Middle Eastern Christian Survival Strategies After

Arab-West Report Papers

Paper 57 (September 2015)

Middle Eastern Christian survival strategies after the Arab Revolutions in 2011 with a focus on Egypt - 2015 International Conference on Middle East Strategic Landscape 100 Years after the First World War

Author: Cornelis Hulsman Editor: Emily Stacey Reviewers: Prof. Dr. Jan Jongeneel, Maurice Gajan, Ella Volkmann

Publisher: Arab-West Report

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Published September, 2015 by Arab-West Report

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Middle Eastern Christian survival strategies after the Arab Revolutions in 2011 with a focus on Egypt

Cornelis Hulsman, Editor-in-chief Arab-West Report Studying Muslim-Christian relations since 1976 [email protected]

September 9, 2015

Presented at the 2015 International Conference on

Middle East Strategic Landscape 100 Years after the First World War

Organized by the Future University and University of Central Florida September 12-14, Cairo-Egypt

Note on transliteration

Transliterated names vary greatly from the Egyptian pronunciation, and thus we see great differences in the spelling of Arabic names. For this paper names and words have been written in their familiar form (for example Tahrir Square rather than midān al-taḥrīr) or have been given in the preferred spelling of the person.

Glossary

sharī’ah - Islamic law Allahu akbar – God is the Greatest Intifadah - uprising Shura Council – Senate – upper bicameral chamber dissolved in 2014

Middle Eastern Christian survival strategies after the Arab Revolutions in 2011 with a focus on Egypt.

Introduction

Christianity in the Arab World was flourishing in relative terms prior to the First World War and consequent break-up of the Ottoman Empire. Since the 1920s, and particularly since the Second World War, Arab Christianity has seen an ongoing demographic decline and, in several parts of the Arab world, a disappearance from which it is unlikely to recover. This paper tries to find an answer to the question of how Christians in the Arab World deal with the prospect of ongoing decline and what strategies they are using to survive in lands where they have lived since the beginning of Christianity.

I will first present a very brief overview of the decline of Christians since the arrival of Islam, the proportional increase of Christians in the 19th century and early years of the 20th century and the renewed decline following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

In the following section I will present the theoretical framework of Alexander R. Arifianto that links declining Christianity to political alliances and tensions along religious lines in the region. This is followed by a section with a description of religion and politics in Egypt in relation to an Egyptian Christian survival strategy that was strongly linked to maintaining good relations with Egyptian authorities before the Revolution of January 25, 2011 and the Islamist rise to power. It continues to describe how, following this, the majority of Christians sided with the opposition to Islamist rule (2012-2013), and after the overthrow of Egypt’s first Islamist president Christians have allied themselves with the rulers of the country led by former field marshal Abdelfattah al- Sisi. The experiences in Egypt and other countries in the region confirm Arifianto’s theoretical framework.

The paper concludes with some suggestions for facing the future. One would think that the future of Christianity in the Arab World is very bleak, but there are sparks of hope that should be kindled.

I am grateful for Prof. Dr. Jan Jongeneel, emeritus professor of Mission Studies at the University of Utrecht, The Netherlands, and CAWU interns Maurice Gajan and Ella Volkmann for reviewing my draft text.1 This has resulted in several additions to this text. I am grateful for both reviews but, of course, I remain responsible for this text.

1 Email Prof. Jongeneel November 5, 2015, review Maurice Gajan and Ella Volkmann November 24, 2015

A brief history of the declining Christian presence in the Arab World

Prior to the arrival of Islam in the 7th century, Egypt, most of North Africa and the Levant belonged to the Byzantine Empire, where Christianity was the majority religion. The early Arab Muslim armies swept over these Christian lands in the 7th and 8th centuries.

Arabs called the indigenous Christians in Egypt ‘Qibt,’ which was taken from the Greek ‘Aegyptos.’ The word ‘Qibt’ has become the name ‘Copt.’ Thus, when we speak of Copts in Egypt, we speak of Egypt’s indigenous Christians. In greater Syria, indigenous Christians were named after Syria, hence the Syrian Orthodox Church.

In the first one or two generations, Christians were treated well, but due to ongoing wars, Muslim rulers needed funds, and exorbitant taxes of Christians became a major source of income.2 Demographics also changed, due to large scale Arab Muslim migration to Egypt and other countries in the first centuries of Arab rule. Large numbers of Christians also converted to Islam. In North Africa the indigenous church entirely disappeared.3 In Egypt the percentage of Christians rapidly dropped to around 20% of the population in the early 10th century and 7% in the 13th century.4 The Christian population in other countries dropped no less rapidly.

The Mongol sacking of Baghdad in the 13th century and the Spanish Reconquista in the 15th century heralded the end of the Islamic Golden Age. During the 15th and 16th century, the Ottoman Empire became one of the most powerful states in the world, but declined in the 17th and 18th centuries.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire and the Egyptian Khedives wanted to modernize, thus bringing Western influences, including those of Western missions, to the Arab World. Indigenous Catholic and Protestant Churches (Presbyterian, Evangelical, Pentecostal and other denominations) developed alongside the ancient Orthodox Churches. They usually took the name of their nationality, i.e. Coptic (Qibt = Egyptian) in Egypt and added to this ‘Catholic’ or ‘Evangelical.’ Almost without exception, converts to these Catholic and Protestant churches came from one of the Orthodox Churches in the Arab World. The Uniate Churches are noteworthy, as they accept the authority of the Pope of Rome, but maintain the liturgy from the Orthodox tradition. These Uniate churches were particularly strong in Lebanon (Maronites) and Iraq (Chaldeans). The Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt represents around 90% of all Christians.

2 C. Hulsman and R. Atallah, “Egypt – the Church under Pressure,” in: H. A. Gravaas, C. Sauer, T. Engelsviken, M. Kamil and K. Jørgensen (eds), Freedom of Belief and Christian Mission (Oxford, Regnum, 2015). 3 Prof. Dr. J. Jongeneel notes that a major reason for survival of the Copts was that they had a Bible and liturgy in their own language. In North Africa the church did not use the indigenous language but Greek, the language of the empire. Email November 5, 2015. 4 D. Behrens-Abouseif, “The Political Situation of the Copts, 1578-1923” in: Braude, B. and Lewis, B. (eds), Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire, vol II: The Arabic-speaking lands (Holmes and Meier, 1982).

Orthodox Churches largely depend on an active monastic life, since church leaders are chosen from the monks. Catholics and Protestants developed flourishing schools, with the result that the average Catholic and Protestant is better educated than the average Orthodox. The better educated Orthodox and Muslims, until today, often went to Catholic or Protestant schools.

It is thus not surprising that increased modernization first took root among Christians, with modernized education resulting in more prosperity, better health care, higher birthrates and lower child mortality which brought about faster population growth among the Christian population, in comparison with the Muslims.5

Christians in Syria made up 10.13 % of the population in 1914 which, partly as a result of migration from modern Turkey, grew to 14.07% in 1948. In 1914, Palestine, Jordan and Lebanon had a Christian population of 11.26%, 9.06% and 57.64% respectively. The Egyptian census of 1917 showed a percentage of 8.07 % Christians. The census showed this increase continued until 1927, when the Christian population was 8.34%.

In the 1920s, a demographic decline began that continues until this day.6 Average Christian families gradually became smaller, while those of the average Muslim, largely due to better health care and consequently lower mortality rates in the lower classes, became larger. Muslims from the higher and middle classes became better educated and had smaller families. Due to their education, they also gradually replaced Christians in government positions that had previously been filled by Christians to a large extent. This contributed to Christians increasingly losing their relative privileged position they had acquired in the 1920s-1940s. 7

Furthermore, nationalizations of property after Egypt’s Gamal Abdel Nasser took power in 1952 resulted in the first large scale migration of Christians from Egypt. Economic hardships increased from the 1960s, with growing differences between the rich and poor in the 1970s. Since the 1970s, Muslim-Christian tensions increased with recurring violence, especially in lower class areas, over issues such as church building, mixed Muslim-Christian relations and conversions. These conversions went in both directions, but mostly from Christianity to Islam, which also negatively impacted Christian demographics. The Egyptian Ministry of Interior is well aware of the number of converts, but does not publish these figures. The estimates for the

5 Y. Courbage and P. Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam (Tauris, 1998), pp 57-90 6 The World Christian Encyclopedia, edited by David Barrett (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), claimed a percentage of 18.6 Christians in the 1970s, including 12 percent “crypto-Christians,” for which no evidence was presented. This was criticized in C. Hulsman, “Discrepancies between Coptic Statistics in the Egyptian Census and Estimates provided by the Coptic Orthodox Church,” Melanges Institut Dominicain D’Ētudes Orientales (MIDEO) 29, (Louvain, Peeters, 2012), pp 419-482. 7 Bishop Athanasius of Beni Suef explained this emphatically on his sick bed in the year 2000, only months before he passed away. I had excellent relations with the bishop and I have never forgotten this meeting with him explaining these changes in Egyptian demographics.

5 number of Christians converting to Islam per year range in the thousands. These factors caused uncertainties for the future, and this in turn encouraged emigration. 8

Western demographers’ research shows that the proportion of Christians had dwindled in 2010 to around 6.4% in Syria, 30% in Lebanon, 5.3% in Egypt, 3.6% in Jordan and 1.5% in Israel/Palestine.9 I am well aware that these figures are disputed by Christians in the region, but no one disputes the serious demographic decline that has been documented in a growing number of books and reports.10 In my own research, I compared arguments of Western researchers with those of Egyptian Christians and estimated that Christians, prior to the January 25th 2011 Revolution, made up around 6-7% of the population.11

In 2008, Prince Hassan bin Talal linked the decline of Arab-Christianity after the fall of the Ottoman Empire to frequent political upheaval and wars that have led to growing religious revivalism, often of a very conservative nature.12 Christians fear Islamist revivalism, because they tend to refer to documents in early Islam that treat non-Muslims as dhimmis, protected but not equal, or worse by treating Arab Christians as the collaborators of Western “Crusaders” that deserve to be killed.

The dominance of Islamists after the Arab revolutions in 2011 greatly increased the Christian fear for a future in their countries of origin. A press release of the Egyptian Union for Human Rights Organizations claimed that between February and September 2011 some 100,000 Christians had left Egypt in fearing violence and uncertainty. The numbers are disputed but it does reflect the fear that existed.13 The Christian populations of Syria and Iraq have been decimated in only a few years. Egyptians have seen how their fellow Christians were slaughtered in Libya.14

8 C. Hulsman, “Discrepancies between Coptic Statistics in the Egyptian Census and Estimates provided by the Coptic Orthodox Church,” Melanges Institut Dominicain D’Ētudes Orientales (MIDEO) 29, (Louvain, Peeters, 2012) 9 Table Decline of Christianity in Countries Once Belonging to the Ottoman Empire, in C. Hulsman, “Discrepancies between Coptic Statistics in the Egyptian Census and Estimates provided by the Coptic Orthodox Church,” Melanges Institut Dominicain D’Ētudes Orientales (MIDEO) 29, (Louvain, Peeters, 2012), pp 476-478. This table is mainly based on figures provided by P. Fargues. 10 Courbage and Fargues, Christians and Jews under Islam; J.P. Jenkins, The Lost History of Christianity: The Thousand Year Golden Age of the Church in the Middle East, Africa and Asia – and How it Died (Harper, 2008) 11 Hulsman, “Discrepancies between Coptic Statistics in the Egyptian Census and Estimates provided by the Coptic Orthodox Church” 12 C. Hulsman, “Interview with HRH Prince Hasan ibn Talal,” Arab-West Report, week 52, art. 5, November 9, 2007, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2007/week-52/5-interview-hrh-prince-hasan-ibn- talal#sthash.KfJl9EjV.dpuf 13 J. Stoop, “Coptic migration figures of EUHRO disputed,” Arab-West Report, week 26, art. 40, June 28, 2012, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2012/week-26/40-coptic-migration-figures-euhro-disputed 14 C. Hulsman, Murder of Copts in Libya Brings Risk for Escalation, Newsletter Arab-West Report, February 19, 2012, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/murder-copts-libya-brings-risk-escalation

Theoretical framework

Alexander R. Arifianto, Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, tried to put the dynamics of a declining Christianity in the Arab World in a theoretical framework, and asks for the underlying causes of the conflicts we are witnessing. “How does past political alignment and alliances of different religious groups contribute to these conflicts?” he asks.15 Arifianto argues “that Islamic fundamentalism [alone] is not sufficient in explaining the rise of inter-religious conflict in Muslim-majority countries. Instead, they occurred due to the coalitional pacts and alliances between Christian minorities to support authoritarian rulers that suppressed Muslim political activists in these countries.”16

Between the 1930s and 1960s, Christians played a major role in the formation and development of the Baath Party, since the Baath advocated a unity of people of different religions and nationalities in a shared Arab identity (pan-Arabism). This therefore led to a separation of religion and state and entailed that religious identity became less important than the Arab identity. The Baath Party was also anti-imperialist, but with the split of the Baath into Syrian and Iraqi factions in the 1960s the parties in both countries were taken over by dictators, which was never the intention of the first ideologues.17 Over time- in particular after the 1967 defeat in the Six-Days-War, after the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979- the faith in the pan-Arabist ideology declined, and Islamism became a viable political alternative to Arab nationalism.

Arab Christian leaders in Syria have long supported President al-Assad, as several Arab Christian leaders in Iraq supported President Saddam Hussein.18 This does not mean they fully agreed with all of their policies, rather that many preferred a secularist dictator over the uncertainty of full democracy, which could bring Islamists to power, who held religious ideals that were seen as threatening to the position of Christians in different Arab countries. This was the dominant view of a large majority, but it did not mean there were no dissenting voices to this

15 A.R. Arifianto, “Religious Freedom, Authoritarianism, and Inter-Religious Conflict: A Theoretical Framework,” presented at the 2013 American Political Science Association (ASPA) Meeting in Chicago, IL, August 29- September 1, 2013, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2299300. Arifianto mentions that this is a draft in progress and thus is not final for citation or attribution, yet this was published online and the only theoretical framework I found that linked the demise of authoritarian regimes to inter-religious conflict. I much hope Arifianto has further developed these concepts. 16 Arifianto, “Religious Freedom, Authoritarianism, and Inter-Religious Conflict: A Theoretical Framework” 17 Based on an email Dr. Jan Jongeneel, November 5, 2015 18 I visited Iraq in the year 2000 and have met with leading clergy from different churches in and outside Baghdad. I was surprised that also in very private meetings several leaders were positive about Saddam Hussein’s policy towards Christians. The critique concerned lack of political freedoms but not the policy towards the mainstream churches of Iraq. Between 2006 and 2010 I have had several meetings with Patriarch Gregory III Laham of the Melkite Greek Catholic Church which had its main seat in Damascus. The Patriarch was a strong advocate of Muslim-Christian dialogue and believed that President Bashar al-Assad created the right environment for this.

7 majority view. It also does not mean the Christians were unique in expressing these preferences. Other numerical minorities and large numbers of non-Islamist Muslims did the same. They preferred the stability of non-Islamist authoritarian rule over democratization, with the risk of instability and policies that could limit their perceived freedoms.19

The fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the ongoing civil wars in both Iraq and Syria have resulted in a significant increase in interreligious violence in which Christians and other minorities have often been targeted.

Arifianto’s theoretical framework “proposes that religious minorities are making alliances with authoritarian regimes because they believe the regime could better protect its interests.” But if an authoritarian regime collapses, religious minorities could easily become a target for having supported the authoritarian regime.20

Is this theoretical framework applicable to the situation in Egypt? We will first provide a brief overview of the growing tensions between Islamists and Christians in Egypt before the January 25 Revolution, followed by even deeper tensions following the Revolution, which explain widespread Christian support for autocratic rule.

The growth of religious revivalism before the Egyptian Revolution of 2011

I mentioned earlier that Prince Hassan bin Talal linked growing religious revivalism to political instability in the region. One could also state that ruling regimes, mostly composed of Western educated elite, feared the populist appeal of religious revivalism with a political angle. For many religious revivalists the line between religion and politics was thin. They believed that religion should necessarily have an impact on society, and thus on politics. Since large numbers of Arabs and Egyptians are deeply pious people, religious revivalists were able to appeal to popular sentiments, and become a threat to their regimes. These regimes have tried to keep Muslim political revivalist groups at bay, using Islam to justify their rule and at times not hesitating to use methods of brutal suppression, which have in turn contributed to a radicalization of their thoughts, which consequently justified violence against these perceived injustices. Regimes then felt the need to protect their own interests and tended to become more autocratic.

This is also apparent in Egypt’s history. The Muslim Brotherhood was founded as a benign Muslim revivalist group in 1928. In the Coptic Orthodox Church, religious revivalism was expressed in the Sunday School movement. However, the development paths of the Muslim and Christian revivalist groups were vastly different. The State kept its influence on the official

19 This theme repeatedly came back in visits I have made to different Arab countries since 1976 20 Arifianto, “Religious Freedom, Authoritarianism, and Inter-Religious Conflict: A Theoretical Framework”

Islamic discourse by appointing Muslim religious leaders, while in the Coptic Orthodox Church Pope Shenouda became the first Christian revivalist leader to become the head of church.

The Muslim Brotherhood turned increasingly violent after 1945 in their struggle against Zionist efforts to establish the state of Israel. Government efforts to clamp down on the Brotherhood resulted in the assassination of Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha and Brotherhood leader Hassan el-Banna. Gamal Abdel Nasser met with brotherhood leaders prior to his coup d’état in 1952, but after he had come to power he clashed with them and initiated a brutal repression, driving them underground, causing their ideologue Sayyed Qutb (1906-1966) to radicalize. Qutb’s thoughts spread in and outside Egypt in a period that Arabism was on the decline and thus one dominating ideology was gradually replaced by another ideology that, however, was not supported by the ruling elite. Qutb’s ideology was further developed in the 1970s and 1980s by such groups as the Jihad, Jama’at al-Islamiya and Takfir we Hijra into a takfir ideology, making it possible to declare Muslim leaders and intellectuals apostate, thus forming the justification to kill them. At the same time attacks of Western and, to a much lesser extent, Egyptian Islamophobes on basic tenets of Islam caused these Islamist groups to rally against blasphemy.

In this period the seeds were sown for a deep schism between Islamists and autocratic states trying to keep them at bay. Not all Islamists or Muslims advocating political Islam are the same, but they differ from one another mainly in terms of their level of determination and methods of defending their principles. All, however, believe that predominantly Muslim nations should be ruled by Islamic principles, foremost through the application of the sharī’ah, or Islamic law, believing that this would bring justice rather than to the widespread injustice that was believed to be the consequence of autocratic rule.

President Sadat tried to appease the Islamists by creating a grey area; the Brothers were tolerated, even encouraged at times, but never granted legal status.

Egypt’s Coptic Christians had experienced their own religious revival, and in the 1970s were drawn into the schism between Islamists and the government. This was due to the space Sadat had given Islamists and their calls for the application of the sharī’ah, and the opposition to this that was led by Pope Shenouda III [1971-2012], resulted in frequent clashes with both Sadat and Islamists, in which not only Christians, but also Muslims, were killed and their property was destroyed.21

Increased religious fervor resulted in greater Muslim and Christian missionary fervor, leading to conversions of Christians to Islam and of Muslims to Christianity. The actual numbers of

21 Pope Shenouda was definitely less assertive after he was allowed to return to Cairo in January 1985 after his monastic arrest and was later challenged by more assertive groups from within the church.

9 converts are only known to the Egyptian security. Estimates from the 1970s till today vary mostly between 5,000 and 15,000 Christians annually converting to Islam while the number of Muslims converting to Christianity, while often high profile, do not exceed tens per year. Conversions from one religion to another are often presented in the West as a right, while overlooking the tensions these can cause in a deeply religious society, as well as increasing fear for religious people, both Christians and Muslims, of another faith.

Ongoing clashes resulted in Sadat sending scores of Muslim and Christian clergy to prison. Pope Shenouda was placed under house arrest in his monastery. A week later, Sadat and Bishop Samuel, then head of the committee of Bishops replacing Pope Shenouda, were killed by Muslim militants. Hosni Mubarak became president, gradually released most prisoners and allowed Pope Shenouda to return in January 1986. Pope Shenouda and Mubarak were never close friends, and at times they clashed, for example in 2004 over the alleged conversion of Wafaa Costantine to Islam, but the conflict never reached the extent of the clashes in the 1970s. However, the issue of Wafaa Costantine became toxic in the discourse of Islamists. For example, Zagloul el- Naggar, widely believed to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood, claimed in 2010 that she had been killed by the church because of her conversion to Islam. Of course this was denied by the church, but statements such as these contribute to a deep sense of mistrust between Coptic Christians and Islamists. In 2012, Salafi demonstrators in Alexandria called for the release of Wafaa Costantine and a second woman wrongly believed to have converted to Islam, Camelia Shehata.22 This shows clearly how deeply Islamists distrust the church in matters of conversions.

During the reign of Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011), the Muslim Brothers avoided direct clashes with the president and worked hard to increase their influence in professional syndicates and parliament. They made sure that they were present in all kinds of social organizations, serving people’s needs, but also seeking their support in elections. Meanwhile, Islamist militant violence plagued the country in the 1990s. The Muslim Brothers publicly advocated non-violent approaches, but some of their younger and more impatient members, who felt they had experienced injustice, joined the militant Gama’at al-Islamiya and Jihad movements. In the early nineties, these movements attacked both police and Christians, in particular Christian jewelers because they needed money. Christian activists, in turn, blamed the government for not providing enough protection. Militants also sometimes attacked tourists, with the intention of harming Egypt’s tourism industry, thus putting pressure on the Egyptian government.23

22 I have argued in a meeting of students and professors of the University of Vienna with representatives of the Salafi el-Nur Party on May 26, 2012, that their campaign for Camelia Shehata had been misguided. I explained I have met with her, her husband and child in their hiding place, fearful for the consequences of these Salafi demonstrations. C. Hulsman, “Austrian Study visit to Egypt, Monday May 23 – Sunday June 3, 2012,” Arab West Report, week 26, art. 43, June 28, 2012, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2012/week-26/43-austrian- studyvisit-egypt-monday-may-23-sunday-june-3-2012#sthash.zneuskX6.dpuf 23 C. Hulsman, “Freedom of Religion in Egypt Prior to the Egyptian Revolution,” Arab-West Papers no. 47, August 1, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/freedom-religion-egypt-prior-egyptian-revolution

The attack in Luxor in 1997, leaving 62 people dead, mostly tourists, was a turning point. It led to a severe government crackdown on Islamist movements, partly with support of Western security experts.24

Islamist opposition also existed in Syria and Iraq. In 1982 Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, an Alawite, instructed the Syrian Army to suppress an Islamist uprising in the city of Hama, leading to a siege of the city for 27 days which resulted in many thousands of deaths and massive destruction. Yet, neoliberal reforms in the early 2000s gave wealthy Christian families the incentive to improve their ties with the Alawite regime.25

The Da’awa Party in Iraq gave expression to Islamist opposition to president Saddam Hussein but was never a real threat to the regime according to Tariq Aziz, then member of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council.26

The Palestinian Intifadah and subsequent harsh Israeli responses (2000-2005), and the U.S. led invasion of Iraq (2003) have strengthened Islamist and anti-Western sentiments. Egyptian media, on the other hand, frequently published highly critical articles about Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, and question whether they sincerely believe in democracy. Many believed this, but the Brotherhood saw this as an attempt of pro-government media to tarnish their image.

Islamists continued making allegations against Coptic Christians, periodically also resulting in local clashes. The aforementioned allegations concerning Wafaa Costantine started in 2004 and have gone on for years. There was a shocking interview in September 2010 with Dr. Selim el- Awa, a man with a great reputation in Islamists circles, on Al-Jazeera TV, in which he claimed the church has its own militia, and hides weapons and ammunition in monasteries and churches, preparing for a war "against the Muslims." This caused a huge outcry in Egyptian media. Selim el-Awa later tried to play down the effects, by stating that the media had not properly presented his views, meanwhile these claims in various media outlets have contributed to a growing distrust between Christians and Islamists.27

Thus the period up to the Revolution showed a growing standoff between autocratic regimes and Islamists, as the regimes cooperated with Western nations and allowed interference in areas that Islamists believed to be unjust. Islamist movements around the Middle East criticized autocratic leaders’ support for the West’s partisan military actions and interventions in the Arab World,

24 The Cairo Foreign Press Association organized in these days a press conference with Egyptian and Western security experts. 25 Maurice Gajan in reviewing this paper, November 19, 2015 26 Interview Cairo Foreign Press Association with Tariq Aziz during visit to Iraq in 2000 which the author of this article attended. 27 C. Hulsman, “AWR Editorial: Intolerant Climate in Egypt and Media Manipulations Result in Row Around Bishop Bīshūy,” Arab-West Report, week 43, art. 32, October 25, 2010, http://www.arabwestreport.info/year- 2010/week-43/32-awr-editorial-intolerant-climate-egypt-andmedia-manipulations-result-row.

11 selective attention on human rights, Islamophobic reporting in Western media and other real and perceived injustices of Western nations. Islamists wanted to Islamize majority Muslim countries and became increasingly more militant, which has set the stage for Christian fear of Islamists.

2011-2013; the rise and fall of Islamists in Egypt28

Throughout the Arab world, the Arab revolutions have resulted in the ascension of political Islam, which was made possible by decades of social work building grass roots support among the lower social classes, and building political structures in an effort to reach the centers of power. These efforts to rule differed from one country to another. In Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen this resulted in bloody civil wars. Egypt experienced much unrest but has not fallen apart.

Christians, largely, remained supportive of autocratic rulers. Pope Shenouda III, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church from 1971 to 2012, asked Christians, in veiled language, not to demonstrate in January 2011. This was reflected in the sermon of a priest in the church of Abuna Abdel Mesih al-Menakhri in Minya, Upper Egypt, who referred to the unrest and said that “the only authority in the world is God and thus we should place all our trust in God only.”29 In times of trouble, most Coptic believers call on God for help.

It is likely that Pope Shenouda feared that toppling Mubarak would bring Islamists to power. Thus Pope Shenouda, operating as a rational-thinking political figure, along with leaders of other denominations and the Azhar, neither made efforts to support Mubarak, nor expressed open support for the Revolution.

Yet there were also Christians active in human rights organizations and joining the protests against Mubarak and the role of the army in politics. The Revolution had shown cooperation of Muslims and Christians in difficult moments and it was thus no surprise that many Christians were greatly elated after the overthrow of Mubarak.

However, following the overthrow of Mubarak, Islamists did climb to power and forced the army to negotiate with them. They were doing well in the first post Revolution parliamentary elections in December 2011 and January 2012, wherein 54 per cent of the electorate went to the polls – the highest percentage since the January 25 Revolution – with 68.95 per cent of votes going to the bloc of Islamist parties, and non-Islamist parties receiving the remaining 31.05 per cent. The

28 This section is to a large extent based on C. Hulsman (ed), “Christians victims of the growing Islamist non- Islamist divide; the urgent need for peace and reconciliation,” Arab-West Papers no. 48, September 10, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/sites/default/files/pdfs/AWRpapers/paper48.pdf 29 I attended this church service on January 28, 2011. See: C. Hulsman, “Experiences of a Dutch/Belgian delegation in Egypt prior to the resignation of President Mubarak (2),” Arab-West Report, week 6, art. 8. February 11, 2011. I have heard other clergy making similar statements during these days.

12 presidential elections followed half a year later, showing a decline in the popularity of the Islamist bloc. Islamist candidates received only 43.77 per cent of the vote during the first round of the presidential elections (May 23-24), which had a voter turnout of 43.4 per cent.30 The outcome of the second round of the presidential elections showed that both presidential candidates, the Muslim Brotherhood’s Morsi and General Ahmed Shafiq, each had close to 50% of the vote. Morsi was announced as Egypt’s first democratically elected president, but by a heavily disputed – and possibly fraudulent – margin.31

In the first round, the Coptic Christian vote was mostly divided between the various non-Islamist candidates. In the second round, the overwhelming majority of Coptic voters voted for Ahmed Shafiq, with strong indications that several local Christian leaders encouraged their flock to vote, not officially taking sides, but off the record hoping this would help to keep the Muslim Brotherhood candidate from the presidency.

The Muslim Brotherhood was well aware of these Christian sentiments and thus, in an early stage, Morsi invited Christian leaders to a dialogue in an effort to allay fears and also nominated a number of Christian advisors. But soon Islamists and non-Islamists clashed over the formulation of the new Egyptian Constitution. Christian and liberal members walked out of the 2012-Constituent Assembly, which subsequently accepted the new text of the Constitution with an overwhelming majority.

The Supreme Constitutional Court prepared for a ruling to dissolve the Shura Council and Constituent Assembly, which in turn caused President Morsi to issue his presidential decree of November 22, 2012. This decree granted him the power to legislate without judicial overview or review, until the Constitution had been accepted, thus giving him temporary powers that his autocratic predecessor Mubarak did not have. From this moment, divisions in Egyptian society became very visible. The presidential palace in Heliopolis became the focal point of anti-Morsi protests. It was quickly noted that the percentage of Christians among the demonstrators was very high.32

30 S. Tarek, ‘Runoffs between Brotherhood's Morsi and Mubarak regime's Shafiq have Egypt in a bind,’ AhramOnline, May 25, 2013, http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/36/122/42896/Presidential-elections- /Presidential-elections-news/MursiShafiq-presidential-showdown-puts-Egypt-revol.aspx 31 C. Hulsman, ‘Was president Mohammed Morsi legitimately elected?,’ Arab West Report, December 16, 2014, http://www.arabwestreport.info/year-2014/week-50/02-was-president-mohammed-morsi-legitimately-elected 32 Former Christian Wafd MP George Messiha agreed that the percentage of Christians in these demonstrations indeed had been large, interview January 25, 2013. One, however, also should note that Heliopolis is a part of Cairo with a high percentage of Christians and thus it was easy for Christians in Heliopolis to join.

Islamist preacher Safwat Hegazy33 stated in a filmed Islamist counter demonstration that 60% of the demonstrators against the proposed constitution were Christians.34 Many of them were not only demonstrating against the constitution but also publicly asked for the downfall of Morsi. Hegazi responded in what he called “a message to the Egyptian church from an Egyptian Muslim.” His anger was focused on demonstrators wanting the first Islamist president of Egypt to resign. “I tell the church, if you conspire and unite with the opposition to bring Morsi down, we will have another talk” he said. The phrase “we will have another talk” was perceived as a threat. The crowd chanted many times Allahu akbar in response, clearly approving Hegazi’s rousing statements.

In the same public statement, Hegazy claimed he had a recording of a meeting of leaders of the National Salvation Front - the collective of political parties opposed to Islamists- in which, according to Hegazy, Christian leaders George Ishaq and Mona Mina said they would fill the squares with demonstrators. George Ishaq was a Christian activist and one of the founders of the Kefeya movement (not linked to any religious beliefs) against President Mubarak. Mona Mina is an obvious Christian name, but was not a known personality. The crowd responded to Hegazy chanting, “our souls, our blood we sacrifice for Islam.” One can hear similar chants in Christian demonstrations with the same rhythm but with slightly different words “our souls, our blood we sacrifice for the cross.” Both express a willingness to die for one’s faith.

Safwat Hegazy continued after the Muslim slant for martyrdom: To the church we say: yes, you are our brothers in this country, but there are red lines and our red line is the legitimacy of Dr. Muhammad Morsi. The crowd chanted Alahu akbar in response.35 The video was widely distributed online. Copts perceived Hegazy’s words as a threat. 36

33 Hegazy has repeatedly stated that he is not a Muslim Brother but an independent Islamist wanting the unity of all Islamists. He, however, frequently seen in Muslim Brotherhood circles and had been rewarded by president Mursi for supporting him with a position in the National Council for Human Rights. J. Casper, Safwat Hijāzī: Bellwether of Egyptian Islamism? Arab-West Report, week 22, art. 10, May 30, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year- 2013/week-22/10-safwat-hijazi-bellwether-egyptian-islamism; C. Hulsman, A. Deiab, D. De Maria, “AWR Interviews Safwat Hegazy,” week 34, art. 1, August 21, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2013/week- 34/1-awr-interviews-safwat-hegazy 34 C. Hulsman, A. Deiab, D. De Maria, “AWR Interviews Safwat Hegazy,” week 34, art. 1, August 21, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2013/week-34/1-awr-interviews-safwat-hegazy. Christians who participated in these demonstrations told me the percentage of Christian demonstrators was indeed high, yet it is disputed if it was as high as 60 percent. 35 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kh5QpEMjHmA 36 C. Hulsman (ed), ‘Christians victims of the growing Islamist non-Islamist divide; the urgent need for peace and reconciliation,’ Arab-West Papers 48, September 11, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/christians-victims- growing-islamist-non-islamist-divide-urgent-need-peace-and-reconciliation#sthash.hIe8h7C2.dpuf

Morsi, despite the division the proposed Constitution caused, insisted that it would be put to a referendum which, in turn, was perceived as Islamists pushing through their agenda regardless of the division this would cause in society.

The disputed Constitution was, despite heavy non-Islamist opposition, accepted by 63.8% of the voters with a low turnout of just over 32.9%.

From this moment, the situation went downhill. Tensions increased. The lines between Islamists and non-Islamists became much sharper, whereby the great majority of Christians obviously belonged to the category of non-Islamists. President Morsi’s responses were surprising. Decisions were made that only poured more oil on the fire, such as the nomination of Abdel el- Khayat, a member of the Jama’at al-Islamiya, as the governor of Luxor, the very city where members of that same group killed 58 tourists and 4 Egyptians in November 1997. The opposition to this nomination was so strong that it was later withdrawn, but the decision showed no sign of an effort to build consensus. Instead, the Muslim Brothers were busy digging themselves in and seeking alliances with more radical Islamist groups.

In response to the growing tensions in society, a group of young activists founded the Tamarod (Arabic for Rebellion) movement on April 28, 2013. Their main activity was making a statement asking for the resignation of President Morsi, and mobilizing thousands of volunteers to collect signatures from the public. The campaign appealed to millions of Egyptians.

Several Islamist preachers issued warnings indicating that efforts to remove Morsi would result in violence. “Be careful with Islamists,” Safwat Hegazy warned, “Do you think Islamists cannot make a pure Islamist revolution?”37 Hazem Abu Ismail, Salafi preacher and a disqualified presidential candidate in 2012, warned the opponents of Islamists before June 30 that live ammunition could be used.38

Minister of Defense Abelfattah al-Sisi saw the country sliding into chaos, and gave repeated warnings to President Morsi and his opponents to be less confrontational with warnings that political unrest between different political factions could result in the “collapse of the state.”39 Prior to the deposal of President Morsi, al-Sisi asked Morsi to call for early presidential elections, but Morsi rebuffed this request.40 The answer came on July 3. Al-Sisi, in the company

37 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gk19AYj00Bg 38 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g7WehcWkJXk 39 H. Saleh, Military Chief Warns of Egypt’s Collapse, Financial Times, January 28, 2013, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/4114f050-69f8-11e2-a80c-00144feab49a.html#axzz3f6HkzKFw

40 S. Fayed and P. Taylor, “Egypt's President Mohammed Mursi Rejects Military's Ultimatum, Country On Edge,” Reuters, July 2, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/07/02/egypt-mohammed-Mursi- ultimatum_n_3532051.html

15 of Grand Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayeb of the Azhar and Pope Tawadros II, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church, and other dignitaries, announced on Egyptian TV that Morsi was ousted and that Adli Mansour, head of the Supreme Constitutional Court would be interim president. The Muslim Brothers were upset about Pope Tawadros and Sheikh al-Tayeb so clearly supporting Morsi’s ouster.41 Shortly after the statement, the police arrested Morsi and closed most Islamic TV channels/stations.

Islamists were furious, and organized large sit-ins in several parts of the country. The most important of these was at the Raba’a Adawiya mosque in Medinet Nasr where Muslim Brother leaders and supporters such as Safwat al-Hegazy frequently met, addressed the crowds and also had their own media center with satellite transmitter.

On July 10, one week after Morsi’s removal, Yaqeen Channel broadcasted statements from demonstrators at Raba’a Adawiya, including that of a sheikh who accused General al-Sisi of having created a new Taliban and a civil war between Muslims and non-Muslims, Muslims and Shi’a, Muslims and secularists. Everyone at Raba’a Adawiya, he said, is ready to commit suicide. “We are warning you, we will explode Egypt.” 42 The phrase with the warning that Egypt would explode was repeatedly mentioned in other statements.43

The language and rhetoric use in this period reminded me of Egyptian intellectual Dr. Tarek Heggy, who spoke years ago about Egyptians being fond of big talk and exaggerations. That is part of the way Egyptians express their emotions. This is often very counterproductive, in particular in a tense climate, where many strongly feel that injustice has been done.

On August 12, immediately after Ramadan, the army announced that the sit-ins would have to end. On Wednesday August 14, the army and police moved in, resulting in hundreds of deaths and thousands of wounded. Live ammunition was used. On the same day, massive violence broke out throughout the country, police stations, churches, Christian schools and sometimes also shops owned by Christians were looted, destroyed and burned.

41 Interview Dr. Amr Darrag, July 22, 2013. Statements later in the Raba’a Adawiya sit-in I went to on July 23,24 and 25 were formulated with much more frustration and anger about the widespread Christian opposition to Mursi and the Muslim Brotherhood. 42 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tn3QH1w6czI. The sheikh’s name was not given. 43 Yaqeen Channel interviewed the same sheikh again on August 21, and this time he apologized for his angry language, saying that his words should not be taken literally, and that he in no way wanted a civil war. Each person who dies, regardless who he is, is one too many, we are all Egyptian, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=joHUgBGZXSo

Many Christians believed Muslim Brothers along with their allies from other Islamist groups had played a major role in inciting this violence that brought mobs into the streets, consisting of a mixture of the poor with members of different Islamist groups.44

Muslim Brothers and Freedom and Justice Party leader Dr. Amr Darrag explicitly denied Brotherhood involvement. “All violent events on police stations, churches, etc. were done by thugs driven by state security to blame it on the Muslim Brotherhood,” Darrag claimed.45

The state security has employed thugs in the past but was this also the case here? Would state security drive thugs to attack police stations? That seems far-fetched, but not to many Muslim Brothers, showing a very deep distrust between the Brothers and Egyptian security.

Dr. Amr Darrag wrote on August 22, 2013, “We have issued in the strongest language statements denouncing the aggressions on churches, killings in Sinai, attacks on police stations....but they insist to keep lying about that. They want to tie this with us to justify our killings, arrests, and all other aggressions. Hundreds of our colleagues are being detained and the campaigns continue. … Compare this to what we did and we have been criticized for. The world is so unjust.”46

Egypt 2013 – today; a war by all means between Islamists and the government

The brutal violence around the dispersal of the sit-ins was followed by massive violence against police and churches in August 2013, which was then followed by massive arrests of Muslim Brotherhood leaders, a curfew lasting many months and on-going attacks against police and military personnel. Talks concerning attempts at reconciliation took place, but in such circumstances had little chance to succeed. After the attack of December 24, 2013 on the Mansoura security directorate building, in which 16 people- mostly policemen- were killed, Egypt held the Muslim Brotherhood responsible and declared them to be a terrorist organization. The Brotherhood denied responsibility, and pointed to the Ansar Bait al-Maqdis, a group linked to al-Qa’ida in Sinai, that released an online statement after the government had declared the Brotherhood to be a terrorist organization.

The efforts to crush the Muslim Brotherhood did not change their rhetoric. They continued to view Morsi as the first legitimately elected president and see his deposal as an illegal and

44 C. Hulsman, “Egypt is burning; reconciliation urgently needed,” Arab-West Report, August 16, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2013/egypt-burning-reconciliation-urgently-needed 45 Email Dr. Darrag, August 15, 2013 46 Email Dr. Darrag, August 22, 2013, quoted in C. Hulsman (ed), “Christians victims of the growing Islamist non-Islamist divide; the urgent need for peace and reconciliation,” Arab-West Papers, no. 48, September 10, 2013, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/christians-victims-growing-islamist-non-islamist-divide-urgent-need- peace-and-reconciliation

17 illegitimate action. Hate rhetoric and violence continued. Some of the Brotherhood rhetoric at times culminated in explicit calls for violence.47 On the other hand efforts were made to discredit the so-called ‘fifth column,’ those asking for dialogue with the Brotherhood, since Morsi’s deposal.48

The Muslim Brotherhood boycott of the referendum on the Constitution and the presidential elections contributed to extremely high approval rates: 98.1% approval of the Constitution with a 38.6% voter turnout and President al-Sisi winning 96.91% of the vote with a turnout of 47.5%. With the boycott of the referendum and presidential elections they were in fact hiding the strength of their opposition, since the non-voters were either responding to the Brotherhood call for a boycott, or for other reasons not interested in participating in voting.

Retired navy Captain Amīr Fu ̓ād reported in June 2015 that the death toll had reached around 8,000 Egyptians in two years, while the Muslim Brothers might have lost 2,000 people.” This number of casualties is a number you find only as a result of a war, a real war.”49 Many of the victims were those of targeted political assassinations, including police and military officers, judges and even Prosecutor-General Hisham Barakat, who on June 29 became the highest ranking victim of this violence.

Position of the Coptic Orthodox Church

On May 16, 2014, during the 2014 presidential election campaign, we visited the festival of St. Dimyana, which in the week of the festival attracted hundreds of thousands of mainly Christian visitors. Outside the walls of the monastery we found a banner with the photo of Metropolitan Bishoy and presidential candidate Abdelfattah al-Sisi. We interpreted this as church support for al-Sisi,50 but the monastery responded that, “neither the monastery, nor its abbot had allowed this banner to be placed.”51

47 F.W. Andersen, “The Use of Hate-Speech, Threats and the Incitement of Violence by Muslim Brotherhood Representatives and their Affiliates” (forthcoming in Arab West Report) 48 F. W. Andersen, “The Private TV Channels’ smear campaign of the Muslim Brotherhood and all other opposition against the Egyptian Army in the time just before and after the ousting of ex-President Mohamed Morsi on July 3, 2013,” (forthcoming in Arab West Report) 49 Amir Fouad, “Letter to the Editor: The death penalty of Mr. Mursī is deserved,” Arab-West Report, June 11, 2015, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2015/week-24/letter-editor-death-penalty-mr-murs%C4%AB-deserved 50 Weston Bland wrote “Cornelis Hulsman expressed his concern at seeing “Church leaders endorse presidential candidate Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi” as he strongly believes in the separation of religion and state. In the view of Hulsman, religious leaders should of course encourage the faithful to vote, but they should never publicly support one particular candidate. Hulsman believes that this is highly risky, as an alliance with Al-Sisi could potentially make them the target of Al-Sisi’s opponents, Muslim Brothers and other Morsi supporters. In the words of Hulsman, “If one day Islamists would come to power again, they might see Christians as those who once supported their enemy,” Daily News Egypt, May 28, 2014. 51 Letter of C. Hulsman to the Editor of the Daily News Egypt, May 31, 2014, http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/05/28/st-dimyanas-monastery-oasis-spirituality/ When I asked the monastery

Throughout Cairo we saw pictures of Pope Tawadros alongside presidential candidate al-Sisi. Some of these carried messages such as “The Lord Jesus calls you to support Field Marshal ‘Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi to preserve national unity.” Other texts called “to stamp out terrorism” or “to stamp out the Brotherhood.” Also here were denials of church involvement. Instead Pope Tawadros has made statements stressing non-involvement in politics.52 A day before Easter 2014, presidential candidate al-Sisi visited Pope Tawadros in his office. It was not an endorsement of his candidacy, but it did boost al-Sisi’s popularity among Coptic Christians.

The church had to walk a fine line between widespread Coptic sympathies for presidential candidate al-Sisi and the official position of abstention from politics which provided two narratives, an official one and one by anonymous political activists, most likely Copts.53

Aryn Baker noted in 2014 that Egypt’s Christians had put their faith in Abdelfatah al-Sisi. Presidential candidate and late President al-Sisi also wanted broad support, including the Copts, but was it a wise move to do this in such an open and crude way?

Coptic support for al-Sisi seemed to pay off. On Christmas Day, January 6th 2015, current President al-Sisi visited the Coptic Orthodox Cathedral, becoming the first Egyptian president to visit the Orthodox Church during Christmas. Several churches that had been destroyed in August 2013 were now rebuilt.54

The pro-al-Sisi stances by the Pope were criticized by Johannes A. Makar as a “risky partisanship” of the pope for “a military-backed regime.” Copts often explain this stance as a necessity for the security for Egypt’s Christian community.” Makar argues, citing arguments one hears among Coptic political activists abroad and in Egypt, that the state’s record in protecting the Copts is mixed. Makar believes that the staunch support of the Pope for President al-Sisi comes at the expense of the community in defending its rights, and risks that Copts as a whole are seen as “steadfast supporters of the Sisi government.” Makar does not address the risk that such a position could serve as a justification for Islamists to attack Christians, but instead is focused on strengthening an active Coptic civil society.55

Baker concluded that the “slavish mixing of religion and politics also made them [that is Christians] a target.” That was obvious in August 2013. “Within days the full brunt of the Islamists’ rage was directed at Egypt’s Christians in one of the worst spasms of communal who had placed the banner the answer was that perhaps a local businessman had done so. Emails Monastery of Dimyana, May 31 and June 1, 2014 52 J. Casper, “Church and Politics under Pope Tawadros,” Arab-West Report, 2014, week 22, art. 10, May 28, 2014 53 ibid 54 Meeting Coptic Social Democratic Party member Emad Awny, September 3, 2015 55 J.A. Makar, “The Egyptian Pope’s Risky Partisanship,” Sada, February 26, 2015, http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/02/26/egyptian-pope-s-risky-partisanship/i2zi

19 violence the country has ever seen. Sixty-three churches were burned, Christian orphanages and businesses were ransacked, and graffiti assaulting Egypt’s Christians as “dogs of Tawadros” was scrawled across the ruins.”56

Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers are now suppressed, but can still act against Christians in local communities. They were, for example, accused of pressuring the village head of Kafr Darwish to mete out a much higher penalty than had initially had been agreed for an alleged blasphemy case, involving a Christian from Kafr Darwish now living in Jordan.57

Copts now do have a president who is sympathetic to them but will this last after his presidency?

Christian survival strategies

Islamists have been on a path of radicalization since the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928. Since the 1970s, the policies of Christian leaders, widely popular among their own followers, have clashed with Islamists. Pope Shenouda was a major opponent to amending article 2 of the Constitution from stating that the sharī’ah is “a” source of legislation to “the” source of legislation. Pope Shenouda was also seen to be making efforts to prevent Christians from converting to Islam. In Mubarak’s last years, Christians were also accused of having arms in monasteries and churches. Much of the debate with Egyptian Christians is whether these perceptions are true or not. It is important, however, not only whether these perceptions are true or not, but that these perceptions exist in Islamist circles.

After the January 25 Revolution, violence against Christians increased, which has spurred Christian migration of those who had the means to emigrate; namely those who are young, educated with funds and/or relations in the countries of emigration. Numbers are not published but practically all Christians know others who have emigrated in recent years.58

It is clear that Christians have a great fear of Islamists coming to power. In 2012, when they were given the choice between the Muslim Brotherhood candidate Muhammad Morsi and General Ahmed Shafiq, they voted in an overwhelming majority for Shafiq. Later, Christians contributed to the downfall of the first Muslim Brotherhood president. They felt the pain of seeing tens of churches burned and voted en-masse for Abdelfattah al-Sisi in the 2014 presidential elections. Pope Tawadros follows in his statements and actions a very pro-President al-Sisi line. Violence against Christians, nevertheless, continued. They are an easy target since they are, as a group, so much more visible in society then Muslim opponents to Islamists.

56 A. Baker, “Egypt’s Christians Place Their Faith in Al-Sisi’s Presidential Bid,” Time Magazine, March 28, 2014 57 Visit the district around Kafr Darwish, July 8 and 9, 2015 58 C. Hulsman, “Sarakna, the migration story of one village,” Maadi Messenger, August 2014. I know of many other similar villages in Egypt, have visited Christians of all social levels in different cities in Egypt and continuously meet with people who know others who have emigrated.

Arifianto asked in 2013 how past political alignment and alliances of different religious groups contributed to conflicts. It is clear that Christians have developed a great fear of Islamists, and believed that they needed to protect themselves by allying themselves with non-Islamist rulers, even if they were authoritarian and anti-Islamist.

The majority of Syrian Christians have for decades followed a pro-Assad line, and similarly Iraqi Christians followed a pro-Saddam Hussein line, until he was removed from power. They were certainly not fully in support of these authoritarian leaders’ policies, but Christian leaders believed themselves to be more secure with these leaders, than with Islamists whom they deeply mistrusted. However, when these authoritarian leaders lost power, and countries were torn apart by civil war, their communities became easy targets for Islamists. Killings and destruction of Christian property caused millions to flee and destroyed a millennia old Christian heritage in these countries.

In Egypt, a bloody war is being fought between the al-Sisi government and Islamist insurgents, who, in the years to come, can create much havoc, but do not have the power to remove the government. Pope Tawadros and the great majority of Christians have allied themselves with the al-Sisi government. Islamists, in turn, hold Christians responsible for their support for a regime that is seen as repressive of Islamists.

As long as a strong non-Islamist leader is in power, Christians may feel to some extent protected, although no government will be able to control local Islamist sentiments.

This Christian survival strategy is widely practiced, understandable and yet risky.

It is in the interest of Egypt’s Christians to diffuse tensions with Islamists, but all indications are that neither most Islamists, nor most non-Islamists are willing to seek a political compromise. That in turn is related to a deep mutual distrust based on past experiences. Amir Fouad (Amīr Fu ̓ād) describes the standoff between Islamists and government as a “war” because of the large number of casualties on both sides. This war includes political violence, draconic responses and highly biased reporting that contributes to deepening the fear of the other.59 Islamists are also seeking to harm Egypt economically in the hope that this will bring down the government of President al-Sisi, and thus bring them back to power.60 This war is bound to inflict major harm on Egypt’s ability to develop its economy and bring stability for all Egyptians. It is also bound to

59 Amīr Fu ̓ād, “Letter to the Editor: The death penalty of Mr. Mursī is deserved,” Arab-West Report, Week 24, Article 1, June 11, 2015, http://www.arabwestreport.info/en/year-2015/week-24/letter-editor-death-penalty-mr- murs%C4%AB-deserved 60 August 7, 2014 meeting with Muslim Brotherhood leader in Amsterdam who asked to remain anonymous

21 deepen the schism between Islamists and non-Islamists and increases the vulnerability of the Christian population.

There are, however, also people who go against the current polarization. Father Mina el- Muharraqi, a hermit living close to the Monastery of al-Muharraq told us that all people, regardless of faith and conviction are children of God.61 This is inclusive. Coptic Orthodox priest Father Jo’annis, Salafi Sheikh Hamdi Abdelfattah and Sheikh Hassan (non-Salafi) lead reconciliation sessions in the village of Qufada when cases concern both Muslims and Christians. Father Jo’annis is preaching love for all Egyptians and building channels of communication. Sheikh Dr. Muhammad Salah of al-Huda TV and Sheikh Anas Aboshady of the Azhar do the same. Muslim and Christian leaders have built the Beit al-Eila as an organization that brings Muslims and Christians together.

Facing the future

A continuation of creating mutual fear between Islamists and non-Islamists will create a risk for the future stability of Egypt and with this future of the Christian communities in Egypt. The group of Islamists is too large to be neglected or suppressed. On the other hand, fear and anger, on both sides, is fully justified. Too many people on both sides have been killed and too much damage has been caused by one party to the other.62

It is dangerous for Christians in the long run to openly align themselves with any particular party in this conflict. A change towards a less partisan and more subtle rhetoric could make them seem less opposed, and thus reduce their risk of becoming a target of Islamist attacks.

It is necessary to bring all initiatives of bridge building, large and small, into one network and learn from positive experiences and efforts that can contribute to reducing tensions and building stability in Egypt and other countries. It is also necessary that the rule of law in Egypt is strengthened. A weak application of civil law causes citizens to seek alternative ways of regulating their lives, but this often comes at the expense of the weakest parties in society. It is also necessary for Egypt’s economy to be strengthened, since Egypt’s economic collapse would be bound to create more instability, which could push millions of Egyptians to seek a way out in Europe.

Egypt cannot do this alone and needs the support of other countries. The Arab Gulf countries have done a lot in the past years to support Egypt’s economy, but Europeans and Americans are

61 The monk Father Basilios of the Monastery of Muharraq asked the hermit Father Mina to receive Norbert Schiller, Dana Smillie and myself on May 21, 2014 and obtained his green light to allow us to visit his cave for a film Schiller is preparing on Christian voices in Egypt. During this visit Father Mina, very impressively, stressed in simple but powerful words that we humans are all children of God, regardless of the convictions we have. 62 Amīr Fu ̓ād

22 lagging far behind, apparently insufficiently aware of what the consequences would be if the most populous country in the Arab World would collapse.