CONFLICT SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF MILITIAS AND IMPACT ON GOVERNANCE Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA/Takamul) Project

November 2019

This publication was produced by the Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability Project under Contract No. AID-267-H-17-00001 at the request of the Agency for International Development. This document is made possible by the support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development. Its contents are the sole responsibility of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the U.S. Government.

Program Title: Iraq Governance and Performance Accountability (IGPA/Takamul) Project

Sponsoring USAID Office: USAID Iraq

Contract Number: AID-267-H-17-00001

Contractor: DAI Global LLC

Date of Publication: November 15, 2019

Author: IGPA/Takamul Team

Photo Caption: PMFs/Hashed parade marking the annual al-Quds Day (Jerusalem Day) on the last Friday of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan in , Iraq May 31, 2019

Source: Reuters/Thaier al-Sudani: https://en.tempo.co/photo/72802/iraqi-shiite- brigades-parade-on-al-quds-day#foto-6

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CONTENTS

DEFINITION AND ABBREVIATION 3 INTRODUCTION 6 PART 1: METHODOLOGY 7 Scope and Objectives 7 PART 2: FOUNDATIONAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 8 DO-NO-HARM (DNH) PRINCIPLE ...... 8 ANBAR ...... 9 Tribal Makeup and Location in Anbar 15 Mapping Out Current Political Context 18 BASRAH ...... 22 Basrah Tribalism and Militias 24 Mapping Out Current Political Context 26 THE CRUX OF THE MILITIAS CONFLICT IN IRAQ ...... 28 Conflict Identification 31 FRAGILE STATE ...... 31 STATE BUILDING ...... 33 LEGITIMACY ...... 34 SOVEREIGNTY ...... 36 RENTIER STATE ...... 37 POLITICAL MARKETPLACE ...... 38 PART 3: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITIAS IN ANBAR 39 MILITIAS TYPES AND ACTIVITIES: ...... 39 PMFs/Hashed Militias 39 Tribal/Hashed Militias 41 DRIVERS OF CONFLICT: MILITIAS AND SERVICE DELIVERY ...... 42 PART 4: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITIAS IN BASRAH 47 MILITIAS TYPES AND ACTIVITIES: ...... 47 PMFs/Hashed Militias 48 Tribal/Hashed Militias 51 DRIVERS OF CONFLICT: MILITIAS AND SERVICE DELIVERY ...... 53 PART 5: CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS 56 PART 6: IGPA/TAKAMUL CONFLICT SENSITIVITY STRATEGY 60 IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY ...... 60 ANCHORING CSA IN ACTIVITY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION...... 62 Step 1: Clear Identfication of IGPA/Takamul 62 Step 2: Sustained Activation of Context monitoring 63 Step 3: Contextual Understanding on Provincial Level 63 Step 4: Recognition Guide of the Militias-Personnel Operating in government Institutions 64 Step 5: Identifying Activity Impact on Conflict 67 Step 6: Strategy for Activity Implementation 67

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TABLES

Table 1: Anbar administrative units ...... 10 Table 2: Anbar commissioners and mayors ...... 11 Table 3: Tribal location, military capabilities, and affiliations ...... 16 Table 4: Anbar representation at the COR ...... 21 Table 5: Basrah mayors and commissioners ...... 23 Table 6: Basrah adminstrative units ...... 24 Table 7: The political make-up of Basrah PC ...... 27 Table 8: The statebuilding approaches utilized ...... 33 Table 9: Makeup and location of the pro-Iranian militias in Anbar ...... 41 Table 10: Main tribal Hashed forces: Areas of operation and affiliations ...... 42 Table 11: Service delivery projects approved the Anbar 2019 budget ...... 45 Table 12: Basrah MPs in the COR and their political affiliations ...... 47 Table 13: The most powerful militias and their political affiliations in Basrah ...... 50 Table 14: Basrah tribes, locations, political, and militia affiliation ...... 51 Table 15: Examples of key questions to support the integration of conflict sensitivity into M&E systems ...... 62 Table 16: Militias names at the ...... 64

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DEFINITION AND ABBREVIATION Conflict: Perceived divergence of interests among parties.1

Structural Conflict: Economic and political structures which contribute to injustice and/or the continuation of poverty. Symbolic violence built into a culture does not kill or maim like direct violence or the violence built into the structure. However, it is used to legitimize either or both.2

Conflict Assessment: A conflict assessment is an analytical process undertaken to identify and understand the dynamics of violence and instability.

Conflict Management: Refers to a set of activities explicitly aim to address the causes and consequences of conflict, but they are often implemented within a traditional development sector, such as within programs that address democracy and governance, environment, or economic growth. Many of these activities also lay the groundwork for significant longer-term results, and work to build the underlying institutions and systems of resilience that provide alternatives to violence. For example, conflict management efforts might include improving the governance of high- value natural resources that are linked to existing political or armed conflict; employment programs designed to reduce the number of available recruits for militias; or post-conflict reconstruction efforts to restore livelihoods. Such activities can also operate as a stand-alone program within a development portfolio.3

Conflict Mitigation: Refers to a set of activities seek to reduce the threat or impact of violent conflict, religious and political extremism, and widespread instability. Such activities promote peaceful resolution of differences, mitigate violence if it has already broken out, or establish a framework for peace and reconciliation in an ongoing conflict. Many, but not all, mitigation activities phase out shortly after the instability, or conflict, has abated and stability is reestablished. Projects that strengthen conflict early warning or response, formal and informal peace process undertakings, and various types of reconciliation programs serve as examples of conflict mitigation activity.4

Conflict Prevention: Refers to a set of activities attempt to resolve incompatibilities between groups in conflict before outbreaks of violence. From a long-term structural perspective, conflict prevention activities at- tempt to address the root causes of conflict by ameliorating the deleterious impact of poverty, gender inequalities, or grievances related to access to natural resources. There can sometimes be considerable overlap between the concepts of conflict prevention and conflict mitigation.5

Conflict Key Actor: Armed or any other types of conflict is driven by key actors; whether individuals, organizational, or institutional. Those actors actively mobilize people and resources to engage in acts of violence. Key mobilizers may have different means and incentives that affect the methods they employ to achieve their objectives; violence is only one tactic among many.

Conflict Context: The operating environment, which ranges from the micro to the macro level (e.g. community, district/province, region(s), country, neighboring countries). It means a geographic

1 Dean G. Pruitt, Social conflict (McGraw-Hill, 1998). 2 Johan Galtung, "Cultural Violence," Journal of Peace Research 27, no. 3 (1990): 291-305. 3 USAID Guide Conflict Assessment Framework: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf. P 7 4 Ibid 5 Ibid

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or social environment where conflict exists and is comprised of actors, causes, profile and dynamics. It also refers to the key actors’ ability to mobilize people and sources depends on the resources and factors that are available in the conflict context and drive incentives and decision-making.

Conflict Grievances: The conflict key actors mobilize people exploiting a set of grievances such as a group’s perception that it has been excluded from political and economic life.

Conflict Dynamics: It describes the system of interactions and relationships among the framework components described in conflict actors, grievances, and context.

Conflict Causes:

• Structural: pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and which may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict. • Proximate: factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation. • Triggers: single key acts, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict.

Conflict Sensitive - Evaluation: This incorporates a detailed understanding of the operating context in terms of historical, actual or potential conflict into traditional evaluation activities and processes. Conflict sensitive evaluations are used to understand the overall impact a given intervention has had on this context, and the context on the intervention. These evaluations can then be used to adjust subsequent phases of an ongoing initiative or gain lessons for future initiatives.

Conflict Sensitive- Implementation: Implementation involves close scrutiny of the operational context through regularly updating the conflict analysis, in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the context.

Conflict Sensitive – Monitoring: This monitoring incorporates an understanding of conflict actors, profile, causes and dynamics into traditional monitoring processes and activities, with the intention of better understanding the context and the intervention, as well as the interaction between the two. Conflict-sensitive monitoring is used to inform adjustments and changes to project or program activities so that the intervention has the optimum impact on conflict dynamics.

Conflict Sensitive- Planning: It incorporates the conflict analysis (the profile, causes, actors, and dynamics of a conflict situation) into traditional planning. The intention is to have a constructive impact on the context to avoid further deterioration and promote more peaceful and effective solutions.

Low Intensity Conflict: Military conflict, usually localized, between two or more state or non- state groups which is below the intensity of conventional war. It usually involves the state’s use of military forces applied selectively and with restraint to enforce compliance with its policies or objectives.6

6 Mohan J. Malik, "The Evolution of Strategic Thought," in Contemporary Security and Strategy (London: Palgrave, 1999), 13-52.

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Do No Harm: Promoting greater awareness of potential negative violent repercussions which may occur due to the implementation of certain types of humanitarian or development assistance, the contribution of aid agencies to these repercussions, and methods which can be used in aid agency programming to anticipate and minimize such repercussions in advance.7

Sunni Areas: Ethnically Arab, religiously Sunni. Major areas: west, central-north, and north (Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Ninewa).

Shiite Areas: Ethnically Arab, religiously Shia. Major areas: south and south-central (Basrah, Maysan, Dhi Qar, Diwaniya, Muthanna, , , Wasit, and Babil).

Center: Baghdad (mixed population)

KRG: Kurdistan Regional Government. Ethnically Kurdish. Religiously majority Sunni.8 Areas: Erbil, Dahuk, and Sulaimaniya.

Provincial Government: This elected body includes the provincial council and governor office and constitutes the executive and legislation branch that govern a province. The PG represents the system of rules that exercises public authority over a given territory on the provincial level.

Provincial Council: It is the legislative branch of the provincial government. It is an elected body and its members are elected during the provincial elections. The PCs are usually political body that mirrors the political context on the provincial level.

Governor’s Office: The governor is elected by the provincial councils post the provincial elections. The Governor office it is the executive branch of the provincial government and has developed and gained new authorities and power post the decentralization process.

CSA: Conflict Sensitivity Analysis

TAL: Transitional Administration Law

PMF/Hashed: Popular Mobilization Forces

7 Mary B. Anderson, Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War (Lynne Rienner Publishers, February 1999) 74. 8 Less than 1% are Shia, the majority of the Shia Kurds (named Failie) live in Khanqeen and Mandeli (districts in Diyala province on the Iranian border). Some Failie Kurds live in Baghdad.

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INTRODUCTION International development programs entail several processes of economic, social, and political changes in post-conflict countries. Contributing to positive change, however, involves changing old structures and systems, which might in turn instigates “struggle between old and new, competition for power and resources, debate over what has happened, and what should come next.”9 Conflict is, therefore, an inevitable concurrent effect with the implementation of development programs in fragile societies.

Implemented in Iraq, the operational context of the USAID-Funded IGPA/Takamul project is extremely fragile; dominated by fluctuating political process and weak government performance.10 In addition to the domestic drivers of conflict, Iraq is also prone to regional influence and spillover of wars and crisis. Since 2011 and at the onset of the Arab Spring, Iraq’s domestic conflicts are highly influenced by the developments in , , and . Roughly, the majority of conflicts that became active in the last decade were in fact recurring conflicts influenced by the regional dynamics. Therefore, as IGPA/Takamul operates in such fragile environment, it must ensure that its operations do not produce inadvertent negative consequences, such as by entrenching into existing patterns of grievance or enabling key conflict mobilizers. For that end, the IGPA/Takamul produces this conflict sensitivity analysis (CSA) updating its foundational CSA submitted on January 22, 2018.

The current IGPA/Takamul CSA report provides updates about that the new sources of conflict dynamics and their impact on governance and service delivery. Entitled “Conflict Sensitivity Analysis of the Political Transformation of the Militias”, the study will focus on analyzing the development of these dynamics in Basrah and Anbar. For an easy reference, we will use the term “updated CSA” to refer to the study throughout the document.

The report will deal with the following topics:

1. The Foundational factors, which includes an overview of the Do-No-Harm concept and USAID guides and toolkits to develop CSA studies. 2. An overview about the Methodology used to develop IGPA/Takamul updated CSA. 3. Statebuilding and Democratization in Iraq, and how the state fragility facilitated the empowered political role of the militias, briefly touching on issues of legitimacy, sovereignty, and regional intervention. 4. Backgrounders about Anbar and Basrah; the two selected samples to trace the political transformation of the militias. 5. The militias in Anbar; their types, transborder affiliations, and political, governance, and security role in the province. 6. The militias in Basrah; their types, transborder affiliations, and political, governance, and security role in the province. 7. The difference between the militias’ activities and roles in Shia dominant province, e.g., Basrah, and in a Sunni predominant province; e.g. Anbar. 8. IGPA/Takamul updated implementing strategy given the emergence of these dynamics, and tools of incorporating the study findings into the project’s activity design and implementation.

9 USAID Guide Conflict Assessment Framework: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf. P 1-2 10 The report will use the term (IGPA/Takamul) throughout the document for an easy reference.

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PART 1: METHODOLOGY SCOPE AND OBJECTIVES

SCOPE The IGPA/Takamul updated CSA covers the development of the role of the militias in the Iraqi political process and governance policies between February 2018 and October 2019. The analysis focuses on two major provinces; Basrah and Anbar. The two provinces encompass a representative mosaic of the Iraqi population, political parties, and influencing regional dynamics. Basrah has a majority of the Shia Arab, whereas Anbar has a majority of the Sunni Arabs. The Shia political parties dominate the provincial government including the provincial council in Basrah, whereas the Sunni parties dominate Anbar’s provincial government and council. The study also focuses on the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMFs/Hashed) militias and provides brief explanations about other minor militias present in Anbar and Basrah, whenever possible. The IGPA/Takamul updated CSA targets the political transformation of the Iranian factions within the PMFs/Hashed militias, because they are the most powerful militias, whose members were elected to the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) and assumed important ministerial positions at the Government of Iraq (GOI) following the national elections of May 2018 representing the regional influence and penetrating the Iraq defense system.

OBJECTIVES The context of conflict in Iraq has complicated and inter-related causes. The updated CSA aims to provide a nuanced overview of the underlying causes of the militias emerging in Iraq and the development of their roles in Iraqi politics and governance structures. The analysis articulates an updated implementation strategy that effectively includes the principle of DNH and conflict sensitivity approach in IGPA/Takamul’s interventions. The updated CSA will inform the USAID’s IGPA/Takamul program about the integral changes in the conflict dynamics that were reported and analyzed in the program foundational CSA submitted in February 2018. In addition, it will map out the conflicts and dynamics in Basrah and Anbar.

IGPA/Takamul’s CSA will integrate a contextual conflict analysis into its implementation strategy, where it will develop a framework to track and respond to conflict sensitive indicators throughout the various phases of project designing, planning, and implementation. It is important to bear in mind that IGPA/Takamul is not a conflict management program but works in conflict-prone country. Given the fragile context of post-Da’esh Iraq, where: a) conflicts are numerous and exist at different levels, with various actors, stages, and intensity; b) regional intervention is salient in Iraqi institutions and political parties; and, c) conflicts are often subject to rapid change and can spiral into different directions targeting different communities, IGPA/Takamul will adopt a nimble strategy. The strategy will deploy CSA as a fundamental principle in designing and planning activities, and will implement activities through CSA lenses, encouraging the analysis of developments during implementation and subsequent modifications to maximize effectiveness of interventions.11

11 IGPA/DAI proposal, 9.

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PART 2: FOUNDATIONAL ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

DO-NO-HARM (DNH) PRINCIPLE Identifying the issue as “how may assistance be provided in conflict settings in ways that, rather than feeding into and exacerbating the conflict, help local people disengage from the violence that surrounds them and begin to develop alternative systems for addressing the problems that underlie the conflict?”12 the basic underlying assumptions of the “Do No Harm” (DNH) principle are that conflict is an inherent part of development and social change. While international development programs have constructive outcomes, certain types of activities may have unintended negative impacts in conflict-prone societies See Figure 1 below:13

Figure 1 Framework for Considering the Impact of Aid on Conflict

In the post-Cold War world, the nature of conflict has generally changed from inter-state to intra- state.14 One of the first major post-Cold War examples of intra-state conflict was the Rwandan genocide. In reviewing the lead-up to the conflict, the international community was deeply disturbed with the nature of the dynamics that led to the genocide. Thus, international aid agencies realized that insufficient consideration of local context can activate pre-existing cleavages in conflict-prone societies and inflate inter/intra-group tensions, instead of working to mitigate communal conflicts.15

The DNH concept, coined by Mary B. Anderson in 1999 in her pioneer work “Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace – or War,”16 guides international development programs to promote greater awareness of the potential negative violent consequences that may occur due to the implementation of certain activities. In addition, the Operations Manual that was published by the Collaborative Learning Projects in 2000 (CDA), entitled “Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from field

12 Do No Harm Project, “Do No Harm Project: Trainer’s Manual,” http://www.donoharm.info/downloads/level000/Trainers_Manual_I.pdf, (November 2004), 4. 13 Source: Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace - or War, Lynne Rienner Publishers, February 1999, p. 74 14 Ted Robert Gurr, "Peoples against states: Ethnopolitical conflict and the changing world system: 1994 presidential address," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1994): 347-377. 15 CDA, “Conflict Sensitivity Mainstreaming Efforts,” http://cdacollaborative.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Conflict- Sensitivity-Mainstreaming-Efforts.pdf, (Accessed December 10, 2017), 1. 16Anderson, Do No Harm.

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experience,”17 provides international agencies with concrete tools and methods to avoid exacerbating existing conflicts while implementing development programs.

Following CDA’s and Anderson’s efforts, major international aid programs started to develop systematic definitions and methodological frameworks to conduct conflict assessments and conflict sensitivity analyses, adopting the DNH principle as an integral component of international development interventions. Towards that end, USAID published its “Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF) 2.0” in 2012 to develop a conflict sensitivity analysis that helps identify the dynamics of instability and violence in its areas of operations.

The USAID CAF offers a toolkit to evaluate the risks for armed conflict, the peace and security goals that are most important in a given country context, how existing development programs can interact with these factors, how the programs may (inadvertently) be doing harm, and where and how development and humanitarian assistance can most effectively support local efforts to manage conflict and to build peace.18

The CAF also provides important analytical tools to differentiate between interrelated concepts such as conflict sensitivity, conflict management, conflict mitigation, conflict prevention, and peacebuilding.19 Understanding and differentiating between these concepts enable development programs to situate their objectives accurately vis-à-vis their operational environment and the goals the programs are mandated to accomplish. Understanding these nuances empowers these programs to narrow down their interventions towards their core objectives without being dragged to a set of complicated challenges evolving in the fragile operation contexts.

A widely shared definition of conflict sensitivity (CS), adopted by CAF as well as other international organization literature, states that CS is “the ability of an organization to: (1) understand the context in which it is operating, particularly with respect to inter-group relations; (2) understand the interactions between its interventions and the context/group relations; and (3) act upon these understandings in a way that avoids negative impacts and maximizes positive impacts vis-à-vis the conflict.”20

Accordingly, CSA entails the effort to understand the implicit and explicit conflict dynamics in a target area, the relationship between causes of conflict and implemented programs, and how these factors interact with each other in target areas – how to maximize positive impacts on mitigating conflicts while also “doing no harm.”21

ANBAR Anbar province, (please see map below) covers a third of Iraq’s total area, more than 138,500 km2 in the western part of Iraq. Anbar is the largest province in distance but smallest in terms of

17 The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc., “Options for Aid in Conflict: Lessons from Field Experience,” http://badael.org/wp- content/uploads/2014/12/DNH_Options-for-Aid-in-Conflict.pdf, (2000). 18 USAID Guide Conflict Assessment Framework: https://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnady739.pdf p 4-6 19 Please refer to the Definition and Acronym section for the definition of these concepts. 20 USAID Conflict Assessment Framework 2.0 (2012), 4. This is a shared definition mentioned in Conflict Sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacebuilding: A Resource Pack. Africa Peace Forum, Center for Conflict Resolution, Consortium of Humanitarian Agencies, Forum on Early Warning and Early Response, International Alert and Saferworld. 2004 21 David Keen, “When ‘Do No Harm’ Hurts,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/07/opinion/when-fear-impedes- aid.html (November 6, 2013).

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inhabitants, with a total population of 1,485,985.22 This statistic makes it one of the most sparsely populated regions in Iraq - about five percent of Iraq’s total population.

Map 1 Anbar Province

Ramadi is the province’s city center and other major cities include Falluja, Anna, Rawa, and Haditha. Most of the population are Arab Sunnis, and the province’s social structure is mainly tribal conservative (see Table 1 and 2: Administrative units, Mayors and Commissioner in Anbar). Anbarian men comprised a large part of the former Iraqi Army, and Anbarians pride themselves on being a hometown to major Iraqi generals and pilots famous during the Iraqi-Iranian War from 1980 to 1988.

TABLE 1: ANBAR ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS DISTRICT SUBDISTRICT Al-Qaim • Obaidy • Karabla • Rumana • Tribil, border-crossing with Jordan Amiriya • Amiriya Falluja

Ana • Rihana Baghdadi • Ayn al-Asad Airbase

Falluja • Saqlawyia

Haditha • Haqlanyia • Birwana Hit • Kubaisa

Habaniya • Eastern Husiba • Khaldiya Kurma • Khayrat • Jazeera

22 “ Anbar governorate profile.” IOM, May-August 2015. Retrieved from: https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Anbar_Governorate_Profile_May-August.pdf.

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Ramadi • Rahalyia • Wafaa Rawa • Rawa town and several villages

Rutba • Nukhayb • Waleed, border-crossing with Syria • Arar, border-crossing with

TABLE 2: ANBAR COMMISSIONERS AND MAYORS DISTRICT/SUBDISTRICTS COMMISSIONERS/MAYOR POLITICAL AFFILIATION (Anbar Hawiyatona (al-Halbousi مهند الهيتي Hit Muhanad Zabar al-Hity Affiliation not determined مبروك حميد Haditha Mabrouk Hamed Affiliation not determined احمد جديان Al-Qaim Ahmed Jydian Affiliation not determined عماد املحمدي Al-Rutba Eimad al-muhimdy Affiliation not determined سعيد فياض سعيد Ana Saeed Faiad Saeed حسين علي حسين Rawa Husain Ali Husain (Anbar Hawiyatona (al-Halbousi شرحبيل كهالن Baghdadi Sharhabil Kahlan Affiliation not determined رافع حرب Rumana Rafea Haroub Affiliation not determined انمار العبيدي Aobaidy al-obaidy Affiliation not determined مؤيد فرحان Nukhayb Moaaid Farhan Affiliation not determined رافع حمود نوار Karabla Rafea Hmood Nawar Affiliation not determined سالم نزال فرهود Habaniya Salam Nazal Farhood Affiliation not determined احمد رجا غزال Birwana Ahmed Rija Ghazal Affiliation not determined شاكر العيساوي Amiriya Shakir al-Esawy Interim) Affiliation not determined)مؤيد فرحان Falluja Moaaid Farhan Affiliation not determined احمد مخلف Gurma Ahmed Mukhlif -Al-Qarar al-Iraqi (Khamis al ابراهيم العوسج Ramadi Ibrahim al-Osaj Khanjar)

In terms of the energy sector, the province hosts one of the three big gas fields in Iraq, the Akkas Gas Field, and is known for the production of phosphates and fertilizer (see Map 2: Akkas Gas Field in Anbar). However, investment in Akkas ceased in 2013 due to several reasons. Da’esh was not the only dynamic that hindered the South Korean company’s implementation. Prior to Da’esh, used political and military proxies to pressure the GOI to slow down the implementation—similar to its activities in Mansuriyah gas field in Diyala.

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Map 2: Akkas Gas Field in Anbar

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In addition to natural gas, the battles to liberate Anbar from Da’esh opened new areas where traces of oil and more natural gas were found deep in the desert. Saudi Arabia offered to GOI Saudi investment in exploration projects and the energy sector in Anbar. Given the critical situation the GOI has with the Iranian pressure, it has not yet responded to the Saudi’s offer.

Anbar has also a strong potential for minerals especially phosphate and has several phosphate factories, such as in Akashat, as well as cement factories, which were instrumental in providing stable employment opportunities for the population. Currently, these factories are being rehabilitated and Anbar’s PG reopened the Kubaisa cement factory on March 13, 2019.23 However, the phosphate factory is not and there are concerns that the PMFs/Hashed might take over the factory as it did with several other industrial factories elsewhere in Iraq. Currently, the PMFs/Hashed have a strong presence in the Akashat phosphate factory, and it is closed in the face of the Anbar PG, raising speculations that the PMFs/Hashed will confiscate the public industry factories and operate them for their own financial benefit, following the IRCG’s footsteps and model in Iran. The IRCG in Iran is known to own several state-owned factories and companies whose profits are used to finance the IRCG’s operations

The Euphrates River is a main water source for Anbar residents. The river flows southeast through seven of Anbar’s districts: al-Qa’im, Ana, Haditha, Hit, Rawa, Ramadi, and Falluja. The district of Rutbah encompasses more than half of Anbar’s area and is located in the southwestern desert expanse bordering Saudi Arabia.24

Domestic borders: Anbar is about 400 kilometers (km) west of the capital, Baghdad, and about 200 km southwest of the Sunni province of Salah al-Din. Salah al-Din province includes the district of Samarra, home to the Al-Askari Holy Shia Mosque that was bombed by al-Qaeda in 2006.25 The West Anbar districts Rawa and Ana are also about 70 km south of Ninewa province. In addition to its borders with the Sunni provinces, Anbar also borders the Shia-majority Babil province, and the holy city of Karbala and has a disputed area with Karbala province in the Nukhayb area. Since 2003, al-Qaeda and then Da’esh exploited administrative and sectarian tensions in Nukhayb and conducted numerous terrorist operations, the most recent of which was in February 201926

Regional borders: Anbar borders three countries: Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. Jordan and Saudi Arabia represent the Sunni Arab camp that rejects Iranian activities in the region, whereas Syria is part of the “”27 camp led by Iran and advanced by forces in (see Map 3: The Regional Border of Anbar Province). Anbar is also located on the only international highway that links Iraq’s major road trade with Jordan’s Aqaba port. This highway used to be of one of the major lines that saved Iraq during the years of embargo in the 1990s. This decade’s international economic blockade intensified the need to use smuggling routes through the Iraqi-Jordanian-Syrian desert, similar to the routes that linked Ninewa with Turkey and Syria. This

23 Retrieved from https://www.almaalomah.com /2019/03/13/393469. 24 “ Anbar governorate profile.” NGO Coordination Committee for Iraq. Retrieved from: http://ncciraqbids.com/images/infobygov/NCCI_Anbar_Governorate_Profile.pdf. 25 The destruction of the Al-Askari Holy Shia Mosque in February 2006 unleashed a wave of sectarian killings and sparked sectarian bloodletting throughout Iraq that claimed countless lives and a mass exodus of refugees from which the war-ravaged state has yet to recover. The bombings, which were blamed on Sunni extremists linked to al-Qaida based in western Anbar, have been widely acknowledged as the most lethal sectarian flashpoints in the six years of chaos that followed 2003. 26 For details about Da’esh recent activities in Nukhayb please refer to the IGPA/Takamul weekly political report submitted February 25, 2019. 27 The Axis of Resistance is a term used by Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah to refer to their alliance against Israel and the American presence in the region.

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was a logistical course that proved its value for al-Qaeda, terrorist and criminal groups, and, later, the emergence of the Da’esh Caliphate across Anbar in Iraq to Raqqa in Syria.

Map 2 The Regional Border of Anbar Province

At the onset of the Arab Spring and the eruption of the Syrian crisis, this logistical course once again proved its value for the Iran’s project to assist the Syrian regime through Iraq. The pro-Iranian factions within the PMFs/Hashed started to position itself on the border with Syria and its transborder roles have been emboldened since then. Given its strategic regional location, Anbar has witnessed more fighting and fatalities than any other Iraqi province since 2003, and over one-third of all internally displaced persons (IDPs) across Iraq originate from the province (see Figure 2: Number of IDPs as of February 2019).28

Figure 2 Number of IDPs as of February 2019

28 IOM, May-August 2015.

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TRIBAL MAKEUP AND LOCATION IN ANBAR Anbar is socially conservative, and tribalism plays an important role in its social structure and interactions, economic transactions, and political preferences and affiliations.29 In addition to the tribes, there are also major families with important roles in the area’s bureaucratic institutions and economy, such as the al-Sadoon family in Haditha, al-Anni in Ana, and al-Rawi in Rawa. The area’s tribal makeup consists of branches of the largest Iraqi tribes, known as Qabila, such as al-Dulaimi and al-Jobouri (see Figure 3: Tribal hierarchy). Al-Mahal, al-Jaghayfa, al-Karabla, al-Salman, al-Kubaisa, al- Obaid, and Albu Namir are among the most powerful tribes in the region and fought to expel al- Qaeda under the Awakening and Sons of Iraq forces between 2007 and 2009.30

From 2015 to 2017, they continued these activities as part of the National Hashed (Tribal Hashed), participating in battles for liberation from Da’esh under the PMFs /Hashed Commission.31 Each of these tribes operates in specific parts of Anbar and has a strong role in the region’s social, political, and economic developments. In Hit, the ruling tribes are al-Obaidy and Albu Namir; in al-Qaim, al- Karbala and al-Salman; and in Haditha, al-Jaghayfa.32 The latter is well-known nationally for its fighting against Da’esh that shielded Haditha from falling under the Da’esh occupation (see Map 4: Tribal locations in Anbar). In Ana and Rawa districts, on the other hand, families rather than tribes comprise the main social units. The two districts are well known for their highly educated people and statesmen who served within the state’s bureaucracies (see Table 3: Tribal military capabilities and political affiliations).

Figure 3 Tribal Hierarchy

29 Patricio Asfura-Heim “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, 2014. https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2014-U-007918-Final.pdf. 30 Al Sahawa—The Awakening Volume III: Al Anbar Province, Western Euphrates River Valley, Area of Operations Denver— Transcripts, 2015. https://www.ida.org/idamedia/Corporate/Files/Publications/IDA_Documents/JAWD/2016/P-4815.pdf. 31 PMFs/Hashed: formed based on a religious fatwa by Ayatollah Sistani in 2014, hijacked by Iran adding its proxy militias to the forces 32 Patricio Asfura-Heim “No Security Without Us”: Tribes and Tribalism in Al Anbar Province, Iraq, 2014. https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/COP-2014-U-007918-Final.pdf.

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Map 3 Tribal Location in Anbar Map 4 Tribal Location in Anbar

TABLE 3:TRIBAL LOCATION, MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND AFFILIATIONS DISTRICTS/ MILITARY SUBDISTRICTS TRIBE CAPABILITIES POLITICAL AFFILIATION Albu Namir Tribal Hashed forces Close coordination with the Iraqi government operating under the and PMFs/Hashed Commission. The tribe was PMFs/Hashed instrumental in establishing the Awakening Commission groups between 2007 and 2009. Hit

The tribe was also targeted by Da’esh, which executed 300 of their armed men between 2014 and 2015. Al-Jaghayfa Currently, Al-Jaghayfa Al-Jaghayfa has close ties with al-Karabla tribe has one of the operating in al-Qaim district and is part of al- strongest Tribal Karbala’s political party (al-Hal party). Hashed forces in West Anbar and operates under the PMFs/Hashed Al-Obaid and Albu Hayat are politically affiliated Al-Obaid and Albu Commission. with the al-Hal Party. Haditha Hayat Al-Obaid and Albu Hayat tribes have a smaller number of Tribal Hashed forces and operate under the PMFs/Hashed Commission. Al-Karbala They are a strong Al-Karbla is affiliated with a strong political Al-Qaim Tribal Hashed force party (al-Hal Party) and has an alliance with the

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and operate the Anbar Hawituna list, which is headed by current PMFs/Hashed COR Speaker al-Halbousi. Al-Karbala played an Commission. important role in electing him. Al-Salman Al-Salman is second to The al-Salman tribe has several prominent al-Karbala in status, affiliates with the Islamic Party, such as Minister role, and military of Planning Noori al-Dulaimi. The Islamic Party capabilities in West is a Sunni party and the Sunni counterpart of Anbar, particularly al- the Shia Dawa Party. Both are an offshoot of Qaim. The Tribe has the Muslim Brotherhood. Tribal Hashed forces operating under the PMFs/Hashed Commission. Al-Mahal The al-Mahal tribe has The al-Mahal tribe was formerly from the Tribal Hashed forces Islamic Party and recently switched to the al-Hal that operate the list. Also, the tribe was instrumental in PMFs/Hashed establishing the AwakeningForces between Commission. 2007 and 2009. Al-Mahal forces were formerly known as the al-Hamza battalion and fought al-Qaeda as part Al-Hardan of the Awakening Forces. Al-Hardan supports the al-Hal list.

Tribal Hashed Forces operate under the PMFs/Hashed Commission. Kubaisy, Al- The three tribes have They support the al-Hal list. Eysawy, and Al- small Tribal Hashed Rutba Alwany operate under the PMFs/Hashed Commission. Families include Al They have no military Most of Ana’s local figures are affiliated with the Ana Kuhli, Al-Qadhi, forces. Islamic Party. and Dela Ali. Families include al- Most of Rawa’s local figures are affiliated with Rawa Sawahic and Baiet the Islamic Party. Shiekh Rajeb. Amiriya Al-Eysawy Tribal Hashed,ISF Islamic Party, Halbousi Al-Obaid and Albu Al-Obaid and Albu Al-Obaid and Albu Hayat are politically affiliated Hayat Hayat tribes have a with the al-Hal Party. smaller number of Baghdadi Tribal Hashed forces and operate under the PMFs/Hashed Commission. Al-Eysawy, All of them have small Halbousi Halabsa, Tribal Hashed operate Falluja Gumilat,al-Anza, under the PMFs/Hashed Kubaisy Commission Khalifa,Shaba’an, All of them have small Islamic Party, Halbousi Fahad Tribal Hashed operate Habaniya under the PMFs/Hashed Commission Gurma Halabsa tribe Hashed,ISF Halbousi

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Al-Alwany, Fahad, Tribal Hashed forces Halbousi, al-Hal list, al-Wafa (Qasim al-Fahdawi) Marie, Janabi, and operate under the Ramadi Joubory, Souda, PMFs/Hashed Gahnim, Dhyaab, Commission. Aitha, Nimir

MAPPING OUT CURRENT POLITICAL CONTEXT As explained in previous sections, Anbar shares borders with three major Arab countries: Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Some of its tribes share transborder allegiance with their counterparts in Syria and Jordan, especially the town of Abu Kamal in Syria. The contiguous heartland and desert between the Iraqi province of Anbar and Syria’s Deir al-Zor province constitutes the Sunni heartland and links Iraqi Sunnis with their counterparts in Syria (see Map 4: The Sunni contiguous land between Iraq and Syria). This geopolitical dynamic influenced Prime Minister Maliki’s decision in 2013 to send the Shia militias to Syria to prevent a linkage between the two Sunni communities, which posed an imminent threat to the Shias’ regime in Iraq.33

Map 5 The Sunni Contiguous land between Iraq and Syria

After the toppling of Saddam regime in 2003, al-Qaeda used Anbar’s location and grievances against the sectarian government in Baghdad to wage terrorist attacks aimed to further widen the rift between the Sunnis and Shias. However, in 2007, the United States was able to convince the tribes in Anbar to switch loyalties by integrating Anbar into Iraq’s defense system. Accordingly, Anbar’s fighting forces, the US-established Sons of Iraq (Awaken Forces) destroyed al-Qaeda in Iraq. However, PM Maliki, suspicious of the Sunnis’ intention, did not integrate the groups into the Iraqi defense system and instead dismantled the Sons of Iraq through budget cuts and intimidation, leaving the Sunni area, especially in Anbar, feeling aggrieved and betrayed. This left Anbar open to terrorists’

33 Tomlinson, Simon. “U.S. Secretary of State pledges 'intense, sustained and effective' support for Iraq against ISIS as militants seize border crossings, four more towns and now surround national grid dam.” Daily Mail, June 23, 2014. Retrieved from: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2665670/ISIS-seize-key-border-crossings-Syria-Jordan-John-Kerry-lands-Baghdad-showdown- talks-Iraqi-PM.html.

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infiltration to create a new formidable terrorist organization: Da’esh. Falluja was one of the first Iraqi cities that fell under Da’esh control in 2013, followed by Ramadi in 2015.

The occupation by Da’esh pushed almost all of Anbar’s population within the province and then settled in IDP camps in KRG. The wealthier Anbarian families settled in privately-owned houses in Erbil and Sulaimaniya, as the GOI did not allow Anbarians to enter Baghdad for security reasons.34 The war to defeat Da’esh destroyed 80 percent of Anbar’s infrastructure, a major reconstruction challenge in Iraq (see Figure 4: Total Funding Needed for Reconstruction Across Sectors in Anbar).

Figure 4 Total Funding Needed for Reconstruction Across Sectors in Anbar

Anbar witnessed nuanced political relations with the federal government in Baghdad after the liberation from Da’esh. The national elections of May 2018 placed Anbar on the Sunni political map. At the local level, al-Hal list, from al-Qaim district and headed by Jamal al-Karbouli, built an alliance with the party of then Governor of Anbar Mohammed al-Halbousi, Anbar Hawituna (which

34 “Integrated Location Assessment, Part II: Governorate Profiles.” IOM Iraq, March 2017. Retrieved from: http://iraqdtm.iom.int/Downloads/DTM%20Special%20Reports/DTM%20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment/DTM% 20Integrated%20Location%20Assessment_Part%20II_Governorate%20Profiles_March%202017.pdf.

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translates to Anbar is Our Identity in ). Both lists succeeded in replacing the traditionally dominant Sunni lists in Anbar, such as al-Wataniya, headed by Ayad Alawi,35 and the Islamic party lists.

The al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi alliance led to the election of al-Halbousi as Speaker of the Iraqi COR. Because a tradition emerged in 2003 that the Sunni leader taking the position would also lead Sunni politics, Sunnis now have only al-Halbousi representing them in a prominent and sovereign position within Iraq’s government structure. al-Halbousi’s election to the role of COR speaker shifted Sunni leadership from Ninewa and Baghdad to Anbar.36

The national elections also brought to the scene another Sunni politician from Anbar; Khamis al- Khanjar, who established the al-Qarar al-Iraqi list (the Iraqi Decision in Arabic). Al-Khanjar had been exiled since 2003 and used his wealth and connections in the Gulf states to undermine the Iraqi political process. Prior to and during the Da’esh occupation, the Shia establishment accused al- Khanjar of financially supporting the terrorist organizations al-Qaeda and Da’esh. However, a major shift occurred after the Da’esh liberation when the most conservative and hawkish Shia politicians welcomed al-Khanjar back to Iraq and forged an alliance with him after the 2018 elections. These politicians included Noori al-Maliki, the head of the State of Law list, and Hadi al-Amiri, the commander of the .

During negotiations to form the new government, the three lists from Anbar—al-Hal, Anbar Hawituna, and al-Qarar al-Iraqi—joined the Bina’a parliamentary bloc, which included the militias’ Fatih list and Maliki’s State of Law list and was headed by Hadi al-Amiri. The traditional Sunni lists, such as al-Wataniya, and leaders such as Salim al-Jobouri, joined the Islah parliamentary bloc which included former PM Abadi’s Nasr list and was headed by al-Sadr.37

The shift of Sunni leadership and parties from being from Baghdad and Ninewa to Anbar was caused by the emerging tribal, political, and security dynamics after Da’esh occupation in 2016. Young Sunni politicians such as al-Halbousi and al-Karbouli galvanized support from tribal leaders and the Anbar constituencies in the aftermath of the of Da’esh’s occupation in Anbar.38 This new generation of Sunni politicians believed that traditional Sunni leadership, such as Tariq al-Hashimi, Rafia’a al-Isawi, and Usama al-Nujaifi, failed to secure Sunnis’ rights and tangible power-sharing agreements with the Shia ruling parties. Instead traditional Sunni leaders rallied the population to protest between 2011 and 2012 without a clear agenda or regional support, which antagonized the Shia parties, deepened Sunnis’ grievances, and paved the way for Da’esh’s destruction. The al-Karbouli-/al-Halbousi alliance argued that such policies yielded the destruction of Sunni provinces and fragmentation of the Sunni population, which as a result became IDPs.

35 The Al-Wataniya list is a Sunni-majority list headed by the Shia secular Ayad Alawi. The Al-Wataniya list of 2018 was considered as a revival of 2010’s al-Iraqi list. 36 There are three sovereign government positions within the Iraqi government’s structure: the PM, who is usually is a Shia; the COR Speaker, who is usually a Sunni; and the President, who is usually a Kurd. 37 There are two major parliamentary blocs within the new COR, neither of which was able to form the largest parliamentary bloc. Both blocs share decision-making responsibilities for the government formation, cabinet confirmation, and other major decisions by the new government headed by PM Abdul Mahdi. These two parliamentary blocs are Sadr’s Islah (Islah means reform in Arabic) and Amiri’s Bina’a (Bina’a means reconstruction in Arabic) blocs. The former consists of Sadr’s Sayroon list and Hakim’s Hikma list, Sunnis who represent Ayad Alawi’s faction of the Wataniya list and al-Nujaifi’s faction of the al-Qarar al-Iraqi list, and the Turkoman Front. The Bina’a bloc is made up of Amiri’s PMF/Hashed Fatih list and Maliki’s State of Law list; Sunnis who represent the National Axis, led by Khamis al-Khanjar; and the pro-PMF/Hashed Christian Babylon list, led by Ryan Keldani. 38 COR MP Mohammed al-Karbouli is Jamal al-Karbouli’s brother, who heads the al-Hal political party from al-Qaim.

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In this context, the 2018 elections in Anbar came in the aftermath of long-term contentious relations between the Sunnis and the new political system that was installed after 2003. These were the first elections post- Da’esh and the first elections in which the Sunnis were not boycotting, protesting, or denouncing the government’s sectarian policies. Instead, they scattered around in IDP camps, suffered destruction, and had fragmented political parties that lacked the tools, resources, and capability to reform Sunnis’ role in the Iraqi political system. Developments in Anbar between 2011 and 2013 were deeply influenced by Da’esh’s occupation, the emergence of new Anbarian leadership, and results of the May 2018 elections in the province.

The new Sunni strategy, led by al-Karbouli and al-Halbousi, included the shift to become allies with the Shia bloc that promises them important positions within the GOI cabinet, despite the bloc’s strong relations with Iran and the militias. The reasons for this were the Sunnis’ loss of their geographical and political base, destroyed provinces, and scattered constituencies. Based on these calculations, al-Karbouli and al-Halbousi entered the Bina’a bloc and secured the position of COR Speaker to al-Halbousi (see Table 4: Anbar representation at the COR). Currently, Speaker’s Halbousi’s part has the strongest influence in Anbar provincial government and council, while the political role of the rest of the Sunni parties have greatly diminished.

TABLE 4: ANBAR REPRESENTATION AT THE COR NATIONAL PARTY/OR NAME PROVINCIAL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY BLOC Speaker Anbar Hawiyatona Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Mohammed al-Halbousi Nahla Jabar Anbar Hawiyatona Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Khalifa (Female) Sameaa Al-Wataniya Islah Parliamentary bloc Mohamed Khalifa (Female) Ibtisam Abiroon Islah Parliamentary bloc Mohamed Daroob (Female) Nahla Al-Nasr list Islah Parliamentary bloc Hamad Abid (Female) Mohammed Anbar Hawiyatona Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Nasir al- Karboli Sadoon Anbar Hawiyatona Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Jweer Farhan Adil Khamis Anbar Hawiyatona Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Abdullatif Falih Younis Anbar Hawiyatona Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Hasan Kareem Al-Wataniya Islah Parliamentary bloc Aftna Ahmed Yehia Ghazi Al-Wataniya Islah Parliamentary bloc Abdulatif

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NATIONAL PARTY/OR NAME PROVINCIAL PARTY PARLIAMENTARY BLOC Abdulah Al-Qarar Al-Iraqi Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Abdelhamed Diaab Hibat Al-Qarar Al-Iraqi Bina’a Parliamentary bloc Hamad Abbas Qasim Abiroon Islah Parliamentary bloc Mohamed al-Fahdawi

BASRAH

Map 6 Basrah Province

Basrah has seven districts: Basrah, Abu al-Khaseeb, al-Midaina, al-Qurna, al-Zubair, al-Faw, and Shatt al-Arab (see Map: Basrah province). The province is Iraq’s third largest urban center, with a majority of Shia Arabs, a considerable Sunni minority, and smaller ethnic and religious communities, such as Chaldean and Assyrian Christians, Mandaeans, and Afro-Arabs (see Table 5: Basrah Mayors and Commissioners and Table 6: Basrah’s districts and sub-districts).39

39 Knights, Michael and Eamon McCarthy. “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Focus 81 (2008): 26-28.

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TABLE 5: BASRAH MAYORS AND COMMISSIONERS District/subdistricts Commissioners/Mayor وليد الشريفي Faw Walid al-Sharifi اسماعيل العامري Abu al-Khaseb Ismaeil al-Amiri عباس السعدي Zubair Abbas al-Saedi محمد الحسن Qurna Muhamad al-Hasan حيدر طعمة Shatt al-Arab Haydar Tomuh عدنات الجابري Al-Madina Adnan al-Jabri عدنان حسين Dayr Adnan Hussain نذير الشاوي Hartha Nadhir al-Shawi ياسين البطاط Imam al-Sadiq Yassin Al-Batat سمير منشد Al-Shaheed Eiz Al-Deen Samier Monshid Saleem وليد املياحي Al - Nashwah Waleed al-Mayahi طالب الحصونة Safwan Talib al-Husona صالح مهدي Umm Qaser Saleh Mahdi احمد هالل Al Seeba Ahmed Hilail ناطق املالكي Al - Thagar Natik al-Maliki

Economically, Basrah is Iraq’s most important province and a vital economic hub for the south. Its location at Shatt al-Arab encompasses Iraq’s only maritime access with lucrative ports: Basrah and Um Qasr. This strategic location, combined with Basrah’s vast oil reserves, which produce two- thirds of Iraq’s oil output,40 and Al Basrah Oil Terminal make Basrah a center for oil export, trade with Iran and the Gulf States, and transportation and storage, so that “while Baghdad may be the political capital of Iraq, Basrah has long been Iraq’s economic capital.”41 The city of Basrah also hosts a university and an international airport. Basrah used to have an important agriculture sector, which harbored 13 million date palms and vast palm groves.42 However, the receding level of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, increased salinization, insufficient waste water treatment capacity, and shadow economy of slum building on agriculture lands caused huge deterioration in this vital sector. This created an increase in unemployment rates, a high dependency on the public sector, and the flourishing of militias and illicit trade.43

40 Visser, Reidar. “ crude: the great game of Iraq’s ‘southern oil.’” Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 2007. Retrieved from: https://brage.bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2395776/WP_nr723_07_Visser.pdf?sequence=3. 41 “Southern Iraq.” Institute for the Study of War, June 23, 2008. Retrieved from: http://www.understandingwar.org/region/southern- iraq. 42 “Before its 1980s war with Iran, Iraq had 30 million date palms producing 1 million tons of dates annually. But ’s military campaigns and decades of neglect savaged the industry, cutting the number of trees in half and yearly production to 420,000 tons.” Al-Ansary, Khalid. “Iraq tries to revive ailing date industry.” Reuters, April 28, 2011. Retrieved from: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iraq-dates/iraq-tries-to-revive-ailing-date-industry-idUSTRE73R1PF20110428. 43 Interview with the head of Fadhila Shia party at the Iraqi Parliament, Mr. Hasan al-Shemari, on 15 November 2017.

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TABLE 6: BASRAH ADMINSTRATIVE UNITS DISTRICT SUBDISTRICTS Faw • Al Seeba Abu al-Khaseb Zubair • Safwan • Umm Qaser Qurna • Al - Thagar Shatt al-Arab • Al - Nashwah Al-Madina • Al-Shaheed Eiz Al-Deen Saleem Dayr • Upgraded from a sub-district Hartha • Upgraded from a sub-district Imam al-Sadiq • Upgraded from a sub-district

Recurring conflicts damaged Basrah’s economic infrastructure and hampered its economic development. The province was a battleground in both the Iran- and the two Gulf Wars, and militant and tribal conflicts serve as continuous destabilization factors. Basrah’s political instability, corruption, crime, and years of militant violence and sabotage negatively influenced the governorate’s economic, social, and cultural development44 since the 1990s.

Domestic borders: The province boarders three of the poorest provinces in Iraq, Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna.

Regional borders: Basrah neighbors Iran and , centered between the Arab and non-Arab worlds, or Sunni and Shia worlds. This strategically important location exposed Basrah’s economy and politics to direct regional influence.

BASRAH TRIBALISM AND MILITIAS The tribal conflict in Basrah is not a new phenomenon, it has historical drivers and continued throughout decades. Whenever the GOI weakens its control of the country’s peripheries, including Basrah, tribal dynamics and conflicts intensify. In Basrah tribalism and militias are intertwined in their interests and activities and both contribute to conflicts in the province.

The power and influence of tribal leaders in Iraq diminished in the second half of the twentieth century because of the modernization and secularization policies of successive Iraqi governments in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. However, tribalism in Basrah was revived during the 1990s. Hussein’s regime used tribal leaders to control and rule the Shia community during the international embargo that crippled the Iraqi economy from 1990 to 2003. The Iraqi government needed to empower the landowners, the majority of whom were tribal leaders in rural areas, to increase wheat production and other strategic agriculture products. The plan was vital during the international sanctions to ensure food sufficiency, support government endurance, and enhance the government’s ability to feed the Iraqi people through ration cards. Therefore, lavish government subsidies and production of the annual harvest enriched the tribal leaders and farmers of the rural areas.

While the Iraqi middle class was falling below the poverty line, the tribal leaders, peasants, and farmers were surfacing as the new elite of Iraqi society. Governorates rich with agriculture products and holding critical political status—especially Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, Al-Anbar, Diyala, Wasit, and Basrah—witnessed profound shifts in their social and economic strata. By the time the Hussein

44 Ibid.

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regime was toppled in 2003, tribalism and the elevated status of tribal leaders already become a prevailing political, social, and economic factor.

In 2008, Maliki waged a military operation (the Knights’ Charge) against Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army militia in Basrah and Maysan. The tribes provided valuable support in Maliki’s crackdown. Recognizing this newfound power and borrowing from the US experience in Anbar with the Awakening Groups and Sons of Iraq, Maliki created the Tribal Support Councils in the southern provinces: Basrah, Babil, Wasit, Karbala, Najaf, Qadisiya, Dhi-Qar, Maysan, and Basrah. Members of the Tribal Support Councils were offered positions and employment within the Iraqi security forces, monthly payments for tribal leaders, and a direct linkage to the prime minister’s office.45 This structure was formed to achieve the following goals:

• To undermine Al-Sadr and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq’s (ISCI) control of the provincial councils and local governments in the south. In 2008, Maliki’s Dawa Party controlled only Karbala. With the Tribal Support Councils, al-Dawa party brought the southern constituencies under its control without elections. Therefore, the ISCI and Al Sadr were vocal against these councils, which they considered unconstitutional and the basis for a dictatorship.46

• To empower the Dawa Party with a massive militia and popular support. Maliki’s Dawa Party in 2008 was the weakest among the three Shia parties in the south. The party did not have a militia similar to the Mahdi Army of Al Sadr or the Badr Forces. The Tribal Support Councils empowered this party with a massive militia and channeled new supporters to the party. The councils played an important role in securing the majority of the votes for Maliki’s list in the 2009 provincial elections.47

• To disassemble the Awakening Groups and Sons of Iraq in Anbar, divide the Sunni tribes and undermine the tribal leaders leading the Sons of Iraq forces. Maliki expanded the councils to Al-Anbar, Salah al-Din, and Diyala. He pressured or bribed many of the tribal leaders to abandon their demands for integrating their forces in the Iraqi army and security forces.48

Therefore, the tribal conflicts became the main source of destabilization in the south (Wasit, Basrah, Maysan, and Qadisiya) and center (Diyala and Al-Anbar) since 2014. PM Abadi dissolved the Tribal Support Councils in 2015 to regain the trust of his fellow Shia political parties, such as al-Sadr.49 Strengthening the Shia alliance was crucial to mobilize support for Abadi’s new government and the difficult task of defeating Da’esh and liberating the Iraqi provinces. However, Abadi’s decision renewed two types of tribal conflicts: first, the conflict between the tribes and the government over power and resources,50 and second, the intra-tribal conflicts over control of irrigation sources, lands, and smuggling/trade routes, especially in Basrah.

45 ISW, “Maliki Makes a Play for the Southern Tribes,” http://iraqslogger.powweb.com/downloads/ISW_Report_Nov2008.pdf (2008). Alissa J. Rubin, “Maliki’s Push for Election Gains, Despite Fears,” New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/26/world/middleeast/26maliki.html (January 25, 2009). 46 ISW, “Maliki makes a Play,” 4. 47 “The Southern Tribes Against the Provincial Councils,” Neqash, http://www.niqash.org/ar/articles/politics/2290/ (2008). Sam Parker, “Shiite Rivalries Increasing as Provincial Elections Near,” http://www.epic-usa.org/shiite-rivalries-increasing-as-provincial- elections-near/ (2008). 48 “Disputes over the Tribal Support Councils,” http://musingsoniraq.blogspot.com/2008/10/disputes-over-tribal-support-councils.html (2008). 49 “Abadi Decides to Cancel the Tribal Support Councils,” Iraqi News Network, http://aliraqnews.com/HERE (2015). 50 “Abadi is outgunned in fight to disarm the tribes,” Al Monitor, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/originals/2016/03/iraq-basra-tribes- fighting-disarmament.html (March 2016).

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Currently, tribes are fighting over control of the drug trade and smuggling routes between Iran and Iraq. The pro-Iranian militias banned the use of alcohol and facilitated the smuggling of Iranian-made drugs (Krystal, the local name for methamphetamine).51 Also, an important negative impact of the militias and intra-tribal violence is the slums phenomenon. Basrah is witnessing a mushrooming of slums expedited by a lucrative shadow economy, whereby each militia (or tribe strengthened by a militia) controls a specific piece of state-owned land, or vast agriculture land, and distributes this among the poorest factions for IQD5 million. These vast lands are divided into pieces varying between 50 and 200 m2. Therefore, Basrah has more than 100,000 housing units,52 occupied by families of five to ten people. This creates densely populated slums in areas like Hayaniha, Bezibiz, and Jama’ayat; political allegiances to the militias; complex socioeconomic problems; acute service delivery challenges; and social conflicts with the rest of the factions of Basrah’s society. Local figures and elite families in particular protest this demographic reengineering of Basrah tilting toward the “outsiders.”53 For example, the Sadrist militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi (later changed to Saraya al-Salam), moved to Basrah following its uprising in Najaf and Karbala and 2004 conflicts with the GOI and Coalition Forces. The influx of Jaysh al-Mahdi and later the split by a group of militiamen forming Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq fueled violence, as the fight between the Shia factions for control of the city’s lucrative resources intensified. In addition to the Sadrists, the ISCI and Fadhila Party all vied for control of the oil infrastructure and smuggling networks, security forces, and public services and state resources. The assassinations, kidnapping, sectarian violence, gunfights, and widespread criminality along with this struggle persisted but varied in quantity and quality during the past 14 years. Amidst such a volatile security situation and ineffective political process, the people of Basrah found themselves subject to intimidation, and the rule of militiamen drove moderate and secular Shiites from the public sphere.

MAPPING OUT CURRENT POLITICAL CONTEXT Socioeconomically, Basrah is a mixture of a shrinking well-educated middle class and expanding underserviced population, whose members have largely emigrated from Maysan, Dhi Qar, and Muthanna for economic and political reasons. Hussein’s draining of the marshes in the 1990s caused the first wave of forced migration to settle in the outskirts of Basrah, such as al-Hyanniyah, al- Husayn, al-Jumhuriyah, and Khamsa Meel. Rural to urban migration has continued and drastically increased in the post-Hussein era because of the province’s status as both Iraq’s economic capital and a lucrative prize for local political actors.54 The dynamics and causes of forced migration is one of the most important factors in instigating conflicts and empowering the militias in the province.

Rawabet Center, “Basra Tribes if the Government doesn’t fight the criminals we will use our weapons,” http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/38987 (2017). 51 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Basra Police Battle Crystal Meth epidemic,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/16/no- one-smuggles-oil-any-more-basra-police-battle-crystal-meth-epidemic (August 16, 2016). “Basra the Drug Hub,” The National World, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/basra-becomes-hub-of-drug-abuse (2010). “Police overwhelmed as drugs from Iran flood Basra,” AlMonitor, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/basra-iraq-drug- smuggling-iran.html (October 2016). “Drugs Wage Tribal War,” Al Sumeria, http://www.alsumaria.tv/mobile/news/165189HERE (2016). 52 Interview with Basrah Acting Head of Provincial Council, Mr. Waleed Hameed Getan, on 22 January 2018: “There are two types of illegal housing in Basrah. First, illegal slums built in/on province-lands, parks, and public buildings, etc. Second, occupation of Saudi and Kuwaiti families’ properties. Prominent Iraqi families from Saudi origins like al-Sa’adoon, al-Thakeer, and al-Mena’ay families, for example, were used to have vast Palm dates farms but have not access their properties due to sectarian violence against the Sunnis since 2003. Poor families or newcomers from Maysan and Dhi Qar have occupied these farms and built their slums protected by the militias.” 53 Interview with Governor As’ad al-Idani, 22 January 2018. 54 Interviews with Basrah PC and governor, 22 January 2018.

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The militias and politicians from various political parties have encouraged newcomers to Basrah for voting purposes. For example, the province’s former PC head Sabah al-Bazoni, originally from Maysan and affiliated with the State of Law list, did not have a strong base in Basrah, he, therefore, encouraged the migration of population from Maysan to Basrah and did not implement any legal action against slum buildings. Relatedly, the decline of the agricultural sector in the south from drought and increasing salinity in the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, both main sources of income generation, are main economic drivers for rural to urban migrations. Security-wise, these newly inhabited slums and neighborhoods have become the strongholds of Saraya al-Salam (Sadr-affiliated militia), Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq, and other militias.55

Basrah’s status as the main cosmopolitan city in the south has forged its identity “in opposition not only to the capital but also to other major southern cities such as Najaf and Karbala.”56 The challenges with Basrah’s executive branch are no less than those facing Basrah’s provincial council. The council has three main strong Shia political parties, each with formidable militia and security influence; the State of Law, Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), Fatih list, and al-Sadr movement. Many provincial council members have several still-operating companies benefiting from the province’s lucrative service provision contracts. The overlapping between business and politics is nowhere more obvious in Iraq as it is in Basrah (see Table 7: The political make-up of Basrah PC).

TABLE 7: THE POLITICAL MAKE-UP OF BASRAH PC Number of Seats at the Political Entity Provincial Council Badr Organization 9 Hikma (previously ISCI) 6 Islamic Dawa Party, general 3 Islamic Dawa Party, internal 2 organization Islamic Dawa Party, Iraqi organization 1 Fathela Islamic Party 3 Al-Ahrar Trend (Sadr) 3 Mestaqeloun (Shahristani list, offshoot 2 of Dawa Party) ISCI 1 Jihad and Reconstruction 1 Justice Assembly 1 Mutehidoon (Osama al-Nujaifi list, 1 Sunni) Al-Eslah Trend 0 Basrah Civil Coalition 1 Minorities 1

Given the complex political, security, and social challenges in Basrah, electing a governor in the province has always been a tedious process. Basrah also underwent dramatic resignations and jailing

55 Ibid. 56 Glenewinkel, Klaas. “ICG Report ‘Where Is Iraq Heading? Lessons from Basra.’” Niqash, June 26, 2007. Retrieved from: http://www.niqash.org/en/articles/politics/1883/.

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of its government officials.57 The current governor, Isa’ad al-Idani, is a well-known wealthy businessman from a prominent Basrah family. These credentials empowered him to attempt to contain corruption, stop the shadow economy of slum building, and start a political process to marginalize the militias’ influence. Al-Idani has also been empowered by continuous demonstrations and public protests demanding better service delivery in the wealthy city of Basrah. However, the governor retracted some of his ambitious plans under political and security pressures, especially after refusing to join the COR as a newly elected MP and stayed in his position as Basrah Governor after the May 2018 national elections. Threatened with dismissal, he was pressured to slow his agenda and has been perceived by the public as being blocked from advancing reforms.

THE CRUX OF THE MILITIAS CONFLICT IN IRAQ The issue of militias in Iraq is not new or exclusive to post-Saddam era. Successive Iraqi governments used the militias to settle political scores or pacify civil unrest. Since the 1980s, Iraq suffered cycles of domestic political unrest, inter-and-intra state wars, international embargo, and counter-terrorism operations, and ethno-sectarian conflicts. The new wave of conflict that manifested in Da’esh’s occupation of Iraqi cities and subsequent military operations to liberate those cities and destroy Da’esh, as well as the proliferation of Iranian-backed Shia militias,58 have created havoc and destruction in major Iraqi cities and resulted in mass displacement, loss of life, cross-border spillover, and regional proxy wars. Politically, the state of Iraq suffers from structural and institutional weakness, corruption, unstable political arrangements, and deeply fragmented political parties. Socially, Iraqi society, similar to the rest of the Middle East, has high proportions of youth under the age of 24 (61.7 percent of the total population),59 concurrent with high unemployment, women’s marginalization, and high youth dependency rates.60

The issue of the PMFs/Hashed emerged on a low scale in 2003. At that time, Iran supported Jaysh al- Mahdi and later established other militias to fight the American troops. Political and security developments, whether on domestic or regional levels, have contributed to the expansion of these militias in terms of numbers, capabilities, and roles within the Iraqi security and political establishments.61

Starting his second term with the goal of securing a third term, Maliki wanted to pacify the Sunni opposition and stabilize Sunni areas using force and aggressive measures. Toward that end, Maliki relied on the militias instead of the official Iraqi Army. In addition, Maliki’s efforts to encourage splits from Jaysh al-Mahdi and support the Iranian-backed militias, such as Kata’eb Hezbollah and al-Nujba, had intensified during his second term as a way to weaken the military capabilities of his Shia rivals while establishing militia forces for his party- al-Dawa party, and later established the State of Law

57 While Majed al-Nasrawi, a former governor affiliated with ISCI, escaped the country following a criminal investigation, Sabah al-Bazoni, former head of Basrah PC affiliated with State of Law/Maliki’s List, was jailed on a corruption allegation without s court decision as of yet. 58 Mapping of the Shia Militias and their Areas of Operation: http://www.sasapost.com/iraq-shia-militia/ 59 Jack A. Goldstone., Eric P. Kaufmann, and Monica Duffy Toft, Political Demography: How population changes are reshaping international security and national politics (Oxford University Press, 2012), 27. Graham E. Fuller, "The youth crisis in Middle Eastern society," Institute of Social Policy and Understanding, http://www.youthmetro.org/uploads/4/7/6/5/47654969/youth_crisis_in_middle_east.pdf, (2004). UNDP, “Iraq Profile,” http://www.iq.undp.org/content/iraq/en/home/countryinfo.html. 60 Gavin W. Jones, "Where are all the jobs? Capturing the demographic dividend in Islamic countries," in Population Dynamics in Muslim Countries (Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2012), http://elibrary.worldbank.org.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/doi/pdf/10.1596/978-1-4648-1016-9 , 36. 61 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 12-33. JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 43-46.

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list (SOL). For example, Maliki supported As’aeb Ahl al-Haq (AAH), headed by Qais al-Khaza’ali,62 to weaken al-Sadr and empower al-Dawa within the National Alliance.63 The AAH is now part of the PMFs/Iranian-backed militia faction. The AAH has more than 10,000 fighters and is one of the first Shia militias that fought in Syria.64

In 2014, when Da’esh controlled most of the Sunni Areas in Iraq, the Shia Marjya, represented in Ayatollah Ali Sistani, issued a religious decree (Fatwa) to form the PMFs/Hashed to defend Baghdad and push back against Da’esh advancements in 2014.65 Thanks to the flood of new recruits generated by Sistani’s Fatwa, existing militias were vastly increased, while new militia units were also formed. Raising, financing, and training the new recruits marked a cooperative effort among the existing militias, the Iraqi government, the Shia religious establishment, and the Shia tribes. For example, in the Basrah, recruits—often by tribal contingent—reported to the police stations, while it was the Basrah local government that provided money to outfit the volunteers.66

The GOI has not developed a mechanism to account for the volunteers at first, therefore, the number of the PMFs/Hashed fighters remain a conflict driver during the legislation of the national budget in which lucrative allocations are usually set for the PMFs/Hashed based on unconfirmed numbers of fighters. According to several local officials, there were over 17,000 volunteers committed on various fronts by September 2014, while the PMFs/Hashed Commission reported 60,000 in the field in 2014. Nevertheless, this number metastasized by 2015 as the Badr organization commander Hadi al-Amiri announced that the militias had 250,000 men in its force structure. Determining the total strength is even more difficult, with few militias providing end strength figures, such as the Saraya Ashura’, which claimed to have 50,000 personnel, and the Al-Abbas Division that claimed 5,000 fighters, with at least 3,000 more in its reserve component. The Shia tribes served as significant manpower pools and provided a recruitment mechanism, as in Basrah province, where tribes set up volunteer recruitment centers, with entire tribal contingents volunteering and tribal leaders sometimes leading the volunteers.67

Concurrent with that Iranian influence has further intensified and shifted from implicit political intervention to explicit proxy military agency. This major change emerged when Iran took over Sistani’s fatwa.68 Having prior militias in place with religious allegiances to the Iranian Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, instead of Sistani, Iran was able to insert its directly funded, trained, and armed militias within the PMFs/Hashed and mobilize them to further its agenda in Iraq. According to al-Amiri, Iranian teams participated in training the newly joined forces, and he claimed that Iran

62 ElKhaza’ali was a member of al-Sadr’s militia, Jaysh al-Mahdi, then left the militia to start his own militia with Iranian support in 2005. American troops accused ElKhaza’ali of conducting several attacks against the troops on behalf of the Iranians. He was in prison between 2007-2009, and then was released by Maliki. Source: ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 72. 63 The National Alliance is a Shia parliamentary bloc encompassing the major Shia parties. 64 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 63-65. 65 Marjya is the Shia Jurisprudence (Marjya) and represents the Shia religious authority. There are two main Marjyas for Shias in the world. The Iraqi Shia Marjya is represented in Najaf’s seminary commonly termed as (al- al-‘ilmiyya) - the enclosure of learning in Arabic. Several senior Grand Ayatollahs constitute the Hawza, and Sistani is the Grand Ayatollah who heads the seminary and present the Marjya’s religious instructions and positions about political and governance issues. The Iraqi Marjya is the biggest Marjya with followers from across the world. The second Shia Marjya is Qumm located in Iran with followers mainly from India, Lebanon, and Pakistan. The Iraqi Shia Marjya differs from the Iranian Shia Marjya in that the Iraqi does not approve a political role for religious leaders, while the Iranian Marjya adopted Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of Wilayat-Faqih (the rule of jurisprudence in Arabic). The IGPA/Takamul will use the Iraqi term “Marjya” in its reporting to refer to Iraqi Shia Jurisprudence. https://www-tandfonline- com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/00263200701568220?needAccess=true 66 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 22-54. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid.

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trained 60 percent of the volunteers.69 In addition, following the Hezbollah model in Lebanon, Iran supported the leaders of its proxy militias to convert their military successes into political power.70

The Iranian intervention and the strengthening of Iran’s military presence are of particular concern for the prospect of stability in Iraq. ’s project to create strategic depth by establishing land corridors from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea via Iraq runs through ethnically and religiously mixed areas in Diyala, Kirkuk, Salah al-Din, and Ninewa, and therefore could undermine the legitimacy of the state of Iraq.71 Furthermore, widely disseminated reports of the torture and murder of Sunnis at the hands of the Iranian-backed militias in the newly liberated areas have ignited fear and grievances among the Sunni population. Such reports have also led to talks about the possibility of the emergence of new terrorist groups, and Da’esh’s sleeper cells resurfacing among the Iraqi political and security establishments.72

In addition to Iran, regional intervention, facilitated by Iraq’s volatile and permissive context for cultivating clientelism, has significantly increased since the spillover of the Syrian crisis and the emergence of Da’esh in the Sunni areas on both sides of the Iraq-Syria border. Regional rivalry in Syria between Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Iran has exacerbated proxy conflicts in both Iraq and Syria.73 Since then, the number of Shia militias have doubled in numbers and capabilities. Iraqi sources document 79 militias active in the country since 2003, with the majority of them announcing their allegiances to Khamenei – Iran.74

Currently, the decades-long uninterrupted cycles of conflicts affected state resilience. Volatile oil prices and staggering demographic problems contributed to enormous fiscal pressures and deficits, spending demands, and loss of revenue.75 The convergence of these dynamics fed the militias with the manpower required to establish a militia and sustain its needs for fighters. The persistence of armed forces outside the state authority threatens the unity of the state and undermines its sovereignty vis-a-vis its neighboring countries.

69 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 22-54. 70ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 22-54. 71 Following the Iranian military parade model, there were reports about a PMF military parade headed by Hadi al-Amri in Baghdad, and a police parade in Basrah, where, in a move considered to be orchestrated by Iranian operatives, the soldiers marched against the U.S. and Israel. The positive news, however, is that it created a huge backlash on social media and in public from people across Iraq, condemning the act and blaming Iran. It is worth mentioning that Iranian influence is widely detested among Iraqis, especially the Shia, and in many of the peaceful demonstrations, protestors were chanting against Iran. Video, Baghdad demonstrations, chants against Iran: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SPAI21DaDlg Akbarzadeh, “Iran’s Uncertain Standing,” 109-111. 72 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 65. Amnesty International, “Iraqis fleeing IS-held areas face torture, disappearance and death in revenge attacks,” https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/10/iraqis-fleeing-is-held-areas-face-torture-disappearance-and-death-in-revenge-attacks/ (October 18, 2016). 73 Meltem Ersoy and Esra Ozyurek, Contemporary Turkey at a Glance II (Wiesbaden: Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden, 2017), 165-166. 74 Some reports about Hashed measures in the Sunni areas: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-iraq- idUSKBN0K909K20141231 “Iraq’s Killing Zone,” Chicago Tribune, http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-iraq-killing-zones-20141217-story.htm (2014). A study about Hashed with a list of their names: (Arabic) http://rawabetcenter.com/archives/31326 https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/07/31/iraq-pro-government-militias-trail-death Human Rights Watch, “After Liberation Came Destruction,” https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/03/18/after-liberation-came- destruction/iraqi-militias-and-aftermath-amerli (March 2015). Details of the Sunnis: http://altagreer.com/HERE 75 The World Bank, “Global Economic Prospects, January 2017: Weak investment in uncertain times,” (2017), 131-137.

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CONFLICT IDENTIFICATION Conflict in Iraq is complex, emerges on social and economic levels, and derives from various ethnic, religious, economic, and social factors. Non-state actors are the main perpetrators of violent operations for political and sectarian reasons. These groups include terrorist networks and sleeper cells, Shia militias, organized crime groups, and intra-sectarian/tribal armed groups.

In addition, conflict types vary across Iraqi regions. In the Sunni areas, terrorism and counter terrorism measures lead to aggressive military operations and the spread of the roles of the PMFs/Hashed, causing enormous destruction to life and infrastructure. The southern provinces, on the other hand, suffer from intra-Shia fighting, violence associated with organized crime and tribal rivalry over irrigation systems, and illicit trade of drugs and weapons; for which the PMFs/Hashed and non-state actors have exploited to advance these conflicts.

FRAGILE STATE76 One important new terminology to emerge in the post-Cold War era is the concept of state fragility. State fragility concept has been particularly powerful concept to construct the framework for the international intervention and donor/state behavior, especially in primarily peripheral statehood.77

In the fragile state of Iraq, non-state actors “increasingly set the agenda, challenging governments, overthrowing them or prompting them to retrench behind increasingly repressive controls.”78 Successive Iraqi have failed to integrate the Iraqi people into any sense of inclusive nationality (citizenship spirit), while transnational political and military ideologies such as , politicized (e.g., Iran’s theocratic governance model), , and Salafism transcend Iraq’s borders. This led to continuous political conflicts, especially within areas neighboring Iran, Syria, and Turkey. The GOI has always, before and after 2003, found it difficult to avow state authority in the desert border areas with Syria, mountain border areas with Iran and Turkey, and the marshes bordering Iran. The GOI is faced with major barriers to provide good governance. The GOI is also disincentivized to implement decentralization that results in transferred power and authorities to local governments. The rentier state of Iraq drives its authority from distributing the oil revenues to the provincial government. The state control of the only revenue the country has, allows the central government to make decisions about service project on provincial and national levels. This causes fragility throughout Iraqi institutions and authorities, whether within the judiciary, executive, or legislative branches, and whether on the national or provincial level. Furthermore, the fragility of the Iraqi state correlates with the epidemic of financial corruption that rewards its perpetrators with enormous financial incentives transferring the politicization of governance, public spheres, and religions to vital tools of governing the state.

The origin of state fragility in Iraq traces back to certain foundational, structural, and geo-strategic considerations. Geo-strategically, Iraq is between the Arab and non-Arab worlds, or the Arab world

76 The section is borrowed from IGPA/Takamul Post-Elections PEA submitted on September 15. The concept of fragile state is an important concept to explain an analysis the political transformation of the militias in Iraq, therefore it is important to include it in the Foundational Concept section for this study. 77 Peripheral statehood refers to the unilinear causality of failed states as it finds its expression in equally unilinear cures like military-led stabilization efforts, and building working state institutions, which would then guarantee state stability (as the opposite of state failure). In order to turn fragility around and transform fragile states and societies into something resilient, a much more complex package needs to be formulated, targeting agents as well as structures, along with their interrelations within the wider normative setting of statehood at the international level. Pospisil, Jan and Florian P. Kühn. “The Resilient State: New Regulatory Modes in International Approaches to State Building?” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 1 (2015), 3. https://www-tandfonline- com.ezproxy.library.tufts.edu/doi/pdf/10.1080/01436597.2015.1086637?needAccess=true 78 “The Rule of the Gunman: Why Post-Colonial Arab States Are Breaking Down.” The Economist, October 11, 2014: 57.

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vis-à-vis Turkey and Iran. Iraq harbors an important portion of the Kurdish population and in doing so faces the Kurdish crisis of sovereignty and legitimacy, along with Iran, Turkey, and Syria. The country is on the frontline of the Shia-Sunni divide, emphasized by the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Further, Iraq holds huge potential for energy production, situated amidst strong energy powerhouses and global hubs such as Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey. These geostrategic factors have an enormous impact on the country’s security and stability, sovereignty and legitimacy, politics and governance, and policymaking choices.

The regional spillover of proxy wars, economic interests, clientelism, and transnational non-state actors has influenced the decisions of successive Iraqi governments and shaped their incentives for policy choices. These decisions have, in turn, determined who gets what, when, and how. Therefore, being able to identify the sources of such incentives can help explain the context of Iraqi elections, motives for amendments and modifications of the legal framework that governs the elections, and the regional military, political, and economic proxies. In brief, the regional dynamics of the Arab vs. non-Arab and Shia vs. Sunni worlds have affected the country’s decisions about elections, development policies, specifically for the “who” aspect of these policies.

Between the 1970s and 1990s, development policies of the Arab Sunni GOI focused on central and western Iraq. This left the northern Kurdish areas and southern Shia provinces underdeveloped in terms of their main infrastructure projects, such as sewerage, water networks, irrigation systems, and roads. The same government waged what is now known as the longest conventional war in the twentieth century against the Shia-Persian government of Iran.79 In post-Saddam Iraq, the Shia-led government adopted sectarian politics and failed to prevent the movement of transnational proxy actors, such as non-state militias and armed groups. It also failed to prevent the spillover effects from the collapse of Syria, which, in turn, led to the absence of institutional legitimacy in Iraq.80 For example, the Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MOD) is no longer the only decision maker about moving troops or launching military operations. The MOD does not have the authority to restrain Iraq militias from transborder activities, like fighting in Syria. This has weakened the military institution in Iraq and further legitimatize its status within the Iraqi governing structure.

In post-2003 Iraq, the rationale for the Shia political establishment was that Iraq needs strong support from Iran against aggressive Sunni attempts to undermine the Shia government and the Kurdish aspirations for independence. The Shia political establishment did not trust the United States or the international community. Based on these calculations, the Shia establishment acted to exploit Iranian ambitions in Iraq and use Iranian tools to pacify and consolidate power for Shia rule of Iraq. Islamist Shia parties sought to align with Iran to permanently marginalize Sunni opposition and Kurdish independence. However, given that the Shia establishment was a relatively nascent polity and the inherited fragility of Iraq, the Iranian regime was able to manipulate these aspirations. Instead of installing strong and independent Shia rule that can stand on its feet in Iraq, the Iranian regime was able to produce a dependent and fragile state in Iraq that has chronic source of oppositions in the Sunni and Kurdish populations; and lost its appeal or allies in the United States, the Arab and regional neighboring countries, and the International community. In this way, Iraq was held hostage to its fragility and the Iranian maneuvers to avow control, power, and influence.

79 Gallagher, Mike. “The ‘beauty’ and the horror of the Iran-Iraq war.” BBC News, September 26, 2015. Retrieved from: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-34353349. 80 “The Rule of the Gunman: Why Post-Colonial Arab States Are Breaking Down.” The Economist, October 11, 2014: 57.

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STATE BUILDING81 The concept of state building is linked to a range of liberal peace models of intervention, including good governance, state and institution building, security sector reform, and public service delivery.82 In the IGPA/Takamul updated-CSA, state building is approached from a granular level, focused on the analysis of the process within Iraq’s governing units and provinces, with emphasis on the issue of democratization and its manifestation in the election processes. This CSA analyzes state building from a systematic perspective, employing the concept of state fragility to examine the state institutions and legal framework that govern elections and state building in Iraq. It will not emphasize the state as the only center of gravity, instead it will add other areas of focus, e.g., state’s sub- governing units, and the impact of non-state actors and regional proxies on institution and process building in Iraq.83 The updated CSA is focused on the political, security, and policy developments that effect the progress of state building and/or cause regression in Iraq.84

Adopting a state building approach enables the CSA to address links between fragility, social order, state-society relations, and regional interventions. The analysis will explain the overall impact of the aforementioned dynamics on the state’s self-resilience and sustained stability. The following table explains the state building approach used in the IGPA/Takamul updated CSA to identify the paradigm through which IGPA/Takamul can design, develop, and implement activities, benefiting also from USAID’s Self-Reliance Learning Agenda (SRLA) tool. (Table 8: The State Building Approaches Utilized )85

TABLE 8: THE STATE BUILDING APPROACHES UTILIZED FIRST GENERATION: SECOND FOURTH STATE CONFLICT GENERATION: THIRD GENERATION: GENERATION: BUILDING RESOLUTION FAILED STATES FRAGILE STATES FRAGILITY/RESILIENCE Approach Violent conflict as the Types of state Types of state fragility Diverse situations of cause of state failure failure fragility Causes Root causes of Unilinear Multilinear causes Complexity/hybridity conflict/trigger factors explanations (governance, as the cause of (institutional institutional capacity, conflict turning violent failure) participation) Main lines of Stabilization Institution State building on various Strengthening resilience intervention operations/conflict building, capacity levels (channeling, etc.) of state-society prevention and building (state, relations, resilience/ transformation civil society) inclusiveness of political settlement Exemplary DAC Guidelines on Aktionsplan Fragile States Strategy DAC Policy Guidance document Conflict, Peace and ‘Zivile (USAID, 2005) Supporting Statebuilding Development Co- Krisenprävention’ in Situations of Conflict operation (1997) (Germany, 2004) and Fragility (2011)

Accordingly, the IGPA/Takamul updated CSA will analyze Iraq’s democratization process, analyzing the elections as a crucial benchmark of this process, through the following lenses: a) government

81 The section is borrowed from IGPA/Takamul Post-Elections PEA submitted on September 15. The concept of state building is an important concept to explain an analysis the political transformation of the militias in Iraq, therefore it is important to include it in the Foundational Concept section for this study. 82 Gordon, Stewart and Bernard Manyena. “Bridging the Concepts of Resilience, Fragility and Stabilization.” Disaster Prevention and Management 24, no. 1 (2015), 38-9. 83 Ibid., 38. 84 For most comprehensive projects, see: Organization for Economic Co-operation Development. Development Assistance Committee. Supporting Statebuilding in Situations of Conflict and Fragility: Policy Guidance. DAC Guidelines and Reference Series. Paris: OECD, 2011; “EU Backs UN Security Council in International Conflict Prevention: Official.” Xinhua News Agency, 2011; and Anten, Louise, Briscoe, Ivan, and Mezzera, Marco. “The Political Economy of State-building in Situations of Fragility and Conflict: from Analysis to Strategy.” Clingendael – Netherlands Institute of International Relations, The Hague, 2012. 85 USAID publication, Self-Reliance Learning Agenda: Evidence to Support the Journey to Self-Reliance https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1870/081519_SRLA_Fact_Sheet.pdf

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domestic legitimacy, b) state sovereignty, c) disparity of the fragility, governance structure, and law enforcement, and d) the role of regional powers to divert free and fair elections.

Utilizing the state building concept, the study addresses the nexus between state building and the pursuit of legitimacy and sovereignty through the consolidation of the use of force in the hands of the state, and how these pursuits facilitate change in the GOI’s conduct and policies. Due to the lack of domestic legitimacy and external sovereignty, the Iraqi government has politicized governance decisions about the political transformation of the militias, and regional powers, especially Iran, have exploited that weakness to keep Iraq within the Iranian sphere of influence. These intense dynamics have created bottlenecks (if not deterioration) in the state building process, hindered Iraq’s path towards state resilience and stability, led the country to an alarming stage of fragility with explicit regional intervention at deeper layers of the Iraqi bureaucracy, and stripped the GOI of effective domestic legitimacy.

LEGITIMACY86 The IGPA/Takamul updated CSA utilizes the concept of the legitimacy to explain the impact of the political transformation of the militias on the state legitimacy; governance decisions; state building; and how regional interventions exploit state weaknesses. Domestically, legitimacy is linked to the process of state building,87 whereas internationally (and on a regional level), it is considered a powerful feature of the inter-state system and an essential requirement for any political entity to play a role within the international community.88 Legitimacy, as used in this CSA, explains “how power may be used in ways that citizens consciously accept.”89 However, in Iraq, it is important not to confuse political legitimacy with social or religious sources of legitimacy.90 Accordingly, the concept of legitimacy used here includes both domestic dynamics (i.e., internal legitimacy which constitutes a legitimate governing polity for the citizens or people of Iraq)91 and international dynamics (i.e., external legitimacy which constitutes a legitimate Iraqi state for members of the international society and among the regional powers.),and how regional intervention have skewed Iraq’s both internal and external legitimacy.92 Internal legitimacy is connected with a state’s domestic concerns: the wielding of power, institutions, political conduct, and administration.93 It encompasses the practical steps of exhibiting the capacity to fulfill state functions and is “a major determinant of both the structure and operation of states.”94 A state’s internal legitimacy can be evaluated based on the degree to which that state’s population accepts the existence of the state’s political regime, measures, coercive use of power, and decision making.95 The stronger the internal legitimacy, the more effective the political system will be as it

86 The section is borrowed from IGPA/Takamul Post-Elections PEA submitted on September 15. The concept of Legitimacy is an important concept to explain an analysis the political transformation of the militias in Iraq, therefore it is important to include it in the Foundational Concept section for this study. 87 Bakke, Kristin M., John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Michael D. Ward. “Convincing State‐Builders? Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia.” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (2014): 591. 88 Alagappa, Muthiah. Political legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The quest for moral authority. Stanford University Press, 1995: 3. 89 Gilley, Bruce. The meaning and measure of state legitimacy: Results for 72 countries. European Journal of Political Research 45, no. 3 (2006): 499. 90 Gilley, 502. 91 Bakke, Kristin M., John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Michael D. Ward. “Convincing State‐Builders? Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia.” International Studies Quarterly 58, no. 3 (2014): 594. 92 Fukuyama, Francis. State-building: governance and world order in the 21st century. Cornell University Press, 2004: 26. 93 Hassan, Zheger. “The Origins and Evolution of De Facto States: Implications for Iraqi Kurdistan.” PhD diss., University of Western Ontario, 2015: 66. 94 Alagappa in Gilley, 499. 95 Bakke, 593.

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involves “the capacity of a political system to engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most appropriate or proper ones for the society.”96

In the Iraqi context the most important notion that effects state legitimacy is the notion of “righteousness,”97 whereby the rules of political conduct or the set of principles that govern are accepted by Iraqis as right. This sense of righteousness is measured in citizens’ acceptance of and belief in the legality of state actions, decisions, and measures and is manifested in the citizens’ act of consent: participation in the elections.98 The relationship between legitimacy and democratization are manifested in state-society relations, whereby the GOI deploys electoral mechanisms to obtain the consent of the governed by way of periodic elections and perceived constitutionalism to protect citizens from governmental abuse. The GOI exploited the notion of “minimal democracy” to attain internal legitimacy. The Iraqi political process, however, lacked foundational aspects of legitimacy and democratization, whereby: (1) there are representative, majoritarian institutions for making general laws, such that no competent adult is excluded from participation, (2) the highest government officials are accountable, that is, subject to being removed from office through the workings of these representative institutions, and (3) there is a modicum of institutionally secured freedom of speech and association required for reasonable deliberation about democratic decisions.99

Additionally, this updated CSA focuses on how the elections effected Iraq’s external legitimacy and ability to conduct balanced inter-state relations, especially at the regional level.100 The paradox that emerged during the elections appeared in regional powers’ illegitimate actions, e.g., Turkey, Iran, and Gulf States. These bold regional actions created a trust gap between the people of Iraq and their political establishment. This strengthened the notion of illegitimate government and political process; especially that the government performance hugely deteriorated in the pre-during-post elections stages.

Conducting national elections in such a context, with deep regional interventions created “a government that ‘captured’ the state—that is, where it has overstepped the bounds of holding office to actually define that office. A better term for this would be ‘state-embedded polity,’ which covers those cases where leaders, parties or governments are indistinguishable from the state.”101

Accordingly, the concepts of internal/external legitimacy have crucial implications for the future and sustainable existence of Iraq whether as a state or a fragile state, and; therefore, are deployed in this CSA to explain the post-elections developments and their impact on the well-being of the Iraqi state.

96 Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Some social requisites of democracy: Economic development and political legitimacy.” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 86. 97 Gilley, 502. 98 Ibid., 502. 99 Caluwaerts, Didier and Min Reuchamps. “Strengthening democracy through bottom-up deliberation: An assessment of the internal legitimacy of the G1000 project.” Acta Politica 50, no. 2 (2015): 151. 100 The international relations theories of realism and constructivism have different interpretations for the sources of international legitimacy. While the realists refer to power as a source for legitimacy, constructivists like Mlada Bukovansky relate legitimacy to a source for power: “The existence in the system of a form of rule considered to be the most powerful and legitimate involves not only material but also cultural conditions…. Cultural conditions help facilitate the accumulation of material preponderance; legitimacy is not reducible to material power but is in fact a crucial aspect of power.” See Voller, Yaniv. “From rebellion to de facto statehood: International and transnational sources of the transformation of the Kurdish national liberation movement in Iraq into the Kurdistan regional government.” PhD diss., London School of Economics, 2012: 33. 101 Gilley, 502.

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SOVEREIGNTY102 The updated CSA uses the concept of sovereignty in terms of its impact on the strength of Iraq’s domestic legitimacy, state building and democratization process. Sovereignty, as “the supreme authority within a territory,”103 is linked to the way in which Iraq became the primary unit in the international system and world order.104 By preserving the sovereign inter-state system on regional and international levels, the state of Iraq will be able to provide peace and security, achieve economic and social justice, and tackle regional escalations and security threats.105

The updated CSA utilizes different notions of positive sovereignty and negative sovereignty, as it explains Iranian interventions as well as other regional interventions and their impact on the state of Iraq. Negative sovereignty is set through judiciary acts by the greater international community, whereas positive sovereignty is “derived from within ethnic groups themselves, rather than bestowed from the outside according to mandatory conditions.”106 In positive sovereignty, regimes have the capacity to govern and shield its political entities from external aggression.107 In contrast, negative sovereignty does not meet “traditional tests of empirical statehood and probably would not exist as sovereign states otherwise.”108 These states retain a negative sovereignty, or “the sovereignty institution that is not able to provide, act and have the capacity to act as full sovereignty.”109

Iraq’s sovereignty is subject to pressure and attempts of marginalization by regional powers like Iran. The political transformation of the militias was one of many processes through which Iranian actors attempted to strengthen their influence and control of the Iraqi state. The fragile state of Iraq tried to maintain its (negative) sovereignty,110 benefiting from the recent defeat of Da’esh, but the stabilization of the country was not achievable by the GOI alone. Therefore, the GOI welcomed the help and presence of international and regional powers. However, adversarial regional states exploited the power vacuum and penetrated Iraqi bureaucracies and institutions, strengthening their political and military proxies. The negative sovereignty of the state of Iraq is not only manifested in its inability to defend its citizens and territories, but also in its government status and capacity, which is related to the lack of the “empirical statehood.”111

102 The section is borrowed from IGPA/Takamul Post-Elections PEA submitted on September 15. The concept of sovereignty is an important concept to explain an analysis the political transformation of the militias in Iraq, therefore it is important to include it in the Foundational Concept section for this study. 103 Philpott states that authority is “the right to command and correlatively, the right to be obeyed.” As the word right suggests, authority is a matter of legitimacy. Supremacy: The holder of sovereignty is highest. No one may question it; no one may legitimately oppose it. Territoriality: territoriality is crucial. This is a principle that defines the set of people over whom the holder of sovereignty rules. They are to be identified, territoriality says, by virtue of their location within borders.” Philpott, Daniel. “Sovereignty: An introduction and brief history.” Journal of International Affairs (1995): 16. Krasner, Stephen D. “Sharing sovereignty: New institutions for collapsed and failing states.” International Security 29, no. 2 (2004): 85. 104 Aalberts, Tanja E. “The sovereignty game states play: (quasi-) states in the international order.” International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 17, no. 2 (2004), 256. 105 Kurtulus, Ersun. “Theories of sovereignty: An interdisciplinary approach.” Global Society 18, no. 4 (2004): 360-2. 106 Ibid. 107 Aalberts, 249-53. 108 Jackson, Robert H. Quasi-states: sovereignty, international relations and the Third World. Vol. 12. Cambridge University Press, 1993: 5. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Aalberts, 253.

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RENTIER STATE112 The updated CSA uses the concept of rentier states to analyze economic incentives and calculations that affected the political transformation of the militias. Rentier economies regularly receive substantial amounts of oil or other types of revenues from transnational sources. The state, in this case, is independent from its society, unaccountable to its citizens, and autocratic. For instance, countries such as Iraq, Iran, the Gulf States, and many African states such as Nigeria and Gabon with abundant natural resources wealth are rentier states. A rentier state and rentier economy contribute to a rentier mentality, which adversely effects a country’s economy and long-term prospects.113 This theme will be used to explain how the Iraqi government approaches the main aspects of democratization, such as transfer of power, elections, government formations, and state authorities and functions. The concept will be also used to explain how the Iraqi rentier state context influences the political transformation of the militias, which in turn affected the domestic legitimacy, sovereignty, and regional interventions. The rentier state of Iraq has had to face a different reality since 2015. One-third of the country was under Da’esh’ occupation, oil prices plummeted to $32 per barrel, and PM Haider al-Abadi did not have a strong political base to secure his grip on power.114 Hence, the GOI was incentivized to rely on international financial support, specifically from World Bank and International Monetary Fund loans. The support by international financial institutions and the United States was conditioned on the activation of decentralization within the country, as the international community recognized that Da’esh’s occupation was a symptom of bigger and deeply rooted governance problems in Iraq, including power sharing, democratization, and devolution of power to Iraqi provincial governments.115

Iraq’s democratization process and challenges to avow state legitimacy have been influenced by the rentier mentality as successive Iraqi governments have heavily depended on oil revenue to avow authority and attain legitimacy through a continuous expansion of employment within the public sector. This results in neglecting the development of the private sector or any other revenue- generating sectors, such as agriculture.

In preparations for the 2018 national elections, which played a vital role in helping the political transformation of the militias, the GOI had different financial challenges in addition to the that those emerged during Da’esh’s occupation. Despite oil prices bouncing back to higher prices, the GOI lacked any effective programs to provide job opportunities outside of public employment. Further, public employment was limited given World Bank and IMF requirements to reduce government expenditures. High unemployment and corruption defined the political landscape leading up to the elections and greatly affected the legitimacy of the Iraqi government. In this context, the GOI as well as the PMFs/Hashed viewed holding elections as an important tool to maintain legitimacy while the state lacked sound financial programs to pacify the population’s demands and maintain stability.

112 The section is borrowed from IGPA/Takamul Post-Elections PEA submitted on September 15. The concept of rentier state is an important concept to explain an analysis the political transformation of the militias in Iraq, therefore it is important to include it in the Foundational Concept section for this study. 113 Beblawi, Hazem. “The rentier state in the Arab world.” Arab Studies Quarterly (1987): 383-98. 114 Ibid., 4. 115 Ibid., 7-9.

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POLITICAL MARKETPLACE116 Another important analytical framework utilized by the updated CSA is the concept of a political marketplace and its impact on weakening GOI legitimacy and opening gaps for regional interventions, mainly by Iran, which in turn contributed to the political transformation of the militias.

The concept of political marketplace refers to “a contemporary system of governance, characterized by pervasive monetized patronage, in the form of exchange of political loyalty or cooperation for payment.”117 Similar to the countries where this occurs, Iraq shares three features: 1) the dominance of inter-personal political bargaining over formal rules and procedures, 2) pervasive rent-seeking by members of the political and business elite, and 3) integration into a global patronage order.

The political marketplace is not a transitional or outdated system, but a flexible and dynamic governance structure 118 Its premise is that in such states, especially Iraq, the ability of public authorities to provide even a basic level of governance is subject to the functioning of the real politics of gaining, managing, and holding power. This updated CSA argues that marketization guides the politics and governance of the GOI. In the lexicon of Iraqi politics, Iraqis have coined the word “Muhassasa,” which translates to “government apportionment” in Arabic. This refers to dominant parties use of GOI payrolls to reward political loyalty with public sector employment, government contracts to enrich allied businessmen, and personal theft from ministerial budgets. The result has been a state payroll which swelled from 850,000 to 1.2 million employees in 2003 to a peak of 3 million in 2015.119

Since 2003, Iraqi politics witnessed the development of the two types of political marketization, or Muhassasa. Between 2003-2014, sectarian Muhassasa (Muhassasa taʾifia) dominated Iraqi politics, whereby Iraqi oil-funded political marketplace was intimately linked to the use of sectarian apportionment promoted by the country’s ruling elite. Since 2014, and especially during the national elections of 2018, a new form of Muhassasa emerged. In this new form of sharing the spoils of government, sectarian considerations were replaced with bargaining between small political parties. Sharing of government positions was no longer on an ethno-religious basis but determined by party shares. This further fragmented Iraqi politics and furthered the marginalization of Sunni and religious minorities, as the new system required the sharing of spoils among winning Shia parties at the expense of minority parties. This new marketplace is called “Muhassasa Hezbiya,” or “political government apportionment” in Arabic.

The vigor of the political marketplace weakens Iraqi public authority, which in turn effects state sovereignty, and legitimacy. The functionality of this marketplace empowers regional powers to entangle themselves within the Iraqi state. The updated CSA analyzes the impact of this issue on the government formation and performance, and the Iranian malign activities in Iraq through which the militias were able to succeed in the political transformation of the militias.

116 The section is borrowed from IGPA/Takamul Post-Elections PEA submitted on September 15. The concept of political marketplace is an important concept to explain an analysis the political transformation of the militias in Iraq, therefore it is important to include it in the Foundational Concept section for this study. 117 De Waal, Alex. "The political marketplace: Analyzing political entrepreneurs and political bargaining with a business lens." In memorandum prepared for World Peace Foundation seminar, Fletcher School at Tufts University, Medford, MA, https://sites.tufts.edu/reinventingpeace/2014/10/17/the-political-marketplace-analyzing-political-entrepreneurs-and-political-bargaining- with-a-business-lens/ 118 Ibid. 119 https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2018/07/31/analysing-growth-trends-in-public-sector-employment-in-iraq/

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PART 3: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITIAS IN ANBAR

MILITIAS TYPES AND ACTIVITIES: The militias in Anbar are of different types, political and religious backgrounds, with various transborder allegiances. Post 2003, former Iraqi army officers organized themselves and waged the Sunni insurgency against the United States and the newly formed Shia government. While the majority of these groups were formed mobilizing the Sunnis’ grievances of losing power to the Shia, the operational context necessitated an alliance with the terrorist and religiously extreme groups, which in turn has turned the Sunni insurgency into terrorist armed forces established on religious and sectarian considerations, e.g., al-Qaeda and later Da’esh.120 Post the liberation of Anbar in 2015- 2016, two types of militias consolidated its presence in the province. The PMFs/Hashed militias and the Tribal Hashed militias.

PMFS/HASHED MILITIAS The majority of the PMFs/Hashed activities in Anbar represent the Iranian factions within the PMFs/Hashed operating as proxies to advance Iran’s interests on the Iraqi borders with Syria. Their main activities comprised a combination of a) military operations to control the borders and secure logistical routes with Syria, b) illicit activities such as extortion, intimidation, and help with smuggling activities, c) engagement of the winning hearts and minds policy through launching service delivery activities and building alliances with the powerful tribes in the area, and d) advancement of religious preaching to spread Shia rituals and activities in the area.121

An important feature of the PMFs/Hashed forces in Anbar is that almost all of them are staunchly pro-Iranian militias, whereas the PMFs/Hashed in Ninewa, for example, include pro-Iranian forces, such as AAH; more moderate forces, such as Sarya al-Salam; and pro-Sistani forces, such as al-Ataba al-Abbasiyha. Additionally, the PMFs/Hashed in Anbar have a special military structure, called the PMFs/Hashed’s Anbar Operation, commanded by Qasim Muslih.122

Despite these differences, the PMFs/Hashed in Anbar conduct illicit activities similar to those in Salah al-Din, Diyala, and Ninewa. The PMFs/Hashed impose fees and extort money not only from the businesses but also from citizens through intimidating the municipalities of Anbar districts and subdistricts. The scheme includes imposing fees on citizens for municipalities’ collection of waste; in a typical corruption arrangement, the PMFs/Hashed take a portion of the collected fees under the term of fees for protection. The PMFs/Hashed also control the illegal trade and smuggling routes and intimidate tribes along these routes. Despite the recent Iraqi-Jordanian agreement to exempt from taxes the goods imported through Jordan, the PMFs/Hashed still impose fees (about US$500) on these goods via trucks by installing mobile checkpoints on the borders and Anbar international highway.123 In addition, it has become a norm among the truck drivers and businessmen to deal with the PMFs/Hashed forces to expedite their custom clearance papers. According to several officials from Anbar, any businessman has custom clearance documents or imported goods stuck at the Iraqi bureaucracies, directly contact the PMFs/Hashed to facilitate the document and truck clearing at the

120 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 20-22 121 Ibid: page 48-50. 122 Ibid: page 42. 123 Interview with former MP Ahmad al-Salmani from al-Qaim.

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customs. The scheme shows the PMFs/Hashed’s operation to follow the Hezbollah model in Lebanon and the IRCG in Iran to control the trade routes and intervene in the private sector activities to establish PMFs/Hashed shares within the Iraqi economy.124

Similar to its land confiscation operation and demographic change process in Ninewa Plains, the PMFs/Hashed have a systematic process of buying lands and houses in Anbar, especially in Falluja and West Anbar districts such as al-Qaim. In order to bypass the public’s refrain from selling to the PMFs/Hashed, the forces’ buying scheme includes using and paying tribal leaders to buy the lands or houses under their names and then transferring them to the PMFs/Hashed. This has occurred, for example areas, in al-Jubeel quarter in Falluja, and the al-Qaim district in West Anbar. In addition, the PMFs/Hashed have used the religious preaching units to spread Shiasm and Shia rituals through building Hussainyha or changing Sunni Masjid to Hussainyha (Hussainyha are Shia mosques, while Masjid are Sunni mosques). For example, there PMFs/Hashed opened a Hussainyha naming it "Martyr Mustafa al-Athari" in Fallujah. According to the focus group discussions (FGD) this move has created public anger and resentment by Anbar tribes and citizens.125

In addition to their illicit activities, the PMFs/Hashed in Anbar have also begun to implement a policy of winning hearts and minds. Their Anbar Operation started to intervene in solving tribal disputes and publish news about the forces’ work to provide a mobile clinic to al-Qaim citizens and support the water stations with the required fuel to secure drinking water for the people there.126

Of late, the PMFs/Hashed have started to build strategic bases in Anbar, Salah al-Din, Diyala, Ninewa, and the Baghdad belt area. Since the election of PM Adel Abdul Mahdi, the GOI approved contracts for Iraqi and Iranian companies to build bases for the PMFs/Hashed. The GOI financed the project from the PMFs/Hashed’s allocations within the 2019 Iraqi national budget, which is about $800 million, corresponding to the budget of a total of five provinces: Anbar, Ninewa, Salah al-Din, Muthanna, and Babil. Iranian companies started implementation of their projects in January 2019. The PMFs/Hashed’s new bases will be built in former bases and offices of the Iraqi army and Iraqi intelligent apparatus as well as former military bases of the Iranian opposition forces in Iraq, the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran, or the Mojahedin-e Khalq (MEK), especially in Camp Ashraf in Diyala. Three of the PMFs/Hashed’s six new bases in Anbar are located in West Anbar—in the Kilo 160 area, Rutba, and the location of the phosphate mines—and three of them are located in Falluja—in Garma, east of Falluja; the Auwisat area, south of Falluja; and the Khamsa Bieot area, on the road between Baghdad and Falluja (see Table 9: the PMFs/Hashed area of operation in Anbar).127

124 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 43. 125 Ibid: page 49, FGD no. 6. 126 Ibid: page 49, FGD no. 5. 127 Ibid: page 68, interview 19 - question 5.

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TABLE 9: MAKEUP AND LOCATION OF THE PRO-IRANIAN MILITIAS IN ANBAR MILITIA LOCATION DESCRIPTION

The PMFs/militias operate mainly in North Euphrates and connect with the Syrian army and the other Shia militias in the Syrian towns across the border. Since February 2019, the PMFs/Hashed have increased their presence in Hit, Rutba, and al-Qaim, and according to KII and FGDs, their forces have reached 15,000 fighters in West Anbar.128

Hezbollah Forces129 Phosphate factory, Akashat area/al- They operated in closed bases and do Qaim. not communicate with the locals.

Based 20 km east of Qaim; north Keta’ab Hezbollah-Iraq is part of the Keta’ab Hezbollah- Rawa, 40 km from Ninewa; the PMFs/Hashed West Anbar Operation 131 Iraq phosphate factory; and used to have a headed by Qasim Muslih. base in the natural gas field of Akaz/ al-Rutba, but withdrew in January 2019.130 AAH’s base is in Habaniyha, 15 km Keta’ab Hezbollah-Iraq is part of the AAH from the American troops in the PMFs’/Hashed’s West Anbar Habaniyha plateau. AAH also has Operation headed by Qasim Muslih. operations in West Anbar and on the Syrian borders. Al-Tufof Brigade’s base is in al-Qaim Al-Tufof split from Sistani’s Al-Tufof Brigade district and the Karabla subdistrict. PMFs/Hashed, and its commander, Qasim Muslih, is a strong pro-Iranian proxy within the PMFs/Hashed. Therefore, Iran appointed Muslih as the head of the PMFs/Hashed West Anbar Operation, which controls and coordinates all of the PMFs/Hashed forces in West Anbar. Logo source: https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/degree%20programs/MPP/files/Finalized%20PAE_Ahn_Campbell_Knoetgen.pdf

TRIBAL/HASHED MILITIAS

The Tribal Hashed in Anbar were established in August 2015 as part of the Sunni efforts to prevent the PMFs/Hashed from utilizing the fighting against Da’esh to enter the province.132 The Tribal Hashed also intended to revive the Sons of Iraq’s and Awakening Groups’ project to incorporate

128 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 43. And Retrieved from And Retrieved from https://www.alaraby.co.uk/politics/2019/2/4 /CSA /%D8%A7%D9%84%D9%85%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AC%D9%87%D8%A9- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A3%D9%85%D9%8A%D8%B1%D9%83%D9%8A%D8%A9- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D9%8A%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%86%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D9%87%D8%AF%D8%AF- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82-2. 129 The Hezbollah Forces also have bases in the Juref al-Sakher subdistrict in Babil province. The extremist forces, influenced by the PMFs/Hashed, AAH and Hezbollah at Babil’s PC legislated a law that bans the return of the Sunni families to the subdistrict. Retrieved from https://www.eremnews.com/news/arab-world/1630036. For details about the issue please refer to IGPA/Takamul Provincial Political Economy submitted in February 2018. 130 Retrieved from https://www.aa.com.tr/ar/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D9%88%D9%84- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A%D8%A9/%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B4%D8%AF- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B4%D8%B9%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D9%8A%D9%86%D8%B3%D8%AD%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%86- %D8%AD%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AD%D9%82%D9%84-%D9%84%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%A7%D8%B2- %D8%BA%D8%B1%D8%A8%D9%8A-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B9%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%82/1380090. 131 The ISF also has a West Anbar operation (al-Jazeera operation) and it is commanded by Qasim al-Muhimdi, while the commander of the Anbar operation in ISF is Mahmood al-Falahi. 132 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 25-37.

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more Sunnis into the Iraqi defense system because the current Sunni representation is less than 1 percent.133

In addition to the Tribal Hashed, the Sunnis also created the Anti-Terrorism Council of Anbar Tribes in September 2015, which is managed directly by National Security Advisor Falih al-Fyyad and leaders of the PMFs/Hashed Commission, Hamid al-Shatri and Zyad al-Alwani.134 Media reports and officials interviewed for JAC Anbar CSA confirmed that the number of Tribal Hashed has reached 24,000 fighters in Anbar, Salah al-Din, Kirkuk, and Ninewa and consists of 49 militias, some of which were established based on PM Haider al-Abadi’s decree no. 91/2016. However, similar to the failure in integrating the Awakening Forces and Sons of Iraqi forces into the Iraqi defense system in 2009, the Tribal Hashed do not have the same privilege the PMFs/Hashed has. In addition, given that the Tribal Hashed were established based on tribal affiliations and competing tribal agendas to control the lucrative PG positions, the Tribal Hashed forces suffer from divisions and fragmentation.

To address the Tribal Hashed concerns and security threats on the Iraqi-Syrian borders, the Anti- Terrorism Council of Anbar Tribes announced in January 2019 that the council is working to hold a conference to coordinate efforts and address the current critical situation in Anbar. The council also hinted that it might form a political party to enter the upcoming provincial elections (see Table 10: Main Tribal Hashed and their area of operations).

TABLE 10: MAIN TRIBAL HASHED FORCES: AREAS OF OPERATION AND AFFILIATIONS TRIBAL HASHED LOCATION TRIBE Hit and north of Euphrates Albu Namir Al-Nimar Forces Al-Qaim Al-Mahal Al-Hamza Forces Al-Qaim Al-Salman Al-Salman Forces Haditha Al-Jaghayfa Al-Jaghayfa Forces Karabla subdistrict Karabla A’ali el-Forat Forces Al-Abour town (Rumana subdistrict) Al-Obaidi Al-Gharbiyah Forces

DRIVERS OF CONFLICT: MILITIAS AND SERVICE DELIVERY The practical steps of the political transformation of the Shia militias have started in 2003, but the role of the Iranian backed factions within the PMFs/Hashed has been emboldened in governance policies and services delivery post Anbar’s liberation from Da’esh in 2016.135

The first area of intervention has been in governance through corrupted networks and government contracts for service delivery projects. For example, in February 2016, former PM Haider al-Abadi launched a campaign to rebuild Ramadi, the city center of Anbar province. He issued an order to form a high committee to rehabilitate the city and incentivize the return of the IDPs. The committee encompassed the head of the Sunni Endowment Abdul Latif al-Hamim; Minister of Electricity, Qasim Fahdawi; and former Governor Suhaib al-Rawi. The campaign was planned to remove the war debris and demine the city from booby trap planted by Da’esh in government buildings. The campaign also

133 Interview with Former Governor of Anbar Suhaib al-Rawi. 134 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 25-37 135 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 75-81

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targeted the rehabilitation of the infrastructure and municipal services; including electricity, water, and solid waste management (SWM). The campaign, however, was highly politicized and ultimately failed due to two key variables. First, the political fluctuation in 2016 surrounding the issue of holding or postponing the provincial elections in April 2016. Second, the Iranian backed PMFs/Hashed role in exploiting the Sunni political fragmentation and advancing their lucrative projects and government contracts in Anbar.136

Given the strategic importance of Anbar’s logistical connections with Syria and Jordan, and its lucrative smuggling routes, Iran took several political and military steps to establish its proxies’ presence in Anbar, utilizing the intense intra-Sunni political rivalry, and tribalism to advance the PMFs’/Hashed’s presence in the area. Additionally, Iranian interest in the area goes back to its attempts to compete with Jordan and United States to control the international highway that links Iraq to Jordan and Syria via Anbar. To that end, in 2017 Iran:137

1. Empowered Anbar politicians such as al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi, who have strong tribes (al- Karablah and Halabsa) in Faluja, al-Qaim, Rutba, and Haditha. 2. Established new terms of operations and understandings with the powerful tribes in that area. 3. Co-opted the Sunni Endowment, which controls the numerous mosques and properties in Anbar. 4. Took out or marginalized the pro-American elements in the political and tribal structure of Anbar.

The Iranian Commander Qasim Soleimani and Deputy Head of the PMFs/Hashed Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were instrumental in establishing these power bases for the Iranian intervention and PMFs/Hashed presence in Anbar politics and; hence, governance and service delivery. Iran sided with the al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi alliance to oust the former Governor al-Rawi, in August 2017. In order to impeach al-Rawi, the al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi alliance needed the GOI approval and the Iranians to facilitate that approval. In addition, it was important for Iran to strengthen its influence in Anbar so that it could advance the presence of its military proxies in Anbar, especially the West Anbar areas on the Syrian borders in al-Qaim. Accordingly, Governor al-Rawi was impeached in August 2017, the Anbar PC elected Mohamed al-Halbousi to replace al-Rawi in the same month.

The political advancement of the al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi alliance continued during the national elections of May 2018. When Governor Halbousi was elected as COR Speaker, the alliance made sure that one of their affiliates would replace al-Halbousi in the Governorship position and elected al-Halbousi’s patronage, Ali Farhan.138 In addition, the al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi alliance became part of the Bina’a list, which encompasses the pro-Iranian PMFs’/Hashed’s Fatih list. In turn, this, along with al-Fayyad’s decision to leave PM Abadi’s Nasr list, contributed to factors that led to Abadi being denied a second term, and facilitated the election of the Iranians’ pick, Adel Abdul Mahdi, as the new PM.

In accordance with its project, Iran also extended its reach to work with the Sunni Endowment, headed by Abdul Latif al-Hemaim. This focus on the endowment is not limited to its operations in Anbar and West Anbar only, but is also extended to the rest of the newly liberated areas (NLAs) in the Salah al-Din and Ninewa provinces, and parts of Kirkuk too. The Iranians recognized the

136 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 25-37 137 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 75-81 138 The Chair of Anbar’s PC is Ahmed Humaid al-Alwani.

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importance of the Sunni Endowment in providing a co-opted Sunni endorsement of Iran’s activities in the Sunni area. The endowment also has a wide range of networks through its control of mosques and religious properties, which provide an organizational structure that can be systematically infiltrated. Given these calculations, the Iranians forged an alliance with the less educated religious clerks through the endowment as well as conservative elements of Anbarian society, empowering them at the expense of more moderate elements of the religious clerks and societal figures in Anbar. As a result, through the PMFs/Hashed in Anbar, Iran was able to establish the religious preaching unit there. The unit is widely condemned by Sunni politicians and powerful religious figures, who consider it to be an instrument to spread Shiasm, particularly the pro-Iranian Shiasm in Anbar. The unit was first established in Haditha and currently also has branches in al-Qaim139

In addition to Iran, Arab regional powers have also started to wage influence in Anbar politics and governance. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Kuwait have also tried to manufacture the Sunni alliance in preparation for the May 2018 elections. The three Gulf states as well as Turkey launched a project to unite the fragmented Sunni leadership and parties in one Sunni bloc and convened several meetings and negotiation sessions in Ankara between March and July 2017.140 However, this project failed, and the Sunni parties continued to fragment due to the political rift between Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) on one hand and Qatar on the other hand in June 2017. On the same regard, Turkey decided to side with Qatar, which led to deepen the divisions among the sponsoring states; Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar and Turkey.

Amidst these dynamics, the failed project to unify the Sunnis created a bigger vacuum in the Sunni political space, paved the way for a stronger Iranian influence, manifested in the PMFs/Hashed, and pushed Sunni parties to find alternatives to secure their demands for power sharing and government positions within the new government. As a result, by the time the liberation battles finished in West Anbar in late 2017 and the elections ended in May 2018, the al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi alliance had become the strongest Sunni list,141 and pro-Iranian militias such as Tefof Brigade, AAH, and Kata’aeb Hezbollah had established their bases in West Anbar on the Iraqi-Syrian borders.

Such political developments and the expanded role of the militias have affected major services in the province, especially the electricity. In 2018, Anbar’s electricity per capita was (0.0016 megawatt per hour), a number that stands a clear and performance of the PG and GOI. According to Anbar Electricity Department, “there are more than one million registered houses to benefit from the electricity services in Anbar; however, the GOI provides very few hours of services that are not enough to cool a liter of water during the summer.” According to a study conducted by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) at the end of 2017, 80 percent of houses in Anbar share a generator or own a generator of 32 percent in the city and 9 percent in the countryside. Residents of the province had to rely on their own generators for lighting and operation of basic equipment. According to the data of the Ministry of Electricity in May, June, and July 2019, Anbar is at the bottom of the list of electricity supply rates. The province is experiencing a severe power crisis and has become one of the main challenges that face the PG. The PMFs/Hashed stands firm against meaningful rehabilitation of the electricity grid in Anbar, because it identifies Anbar is a stronghold against its plans to expand and sustain its presence on the Syrian borders, and electricity can bring crucial role in rehabilitating not only the services but also the province economy and socio-

139 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 75-81 140 Ibid 141 The al-Karbouli/al-Halbousi alliance is currently undergoing a rift between the leaders. According to political information from the al- Hal list, intense political negotiations to bridge the gap are under way, and they are optimistic that they will be able to repair their relationship and sustain the alliance.

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economic stability in the Sunni majority area. For example, in Qaim, militias prevented Anbar Electricity Department maintenance teams from rebuilding the high-pressure line linking the city of Qaim to the national system. In the same context, the militias stopped electricity supply from Haditha hydroelectric dam station to Anna and Rawa cities, while increasing the number of service hours in Haditha, because the militias presence in the area. Therefore, the rate of electricity supply in Haditha is 22 hours, compared to an average of 8 hours a day for the rest of Anbar. Recently, the Ministry of Electricity announced March 19 that it was able to rehabilitate the 400-KV electricity transmission line and returned it to service. The project also modified the 132-KV line and added two mobile transformer stations at 132 and 33 KV, which brought back electricity to the majority of Anbar after three years (see Table 11: Service delivery projects approved the Anbar 2019 budget).

TABLE 11: SERVICE DELIVERY PROJECTS APPROVED THE ANBAR 2019 BUDGET PROJECT AREA Development of the 3000-megawatt Hit power station plant Hit Establishment of a hospital in Ramadi with 900 beds Ramadi Establishment of customs at the border to enter goods in Ramadi Al-Qaim and Ramadi Building of an electric power station Haditha Intra-province highway, 120 street, which connects Ramadi with Ramadi and West Anbar the West Anbar international highway Habaniya International Airport Habaniya Construction of two industrial zones Ramadi Building of a natural gas refinery by Korean company Al-Qaim

In addition, the PMFs/Hashed has also controlled the illicit trade of smuggling copper and aluminum from Anbar (similar activities were carried out in Ninewa too). Accordingly, the presence of militias in Anbar and their political role, and intervention in governance issues have has clearly affected service delivery in the province and continue to pose as one of the main drivers of conflict in the province.

The political transformation of the PMFs/Hashed and Iranian malign activities have not been limited to service delivery only but have also extended to the agriculture sector. For instance, the PMFs/Hashed play a negative role by pushing the farmers from their farms with security excuses. The militias did allow the return of the IDP farmers to their areas of origins the militias’ bases on the Tigris river in Lake Tharthar, Karma, and Qaim. On the other hand, the farmers are subjected to constant and systematic extortion by the militias, imposing royalties on the transfer of crops through the main roads controlled by the militias, or by allowing them to harvest in return for imposing money on the farmer. This was the case during the wheat harvest in Rutba during the harvest season of 2019.142

Regarding waste management, Dr. Sate Al-Rawi, a professor at the Center for Environmental Research at Anbar University, points out in his studies that the changes that have taken place in Iraq since 2003 and the accompanying looting incidents have paralyzed the municipality's capabilities and stolen its vehicles and equipment. This has significantly weakened their ability to perform the required services. After the liberation from Da’esh, Anbar municipality faced the challenge of lifting thousands of tons of rubble left by the liberation battles. Ramadi Municipality Director Jassim Mohammed Alwan said “the estimated amount of debris that has been lifted from Ramadi since the

142 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 80.

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beginning of 2016 is 1.5 million cubic meters of debris, pointing out that the size of the destruction is so large and included extensive infrastructure so that the citizens found difficult to distinguish the geography of their city upon their return.” In a periodic study carried out by the Central Bureau of Statistics of the Ministry of Planning in April 2019, it was announced that Baghdad has the highest waste collection service, while Anbar is the lowest in this service. Through this statistic, the percentage of the population served by garbage collection service in Iraq was 61.0%, pointing out that the highest percentage of the population served by this service was within the Municipality of Baghdad by 95%, while the lowest rate was 27.2% in Anbar province.143

143 JAC Anbar CSA Final Report August 22, 2019: page 68, analysis page: 85.

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PART 4: THE POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE MILITIAS IN BASRAH

MILITIAS TYPES AND ACTIVITIES: Basrah represents one of the most important strongholds for the militias. The province, as explained in part two, represent Iraq’s economic capital and export about 80 percent of the Iraqi oil, with lucrative maritime ports and border-crossings with Kuwait and Iran. The power and sustained financial support of the Iranian factions within the PMFs/Hashed depend on their presence and interventions in Basrah governance issues, including government contracts for service delivery. Thus, the majority of the MPs representing Basrah at the COR are from the militias’ political lists (see Table 12: Basrah MPs in the COR and their political affiliations).

TABLE 12: BASRAH MPS IN THE COR AND THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS NAME PROVINCIAL PARTY PARTY OR PARLIAMENTARY BLOC Ammar Al Fayez Fatih List Bina’a Bloc

Uday Awadi Fatih List /AAH Bina’a Bloc Faleh Hassan Jassim Fatih List/ Badr Bina’a Bloc

Mohammed Kamel Hanoun Fatih List Bina’a Bloc Intisar Hussain Yousef Fatih List/ Badr Bina’a Bloc

Metha’q Ibrahim Al - Hamdi Fatih List/ Badr Bina’a Bloc Rami Jabbar Mohammed Sayroon Islah Bloc Mudaffar Ismail Sayroon Islah Bloc Badr Meklif Sayroon Islah Bloc Asa’ad Jassim Sayroon Islah Bloc Najah Muheisen Shaeea Sayroon Islah Bloc Jabbar al-Laibi Al-Nasr Islah Bloc Mzahim Al - Tamimi Al-Nasr Islah Bloc Jamal Abdul-Zahra Al-Nasr Islah Bloc Asa’ad al-Idani Al-Nasr Islah Bloc Thawra al-Hilfi Al-Nasr Islah Bloc Khalaf Abdul Samad State of law Bina’a Bloc Abdul Salam Mohsen State of law Bina’a Bloc Kadim Finjain al-Hamami State of law Bina’a Bloc Safaa Muslim Bandar State of law Bina’a Bloc Hassan Khalati AL-Hikma - Zahra al-Barchari AL-Hikma - Abudl AlAmeer Najim The Iraqi Men Congress تجمع رجال العراق Abud Aoun Allawi Irada Bina’a Bloc Safaa al-Ganim Al-Wataniyh List Islah Bloc

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Accordingly, while the following sections focus on the political transformation of the militias in Basrah, it reflects the majority of the militias’ activities throughout Iraq and their impact on driving and instigating conflicts.144 Working under the PMFs/Hashed, the militias operating in Basrah are of four main types based on their religious allegiances. First, the Marjya militias; these armed forces were established based on Ayatollah Sistani’s Fatwa to volunteer and defend the Iraq during Da’esh surge against Baghdad in June 2014. Second, the militias that were established since 2003 and announced their religious allegiances to Iran’s Supreme leader Ali Khamenei. Third, militias that announced their religious allegiances to Mohammed al-Kawthrani, the head of Iraq dossier in Hezbollah, and fourth, al-Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam militia.145

The following sections will explain the role of each of these groups in Basrah’s political process, governance, and service delivery. The analysis will also explain the drivers of conflict and enabling factors that contribute to the empowerment of the militias.

PMFS/HASHED MILITIAS According to the KII and FGDs conducted in July 2019, the most powerful militias in Basrah are the Badr Organization (or Badr Corp), Asa'ib Ahlul-Haq (AAH) and the Saraya Al-Salam (see Table 13: The most powerful militias in Basrah). On the other hand, the militia that was created under Sistani’s Fatwa, according to the KII and FGDs, has a very limited control or role in the political and governance issue in Basrah.

The Badr Corp was established as the military wing of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI). The organization that would become ISCI was originally formed in the early 1980s by Iraqi Shia exiles. Established in Iran under Tehran's tutelage, the group was then known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI). In 1982, it developed a military branch called Faylaq Badr (the Badr Corps) during the 1980s.146 Iran used Badr Corp to carry out a guerrilla warfare against the Iraqi army during the Iraqi-Iranian war, and later as an assassination tool during the 1990s. Badr Corp is one of the first Shia militias with clear military organization and hierarchy, therefore, it was one the first militia to develop political role in post-2003 Iraq. Following Abdulaziz's death in 2009, his son Ammar al-Hakim led ISCI until 2018 when split and created the Hikma Movement in preparations for the National Elections of May 2018. Under al-Hakim’s tenure, ISCI took electoral and social positions more in line with influential traditionalist clerics such as Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. Yet internal fissures emerged as Hakim opposed certain Iranian policies and distanced the group from the ideology of velayat-e faqih, which accords full authority to Iran's Supreme Leader-

144 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 4. 145 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 5. 146 The Islamic Supreme Council is used to be known as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq. A Shia political party with mixed records. As explained in the Crisis Group report about ISCI, the party is “The Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (Al-Majlis al-‘Aala li al-Thawra al-Islamiya fi-l-Iraq) – is certainly one of the most powerful. Its defining characteristics are a strong organization, whose leadership hails from one of Najaf’s leading families, the Hakims; a surprising political pragmatism in light of profound sectarian inclinations; and a somewhat incongruous dual alliance with the U.S. and Iran. Since its founding a quarter century ago, it has followed a trajectory from Iranian proxy militia to Iraqi governing party, whose leader, Abd-al-Aziz al-Hakim, has been courted and feted by the Bush White House. Today, it is engaged in a fierce competition with its main Shiite rival, the movement led by Muqtada al-Sadr, which may well determine Iraq’s future. As a result of the pervasive distrust, if not open hostility, SCIRI encountered upon its return from Iranian exile in April 2003, its quest for power (political in Baghdad, religious in Najaf) has first and foremost taken the form of a quest for respectability. It has made strenuous efforts to distance itself from its Iranian patron, whitewash its embarrassing past, build political coalitions, profess the importance of Iraq’s unity, maintain the semblance of government and, as conditions deteriorated, use the state’s security apparatus to protect the Shiite community from insurgent attacks. In 2007, it removed the word “revolution” from its name, becoming the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (Al-Majlis al-‘Aala al-Islami al-Iraqi), or ISCI, thereby suggesting that its days of armed opposition were over.” Source: https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian- peninsula/iraq/shiite-politics-iraq-role-supreme-council

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a situation exacerbated by Tehran's support for Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki. In 2012, these fissures spurred ISCI's Badr Corps, led by Hadi al-Amiri, to split off and reform themselves as the Badr Organization, a fervently pro-Iranian political and militia group. Currently, the Badr Organization is a leading political faction within al-Bina’a parliamentary bloc.147

The second powerful militia in Basrah is Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), which is an Iranian-backed militia and political party operating primarily in Iraq, as well as in Syria and Lebanon. AAH is established in 2006 by Qais al-Khazali, who split from Muqtada al-Sadr militia-Jaysh al-Mahdi. Currently, AAH has between 7,000 and 10,000 members and is one of the most powerful Shiite militias in Iraq. Until the U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq in December 2011, AAH launched more than 6,000 attacks on American and Iraqi forces, including highly sophisticated operations and targeted kidnappings of Westerners. In Basrah, AAH controls the Shalamcha border-crossings, some parts of UM Qader port, and have political representation in Basrah PC. In August 2007, the U.S. designated AAH a “Special Group,” a label given to Shia militias operating in Iraq, but funded and trained by Iran’s external military wing, the Quds Force of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). AAH overtly displays its loyalty to Iran’s leaders, including the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and his predecessor, the late Ayatollah . In Iraq, and reportedly in Syria as well, the group operates under the command of Iranian Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani. The political transformation of the AAH started in 2011, opening a number of political offices and religious schools and offered social services to widows and orphans. According to a Reuters report, “The model [AAH] uses is Hezbollah in Lebanon,”.148

The group formed a political bloc, al-Sadiqun, and ran under al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc in the April 2014 Iraqi national elections, winning one seat. In May 2017, the group earned a license to operate as a political party and ran in the national elections of May 2018 under Fatih list, which later constituted the Bina’a parliamentary bloc. While AAH is part of the main parliamentary bloc at the COR, the group did not halt armed resistance or dismantled its militia. The militia took, however, some shallow measures to project its political transformation to distance itself from the militant image enhanced through several international human rights organizations, which accused the group with various war crimes. For example, the AAH has removed the rifle from its official logo and has begun referring to itself as the “Asaib movement” Since 2017.

The AAH militia has publicly announced its transborder allegiances to Iran and has several offshoots and offices in Syria. According to the KII and FGDs, the underserviced districts and sub-districts in Basrah are one of the major feeders to AAH with fighters. Volunteering to AAH is considered as one of the main channels for income generation in those areas. The AAH in turn channel those untrained and underserviced fighters to battles in Syria and to strengthen its presence throughout the newly liberated areas in Iraq. One of AAH’s Syrian offshoots—the IRGC-backed Harakat al Nujaba militia—is reportedly the largest Iraqi militia operating in Aleppo, where reports of war crimes against the civilians are widespread. Another AAH offshoot, Imam Ali Brigades, dispatched forces to both Aleppo and Palmyra in 2016. AAH forces are themselves reported to maintain unofficial units in Syria under the direct control of Qasem Soleimani. Meanwhile, the group is itself suspected of carrying out war crimes, alleged to be behind a series of abductions, killings, and torture targeting hundreds of Sunnis in Babil and eastern Diyala province.149

147 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 37-40. 148 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 41-46. 149 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 41-46.

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Following the steps to empower the AAH as one of the formidable pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, Iran used elections to advance the role of AAH to influence the COR, government institutions and political units in southern provinces, especially in Basrah’s PC, Governor’s Office, and service delivery directorates.150 Working as one of the leading militias under the PMFs/Hashed, AAH and other PMF militias—including the Badr Organization and the U.S.-designated Kata’ib Hezbollah— were formally recognized by Iraqi Parliament in November 2016. In January 2018, AAH, Kata’ib Hezbollah, and the Badr Organization joined with other PMFs/Hashed units to form the Fatih Alliance political party in preparation for Iraq’s May 2018 elections. Following a country-wide recount, AAH was awarded 15 seats in the parliament. This new coalition placed Fatih—and by extension AAH—in a strong position to influence the new Iraq government, and have the upper hand in selecting PM Abdul Mahdi.151

As for the Saraya al-Salam militias; Al-Sadr established the first Shia militia in 2003, known as Jaysh al- Mahdi. The militia carried operations against the United States troops in Iraq, and later directed its capabilities to attack the civilians during the civil war in 2006. Jaysh al-Mahdi had a stronghold in Basrah until 2008, when former PM Maliki waged a military operation against the group and was able to diminish its power and control command in the province. Several militias were born from Jayash al-Mahdi, as warlords began to split from the group, for instance, AAH, Harakat Al-Nujaba. In 2014, al-Sadr created Saraya al-Salam ("the Peace Brigades") to replace his weakened and diminished Jaysh al-Mahdi militia, with strongholds in the Baghdad suburbs areas, e.g., al-Sadr city, and in Basrah, especially in the district of Hayaniya, which stands for one of the most underserviced and improvised areas in Basrah. Contrary to Badr Crop and AAH, Saraya al-Salam maintains that it is an Iraqi group with no transborder allegiances, as it follows al-Sadr command. In 2018, al-Sadr won the national elections of May 2018, and announced the dismantling of Saraya al-Salam militia to encourage the rest of the militias to follow lead. Despite al-Sadr announcements, the militia is still active in Basrah, and considered the military branch of Sadr’s political coalitions, Sayroon list.152

TABLE 13: THE MOST POWERFUL MILITIAS AND THEIR POLITICAL AFFILIATIONS IN BASRAH

MILITIA POLITICAL AFFILIATION Saraya Al-Salam Sadr Sayroon list

Badr Corp Badr Organization

Asaib Ahl Al-Haq Sadiqoon Parliamentary Bloc Ali Al-Akbar Brigade Al-Abbas Combat Division Al-Nujaba The group has strong ties to AAH Kata’ib Hezbollah Iraq Hezbollah-Lebanon Rasaleyon Fadhela Party Saraya Ashura Al-Hikma movement

Al-Muntadher Brigade ISCI

150 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 84-86. 151 Ibid. 152 Ibid: page 52, 61-61.

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TRIBAL/HASHED MILITIAS Given the Iraq’s fragile governance structures and institutions the tribal control and dominance have been growing enormously since 2003, especially in the southern provinces and Basrah in particular. The political transformation of the militias would have been completed without the support and relations the militias cultivated with the local tribes, who vie for control of the illicit trade routes.

The crux of the tribal conflict is about the control of the drug trade and smuggling routes between Iran and Iraq. The pro-Iranian militias, on the other hand, have banned the use of alcohol in the southern provinces, especially in Basrah, and facilitated the smuggling of Iranian-made drugs (Krystal, the local name for methamphetamine).153

The tribal conflicts are also exacerbated by tribal loyalties to various groups of the PMFs/Hashed militias. The historical rivalry among certain tribes has transferred to dictate their support to rival militias. Concurrently, the simmering fights among different Hashed militias over resources and influence are reflected in their tribal support. The tribal conflict drivers can be also clearly detected in other provinces in addition to Basrah and Anbar. For example, Diyala is also a clear example of such conflicts. The Tameem tribe, which supports the Badr militia led by Hadi al-Amri, is currently fighting the Rabia tribe, which supports the As’aeb Ahl al-Haq militia led by Qais al-Khaza’ali, in Abu Saida town, near the Iranian border. The town is an important trading and smuggling route and part of Miqdadiya, a Sunni town. At first, the Badr and Asa’eb Hashed raided houses and conducted mass killings and random kidnappings and detentions in Miqdadiya to control the town and expel its population. However, the simmering fights between the two groups have erupted in Abu Saida, where the Tameem tribe (manifested in the Badr militia) fights the Rabia tribe (manifested in Asa’eb Ahl al-Haq). The Khazraj and Zubaid tribes have also had several clashes over control of Shifta village near the Iranian border.154

TABLE 14: BASRAH TRIBES; LOCATION, POLITICAL AND MILITIA AFFILIATION155 DISTRICTS/ TRIBE MILITARY CAPABILITIES POLITICAL AFFILIATION SUBDISTRICTS Faw Al-Dawasir Sunni tribe unarmed, a lot of In the 2014 one of the tribal figures, members were killed due to Abdul Kareem Al-Dawasir entered the sectarianism COR elections in Basrah and was killed. After few days IHEC announced he won the elections and asked the Independent Civil Alternative alliance to nominate an alternative. Al-Sharifat The al- Sharifat tribe has In Basrah their candidate in the Tribal Hashed forces that previous elections was affiliated with Zubair operate the PMFs/Hashed the Shia secular Ayad Alawi’s list of Al- Wataniyh. In Babil the tribe is affiliated كتائب جند االمام( under) to Maliki’s State of Law.

153 Ghaith Abdul-Ahad, “Basra Police Battle Crystal Meth epidemic,” The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/16/no- one-smuggles-oil-any-more-basra-police-battle-crystal-meth-epidemic (August 16, 2016). “Basra the Drug Hub,” The National World, http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/basra-becomes-hub-of-drug-abuse (2010). “Police overwhelmed as drugs from Iran flood Basra,” AlMonitor, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/10/basra-iraq-drug- smuggling-iran.html (October 2016). “Drugs Wage Tribal War,” Al Sumeria, http://www.alsumaria.tv/mobile/news/HERE (2016). 154 “Hareth AlRubai demands Abadi to intervene against Tameem Tribe,” “Hareth AlRubai demands Abadi to intervene against Tameem Tribe,” “Tribal Conflicts Exacerbated by the Militias in Abu Saida-Diyala,” Bas News, http://www.basnews.com/index.php/ar/reports/296589 (2016). 155 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page 56.

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The tribe is powerful in Dhi Qar many tribe members were killed in the recent demonstrations. Abu al-Khaseb Bani Amer It’s a different group of Shia For the third time they elect Amer al- that don’t follow Marjya in Faiz to the COR. In national elections Iraq or Iran they are called of May 2018, the tribe’s candidate ran Shaikhia. They are armed but under the PMFs/Hashed’s Fatih List. didn’t operate under the PMFs/Hashed and they don’t enter tribe conflicts. Qurna Bani Malik As'aib Ahlul-Haq, Kataeib Maliki’s State of Law list. Their tribal Sayid Al-Shuhada, Badr Crop figure Dorgham al-Maliki is PM Adel Abdul Mahdi advisor on tribal issues in Basrah. Shatt al-Arab Al-Idani The tribe has Tribal Hashed Affiliated to Basrah Governor Asa’ad forces operating under the al-Idani PMFs/Hashed Al-Madina Bain Mansour The tribe is armed with light Its affiliated to Fatih list. Sheikh and medium-size weapons. It Mohammed Abu Al Hail is the tribe’s enters a lot of conflicts and it leader and COR MP under the Fatih has militias that operate list. under the PMFs/Hashed Dayr Bayit Wafi The tribe is armed with light Fatih List Bina’a Bloc and medium-size weapons. It has been involved in many tribal conflicts and has militias that operate under the PMFs/Hashed Hartha Al-Halaf tribe Both tribes are armed with Al-Halaf tribe member Thawra al-Hilfi is and light and medium-size a COR member under Al-Nasr Bina’a al-Garamesha weapons. They have been in Bloc. tribe several tribal conflicts.

Imam al-Sadiq Bain Mansour Same as above Same above Umm Qaser Mixed from - - different tribes Al Seeba Mixed from - - different tribes Al - Thagar Bani Malik Same above Same above Safwan Bain Sakien The tribe is armed with light Sayroon Islah Parliamentary Bloc. The and medium-size weapons. It COR member Rami al-Sakieni has been involved in many tribal conflicts and has militias that operate under the PMFs/Hashed. The tribe has been given heavy weapons such as Tanks by the PMFs/Hashed Commission office in Basrah. Al-Shaheed Eiz Al- Al-Imarah The tribe is armed with light Fatih List Bina’a Parliamentary Bloc Deen Saleem and medium-size weapons. It has been involved in many tribal conflicts and has militias that operate under the PMFs/Hashed.

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Al - Nashwah Al-Mayahi The tribe is armed with light Fatih List Bina’a Parliamentary Bloc and medium-size weapons. It has been involved in many tribal conflicts and has militias that operate under the PMFs/Hashed

DRIVERS OF CONFLICT: MILITIAS AND SERVICE DELIVERY The KII and FGDs revealed that the majority of Basrah government officials, University teachers, and politicians believe that the PMFs/Hashed have an overall control of the government institutions in Basrah provincial government (see Figure 5: The control of the militias over the government institutions).156

Service delivery in Basrah has been always one of the main challenges in Iraq’s state building process. The province suffers chronic water and electricity problems as well as hard enormous corruption schemes given the province’s lucrative border-crossings with Iran and Kuwait, and maritime port such as Um Qasr. Post 2003 and due to the political transformation of the militias, these problems and drivers of conflict has exacerbated, creating a failing provincial government and weak civil society role. One of the major dynamics that has contributed to the emboldening of the PMFs/Hashed militias role in Basrah is the province’s high unemployment rates, e.g., about 35 percent in 2019, and high youth population rates which are about 65 percent of Basrah’s society.157

30

25 28 26 20

15

10 10 5

0 Comprehensive Backing and The parties that control over support role for own the militias government government control all state institutions institutions institutions. without control

Figure 5: The control of the militias over the government institutions

156 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page: 25. 157 Ibid: page: 85.

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The Government Institutions take on After 2014, the PMFs/Hashed have become part and parcel of the Militias activities the Basrah’s conflict dynamics, as the militias’ activities have continued to erode state authority and undermine economic Interview No. 42-Question 3: Director of Basrah Municipality recovery. In Basrah, the PMFs/Hashed started to expand its control through force and military weight into various sectors “In the beginning, there was a desire of the economy. Their involvement is broad, aggressive, and in Basra to support the Popular Mobilization because its aims and occurs at various government levels. According to COR’s slogans were to eliminate corruption Financial Committee, there are many unofficial check points in the government and provide along the border with Iran and they are controlled by armed services, but after winning the elections did not make any of its forces. On a higher and more official level, the PMFs/Hashed promises, but it allied with the devil militias have been extending their control over state-owned for positions and financial gains, engineering and construction companies in Basrah (a where it was a disappointment to public opinion.” phenomenon that is also emerging in Baghdad and Anbar). In addition, the powerful militias have been also interfering in the - ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report functions of land and sea ports. For example, the private sector August 16, 2019 importers have to pay the PMFs/Hashed taxation in addition to the GOI taxation on goods. The PMFs/Hashed in turn issue the Interview no. 20 - question 6 importer a (traffic receipt). The receipt confirms the inspection

“Hadi al-Amiri appointed the director of the goods and facilitates the importers’ ability to clear the and head of reconstruction of Basrah, traded goods from the customs quickly. Usually, these receipts but we did not see any reconstruction or a single press conference. We are issued for the goods that otherwise will not be cleared don't know where Basra's money from the customs. The traders in Basrah usually pay high rate goes.” fees that reaches about ten thousand USD, particularly for 158 - ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report alcoholic drinks. In addition, the oil industry has not been August 16, 2019 spared either, as in Basrah, the militias have been smuggling fuel for a long time, and some have cornered opportunities for lucrative contracts with international oil companies.159

Driving from its presence and activities in Basrah, the PMFs/Hashed enhanced its political and governance weight at the Federal level. The leaders of the PMFs/Hashed Commission have used their influence on PM Adel Abdul-Mahdi and their weight in COR to capture more funds. The 2019 budget allocated $2.16 billion (a fifth higher than 2018) for the PMFs/Hashed Commission. The allocation is about two and half times the budget of the Ministry of Water Resources, at a time of alternating floods and droughts, three times that of the Counter Terrorism Service Forces, and eighteen times that of the Ministry of Culture, responsible for Iraq’s massive and priceless archeological heritage. Such allocations from the national budget have empowered the militias to maintain the level and number of its fighters and wield stronger political influence in Basrah. The following are examples of the government institutions under the militias control:160

• The Hakim’s party as well as the Badr Organization, one the of the leading Iranian backed militias at the PMFs/Hashed control the major facilities at the Rumeila oil fields; e.g., service companies; al-Ma'qil port; Safwan border crossing with Kuwait.

158 ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019: page: 85. 159 Ibid: page: 47. 160 Ibid: page: 47-49.

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The Government Institutions take • Maliki’s State of Law and AAH militia control 60 percent of on the Militias activities Um Qasr government agencies; southern Rumeila oil fields; as well as the petrochemical factory and the gas field in Interview No. 55 - question 4

Burjisia area, and Basrah International Airport. “The objectives of the PM's control over most government • Badr Organization and AAH control the facilities of the institutions are economic and West Qurna and Abu floos port. The area is also one of the buying and selling positions. The result was the failure of state major venues for illicit trade and smuggling. Both militias also institutions to provide services manage the quality control companies at the Shalamcha and all state departments border crossing with Iran. occupied by the PM's parties.”

• Sadr’s Saraya al-Salam militia controls Basrah’s sport city and - ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019 international stadium, the directorate of the electricity, and the al-Jemhori hospital. Interview no. 12 - question 7 • Fadhila party and its militia controls governmental the “PM militias affected government fertilizers factory at Abul-Khaseeb. institutions by controlling and exploiting positions where they had a negative impact on the deterioration at all levels and their links to religious references outside Iraq and their affiliates.”

- ISSTI’s Basrah CSA- Final Report August 16, 2019

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PART 5: CONCLUSION AND ANALYSIS Based on the aforementioned overview of the militias and their role in two major Iraqi provinces, Basrah and Anbar, the following are the main concluding points about the nature and impact of the political transformation of the PMFs/Hashed militias on the Iraqi democratization, state-building, and development process:

1. Iraq is a fragile state with weak government legitimacy, and state sovereignty. These two dynamics have greatly facilitated the political transformation of the Iranian backed militias at the PMFs/Hashed, while keeping their armed forces, and; hence, contributing to structural and socio-economic as well as military conflicts in Iraq.

2. The phenomenon of armed-non-state actors is not new in Iraq. Successive Iraqi government has drawn upon militia-like reserve forces throughout its history to defeat internal and external threats; al-Haras al-Qaumi militias in the 1970s, Jayish al-Sha’abi in the 1980s, and Fidayee Sadam in the 1990s.

3. The use of the militias services is not exclusive to the Iraqi government. Various governments in the Middle East, especially since the Arab Spring, used militias and paramilitary forces to quell demonstrations and pacify opposition such as al-Asad regime in Syria, Mubarak regime in Egypt, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and the on-going conflict in Yemen and Libya. The Iraqi phenomenon, however, is the most dangerous one. Iraq possess huge financial potential and regional status. The success of the political transformation of the militias, while keeping their armed forces, stands for a dangerous regional development. These activities of these militias showcased their transborder agenda and allegiances, which in turn threaten the security and stability of Iraq and the region.

4. Shia militias have been a political-military factor in Iraq ever since the overthrow of the Saddam regime in 2003. However, they have increased in the numbers of fighters, capabilities, and political role since 2014. The militias were about 4,000 fighters in 2010, now reports document about 200,000 fighters under the PMFs/Hashed Commission pay role.161

5. The institutionalization of the Iranian backed militias within the PMFs/Hashed, the civil war in Syria, and the liberation battles against Da’esh greatly altered the political and military profile of these militias. Prior to 2014, a figure like Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis was an obscure former MP in Iraq with little public profile.

6. The mushrooming of the Iranian-backed militias has not stopped with Badr and AAH, instead Iran has started to empower new forces with smaller, yet tightly controlled, personnel, such as Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali. These new militias operate mainly in Anbar, Baghdad outskirts, and Basrah with closer ties to the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), than the larger and older pro-Iranian militias such as Badr and AAH.

7. The Iranian backed factions within the PMFs/Hashed are attacking foreign entities on Iran’s behalf. A dozen attacks have been launched on U.S. military, diplomatic, and commercial targets in Iraq so far in 2019. Then on May 14, 2019, two Saudi oil pumping stations were struck by long-range explosive drones launched from Jurf as-Sakr (small town in Babil and the base of the most powerful Iranian-backed Kata’ib Hezbollah militia).

161 https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/11/18/shiite-militias-are-crashing-the-mosul-offensive/

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8. The Iranian backed factions within the PMFs/Hashed have triggered a number of political- military issues on provincial level, especially in the southern provinces and Basrah. Some of these activities have threatened to spark domestic conflict and could have a serious effect on Iraq’s long-term security and stability. For example, during the on-going Iraqi Youth Demonstrations, the Iraqi public accused the Iranian backed militias, e.g., al-Khurasani, Kata’eb Hezbollah, for the excessive use of force used against the protestors, killing as many as 400 by the end of November 2019.162

9. The Iranian backed factions within the PMFs/Hashed are growing in economic and political power, with significant role and impact on governance policies and service delivery. The militias operations and political activity are intertwined, and the warlords work to shape the situation so that they can sustain and institutionalize a greater role for themselves in provincial governments. Their input extends to concrete policies, which they may introduce, derail, shape, or delay, depending on the specific circumstances. The cases explained in Basrah and Anbar sections provide clear examples on that.

10. As explained in Basrah and Anbar sections, the Iraqi Army, and police have only tenuous operational control over the militias. For example, municipal authorities can appeal directly to militia leaders and bypass the government chain of command, as was the case for the embattled province of Basrah, when PM Abdul Mahdi appointed al-Amiri as Basrah head of the reconstruction committee to expedite the reconstruction and Municipalities projects.

11. In Anbar: a. The PMFs/Hashed such as Kata’ib Hezbollah (brigade 45), Kata’ib Al-Imam Ali (brigade 40), and Harakat al-Abdal (brigade39) maintain combat forces in Albu Kamal in Syria, facing the eastern end of Anbar in Husaybah border crossing on the Euphrates.163

b. Husaybah/Al-Qaim district is controlled mainly by Liwa al-Tafuf (brigade 13).

c. The Euphrates River Valley leading down to eastern Anbar has a strong presence by a mix of Iraqi Army forces and Liwa al-Muntadher (brigade 7) and Kata’ib Ansar al- Hujja (brigade 29).

d. The PMFs/Hashed militia of Liwa al-Tafuf operates as the PMFs/Hashed West Anbar headquarters for all PMFs/Hashed operations along the border in al-Qaim and Rutbah. i.e., on the Baghdad-Damascus highway.

e. In collaboration, Liwa al-Tafuf and Kata’ib Hezbollah control all cross-border smuggling and commerce.

f. Kata’ib Hezbollah reinforce each of the militias along the Iraqi-Syrian border, maintaining checkpoints on Highway 20. Kata’ib Hezbollah also controls the Husaybah Point of Entry, where it clears its military vehicles to enter and leave Iraq without being inspected by customs. Akashat border crossings—where no customs

162 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iraq-death-toll-passes-400-after-weeks-mass-protests 163 The brigade number of the militias are quoted from the following source: https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new- special-groups/

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personnel are present—are coordinated via a Kata’ib Hezbollah base at the H-3 airfield near Rutbah.

12. In Basrah: a. The PMFs/Hashed maintains three operational commands in southern Iraq: the Rafidain Operations Command (in Maysan and Dhi Qar), and the Basrah Operations Command.

b. The Badr Organization control PMFs/Hashed command in Basrah.

c. These commands appear to be maintained by Badr in readiness for any of a number of contingencies: the deployment of Badr PMFs/Hashed units to restore order during electricity-related or secessionist rioting, to deliver civil engineering, and disaster relief, or to crack down on demonstrations.

13. On National Level: a. The malign activities of the Iranian regime are the most important factor in the growing role of these militias in the Iraqi political, economic, governance and service delivery, and security sectors. The Iranian regime has been modeling the establishment of the militias in Iraq into an equivalent of the IRGC or the Basij in Iran. Some in the PMFs/Hashed Commission have proposed an expansion of the existing Commission by creating new units and staffing them with the current militia fighters as individuals without their present militia units’ names and flags and placing the expanded force directly under the Commission’s command, essentially creating a parallel force similar to the IRGC. It is unclear how the Iranian regime will be able to carry out these steps given the current public backlash against the role of the militias, and political and civil unrest in Iraq. PM Abdul Mahdi decree in July to integrate the militias to the Iraqi defense system and integrate the PMFs/Hashed militias to the official Iraqi brigade has not been successfully implemented yet.

b. The central nervous system of the Iranian IRGC- Quds Forces (IRGC-QF) influence in Iraq is Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and Kata’ib Hezbollah, which maintain a stranglehold over most of the PMFs/Hashed Commission. From the IRGC-QF perspective, a smaller and centrally controlled force was more instrumental for the Iranian project in Iraq. The IRGC-QF found that smaller, yet higher-quality, centrally controlled militias are vital due to the difficulty of moving IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah trainers inside Iraq.

c. The Central Security Directorate (CSD) of the PMFs/Hashed Commission is mandated to discipline the militias’ leaders. The CSD has its own well-equipped special forces and intelligence capabilities and led by Abu Zaynab al-Lami (real name: Hassan Falah), an associate of Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and a Kata’ib Hezbollah member from Baghdad. The first deputy director is Abu Ali al-Zaydi, and the second deputy director is Abu Wahab al-Maliki. Al-Lami is emerging as a very powerful figure was floated as one candidate for the highly influential deputy minister of interior for intelligence role in the Iraqi government in June 2019. The CSD is believed by Iraqi politicians to operate a technical intelligence branch under an official known as Abu Iman, focused on developing compromising material on politicians, Governors, government institutions officials, ministry directors, and security personnel.

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d. The Central Bank of Iraq (CBI) has been in continuous conflict and frictions with the PMFs/Hashed Commission over personnel payment, salaries, and pension. The CBI is advancing an audit-biometric system in the Iraqi bureaucracies through its Payment Systems Directorate. The goal is reduced corruption and fake contracts, registering all the government personnel in the biometric system and audited by the CBI. However, up until the writing of this analysis, the PMFs/Hashed has not submitted accurate data and wield its power to block the appointment of a director general to the CBI’s Payment System Directorate. The CBI is pressuring the PMFs/Hashed Commission to move from cash payments to the popular QiCardad electronic debit cards to allow easy transfer of money into bank accounts. Indications from the CBI state that the registration process at the PMFs/Hashed is not an independently verified. Movement to independent auditing and electronic payment would reduce much of the potential for the PMFs/Hashed to massage the real number of active fighters at unit level, which is his key means of maintaining influence over the Iraqi defense system.

14. What Iraq faces today are effectively the out-of-the state control pro-Iranian militias. These militias provide material support to IRGC-QF and other sanctioned Iranian entities, on the expense of the Iraqi provinces’ security, stability, and economic prosperity.

15. While the Iranian-backed militias may change names or administrative and organizational structures or go through a false integration process to the Iraqi army, the phenomenon of the militia is not likely to disappear in the near future, and the warlords will remain meddling in the security, economic, governance, and political situations in Iraq.

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PART 6: IGPA/TAKAMUL CONFLICT SENSITIVITY STRATEGY

IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY

IGPA/Takamul is not a project “working specifically ON conflict (i.e., to address conflict issues);”164 instead, it operates “IN conflict (i.e., applying a conflict sensitive lens to ensure that programming does not have a negative impact on the conflict at hand).”165 Accordingly, based on the contextual overview of the new Iraqi conflicts explained in the sections above, and recognizing the complexity of the country’s chronic and protracted conflicts, IGPA/Takamul adopts a Conflict Sensitivity (CS) strategy in all phases of activity design and implementation (see Figure 6: Conflict Sensitive Analysis and Intervention).166

Figure 6 : Conflict Sensitive Analysis and Intervention

164 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, “Framework for conflict-sensitive programming in Iraq,” https://reliefweb.int/report/iraq/framework-conflict-sensitive-programming-iraq (December 31, 2007). 165 Ibid. 166 https://www.dmeforpeace.org/peacexchange/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/Conflict-Sensitive-Approaches-to-Development- Humanitarian-Assistance-and-Peacebuilding-Resource-Pack.pdf

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The nature of IGPA/Takamul activities and objectives involves working at both the provincial and federal levels. Conflict may accordingly ensue on either level as part of a larger controversy over the continuous role of the Iranian backed factions at the PMFs/Hashed militias in governance policies and service delivery, where the delivery of services may be perceived as favoring one group over another. On the federal level, IGPA/Takamul seeks “champions-career bureaucrats” of governance who are helpful in both legitimizing and promoting the Project’s activities related to the delivery of services. For IGPA/Takamul’s interventions to be successful, they must bear an Iraqi face. As such, IGPA/Takamul operates in line with the following principles:

1. Ensure that programming choices demonstrate awareness of the different forms of PMFs/Hashed’s presence in government institutions and bureaucracies, in accordance with the “do no harm” principle.

2. Work to establish consensus within provinces on the delivery of services as a means of demonstrating good governance, by being a constant advocate for fairness in the distribution of services.

3. Be aware of the implications of program choices for increasing or diminishing the role of the Iranian backed factions at the PMFs/Hashed in the selection of partners.

4. Recognize the need for ensuring sustainability in the delivery of services through training and strengthening of financial capacities of provinces and service delivery agencies.

5. Assist local governments in communicating its service delivery successes through its bureaucracy and government institutions processes and not through the might of militias.

6. Be aware that additional resources will be required for improved service delivery, empowering local revenue generation and transparent provincial collective mechanisms.

7. Conflict sensitivity should be integrated in IGPA/Takamul’s monitoring and evaluation (M&E) systems rather than creating new ones in order to avoid creating additional work and the risk that a conflict sensitivity assessment (CSA) is side-lined when time or resource pressure is high (see Table 15: Examples of key questions and approaches that can be adopted to support the effective integration of conflict sensitivity into M&E systems).167

167 The table and example indicators are borrowed from the following source: https://www.southsudanpeaceportal.com/wp- content/uploads/2017/11/CSRF-Conflict-Sensitivity-Toolkit.pdf

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TABLE 15: EXAMPLES OF KEY QUESTIONS TO SUPPORT THE INTEGRATION OF CONFLICT SENSITIVITY INTO M&E SYSTEMS Questions for framing What this means for M&E processes Conflict Sensitive M&E What is the program trying to Example indicators for M&E: achieve from a conflict sensitivity perspective? Minimizing harm: New training at the Basrah Water Directorate does not contribute to empowering members of militias present at the directorate.

Contributing to peace and stability: New water points contribute to strengthening peaceful coexistence between communities.

Directly addressing conflict drivers: New water points and community reconciliation processes assist communities in Who will the program need to Ideally,strengthening from beneficiaries local conflict and resolut non-ionbeneficiaries mechanisms. (inclusive of get feedback from in order to gender, age, ethnicity) – those most directly affected by both the understand its intended and conflicts, aid and from implementing partners. unintended impact? How should M&E be Safety of interviewees and interviewers/researchers, taking into implemented account particular gender and ethnicity-related vulnerabilities. to be conflict-sensitive? Targeting men/women, old/young, different ethnicities etc. will allow for the recording of different experiences and roles in conflict and peace.

Will feedback be provided to This could be a powerful way to demonstrate accountability and beneficiaries? that people are being listened to in a context where leaders are in many respects unaccountable to the population.

ANCHORING CSA IN ACTIVITY DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION IGPA/Takamul’s implementation strategy is contingent on a clear understanding of the context of conflict and its interaction with project activities. The strategy aims to prevent unintentional conflict provoking, and, where possible, to mitigate and contribute to conflict prevention in the area of operation. Hence, the implementation strategy will inform all levels of interventions and all stages of a programming cycle. Deploying USAID CAF 2.0, 2012, Conflict Sensitive Activity Design Tool, Conflict Sensitive Solicitation Checklist, and the Activity Design Template the following are the key issues IGPA/Takamul will take into consideration to identify CS aspects of activity design and implementation.

STEP 1: CLEAR IDENTFICATION OF IGPA/TAKAMUL There are three major types of international development program interventions; governance, peacebuilding, and humanitarian assistance. The operational context of IGPA/Takamul can be best described as a fragile state, with a fluid political, economic, and security situation as well as heavy regional interventions, especially on the part of the Iranian regime. The Iraqi context, hence, is

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highlighted by a high degree of politicization that predominantly affects governance policies and service delivery. In addition, the country’s bureaucratic system is infused with armed non-state actors who have transborder agenda and allegiances. The complexities of these dynamics might easily shift provincial or national governance issues, with rapid and unpredicted changes.

Operating in such a fluctuating context, it is crucial for IGPA/Takamul to clearly identify its mission and nature of the intervention in direct and clear terms for its local and international staff, to avoid dragging the program into any unintended venues of intervention. IGPA/Takamul is a long-term governance intervention that aims to bring improvements in the service delivery sector through building the provincial and national governments’ capacity to assume their core responsibilities, which in turn leads to economic, political, and social stability and a higher quality of life of the population, including vulnerable segments of society and faith-based communities. The program is not an emergency intervention to assist certain population or mandated to design measures to consolidate peaceful relations and strengthen viable political institutions capable of mediating conflict.

STEP 2: SUSTAINED ACTIVATION OF CONTEXT MONITORING IGPA/Takamul’s operational context is managed through the lenses of political economy assessments (PEA), CSAs and complexity awareness monitoring (CAM). Altogether, the PEA/CSA/CAM constitute the Project’s overall Context Monitoring (CM).168 It is important to look into the contextual operations of these three components. Conflicts can benefit certain sectors of society, thus creating vested interests in perpetuating conflict and impeding peace, as is the case of the militias in Anbar and Basrah. Similar to the majority of global conflicts, Iraqi conflicts largely originate due to unaddressed “grievances” such as, religious discrimination, unequal distribution of resources and dramatic increases in unemployment. In addition, current frictions and conflicts exacerbated by the Iranian-backed militias have economic incentives; i.e. “greed which is the benefits that accrue from participation in conflict – employment in armed forces, access to scarce resources, power.”169 The political economy of conflict looks into both greed and grievance. For example, the PMFs/Hashed militias started to participate in, and take control of, the illegal and illicit trade routes at both the official and unofficial border-crossings in Anbar and Basrah to fund their personnel and maintain financial flows to transborder activities. The political transformation of the militias was mainly enabled by politicians, commanders and fighters, whose interests are to generate new forms of profit, power and protection. At the same time, a shadow economy has emerged in several Iraqi provinces like Ninewa, Anbar, Diyala and Basrah, to make high profits at the margin of conflict. There, both political and entrepreneurial stakeholders benefit from the general insecurity and lack of rule of law to extract precious natural resources, trade in illicit goods (e.g., drugs), and smuggle high value commodities. The results are high concentrations of power, destruction of economic assets, and impoverishment of vulnerable groups. Such economic structures created by conflict are among the most powerful blockages to attaining stable and enabling conditions for the local government to perform its responsibilities. As such, IGPA/Takamul interventions continue to factor the political economy of conflict into activity design, plan, and implementation to ensure that the Project does not fuel war economies. Doing so is key to ensuring conflict sensitivity implementation.

STEP 3: CONTEXTUAL UNDERSTANDING ON PROVINCIAL LEVEL Under guidance from USAID, IGPA/Takamul senior management works with the technical staff leading activities to build in conflict analyses for project activities, especially for interventions at the provincial level during the current civil unrest in Iraq. Ideally, IGPA/Takamul will continue its

168 Updated USAID Program Cycle Operational Policy (June 2019) and updated USAID note on CAM (July 2018). 169 https://www.southsudanpeaceportal.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CSRF-Conflict-Sensitivity-Toolkit.pdf

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adoption of in-house conflict sensitivity consideration, in addition to gender and vulnerable population sensitivity analyses for each activity undertaken. These analyses will draw upon the best available data and an assessment of the potential effect of data gaps on the proposed activity’s ability to increase or decrease conflict. Additionally, the analyses will take into account the demographic and political realities of each province where IGPA/Takamul works. To that end, and given the challenges of data collection in Iraq, IGPA/Takamul adopts a province- and locality-specific approach by triangulating data from various sources in order to have a full grasp of the dynamics. Sources include project staff, interviews with local partners and government institutions, local subcontractors, and national or international civil society organizations (CSO) such as, but not limited to, UN agencies and the International Crisis Group.

STEP 4: RECOGNITION GUIDE OF THE MILITIAS-PERSONNEL OPERATING IN GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS The first step to addressing the challenge posed by today’s Iran-backed militias is to clearly define - and continually refine - identification of their presence within Iraqi government institutions and bureaucracies. IGPA/Takamul must understand that militias are not simply military forces, but rather led by warlords who are also politicians whose power has extended into the Iraqi Council of Representatives (COR) as well as national and provincial government institutions. IGPA/Takamul, through its PEA Unit, has developed easy-to-use recognition guides to distinguish between the array of militia logos, flags, and uniforms (which, in some cases, may resemble those worn by the Iraqi Army or police). More importantly, it is vital that the Project address the new trend in militias’ names. Following Prime Minister (PM) Adel Abdul Mahdi’s order to integrate the PMFs/Hashed into the national army and change their names and military rankings to match those of the Iraqi army, the PMFs/Hashed, especially the Iranian backed militias, have started to promote their military names to create confusion among the official Iraqi army forces. For example, one of the newly established and most capable pro-Iranian militia, Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, has now changed its name to PMFs/Hashed-brigade 14 to divert attention from its original militia name and gives the false impression that the militia has been integrated to the Iraqi army. (see Table 16: Militias names at the Iraqi Army.170 Figure 6: The Main Militias with their logos and leaders171).

TABLE 16: MILITIAS NAMES AT THE IRAQI ARMY Militia Iraqi Army Name Kata’ib Jund al-Imam Brigade 6

Liwa al-Muntadher Brigade 7

Harakat Hezbol-lah al-Nujaba Brigade 12

Liwa al-Tafuf Brigade 13

Saraya al-Jihad Brigade 17

Saraya Talia al-Khurasani Brigade 18

Ansar Allah al-Tawfiya Brigade 19

Saraya Ansar al-Aqeeda Brigade 28

170 https://ctc.usma.edu/irans-expanding-militia-army-iraq-new-special-groups/ 171 https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/R45633.pdf

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Quwwat al-Shahid al-Sadr al-Awwal Brigade 25

Kata’ib Ansar al-Hujja Brigade 29

The Shabek Shia Militia Brigade 30

Kata’ib al-Tayyar al-Risali Brigade 31

Quwwat al-Shahid al-Sadr Brigade 35

Harakat al-Abdal Brigade 39

Kata’ib al-Imam Ali Brigade 40

AAH Brigades 41, 42, 43

Kat’aeb Hezbollah Brigades 45, 56, 57

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Figure 7: The Main Militias with their logos and leaders

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STEP 5: IDENTIFYING ACTIVITY IMPACT ON CONFLICT IGPA/Takamul continues to determine how interventions may impact the conflict context and develop strategies to maximize positive outcomes, minimize negative side effects, and develop an understanding of how these issues may affect the Project’s overall effectiveness. To that end, IGPA/Takamul will continue using a risk/opportunity analysis to identify potential risks and opportunities to mitigate potential tensions through project activities to reinforce the dynamics of peace. Given IGPA/Takamul’s provincial and locality focus, understanding the intra-communal/group conflict dynamics in the target provinces is of particular importance for the identification of activity impacts. Thus, IGPA/Takamul will continue to emphasize several factors when selecting engagement activities, including the variety of targeted locations, ethnicities, religions, and province affirmative action toward presently marginalized groups, and faith-based communities.

STEP 6: STRATEGY FOR ACTIVITY IMPLEMENTATION This step depends on utilizing the information obtained during the contextual and activity impact analyses (steps 1-5) for specific province in order to mitigate potential negative impacts on conflict dynamics, encourage positive outcomes, while also monitoring for these outcomes. Specifically, the strategy will include the following processes:

SaferWorld’s Guiding Principles 1. What: Identify activity goals and targets. for Conflict Sensitive Approaches: 2. Who: Participants, implementers, and beneficiaries (e.g. diverse group of local officials, CSOs and/or diverse • Participatory process: the localities/institutions in the target province). process perceived as being Iraqi and beneficial to Iraqis, not imposed by outsiders. 3. When and How: When and how the activity will • Inclusive: actors, issues, and occur and its implementation process. perceptions-various ethnic/religion/socio- 4. Strategy Inclusion: CS strategy will be part of economic background planning and implementation discussions for the • Ensure impartiality suggested activity. • Transparent process of activity design, plan, and 5. Re-adjustment Plans: Establish re-adjustment implementation plans to address conflict prone issues as they arise. The • Respectful of people’s Do-No-Harm (DNH) considerations are of particular ownership of their conflict impact in this regard. A decision not to move forward will and their suffering be considered should potential conflict emerge, or the • Program Accountability engagement appears to exacerbate, rather than, mitigate • Partnership and conflict. coordination • Complementarity and 6. Staff Awareness: The Project management ensures coherence that staff understand CSA and all issues, if any, are • Timely immediately reported.

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IGPA/Takamul Activity Checklist: Project Design and Implementation Conflict Sensitivity and Gender Sensitivity

Component Impact Pattern Questions Notes Location: Distribution • Why did we choose this location? Are there other The Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds are located in defined- donors/activities who work in this location? boundaries regions. IGPA/Takamul pays extra Where? • Who is left out because of our location choices? attention to secure proximity and access to the • Does the target area benefit one identity (minority, gender, populations located in the following four problematic vulnerable) group more than another? areas so that they can participate in activities and • Is this location accessible to all beneficiaries? benefit from resources: • Does the location choice send any messages about preference for one group over another? Mixed communities in the disputed areas (Kirkuk, • Do authorities seek to control or manipulate the selection Ninewa, Diyala, and Salah al-Din). of beneficiaries, the location of interventions, or activity Pockets of Shia communities in Sunni areas (i.e. the implementation in ways that are biased and may raise Samara and Baled districts of Salah al-Din and the Tal tensions? Afar district in Ninewa), and pockets of Sunni communities in Shia areas (i.e. Zubair in Basrah). Religious minorities are mainly located in the Ninewa Plains. The capital Baghdad inhabits various Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, and minorities. For example, the Risafa area is mainly Shia while the Karekh area is mainly Sunni. The Kurds are largely located along Falastine Street and the Jamila Quarters, whereas the Christians are in the Karrada, Mesbah, and Zaiona areas. Participants: Inclusion For who? Similar to above, activity design can be problematic • Are all identity groups that exist in the context represented for mixed communities. IGPA/Takamul works to For who? among beneficiaries? address the sensitivity of beneficiary selection in the • Why did we choose our criteria to select a target group? disputed areas, pockets of Sunnis and Shias Why them? Why not others? communities in the opposite sect areas, and the • Who did we leave out and why? Ninewa Plains.

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Component Impact Pattern Questions Notes • Will anticipated interventions exacerbate existing tensions (dividers) between these identity groups? • How might patterns of exclusion (e.g., gender, identity) impact access to aid? With whom? With whom? • Do staff of potential partner organizations represent any particular group? • Are staff able to engage with both men and women, for example in environments where women’s engagement may be limited? • Are staff able to engage vulnerable populations? • Which partner authorities are involved in the activity? • Are these activity beneficiaries esentative of diverse identities (i.e. women, vulnerable populations, ethnicity, etc.)? • Activity: Operationalization • What resources (skills, services, goods, etc.) is the IGPA’s activities are mainly targeting government and activity bringing? bureaucracy officials on provincial level. What does it • Are the resources appropriate for the context? For The local government and provincial councils are involve? different gender identity groups? politicians who were elected based on a • How does the activity distribute resources? proportional representation system. • Are certain groups benefiting more than others? Hence, IGPA will pay extra attention in the designing • Is there resistance to the activity? By whom? Why? its activities, as they can be highly political and be • What is the impact of the activity on conflict dynamics? perceived as inadvertently supporting one group on • What is the impact of the activity on gender dynamics? the expense of the other. • How do these resources affect different identity groups and the relations between them? • Are there security risks for beneficiaries?

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Component Impact Pattern Questions Notes Purpose: Legitimization • How does the activity advance the project purpose? At the heart of IGPA/Takamul’s objectives is better • Do people in the community agree that the anticipated service delivery and decentralization as a means of Why this desired change facilitated by this activity is important? achieving this goal. The project has to take into activity? • Are there differences in needs and perceptions of women consideration the disparity in the decentralization and other vulnerable or marginalized populations? process among various province; based on their • Why did we select these resources and interventions? ethnic and religious representation. Why this activity? Timing: Consideration • Does the planned timing of activity interventions The context in which IGPA/Takamul launched is (consultations, training, distributions, etc.) coincide with featured by the following: When? any of conflict triggering events, such as elections? 1. Post-Da’esh Iraq • Does the planned timing of interventions make any 2. Post-Kurdish Referendum beneficiaries/staff vulnerable to violence? 3. Pre-Elections of 2018 • Are activity times appropriate for the inclusion of 4. Failed anti-corruption campaign women, vulnerable groups, and minorities? 5. A shaken social contract with deonstrations • Who may be left out based on our timeframes? erupting in Baghdad and southern provinces. Means: Orientation • How do activity operations affect gender, minority, and vulnerable groups dynamics? How? • Who is involved in decision-making processes? Are these processes inclusive of men, women, marginalized populations, other identity groups? • What mechanisms should we install to create safe spaces for feedback and complaints from participants and non- participants? • Do women, vulnerable populations, and other groups have equal access to activity information or do we need to make additional communication efforts? • Are there risks of backlash when supporting the empowerment of women or minority groups in certain areas? If so, how do we mitigate that?

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Component Impact Pattern Questions Notes M&E Equity and • Does the activity require context-specific quantitative and Specific context-demographic must be taken into Inclusiveness qualitative indicators for conflict sensitivity? account in engendering targets or to ensure an equity • Does the activity require context-specific indicators that lens in setting indicators. Context-specific indicators measure progress or monitor context relative to ensure that possible consequences - intended as well as unintended, positive and negative - of community- gendered dimensions of the conflict? ` specific dynamics are detected early on, allowing for • What are the adaptive management aspects to be learning and adaptation to avoid contributing considered in this activity? to/accelerating violence and tensions.

For example, context specific indicators can provide information on how the conflict is relevant to the evolving interventions. Interaction indicators that track how the intervention is affected by the conflict, and how it affects the conflict trends, considering facts and perceptions of who benefits from the intervention.

Context-specific conflict sensitivity indicators serves as an ‘early warning system’ for program impacts and ensures collaboration, learning and adaption through, for example: • Regular review of drivers/connectors (tensions/enablers) for changes in dynamics; • Revisiting priority drivers/connectors to monitor and adjust prioritization as needed; • Determining which details of the activity in a specific context caused changes in drivers/connectors; • Identifying the patterns of impact (i.e. context-specific negative/positive patterns of behavior related to respect, accountability, fairness and transparency); and

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Component Impact Pattern Questions Notes • Identifying available options to change the patterns, with due consideration to the impact of such changes (i.e. will changes result in conflict mitigation or in amplification?).

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