We Have the Prophets”: Inspiration and the Prophets in Athenagoras of Athens

ZAC 2016; 20(2): 211–242

D. Jeffrey Bingham* “We Have the Prophets”: Inspiration and the Prophets in Athenagoras of Athens

DOI 10.1515/zac-2016-0031

Abstract: In contrast to those who argue simply that Athenagoras’s discussion of the prophets and inspiration is Hellenic, sourced in Philo as well as in Plato and Plutarch, this paper claims that there are other sources to consider that are equally informative. Athenagoras manifests alliance and dependence upon the Septuagint, other Jewish sources, the New Testament and second-century Chris- tian sources, especially Ignatius and Justin. Athenagoras is a Christian philosopher. We would expect to see such a broad-based platform of resources for his theological construction. A simple classification of Greek, Hellenistic or Philonic for his notion of the inspired prophets is incomplete, unreflective of his own inge- nuity, and fails to adequately account for his Judaeo-Christian heritage. It also minimizes the elegance of this early Christian attempt to theologize about the Jewish prophets in a gentile world. In Athenagoras we have an explanation of the prophets and inspiration that (1) clearly positions them preeminently as rational, doctrinal Christian authorities above the poets, philosophers, and human opinions; (2) constructs his community’s theology with an artistic flair that selectively and critically weaves together both pagan and Judaeo-Christian sources; so that (3) he might win a hearing from both his imperial and ecclesiastical audience.

Keywords: Athenagoras, Prophets, Inspiration, Philo, Plato, Ecstasy, Justin Martyr, Spirit

In 1928, Arthur D. Nock penned his classic essay, Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background. There, in his opening pages, he oriented his reader to the challenges faced by Christianity as it moved from Palestine into the rest of the world.

*Corresponding author: D. Jeffrey Bingham, Southwestern Theological Seminary, 2001 West Seminary Drive, Fort Worth, TX 76115, United States, e-mail: [email protected] 212 D. Jeffrey Bingham

In spreading from this well-prepared ground [of Judaism] the Christian movement encoun- tered new tasks. It faced a world which did not know Judaism or which hated and despised it, a world which was unacquainted with the prophets and familiar with cults not pretend- ing to exclusiveness, with mysteries not always requiring a moral standard of their devo- tees, with an unchangeable and unmoral order of destiny determined, or at least indicated, by the stars, with magic of various kinds.1

Early Christians certainly had to make their way into a world that was not familiar with the Jewish prophets. They did not move, however, into a culture that was a tabula rasa in regard to the question of prophets. The world into which they migrated was well acquainted with prophets and prophecy.2 This meant that their missionary efforts and their defensive posture would need to establish grounds for their particular view of prophecy, a task that would involve both apologetic and polemic. My interest here is to study how early Christians went about the task of introducing their concept of the Old Testament prophets to an audience that embraced different perspectives on prophecy. This will, of course, include the related idea of inspiration. Within the New Testament and the second century before Irenaeus and Theophilus, several texts relating the two concerns come to mind. We will interact with some of these below.3 Our focus here is Athenagoras of Athens.4 Two passages from his Legatio pro Christianis, 7,3 and 9,1, are central to our interest:

We, however, have prophets (προφήτης) as witnesses of what we think and believe. They have spoken by the inspiration (ἔνθεος) of a divine Spirit (πνεῦμα) about God and the things of God. And you, who excel others in wisdom and in piety toward the true Divinity, would

1 Arthur D. Nock, Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background (Harper torch- books 111; New York: Harper and Row, 1964), 3. The essay first appeared in Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation (ed. Alfred E. J. Rawlinson; London: Longmans, Green, 1928), 51–156. 2 Cf. Nock, Early Gentile Christianity and Its Hellenistic Background (see note 1), 88. 3 Cf. 2 Tim 3:16; 1 Pet 1:10–12; 2 Pet 1:20–21; Rev 22:6; Ignatius, Epistula ad Magnesios 8,2; 9,2 (ed. and trans. Andreas Lindemann and Henning Paulsen, Die Apostolischen Väter: Griechisch- deutsche Parallelausgabe [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992], 194,26–196,2; 196,8–10); Epistula ad Philadelphios 5,2 (ed. and trans. Lindemann and Henning, Die Apostolischen Väter [see above], 220,15–20); Justin, 1 Apologia 31,1; 33,2.9; 36; 37,9; 53,6 (PTS 38, 76,1–6; 80,4–7; 81,31–33; 84,1–12; 85,17–18; 107,23–26 Marcovich); Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo 7,1–2; 32,2–3; 48,4; 115,3 (PTS 47, 82,3–83,14; 122,14–23; 149,22–25; 268,18–22 Marcovich). 4 The critical editions consulted include Bernard Pouderon, ed., annot. and trans., Athénagore: Supplique au sujet des chrétiens et sur la résurrection des morts: Introduction, texte et traduction (SC 379; Paris: Cerf, 1992); Miroslav Marcovich, ed., Athenagoras: Legatio pro Christianis (PTS 31; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1990); William R. Schoedel, ed. and trans., Athenagoras: Legatio and De resurrectione (OECT; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972). “We Have the Prophets” 213

admit that it would be absurd for us to abandon our belief in the Spirit (πνεῦμα) of God, which moved (κινέω) the mouths of the prophets (προφήτης) like instruments (ὄργανον), and to pay attention to human opinions.5

If we were content with such considerations, one could imagine that our doctrine was human. But the voices of the prophets (προφήτης) confirm our arguments (λογισμός). And I suppose that you, who are so curious and so learned, are not without knowledge of Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah, and the other prophets (προφήτης). Who, in accordance with the ecstasy (ἔκστασις) of their reason (λογισμός), as the divine Spirit (πνεῦμα) moved (κινέω) them, proclaimed the things that they were inspired (ἐνεργέω) to say, the Spirit (πνεῦμα) using them just as a piper (αὐλητής) blows (ἐμπνέω) into a pipe (αὐλός).6

Previous scholarship on these two passages has largely taken two paths. First, it has either noted Athenagoras’s contrast between the philosophers and prophets on the basis of the means of their inspiration or described the commonality between them. The philosophers, Abraham Malherbe noted, were moved only by the divine breath (πνοή), while the prophets were informed by the divine Spirit (πνεῦμα).7 David Rankin, on the other hand, argues that by “breath,” Athenago- ras “obviously means the Spirit.”8 The philosophers and prophets, in different measure, both receive knowledge of God from the same Spirit. Second, scholarship has been quick to assert the classical and Hellenistic background for Athena- goras’s concept of inspiration and the prophets. The favored sources are Plato, Philo, and Plutarch. Malherbe, for instance, claims that the apologist described the prophets in “general hellenistic terms” and “in terms customary among philosophers.”9 Leslie W. Barnard locates the original source for Athenagoras’s

5 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3 (SC 379, 92,17–94,23 Pouderon): ῾Ημεῖς δὲ ὧν νοοῦμεν καὶ πεπιστεύκαμεν ἔχομεν προφήτας μάρτυρας, οἳ πνεύματι ἐνθέῳ ἐκπεφωνήκασι καὶ περὶ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ περὶ τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ. Εἴποιτε δ’ ἂν καὶ ὑμεῖς συνέσει καὶ τῇ περὶ τὸ ὄντως θεῖον εὐσεβείᾳ τοὺς ἄλλους προὔχοντες ὡς ἔστιν ἄλογον παραλιπόντας πιστεύειν τῷ παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεύματι ὡς ὄργανα κεκινηκότι τὰ τῶν προφητῶν στόματα, προσέχειν δόξαις ἀνθρωπίναις. 6 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 (98,1–10 P.): Εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐννοίαις ἀπηρκούμεθα, ἀνθρωπικὸν ἄν τις εἶναι τὸν καθ’ ἡμᾶς ἐνόμιζεν λόγον· ἐπεὶ δὲ αἱ φωναὶ τῶν προφητῶν πιστοῦσιν ἡμῶν τοὺς λογισμούς—νομίζω <δὲ> καὶ ὑμᾶς φιλομαθεστάτους καὶ ἐπιστημονεστάτους ὄντας οὐκ ἀνοήτους γεγονέναι οὔτε τῶν Μωσέως οὔτε τῶν Ἠσαΐου καὶ Ἱερεμίου καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν προφητῶν, οἳ κατ’ ἔκστασιν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς λογισμῶν, κινήσαντος αὐτοὺς τοῦ θείου πνεύματος, ἃ ἐνηργοῦντο ἐξεφώνησαν, συγχρησαμένου τοῦ πνεύματος, ὡς εἰ καὶ αὐλητὴς αὐλὸν ἐμπνεύσαι. 7 Abraham J. Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers,” in Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten 1 (ed. Patrick Granfield and Josef A. Jungman; Münster: Aschendorff, 1970), (214–225) 222. 8 David I. Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 29, 79, 137. 9 Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers” (see note 7), 222. 214 D. Jeffrey Bingham musical image concerning the prophets in a different Platonic metaphor concerning the philosophers.10 Joseph Crehan argues for indebtedness to Philo to “some extent,”11 but also allows for independence. Johannes Geffcken, citing Plato, had already set forth the thesis that for Athenagoras, the prophets (μάντις), in ecstasy under inspiration, were merely God’s passive, ignorant instruments. Here he saw a thoroughgoing Hellenism.12 Readers have appealed to three specific sets of similarities that Athenagoras had with classical Greek and Hellenistic material. Malherbe showed a Philonic similarity with Athenagoras’s language that differentiates philosophers from prophets on their association with divine breath (πνοή) or Spirit (πνεῦμα).13 Many argue that his language and thought concerning spiritual inspiration and ecstasy has parallels with Plato, Philo, and Plutarch.14

10 Cf. Leslie W. Barnard, “The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras,” in Epektasis: Mélanges patristiques offerts au Cardinal Jean Daniélou (ed. Jacques Fontaine and Charles Kannengiesser; Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), (3–16) 15 (note 48); eadem, Athenagoras: A Study in Second Century Christian Apologetic (Théologie historique 18; Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 77 (note 16); eadem, “Athenagoras and the Biblical Tradition,” in Studia Evangelica 6: Papers presented to the Fourth International Congress on New Testament Studies held at Oxford 1969 (ed. Elizabeth A. Livingstone; TU 112; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1973), (1–7) 5 (note 4). 11 Joseph H. Crehan, trans. and annot., Athenagoras: Embassy for the Christians and The Resur- rection of the Dead (Ancient Christian Writers 23; New York: Paulist, 1956), 132 (note 53). 12 Cf. Johannes Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (Leipzig: Teubner, 1907), 180. 13 Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers” (see note 7), 222. Cf. τοῦ θεοῦ πνοῆς and πνεύματι ἐνθέω (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,2.3 [92,11.18 P.]) with πνοῆς and πνεῦμα (Philo, Legum allegoriae 1,13,42 [ed. Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland, Philonis Alexan- drini opera quae supersunt 1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1896), 71,10–11] where Philo uses the terms not in relation to the difference between philosophers and prophets, but in regard to Moses’s account of the creation of humanity). 14 Cf. Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (see note 12), 177; Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers” (see note 7), 222; Marcovich, Athenagoras: Legatio (see note 4), 34; Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (see note 8), 96. Geffcken specifically points to Plato, Menon 99c, as the parallel for Athenagoras’s “Hellenistic” concept of the inspired, ignorant, passive prophet (μάντις). I treat Menon 99c below. Cf. προφήτας . . . πνεύματι ἐνθέῳ (Athe nagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3 [92,18 P.]) with προφητῶν . . . ἐνθέου πνεύματος (Philo, De decalogo 175 [ed. Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland, Philonis Alexandrini opera quae supersunt 4 (Berlin: Reimer, 1902), 307,2–3]) where Philo uses the phrase in relation to the prophets and particularly Moses who was inspired to deliver the laws by mouth. Cf. also πνεῦμα . . . ἐπιπνέουσα θεοῦ δύναμις . . . ἐνθέου (Philo, De decalogo 33–35 [276,8.14.18 C./W.; cf. 276,3–19 C./W.]). Here, God’s breath or Spirit empowers Moses to speak and inspires his hearers. See, too, ἐνθέου . . . προφήτης . . . ἐνθουσιᾷ . . . ἀγνοίᾳ . . . μετανισταμένου μὲν τοῦ λογισμοῦ . . . θείου πνεύματος . . . ὀργανοποιίαν (Philo, De specialibus legibus 4,48–49 [ed. Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland, Phil- onis Alexandrini opera 5 (Berlin: Reimer, 1906), 219,21–220,3]). This Philonic parallel has several significant features: the inspiration of the prophet by the divine Spirit, the Spirit’s prompting “We Have the Prophets” 215

And, finally, scholars point to parallels with Philo and Plutarch concerning his metaphor of the prophets as musical instruments and even identify a different Platonic metaphor as the source of Athenagoras’s image.15 Scholarship on the background of Athenagoras’s idea of prophets and inspiration has not moved beyond these earlier studies. While scholars have written several treatments on prophets and prophecy in early Christian contexts over the last forty years and have offered advanced reexamination of prophecy in the classical and Hellenistic periods, they have not readdressed the question of prophets in Athenagoras.16 Specifically, there has been no attempt to reassess the conclu-

of all the prophet’s words as his own, the inspired prophet’s loss of reason, and the metaphor of the prophet as an instrument made to be played by the Spirit. Cf. ἔκστασιν τῶν . . . λογισμῶν (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 [98,7 P.]) with ἐκστάσει λογισμοῦ (Philo, De vita contemplativa 5,40 [ed. Leopold Cohn and Friedrich Reiter, Philonis Alexandrini opera 6 (Berlin: Reimer, 1915), 56,16–57,1]). This parallelism, however, does not have Philo using the language in positive description of the Jewish prophets, but rather of pagan banquets. Cf. ἔκστασιν τῶν . . . λογισμῶν (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 [98,7 P.]) with ἔκστασιν τῶν λογισμῶν (Plutarch, Solon 8,1 [ed. Konrat Ziegler and Hans Gärtner, Plutarchi vitae parallelae 1,1 [5th ed; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1957], 90,8). Plutarch uses the phrase not to describe the prophets, but the feint of Solon who pretends to be out of his mind. 15 Cf. Schoedel, Athenagoras (see note 4), 21 (note 9.1); Crehan, Athenagoras (see note 11), 132 (note 53); Barnard, “The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” (see note 10), 15 (note 48); eadem, Athenagoras: A Study in Second Century Christian Apologetic (see note 10), 77 (note 16); eadem, “Athenagoras and the Biblical Tradition” (see note 10), 5 (note 4); Marcovich, Athenagoras: Legatio (see note 4), 35; Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers” (see note 7), 222; Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (see note 12), 177, 180 (note 1); Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (see note 8), 96. Cf. ὄργανον in both Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3 (94,22 P.) and Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 259; 264–266 (ed. Paul Wendland, Philonis Alexandrini opera 3 [Berlin: Reimer, 1898], 59,11–16; 60,11–61,6). In Philo, God plays the prophet as a stringed instrument, not as the pipe of Athenagoras (Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 [98,9 P.]). Philo also uses ὄργανον to refer to the vocal organs of the prophets that God uses to speak his message forth (De specialibus legibus 1,65 [16,19 C.]; Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 264–266 [61,3 W.; cf. 60,11–61,6 W.]). Finally, Philo writes of how God purifies the sage’s soul, an instrument (ὄργανον), by perfectly playing it as a lyre (Quod deus sit immutabilis 24–25 [ed. Paul Wendland, Philonis Alexandrini opera 2 (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), 61,9–18]). In this case, the issue is not prophetic inspiration, and the instrument, again, is stringed. In regard to the musical metaphor, Plutarch (De defectu oraculorum 436 f [ed. Wilhelm Sieveking, Plutarchi Moralia 3 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1929; new print 2010), 118,24–119,1]), like Philo, describes the prophet’s soul as an instrument that the spirit of inspiration plucks with a plectrum or plays with another implement (ὄργανον). Neither Philo nor Plutarch describes the prophet as a flute/pipe. 16 Cf., e. g., Ben Witherington III, Jesus the Seer: The Progress of Prophecy (Minneapolis: For- tress, 2014); Joseph Verheyden, Korinna Zamfir, and Tobias Nicklas, ed., Prophets and Prophecy in Jewish and Early Christian Literature: International Conference on “Prophets and Prophecy in the Old and the New Testament” Held in October 2006 and Organized by the Centre for Biblical 216 D. Jeffrey Bingham sions of Geffcken, Malherbe, and Barnard as well as those who simply repeat the parallels in the Greek literature and go no further. Even Rankin, in the most recent monograph on Athenagoras (2009), notes the Philonic parallels, but without new commentary.17 Such a reassessment is warranted on three grounds. First, Greek thought on poets, prophets and inspiration was more varied than is sometimes acknowledged. Second, recent scholarship on prophecy in early Christianity has opened new doors to our understanding of prophecy in the setting of Athenago- ras. Third, in Athenagoras we have an example of the early Christian attempt to form and present a Christian concept of the Old Testament prophet in a Gentile world. The language and concepts in these two passages are carefully thought out, reflective of received tradition, and polemically contrived. Athenagoras has crafted his words conscious of both his own religious convention and the Greco- Roman context. At one and the same time he demonstrates lexical and conceptual difference with his pagan milieu, appreciation for elements of its metaphors,

Studies of the Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj (WUNT II 286; Tubingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010); William Tabbernee, False Prophecy and Polluted Sacraments: Ecclesiastical and Imperial Reactions to Montanism (VCS 84; Leiden: Brill, 2007); David E. Aune, Apocalypticism, Prophecy and Magic in Early Christianity: Collected Essays (WUNT 199; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2006); idem, Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1983); Rex D. Butler, The New Prophecy and New Visions: Evidence of Montanism in the Passion of Perpetua and Felicitas (Patristic Monograph Series 18; Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2006); Laura S. Nasrallah, An Ecstasy of Folly: Prophecy and Authority in Early Christianity (Har- vard Theological Studies 52; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Alistair Stew- art-Sykes, From Prophecy to Preaching: A Search for the Origins of the Christian Homily (VCS 59; Leiden: Brill, 2001); Christine Tevett, Montanism: Gender, Authority and the New Prophecy (Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Christopher Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (WUNT II 75; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995); Jan Fekkes, Isaiah and Prophetic Traditions in the Book of Revelation: Visionary Antecedents and Their Development (Journal for the Study of the New Testament, Supplement Series 93; Sheffield: JSOT, 1994); Helmut Merklein, “Der Theologe als Prophet: Zur Funktion prophetischen Redens im theologischen Diskurs des Paulus,” New Testament Studies 38 (1992): 402–429; Terrance Callan, “Prophecy and Ecstasy in Greco-Roman Religion and in 1 Corinthians,” Novum Testamentum 27 (1985): 125–140; M. Eugene Boring, Sayings of the Risen Jesus: Christian Prophecy in the Synop- tic Tradition (Society for New Testament Studies, Monograph Series 46; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Pier C. Bori, “L’estasi del profeta: Ascensio Isaiae 6 e l’antico profetismo cristiano,” Cristianesimo della Storia 1 (1980): 367–389; E. Earle Ellis, Prophecy and Hermeneutic in Early Christianity: New Testament Essays (WUNT 18; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1978); Johannes T. Panagopoulos, ed., Prophetic Vocation in the New Testament and Today (Novum Testamentum, Supplements 45; Leiden: Brill, 1977); James L. Ash, “The Decline of Ecstatic Prophecy in the Early Church,” Theological Studies 37 (1976): 227–252. 17 Cf. Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (see note 8). “We Have the Prophets” 217 and faithfulness to his Judaeo-Christian heritage. Before we can appreciate his genius fully, we need to examine the perspectives of his pagan context on prophets and inspiration.

1 Poets, Prophets, and Inspiration in Plato

Poets and prophets in Greece, though largely revered, did not receive universal approval. Poetry, as one of the arts (alongside dance and music) presided over by the Muses, was central to communal life.18 Education, aimed toward being a good citizen, included learning good poetry, especially Homer, by heart in school for it provided exemplary models for ethical instruction. Cultural values were also passed on as citizens participated in poetry through choral singing and rhap- sodic recitation at festivals and as interpretation of poetry was taught in sophistic methods. Nevertheless, Plato finds some fault.19 Poetry, Socrates says, “feeds and waters” (τρέφει . . . ἄρδουσα)20 the passions instead of leaving them to whither, deceives by substituting appearance for reality, and cripples rational thought. This leads to the implantation of an “evil constitution” (κακὴν πολιτείαν)21 in the soul and the destruction of its civilized aspect. It is imitative or tragic poetry that he has in mind here in the tenth book of The Republic. Such poetry threatens not only those predisposed to corruption, but also the good. Unlike other poetry that might eulogize the virtues of exemplary figures or sing to the gods, imitative poetry incites the emotions and passions, the irrational, senseless aspect of the soul, rather than the best, thoughtful, rational part of the soul.22

18 Cf. Plato, Protagoras 325e-326b; 338e7–339a3; Leges 658d; 764d-e; 810e-811a; Ion 535e4–6; Aristophanes, Ranae 727–729 (SCBO Aristophanis Fabulae 2, 167 Wilson). Cf. Penelope Murray, Plato on Poetry: Ion, Res publica 376e-398b9, 595–608b10 (Cambridge Greek and Latin Classics; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 15–19. 19 His critique, however, leaves room for the value of the “well-educated poet in his Republic” (Susan B. Levin, The Ancient Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry Revisited: Plato and the Greek Literary Tradition [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001], 126). 20 Plato, Res publica 606d. See Jessica Moss’s thorough analysis of the negative aspect of imitative poetry in Plato, Republic, book 10: “What Is Imitative Poetry and Why Is It Bad?,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic (ed. Giovanni R. F. Ferrari; Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press, 2007), 415–444. Cf. Nickolas Pappas, “Plato on Poetry: Imitation or Inspiration?,” Philosophy Compass 7 (2012): 669–678. 21 Plato, Res publica 605b. 22 Cf. Plato, Res publica 603b-608b. Murray, Plato on Poetry (see note 18), 19–24. 218 D. Jeffrey Bingham

In another place, Plato extends his critique of the poet introducing the connection between inspiration and imitative poetry.23 In short, the problem is that poetry reproduces the Muse’s words in a flawed manner.24 The inspired poet is like a fountain that allows water to rush upwards and spray forth in an uncontrolled way. The problem is not with the inspiration, not with the words that come to him from the gods. Instead, the problem is with the poet’s art. Composing imitative poetry involves presenting characters opposed to each other with contradictory opinions. The poet receives truth from the gods, but in composition he presents their revelation without discretion, in a mindless manner, spraying it forth so that his material is full of inconsistencies and propositions that are incompatible with each other. He ends up contradicting himself. Although the revelation is trustworthy, for the gods are infallible and do not lie, the poetic discourse contains error.25 The poet is a flawed medium for the transmission of divine words. Inspi- ration, in later Greek thought, did not guarantee truth. The god’s participation was not such that it superintended the process so that the poet’s translation and transmission of the divine words would be without contradiction. Inspiration was no guardian of a poet’s wisdom or technical skill for Plato either. In the Apology, Socrates disparages poets.26 They compose their poems by means of nature (φύσις) and inspiration (ἐνθουσιάζω), like the prophets, rather than by wisdom (σοφία), or, we might supply, craft, “expert knowledge” (τέχνη).27 The opposition of nature, or instinct, and inspiration to wisdom indicates that poets have no rational explanation or grounds for their poetry.28 It is not produced by cognitive or intellectual means. This lacuna results in the absence of hermeneutical skill and they are unable to provide a rational, coherent explanation of the meaning of their compositions. The poet cannot be both inspired and an interpreter.29 Although the divine touches them, they fall short of being

23 Cf. Plato, Leges 719c-d. 24 Cf. Catherine Collobert, “Poetry as Flawed Reproduction: Possession and Mimesis,” in Plato and the Poets (ed. Pierre Destrée and Fritz-Gregor Herrmann; Mnemosyne, Supplements 328; Lei- den: Brill, 2011), (41–62) 47–49. 25 Cf. Plato, Leges 669c; Res publica 382e. 26 Cf. Plato, Apologia 22c. 27 Charles H. Kahn, “Plato’s Ion and the Problem of Techne,” in Nomodeiktes: Greek Studies in Honor of Martin Ostwald (ed. Ralph M. Rosen and Joseph Farrell; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1993), (369–378) 370. The current context doesn’t have τέχνη, but the parallel with Plato, Ion 533e, is noteworthy. There, inspiration and craft are mutually exclusive (Collob- ert, “Poetry as Flawed Reproduction” [see note 24], 45). 28 Paul A. Miller and Charles Platter, Plato’s Apology of Socrates: A Commentary (Mnemosyne, Supplements 137; Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 51. 29 Collobert, “Poetry as Flawed Reproduction” (see note 24), 45. “We Have the Prophets” 219 wise, skilled in their art, or adept in craft. They should not be numbered among σοφοί.30 Others also suffered from similar criticism at the hands of Plato. He characterized both politicians and prophets (θεόμαντις; μάντις) as inspired (ἐνθουσιάζω; ἐπίπνους), divine (θεῖος) and possessed by god.31 However, due to such inspiration their words did not originate from their own wisdom (σοφία), they did not speak well or true because they were wise (σοφός) and they had no knowledge of what they said. Divine possession results in prophetic passivity and mind- lessness.32 Again, Socrates teaches the “ignorance of inspired people.”33 The passage discussed above from the Apology similarly places poet and prophet side by side. Both prophets (θεόμαντις) and poets were inspired (ἐνθουσιάζω). But although the prophets speak beautiful words, they have no knowledge of what they say.34 Like the poets of the Laws, prophets too are flawed though the revelation is trustworthy. The association of poet, prophet (μάντις) and the prophetess (προφῆτις) at Delphi along these lines is also found in Ion and Phaedrus.35 As inspired (ἔνθεος), as those who have a divine μανία, they are enabled to speak lovely, beneficial things, not by art (τέχνη), but only by divine providence and empowerment. Divine act renders them mindless and passive while god alone, through them, serves as composer and speaker of blessed, beneficial words. With the poet or prophet left without skill under inspiration, one finds it easy to understand, as Eric R. Dodds puts it, that the divine mania was viewed as “a real intru- sion of the supernatural into human life.”36 Socrates minces no words. The poet or prophet who aspires to compose virtuous material by expert skill (τέχνη) fails. Poetry composed without divine mania, by those of sound mind, is transitory when compared to the compositions of the inspired ones. Unable to give account of their compositions or proclamations prophets and poets simply channel and manipulate the words of the deity.37 The final portrayal is not overly flattering,

30 Miller and Platter, Plato’s Apology of Socrates: A Commentary (see note 28), 51; Kahn, “Plato’s Ion and the Problem of Techne” (see note 27), 371–373; Murray, Plato on Poetry (see note 18), 10. Cf. φρονέω in Plato, Menon 99c. 31 Cf. Plato, Menon 99c-d. 32 Cf. Plato, Ion 534a-b. 33 Murray, Plato on Poetry (see note 18), 236. Note, however, the irony in this passage (Richard S. Bluck, ed., Plato’s Meno [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961], 38–39). 34 Cf. Plato, Apologia 22c. 35 Cf. Plato, Ion 534b-d; Phaedrus 244a-245b. 36 Eric R. Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (Sather Classical Lectures 25; Berkeley: Univer- sity of California Press, 1951), 217. 37 Cf. Murray, Plato on Poetry (see note 18), 12. 220 D. Jeffrey Bingham and in light of Plato’s vision for reason itself as divine, grows even less appealing. In one sense, he might even perceive the divinely inspired as godless. For while Plato

accepted (with whatever ironical reservations) the poet, the prophet, and the “Corybantic” as being in some sense channels of divine or daemonic grace, he nevertheless rated their activities far below those of the rational self, and held that they must be subject to the control and criticism of reason, since reason was for him no passive plaything of hidden forces, but an active manifestation of deity in man, a daemon in its own right.38

In the texts reviewed, Plato does not provide us with his doctrines of poets, prophets or inspiration.39 We are, nevertheless, able to construct a perspective regarding the connections between these three that was known to the second-century contexts addressed by Athenagoras. Concerning the poet and the prophet, we are able to say that at best, under inspiration, they function as agents of virtuous, enduring, divine discourse.40 At worst, they are artless, mindless, ignorant, flawed, composers of contradictions. Such a perspective could generate skepticism regarding the trustworthiness of prophetic compositions, while at the same time foster confidence in the divine origin of a prophecy. Plato’s theory of inspiration, seen from the texts discussed here, does not provide for an infallible bridge between the prophet’s reception of the divine discourse and the prophet’s pronouncement or publication.

2 Poets and Inspiration in Early Greece

However, some in early Greece viewed the relationship of poets and prophets to inspiration a bit differently. For them, inspiration did not leave the poet unconscious, a passive instrument of the deity.41 Rather, the relationship involved both dependence and intellect. Poets received revelation and mindfully participated in composition; under inspiration they did not lose their standpoint, but made a rational contribution.42 They served as messengers of the deity, both interpreting

38 Dodds, The Greeks and the Irrational (see note 36), 218. 39 Cf. Rosemary M. Harriott, Poetry and Criticism before Plato (London: Methuen, 1969), 82. 40 Plato does portray the poet in a positive light at times. For a brief discussion of such images see, Harriott, Poetry and Criticism before Plato (see note 39), 84–85. 41 Contra Georges M. A. Grube, The Greek and Roman Critics (London: Methuen, 1965), 2: Homer “speaks as if the poet were but a passive instrument.” 42 Cf. Eike Barmeyer, Die Musen: ein Beitrag zur Inspirationstheorie (Humanistische Biblio- thek 1,2; München: Fink, 1968), 102. “We Have the Prophets” 221 and proclaiming the revealed message.43 The poet received a revelation, poetry was certainly “first born and bred in heaven,” but then with skill, technique, and craft, he created a poem.44 Poetry was both a divine and sober human enterprise.45 In early Greece, divine gift and human invention coincide.46 On this note we hear Alcinous speak of the poet, the “divine minstrel” (θεῖον ἀοιδόν),47 Demoducos, in this way: “for to him above all others has the god granted skill in song, to give delight in whatever way his spirit prompts him to sing.”48 Here, the poet’s spirit (θυμός) engenders his song. Elsewhere, it is the movement of his mind or heart (νόος).49 Pindar, likewise, bears witness to the relationship between deity and poet. “The Muse stood beside me,” he sings, “as I found (εὑρίσκω) a newly shining way to join to Dorian measure a voice of splendid celebration.”50 The Muse is an inspiring presence, but apparently only in an auxiliary capacity, one that promotes almost an autonomous poetic spirit. It is the poet himself

43 See the texts from Homer and Pindar, as well as discussion, in Penelope Murray, “Poetic In- spiration in Early Greece,” The Journal of Hellenic Studies 101 (1981): (87–100) 96–98 and Eugène N. Tigerstedt, “Furor Poeticus: Poetic Inspiration in Greek Literature before Democritus and Plato,” Journal of the History of Ideas 31 (1970): 163–178. 44 On poetry as a craft cf. Murray, “Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece” (see note 43), 98–99; Alice Sperduti, “The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity,” Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association 81 (1950): (209–240) 213. 45 Contra Manfred Fuhrmann, Einführung in die antike Dichtungstheorie (Darmstadt: Wissen- schaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1973), 73–74: “Verzückung, Wahnsinn, Entrückung oder Rausch, als ein Heraustreten des Dichters aus sich selbst (Ekstase), als ein Erfülltsein durch den Gott (Enthusiasmus).” 46 Cf. Willem J. Verdenius, Commentaries on Pindar 1: Olympian Odes 3, 7, 12, 14 (Mnemosyne, Supplements 97; Leiden: Brill, 1987), 11. 47 Homer, Odyssea 8,43. 48 Homer, Odyssea 8,44–45: τῷ γάρ ῥα θεὸς πέρι δῶκεν ἀοιδὴν τέρπειν, ὅππῃ θυμὸς ἐποτρύνῃσιν ἀείδειν. (trans. August T. Murray, rev. George E. Dimock, Homer Odyssey 1: Books 1–12 [Loeb Clas- sical Library 104; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998], 274–275). 49 Homer, Odyssea 1,346–347. 50 Pindar, Olympia Oda 3,4–6 (BSGRT Pindari Carmina cum Fragmentis 1, 12,6–9 Snell/Maehler; trans. William H. Race, Pindar 1: Pindar, Olympian Odes, Pythian Odes [Loeb Classical Library 56; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997], 78–79): Μοῖσα δ᾿οὕτω ποι παρέστα μοι νεοσίγαλον εὑρόντι τρόπον Δωρίῳ φωνὰν ἐναρμόξαι πεδίλῳ ἀγλαόκωμον. Cf. Lucia Prauscello, “Epinician Sounds: Pindar and Musical Innovation,” in Reading the Victory Ode (ed. Peter Agócs, Chris Carey, and Richard Rawles; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), (58–82) 77–79; Wil- lem J. Verdenius, “The Principles of Literary Criticism,” Mnemosyne 36 (1983): (14–59) 54–55 (note 187); idem, Commentaries on Pindar (see note 46), 12; Charles A. M. Fennell, ed. and annot., Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1879), 28; Basil L. Gildersleeve, “Introductory Essay,” in idem, ed. and annot., Pindar: The Olympian and Pythian Odes (New York: Harper, 1892), (vii-cxv) lxxiv-lxxvi. 222 D. Jeffrey Bingham who through his own skill produces a poem by an original coupling of lyric and Doric meter and/or melody. Simonides conveys the same weakened notion of the deity’s role in inspired poetic composition. In fragment 11,21 (W), he calls upon the Muse as simply his helper, ally or auxiliary (ἐπίκουρος).51 Contrary to what Plato would express, the implication is that the poet is self-sufficient in poetic composition.52 Plato also wished to make clear that inspiration and composition provided multiple opportunities for error. Earlier Greeks, on the other hand, understood inspiration to guard a poem’s truth.53 Hesiod writes, for instance, of the sweet- ness of the poetry that he sings by virtue of the Muses’ blessing of inspiration: “that man is blessed, whomever the Muses love, for the speech flows sweet from his mouth.”54 The gift they give to the poet is transformative. It takes away his sorrow and anguish and leaves him with a lovely song that glorifies the gods.55 This resonates with Hesiod’s proem.56 There, the Muses have just announced that they know to speak true (ἀληθής) things. Then, Hesiod tells us, “they breathed (ἐμπνέω) a divine (θέσπις) voice into me, so that I might glorify what will be and what was before.”57 In this way, by linking the true revelation of the goddesses with his glorifying speech, he introduces the infallibility of his whole poem.58

51 Simonides, Fragmentum 11,21 (ed. Martin L. West, Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum can- tati 2 [2d ed.; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992], 119). 52 Cf. Eva Stehle, “A Bard of the Iron Age and His Auxiliary Muse,” in The New Simonides: Con- texts of Praise and Desire (ed. Deborah D. Boedeker and David Sider; New York: Oxford Univer- sity Press, 2001), (106–119) 107; Prauscello, “Epinician Sounds: Pindar and Musical Innovation” (see note 50), 78; Benjamin Acosta-Hughes, Arion’s Lyre: Archaic Lyric into Hellenistic Poetry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 194–195; Deborah Boedeker, “Simonides on Pla- taea: Narrative Elegy, Mythodic History,” Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik 107 (1995): (217–229) 221; Eva Stehle, “Help Me to Sing, Muse, of Plataea,” Arethusa 29 (1996): (205–222) 2 07–2 10. 53 See the texts from Homer, Hesiod, and Pindar on truth in inspired poetry, as well as discussion, in Murray, “Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece” (see note 43), 90–92. 54 Hesiod, Theogonia 96–97 (SCBO Hesiodi Theogonia, Opera et dies, Scutum, 9 Solmsen/Merkel- bach; trans. Glenn W. Most, Hesiod 1: Hesiod: Theogony, Works and Days, Testimonia [Loeb Clas- sical Library 57; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006], 10–11): ὁ δ᾿ ὄλβιος, ὅντινα Μοῦσαι φίλωνται· γλυκερή οἱ ἀπὸ στόματος ῥέει αὐδή. 55 Cf. Hesiod, Theogonia 98–103 (9 S./M.). 56 Cf. Hesiod, Theogonia 22–34 (6 S./M.). 57 Hesiod, Theogonia 31–32 (6 S./M.; trans. 5 M.): θηητόν· ἐνέπνευσαν δέ μοι αὐδὴν θέσπιν, ἵνα κλείοιμι τά τ᾿ ἐσσόμενα πρό τ᾿ ἐόντα. 58 Cf. Murray, “Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece” (see note 43), 91. “We Have the Prophets” 223

Pindar, on the same theme, declared that he would not soil his poem with a lie.59 Instead, with the aid of the Muse, he would bear true witness.60 Early Greek conceptions of inspiration differed, then, from those that Plato would later set forth. Inspiration was not understood, in the main, to place the poet into a state of unconscious passivity. Instead, by his own spirit and mind, he composed his song with the aid of the deity in such a way that the song con- veyed truth. Plato shared with his predecessors the belief that the revelation given by the gods was true. The earlier poets expressed a confidence, however, in the capacity of their poems to relate the truth revealed. And, it is the gods, by their blessing and gift that help them compose their sweet, glorifying, infallible verse. We have taken effort to review the question of inspiration in Greek poetry for three reasons: First, much Greek reflection on the question of the gods and inspiration takes place in contexts concerning the poet. Second, as has been seen above, the accounts, at times, treat the topic of inspiration in light of both poet and prophet together. Third, as Alice Sperduti shows, the “belief in the divine origin of poetry emerges for the historical period under the more refined concept of divine inspiration, whose annals properly begin in the sphere of prophecy.”61 To this point, when our texts have addressed the inspired prophet in conjunction with the poet, the Greek term has been μάντις. It is necessary that we also gain some insight into how the Greeks understood prophet as προφήτης. What differences and similarities did the two terms communicate? Such clarity will aid our interpretation of Athenagoras as we reassess his relationship to Hellenism. We will see that in the classical and Hellenistic periods, in the main, προφήτης carried a different meaning than it did for Athenagoras. Whatever the apologist does, he does not simply adopt the predominant meaning the term had for his Greek setting.

3 Προφήτης and Μάντις in Greek Thought

Christopher Forbes, against the theses of Eugene Boring and Terrance Callan, claims that προφήτης was not employed widely to refer to inspired persons in

59 Cf. Pindar, Olympia Oda 4,17–18 (15,29–30 S./M.). 60 Cf. Pindar, Olympia Oda 6,20–21 (18,35–37 S./M.). Cf. Olympiae Odae 7,20–21; 13,50–52 (24,36– 40; 45,70–72 S./M.). Pindar’s metaphors of weapons that hit their mark may also communicate this point. Cf. Murray, “Poetic Inspiration in Early Greece” (see note 43), 92 (note 31). 61 Sperduti, “The Divine Nature of Poetry in Antiquity” (see note 44), 213. 224 D. Jeffrey Bingham the Hellenistic period.62 He argues, instead, that classical Greece understood the term “prophet” (προφήτης) in three ways. It referred to: (1) a class of officials, not necessarily inspired, who mediated the oracles of others; (2) inspired persons, who received divine oracles and, who, the texts emphasize, proclaimed these oracles; and (3) official spokespersons. In the Hellenistic period, he shows, these three meanings endured, yet with two developments: (1) the application of the term to Egyptian priests of high rank; and (2) the usage of the term by the LXX to .(נבי) translate the Hebrew term nabi In his analysis of the classical period, Forbes argues that the emphasis of the texts is upon the prophet as one who announces the oracle. Although the texts do witness at times to the prophet as an inspired person, the emphasis is upon the prophet as proclaimer. Μάντις and προφήτης are not synonymous. He cites Erich Fascher to explain the difference. The two terms complement each other. “A ‘mantis’ is a seer. If he tells the people these secrets, he is prophet.”63 Forbes’s conclusion concerning the term προφήτης in the Hellenistic period echoes his summary regarding the classical period: “Nothing requires us to believe that inspiration was believed to be a defining quality of προφῆται.”64 Forbes disagrees with Boring and Callan on another point related to our investigation.65 Since they saw in Hellenistic times little difference between the μάντις and προφήτης, they also argued that the manic state, the enthusiasm and frenzy that was sometimes linked with the former was also a characteristic of the latter. Forbes’s summary softens the sharpness of his argument a bit, but still insists on the validity of his basic claim. “Even if,” he writes, “some of the arguments brought forward here are not decisive, it must be clear that the overwhelming majority of usages of the term [προφήτης] have to do with persons who were not inspired or frenzied in any sense.”66 Forbes’s conclusion concerning the Greco-Roman

62 Cf. Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (see note 16), 192–217. 63 Erich Fascher, Prophētēs: eine sprach- und religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Giessen: Töpelmann, 1927), 13. Cited by Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (see note 16), 196. 64 Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (see note 16), 199. 65 Cf. Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (see note 16), 208–214. Boring, Sayings of the Risen Jesus: Christian Prophecy in the Synoptic Tradition (see note 16); Callan, “Prophecy and Ecstasy in Greco-Roman Religion and in 1 Corin- thians” (see note 16). 66 Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (see note 16), 214. “We Have the Prophets” 225 world is similar. Divination in a variety of forms, from astrology to the analysis of entrails, was prophecy’s dominant form, he argues, not “inspiration manticism.”67 One passage in Plato demonstrates that, at least in his mind, the μάντις and προφήτης were distinguished from each other on the basis of frenzy or mania.68 Prophecy did not necessitate frenzy. Timaeus says that prophets (προφήτης), those of sound mind, should judge inspired (ἔνθεος) divinations (μαντεία), for it is not the business of those who are in frenzy (μαίνομαι). However, it should be noted, that in the same passage Timaeus says that some name the prophets diviners (μάντις). Now, granted, he believes these people to be ignorant. Never- theless, in one passage we have witness to two views held simultaneously by two different groups: (1) the prophets (προφήτης) are not associated with a state of frenzy, rather they are of sound mind (ἔμφρων); and (2) prophets (προφήτης) are diviners (μάντις). Forbes’s thesis, I think, is largely correct. The two terms, in both the classical and Hellenistic periods, were not synonymous; prophets proclaimed with soundness of mind, they were not inspired nor frenzied.69 However, some held to the understanding that the two were the same. The lines did cross. There existed fluidity in how the culture viewed prophets. Forbes’s interest is in early Christian prophets and how the Hellenistic environment enlightens our understanding of that phenomenon. My interest is different. I am attempting to decipher how the classical and Hellenistic background may enlighten our understanding of an early Christian’s (Athenagoras) understanding of inspiration and the Jewish prophets. Our reading of Forbes has helped us in two key ways. First, by demonstrating the predominant meaning of προφήτης in the classical and Hellenistic periods he has provided a backdrop against which Athenagoras’s perspective more clearly shows its difference. In most Greek thought προφήτης refers primarily to spokespersons, not to inspired or frenzied persons. In Athenagoras, however, we will see that it refers to an inspired, even ecstatic, but non-frenzied spokesperson of sound mind. Second, although clearly not the main thrust of his argument, he has noted the diversity within Greek thought concerning the prophet. This emphasizes the need for nuance in analysis of the relationship between Greek, Jewish, and early Christian notions of prophets and inspiration.

67 Forbes, Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellenistic Environment (see note 16), 288–302. 68 See Plato, Timaeus 72a-b. Cf. Callan, “Prophecy and Ecstasy in Greco-Roman Religion and in 1 Corinthians” (see note 16), 131. 69 See Forbes on Timaeus 72 in Prophecy and Inspired Speech in Early Christianity and its Hellen- istic Environment (see note 16), 198–199, 208–210. 226 D. Jeffrey Bingham

4 Prophets and Inspiration in Athenagoras of Athens

Having set forth in brief the parameters on the Greek ideas of prophets and inspiration, we can now turn our attention to Athenagoras’s own idea. His term for “prophet” is προφήτης, not μάντις. He names three, Moses, Isaiah, and Jere- miah, yet knows of the rest (λοιπός), and reports their writings as accessible in books (βιβλίον).70 In the Legatio pro Christianis he cites Isaiah four times.71 Three of those citations occur in Legatio pro Christianis 9,2 immediately following one of the passages analyzed here. They provide prophetic witness to the one God’s uniqueness and greatness. Also, probably attributing the words to Jeremiah, Athenagoras cites Baruch in the same catena of prophetic testimony.72 Finally, he seems to allude to Moses four times.73 Significant is the early apologist’s dec- laration that these prophets are the prophets of the Athenian Christian community.74 “We, however” he says, “have prophets.”75 He manifests no interest in the Jewishness of the prophets and this reflects some difference with Justin.76 To him they are Christian prophets.77 Such understanding is ultimately in line with

70 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,1.3 (98,5–6.19 P.). Cf. Justin, 1 Apologia 31 (76,5 M.). 71 Isa 43:10–11; 44:6; 66:1 (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,2 [98,12–18 P.]); Isa 22:13 (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 12,3 [108,14–15 P.]). 72 Bar 3:36 (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,2 [98,11–12 P.]). Cf. Cyprian, Testimonia ad Quirinium 2,6 (CChr.SL 3,1, 35,17–36,20 Weber); Lactantius, Divinae institutiones 4,13,8 (SC 377, 114,30–34 Monat); Bernard Pouderon, “Les citations scripturaires dans l’œuvre d’Athénagore: leurs sources et leur statut,” Vetera Christianorum 31 (1994): (111–153) 112; Sean A. Adams, Baruch and the Epistle of Jeremiah: A Commentary on the Greek Texts of Codex Vaticanus (Septuagint Commentary Series; Leiden: Brill, 2014), 17. 73 Gen 1:13–27 (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 13,2 [112,14–16 P.]); Gen 6:1–4 (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 24,5–6 [164,42–47 P.]); Ex 20:12 (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 32,5 [196,25–26 P.]); Gen 1:27 (Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 33,6 [198,21–22 P.]). Cf. Pouderon, “Les citations scripturaires dans l’œuvre d’Athénagore” (see note 72), 118. 74 Cf. Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (see note 12), 176–177. 75 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3 (92,17–18 P.): ἡμεῖς δὲ . . . ἔχομεν προφήτας. Cf. Ta- tian, Oratio ad Graecos 36,3 (PTS 43, 67 Marcovich): ἡμᾶς προφητῶν—“our prophets.” 76 Cf. Justin, 1 Apologia 31,1 (76,1 M.); Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo 32,2 (122,15 M.). Cf. Aristides, Apologia 2,14 (SC 470, 186–190; 232–234 Pouderon/Pierre/Outtier/Guiorgadzé); Stephen G. Wil- son, Related Strangers: Jews and Christians 70–170 C. E. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1995), 31–32. 77 Wilson (Related Strangers [see note 76], 30) writes that Athenagoras “simply ignores the Jews. For him they seem to be an irrelevance, and they appear in the argument only in the most resid- ual fashion (e. g., via use of their scriptures, though these are now thoroughly christianized).” Cf. Adolf Harnack History of Dogma 2 (trans. Neil Buchanan; London: Williams and Norgate, 1910), 189: “Moreover, it is not to be denied that Athenagoras views the revelation in the prophets and in Christ as completely identical.” “We Have the Prophets” 227 the manner in which early Christians read the prophets. Their lives were understood to be in harmony with Jesus Christ as they foresaw him and waited for him by means of the Spirit.78 They were to be loved for they proclaimed the Gospel as they believed in Christ, hoped in him, waited for him, announced him and partook in the same Spirit as the Apostles.79 In their hermeneutic, these writings predicted Christ and his fulfillment of these promises validated the Christian faith. Demonstrating the coherence between prophet and Jesus was central to early evangelistic technique.80 The faith of Athenagoras’s community, like that of Justin, was grounded in an argument from prophecy. He writes that the prophets are witnesses (μάρτυς) to Christian thought and faith and that they confirm the Christian arguments (λογισμός).81 Such witness and argumentation had begun within a Judaeo-Christian mission.82 The Jewish component of the mission’s iden- tity, however, is not reflected in our apologist’s characterization of the prophets. Athenagoras’s strong appeal to the prophets is in continuity with earlier Christian tradition that emphasized a Christology rooted in the prophets and that was exhibited clearly, for instance, in Justin and Luke.83 But such appeal to the prophets resonates also with his pagan context. The emperor also found it useful to appeal to prophets in order to craft public policy. William Klingshirn and Mark Vessey, informed by David Potter, explain that Christian intellectuals shared with the Greco-Roman milieu a set of assumptions about universal histories. Nations, it was commonly held, had histories that were divinely ordered and orchestrated. Peoples and empires could understand their place in the world, their place in history, by means of divine revelation, in particular the information provided by prophets.84 Because of this commonplace belief that nations were part of a

78 Cf. Ignatius, Epistula ad Magnesios 8–9 (194,24–196,10 L./H.); Justin, 1 Apologia 31,7–8 (77,24– 34 M.); Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo 7 (82,1–84,22 M.). 79 Cf. Ignatius, Epistula ad Philadelphios 5,2 (220,15–20 L./H.); e. g. Justin, Dialogus cum Try phone Judaeo 8,1; 32,3–6; 35,8; 36,1–2; 39,4–5; 43,1–8; 52,1–54,2 (84,2–4; 122,19–123,50; 129,41–43; 130,1–13; 135,16–25; 140,1–142,47; 155,1–159,13 M.). 80 Cf., e. g., Justin, 1 Apologia 23; 31–53 (66,1–13; 76,1–107,39 M.); Dialogus cum Tryphone Ju- daeo 14,8; 17,1 (94,41–47; 97,6–98,7 M.). 81 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3; 9,1 (92,18; 98,3.7 P.). 82 Cf. Oskar Skarsaune, Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr’s Proof-Text Tradition (Novum Testamentum, Supplements 52; Leiden: Brill, 1987), 429. There is insufficient data to say if Athenagoras had disinherited this aspect of the pedigree. 83 Skarsaune, Proof from Prophecy: A Study in Justin Martyr’s Proof-Text Tradition (see note 82), 428. 84 Cf. William Klingshirn and Mark Vessey, “Sacred Histories,” in iidem, ed., The Limits of Ancient Christianity: Essays on Late Antique Thought and Culture in Honor of R. A. Markus (Re- centiores; Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999), (3–5) 3. Emphasis is theirs. They cite 228 D. Jeffrey Bingham divine order in which prophets manifested the particulars of the arrangement, Potter claims that emperors manipulated their subjects by selective appeal to the prophets.85 They exploited the popular faith in prophets in order to concoct a national history that was useful to the emperor’s agenda and trusted by the general public. Therefore, when Athenagoras pivots from the partial reliability of the poets and philosophers in Legatio pro Christianis 7 with, “We, however, have prophets” (ἡμεῖς δὲ . . . ἔχομεν προφήτας), and characterizes their contribution for the emperor as “divine” (θεῖον), from the “Spirit of God” (παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πνεύματι), and superior to “human opinions” (δόξαις ἀνθρωπιναις)86 he is employing a strategy all too familiar to both the imperial court and early Christian apologetics. The emperor would have been sympathetic to the tactic of appealing to prophetic authority and the second-century Christian would have recognized it as part of the received tradition. Athenagoras, then, in his introduction of prophets into his apology, displays loyalty to his Christian tradition and shows himself an astute observer of the Roman Imperial context. What can we discover about his concept of the inspired prophet? Does it reveal a thoroughgoing debt to classical Greece and Hellenism, as indicated by Geffcken, Malherbe and Barnard? Or will we find again association with both his Christian and pagan worlds? Athenagoras’s language for divine inspiration is diverse. He does use a term (ἔνθεος) commonly translated “inspired” or “possessed”87 by God. Above, we observed Plato’s use of the same word for both poetic and prophetic (μαντικός) inspiration.88 Philo also uses the term for prophetic inspiration, and like Athena- goras, he identifies the means of inspiration as the Spirit (πνεῦμα), the fruit as the speech of the prophets (προφήτης), and the prophet Moses, in particular.89 He also understands inspiration as a deliberate action of the Spirit whereby he moves or impels (κινέω) the prophets, particularly their mouths, to speak

David S. Potter, Prophets and Emperors: Human and Divine Authority from Augustus to Theodosius (Revealing antiquity 7; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). 85 Cf. Potter, Prophets and Emperors (see note 84), 146–182. 86 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3 (92,17–18; 94,20.22.23 P.). Cf. Justin, Dialogus cum Try- phone Judaeo 48,4 (149,22–25 M.): Christ taught Christians to have faith in the prophets not in human opinion. Cf. also Justin, 1 Apologia 54 (108,1–109,38 M.), where he contrasts the prophets with the error and demonically inspired myths of the poets. 87 Henry G. Liddell and Robert Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon (9th ed.; revised by Henry S. Jones; Oxford: Clarendon, 1940 [with a rev. supplement 1996]), col. 566b, s.v. ἔνθεος. 88 Cf. Plato, Ion 534a; Phaedrus 244b. 89 Cf. Philo, De decalogo 33–35; 175 (276,8.18; 307,2–3 C./W.); De specialibus legibus 4,48–49 (219,21–22; 220,2 C./W.). “We Have the Prophets” 229 divine opinions as inspired spokespersons. Using the verb twice, once in each of our passages, it apparently serves as his favorite image.90 This conception is not uncommon in early Christian treatments of prophetic inspiration. The same language is used elsewhere in the second century for the ministry of the Word who inspired both Christian and Jewish prophets.91 The New Testament has a parallel term. 2 Pet 1:21, while denying that prophecy arose out of the prophets themselves, affirms that they were carried or moved (φέρω) by the Holy Spirit.92 In his lexical repertoire we find another verb commonly used to convey generic action, but which can more specifically describe divine, supernatural action. Athenagoras employs it in Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 and 10,4 to describe how the Spirit related to the prophets in order to effect their preaching. He influenced, acted upon, inspired (ἐνεργέω) them.93 Justin used the cognate, ἐνέργεια,

90 He uses the term in both Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3 and 9,1 (94,22; 98,7 P.). Cf. Geoffrey W. H. Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (8th ed; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), s.v. κινέω 6: “ref. inspiration of scripture . . . esp. to prophecy.” 91 Cf. Epistula ad Diognetum 11,7–8 (ed. Lindemann and Paulsen, Die Apostolischen Väter [see note 3], 322,4–7); Justin, 1 Apologia 36,1 (84,3 M.). 92 We should also note here a group of related terms for inspiration rooted in the notions of “being carried by the Spirit” or “bearing the Spirit” (depending on accentuation) and “bearing God.” They are not used by Athenagoras, but are present in classical Greek, the LXX, Philo and Justin: πνευματoφόρος; πνευματοφόροι (Hos 9:7; Zeph 3:4); θεοφόρητος (Aeschylus, Agamemnon 1140 [ed. Denys Page, Aeschyli Septem quae Supersunt Tragoedias (Oxford Classical Texts; Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972), 178,1140]; Strabo, Geographica 12,2,3 [ed. Augustus Meineke, Strabonis Geographica 2 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1877), 752,10]; Philo, De specialibus legibus 1,65 [16,15 C./W.]); θεοφοροῦμενος (Justin, 1 Apologia 33,9 [81,32 M.]). Cf. Richard J. Bauck- ham, Jude, 2 Peter (World biblical commentary 50; Waco, Tex.: Word, 1983), 233. See also ὁρμάω in Plato, Ion 534c. 93 Cf. Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,1; 10,4 (98,1–10; 102,24–28 P.). Lampe, A Patristic Greek Lexicon (see note 90), s.v. ἐνεργέω IB3c: “of prophets inspired by the Holy Ghost.” Pou- deron’s translation of Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 10,4 (102,24–25 P.), “In truth, the Holy Spirit who is manifested in the words of the prophets” (“En vérité, cet Esprit-Saint qui se manifeste dans les paroles des prophètes”) (idem, Athénagore [see note 4], 103), does not capture the strong sense of the Spirit’s activity of inspiration with his translation of the present participle, τὸ ἐνεργοῦν, with “qui se manifeste.” In this context of prophetic speech, the participle carries the specific idea of inspiration in parallel with ἔνθεος in Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7, 3 (94,22 P.). Schoedel’s translation is slightly better, for it at least sets forth the notion of the Spirit’s activity, yet it leaves the particular type of activity undefined: “Further, this same Holy Spirit, which is active in those who speak prophetically” (Schoedel, Athenagoras [see note 4], 23). Cyril C. Richardson’s translation is best: “Indeed we say that the Holy Spirit himself, who inspires those who utter prophecies” (idem, “A Plea Regarding Christians by Athenagoras the Philoso- pher,” in idem, ed. and trans., Early Christian Fathers [The Library of Christian Classics 1; Phila- delphia: Westminster, 1953], [290–340] 309). 230 D. Jeffrey Bingham along with a more common noun for inspiration, ἐπίπνοια, to the same effect. It helps him characterize Moses’s inspired prophetic activity in the tabernacle.94 The apostle Paul also finds use for a related term when discussing the Spirit’s involve- ment in equipping the community. In 1 Cor 12:4–6, he puts forth three terms for the manifestations of the Spirit: gifts, services, and workings (ἐνέργημα).95 Although he specifically mentions one such working, that of mighty deeds, he is not too interested in distinguishing between the three terms. Each can refer to all the Spirit’s manifestations. He is much more concerned with emphasizing the worker as the one God. For our purposes it is important to note that one of these divinely worked manifestations is prophecy. Early Christianity, from Paul to Justin to Athenagoras, seems to have wanted to highlight that divine inspiration of prophets, old and new, was the work, the result of the activity, of God. This may be why in contrast, we find Athenagoras speaking in apparent irony of the activities (ἐνέργεια) of the pagan idols.96 Only the one God is truly active. The final pair of terms elaborate upon the earlier notion of the Spirit’s moving the prophets. As part of Athenagoras’s musical, instrumental metaphor, they add further insight to how the Spirit stirs the prophet. In Legatio pro Christianis 7, 3 , the Spirit, the apologist says, “moved the mouths of the prophets like (musical) instruments.”97 The movement of the Spirit, metaphorically, is his playing of the instrument. In Legatio pro Christianis 7,1, we do not know whether the instrument is a percussion instrument like a tympanon, a stringed instrument like a lyre or harp, or one played by wind.98 In any case, we are not to understand the instrument (ὄργανον), like Philo does in one place, as the prophet’s vocal organs.99 The metaphor is meant to figure the Spirit’s movement of the prophet’s mouth. It is only in Legatio pro Christianis 9,3 where the reader learns that he has had a pipe, αὐλός, in mind. The prophet’s mouth is a pipe and the Spirit makes use (συγχράομαι) of it by blowing (ἐμπνέω) into it. These last two terms for inspi-

94 Cf. Justin, 1 Apologia 60,3 (116,3–4 M.). Cf. also the different pairing, ἐπίπνους ὄντας καὶ κατεχομένους ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ—“inspired and possessed of god,” in Plato, Menon 99c. 95 Cf. Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (2d ed.; The new international commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014), 587; Joseph A. Fitzmeyer, First Corinthians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary (The Anchor Yale Bible 32; New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 465. 96 Cf. Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 18,1; 23,1 (126,7; 154,2 P.). 97 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3 (94,22–23 P.): ὡς ὄργανα κεκινηκότι τὰ τῶν προφητῶν στόματα. 98 For music in ancient Greece see Martin L. West, Ancient Greek Music (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 99 Cf. Philo, De specialibus legibus 1,65 (16,19 C.). “We Have the Prophets” 231 ration, “make use” and “blow,” lead us to appreciate distinctive features of his thought. The first (συγχράομαι) helps to differentiate his view from the idea that under inspiration the prophet is a mindless, passive instrument. We saw this idea above in Plato and Geffcken cites him on this feature in order to validate his claim concerning Athenagoras’s thoroughgoing Hellenism.100 Polybius employs the term when he recounts Hannibal’s strategic use of river and elephants.101 The Carthag- inian availed himself of their aid, employing them as coadjuters.102 The apologist seems to have more in common with the early Greek view of poets, prophets and inspiration rather than the later. The early view, described above, emphasized the poet’s participation in the composition of poetry.103 The prophet is not a mere passive instrument. The early view also stressed another feature of inspired poetry. While for Plato, the poet under inspiration was mindless, without discretion, and composed flawed poems full of contradictions, early Greek literature allowed for the infallibility of a poem composed by an inspired poet.104 Plato, in effect, doomed the poet with his chosen metaphor. The poet resembled a fountain that did not govern the upward surging water. It sprayed freely without guidance. Athenago- ras’s metaphor, whatever else it does, does not convey the idea of an unstruc- tured tune and he does not entertain the possibility of contradiction between the prophets. When they compose under inspiration they do so in such a way that their own text coheres and there is harmony between them. We know this because immediately following his metaphor he cites three prophetic texts in witness of the same theological construct: the oneness and greatness of the true God.105 For Athenagoras, the prophet is not frenzied. He is coadjutator with the Spirit, superintended by the Spirit, but clearly a participant in composition. Furthermore, this

100 Cf. Plato, Menon 99c; Ion 534b-d; Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (see note 12), 180. 101 Cf. Polybius, Historiae 3,14,5 (ed. Theodorus Büttner-Wobst, Polybii Historiae 1 [Leipzig: Teubner, 1905], 228,13). 102 Cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon (see note 87), s.v. συγχράομαι. 103 Homer, Odyssea 8,44–45; 1,346–347; Pindar, Olympia Oda 3,4–6 (12,6–9 S./M.). Cf. Barnard, “Athenagoras and the Biblical Tradition” (see note 10), 5; eadem, Athenagoras (see note 10), 77; eadem, “The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” (see note 10), 15; Crehan, Athenagoras (see note 11), 132 (note 53). They point to συγχράομαι as an indicator that for Athe nagoras God works “with as well as through” the prophets. 104 Plato, Leges 719c-d; Hesiod Theogonia 22–34; 96–103 (6; 9 S./M.); Pindar, Olympiae Odae 4,17–18; 6,20–21; 7,20–21; 13,52 (15,29–30; 18,35–37; 24,36–40; 45,70–72 S./M.). 105 Cf. Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,2 (98,11–18 P.). Cf. Theophilus, Ad Autolycum 2,35 (OECT, 84–86 Grant). 232 D. Jeffrey Bingham movement of the Spirit, whereby he avails himself of the prophet, results in prophetic harmony and truth. His view accords much more with the early Greek view of inspired poetry than with Plato’s perspective. Typically, Athenagoras’s metaphor is presented as that of a flautist blowing into a flute. However, the instrument he has in mind was an αὐλός, a pipe with a reed mouthpiece, finger-holes, related to the oboe, and normally played in pairs.106 Thus, in his metaphor, the Spirit is a piper, an αὐλητής, who blows (ἐμπνέω) into the prophet’s mouth (or the mouths of the prophets) as into a pipe or pipes. How might we understand his metaphor in such a way that the two features of the prophet’s participation and the Spirit’s truth-yielding administration are protected? What might serve as the precedents for his image? Here, his last term for inspiration, “blow,” draws our attention to the piper’s breath.107 Familiar with the pipe, the ancients wrote about the importance of the piper’s breath for melody and tone. Aristoxenus writes that successful melody depends upon agents exter- nal to the pipe, like a change in the piper’s breath that can alter pitch.108 Aristotle speaks in a similar way about the temperature of the piper’s breath. When the piper exhales as in a sigh, the breath is warmer and a deeper note sounds. Skilled pipers also practiced overblowing, producing a separate set of notes.109 For Athenagoras, breath inspired, and these texts help us to grasp how the Spirit’s blowing superintended the success of a prophet’s ministry. Without breath there is no melody, no tone. More pointedly, Athenagoras may have in mind here the notion that without the Spirit’s breath there is no harmony, no continuity between the prophets, and no coherence with reason. He speaks continuously of the prophets as the group of Moses, Isaiah, Jeremiah and the rest. In the plural they and their mouths serve as objects of the Spirit’s influential movement, as witnesses to the church’s thought and faith concerning God, and as messengers of divine, rather than, human, opinions. Furthermore, by proclaiming the things they were inspired to say they corroborate the church’s reasoning (λογισμός). So, when he shares his metaphor, the pipe does not represent a single prophet but the prophets.110 His

106 Cf. West, Ancient Greek Music (see note 98), 81–89. 107 See for a discussion on the breath-stream in playing this instrument, Kathleen Schlesinger, The Greek Aulos: A Study of Its Mechanism and of Its Relation to the Modal System of Ancient Greek Music, Followed by a Survey of the Greek Harmoniai in Survival or Rebirth in Folk-Music (London: Methuen, 1939), 43–45. 108 See Schlesinger, The Greek Aulos (see note 107), 57–65, for a discussion of the passage and the role of breath. 109 Cf. West, Ancient Greek Music (see note 98), 101–103. 110 Cf. Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 (98,7–8 P.): Αὐτοῖς . . . αὺτοὺς. “We Have the Prophets” 233 choice of the αὐλός might be driven by his desire to communicate that although the different prophets utter words that are not identical and witness to different aspects of the faith, their testimonies agree, in the end they are symphonic. They speak both about God and the things of God. In the cento of prophetic words cited, three testify to God’s oneness, but one testifies specifically to his greatness. Since the αὐλός was typically played in pairs the metaphor allows for a picture of the Spirit who pipes as the whole score requires. If played simultaneously, one pipe may have played melody while the other played sustained or varied notes or each could have sounded a different pitch. If played alternatively, different pitch seems the most likely explanation.111 The metaphor provides for diversity in particular prophecies, while protecting the unity of the collective witness. Aris- toxenus makes this point in regard to both instruments and poets. Each pipe is a part of the whole, not an end in itself and the audience can always tell when the pipes or singers are in harmony (συμφωνέω).112 Although the metaphor of the Spirit playing a musical instrument is a common one for the divine inspiration of prophets and the purification of sages, Athenagoras is alone in selecting the pipe for his picture. Philo prefers to imagine a stringed instrument, specified once as a lyre, as does Plutarch.113 Montanus does the same.114 So, although the image of a musical instrument is common, Athenagoras shows his own genius.115 His selection of a pipe is carefully thought through. Immediately, a polemically motivated distinction between pagan deities and the Christian God comes to mind. The lyre was the instrument of choice for

111 Cf. West, Ancient Greek Music (see note 98), 103–105; Giovanni Comotti, Music in Greek and Roman Culture (trans. Rosaria V. Munson; Ancient Society and History; Baltimore: Hopkins University Press, 1989), 70–71; John G. Landels, Music in Ancient Greece and Rome (London: Routledge, 1999), 42–46. 112 Cf. Pseudo-Plutarch, De musica 1144d (BSGRT Plutarchi Moralia 6,3, 32,11 Ziegler/Pohlenz). Cf. West, Ancient Greek Music (see note 98), 104. 113 Cf. Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 259 (59,11–16 W.); Quod deus sit immutabilis 24–25 (61,9–18 W.); Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum 436 f (118,24–119,1 S.). 114 Cf. Epiphanius, Panarion 48,4,1 (GCS 31, 224,22–23 Dummer/Holl). See Paul Lejay, “Un oracle montaniste: Le plectra, la langue et l’Esprit,” Bulletin d’ancienne littérature et d’archéologie chrétiennes 2 (1912): 43–45. 115 Cf. Crehan, Athenagoras (see note 11), 132 (note 53); Barnard, “Athenagoras and the Biblical Tradition” (see note 10), 5; eadem, Athenagoras (see note 10), 77; eadem, “The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” (see note 10), 15. Lejay sees the frequent appearance of the musical analogy as indicative of a common intellectual milieu (idem, “Un oracle montaniste” [see note 114], 45). Certainly, there is intellectual sharing. But, Athenagoras also demonstrates intellectual independence. 234 D. Jeffrey Bingham

Apollo.116 The apologist prefers to associate the Christian God with the αὐλός.117 Also, the αὐλητής cannot sing or speak, therefore some Greeks viewed this limi- tation as indicating that the instrument and its musician were inferior and lacked nobility.118 Athenagoras, however, recognizes the analogy’s usefulness for his theological idea. If the αὐλητής communicates by mouth only by means of the αὐλός, this highlights the role and active participation of the prophets. His analogy conveys the idea that the Spirit breathes into the prophets, but it is the prophets who speak the words. The music of the divine, Christian αὐλητής has lyrics, but it is the inspired, human αὐλός that sings the words. Furthermore, his analogy of this wind instrument resonates with the way breath was already associated with divine inspiration in pagan, Jewish and Christian contexts.119 This also may explain why his metaphor highlights the piper’s breath and not the musician’s skillful use of fingers as well as mouth and tongue in the playing of the pipe.120 Homer lets Penelope say that a god inspired her by breathing (ἐμπνέω) a thought into her heart while Longinus links inspiration by breath to possession by a god. We note that Plutarch describes inspired, prophetic speech as breathing out (ἐμπνέω) and elsewhere relates prophetic inspiration to breath, but uses πνεῦμα.121 Pseudo-Plutarch records Herophilus’s theory of god-breathed (θεόπνευστος)

116 E. g., Homer, Ilias 1,603; 24,63. Cf. Fritz Graf, Apollo (Gods and Heroes of the Ancient World; London: Routledge, 2009), 31–32; Martha Maas and Jane McIntosh Snyder, Stringed Instruments of Ancient Greece (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 5; West, Ancient Greek Music (see note 98), 50. 117 Cf. the musical contest between Apollo who plays a lyre and Marsyas who plays the αὐλός and loses the match (Diodorus, Bibliotheca historica 3,59 [ed. Friedrich Vogel, Diodori Bibliotheca Historica 1 (Leipzig: Teubner, 1888), 360,20–363,12]). 118 Cf. Plutarch, Alcibiades 2,4–5 (ed. Konrad Ziegler and Hans Gärtner, Plutarchi Vitae Paral- lelae 1,2 [Leipzig: Teubner, 1994], 228,8–22); Quaestiones convivales 713d (7,8) (BSGRT Plutarchi Moralia 4, 249,24–250,9 Hubert). 119 It is doubtful that he selects the αὐλός because of the way Aristotle describes it as an “exciting” (ὀργιαστικός) instrument (Aristotle, Politica 1341a) or because of its association with “religious frenzy” and “ecstatic cults” (cf. West, Ancient Greek Music [see note 98], 105 [note 103]; Gilbert Rouge, Music and Trance: A Theory of the Relations between Music and Possession [trans. Brunhilde Biebuyck; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985], 76–78). His emphasis is rather on the rationality and harmony of the prophetic witness. 120 See Landels, Music in Ancient Greece and Rome (see note 111), 34–35; West, Ancient Greek Music (see note 98), 94–97; Schlesinger, The Greek Aulos (see note 107), 113–117. 121 Cf. Plutarch, De defectu oraculorum 421b; 432d (84,20; 109,10 S.). Cf. Strabo, Geographi- ca 9,3,5 (591,7–11 M.). The connection in the latter two is to the vapors of Delphi. Cf. ἐμπνέω in Hesiod, Theogonia 31 (6 S./M.), where the goddesses breath his poetry into him and spiro in Ovid, Metamorphoses 1,3 (SCBO, 1 Tarrant) where he prays that the gods would breath his song into him. “We Have the Prophets” 235 dreams, Pseudo-Phocylides extols the excellence of God-breathed (θεόπνευστος) wisdom, and Cicero writes of the poet as breathed into (inflo) by a divine spirit.122 The New Testament reflects this notion of inspiration as well. In 2 Tim 3:16 all Scripture is God-breathed (θεόπνευστος). One must wonder if the apologist is thinking of John 20:22 and Gen 2:7 in a fashion that connects original creation to prophetic utterance as life-giving. Although he alludes to John 1:3, gives evidence of a Johannine Christology, and alludes to Gen 1 and 6, there is, nevertheless, no explicit connection.123 It is in Justin where we are now able to appreciate a significant similarity, however. We have already mentioned 1 Apology 36,1 above in our discussion of early Christianity’s concept of divine inspiration as an act of the Son or Spirit whereby the prophet is moved or impelled (κινέω) to speak.124 In this same passage, Justin denies that the prophets inspired themselves by breathing (ἐμπνέω) into themselves. In his mind, as in Athenagoras’s, the inspiring movement of God (Son or Spirit) is one of breathing into the prophet. In addition to indicating that the Spirit’s breath plays the prophet in such a way that harmony, continuity, and truth sound forth, Athenagoras’s metaphor also communicates the prophet’s own contribution. The uniqueness among pipes may be seen in the types of the pipes that differed mostly in the positions of the finger holes, mouthpiece, and length.125 Each type produced a different pitch to provide accompaniment in different performances.126 One might be low-pitched for male choruses; another might be cut for a higher octave more suitable for women or boys. Some were deemed appropriate for symposia; others for hymns; still others for frenzied ceremonies. Each had its own character, made its own

122 Cf. Placita philosophorum 5,2,3 (= 904 f) (CUFr Série grecque 356, 168,1 Lachenaud); Pseudo- Phocylides, Sententiae 129 (ed. Douglas Young, “Pseudo-Phocylides,” in Theognis: Pseudo- Pythagoras, Pseudo-Phocylides, Chares, Anonymi Aulodia, Fragmentum Teliambicum [ed. Ernest Diehl and Douglas Young; Leipzig: Teubner, 1971], 106); Cicero, De natura deorum 2,66 (ed. Wil- helm Ax, De natura Deorum 2 [M. Tulli Ciceronis scripta quae manserunt omnia 45b; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1980], 116,14–117,18). Cf. afflatus in De oratore 2,194 (ed. Augustus S. Wilkins, M. Tullii Ciceronis De Oratore ad Quintum Fratrem Libre Tres 2 [Oxford: Clarendon, 1881], 293,3). Cf. Mi- chael Ursell, “Inspiration,” in The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics (ed. Roland Greene et al.; 4th ed.; Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), 709. 123 Cf. Pouderon, “Les citations scripturaires dans l’œuvre d’Athénagore” (see note 72), 118. Cf., too, Ezek 37:9; Wis 15:11. 124 Cf. Justin, 1 Apologia 36,1 (84,3 M.). 125 See Schlesinger, The Greek Aulos (see note 107), 83–84, 86–87, on length and pitch; 88–96 on the mouthpiece. 126 See Comotti, Music in Greek and Roman Culture (see note 111), 71–72; West, Ancient Greek Music (see note 98), 89–94; Landels, Music in Ancient Greece and Rome (see note 111), 40–41. 236 D. Jeffrey Bingham contribution, and suited particular settings. Each served along with the piper as coadjutor contributing from its own nature.127 The final question to be addressed is what Athenagoras means when he refers to the inspired prophets as being “in the ecstasy (ἔκστασις) of their reason (λογισμός)” (κατ’ ἔκστασιν τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς λογισμῶν) and what might have influenced his thinking.128 Malherbe points to parallel phrases in Philo and Plutarch.129 The Philonic parallel does not describe the Jewish prophets, but pagan banquets characterized by drunkenness. The occurrence in Plutarch describes Solon pre- tending to be out of his mind. Neither provides a context shared with Athenago- ras. Two other Philonic parallels might be mentioned. Following his statement that prophetic ecstasy is the best of four types, he provides an interpretation of Gen 15:12 assisted by the metaphor of a stringed instrument. He reads it as Abraham’s prophetic, ecstatic experience.130 When in ecstasy (ἔκστασις), the Spirit arrives, the prophet’s mind is evicted, his reason (λογισμός) sets like the sun, his vocal organs remain quiet and the Spirit plays by making use of them in accordance with his will. In another passage, reason (λογισμός) withdraws and the Spirit puts forth the prophetic message by playing the vocal organs.131 We also know that Philo’s own experience of divine possession resulted in frenzy and unconsciousness.132 The scholarly literature seems fixated upon the parallels with Philo and Plutarch. However, the Old Testament relates remarkable conversions of those

127 Cf. Crehan, Athenagoras (see note 11), 132 (note 53). 128 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 (98,7 P.). Barnard has discussed Athenagoras’s relationship to Montanism and dismissed the idea that his treatment of the prophets has Montanism as a direct source (“The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” [see note 10], 14–16). For a discussion of ecstatic prophecy in early Christianity see, Ash, “The Decline of Ec- static Prophecy in the Early Church” (see note 16), 227–252. 129 Cf. Philo, De vita contemplativa 5,40 (56,13–57,5 C./R.); Plutarch, Solon 8,1 (90,8 Z./G.). See Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers” (see note 7), 222 (notes 64–65) and notes 13, 14 above. Note also Crehan, Athenagoras (see note 11), 132 (note 53), and Barnard (“The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” [see note 10], 15 [note 48]) who list Philo, De specialibus legibus 4,48–49 (216,19–220,4 C./W.) and De decalogo 35; 175 (276,13–19; 306,24–307,3 C./W.) as parallels for Athenagoras’s πνεύματι ἐνθέῳ (Legatio pro Christianis 7, 3 [92,18 P.]) and his ἔκστασιν τῶν . . . λογισμῶν (Legatio pro Christianis 9,1 [98,7 P.]). I am unable to find the occurrence of ἔκστασις in these Philonic texts (however, see Philo, De vita contemplativa 5,40 [56,16 C./R.]). Rankin says “the notion of the ecstasy of the prophets” can be found in Philo, De specialibus legibus 4,49 (219,22–220,4 C./W.) (Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian [see note 8], 96). 130 Cf. Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 264–266 (60,11–61,6 W.). 131 Cf. Philo, De specialibus legibus 4,49 (219,22–220,50 C.). 132 Cf. Philo, De migratione Abrahami 34–35 (275,3–15 W.). “We Have the Prophets” 237 who prophesy by means of the Spirit and the New Testament, too, uses ἔκστασις to refer to revelatory, visionary trances experienced by Peter and Paul where they see heavenly things and hear the divine voice.133 Furthermore, Justin clarifies that Zechariah’s prophecy (2:10–13) came about not when he was in a normal state, but “in ecstasy (ἔκστασις).”134 Zechariah in ecstasy saw things not visible to natural eyesight, but Justin provides no accompanying details of frenzy or unconsciousness. Common to all these texts is the idea that the prophetic experience of ecstasy is a state of consciousness or vision different from a normal one. Philo specifically introduces the factor of the divine Spirit and presents the state as one in which human reason is evicted. How we are to understand Athenago- ras’s language is unclear. He does not say that reason is evicted or withdrawn and there is no indication of frenzy or unconsciousness. In the translations we find several options. Scholars render Athenagoras’s ἔκστασις in a variety of ways. Some read it in parallel with a notion of frenzied unconsciousness, confusion or loss of reason. Crehan and Pouderon are closest to Philo. For Crehan, the prophets’ reasoning fell “into abeyance” while Pouderon has, “dans le délire de leur raison.”135 Richardson’s translation suggests that prophetic ecstasy involves an act of the Spirit whereby the prophets are given thoughts loftier than those that are human, but he does not go so far as to suggest that they lose consciousness or become hysterical or delirious. He puts it as “raised above their own thoughts.”136 Malherbe’s and William R. Schoedel’s renderings do not venture to interpret the ecstatic state. Malherbe has “in accordance with the movements of their reason- ings.”137 Schoedel simply reads, “in the ecstasy of their thoughts.”138

133 Cf. 1 Sam 10:5–7. Note, especially, 10:6: “Then the spirit of the Lord will come mightily upon you, and you shall prophesy with them and be turned into another man.” Cf. Acts 10:10; 11:5; 2 2 :1 7. 134 Justin, Dialogus cum Tryphone Judaeo 115,3 (268,22 M.). 135 Crehan, Athenagoras (see note 11), 39; Pouderon, Athénagore (see note 4), 99. Note, too, the translation of Spencer Mansel, “Athenagoras,” A Dictionary of Christian Biography, Literature, Sects and Doctrines 1 (London: Murray, 1877): (204–207) 206–207: The prophets “were rapt in mind outside of themselves.” He does attempt to explain: “The prophet was carried beyond himself by the Holy Spirit . . . the words uttered were not his own.” Conyers Middleton (The Miscel- laneous Works of the Late Reverend and Learned Conyers Middleton 1 [2d ed.; London: Manby, 1755], 237) puts it: “They were transported out of their senses . . . [they were] mere organs of the Holy Spirit.” 136 Richardson, “A Plea Regarding Christians by Athenagoras the Philosopher” (see note 93), 308. 137 Abraham J. Malherbe, “Apologetic and Philosophy in the Second Century,” Restoration Quarterly 7 (1963): (19–32) 30 (note 101). 138 Schoedel, Athenagoras (see note 4), 21. 238 D. Jeffrey Bingham

Athenagoras does not elaborate on the state of ecstasy. If the prophets’ reason is being “displaced”139 he does not explicitly say so. This accounts for the vari- ance in translations. He is much more interested in its result and in stating that his community’s prophets experienced it. For apologetic reasons, it is important that both his imperial and Christian readers know this. Two things are clear. First, he emphasizes that the prophetic proclamations, facilitated by the divine Spirit while in a state of ecstasy, have replaced human opinions and human doctrine with divine ones.140 They teach “about God from God” (παρὰ θεοῦ περὶ θεοῦ).141 Second, in two steps he clarifies that the ecstasy has not done away with reason: (1) the prophets confirm the Christian arguments (λογισμός); and (2) the writings of the prophets provide the emperor with “good reason” (λογισμός)142 to reject the false charges against the Christians. Among the translations reviewed above, Richardson’s conveys Athenago- ras’s meaning the best. His use of ἔκστασις in this context does not seem to carry the sense of distraction of mind, entrancement, astonishment or excitement. Instead the sense points to a displacement or outward, upward movement of the prophet’s mind and reason.143 In ecstasy the prophet’s thoughts are raised up from the realm of the human to the realm of the divine so that he thinks heavenly thoughts. In light of our analysis concerning Athenagoras’s concept of the prophet as coadjutor, his use of ἔκστασις most probably indicates that in ecstasy the Spirit complements human reason with divine thought and superintends the process so that the prophet speaks words in guarded partnership with the prophet’s milieu that accurately convey the revelation received. For a final parallel in antiquity, in addition to those discussed above in early Greek thought, we might offer the Pythia’s ecstasy. Recent scholarship, profiting greatly from Pierre Aman- dry’s study of the Delphic oracle, has provided some corrective to earlier characterizations of the Pythia’s ecstasy as hysterical, frenzied, delirious, irrational, and

139 Albrecht Oepke, “ekstasis,” Theological dictionary of the New Testament 2 (Grands Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964): (449–458) 449–450. 140 Cf. Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 11,1 (104,3–5 P.). This could indicate that in ecstasy the Spirit replaces human, earthly reason with divine, heavenly reason. Cf. Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (see note 8), 96. Cf. Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 264–266 (60,11–61,6 W.); Plato, Phaedrus 249c-d; Barnard, “The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” (see note 10), 15 (note 48). 141 Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,2 (92,14 P.). 142 Malherbe, “Apologetic and Philosophy in the Second Century” (see note 7), 30–31 (note 101); Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (see note 8), 96. 143 Cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-English Lexicon (see note 87), s.v. ἔκστασις. “We Have the Prophets” 239 vocally passive.144 Some portrayals of the Pythia, Lucan’s, for instance, connect some of these stereotypical traits with her experiences of inspiration as the god possesses her.145 However, there are other portrayals suggesting some fluidity in how the state of inspired ecstasy was understood.146 Plutarch, for example, describing the Pythia’s state under inspiration, tells how she received visions and divine illumination and how the god employed her body and soul to convey to human ears divine thoughts. As the god inspires her she is serene and composed, not frantic.147 As she speaks her voice and words are her own, not the god’s.148 The god did not take possession of the Pythia’s body.149 Here, the deity, through visions and the inner illumination of the Pythia, conveys divine thoughts. But under inspiration the Pythia remains tranquil, rational, and articulate. She is a coadjutor; she, with her personality, forms the oracle.150 Although we do not have in Plutarch a systematic doctrine of inspiration, in these texts the god reveals; the Pythia receives, composes and proclaims.151 “Ecstasy and rationality,” David E. Aune points out, need not be understood “as two mutually exclusive states of consciousness.”152 Neither is it necessary to conclude that ecstasy or inspiration always indicate a prophet’s passivity. The apologist means for his metaphor of the

144 Cf. Pierre Amandry, La mantique apollinienne à Delphes: Essai sur le fonctionnement de l’ora cle (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d’Athènes et de Rome 170; Paris: Bocard, 1950); Joseph Fontenrose, The Delphic Oracle: Its Responses and Operations with a Catalogue of Responses (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 204–212; Aune, Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World (see note 16), 33–34; Graf, Apollo (see note 116), 54–55. 145 Lucan, Bellum civile 5 (BSGRT, 110,165–174; 111,190–193 Shackleton). Cf. Amandry, La mantique apollinienne à Delphes (see note 144), 20–21, 234–235 and Fontenrose, The Delphic Oracle (see note 144), 208–210 who dismiss the portrayal as atypical and spurious. It is descriptive of the Sybil in Virgil, Aeneis 6,9–158 (BSGRT, 159–165 Conte). 146 I am grateful to Devin L. White for his suggestions regarding Plutarch on this issue. 147 Plutarch, De Pythiae oraculis 397c-d; 21,404e (ed. Stephan Schröder, Plutarchs Schrift De Pythiae oraculis: Text, Einleitung und Kommentar [Beiträge zur Altertumskunde 8; Stuttgart: Teubner, 1990], 86,3–21; 98,11–21). Cf. the Greek vase paintings of Pythia and Apollo (Amandry, La mantique apollinienne à Delphes [see note 144], 66–77). 148 Plutarch, De Pythiae oraculis 397c-d (86,3–21 S.). 149 Plutarch, De Pythiae oraculis 397b-c; 404a-f (85,22–86,9; 97,5–99,1 S.); De defectu oraculorum 414c (69,10–22 S.). Cf. Fontenrose, The Delphic Oracle (see note 144), 206–207. 150 Yvonne Vernière, “La théorie de l’inspiration prophétique dans les dialogues pythiques de Plutarque,” Kernos 3 (1990): (359–366) 365. 151 Stephan Schröder, “Plutarch on Oracles and Divine Inspiration,” in Plutarch, On the Daimo- nion of Socrates: Human Liberation, Divine Guidance, and Philosophy (ed. Heinz-Günther Nessel- rath; trans. Donald Russell; Scripta antiquitatis posterioris ad ethicam religionemque pertinen- tia 16; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2010), (145–168) 168. 152 Aune, Prophecy in Early Christianity and the Ancient Mediterranean World (see note 16), 33. 240 D. Jeffrey Bingham pipe to communicate the divine source of the prophet’s words, but he does not mean for it to convey the utter passivity of the inspired spokesperson. Perhaps, at least, we can say that in their ecstatic state the prophets, by the movement of the divine Spirit, had their minds lifted up so that they received divine thoughts that they expressed in words. These words provided reasonable warrant for the faith and were unattainable through human means. It is worth- while to note that Athenagoras’s perspective of the inspiration of the prophets does not only stand in contrast to aspects of the later Greek view of inspiration, but also to that of the Montanists.153 Their prophets fell into ecstatic frenzy and were portrayed by Montanus as lyres, passive instruments played by the Lord, and as persons whose earthly faculties, under inspiration, were asleep.154

153 Contra Louis-Sébastien Le Nain de Tillemont, Mémoires pour servir a l’histoire ecclésiastique des six premiers siècles 2 (Paris: Charles Robustel, 1701), 350; idem, Histoire des empereurs et autres princes qui ont régné pendant les six premiers siècles de l’Église 2,2: Qui comprend depuis Vespasien jusqu’à la mort de Trajan (Brussels: Fricx, 1693), 759 and Tabbernee, False Prophecy and Polluted Sacraments (see note 16), 94. Tillemont originated the view that Athenagoras was a Montanist on the basis of his view of ecstatic prophecy and disapproval of second marriages (Legatio pro Christianis 9,1; 33,4 [98,1–10; 198,13–15 P.]). It has never received much support. See, e. g., The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr. Peter Bayle 1 (2d ed.; rev. Pierre Des Maizeaux; London: Knapton, 1734): 533 and note 154 below. Nevertheless, see Vernon Bartlett, “Harnack’s Texte und Untersuchungen,” The Critical Review of Theological and Philosophical Literature 2 (1892): (191–194) 194 (note 1). Tabbernee writes that the metaphor of the musical instrument in Athenagoras illustrates “the passive role of the prophet” in the same way that Montanus employs the analogy. Cf. Epiphanius, Panarion 48,4,1 (224,22–225,2 D./H.). 154 Cf. Eusebius, Historia ecclesiastica 5,16,7 (GCS 6,1, 462,9–15 Schwartz/Mommsen/Winkel- mann); Epiphanius, Panarion 48,4,1 (224,22–225,2 D./H.). Cf. Lejay, “Un oracle montaniste” (see note 114), 43–45; William G. Murdoch, A Study of Early Montanism and Its Relation to the Chris- tian Church (Ph.D. diss.; Birmingham: University of Birmingham, 1946), 41–44. Barnard notes the differences between the musical analogy of Montanus (lyre) and Athenagoras (pipe) and points out that in Athenagoras God works with as well as through the prophet. He concludes that Athenagoras was not influenced by Montanist teaching (Barnard, “Athenagoras and the Biblical Tradition” [see note 10], 4–5; eadem, Athenagoras [see note 10], 75–77; eadem, “The Philosoph- ical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” [see note 10], 14–15). Cf. Mansel, “Athenagoras” (see note 135), 206–207; John Kaye, Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr (Cambridge: Smith for Deighton, 1829), 179–180 (note 68); Georges Bareille, “Athénagore,” Dic- tionnaire de théologie catholique 1,2 (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1923): (2010–2014) 2013. We do not find in Athenagoras the notion of the inspired prophet being asleep as with Montanus, Plato, Timaeus 71e and Philo, Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 264–265 (60,11–61,6 W.), who uses metaphors for the idea of sleep. Cf., too, the different types of ecstasy in Epiphanius of Constantia (Sa- lamis) in Soterios A. Mousalimas, “ ‘Ecstasy’ in Epiphanius of Constantia (Salamis) and Didymus of Alexandria,” Studia Patristica 25 (1993): 434–437. “We Have the Prophets” 241

5 Conclusion

This study is a response to one basic claim that has governed the reading of two passages in Athenagoras’s Legatio pro Christianis. These passages concern the early Christian understanding of the Old Testament prophets.155 The problem- atic claim is that the apologist’s treatment of the prophets as “Hellenistic,” takes place in “general Hellenistic terms,” and represents a “thoroughly Greek percep- tion.”156 In detail, scholars claim that his view reflects the phenomenon seen in Plato, Meno 99c, originates from Plato, Phaedrus 249d, and is especially similar to Philo’s perspective in several passages.157 To support the claim, texts from Philo and Plutarch are commonly cited.158 Even when studies or editions only cite the Hellenistic parallels without commentary, they continue to give credence to the claim.159 Our analysis demonstrates a broader background for Athenagoras’s treatment of the prophets and inspiration and it indicates the need for more nuanced characterizations. Certainly, there are significant parallels with Philo, both lexical and conceptual. His discussions concerning the divine inspiration of the prophets, the state of ecstasy, the role of the Spirit, the effect upon reason, and the musical metaphor find some degree of resonance in our apologist. It is almost unimaginable that Philo was not in his mind. Yet, we have noted significant differences in their metaphors, the contexts in which the lexical similarities occur, and their concepts of the participation or passivity of the inspired, ecstatic prophet. Clearly, both independence and dependence on other sources is sug- gested. Furthermore, this study shows that conclusions based on assumed parallels with Plato also require adjustment. Athenagoras does not share the notion of an unconscious, passive, mindless prophet or poet who under inspiration

155 Cf. Athenagoras, Legatio pro Christianis 7,3; 9,1 (92,17–94,23; 98,1–10 P.) 156 Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (see note 12), 177, 180; Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers” (see note 7), 222. 157 Cf. Geffcken, Zwei griechische Apologeten (see note 12), 180; Barnard, “The Philosophical and Biblical Background of Athenagoras” (see note 10), 15 (note 48); Malherbe, “Athenagoras on the Poets and Philosophers” (see note 7), 222; Crehan, Athenagoras (see note 11), 132 (note 53). See above, note 140, for a brief comment on Plato, Phaedrus 249cd. 158 Cf. Philo, De decalogo 35; 175 (276,13–19; 306,24–307,3 C./W.); De specialibus legibus 1,65; 4,49 (16,15–22; 219,22–220,4 C./W.); De vita contemplativa 5,40 (56,13–57,5 C./R.); Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 259 (59,11–16 W.); Quod deus sit immutabilis 24–25 (61,9–18 W.); Plutarch, Solon 8,1 (90,8 Z./G.); De defectu oraculorum 436 f (118,24–119,1 S.). 159 Cf. Schoedel, Athenagoras (see note 4), 21 (note 9); Marcovich, Athenagoras Legatio (see note 4), 5; Rankin, Athenagoras: Philosopher and Theologian (see note 8), 96. 242 D. Jeffrey Bingham composes flawed, contradictory material. Rather, there are important similarities with early Greek thought on the activity and contribution of the inspired poet as well as the infallibility of the composition. Also, in addition to the texts of Plato and Plutarch commonly associated with the question of prophets, inspiration, and ecstasy, important alternative portrayals exist in these authors. The inspired prophets, in the mind of Athenagoras, are coadjutors with the Spirit who are not frantic, but of sound mind, and their own speech, as well as their books, contains harmonious, true teachings. Finally, this investigation makes one additional claim. In addition to the common Philonic parallels as well as those from Plato and Plutarch, there are other sources to consider that are equally informative. Athenagoras’s discussion of the prophets and inspiration manifests alliance and dependence upon the Septuagint, other Jewish sources, the New Testament and second-century Chris- tian sources, especially Ignatius and Justin. Athenagoras is a “Christian philosopher.”160 We would expect to see such a broad-based platform of resources for his theological construction. A simple classification of Greek, Hellenistic or Philonic for his notion of the inspired prophets is incomplete, unreflective of his own inge- nuity, and fails to adequately account for his Judaeo-Christian heritage. It also minimizes the elegance of this early Christian attempt to theologize about the Jewish prophets in a gentile world. In Athenagoras we have an explanation of the prophets and inspiration that (1) clearly positions them preeminently as rational, doctrinal Christian authorities above the poets, philosophers, and human opinions; (2) constructs his community’s theology with an artistic flair that selectively and critically weaves together both pagan and Judaeo-Christian sources; so that (3) he might win a hearing from both his imperial and ecclesiastical audience.

160 Bernard Pouderon, Athénagore d’Athènes: philosophe chrétien (Théologie historique 82; Paris: Beauchesne, 1989).