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The Sophist in the Cave: Education Through Names in Plato's Republic

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The Sophist in the Cave: Education Through Names in Plato's Republic Wayne State University Wayne State University Dissertations 1-1-2016 The ophiS st In The aC ve: Education Through Names In Plato's Republic Daniel Propson Wayne State University, Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Linguistics Commons, and the Philosophy Commons Recommended Citation Propson, Daniel, "The opS hist In The aC ve: Education Through Names In Plato's Republic" (2016). Wayne State University Dissertations. 1476. https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations/1476 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Wayne State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState. THE SOPHIST IN THE CAVE EDUCATION THROUGH NAMES IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC by DANIEL PROPSON DISSERTATION Submitted to the Graduate School of Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 2016 MAJOR: PHILOSOPHY Approved By: _________________________________________ Advisor Date _________________________________________ _________________________________________ _________________________________________ DEDICATION To my five little philosophers. ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I am grateful to many, many people who have made this dissertation possible. My professors at Wayne State have consistently challenged me to do my best work, and to them I am sincerely grateful. I thank Lawrence Lombard for his endless curiosity and rigor, Bruce Russell for his amiability and inquisitiveness, Susan Vineberg for her sound advice and her wit, Mike McKinsey for his warmth and insight, Jonny Cottrell for his enthusiasm, and Greg Novack for his stories about Sherlock and Moriarty. Phyllis Seals has been an indispensable source of practical assistance and cheerfulness. My fellow current or erstwhile students David Baxter, Marcus Cooper, Dan Yeakel, Jim Schwartz, Travis Figg, Jennifer Goossen, and Lucas Lockard have filled my life with interesting conversations, and in no small way refined my thinking about Plato and philosophy. I also thank the late Joseph Hinkins, who was the first graduate student I met at Wayne State, and whose passion for philosophy inspired me. After reading an early draft of Chapter I, Sean Stidd made a comment about Hilary Putnam that transformed the chapter, and by extension the entire dissertation. Eric Hiddleston later helped me refine my discussions of philosophy of language, so that I could engage with contemporary practitioners of the discipline more effectively. Both Katherine Kim and John Corvino have been extremely helpful to me throughout my time at Wayne State, and they certainly deserve my thanks. Katherine is not just a great professor; she is a great friend, and her advice about how to work on a dissertation has been invaluable. John is dedicated to the department and to his students, and he is consistently available to help, even at a moment’s notice. I have only Herb Granger to blame for my passion for Plato, and only Ken Walters to blame for my passion for Greek. In only the third philosophy class I had ever taken, Professor Granger iii inspired my interest in Plato’s Republic, and patiently guided me through a graduate seminar that I was hardly qualified to attend. His diligent instruction and his enthusiasm set the course for this dissertation. As for Professor Walters, I began taking courses in Greek because they were a required chore for my chosen profession. By the time he was done with me, I found myself utterly fascinated by ancient Greek, both the language and the culture. Professor Walters deserves credit not only for the hours he has spent poring over this manuscript, but also for any understanding I have of the intellectual culture of ancient Greece. My advisor, Josh Wilburn, appeared on the scene at exactly the right moment, and has never ceased to amaze me with his diligence and insight. Josh has made me a much, much better philosopher in the process. His patience with drafts that could be scattered and disorganized has been impressive, and his concern for my professional future has been ever-present and commendable. Thank you, Josh. A number of friends and family members also deserve my thanks, for their unfailing love and support. David Propson, Shelly Tyshka, Paul Propson, Mark Whitters, Josh Rock, Josh Pauley, Mike Loveland, Dave O’Connor, Garrett Shireman, Brian Laba, Yvette Rock, Mike Miklosovic, and Dan Smith: thank you! My gratitude also goes out to my father, whose perseverance through adversity is the inspiration for my life, and my mother, who showed me what it means to love. Finally, I would like to thank the crazy woman who encouraged her husband to follow his dream: Priscilla Propson. Although I am surrounded by philosophers all day, you are the smartest person I know, my dear, and certainly the greatest lover of wisdom I have ever known. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements _________________________________________________________________ iii Introduction ______________________________________________________________________ 2 Chapter One, “Education Through Names in the Cratylus” __________________________________ 8 Chapter Two, “Onomastic Education in Plato’s Republic” ____________________________________ 44 Chapter Three, “Middle Virtue: Accurate ‘Poetry’ in Republic X” ______________________________ 80 Chapter Four, “Language in the Cave” __________________________________________________ 104 Conclusion _______________________________________________________________________ 134 Bibliography .______________________________________________________________________ 138 Abstract __________________________________________________________________________ 145 Autobiographical Statement __________________________________________________________ 147 v 1 Be sure of it, my dear Crito: Incorrect speech is not only discordant in its own right, but it also works mischief in our souls. – Phaedo 115e1 1 Unless otherwise indicated, translations are my own. 2 INTRODUCTION “What is the nature of the relationship between words and the objects they refer to?” This question is surely central to philosophical inquiry, since errors of language inevitably breed errors of investigation. Plato was one of the first people to ask the question. His answer, in the Cratylus, has attracted a great deal of scholarly disapproval, and very little genuine philosophical interest. Worse yet, scholars generally think that Plato’s views about philosophy of language were confined to one (or, at best, two) dialogues, and that his philosophy of language played no particular role in the metaphysical theories that we associate with “high Platonism.” In this dissertation, I will contest all those common views. I will argue that philosophy of language played a genuine role in Plato’s metaphysical doctrines in the Republic, and that these doctrines are borne out by at least half a dozen other dialogues. I will argue that Plato’s views on linguistic reference are, far from being obscure or outlandish, roughly comparable to certain widely accepted modern views about linguistics, and reasonably plausible. I will argue that Plato’s cave image dramatizes his philosophy of language – and his animosity against the sophists – in a remarkable and previously unappreciated way. I am not, however, making the claim that philosophy of language was somehow central to the dialogues of Plato’s middle period. I do not think that theories of reference were on Plato’s mind when he wrote the Republic, and I don’t think my thesis requires him to have been focused on such a thing. I would merely say that Plato’s views about language informed his writing about other topics, and that this connection can be traced in the dialogues. And perhaps this is just what we would expect. Had Frege written about politics and propaganda, surely his views about language would have influenced what he said. Why? Because language is the very lifeblood of political 3 information/misinformation, and – as Orwell recognized – the most powerful revolution proceeds by controlling what things citizens are capable of referring to. The book 1984 is in the tradition of Plato’s Republic, not (I hope) because the latter book does away with all freedom, but because 1984 carries on the Republic’s tradition of media censorship. As I will argue, Plato believed that unjust states were rife with linguistic inaccuracy about objects of the highest importance; citizens in such a state could refer to objects like justice or temperance, but their notion of these words was radically at odds with the genuine nature of such objects. Plato’s solution to this sorry situation was censorship. According to Plato, the principle guiding his censorship is truth (Rep. 490a).2 With a few exceptions, stories are to be censored precisely insofar as they fail to conform to the truth (Rep. 377e). In Athens, however, it was a common sophistical teaching that falsehood was impossible.3 Plato’s philosophy of language in the Cratylus, the Sophist, the Statesman, and the Theaetetus was clearly meant to dispute this teaching as thoroughly and decisively as possible. These dialogues, then, have at the very least the role of carving out a place for the sort of falsity that must then be expunged from the Beautiful City. I see them as doing something more. By promoting the notion that language proceeds from the lawgiver,
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