6. Raymond William Baker, Sadat and After: Struggles for Egypt’s 3. David D. Kirkpatrick and David E. Sanger, “After First Talks, Political Soul (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. Egypt Opposition Vows New Protest,” New York Times, Febru- 118–20, 151; Judith Tucker, “While Sadat Shuffles: Economic ary 6, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/07/world/ Decay, Political Ferment in Egypt,” MERIP Reports 65 (March middleeast/07egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 1978): p. 9. 4. Muslim Brotherhood, “Press Statement from the Muslim Brother- 7. Mona Makram-Ebeid, “The Role of the Official Opposition,” hood on the Fourteenth Day of the Blessed Popular Revolution” in Egypt under Mubarak, ed. Charles Tripp and Roger Owen (in Arabic), February 7, 2011. (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 25, 30–32. ERIC TRAGER 2 EGYPT’S OCCASIONAL NON-ISLAMIST REFORMISTS Beyond Islamists & Autocrats cized Mubarak’s pro-Western foreign policy. Moreover, ted to print newspapers, which enabled them to send these parties were not always hapless: the Tagammu correspondents to various governmental ministries and Party at one point boasted more than 150,000 mem- institutions for collecting information.10 Finally, parties bers, while the Wafd Party maintains headquarters in could run in parliamentary elections, and the leader- nearly every governorate and prints a daily newspaper. ship often awarded a few seats to quiescent parties. But throughout his three-decade rule, Mubarak While parliament largely served as a rubber stamp for brought these opposition parties to heel by offering them Mubarak’s policies, participation in parliament carried a deal they couldn’t refuse: if they wanted to continue key benefits, including a boost in a party’s public profile. existing, they couldn’t cross his government’s redlines. Parliamentarians also enjoyed parliamentary immunity, The redlines represented the upper bounds of opposi- which enabled them and their partners to pursue lucra- tional activity that the government was willing to tolerate, tive business deals extralegally.11 and the punishments for crossing them could be sub- Given the autocratic context in which the legal op- stantial. Rogue oppositionists risked sanctions on their position parties operated, this wasn’t such a bad deal. businesses, disclosures of their private lives in Egypt’s So long as they kept their critiques of the government sensationalist press, harassment by authorities, and im- within certain boundaries, they were granted a plat- prisonment. And to induce the opposition parties’ cau- form. Opposition leaders thus graced the pages of the tion, the leadership kept these redlines somewhat am- major newspapers and appeared frequently on televi- biguous, such as by permitting intense criticism at certain sion, sometimes as counterparts to ruling-party shills. times but punishing it harshly at other times. They were, in other words, prominent figures from rec- Yet opposition party leaders understood that three ognized organizations. topics were off-limits for criticism: President Mubarak, Yet the legal opposition
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