The United States Is Moving Further from Fostering Multilateral Restraint of Conventional Arms Sales
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Penn State International Law Review Volume 6 Article 3 Number 3 Dickinson Journal of International Law 1988 The nitU ed States Is Moving Further From Fostering Multilateral Restraint of Conventional Arms Sales William George Wentz Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr Part of the International Law Commons Recommended Citation Wentz, William George (1988) "The nitU ed States Is Moving Further From Fostering Multilateral Restraint of Conventional Arms Sales," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 6: No. 3, Article 3. Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol6/iss3/3 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact [email protected]. The United States Is Moving Further From Fostering Multilateral Restraint Of Conventional Arms Sales Arms sales is the blind spot of our generation. Every gener- ation has its own blind spot which is incomprehensible to future generations - slave trade of the eighteenth century and childworkers of the nineteenth century. Like the other evils, this too shall pass.1 I. Introduction Not by itself, it will not pass. History has shown that leadership, by a particular nation and with concerted diplomatic effort, has been a principal ingredient leading to positive results from multilateral conventional arms2 transfer restraint efforts.3 In the last thirty years, arms transfer has become a national security and diplomatic instru- ment of the major powers," as the quantity of arms transferred5 and level of their technological sophistication has increased. 6 As a result, arms transfer has become a major factor in East-West competition,7 and armed conflicts have become more devastating. 8 The past thirty years has also been marked by unilateral9 and multilateral1" at- tempts to both reduce the negative results of international arms 1. A. PIERRE, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF ARMS SALES 311 (1982) [hereinafter A. PIERRE]. This is a paraphrase of A. Pierre's quote of Anthony Sampson, noted British journal- ist, in Arms Sales: Blind Spot of a Generation, The Observer (June 18, 1978). The last sen- tence of this paraphrase, stating that "this too shall pass" is inferred by the quoted sentence, according to A. Pierre. 2. The scope of this Comment is restricted to "conventional arms," meaning other than nuclear. "Arms," as used in this Comment is not restricted to individual weapons, but means all weapons and equipment of conventional war, to include individual and crew-served weap- ons, weapons systems, aircraft, armored and other ground vehicles, boats and ships, communi- cations equipment, and other equipment (writer's definition). 3. See generally infra p. 359 (discussion of Soviet First Party Secretary Khrushchev's proposal for United Nations arms embargo of the Middle East), p. 360 (discussion of the Carter administration's Conventional Arms Transfer Talks with the Soviet Union), p. 365 (discussion of the Venezuelan president's efforts to reactivate the Ayacucho Declaration). 4. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. 5. See infra p. 345. 6. See infra pp. 345-46. 7. See infra p. 346. 8. See infra p. 370. 9. See generally infra pp. 356-65. 10. Id. DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6:3 transfer and reverse the current trends." Until the present decade, the United States had taken the initiative in many of these instances to encourage restraint. 2 Presently, international arms transfer re- straint does not appear to be a significant item in the United States foreign policy agenda.' In the past, cooperation among major arms suppliers was only successful to a limited degree, in achieving restraint, when the objec- tives were limited to a particular region of the world and toward correcting a particular crisis. 4 Conventional wisdom at the begin- ning of the Carter administration was that the Soviet Union was not interested in multilateral arms transfer restraint; however, this changed when, at Carter administration initiative, the United States and the Soviet Union conducted Conventional Arms Transfer Talks, which lasted for one year.' 5 The Reagan administration has taken a different tack, concluding that cooperation among major suppliers is presently an unworkable approach. One reason for the Reagan ad- ministration's conclusion is that the Soviet Union, whose participa- tion would be necessary for success, is no longer interested.' 6 Thus, the present United States policy is to take no initiative toward en- couraging arms supplier multilateral restraint, but to focus on re- gional conflict resolution in an attempt to reduce underlying arms demand motivation. 7 The present policy also supports United Na- tions' ongoing arms transfer restraint efforts.' 8 This Comment describes world arms sales trends and the roles of the arms suppliers. It traces the United States arms sales policies and practices from World War II to the present. This Comment out- lines past international efforts at restraint that illustrate how previ- ous successes have been achieved. Last, this Comment examines the present United States policy, concluding that the policy is too pas- sive, lacks implementation, and lacks diplomatic leadership needed for success. II. Trends in World Arms Trade Several marked international trends have occurred in the 1970's and 1980's. 19 The trends are that arms sales have become a key dip- 11. Id. 12. Id. 13. See generally infra pp. 372-74. 14. See generally infra pp. 358-64. 15. See infra text accompanying note 183. 16. See infra text accompanying notes 303 and 304. 17. See infra text accompanying notes 308-10. 18. Id. 19. Most scholars of international arms transfer would likely agree that an excellent discussion of trends is at A. PIERRE, supra note I. See also Arms Sales: The New Diplomacy, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Wntr 1981-82), reprinted in NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, INTERNA- Spring 1988] CONVENTIONAL ARMS SALES lomatic tool of supplier states, quality and quantity of transferred arms have increased, significant flow is toward the Third World rather than solely toward major alliance allies, indigenous arma- ments industries within the Third World have become prominent, and arms sales have become a major factor in East-West competi- tion in the Third World. Each of these trends is discussed below. The first rend is that arms sales have become a key diplomatic tool of suppliers. 20 The major powers are placing less reliance on the traditional instruments of reassurance and diplomacy, such as formal alliances, stationing forces abroad, and threat of direct interven- tion.21 Instead, nations are more likely to shore up allies or proxies with arms than to commit their own forces. 22 Both the United States and the Soviet Union now give less economic assistance than they give military assistance.23 The second trend is that the quantity of weapons traded has increased.24 Worldwide arms imports rose from 22.9 billion dollars in 1975 to approximately 40 billion dollars each year from 1981 to 1984.25 In 1984, the United States share of total world arms exports was 24.6 percent, and the Soviet Union's share was 26.8 percent.2 French and British sales volume have quadrupled since 1970.27 A number of smaller suppliers have significantly increased their sales.28 The third trend is the qualitative upgrading of arms trans- TIONAL ISSUES AND PERSPECTIVES 208-26 (1983) [hereinafter NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY]. 20. NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY, supra note 19, at 211. Although not the most evi- dent trend, this is the most disheartening trend with regard to prospects for multilateral restraint. 21. Id. 22. Id. These trends, breaking away from the traditional diplomatic tools and instead using arms supply, portend an environment that is more unfriendly to multilateral reduction agreement. This Comment traces the change, from major power reliance in prior decades on regional alliance and diplomacy, to supplying arms in this decade in order to achieve interna- tional objectives. As major powers find that arms supply is more effective and economical than traditional methods, it seems that major powers will emphasize arms supply. Id. 23. Id. 24. Id. at 209. 25. Measured.in constant 1983 dollars. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ARMS TRANSFER, 6 (1986) [hereinafter WMEAT]. This document has been published annually by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA). ACDA distributes the report to major college, university, and public libraries. Transfers dropped to 27 billion dollars in 1985, due principally to a decline of developing country imports by over 40 percent in real terms for the previous year. Id. at 7. The 1986 WMEAT report concludes that the sharp decline was due to a burgeoning rise in developing countries' imports in the early 1980's, which could not be sustained because of the economic drain on those countries. Id. The 1986 WMEAT report states that years 1979-1984 can be seen as a plateau period with a moderate growth rate of 1.5 percent, and that the 1985 drop will probably be revised upward in future editions. The WMEAT report cautions against as- suming a downward trend. Id. 26. WMEAT, supra note 25, at 11. 27. Id. 28. Id. DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 6:3 ferred.2 9 Prior to 1970, most arms transferred were the major pow- ers' surplus and obsolete weapons.30 Today the weapons transferred are among the most sophisticated the suppliers can offer."' The fourth trend is that the direction of arms flow has changed."2 Until the mid-1960's most weapons went to developed countries, namely NATO and Warsaw Pact allies."3 This changed during the Vietnam War period when the major portion of transfers went to the developing world.3" The trend did not reverse with the end of the war.