An Ethnography of Law and Violence in Rural Oaxaca, Mexico [Article]

An Ethnography of Law and Violence in Rural Oaxaca, Mexico [Article] Item Type Article; text Authors Greenberg, James B. Citation 1988 Ariz. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 69 (1988) Publisher The University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law (Tucson, AZ) Journal Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law Rights Copyright © The Author(s) Download date 29/09/2021 23:56:43 Item License http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ Version Final published version Link to Item http://hdl.handle.net/10150/659525 AN ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAW AND VIOLENCE IN RURAL OAXACA, MEXICO* JAMES B. GREENBERG** Resumen Las comunidades indigenas Chatinos en el estado de Oaxaca, M&ico tienen una proporci~n extraordinaria de homicidios. El Profiesor Greenberg, un antrop6logo, ha estudiodo las comunidades Chatinos desde 1973 para tratarde encontrarla causa de esta violencia endemica a la regi6n. Entre las causas de esta violencia se encuentran la posicidn politica y legal de las comunidades indigenas en M.xico, que dejan las comunidades semiaut6nomas, pero, en una situaci6n de descuido y a consequencia no pueden hacer uso del sistema legal estatal y federa4 la rotura de las formas tradicionales de tenencia de tierras que result6 a consequencia de la introducci6n del cultivo del cafe en los afios 1950, conflictos de clase social y racial El Profesor Greenberg utiliz6 datos etnogrdficos, que el personalmente reuniO, como la base de sus observaciones y como un mtodo para describir las complicadas e implacable relaciones sociales en que se encuentran estas comunidades atrapadas. INTRODUCTION As an anthropologist, I am not merely concerned with the formal characteristics of a legal system, but also with the way it is embedded in the social, political, and economic fabric of society. The questions which concern me are not just the way the formal system functions, but also how conflicts are created, evolve, and are resolved, whether these processes occur within the legal system or outside of it. Such concerns mean that I am equally interested in those kinds of disputes and contracts which make use of the law, and those which do not. In this article I shall examine conflict and violence among the Chatino Indians of Oaxaca, Mexico and the role that the legal system plays in addressing these problems. Much of my insight I owe to Don Fortino, a good friend, whose family ties have linked him to both Chatino and mestizo societies. (Mestizos are Mexicans of mixed parentage who, despite their Indian ancestry, culturally identify *Copyright 0 1988 by James B. Greenberg. **Bureau of Applied Research in Anthropology, Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona. Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law themselves as non-Indians.) I use his testimony as a means to explore topics of great personal concern: the way the legal system functions, and the violence which is endemic to this region. These topics are of personal concern, not simply as a matter of intellectual curiosity, but because they directly affect my family. The conflicts and bloodshed in the region have cost the lives of many of my wife's kinsmen, compadres,' and many of my friends; it continues to threaten their lives and to affect my own. THE LEGAL STATUS OF INDIAN COMMUNITIES The legal status of Mexican Indians and their communities is different from that of Indians in the United States. In theory, Mexican Indians have the same rights, duties, and privileges enjoyed by any Mexican citizen, but in practice this is seldom the case. There are no "Indian reservations" in Mexico, but Indians have nevertheless grouped to form many purely Indian communities. Non-Indian elites, however, who control state and federal government, also control these purely Indian communities. The governmental organization imposed on these Indian communities is in sharp cultural contrast with traditional Indian administration of their communities. I will show in this article that the traditional forms of organization go beyond and often oppose those created by the state. I will further argue that indigenous concepts of law and justice often contradict those of the state, and that the defense of those indigenous concepts itself generates violence. Mexican states are divided into districts, each with a district capital. The state of Oaxaca is divided into 30 districts. Each district comprises a number of municipios (counties) which may contain agencias (townships). The civil officials elected in the agencia must be confirmed by the presidente (mayor) of the municipio and are accountable to him. Frequently, to guarantee the agencia's "cooperation" and smooth administration, the presidente municipal in the county seat names a non-Indian as secretary for the township. The secretary not only insures that legal formalities are observed, but also sees to it that the municipio is the judge and arbitrator in all important agencia matters - the administration of justice, the collection of taxes, and so forth. This arrangement creates a closed circuit between the county seat and the township, and places a substantial obstacle between the township and state and federal levels of government. 'A compadre (literally "co-parent") is a godfather of one's child. An Ethnography of Law and Violence Although Oaxaca has some 15 different Indian ethnic groups and the largest indigenous population of any state in Mexico, its territorial units have been imposed in such a way as to gerrymander these ethnic groups between its political divisions, which effectively reduces Indian representation and access to power. The gerrymandering of Chatino communities presents a typical case. There are some 30,000 Chatino spread among 23 Chatino villages. The villages are politically divided between two districts: Juquila and Sola de Vega. The district capitals of the same names are dominated by mestizos. (Refer to the map on the following page.) In addition to their control of district governments, mestizos in these districts also control the majority of lower-level governmental units. In the district of Juquila, for example, mestizos manipulate 17 of the 21 Chatino villages directly, through control of either municipios or agencias. The remaining four villages are in a Chatino-controlled or "free" municipio, and mestizo manipulation of them takes a more indirect form. In the four Chatino communities which have the status of "free" municipios, the indirect influence of non-Indian elites is nonetheless sharply felt. Because this status requires that the county government have a republican form of government elected by popular vote and that its internal regime conform to state and federal law, municipio officials are legally accountable to mestizo authorities at the district level. While Indians may hold the elected offices, serious violations of state or federal law may lead to their removal from office and to the demotion of the community's status from that of municipio to agencia, with the resulting lower level of independence. Thus, mestizos are in a position to force the authorities of Indian municipios into actions which favor mestizo interests. Despite the state's imposition of its political and legal systems on Indian communities, indigenous notions of law, justice, and government have not been entirely suppressed. Chatino villages remain corporate entities in their own right. The Chatino are citizens of a village first, a nation second. Despite state and federal constitutions which dictate that local government shall be organized in a particular fashion, Indian traditions have permeated local government organization. The constitutionally mandated posts have become a part of a social ladder in which men, over the course of a lifetime, alternate service in ranked religious posts (which sponsor fiestas for the saints) with civil posts, increasing their prestige and power with each step. Upon completion of this ladder, men become elders of the community. The committee of elders, though it exists entirely outside the framework of the civil government, has veto power in the community 72 Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law Z 0 to- .00 o . o o . .0 .. - -/ ° 0 c" 0 ~ -0 00 0aa af o 0 ' 0 ,,.I _-. C I--- - . 0. 0 ,2 0 0 ="Q1- 0 Z* = o 2- !Io'i.1 0 iN c ~ 11 _ CL 0.0 *. 0 .0 1 - . C . 2 - 00 0 1f -- ~ ~ I0 O .. E-. -- -i I CL 0.01 0 U . 60 0 0U *00 cc -- U 0~ An Ethnography of Law and Violence over the civil government, and may even force elected officials to resign if they go against the elders' wishes. The traditional power hierarchy conflicts with the state-imposed system of government in critical subject areas. Of greatest importance is the exercise of police and judicial powers. Because of their lack of access to political power and their distrust of the non-Indians who control their communities, Chatinos have continued traditional methods of handling community problems. If the Chatino were, in fact, economically, geographically, and politically isolated, these traditional methods might suffice. But unlike Indians in the United States, the legal status of these people does not so isolate them, and the traditional methods are ill-equipped to handle the volume and complexity of the problems facing the Chatino in modern Mexico. Furthermore, the continuation and defense of these methods only entrenches a cultural response that has deadly consequences. ENDEMIC VIOLENCE I first visited the district of Juquila in 1973 whi l searching for a village in which to do anthropological fieldwork. On"iie way into the district, I heard stories about people being hacked to death with machetes. Upon my arrival in the Chatino village of Yaitepec, these stories took on a more realistic probability. I went to the village to see if it would meet my research needs, and, as I was talking to the village officials, the village topiles (police) brought in two young men charged with murder.

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