Syria's Mutating Conflict
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SYRIA’S MUTATING CONFLICT Middle East Report N°128 – 1 August 2012 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ...................................................................................................... i I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................. 1 II. THE PROBLEM WITH THE REGIME’S MILITARY SOLUTION ........................ 3 A. THE FAILED SECURITY SOLUTION ................................................................................................ 4 B. SCORCHED EARTH COUNTER-INSURGENCY? ................................................................................ 6 C. THE END OF TERRITORIAL COMPARTMENTALISATION ................................................................. 9 D. MISSED POLITICAL OPPORTUNITIES? ......................................................................................... 12 III. SHIFTING SOCIAL TRENDS ...................................................................................... 17 A. THE RESPONSE TO RADICALISATION .......................................................................................... 18 B. AN EVER-GROWING DIVIDE ....................................................................................................... 21 1. One side’s awakening ................................................................................................................ 21 2. The other side’s vision ............................................................................................................... 23 3. The Alawite community’s nightmare ........................................................................................ 24 C. THE ISSUE OF SECTARIANISM ..................................................................................................... 27 D. THE ECONOMY OF VIOLENCE ..................................................................................................... 31 IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................ 33 APPENDICES A. MAP OF SYRIA ................................................................................................................................. 36 B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .................................................................................... 37 C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA SINCE 2009 ... 38 D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ................................................................................................ 40 Middle East Report N°128 1 August 2012 SYRIA’S MUTATING CONFLICT EXECUTIVE SUMMARY At a distance, Syria’s conflict can resemble a slow, pain- wished it well, even as no one wanted to be caught bury- ful slog, punctuated by intermittent accelerations and ap- ing it. parent tipping points, influenced by international activity. Zoom in, and one can cast such impressions aside. Dip- International attitudes might yet change: an especially lomatic manoeuvrings have ended up being little more large-scale massacre or, more likely, regime use or loss of than inertia masquerading as motion. The West used them control of chemical weapons could trigger Western military to pretend it was doing more than it was; Russia exploited action; Turkey or Jordan, alarmed at the rate of refugee them to feign it backed the Syrian regime less than it ac- inflows, could establish a safe-haven in Syrian territory; tually did. Meanwhile, in Syria, one sees neither deadlock in the event of Western intervention, Iran or Hizbollah nor abrupt transformation; virtually everything has been could reciprocate on the regime’s behalf. For now, such changing but at a steady pace: the shape of the conflict; scenarios are entirely hypothetical. The bottom line at this civil society dynamics; sectarian relations; and the very stage is that the conflict will be sustained and influenced nature of the regime the opposition seeks to depose. by outside parties but not determined by them. That un- enviable role will fall on Syrians. Not all is heading in the wrong direction; some develop- ments have been surprisingly uplifting. But there are more That is why by far the more significant dynamics are those than enough ominous trends, none more alarming than unfurling on the ground. One is tempted to say that the these: a regime seemingly morphing into a formidable mi- regime has been uniformly cold-blooded and indiscrimi- litia engaged in a desperate fight for survival; an Alawite nate from the start, but that is not so. The conflict experi- community increasingly embattled and persuaded its fate enced several phases: from the regime’s political conces- hinges entirely on the regime’s; and an opposition that, sions, both half-hearted (which prompted stronger popular despite sometimes heroic efforts to contain them, is threat- demands) and coupled with brutal repression (which fur- ened by its own forms of radicalisation. Together, this ther undermined their credibility); to its so-called security could portend a prolonged, ever more polarised, destruc- solution (which, by seeking to force entire communities tive civil war. into submission further energised the opposition and pushed it toward armed resistance); and, finally, to its so-called The regime almost certainly will not change its ways, and military solution (a scorched earth policy of rampant de- so the burden must fall on the opposition to do what – giv- struction and looting that turned what once was viewed as en the immensity of its suffering – must seem an improb- a national army into a broadly reviled occupation force). able undertaking: seriously address the phenomena of retaliatory violence, sectarian killings and creeping funda- With each stage, the regime burned yet another bridge, mentalism within its ranks; rethink its goal of total regime leaving it with neither way back nor way out. Just as the eradication and instead focus on rehabilitating existing political solution undermined those involved in politics institutions; profoundly reassess relations with the Ala- and the security situation wrecked the security services’ wite community; and come up with forward looking pro- ability to operate, so did the military solution eviscerate posals on transitional justice, accountability and amnesty. the army’s credibility. First things first: Syria indeed has become an arena for out- Social dynamics have evolved as well, a case of what one side meddling, but the meddling has been far more effec- might call the good, the bad and the ugly. The good was tive at sustaining the fighting than ending it. The joint UN/ better than anticipated: a remarkably vibrant, courageous Arab League envoy, Kofi Annan, sought to mediate, but and resilient civil society that has mobilised networks of Syrians and non-Syrians alike backed him for opposite assistance and kept in check some of the worst forms of reasons and in entirely self-serving ways. Because the mis- violence to which any armed opposition operating in a sion’s success was predicated on finding middle ground poisonous environment might have resorted. Intensified when most parties yearned for a knockout punch, few truly regime brutality failed to subdue popular protests; if any- Syria’s Mutating Conflict Crisis Group Middle East Report N°128, 1 August 2012 Page ii thing, it gave them a shot in the arm. Surprising none more might contemplate triumphant success. Alawites worry than itself, Syria’s opposition rediscovered a sense of sol- about collective eradication. idarity, community and national pride. Of all the ongoing changes, perhaps the most significant The bad involves those features (sectarianism, fundamen- and least appreciated is what, over time, has become of the talism, jihadi and foreign fighters) that a prolonged battle regime. The one that existed at the outset of the conflict virtually was bound to unearth and attract and that the re- almost certainly could not have survived the spectacular gime did its utmost to exacerbate. Several opposition groups killing of top officials in the heart of its traditional strong- have adopted an increasingly fundamentalist discourse hold; street combat in Damascus, Aleppo and a string of and demeanour, a trajectory that mirrors the conflict’s grad- other towns; the loss of important border crossings with ually deadlier and more confessional turn; popular loss of Turkey and Iraq; all amid near-total economic devastation faith in the West; as well as mounting pledges of support and diplomatic opprobrium. That, a year and a half later, from Gulf Arab states such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar. its new incarnation not only withstood those blows but All this could be – and, looking back, was predicted to be vigorously counterpunched sends a message worthy of – far worse. In the tug of war between society’s demons reflection. and its ability to resist them, the most encouraging aspect has been Syrians’ at times striking self-awareness, grasp As its political backbone disintegrates, the regime is be- of dangers ahead and attempts at course correction. Yet, ing reduced to its repressive apparatus, while the latter this hardly justifies complacency. itself gradually morphs into an entity more akin to a mili- tia than an army in both make-up and ethos. The regime That is because the ugly is truly alarming. From the start essentially has been stripped down to a broadly cohesive, of the crisis, the gulf between pro-opposition and pro- hardcore faction fighting an increasingly