79

Missed Opportunities in the Ukraine: U.S.S.R. and Nazi Occupation in the Inter-War and World War II MICHAEL HUMENIUK

During the height of Nazi Germany’s militaristic expansion in World War II, it occupied a vast amount of the European continent, consisting of twenty-two countries from France to Lithuania. However, Nazi Germany—and Hitler—had a vested interest in occupying the Ukrainian state held by the Soviet Union prior to World War II more than any other. German leaders such as Otto von Bismarck, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Hitler all considered the “conquest of the Ukraine as offering the surest road to a more abundant German life,”1 and Wilhelm had even tried to bring this to fruition before the First World War. Many Germans saw the Ukraine as a potential “breadbasket”2 and “one of the loveliest gardens of the world . . . . a Paradise,”3 for Germany’s cultivation. The Ukraine—after the beginning of Operation Barbarossa—seemed willing to co-operate with the Germans. The majority of the Ukrainian state showed a willingness to “support the New Order,”4 demonstrating that there were high hopes for the impending Nazi invasion. However, as the war continued, the enthusiasm of the Ukraine towards the Nazi occupation slowly shifted to dissatisfaction. By examining the interwar-era Ukraine under Soviet and Polish occupation, the Ukraine’s hope in regard to the Nazi invasion can be uncovered. Then, by moving into an examination of the Nazi occupation of the Ukraine during the Second World War, it is possible to analyze how Nazi Germany lost favour among the Ukrainian population, and ultimately failed to capitalize on a state willing to assist its cause against communism. This paper will argue that the Soviet’s interwar mistreatment and brutal policies towards the Ukraine—policies that led to terrible collectivization, a suppression of federal autonomy, and the Red Famine of 1933—created the initial hope of the Ukrainian state regarding the Nazi invasion. Furthermore, this paper will go on to argue that Germany failed to capitalize on the potential of its occupation by focusing on the Ukraine as a colony for mining resources and supplies for the expanding German Reich. By doing this, Germany ultimately continued the occupation where the Soviets had left off rather than fostering more active collaboration and calls for federal autonomy against the Soviets during Operation Barbarossa. Had Germany done so, they might have been able to create an active and willing ally to their offensive against communism during

1 Joachim Joesten, “Hitler’s Fiasco in the Ukraine,” Foreign Affairs 21 (January 1943): 331. 2 Ibid., 331. 3 Mark Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), 144. 4 Marcus Eikel and Valentina Sivaieva, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs and Village Elders in Ukraine, 1941–4: How Local Administrators Co-operated with the German Occupation Authorities,” Contemporary European History 23, no. 3 (2014): 406.

80

World War II. To examine all this information in an effective manner, this paper will be split into sections. The first will focus on the interwar Soviet and Polish occupation of the Ukraine, outlining the importance of the independence movement among the Ukrainian population from World War I onward. The section will then move into discussing Soviet politics that result in the suppression of Ukrainian independence and a manmade famine that some historians consider genocide. This will ultimately show that the hope for the Nazi invasion during the Second World War was due to the interwar occupation by the Soviets and Polish. The second section of the paper will first focus on the failure of the Nazis to capitalize on the potential of their invasion. The section will then discuss the Nazis’ policies regarding governance and autonomy, including the idea that these policies were in fact a façade to hide Hitler’s and the Nazis’ real intentions regarding the Ukrainian state. Finally, this section will discuss how the Nazis’ policies in the Ukraine began to resemble those of the Soviet occupiers during the interwar era, ultimately leading to dissatisfaction among the Ukrainian population. * * * In 1938 during the prelude to World War II, on “December 9, a Ukrainian Autonomist Bill was submitted to the Sejm in Poland.”5 This was the last of numerous bills seen in states after the Munich agreement in September 1938—The agreement that gave Germany the annexed Sudetenland. However, “at no time in history” have all the countries and nations that are comprised of Ukrainian-speaking people “been united within a single Ukrainian national State.”6 This determination by the Ukraine to achieve autonomy is a large part of the narrative surrounding the interwar era and World War II, and plays a key role in the hatred of the Soviet Union and Poland in the interwar era. At the end of World War I, U.S President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points called for “autonomy for all the peoples of the Austria-Hungary,” which consisted of a largely Ukrainian population.7 However, it is important to note that many people within this empire understood “autonomy to mean national self-determination or independence.”8 Wilson’s statement caused the Ukrainian peoples to organize around a common goal of achieving power by autonomy in the final years after World War I. The Ukrainian people—of the “East Galician Republic” and “Ukrainian Republic”—rallied together to fight a campaign against the Poles and Red armies invading the Ukrainian state established between these groups.9 This was to help establish the independence and “self-determination” that the people of the Ukraine understood as being essential in the “future peace” of Europe, according to Wilson.10 However, in 1920 “with the establishment of Bolshevik rule in Dnieper Ukraine . . . efforts to create a sovereign Ukrainian state . . . came to an end.”11 This new governmental rule established over the Ukraine created long-

5 E.P., “The Ukrainian Problem,” Bulletin of International News 16, no. 1 (January 14, 1939): 3. 6 Ibid., 3. 7 Paul R. Magocsi, A History of Ukraine (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 512. 8 Ibid., 512. 9 E.P., “The Ukrainian Problem,” 8. 10 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 512. 11 Ibid., 520.

81 standing resentment due to the disregard for the determined future peace of Europe that Wilson had expressed and the Ukraine had tried to follow. From this brief history of Ukrainian attempts at federal autonomy—attempts that were continually suppressed—the seed of resentment towards the interwar occupiers was planted. This resentment was fostered not only by the defeat of their autonomy movement, but also by the Polish betrayal of the Galician Republic, who had “abandoned [their] claim to Eastern Galicia in exchange for Polish recognition of the Ukrainian Republic and military assistance against the Bolsheviks.”12 The Polish—who could not stand against the Soviets—came to an agreement in 1920 recognizing a Ukrainian state “under Bolshevik occupation, and which eventually became a constituent member of the U.S.S.R.”13 Despite ongoing attempts at independence and autonomy by the Ukrainian state, it was continually repressed by outside powers even after Wilson’s statements in 1918, which the Ukraine took seriously. This disregard for Ukrainian independence created the basis for the resentment and distaste felt for the interwar era occupiers by the Ukrainian state. The resentment established shortly after World War I within the larger Ukrainian state— now occupied by both Poland and the Soviet Union—was only exacerbated by the policies of the occupying countries, especially the Soviet Union. The Ukraine continually resisted the Soviets’ policies, “urging concessions to the localities and limitations on the powers of the central government” even as the centralization process began.14 The leading authorities within the Ukrainian S.S.R. held the belief that the Union’s strength was held within its multiple republic states and that “the Union would grow powerful as it encouraged wide independence at the local level.”15 However, the Soviet Union rejected these ideas, embarking—in later years—on “programs of state industrialization” and “farm collectivization” that would help to enlarge “central authority” within the Soviet Union.16 In suppressing the ideas held by leading officials within the Ukraine, the Soviets created further resentment towards themselves in the state. In the 1920s the Ukraine firmly opposed collectivization of farmland. It “passed a law embodying the principle that all land should belong to those who work it.”17 However, these ideas did not last long, as they were in direct opposition to Stalin’s future policies. When Stalin rose to power in 1924, he quickly embarked on attaining “uncontested political power.”18 In 1928, Stalin implemented the “concept of a planned command economy. All decisions were to be made at the center in Moscow and implemented throughout the Soviet Union,” which, from this point on, was considered “a single economic unit.”19 Through the enactment of these policies by Stalin and other Bolshevik leaders, the Ukrainian agenda for independence and autonomy—along with the state’s objection to centralized government—was suppressed, furthering the resentment felt among

12 E.P., “The Ukrainian Problem,” 8. 13 Ibid., 8. 14 Robert S. Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 80. 15 Ibid., 80. 16 Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957, 83. 17 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 549. 18 Ibid., 550. 19 Ibid., 551.

82 the Ukrainian population. It is important to note that not all Ukraine peoples were resentful towards the Soviets and Polish. Both occupiers—in particular, the Polish—instituted some reforms. For example, they announced in a memorandum the “abolition of educational legislation discriminating against Ukrainian schools,” and other reforms regarding Ukrainian education.20 The Bolshevik rule also introduced similar reforms under Lenin, giving Ukrainian children a chance at an education in their own language, something almost unthinkable prior to the First World War.21 However, while these bills and legislation helped to comfort the Ukrainian population and diminish some of the established resentment, Stalin’s Five Year Plan—which began in 1928,22 after Lenin’s death—sent the Soviet Ukraine down an irreversible path to collectivization, famine and resentment. The Five Year Plan was meant to achieve “rapid industrialization” by nationalizing the remaining areas of the economy of the Soviet Union and to “collectivize the agricultural sector,” meaning that all income from this sector would accumulate to the state.23 The collectivization of agriculture was the more difficult aspect of this plan, especially in the Ukraine. Under the former New Economic Policy put into effect to settle the Soviet Union after the First World War,24 the Soviet Union—under Lenin—introduced a “relaxation of central controls,”25 which allowed for more free and independent farming and governance. However, Stalin opted to move forward once Lenin died and introduced a collectivization plan that was unpopular among the Ukrainian population after years under Lenin’s NEP. Even this simple shift in leadership and policy created a general shift in sentiment towards the occupying powers. As the Five Year Plan began, it became clear just how far Stalin’s new plan would have to push the population of the Ukraine to collectivize. By 1928 only “3.4 percent of farms (representing 3.8 percent of the arable land) had been collectivized in Soviet Ukraine.”26 Just two years later, this number would jump to “65 percent of farms and 70 percent of livestock” within the Ukraine, where it had been “forcibly collectivized” against the wishes of the population.27 Over this short amount of time, citizens known as Kulaks28 were increasingly persecuted within the Ukraine for being an “independent movement” against Soviet collectivization.29 More specifically, the Kulaks were identified with “right [wing political] deviation”30 from the Soviet Union’s communist ideal. This group personifies the resentment towards Stalin’s policies that took away the wealth the people of the Ukraine had accumulated over the previous decades. Their actions against these

20 E.P., “The Ukrainian Problem,” 13. 21 Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, 50. 22 Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957, 150. 23 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 551. 24 Mazower, Dark Continent: Europe's Twentieth Century, 117. 25 Ibid., 117. 26 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 555. 27 Ibid., 555. 28 Well-off peasants who had expanded their land holdings with the reforms of 1906. The name becomes associated with those who oppose collectivization because of their expanded wealth and land holdings. 29 Sullivant, Soviet Politics and the Ukraine 1917-1957, 169. 30 Karel C. Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair: Life and Death in Ukraine Under Nazi Rule (London: Harvard University Press, 200), 47.

83 policies also lead to a breaking point. The Kulaks, along with local farmers, were against giving up such an important part of their heritage, “the land,” to the state.31 The people of the Ukraine—led by the Kulaks brazen dislike of the Soviet policies—took various routes to resist collectivization, such as “the slaughter of livestock, the burning of fields,” and “the driving out of the new collective farm officials” Stalin had introduced.32 Due to these acts of resistance, some collective farms became “centers of opposition” to the Soviet collectivization.33 This prompted the Soviets, under Stalin’s leadership, to “eliminate the kulaks.”34 Those who attempted resistance were deemed Kulaks, or their henchmen, and were equally persecuted. Stalin and his leading officials forcibly deported all of these people to areas such as “Central Asia, Siberia, and the Soviet Far East,” where thousands died either there or in transport.35 In response to the resistance, officials within the Soviet Union ordered that the grain from the Ukraine should be seized. The Kulak revolt and killings also had negative implications on the harvest in 1930, at which point a slow decline in the ability to produce grain occurred.36 As the 1930s began, the slow decline in grain production resulted in a famine in the Ukraine, causing almost “4.5 to 5 million deaths in 1933 alone to 10 million deaths during the rest of the 1930s.”37 Stalin and his regime denied the existence of the famine for decades after its outbreak, despite outcries by former residents of the Ukraine under Soviet occupation well into the 1980s, when the extent of the famine was finally uncovered.38 This famine marked the apex of Ukrainian resentment and dislike of Soviet rule. From almost the beginning of the Soviet occupation in the years following World War I, there had been distaste towards the occupier. However, while small steps were taken towards forms of Ukrainianization and nationalism under Lenin, Stalin’s repeal of the NEP and introduction of the Five Year Plan marked a turning point in the relationship between the occupied state and its occupier. The forced centralization of land and farms created mass resistance among the population of the Ukraine, and in turn thousands were killed. As a result, further collectivization was introduced within the Ukraine that resulted in a famine, which was denied by the Soviet Union almost until its collapse in the 1990s. All of these factors combined to create a resounding amount of opposition to the Soviet occupation of the Ukraine. As a result, the onset of World War II saw the Ukraine hopeful for an invasion by the Nazis. This would, many Ukrainians felt, abolish Soviet rule over the Ukraine. This optimism stemmed from the hope of a new chance at Ukrainian federal autonomy and a desire to see the Soviet Union destroyed—a point that the Ukraine made

31 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 556. 32 Ibid., 556. 33 Ibid., 558. 34 Ibid., 557. 35 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 7. 36 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 558. 37 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 559. 38 Roman Serbyn, comp. “The Great Famine of 1933 and the Ukrainian Lobby at the League of Nation and the International Red-Cross,” Holodomor Studies 1, no. 1 (Winter 2009): 92.

84 clear to the incoming Nazi occupiers during Operation Barbarossa. However, the Nazis did little to foster the Ukraine’s willingness to collaborate. * * * John Armstrong, a European historian suggests that “the sweeping German conquests” of the Second World War “provided the potential for collaborationism on a scale unparalleled since the Napoleonic wars.”39 Another historian, Oleg Zarubinski that it was the “influence of the totalitarian system, the mass repression associated with it, and the damage done to the entire social- political system during Soviet prewar domination”40 that was responsible for inspiring collaboration. Regardless, it is evident from these statements that the Nazis inspired collaboration across Europe during the Second World War, but this potential for collaboration was particularly strong within the Ukraine. Within the Ukraine, there was a deep-seeded resentment towards the Soviet occupiers of the interwar era that existed due to the policies enacted by Lenin, Stalin, and other Soviet leaders.41 However, to what extent did the new Nazi occupiers foster this distaste for the Soviets? According to one historian, “collaborationism in the Ukraine . . . was based primarily on ideological affinity.”42 The Ukraine saw similarities between the Nazis and itself. The Nazis had embarked on their expansion with the hope of uniting the larger German population of Europe. The Ukraine—in the final years of World War I—made its own attempt at federal autonomy for the greater Ukrainian population of Europe, However, the Ukraine’s attempt at creating a land for its people was suppressed by the combined power of the Polish and the Bolsheviks. Due to this suppression, the Ukrainians greeted the Nazis as representatives of a country with similar ideological aspirations, and potentially one that would help to foster their own independence. This ideological similarity was one of the root causes of the Ukraine’s collaborative moves with the Nazis. Upon the arrival of the Nazis, the population of certain areas of the Ukraine were informed by their own leading officials to “support the new order” of Germany; some officials even went as far as calling the Nazis “their redeemers.”43 Clearly, the people of the Ukraine favoured the Nazis, and also saw them as a saviour following the Soviet Union’s oppressive policies. To cultivate this image, the Nazis quickly established a “Ukrainian Committee” within the conquered area to act as a middleman between the Nazi generals and the local authorities of the cities within the Ukraine.44 This committee “took measures to enhance the development of the local industry”45 in a way that would support the local economy; this was quite different from the collective as it had been developed under the Soviet Union in the interwar years. These Nazi policies enacted in 1941

39 John A. Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II: The Integral Nationalist Variant in Eastern Europe,” The Journal of Modern History 40, no. 3 (September 1968): 396. 40 Oleg Zarubinski, “Collaboration of the Population of Occupied Ukrainian Territory: Some Aspects of the Whole Picture," edited by David M. Glantz. The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 10, no. 2 (June 1997): 139. 41 Eikel, “City Mayors, Raion Chiefs,” 425. 42 Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II,” 398. 43 Eikel, “City Mayors Raion Chiefs,” 406. 44 Ibid., 411. 45 Ibid., 411.

85 supported many of the policies that the Ukraine hoped to achieve in becoming a more independent state. However, there is something that must be considered when talking about the independence of the Ukraine. It is interesting to note the statement made by John Armstrong—a respected historian of the Ukraine and World War II—that “eastern European areas . . . had not constituted independent states at any time in modern history,”46 when they were invaded by the Nazis. Despite calls for independence and even armed conflicted in support of it—in the case of the Ukraine—these eastern states had never been self-governed. This lack of experience with self-government ultimately played a role when the Nazis began to offer autonomy in these areas. In fact, the Ukraine tried to “stress the nation-building influence of the German occupation”47 to its people. Within the Ukraine, the Nazis introduced policies that had never been allowed under the Soviets, inspiring support for their cause. However, despite the Nazi façade as a liberator, in the case of the Ukraine, this was not the goal. German leaders dating back to before the First World War, such as Bismarck and Wilhelm II, had ideas of a colonized Ukraine that could become the “breadbasket for a greater Germany Reich,”48 and Hitler held similar notions during his leadership. While Hitler made moves to advance the Ukrainian economy, he also ensured that German commanders would supervise the agricultural production as far down as the local villages, never truly giving complete autonomy of local governance to the people of the Ukraine.49 More noteworthy is that these German-controlled farms were known as “collective farms,”50 creating an eerie remembrance of the Soviet occupation. Hitler’s goal with the Ukraine was not to create an ally, rather, he was “determined to treat the Ukraine as a colony”51 for the collective good of the German Reich and intended to use the Ukraine to mine raw material and grain. However, the Soviet’s destruction and scorched-earth tactics as they had retreated from the Nazi invasion placed a strain on Hitler’s plans for an agricultural colony in the Ukraine. Stalin left very little behind for Hitler to use in his cultivation of the Ukraine—a situation that led to a very aggressive and relationship-altering return to the collectivized idea in the country under the Nazis. The Soviets had destroyed an estimated “67,000 tractors, 18,500 heavy trucks, 22,000 combines before they gave up the Ukraine.”52 Hitler further mismanaged this issue by deporting around 500,000 Ukrainian workers to Germany,53 not considering their ability to work the land or foster their collaborative nature. This was due to Hitler’s plan to resettle some areas of the Ukraine completely with Germans, which only created further dissatisfaction amongst the

46 Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II,” 398. 47 Frank Golczewski, “Poland’s and Ukraine Incompatible Pasts,” Jahrbücher Für Geschichte Osteuropas 54, no. 1 (2006): 39. 48 Joesten, “Hitler’s Fiasco in the Ukraine,” 331. 49 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 41. 50 Ibid., 41. 51 Armstrong, “Collaborationism in World War II,” 409. 52 “"What Is Hitler Losing,”." Time 41 (Unknown), March 1943, 1. 53 Joesten, “Hitler’s Fiasco in the Ukraine,” 332.

86 population of the Ukraine.54 During the Nazi invasion of the Ukraine, Hitler implemented some policies to ease the population into collaboration, However, through these polices Hitler aimed to “conceal the fact that he was planning to run the Ukraine as a real slave state: all the work for the natives, all the benefits for the conquerors,”55 rather than acting as an ally and supporter of federal autonomy for the Ukraine. By doing this, the Nazis created a problem whereby their policies began to come into direct conflict with the nation-building and autonomy movements within the Ukraine, especially by certain nationalist groups such as the OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists). This led to conflict between the occupied state and the occupier similar to that seen during the years of Soviet rule. Within the Ukrainian state, there had always been an “unbroken tradition of independent national life.” However, Bolshevik occupiers had suppressed this way of life during the interwar era.56 With the arrival of the Germans in 1941, the Ukrainian nationalists were eager to work with the German Army, who they saw as “liberators from Bolshevism.”57 The OUN hoped to work with the Nazis to create a more independent state. However, this was not what Hitler and the Nazis had planned. Soon after the Nazi invasion, members of the OUN found their way into administrative positions within the Ukrainian government—allowing them to enact laws and policies to further the independence of the Ukrainian state.58 However, Hitler—with his intention of creating a colony and not an ally—quickly moved to systematically eliminate all Ukrainian peoples within the local administrations who had ties to the OUN and ultimately attempted to destroy the OUN itself.59 Hitler saw members of the OUN as exploiting the “local administration for its own nationalistic goals.”60 He had no intention of allowing the OUN to create a more independent state for the Ukraine beyond what the Nazis had done, to inspire collaborative efforts on the part of the population for the grain and agriculture needs of the German Reich. Hitler even went as far as to say, “I cannot set any goals which will some day produce independent . . . autonomous states.”61 This view led ultimately to further suppression of the Ukraine. More importantly, it led to the Ukraine’s final disinterest in cooperating with the Nazi state. In the eyes of the Ukraine, by this point the Nazis were no better than the Soviets. Both regimes had suppressed the Ukraine’s nationalistic ideas and attempted to collectivize the great agriculture of the area without any consideration—or very little—for the population that worked the land. In doing so, both states came to be seen as equals in the eyes of the Ukrainian people. Ultimately, the Nazis’ decision to treat the Ukraine as a colony and not an ally led to the destruction of any collaborative sentiment that had been present at the time of their invasion. In the end, this led to the Ukrainian people

54 Norman Rich, The Establishment of the New Order. Vol. 2. 2 vols. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1973), 356. 55 Joesten, “Hitler’s Fiasco in the Ukraine,” 333. 56 Rich, The Establishment of the New Order, 373. 57 Berkhoff, Harvest of Despair, 20. 58 Eikel, “City Mayors Raion Chiefs,” 413-14. 59 Eikel, “City Mayors Raion Chiefs,” 414. 60 Ibid., 414. 61 Mazower, Dark Continent, 149.

87 seeing them as similar to the Soviets, and ruined any chance of fostering their anger towards communism in the continued invasion of the Soviet Union. * * * This paper has clearly demonstrated the mismanagement of the Ukrainian state by both the Soviets and Nazis. In the interwar era the Soviets—along with the Polish—were responsible for the first suppression of the calls for federal autonomy in the Ukraine. While the Soviets under Lenin embarked on policies aimed at the Ukrainianization of the area—something not imagined before World War I for many Ukrainians—under Stalin the policies changed. Stalin acted in the hopes of creating “a single economic unit”62 for the benefit and betterment of the Soviet Union. To achieve this, farms were collectivized under the Five Year Plan, ultimately leading to resistance by the Ukrainian population—led by the Kulaks—that resulted in mass deportation, extermination, and finally a famine that that was responsible for the death of millions within the Ukraine. Collective memory of this event places the blame for the Great Famine directly on Stalin and his policies, calling it a “murderous famine”63 implemented to destroy the resistance and the people of the Ukraine who had defied Stalin (some even consider it a genocide).64 Among the Ukrainians, these extremely unpopular policies led to a feeling of hope around the impending invasion by the Nazis. However, while there was a great amount of hope in the early stages of the Nazi invasion— particularly because of the policies established by the Nazis to allow for local governance and forms of autonomy that had not been allowed under Soviet occupation—these initial steps forward acted as a smokescreen for the wider agenda that Hitler and the Nazis had for the Ukraine. Hitler saw the Ukraine as nothing more than a “colony”65 to be cultivated by the German people to act as a supplier of raw materials and food for the greater German Reich. Eventually, Hitler began to suppress the nationalistic movements occurring within the Ukraine that he had allowed, as he realized they contradicted the future he envisioned for the Ukraine. Here, Hitler made a critical mistake. Germany’s continued suppression of the Ukrainian independence movement—after the Soviets—along with the re-collectivization of farmland, created a strikingly negative image of Germany within the Ukraine. While the Ukraine had initially hoped to collaborate with and act as an independent ally of the Nazis against the Soviet Union, Germany did little—if nothing—to foster anti-communist feelings within the state, acting instead out of a desire to gain something for the Reich. By introducing the policies they chose to enact, the Nazis missed an opportunity for a true ally, opting instead to pick up the occupation of the Ukraine where the Soviets had left it, with very minimal improvement for the population. As early as 1927, Alfred Rosenberg said that, “the Ukraine was the key to the success or failure in Russia”66; ultimately, he may have been correct. While it is clear where the hope

62 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 551. 63 Serbyn, “The Great Famine of 1933,” 92. 64 Magocsi, A History of Ukraine, 559. 65 Joesten, “Hitler’s Fiasco in the Ukraine,” 331. 66 Rich, The Establishment of the New Order, 373.

88 surrounding the Nazi invasion stemmed from, and how the Nazis failed to capitalize on their occupation of the Ukraine, it is possible that Germany’s failure to foster a better relationship with the Ukraine ultimately contributed to its failure in Hitler’s “General Plan East.” Whether this is true or not would be an interesting area for further research and discussion. In conclusion, the Ukraine’s hope of a Nazi invasion stemmed from long-standing resentment towards the Soviet occupiers due to policies and actions taken during the First World War and in the years following it. The Nazis failed to capitalize upon the anti-Soviet and anti- communist tendencies of the Ukraine upon their invasion, opting to use the Ukraine as a colony for the gain of the German state rather than to foster an ally that would help during the Soviet invasion. Ultimately, the policies introduced by the Nazis created resentment rather than admiration for the occupier and led to the failed occupation of the country despite initial hopes by the Ukrainian population. ______