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Document of The World Bank

Report No: ICR2286 Public Disclosure Authorized

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IBRD-72380 IDA-39360 IDA-44980)

ON A

LOAN

Public Disclosure Authorized IN THE AMOUNT OF US$ 3.7 MILLION

AND ON

CREDITS (2) IN THE AMOUNT OF

SDR 2.6 MILLION (US$ 3.8 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

SDR 1.9 MILLION (US$ 3 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

Public Disclosure Authorized TO SAINT LUCIA

FOR A

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PROJECT II

August 29, 2012

Sustainable Development Department Caribbean Country Management Unit Public Disclosure Authorized Latin America and the Caribbean Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective June 2012)

Currency Unit = Eastern Caribbean Dollars (EC$) US$ 1.00 = EC$ 2.70

FISCAL YEAR January 1 to December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

APL Adaptable Program Loan CAS Country Assistance Strategy CDERA Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency CDEMA Caribbean Disaster and Emergency Management Agency CDMP Caribbean Disaster Mitigation Project DMP II Disaster Management Project II ECCB Eastern Caribbean Central Bank EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EOC Emergency Operations Center ERDMP Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project ERP Emergency Recovery Project EU European Union IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development IDA International Development Association IADB Inter-American Development Bank LAC Latin America and the Caribbean MCWT&PU Ministry of Communications, Works, Transport and Public Utilities MOE Ministry of Education MOH Ministry of Health MPDE&H Ministry of Physical Development, Environment and Housing NEMO National Emergency Management Office NHC National Hurricane Center OECS Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States PAHO Pan American Health Organization OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs UNDP United Nations Development Program USGS United States Geological Survey

Vice President: Hasan Tuluy Country Director: Françoise Clottes Sector Manager: Anna Wellenstein Project Team Leader: Tiguist Fisseha ICR Team Leader: Tiguist Fisseha

SAINT LUCIA Disaster Management Project II

CONTENTS

Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph

1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ...... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes ...... 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes ...... 14 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ...... 19 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ...... 20 6. Lessons Learned ...... 23 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners ...... 25 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing ...... 26 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ...... 27 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ...... 31 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ...... 39 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ...... 41 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ...... 42 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ...... 43 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ...... 45 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...... 46 MAP IBRD 39258

:A. Basic Information· LC Disaster Country: :st. Lucia !Project Name: Management Project II IBRD-72380,IDA Project ID: 'P086469 VC/TF Number(s): ;39360,IDA-44980 :IcR Date: :os/3112012 JCR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF :Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: SAINT LUCIA .Original Total USD 7.50M Disbursed Amount: USD 10.50M 1Commitment: [13:~y_i~~-d Amount: !USD 1O.SOM !Environmental Category: B i'~""" -- ..... ' !Implementing Agencies: i ~i~i~t_ry of Finance (~c;u)

~~~~tri~~!'!~~ ' Revised I Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 10/28/2003 Effectiveness: 10/27/2004 10/27/2004 Appraisal: 05/04/2004 ,Restructuring( s ): i . AIJproval: 06/22/2004 :Mid-term Review:

~losing: 12/3112011

p·:·~-~~·~'""'"""~"7~ ~.':""'':"'': ~~ "F··~-· '" Jf~(:~·~·~w·.:~:"•:':"':~ '.~'Ci?":" ·· '-'~;- -:':":•:t''~'7'i"il~~T·' r~ r:::·"'7' n<:.1..:- l~~:~~~.§P:m.~!!Y .;• ,,, ,~.~~ .. _C.l Performance Rating by ICR Satisfactory Moderate

Sati~factory _ Satisfactory

C.l Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)

Bank 1 Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: 'Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: r-··------~------·----.. -· -··--- ...... ·----·· .. - f~~~_2_~~~~-~~!-~~try_~~~--I".Ipl_e._~-~-!l.. !~f!~~--}>~~~~~~!l-~~-!!l~icat()_..-_s . Implementation I d' t ! QAG Assessments 1 1 1n 1ca ors ' . Rating . Performance . (1f any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry None at any time (Yes/No): No !(QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): I : DO rating before 1Satisfactory 1Closing/Inactive status:

·iii~~~i~i6r'knii!li~;ue:tE~d~- .,.. ;,::.:,.,,,_,,~,,_,),_,_,., .'e~• :.•. •·- -'...,''' :, -----·-"- ;, " "'"""" "" .. " • • " • "" "'•• • Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) , Celltralgovemment administration 15 15 Flood protection 60 60 · Other social services 15

Sub-natio_llt\1 government admi!list~ation _ 10

'Theme Code _(its % of total Bank financing). ; Natural disaster management 50 50 Rural services and infrastructure 25 25 Water resource management 25 25

·E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval ! Vice President: Hasan A. Tuluy David de Ferranti Country Director: 1Francoise Clottes Caroline D. Anstey f ' Sector Mana~er: 'Anna W ellenstein ;John Henry Stein I lProj~ct Team Leader: Tigl!ist Fisseha !Francis Ghesquiere ! ... ICR Team Leader: Tiguist Fisseha . ICR Primary Author: Rossella Della Monica

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The project aims at further reducing the country's vulnerability to adverse natural events (hurricane, floods, etc.) through investment in risk management activities. As such, the objectives of the project are to further strengthen (a) infrastructure against the impact of adverse natural events (hurricanes, flooding, etc.) through the implementation of physical mitigation measures; (b) the response capacity in case of adverse natural event

11 (hurricane, flooding, etc) through capacity building, equipment purchase and investment in emergency infrastructure; and (c) the institutional capacity of the various ministries and agencies dealing with disaster management through the provision of adequate facilities, critical equipment, technical assistance and training.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) Not Applicable

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Original Target . Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval . Target Completion or documents) . Values Target Years Indicator 1 : Percentage of population with access to improved infrastructure Value quantitative or 30% 65% 70% 80 Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2004 12/31/2008 12/31/2009 12/3112010 Comments It was estimated that by the project closing, 80% of the population had access to (incl.% improved infrastructure achievement) Indicator 2 : Dennery Village protected from storm surge of a 10 year return period Value quantitative or Yes Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2011 Comments The coastal defense, the Berm and the recreational parks area are completed. No (incl.% major storm surge was experienced to date, and works proved to be effective achievement) after two hurricane events (2007 & 201 0). National Emergency Management Office (NEMO) operational in new Indicator 3 : Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and with updated Emergency Response Plan Value quantitative or Yes Qualitative) Date achieved 12/31/2009 Works were completed on 12/1/2009. The EOC was actively used as a command Comments center for relief efforts during and after Hurricane Tomas. A non technical (incl.% version of the emergency response plan was printed. The technical version was achievement) finalized on 7/2/201 0. Populations with access to shelters with acceptable water systems and with Indicator 4 : access to emergency equipment throughout the territory. Value quantitative or 60% 60% Qualitative) Date achieved 06117/2008 12/3112011 Comments Water tanks were installed in all the foreseen schools serving as emergency

111 (incl. % shelters. achievement) Indicator 5 : At least 5 contractors using improved building standards Value quantitative or 5 5 Qualitative) Date achieved 06/17/2008 12/3I/20II Comments Contractors have been trained and are implementing improved building (incl.% standards. The Building Codes have not been enacted yet, but approval by the achievement) MPDE&H are based on this new code.

(b) Intermediate Outcome lndicator(s)

Original Target Actual Value, Fm·mally Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Values (from Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Yeat·s Protection works at Dennery (a) Beach reclamation; and b) Dennery River Indicator 1 : Ravine works. Value (quantitative IOO% IOO% or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/27/2004 I2/31/20 II Comments (incl.% achievement) Indicator 2 : Reconstruction of 2 bridges Value (quantitative 2 2 or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/27/2004 12/31/201I Comments (incl.% The 2 bridges have been completed achievement) Slope stabilization [small mitigation works- integration of hazard mapping Indicator 3 : objective with small mitigation wall and technical audit] Value (quantitative 5 7 or Qualitative) Date achieved I2/3I/2009 I2/31/20II Comments (incl.% achievement) Indicator 4 : Retrofitting of schools: 4 schools hurricane resistant Value (quantitative 55% 80% 4 5 or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/27/2004 I0/27/2004 06/17/2008 12/31/20Il

IV Comments {incl.% Retrofitting works were completed in 5 schools achievement) Retrofitting of health centers: 3 health centers retrofitted for hurricane Indicator 5 : resistance/flooding Value (quantitative 8 3 3 or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/27/2004 06117/2008 12/31/2009 Comments (incl.% 3 health centers were fully retrofitted. achievement)

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 11/30/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.02 2 12/22/2004 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.72 3 04/29/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.72 4 10/15/2005 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.72 5 01/03/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.16 6 04/26/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 1.86 7 12/18/2006 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.02 8 05/24/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.59 9 08/31/2007 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.34 10 01/29/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.71 11 09110/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.83 12 03/09/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 5.94 13 09/24/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.22 14 12/30/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.51 15 05/27/2010 Satisfactory Satisfactory 7.96 16 02/12/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.13 17 07/31/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 9.60

H. Restructuring (if any) Not Applicable

v I. Disbursement Profile Original ---- Formally Revised -- Actual 12

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1 Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. At the time of project appraisal in 2003, Saint Lucia had just initiated the preparation of its National Hazard Mitigation Policy to establish an enabling legal framework for the integration of disaster risk management (DRM) and prevention planning into all aspects of public and private sector activities. The Policy also formalized Saint Lucia’s political will to considerably shift its approach to adverse natural events, from response and recovery towards disaster risk mitigation and prevention.

2. This shift stemmed from the realization of the high financial and human costs caused by adverse natural events which threatened the sustainability of the country’s development processes. A series of adverse natural events marked the decade preceding project appraisal and severely impacted Saint Lucia’s development. Such events include Tropical Storm Debbie in 1994 which resulted in losses over US$88.5 million, the Tropical Wave of October 1996 which incurred an estimated US$4.6 million in damages to property and infrastructure across the island and Tropical Storm Lili in 2002 which cost Saint Lucia an estimated US$20 million in damages. Furthermore, flooding which recurred frequently, particularly in low-lying areas as well as coastal villages, resulted in population displacement and property destruction.

3. In 1997, Saint Lucia requested support from the World Bank to improve disaster response capacity and reduce vulnerability following the extensive damages caused by Tropical Storm Debbie. The Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Program (ERDMP) (PAD Report No. 18655), an IBRD/IDA blend project totaling US$ 6.27 million (Loan 44190 SLU/Credit 31510 SLU) was implemented as part of an Adaptable Program Loan (APL) prepared for the Eastern Caribbean sub-region. The project was developed under the Bank’s Rapid Response to Crises and Emergencies (OP/BP 8.0), to support physical and institutional efforts for disaster recovery and emergency preparedness and management in five OECS members States, namely, Saint Lucia, Dominica, St. Kitts & Nevis, Grenada and St. Vincent and the Grenadines. The program financed physical prevention and mitigation investments, development of a building code, early warning systems, and capacity building initiatives to strengthen disaster management, and community preparedness activities.

4. Following the successful implementation of the ERDMP, which closed having realized all the project development objectives, Saint Lucia was keen to build on the project’s success to further reduce the island’s vulnerability to disasters. Saint Lucia also carried out studies with the intention of implementing works for areas that had been severely impacted by Tropical Storm Debbie (i.e. Dennery village). The Bank and the Government agreed that clear benefits would be derived from further investments in disaster vulnerability reduction and management capacity following the multi-sectoral

approach initiated under the ERDMP, which would include coastal protection investment, retrofitting of health facilities and schools that double as emergency shelters, and health facilities, construction of satellite warehouses, community-based small mitigation programs, as well as institutional strengthening activities which aimed to improve the country’s disaster preparedness and response capacities. The resulting project (DMP II), was aligned with the National Hazard Mitigation Policy which: (i) highlighted the need to place emphasis on long-term disaster prevention measures that would embrace all relevant economic and social sectors inclusive of the public and private sectors; and (ii) intended to facilitate the more effective use of scarce financial resources in a comprehensive approach to disaster management in Saint Lucia.

5. A combination of reasons has contributed to why project financing was appropriate at the time of appraisal. The dual challenge of needing to implement measures mandated under the National Hazard Mitigation Policy, coupled with the country’s fiscal constraints1 provided a key entry point for Bank assistance. Furthermore, the country’s successful experience with ERDMP well-positioned the Bank to assist the Government both in (a) providing the needed financial resources to support priority disaster risk mitigation programs and (b) designing a comprehensive hazard mitigation project that would strengthen Saint Lucia’s infrastructure and institutional capacity to withstand disaster events.

6. The 2002-2006 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS - Board date: June 28, 2001: Report 331 18-LAC) for the Eastern Caribbean States also provided the framework for the Bank’s disaster risk management engagement in Saint Lucia. In line with the CAS objectives, the project was expected to contribute to reducing the country’s income volatility by reducing its vulnerability to natural disasters. The project was also expected to contribute to poverty alleviation, through community participation, taking into account that the poor are generally the most vulnerable to natural disasters and would be direct beneficiaries from the project’s mitigation investments.

1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

7. The project sought to reduce the country's vulnerability to adverse natural events through investments in DRM activities. As such, the objectives of the project were to further strengthen (a) infrastructure against the impact of adverse natural events through the implementation of physical mitigation measures; (b) the response capacity in case of adverse natural events through capacity building, equipment purchases and investments in emergency infrastructure; and (c) the institutional capacity of the various ministries and agencies dealing with disaster management through the provision of adequate facilities, critical equipment, technical assistance and training.

8. The key indicators of the project were defined as follows:

1 At the time of appraisal, Saint Lucia had already spent significant amounts of its limited resources on recovery efforts from past disasters.

(a) the increase in the percentage of the population protected by key investments in infrastructure and emergency facilities; and

(b) the strengthening of the country’s institutional capacities to prepare for, and respond to, disaster emergencies.

9. In addition to the 2 key indicators listed in the main text of the PAD, stated above, a third outcome indicator, ‘Readiness and capacity of the country’s institutions to prepare for and respond to disaster emergencies by planning district’, was included in the Results Framework and Monitoring under Annex 3 of the original PAD.

1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

10. The PDO were not revised. However, the key outcome indicators for Component 1 were revised when Additional Financing (AF) for the project was approved in 2009, to reflect the added activities. See Table 1 below.

Table 1: PDO Level Outcome Indicators Original Indicators Revised Indicators (a) The percentage of population protected (a) The percentage of population with by key mitigation works on infrastructure, access to improved infrastructure flood control and hardening of emergency facilities by planning district (b) Dennery village protected from storm surge of a 10 year return period (b) Readiness and capacity of the country’s institutions to prepare for and (c) National Emergency Management respond to disaster emergencies by planning Office (NEMO) operational in new district Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and with updated Emergency Response Plan (c) The country’s institutional capacities to prepare for and respond to disaster emergencies (d) Population with access to shelters with are strengthened and improvements are seen in acceptable water systems and with access to the individual planning districts emergency equipment throughout the territory

(e) At least 5 contractors using improved building standards

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

11. Broadly, the project beneficiaries included the entire population of Saint Lucia who has benefited from: (i) improvements to local and national infrastructure; (ii) an improved civil protection system that warns of imminent events and facilitates timely evacuation and secure protective sheltering. The primary beneficiaries of the project were the specific communities where investments were executed, including, inter alia, the 5,000 inhabitants of Dennery village, the 7 communities (216 households in total) that

benefitted from slope stabilization interventions, 150 school children that attend the retrofitted school facilities (which also serve as emergency shelters to nearly 210 local inhabitants), and the 14 communities that benefit from the improved health facilities. In addition, more than 150 small local contractors were employed to carry out the small mitigation works, and hence directly benefitted from the project.

12. The social benefit of the project, however, was slightly skewed toward specific income strata. As the Project specifically targeted the most disaster-prone and financially vulnerable communities, areas with moderate and lower income groups benefited more from landslide mitigation works and sheltering facilities.

13. While not explicitly specified in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), national emergency management authorities and decision-makers also benefited from the Project’s training and institutional strengthening activities, as an improved understanding of risk and the measures necessary to reduce the vulnerability of their communities led to better-informed planning policies. .

1.5 Original Components (as approved)

14. Component 1. Physical Prevention and Mitigation Works (US$5.96 million) aimed at strengthening key public infrastructure to reduce their vulnerability to landslides, sea swells, storm surges, floods and hurricanes. The component included the retrofitting of schools also used as shelters as well as other critical infrastructure such as health centers and bridges, coastal protection works in Dennery and training and capacity building for the Technical Service Division of the Ministry of Communications, Works, Transport and Public Utilities (MCWT&PU) and the Architectural Section of the Ministry of Physical Development, Environment and Housing (MPDE&H).

15. Component 2. Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Response (US$1.38 million) to support the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) in responding to emergencies. The component included the construction of a Central Warehouse and the Emergency Operation Center (EOC), the construction of additional satellite warehouses as well as the purchase of specialized disaster equipment. Technical assistance as well as training was also provided for NEMO and other stakeholders (training of school principals to serve as shelter managers and training of local disaster committees and core stakeholders involved with disaster response).

16. Component 3. Institutional Strengthening (US$0.41 million) to improve the capacity of the MCWT&PU to address disaster risk in its infrastructure program. The component included technical assistance to the MPDE&H to improve enforcement of territorial planning and building code regulations, and to the Ministry of Finance to undertake a study on vulnerability and risk transfer of government assets.

17. Component 4. Project Management (US$0.30 million) for costs associated with project administration, coordination, supervision, monitoring and evaluation, as well as training for the PCU staff.

1.6 Revised Components

18. The four components were not revised. However, additional activities were included under the original Components 1 (US$2.71 million) and 4 (US$0.29 million) with the approval of total additional financing of US$3 million (see Section 1.7 for detail) and the activity related to the study on vulnerability of government assets for risk transfer was dropped from Component 1.

1.7 Other significant changes

19. Additional Financing. In 2007, Saint Lucia requested additional financing to scale up investments under Component 1 (Physical Prevention and Mitigation Works). The request was based on the need for: (i) additional coastal protection works to solidify the gains made under the original project in Dennery Village; and (ii) extension of the successful small mitigation works. More specifically:

i) The success of the sea defense construction in Dennery, which was designed both to protect the town’s coast from storm surge and extreme wave activity as well as to reclaim eroded beach front resulting from previous changes to bay hydraulics, led to 15,000 square feet of reclaimed beach, more than originally envisaged. So, part of the additional funds financed the creation of a communal recreational park on the newly reclaimed land, to prevent encroachment by unauthorized persons, as recommended by technical audits of the sea defense works. Funds from the AF were also allocated to support a river berm extension and to raise the elevation of an embankment to effectively protect an additional 50 Dennery households against flooding. This intervention required private land acquisitions, hence triggering the Bank Safeguards policy on Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12).

ii) Recognizing the additional need for small mitigation works, the government requested additional funds to finance the continuation of investment in drainage systems and river walls. In addition, community-based slope stabilization interventions were included.

20. Additional resources were also allocated for Component 4 (Project Management) for project management costs associated with the execution of the above-mentioned activities during the two year implementation extension period as well as for conducting technical audits of the mitigation works executed under the original Project. The portion of the additional resources allocated for Project management under the AF is greater than that of the original Project (10% vs. 3.3%) in part due to underestimation of the Project management costs in the initial project design. However, the increase was primarily considered essential in providing adequate supervision of civil works (through supervision consultancies), undertaking technical audits of investments already completed under the earlier phase of the original project, and for close monitoring of implementation of the Land Acquisition Plan that was developed under the AF. The World Bank policy on Involuntary Resettlement was not triggered under the original project, hence not included under the initial project management budget.

21. Closing Date Extension. Along with the approval of the AF, the project’s original closing date was extended by two years, from December 31, 2009 to December 31, 2011.

22. Project Outcome Indicators. With the additional resources, the Results Framework was revised to include results indicators to measure the additional activities financed with the AF. The AF contributed to the incremental achievement of the first two expected outcomes of the project. The revision of the PDO level outcome indicators is discussed in detail in Section 1.3. Table 2 below provides an overview of changes in the results indicators per component.

23. Study on Vulnerability and Risk Transfer of Government Assets. This activity under Component 3 was dropped from the Project, but was completed under the Bank- financed OECS Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) program.

Table 2: Overview of Revisions to Project Results Indicators per Component Intermediate Results Indicators Original Indicator Revised Indicator Component 1  Contract milestones achieved for works completed at Dennery village 15,000 sq feet of community area Contract milestones achieved for   organized in the reclaimed land works completed at Dennery village  Mobilization of a community area including preventing illegal settlements  100 meters of river bank protected  # of bridges completed and contract  2 bridges completed and contract milestones achieved. milestones achieved

- 75 minor works completed by class - Good practice guidelines on - # of minor works completed by class community low-cost landslide and hurricane risk mitigation measures submitted to at least 5 communities

- % of schools hurricane resistant - 4 schools hurricane resistant

- 3 health centers retrofitted for - # of health centers retrofitted hurricane resistance/flooding. Component 2  EOC and Central Warehouse  EOC and Central Warehouse completed completed  Warehouses completed  11 Warehouses completed  Water tanks installed  5 Water tanks installed  Emergency plan completed; shelter  Emergency plan completed; shelter manuals completed; shelter regulations manuals completed; shelter regulations completed; # of persons trained (shelter completed; # of persons trained (shelter management, telecommunications and management, telecommunications and

supply management completed); supply management completed); national Emergency Response Plan national Emergency Response Plan completed completed  Strong boxes and additional  Strong boxes and additional communication equipment pre- communication equipment prepositioned positioned Component 3  # of inspectors and staff trained on  100 inspectors and staff trained on building codes and territorial planning building codes and territorial planning  Assessments and hazard mapping  4 Assessments and hazard mapping completed completed  Study on risk transfer completed and  Study on risk transfer completed reviewed

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry

24. Project Preparation. Following the completion of ERDMP in 2003, DMP II was prepared as a follow-on operation to scale up disaster risk reduction investments in Saint Lucia, building on the successful achievements established by ERDMP. The Project was appraised in May 2004, approved by the Board in June 2004 and declared effective in October 2004. The Additional Financing for US$3 million was approved by the Board in July 2008, and declared effective in January 2009. No Quality Assurance Group (QAG) review was undertaken for the project.

25. Project preparation was sound and relied on a comprehensive project identification jointly conducted by the Government and the Bank. Furthermore, the project intended to implement works for which studies were developed under ERDMP for areas that had been severely impacted by Tropical Storm Debbie, such as Dennery village. Consultations were held with the Budget Office of the Ministry of Finance to ensure that project activities were complementing the national investment plan. This preparatory work established the framework for determining the project’s components and activities.

26. Most project preparation activities that could be undertaken before project effectiveness, (i.e. feasibility studies, TORs, designs, tender documents) were completed in advance of project effectiveness. More specifically, the complete bidding document, including drawings; engineering design, bills of quantities for the largest works (i.e. the first phase of the flood protection works in Dennery); and technical designs for the extension of the berm at the Dennery bridge, were financed under ERDMP. The TOR for communal park’s technical design for the communal area was in an advance stage by the time of AF approval.

27. A shortcoming during project preparation involves the amount of attention paid to the collection of baseline information. An inadequate amount of baseline data exists for most of the project activities. Another weakness involves the underestimation of the project management budget, as explained above.

28. Project Design. Project design adequately proposed a well-balanced longer-term approach to disaster management that included structural and non-structural (early warning systems, emergency communication equipment, etc) disaster mitigation interventions as well as institutional capacity building activities (training and technical assistance with spatial planning and review of the building codes, etc.) for disaster preparedness.

29. Due consideration was given to issues of sustainability during project design. To ensure the sustainability of project-related facilities and infrastructure, the Bank requested advanced preparation of maintenance Plans for all structures to be retrofitted or built under the Project, with responsible public entities identified and a budget dedicated for implementation of the Plans. During Project preparation, the Government committed to provide the necessary resources to carry out the maintenance stipulated in the Plans. Furthermore, as part of Component 1, it was agreed that after Project completion, local residents would manage Dennery recreational park and establish a community-based organization to manage and maintain the facility.

30. Critical risks to Project implementation were also clearly identified and appropriate mitigation measures put in place.

31. Under the design of the Additional Financing, the Government incorporated a new component on community-based slope stabilization intervention which applied the MoSSaiC methodology (see box below) that had been successfully piloted in Saint Lucia under a USAID-funded project. The component was well-designed to facilitate collaboration between the MoSSaiC team of technical consultants, the targeted communities and the technical government agencies to deliver low-cost landslide risk reduction measures and to develop sustainable strategies of slope stabilization. In addition to the risk reduction benefits of the approach, the MoSSaiC design had the added benefit of employment generation for local contractors within the communities.

Box 1: Management of Slope Stability in Communities

The MoSSaiC (Management of Slope Stability in Communities) methodology, lead by a team of academics from the University of Bristol, was initiated in Saint Lucia in 2003 with the aim of reducing landslide risk affecting the most vulnerable communities and vital infrastructure. The work started in a number of communities with the support of the Government of Saint Lucia, and later continued in partnership with several international organizations (particularly the World Bank), through the Saint Lucia Second Disaster Management Project.

The methodology of MoSSaiC are based on: (a) the identification of localized physical causes of landslide risk (i.e. poor drainage); (b) the identification of appropriate mitigation measures to address these causes (i.e. constructing drains); (c) the justification of these solutions to both the community and the government; and (d) an explanation of the need for a certain standard and quality of design and construction to effectively address the hazard’s root cause.

MoSSaiC stands apart from many other interventions as it is deeply rooted in community engagement - from start to finish. Community residents participate in identifying landslide risk causes and solutions, are employed in vulnerability mapping and constructing drainage infrastructure, as well as work in collaboration with civil servants and practitioners to deliver mitigation measures. As a result, the vision for this proactive, sustainable approach to slope management is shared, championed, and owned by the communities themselves, not only by the government or an implementing agency. Such low-cost landslide risk reduction methodologies and interventions also establish a feedback loop between project inputs and outputs, with more than 80 percent of funds spent in the communities, thereby allowing communities and governments to establish a clear link between risk perceptions, inputs, and tangible outputs.

32. Both project preparation and design were appropriately responsive to the established legal framework as outlined in the Disaster Preparedness and Response Act # 13 of 2000 which relates to the legal, regulatory and administrative framework for the role of the National Emergency Management Organization (NEMO) and to the directions of the draft National Hazard Mitigation Policy. Project preparation and design and were also consistent with the Government’s Medium-Term Economic Strategy Paper (2003).

33. At the time of project design, the PDO was fully aligned with the World Bank Group’s Country Assistance Strategy for the Eastern Caribbean sub-region for the period 2002-06, which placed high importance on reducing vulnerability to disasters and increasing its resilience to shocks.

34. Implementation Arrangements. The Project implementation arrangements followed the same model as the ERDMP. The Project Coordination Unit (PCU) housed within the Ministry of Finance was responsible for overall project oversight, including the day-to-day coordination amongst implementing agencies, as well as fiduciary management. The PCU was also responsible for reporting to the World Bank, as outlined under Component 4 (Project Management). The MCWT&PU was tasked with the responsibility of contracting and supervising coastal protection works at Dennery Village and the majority of the small mitigation works under Component 1 (Physical Prevention and Mitigation Works). The Ministry of Education and Culture (MOE) and the Ministry

of Health, Wellness, Human Services, Family Affairs, Gender Relations, and National Mobilization (MOH) were responsible for contracting and supervising retrofitting works for schools and health facilities, respectively. NEMO was responsible for implementing the technical assistance activities under Component 2 (Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Response). The (MPDE&H) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) were responsible for implementing Component 3 (Institutional Strengthening).

35. Lessons learnt from ERDMP were adequately reflected and taken into account in the implementation setup for this operation. Specifically, past experience revealed that poor communication between the PCU and the implementing agencies caused some delays during implementation, especially at the Project’s beginning. In view of such, respective line agencies were requested to designate a contact person to work closely with the PCU and provide progress reports to the PCU on a quarterly basis.

36. Shortly after the project became effective, a project launch workshop was held to sensitize relevant agencies (including the Central Tenders Board, Budget Department within Ministry of Finance, and accountants of the Implementing Agencies) to the process, roles and responsibilities for the Project, as well as procurement and financial management procedures for the Project.

2.2 Implementation

37. Overall, project implementation was always on track and progressed well according to the project execution schedule. The one exception was the construction of the communal recreational park in Dennery village, which experienced delays due to land acquisition issues (see section 2.4). Despite the tardy launch of this sub-component, all project activities were successfully completed before the closing of the project.

38. Two of the key factors that contributed to the successful implementation of all project activities in a timely manner include: i) implementation readiness; and ii) adequate project management capacity. Detailed preparatory activities, including bidding documents and TORs for specific works were financed under the ERDMP and completed ahead of Appraisal, which allowed swift implementation of works and activities soon after Project effectiveness. Secondly, at the time of project appraisal, the PCU had acquired solid experience and adequate capacity for project management having already been involved in the implementation of the first ERDMP project. In addition, a training program in Procurement and Financial Management was developed to further enhance the PCU’s capacity as well as the capacity of the implementing agencies’ Technical Officers to foster smooth project management.

39. Weak safeguards capacity of the implementing agencies presented some challenges, causing slight delays in the execution of the Dennery recreational park works. The lack of capacity to produce a decent RAP, coupled with limited experience in resettling squatters, including compensation calculation, led to the delays. However, with close support from the Bank team, the project adhered to the Bank’s OP 4.12 guidelines.

40. During the life of the project, Saint Lucia was impacted by three adverse natural events: Hurricanes Ivan (2004), Dean (2007) and Tomas (2010). The passage of Hurricane Ivan caused an estimated US$2.6 million in damages, while Hurricane Dean caused significant damage to Saint Lucia’ infrastructure and agricultural production. Total losses resulting from Hurricane Dean amounted to 0.5% of the nation’s GDP. Hurricane Tomas, a 1-in-500 year’s rainfall event, severely impacted Saint Lucia with total estimated losses equal to 43% of its GDP. None of the Hurricanes hampered the project implementation, causing only minor delays to a few mitigation works. These events renewed the government’s already high level of commitment to disaster risk management. In the aftermath of Hurricane Tomas, the World Bank conducted a damage assessment, including an evaluation of past and current Bank-financed disaster risk management investments (including those funded under DMP II). The review, further detailed in section 3.2, mainly concluded that physical prevention and mitigation works that had previously been financed by the Bank proved to perform effectively.

41. During implementation, as agreed at the design stage, a Maintenance Manual was prepared for the coastal protection structures at Dennery. In addition, as part of the vulnerability assessment of the health centers, a checklist was developed for the Ministry of Health to be used as a guide for routine maintenance, which the Ministry agreed to adopt.

42. Despite the concrete efforts, the Plans were not fully executed and maintenance of the structures is carried out partially due to limited public resources, in view of competing needs in other development areas.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization

43. At the time of project design, the Results Framework and Monitoring were developed, with annual target values established to measure progress made towards achieving the project outcomes and results. However, the design of the Results Framework is deficient on many fronts, as compared to today’s Results Framework design standards. Firstly, the Framework focused more on short-term project outputs than on long-term outcomes. Secondly, baseline data were missing for many of the project activities, thereby making it difficult to precisely assess the project’s achievement. With the Additional Financing, the Results Framework and Monitoring was either revised or further detailed. PDO indicators were strengthened and focused more on outcomes. Furthermore, to improve the project’s monitoring and evaluation, a M&E training was provided to the PCU by the Bank’s Independent Evaluation Group (IEG).

44. Reporting, monitoring and evaluation were done through: (i) Bank supervision missions that were conducted on average twice yearly; (ii) quarterly IUFRs (Interim Unaudited Financial Reports) including reviews of financial reports and procurement plans; (iii) annual audits; and (iv) a mid-term review (MTR) which was conducted in May 2007. The values of the project’s indicators were recorded every six months in the Implementation Status and Results (ISR) reports. These reports demonstrated that the PDO indicators were monitored consistently during the project life.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

Environmental Safeguards

45. The project was classified under Environmental Category ‘B’, as no adverse long- term impacts on human populations or environmentally important areas were anticipated. To comply with the policy, an Environment Management Framework was prepared prior to Appraisal. With the Additional Financing, the Framework was subsequently updated and incorporated into the revised Operational Manual. The Mid-term Review (MTR) conducted by the Bank and the supervision reports (mission aide-memoires, ISR) indicated that implementation adhered to the Bank’s environmental safeguards policies:(i) identification of project sites for all civil works closely followed the required environmental and social screening process for environmental impacts and cultural property; (ii) all civil works were implemented with appropriate environmental measures applied to the worksite, and (iii) once works were completed, worksites were fully restored to pre-disturbance conditions.

Social Safeguards

46. Under the original project, the Involuntary Resettlement Safeguards Policy (OP/BP 4.12) was not triggered as acquisition of land was not envisaged. However, for the AF coastal protection works in Dennery, and more specifically for the berm extension works, the need to acquire privately owned land was identified. In response, the Policy was triggered and an Abbreviated Land Acquisition Plan was prepared and successfully implemented, in compliance with the Bank’s guidelines.

47. During the implementation of the AF, the project had to address an encroachment issue on the reclaimed area identified for the communal park. The government had designated the reclaimed area as a 'Special Enforcement Area,' where no structures should be built. Despite a visibly displayed on-site sign clearly forbidding settlement, and routine monitoring of the area, two semi-permanent structure shops were illegally constructed. After consultation with the Bank safeguards team, it was concluded that OP 4.12 would not apply. The squatters remained on the land while the government determined an appropriate solution to address the issue. This process extended for over one year.

48. The Land and Survey’s Unit within the MPDE&H worked closely with the Bank to prepare a RAP to address the relocation of the informal shops, although a Plan was not required in this particular case. The government paid for the construction of new shops located 500 meters away from the original location and the shop owners were successfully relocated. This process delayed implementation of the subcomponent, though it did not affect the timely completion of the project overall.

Financial Management

49. The Client was required to submit unaudited interim financial management reports every six months and conduct a financial audit of the project accounts each fiscal year. The project had capacity gaps in preparing acceptable Interim Financial Reports (IFRs). IFRs were in some instances submitted late, and with inconsistencies and errors, such as payment being incorrectly apportioned, which occurred throughout much of the project life. Annual financial audits of the project were completed and submitted to the Bank every year, as agreed in the Loan and Credit Agreements. Some of the Audits were submitted late and the auditors mentioned a number of generic issues in the management letters, requiring the attention of the Central Government, such as:  The Project’s accounts were not reconciled monthly in the Government accounts;  Capital revenue to cover expenditure was not recorded in the Accountant General’s Account;

50. The PCU management acknowledged the shortcomings in its financial management (FM) performance and the importance of developing sound FM systems. To address such shortcomings, the PCU management addressed the problem by regularly sending its staff to participate in fiduciary training sessions organized by the Bank. The Bank also provided hands-on training to three PCU FM staff in the preparation of IFRs. As a result, the PCU made some improvements in financial management over the last two years of project implementation. While the quality of the FMRs had improved substantially, submissions remained late, partly due to the large load of work the PCU manages.

Procurement

51. Procurement activities were carried out by the procurement officer within the PCU. The Operational Manual was drafted on the basis of the ERDMP’s Manual prior to project effectiveness and served as a guide for implementing agencies. The Manual included an extended section on procurement guidelines and processes. During the project launch, all stakeholders and participating agencies were provided with information on procurement and financial management processes, and clarifications were given on roles, responsibilities, and reporting requirements in an effort to ensure smooth implementation of the project. In addition, the PCU staff was trained in both World Bank and national procurement procedures. Overall, despite some delays, procurement was managed adequately throughout the implementation of the project. Some minor capacity issues that emerged were fixed through training.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

52. In October 2010, nearly a year before the project closing date, Saint Lucia suffered extensive damages from Hurricane Tomas, with economic losses of US$336 million (equivalent to 43.4% of Saint Lucia’s GDP). In response to the disaster, Saint Lucia requested support from the World Bank for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged public buildings and infrastructure. The Saint Lucia Hurricane Tomas

Emergency Recovery Project (P125205) was approved by the Board in March 2011, and took into account the achievements and lessons learnt from the previous disaster management projects. The project finances the rehabilitation of damaged critical infrastructure to support Saint Lucia’s recovery from Tomas.

53. Prior to Hurricane Tomas, Saint Lucia requested in September 2010 to be part of the regional Disaster Vulnerability Reduction APL Program (DVRP) that would be implemented in four Eastern Caribbean islands, namely: Grenada, Dominica, Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The DVRP APL for Saint Lucia is currently under preparation and will be presented to the Board in December 2012. The project would finance structural mitigation investments in selected critical public infrastructures and technical assistance activities with the aim of measurably reducing Saint Lucia’s vulnerability to natural hazards and climate change impacts. The proposed US$ 27 million project would have a similar implementation set-up as the previous two disaster management projects, and lessons learned would be taken into consideration in appraising the DVRP for Saint Lucia.

54. While overall progress have been made in reducing the country’s vulnerability to disasters, Saint Lucia still faces challenges in understanding and strategically and comprehensively managing natural hazard risks it faces, particularly in the context of a changing climate that threatens to increase the disaster risk, further aggravating the hydro-meteorological hazards that impact the island. In spite of the intentions of the National Hazard Mitigation Policy of 2006, most development decisions in Saint Lucia still do not account for disaster risk management and expected climate change impacts, in part due to lack of available information on hazards and climate change impacts at the right scale. Secondly, data sharing and collaboration among agencies, both regionally and nationally is weak, largely due to limited capacity and lack of an overall mechanism to share information with low transaction costs. Additionally, DRM responsibilities are dispersed among various Government agencies, and, lacking an overall structure for analyzing and integrating risks in the development process, agencies operate in a relative information vacuum with limited resources, particularly in their capacity to analyze and integrate risk and climate change management in the development process. The DVRP will contribute to overcome several of these challenges.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation

55. The project development objective (PDO) was and remains highly relevant to Saint Lucia’s development agenda, in view of the fact that one of the most important issues confronting Saint Lucia’s development is the vulnerability of its population and economy to adverse natural events. The island is exposed to a range of natural hazards, the most frequent of which stem from weather-related phenomena, such as heavy rainfall, hurricane, winds and droughts. Disasters caused by these hazards have, and continue to impose large costs on the country’s fragile economy and exacerbate poverty levels.

56. The PDO was aligned with the government’s hazard mitigation vision as articulated in the National Hazard Mitigation Policy (2006) which provides the enabling legal framework for a comprehensive and preventive approach to disaster management in Saint Lucia.

57. The PDO was also consistent with the Regional Partnership Strategy for the Eastern Caribbean (Report 33118-LAC), approved in June 2001, which, aimed to reduce the island’s overall vulnerability by promoting greater social inclusion and strengthening disaster risk management.

58. Finally, natural disaster events that occurred on the island during project implementation ensured that disaster risk management remained a high priority, and the government has remained committed to reducing the island’s vulnerability to disasters and to building its climate resilience.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

59. Most of the Project Development Objectives were achieved. The achievement of the project development objectives compared against indicators defined at project appraisal is illustrated below. (See Annex 2 for a complete listing of project results).

60. The first objective of the project, to further strengthen infrastructure against the impact of adverse natural events through the implementation of physical mitigation measures, was satisfactorily met. All mitigation investments financed under the project were completed. These include the coastal protection works in Dennery Village, the reconstruction of two bridges, retrofitting of 4 schools and 3 health centers, and 79 small mitigation works (4 more than the targeted output) were completed, of which community-based landslide mitigation interventions were undertaken in seven communities and benefitted 261 homes.

61. A World Bank assessment of the structural investments was undertaken after the passage of Hurricane Tomas in 2010. The retrofitted public buildings (schools and health centers) withstood the hurricane and no damage to the facilities was reported. There were no reports of landslides in project beneficiary communities after Hurricane Tomas, while in past hurricanes, project areas suffered from regular landslides.

62. While no major storm surge was experienced since the construction of the coastal protection at Dennery, the mitigation structures proved to be effective during the two hurricane events (in 2007 and 2010) that occurred after the works were completed. Following Hurricane Dean, UN ECLAC carried out a damage and loss assessment. For Dennery village, the assessment concluded that little damage was incurred largely owing to the coastal protection structure financed under the Bank Project.

63. Overall, through these interventions, the percentage of population with access to improved infrastructure increased significantly, from 30% at pre-project phase to an estimated 80% (the target was 70%) by project completion.

64. The second objective, to further strengthen the preparedness and response capacity in case of adverse natural events through capacity building, equipment purchase and investment in emergency infrastructure, was partially met. The component was successful in the following areas: (i) completion of the emergency infrastructure works, including the construction of the EOC, the establishment of 11 satellite warehouses across the island, and the installation of water tanks in selected schools which also serve as emergency shelters; and (ii) provision of adequate technical assistance and training to NEMO.

65. Hurricane Tomas tested the systems and investments implemented under this component. The EOC was actively used as a command center for relief efforts during and after Hurricane Tomas. Similarly, the satellite warehouses where emergency supply items were stored were instrumental in the relief operations at the district and local levels. Schools served as shelters to host displaced people. The shelter management and supply management trainings demonstrated their value as NEMO staff and member volunteers successfully fulfilled their responsibilities during the emergency – by managing warehouses, emergency shelters occupied by disaster-affected people, and logistics related to emergency supply and stock, both efficiently and effectively.

66. However, the component fell short in the provision of adequate emergency communication equipment and the training in the areas of effective coordination between NEMO and the national emergency committees, following a disaster event. Communication between the central EOC and district emergency committees was compromised because of failure of emergency communication equipment. Some of the emergency communication equipment (primarily procured under the ERDMP and completed during DMP II) was not maintained and was outdated, hence was not functioning during the emergency. Furthermore, when the communication equipment was purchased and installed in each of the island’s 18 districts, no back-up power systems were installed. Since the power network went down during the passage of Hurricane Tomas, the communication system was not operational.

67. At the institutional level, coordination between the ministries and NEMO was also inefficient during the emergency operations. Coordination between the various ministries and agencies dealing with disaster management, as stipulated under the National Disaster Management Plan is still not as systematic as it could be. The National Emergency Committee which consists of NEMO as its chair, and with representatives from all the ministries and public agencies, are expected to meet daily at the EOC to coordinate rehabilitation efforts during the emergency phase. During Tomas, however, the Committee did not meet. The first meeting that brought the Committee together was organized by the World Bank team who was on the ground in Saint Lucia five days following Tomas. Recognizing the observed challenges during Tomas, the Government is undertaking a comprehensive review of the National Disaster Management Plan that will include an evaluation of the lessons learned from the response operation during Hurricane Tomas and make recommendations for capacity building activities.

68. The third objective, to strengthen the various ministries and agencies dealing with disaster management through technical assistance and training in territorial planning, building codes, vulnerability assessment and hazard mapping was achieved. Technical assistance in territorial planning was provided to public physical planners, while building code training and sensitization activities were conducted for 100 inspectors and design engineers. Flood risk assessments were carried out in Dennery and landslide risk assessments and mapping were conducted in the 7 communities where MoSSaiC interventions were financed. Drought hazard maps were also successfully developed to provide improved understanding of the hazard risks for better planning. The assessment on the Vulnerability and Risk Transfer of Government Assets has been fulfilled under the Bank-financed OECS Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) project.

3.3 Efficiency

69. At Appraisal, detailed economic and financial analyses were prepared for the coastal protection works in Dennery, to quantify the economic benefits of the investments.

70. Following project completion, an economic analysis for the project was undertaken based on actual investment, operating costs, and benefits. All costs and benefits were transformed to 2004 prices to make them comparable with results obtained at Appraisal. The same discount rate of 12 percent was used for this evaluation. The ex- post economic evaluation was conducted for the works implemented in Dennery village as was done at Appraisal, including a percentage of the costs of Component 2 Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Response, and Component 3 Institutional Strengthening. Additionally, an ex-post economic analysis was carried out to evaluate the impact of small mitigation works focused on community-based slope stabilization investments, (MoSSaiC). Financial analysis was not carried out, as the project does not generate any revenue.

71. The economic analysis was carried out and the NPV and ERR were re-estimated, including actual investment costs and an updated projection of benefits based on benefits already seen in the Dennery area, and in other communities in Saint Lucia. Economic returns for Dennery works show profits of XCD 8.6 million, which are twice as much as the returns foreseen at appraisal of XCD 3.85 million. The Economic Rate of Return obtained is 20 percent; while lower than the 23 percent projected at appraisal, the rate of return is well above the discount rate of 12 percent. Evaluation of the small mitigation intervention, which was not evaluated at appraisal, show actual benefits of XCD 257 thousand. These results were obtained from the evaluation of the interventions in a typical community in Castries consisting of 20 houses, which closely represents all mitigation works carried out in a dozen communities in St Lucia under the MoSSaiC interventions.

72. Based on economic evaluation results, the outcome for efficiency is considered highly satisfactory based on the good economic returns. Details of this evaluation are presented in Annex 3.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Satisfactory

73. Overall, project outcome is rated as satisfactory based on the high relevance of the Project objectives and the achievement of the Key Performance Indicators, with minor shortcomings. The project has been successful in reducing the specific vulnerability of the assets financed and in strengthening the capacity of ministries and agencies dealing with disaster management planning, through improved understanding of the country’s vulnerabilities and risks and provision of practical tools (territorial planning, building codes) to reduce vulnerabilities. However, two shortcomings have been highlighted above and can be summarized as follows: (i) the emergency communication equipment purchased under ERDMP and partially under DMP II were not functional, which hampered the communication between the national and the district- level emergency centers during the emergency phase following passage of Hurricane Tomas; and (ii) the coordination among NEMO and the emergency committee representing the various ministries during the disaster was inefficient during the emergency phase, which indicates the need for further capacity building, training and sensitization for community emergency committee members, ministries and agencies.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

74. While the project did not directly focus on aspects related to poverty, gender, and social development issues, many of these issues are linked to disaster risk management, as disasters have a disproportional impact on poorer segments of the population who settle in the most vulnerable areas and live in poorly constructed housing. Therefore, the social benefit of the project in terms of economic segment was slightly biased, providing greater benefit to the moderate and lower economic income groups as many of the small landslide mitigation works were planned and executed in the most disaster-prone and financially vulnerable communities.

75. Overall, the project had a direct and indirect influence on poverty reduction through improved safety measures, vulnerability reduction, better dissemination of knowledge about risks in communities, and employment generation for 55 small local contractors during the construction of the MoSSaiC interventions.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

76. The project contributed to an increased awareness in the public sector about the importance of comprehensive disaster risk reduction and management. During the project’s lifetime, the Disaster Management Act was enacted in 2006, providing NEMO leadership in the disaster risk management initiative with the support and participation of the relevant agencies. Subsequently, with the funding from the project, the National Disaster Management Plan which was developed under ERDMP, was adopted and

published in 2007 under DMP II to guide prevention, mitigation and response, post- disaster. The Plan contributed to strengthening institutional capacity in the area of disaster risk management.

77. With the successful implementation of the slope stabilization interventions using the MoSSaiC methodology, the project contributed to enhancing the in-country capacity for managing and mitigation landslide risks, with more than 15 engineers within the MCWT&PU fully trained in the MoSSaiC methodology. The Government has expressed strong interest to establish a MoSSaiC Core Unit housed within the MCWT&PU to continue implementing slope stabilization activities in the remaining communities across the island.

78. While the objective of the investment in the Dennery Coastal Protection Works was to protect the community from storm surge and the beach from erosion, an unexpected 15,000 sq. meters of sandy beach was reclaimed as a result of the intervention, which has enhanced economic activities in the community.

79. The project allowed local communities participation, integration, and organization, around the topic of disaster risk management. In the case of the MoSSaiC interventions, more than 100 local contractors were trained in landslide mitigation and maintenance of drainage, while the 7 targeted communities were trained on environmental health management, including waste management and garbage disposal.

80. In addition to the direct benefits associated with landslide risk reduction, the MoSSaiC approach that fosters improved drainage and installation of roof guttering brought about a number of additional benefits to the community’s residents, including: (i) savings in water bills through the harvesting of intercepted rainwater from roofs; (ii) improved access to and from the community due to reduced flooding and debris washed onto footpaths, thereby making it easier to get to work and school; (iii) reduced erosion and flood damage to property; and (iv) reduced mosquito population due to fewer mosquito-breeding sites. The indirect benefits were listed in a 2010 survey that was carried out for beneficiaries/households directly affected by the MoSSaiC intervention.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

81. Not applicable

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

82. The risk to development outcome is rated moderate. While the civil works investments and most of the instruments that were procured under the operations showed to perform well during Hurricane Tomas, the sustainability of the specific vulnerability

reduction achievements and the disaster management achievements will depend on: (i) how well the structural elements and the equipment procured are maintained; and (ii) the replacement of outdated emergency communication equipment. While maintenance plans have been developed for all the structures as part of the project, it is critical to ensure that the Government is fully committed to allocating the necessary funding for periodic and scheduled maintenance. The capacity building improvements for NEMO and private contractors are susceptible to lack of staffing, change in staffing, and lack of incentives to apply improved building standards. Continued training and capacity building and further institutional improvements are likely needed to turn NEMO into a consistently better performing agency, and to consolidate the capacity improvements among local contractors.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Satisfactory

83. The Bank adequately identified the country’s disaster management needs, and the operation was highly relevant to the Government of Saint Lucia. The Bank’s preparation adequately incorporated lessons learned from the implementation of ERDMP such as early preparation of engineering designs and TORs for works and TA prior to effectiveness to ensure implementation readiness and minimize delays.

84. One area where quality at entry could have been improved would be the Results Framework, which lacked specificity and baseline information for some of the activities. Nonetheless, inclusion of baseline and specific targets in the results matrix as part of the Additional Financing has enabled better tracking toward achievement of project objectives. Overall, while the design of the project’s Results Framework was advanced at the time the project was prepared, in comparison to today’s standards, the Framework appears weak due to its focus on outputs than on outcomes, and due to lack of baseline data for many of the project activities.

85. Financial management was another aspect of the project that could be improved. The fact that the project’s financial management remained a challenge throughout the project life, as stated earlier, leads to the conclusion that insufficient attention was given to strengthen the FM arrangement at the early stages of project preparation, although some resources were allocated for training for the PCU FM staff. The Bank team could have better evaluated the PCU’s FM capacity to identify the weak areas and tailor the FM training to address those specific issues or recruit additional staff to support the project and ensure timely delivery of FM reports. The training provided during implementation was rather general and did not address the specific needs of the PCU, such as training on preparation of adequate IFRs. While some of the FM issues were project-specific (such as the poor quality of the IFRs and delayed submission of Audit reports, in some instances) and could have been improved had they been addressed adequately at the beginning, 20

there were many challenges that have to do with the overall country system, hence requiring the attention of the Central Government, including the Project’s accounts not being reconciled monthly in the Government accounts and the Capital revenue to cover expenditure not being recorded in the Accountant General’s Account.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

86. The quality of the supervision is rated satisfactory on the basis that the Bank team conducted frequent and close supervision, provided strategic guidance to the implementing agencies, mobilized additional training resources for the PCU and implementing agencies, and remained flexible and responsive to emerging needs and crisis. The Bank’s pro-activity and flexibility to quickly provide additional funding for continuity of critical activities when requested should be highlighted. Within days following the passage of Hurricane Tomas, a Bank team was deployed to Saint Lucia to support the Government’s effort to undertake a damage assessment. In addition, using the Bank’s convening power, the team organized a meeting in Saint Lucia during the Emergency period after Tomas to facilitate a cross-sectoral dialogue among key stakeholders on the ongoing damage assessment, when local authorities were not coordinating amongst themselves.

87. During project implementation, the Bank team undertook an average of two supervision missions per year, adding to 19 supervision missions in total, and all of them with a Disaster Risk Management Specialist. Disbursement, Finance, Procurement and Safeguards specialists regularly joined missions and provided training in Bank procedures to the PCU and other agencies staff, which proved instrumental for the project implementation. Supervision missions identified and documented implementation issues, and Aide-Memoires shared with Government were transparent and frank in highlighting concerns. In addition to the routine supervision, a Mid-Term Review (MTR) was conducted in 2007, and twice yearly ISRs were, in accordance with LCR regional practice, produced, reviewed by management and filed in IRIS. The ISRs included detailed updates on the project indicators on each component, which provided a good basis to monitor progress and assess final results.

Rating: Satisfactory

88. Based on the performance ratings at entry and during supervision, the overall Bank performance is rated satisfactory. This rating reflects a well-designed and relevant operation with respect to country development priorities, as well as a close and professional implementation support provided to the Project.

5.2 Borrower Performance

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Satisfactory

89. The Government of Saint Lucia was actively involved in the identification and preparation of project activities. The PCU was already established and had been implementing ERDMP. The Government worked diligently to declare the loan and credit effective, and provided counterpart funding up front for the additional funding needed to bridge the construction cost for the EOC (16% of total project amount) and remained highly committed during the project’s lifetime.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

90. Various implementing agencies were used to facilitate project implementation. The PCU satisfactorily implemented the project, always in compliance with Bank policies. During the project duration, the PCU has also been simultaneously managing three other World Bank projects satisfactorily. The PCU was well managed and performed efficiently in its coordination and procurement role throughout the project. The PCU took a proactive role in timely implementing all the activities under the different components, including reallocating funds saved under specific sub-component to undertake additional works that included additional designs, surveys, and additional remedial and ancillary works including drainage and fencing work at three health centers. However, the PCU’s FM and Safeguards capacity were weak, as explained earlier. Under Component 4, funds were made available both under DMPII and the Additional Financing for the provision of technical assistance for project management which included the recruitment of a technical engineer as set out in the project design. However, no action was taken on the part of the PCU to hire the technical engineer. The project engineer could have provided the needed supervision support for the civil works component, rather than hiring new supervision engineers for each civil works, Instead, the project utilized the services of the engineer of the Special Projects Unit of the MCWT&PU to assist with review of designs and supervision support for the civil works component and in most instances hired supervision engineers for civil works. The Technical Staff of the concerned implementing agencies also assisted with monitoring and supervision. The schools and the health centers were adequately designed, supervised and monitored by the MOE and the MoH, respectively.

91. The MPDE&H was the agency that had technical oversight for the construction of the Emergency Operations Center. While the MPDE&H was staffed with highly qualified personnel, the amount of work at the initial stages of construction overwhelmed the MOPD staff who were unable to devote the needed attention to the activity. In order to overcome this challenge, the PCU and MPDE&H mutually agreed that a project

management engineer be hired to supervise the construction of the civil works and report to Ministry.

92. The MCWT&PU was responsible for the implementation of the communal recreational park in Dennery, while the MOPD was responsible for the implementation of the RAP. The MOPD’s performance in dealing with the relocation issue was not satisfactory. After several follow-ups by the PCU and by the Bank’s team, MOPD managed to identify a suitable relocation site for the two shops and arrived at an adequate compensation for the affected persons that were operating from the reclaimed land. The process took close to two years, which caused some delays in the works.

93. As the implementing entity for all the works (the coastal protection works, berm construction and open recreational facility in Dennery, Trou a Leau Drainage, the rehabilitation of the 2 bridges, and the small mitigation works in communities, and MoSSaiC intervention), the MCWT&PU performed satisfactorily. The team conducted close technical supervision of the works activities and provided timely progress updates to the PCU. The community-based landslide mitigation investments were particularly well-managed, with smooth coordination of the various stakeholders, including the local residents, the small contractors, the PCU, the community officers assigned for the particular communities benefitting from the MoSSaiC intervention employed with the Social Transformation Agency, and the MoSSaiC technical team.

94. The ministries of Health and Education performed well in supporting contracting and implementing the retrofitting activities for their respective facilities.

Rating: Satisfactory

95. Despite the shortcomings mentioned above, overall, the borrower performed satisfactorily. The human and technical capacity of the PCU and other implementing agencies improved significantly over the life of the project.

6. Lessons Learned

96. The passage of Hurricane Tomas demonstrated that the emergency communication equipment was inadequate due to lack of maintenance. In future disaster vulnerability reduction operations, there is a need to finance full system solutions capable of transferring data and visuals in real time. Such solutions should include appropriate training in use of equipment, planning for and training in equipment maintenance, and ensuring that all needed elements for the equipment to perform under emergency conditions are included. Additionally, in Saint Lucia, there is a need to establish a radio protocol in the national emergency management plan.

97. The engagement of communities in identifying and addressing landslide risk reduction can bring good results. Hurricane Tomas tested the slope stabilization

interventions in the seven communities that had benefitted from them, and they passed the test. While in past hurricanes, project areas suffered from regular landslides, following the project's slope stabilization interventions, no landslides were reported in beneficiary communities. Given the additional social gains and employment generating benefits of the approach, it is likely that other countries with similar landslide risk could benefit from using this approach as well.

98. Hazard maps produced under the project were not sufficiently put into use. For example, in 2010 Saint Lucia experienced a severe drought. The drought maps, produced by the Ministry of Physical Planning, were not sufficiently used as tool for organizing the government response to this emergency. There is a need for significant capacity building on the use and interpretation of hazard and risk information. It is likely that better results would be achieved if production of risk information was derived from prior identification of the decision processes the risk information should inform, and the involvement of the decision maker in the process.

99. Conducting comprehensive hurricane vulnerability assessments of the targeted health centers and school buildings prior to the interventions has been critical in informing and identifying the appropriate retrofitting interventions that will protect the buildings against adverse hazards. This also ensures that the investments focused on vulnerability reduction and not just maintenance of the facilities. At the same time, the retrofitting program was so focused on vulnerability reduction of the buildings alone that critical elements such as drainage, landscaping and fencing were not included in the scope of work, and in most cases had to be postponed for completion in the future. Therefore, it is critical to include all elements in the scope/design of retrofitting programs.

100. While maintenance plans have been developed for all the structures as part of the project, it is critical to ensure that the Government remains fully committed to allocating the necessary funding for periodic and scheduled maintenance. As an example, the Emergency Operations Center was completed and has been in operation since 2009. Peeling of exterior painting and leakages in some parts of the roof are already being observed. Similar examples can be drawn from observations of some of the schools and health centers completed under the project. There is a need for a dialogue and reaching an agreement with government officials during project preparation on the issue of preventive maintenance of buildings that have been built through government financing in order to come up with administrative directives in the preservation of assets such as the EOC and various other structures.

101. The Bank’s ability to stay engaged with Saint Lucia in this agenda over a period of fifteen years (four projects that included emergency response and risk mitigation investments) has enabled the Bank and Saint Lucia to learn together and to gradually improve Saint Lucia’s approach and capacity to manage disaster risk. Disaster risk reduction entails a change in behavior and change in development patterns. Establishing a culture of prevention and reducing disaster risk of a country takes time, and requires dedication and resources over multiple years and activities. The project shows that a combination of capacity building initiatives and concrete investments such as mitigation

works are key factors in keeping actors involved through a full project cycle. This leads to tangible changes in perception, behavior and capacity to manage risks.

102. Specific vulnerability reduction interventions reduce localized risk, but do not measurably reduce risk at a national level. While specific vulnerability reduction investments continue to be important investments, a more systematic approach is needed in order to reduce disaster risk measurably at a national level. Particularly for small island states, it may be feasible to use probabilistic risk assessment methods for various sector portfolios to generate baselines against which risk could be measurably reduced country- wide.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

(a) Borrower/implementing agencies

103. The Completion report prepared by the PCU on behalf of the Borrower and their comments on this ICR are presented in annex 7.

(b) Co-financiers

104. Not applicable

105. Not applicable

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Estimate Percentage of Components Estimate (USD (USD millions) Appraisal millions)

PHYSICAL PREVENTION AND 9.31 9.74 77.52 MITIGATION WORKS STRENGTHENING EMERGENCY 1.38 1.82 11.49 PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE INSTITUTIONAL 0.41 0.28 3.41 STRENGTHENING PROJECT MANAGEMENT 0.91 1.23 7.58 Total Baseline Cost 12.01 13.07 100

Physical/Price Contingencies 0.80 0.00 Total Project Costs 12.81 13.70 Front-end fee 0.08 0.00 Total Financing Required 12.89 13.70

(b) Financing Appraisal Actual/Latest Type of Co- Estimate Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds financing (USD (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Borrower 2.39 2.76 18.54 International Bank for Reconstruction 3.70 3.70 28.70 and Development International Development 6.80 6.80 52.75 Association (IDA)

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Below are the achievements of outputs as indicated in the Project Appraisal Document and the Project Paper for the Additional Financing. This information was collected from interviews with the PCU and implementing agencies, and project monitoring documents (ISR).

Project Development Project Outcome Indicators Comments at ICR stage Objectives

(a) To further reduce the (a) Percentage of Achieved. It was estimated vulnerability of infrastructure population with access to that as of December 31, 2011, to natural disasters improved infrastructure 80% of the population has (hurricanes, floods, etc.) access to improved through the implementation of infrastructure (the target was physical mitigation measures, 70%). improvements and repairs; and (b) Dennery Village protected from storm surge of Achieved. The coastal (b) To strengthen the a 10 year return defense, the Berm and the institutional management and recreational park area are response capacity of the completed. No major storm respective ministries and surge was experienced to date agencies for disaster but works proved to be management through the effective after two hurricane provision of facilities, critical events (2007 & 2010) equipment, technical assistance and training. (c) National Emergency Achieved. NEMO’s office Management Office (NEMO) building, the EOC, was operational in new Emergency completed on December 1, Operations Center (EOC) and 2009. The Center was actively with updated Emergency used as a command center for Response Plan. relief efforts during and after Hurricane Tomas. A non technical version of the Emergency Response Plan has been printed and disseminated. The technical version was finalized on July 2, 2010.

(d) Population with Achieved. Water tanks were access to shelters with installed in all the foreseen acceptable water systems and schools serving as emergency with access to emergency shelters equipment throughout the territory

(e) At least 5 contractors Achieved. 5 Contractors have using improved building been trained and are standards implementing improved

building standards. The Building Codes have not yet been enacted, but design approvals for new works by the MPD are based on this Code. Intermediate Outcomes per Results Indicators for Each Comment and ICR rating Component Component

Component 1: Physical Prevention and Mitigation Works

(i) Protection works at Contract milestones achieved Achieved. All protection Dennery [(a) Beach for works completed at works at Dennery have been reclamation effort – Dennery Village completed. construction of a public area for community use, to prevent 15,000 Sq feet of community Achieved. 15, 000 sq feet of illegal settlement on newly area organized in the beach front area was regained beach land; and (b) reclaimed land reclaimed as a result of the Dennery River Ravine Works coastal protection works in (river walls) – Further the Dennery, and an open protection of Dennery Village communal recreational park against flooding by extending was build on the reclaimed the reinforcement of the land. embankment upstream until Dennery Bridge (100 meters)] Mobilization of community- Not Achieved. The based committee to monitor, management of the maintain and manage the new community park has not been community park, including transferred to the yet to be preventing illegal settlements established community-based committee. In the interim, the National Conservation Authority which is responsible for maintenance of all public beaches, is in charge of the management of the park.

100 meters of river banks Achieved. The Berm protected withstood Hurricane Tomas and protected households during adverse rains in October 2010.

(ii) Reconstruction of 2 2 bridges completed and Achieved. The 2 bridges have bridges contract milestones achieved been completed

(iii) Drainage, river walls & 75 minor works completed by Achieved. 79 minor slope stabilization [Small class mitigation works have been Mitigation Works – successfully completed. Integration of Hazard 28

Mapping Objective with Small Good practice guidelines on Achieved. Good practice Mitigation Works and community low-cost landslide guidelines on community low- technical Audit] and Hurricane risk mitigation cost landslide and hurricane measures submitted to at least risk mitigation measures were 5 communities submitted to 7 communities

(iv) Retrofitting of schools 4 schools hurricane resistant Achieved. Retrofitting works were completed in 5 schools.

(v) Retrofitting of health 3 health centers retrofitted for Achieved. 3 health centers centers hurricane resistance/flooding were fully retrofitted in 2009. The PCU utilized the remaining balance of funds under IBRD Loan (from savings) to carry out additional works in these 3 centers (such as drainage, fencing and landscaping) as well as in the Vieux Fort health center, which was retrofitted under the HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Project. Component 2: Strengthening Emergency Preparedness & Response

(i) Construction of EOC and EOC and Central Warehouse Achieved. Construction was Central Warehouse completed completed on December 1, 2009.

(ii) Construction of additional 11 satellite warehouses Achieved. 11 satellite Satellite Warehouses completed warehouses have been constructed across the island.

(iii) Installation of water tanks 5 water tanks installed Achieved. 28 water tanks have in shelters been installed

(iv) TA, Planning and training Emergency Plan completed; Achieved. All the TA and for NEMO shelter manuals completed; training activities were shelter regulations completed; completed, and proved to be 80 persons trained (shelter effective during and after the management, passage of hurricane Tomas, telecommunications & and since staff and volunteer of supply management); national NEMO adequately handled emergency response plan their responsibilities during completed. the emergency, such as coordination, warehouse management and logistics related to emergency supply and stock, as well as shelter management.

(v) Specialized disaster Strong boxes and additional Partially achieved. The equipment communications equipment construction of strong boxes prepositioned in satellite was cancelled as it was warehouse and EOC. discovered that some of the schools/emergency shelters already had strong boxes that could serve the same purpose. The emergency communication equipment was successfully procured. Component 3: Institutional Strengthening

(i) Building Code Training 100 inspectors and staff Achieved. The training has and territorial TA trained on building codes and been successfully completed. territorial planning

(ii) Vulnerability Assessment 4 assessments hazard mapping Partially Achieved. 3 and Hazard Mapping completed assessments have been completed; including: i) a drought hazard map, ii) flood assessment for Dennery and iii) landslide assessments and risk mapping in communities

(iii) Study on Risk Transfer of Study on risk transfer Partially Achieved. Although Government Assets completed and reviewed. the study was not done under the project, the Government successfully accomplished this activity under the OECS Catastrophe Risk Insurance Project (P094539).

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. Methodology. This evaluation followed the same approach used at appraisal, which estimates the net benefits based on the projection of two scenarios: with and without project. The net benefit corresponded to the difference between incremental benefits and incremental costs from the two scenarios. Financial prices were adjusted for the impact of taxes, subsidies, and externalities to arrive at the economic flow of costs and benefits and the net present value was estimated, using the same standard conversion factor of 0.918, and discount rate of 12 percent used at appraisal.

2. Project Components. The project consisted of four components: (a) Physical Prevention and Mitigation Works; (b) Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Response; (c) Institutional Strengthening; and (d) Project Management. The works implemented under component 1 included coastal protection, river defense, and beach reclamation works in Dennery, bridges, health centers, and mitigation intervention focused on community-based slope stabilization investments, also known as the MoSSaiC approach All of the works aimed to improve resilience to hazards, such as landslides, sea swells, storm surges, flood and hurricanes.

3. Actual Investment Costs. As table 1 shows, the actual cost of the project was XCD 35.1 million (USD 13 million), which is just 1% higher than projected at appraisal plus additional financing (XCD 34.6 million).

Table 1. Project Costs PROJECTED COSTS XCD ACTUAL PAD ADDTL FINANCING TOTAL COMPONENT 1 Works at Dennery Coastal Protection Works Dennery Village 6,609 7,376 7,376 Architectural Designs 41 - Dennery (Trou A L’eau Works) 1,462 1,495 1,263 2,759 Cadastral Survey 75 - Creation of Communal Recreation Areas 1,712 968 968 Dennery River Berm 614 - Subtotal Works Dennery 10,513 8,871 2,231 11,102 Other works (in areas different to Dennery) 15,657 7,149 6,774 13,923 TOTAL COMPONENT 1 26,170 16,017 9,005 25,022 COMPONENT 2: Strengthening Emergency Preparedness Response 4,880 3,709 3,709 COMPONENT 3: Institutional Strengthening 744 1,102 1,102 COMPONENT 4: Project Management 3,306 806 1,640 2,446 OTHER: Price contingencies 2,150 2,150 Loan Fee 50 215 215 TOTAL PROJECT (000 XCD) 35,150 24,004 10,644 34,648 TOTAL PROJECT (000 UCD) 13,076 8,930 3,960 12,890

4. The evaluation at appraisal was carried out for the works on Dennery, and so this ex-post evaluation. Additionally, an evaluation of the effectiveness of mitigation measures was carried out on a typical community in Castries, as representative of the MoSSaiC interventions implemented under the project.

Economic Evaluation of Works in Dennery

5. The actual costs of works in Dennery under component 1 were XCD 10.5 million, 40% of this component. An additional cost was added to count for components 2 to 4, which was estimated as a percentage of the investment costs. The resulting investment cost was XCD 13 million (USD 4.9 million), 38% of total investment (Table 2).

Table 2. Project Costs at Dennery Project Costs in Dennery ACTUAL COSTS 000 XCD 000 USD Works in Dennery 10,513 3,911 Strengthening Emergency Preparedness and Response 1,459 543 Institutional Strengthening 238 89 Project Management 989 368 TOTAL PROJECT IN DENNERY 13,198 4,910

% Investment cost 38%

6. Operating costs were assumed the same as at appraisal, that is XCD 350 thousand for a 5-year period. The Dennery Development Foundation is in charge of maintaining the infrastructure using the revenues collected from tolls charged to hotels and cruises when offering visits to Dennery area.

7. Other Projects. In 2009 the Ministry of Tourism launched a new project for Dennery and Mabuya communities. The project targets were developing an action plan for improving economic activities, capacity building and training. The project centered on: Mandele Labaee and La Pointe Visitor Stop Centre, Dennery Seafood Fiesta, High Street Plant and Paint Project, Fond d’Or Heritage Park, and Sankfa Rainbow Roots Farm. The project was borne out of European Union-funded Community Based Eco-Agro Tourism (CBEAT) program (SFA 2007).

8. The SFA 2007 project had a total cost of Euros 4.2 million and developed activities on the agro, tourism facilities, and training. Some of the works complemented the World Bank project and contribute to boost recreational activities along the area, such as the painting of all houses along High Street, which gave colorful view to the area along the beach. It is estimated that 20% of the cost complemented the World Bank project and impact the benefits. Therefore the cost is added to the costs used for this evaluation. The Foundation plans to oversee the projects implemented on the area and to help in ensuring their sustainability.

9. Benefits. The approach used to estimate the benefits followed the same methodology used at appraisal, which included: (i) avoided flooding damage costs; and

(ii) increase of revenues from boosting economic activities along the shoreline. For this evaluation it has added benefits that came through the construction of the sewage treatment plant, which was built with the additional financing.

10. Avoided damage costs. Two benefits were included: (a) avoided costs to households and commercial entities within the coastal area due to property damage as a result of flooding and beach erosion; (b) relocation costs of the properties along the coastline due to beach erosion; and (c) avoided road reconstruction costs assuming a substantial storm event every ten years that could result in storm surge flooding and road damage.

a. The damage costs of flooding were based on the collected data during preparation, of the number of properties affected with the flood and the damage cost. The damage cost was applied in this evaluation before relocation cost was applied to avoid double counting of benefits. b. The relocation cost was also estimated at preparation, as it was noticed that the shoreline was experiencing a steady erosion pattern. The Dennery village had lost almost 40 meters of beach over a 36-year period. This indicated that if project had not been implemented greater damage of properties in the area would have occurred and eventually the properties would have to be evacuated and the population relocated. It was foreseen that under without project situation, residents and businesses from the area on the east side of High Street would have been gradually relocated starting in year 2 and completed by year 5. Relocation of the residents and businesses on the west side of High Street would have started in year 21 and completed by year 25. The same assumptions of relocation costs at appraisal were used for this evaluation under the without project scenario and presented in table 3. c. The road reconstruction was estimated as XCD 1.5 million per km. The potential road frontage that could be damaged was estimated as 400 mt, which equals to a cost of XCD 600 thousand.

Table 3. Relocation Costs “Without” Project Situation Residential Commercial Vacant lots Number of properties affected East side 30 16 7 West side 30 12 - Average size of the building (sq.ft) 600 400 Average construction costs ($EC/sq ft) 75 75 Average cost per property 45,000 30,000 -

Average size of the lot 1,800 1,800 1,800 Average land price ($EC/sq ft) 5 5 5 Average cost of the lot 9,000 9,000 9,000

11. Benefits for increasing economic activity. The World Bank project has helped Dennery to capitalize its strategic location and rebound economic benefits to the community. The Seafood Fiesta, the Carnival, Sports, and the visits that tourists pay to Dennery en route to and from the main international airport in Vieux Fort, are some of the activities that have made a difference in Dennery’s daily life.

12. It is interesting to note that 52% of current businesses in Dennery area were established on or after 2004.

Table 4. Business According to Year Established Established Established on or No information before 2004 after 2004 on year Total Accommodations & Food services 16 21 6 43 Other 72 88 17 167 Total 88 109 23 210 % 42% 52% 11% 100% Source: The Central Statistics Office of St. Lucia. 2010 Information

13. If the project had not been implemented these activities would have deteriorated and eventually would have disappeared as the erosion of the beach and floods damage would have made their part in deteriorating the area along coastline. According to people familiar with the area (Dennery Foundation, Eco Agro Tourism, and PCU) no more than ten year would have passed before the recreational activities ended. For the without project scenario the revenues gradually diminish during a 10-year period and then no activity along the beach is included.

14. For the with-project situation the following assumptions were made:

a. Seafood Fiesta. Currently about 1,000 people show up for the fiesta every weekend, 80% of them are local and 20% tourists. Locals are generally young people who spend about XCD 25, while tourists spend twice as much. Even though the main attraction is the fish, locals take advantage of the activities and set vending sites for additional kind of food such as chicken and pork. It is estimated that about 4 to 5 vending sites are organized every week, and each site consists of about 8 locals selling their food and earning revenue of about XCD 200 per night.

Saturday Night Fiesta Without With Project Project Total Locals Tourists No of Patrons per week 62 1,000 800 200 Average bill/person (XCD) 30 30 25 50 Annual Growth rate -10% 1% Food Fiesta (Chicken-Pork) Vending sites 4 Average # of Tables per site 8 Revenues/vendor/night(XCD) 200 34

b. Tourists that stop by on their way to the airport. The assumptions of number of tourists used at appraisal, 12% of those going to and from the international airport at Vieux Fort) was reviewed with people familiar with the area and found accurate. They spend an average of XCD 30 per person. The projection of tourists going to and from the international airport was based on updated information provided by the Central Statistics Office of Saint Lucia. c. Cruise Ship Passengers. It is estimated that about 500 passengers from cruise ships go to Dennery on a daily basis during tourism season (October to May) and spend about XCD 50 per stay. The number of tourists is the same assumed at appraisal, when it was estimated that 15% of the cruise ship passengers were excursionists traveling south and of these, 30% stopped for a snack or lunch. The projection of cruise ships was based on updated information provided by the Central Statistics Office of Saint Lucia.

15. Sewage Treatment Plant. It was built with the additional financing and complemented the work of the Communal and Recreational Facility. It also included: (a) the construction of sanitary facilities for the recreational area and its connection to the sewer system; (b) connection of about 25 houses and businesses along the coastline to the sewer system; (c) upgrading or constructing sanitary facilities for those houses; (d) disposal of treated wastewater.

16. The benefits of the sewerage connection are basically two: (a) convenient wastewater disposal in the houses and businesses connected; and (b) appropriate sanitary facilities at recreational area and correct sewage disposal. These benefits were estimated as the cost savings from not having to evacuate the sewage from the available on-site solution. According to 2010 Census information2 27% of the houses located in the coastal area of Dennery have septic tanks, and all the businesses along the coastline. 25 properties were connected to the sewer system, 10 of which were restaurants, and 15 houses. The septic tanks were cleaned out twice a year at a cost of XCD 1,200 for restaurants, and XCD 120 for houses.

17. Additionally, every week after the Seafood Fiesta took place, the area had to be cleaned and the wastewater had to be evacuated. According to information provided by the Dennery Development Foundation the cost savings of cleaning the area is XCD 21,000 fortnight and 10% of which could be attributed to sewage evacuation. Results show that cost savings of having sewer connections are about XCD 80 thousand per year.

18. The benefits of sewage treatment include: improvement of water quality, restored aesthetic properties, reduction in fecal coliform and potential human infection, reduction of human health risk, increase in property values, and enhanced marine environment. Even though these benefits are already seen in the area and have positively contributed to

2 The Central Statistics Office of Saint Lucia.

the quality of life of the community, they could not be estimated for this evaluation due to lack of information.

19. Results. The results show a net benefit of XCD 8.6 million and internal rate of return of 20%. The expected benefit at appraisal was XCD 3.86 million and the EIRR of 23%. Actual results are very satisfactory, as benefits were twice as much and the EIRR is well above the discount rate of 12%.

NPV of Actual Net Benefit (000 XCD) Costs Investment Costs 8,913 Operating costs 286 Total Costs 9,199 Benefits Road Reconstruction 308 Relocation costs 2,120 Damage costs of properties due to floods 1,648 Cleaning the beach due to lack of ww treatment 194 Cleaning septic tanks 89 Revenues from Saturday Fish Fry Fiesta 7,038 Revenue from tourists in their way to the airport 2,514 Revenues from cruise passengers 3,869 Total Benefits 17,780

Net benefits (without project situation) 8,580 IRR 20%

Economic evaluation of small mitigation works (MoSSaiC)

20. Methodology. Avoided damage cost was the approach used to evaluate the MoSSaiC interventions. For doing this, damage costs were estimated for different landslides scenarios, and the benefit of intervention were defined as avoided landslide costs. The landslide risk was quantified in terms of the hazard, exposure and vulnerability of elements at risk. Landslide hazard (magnitude and frequency) was modeled with and without drainage interventions. These hazard predictions were then used to estimate the damage potential of the elements exposed.

21. The evaluation was carried out for a MoSSaiC project implemented in 2008 in a typical community in Castries consisting of 20 households located on the lower slopes of a moderately steep (300) ridge. The vulnerability of the community to events such as landslides is typical of unplanned settlements in the region in terms of poor construction standards, limited access, lack of drainage, and poverty levels.

22. By choosing a completed landslide risk reduction intervention at a scale of a single community it was possible to quantify the landslide hazard using physically based modeling methods and made possible to prepare a direct assessment of the vulnerability and the benefits of landslide mitigation. Additionally, knowledge of, and access to, the local community through the project made possible to estimate the direct benefits form the risk reduction, as well as some indirect benefits that accrue to the community (such as improvements in water supply and access to and from the community.

23. The two main components of MoSSaiC interventions are: (a) the construction of a network of surface drains to intercept surface-water runoff and convey it to main drains or natural watercourses; and (b) the connection of houses roof water (using roof guttering to capture rainfall) and grey water to these drains. The analysis showed that the amount of rainfall intercepted by the roofs of the houses was about 35%, based on the estimation of the areal extend of the community, and the calculation of the roof area of each house. This translated to a 35% reduction in the “effective intensity” of the design rainfall events used in the simulations. The assumption of 35% is conservative, as it only represents rainfall intercepted on the roofs of houses, captured by the new guttering and directed into the drains or water tanks. In reality, the drains, intercept surface-water runoff, would be concentrated at convergence zones and infiltrate into the soil, which could increase the estimation to about 50%.

24. Costs. The costs included in the evaluation were mainly those incurred in 2008 when drain construction and guttering installation were undertaken. Minor additional costs accrue when ongoing maintenance was assumed. The costs were based on standard unit costs of construction adopted by the government social development agency, which implemented the project.

25. Benefits. The estimation of benefits included direct benefits from the reduction in landslide risk (which reduces the expected cost of rebuilding damaged homes and replacing lost possessions); as well as indirect benefits arising from improvements in the everyday lives of community residents. Estimation of benefits was made for community residents who continue to carry out maintenance and when they do not continue maintenance.

26. Direct benefits were estimated as the reduction in landslide risk by comparing the expected cost form landslides without the intervention and with it. The hazard assessment component identified two scenarios and their associated frequency and magnitude, and the expected damage potential of the exposed houses. The two scenarios were: A. Progressive shallow failures affecting whole slope; and B. Minor failure in particular locations, selecting three locations. For each scenario it was estimated the damage cost from lost houses,, damage houses, and lost possessions. Then the landslide probabilities were incorporated to find the expected damage cost, which translates into benefit of the intervention.

27. The results of direct benefits for each scenario is the following:

Expected benefits NPV (000 XCD) With Avoided damage intervention W/o intervention cost (benefit) With maintenance A. Progressive shallow failures affecting whole slope 68.8 286.9 218.1 B. Minor Failure in particular location: Location 1 13.2 39.7 26.4 Location 2 14.9 44.7 29.8 Location 3 14.9 44.7 29.8 Total expected cost: 111.9 416.1 304.2 Without maintenance A. Progressive shallow failures affecting whole slope 149.1 286.9 137.9 B. Minor Failure in particular location Location 1 21.9 39.7 17.8 Location 2 24.7 44.7 20.0 Location 3 24.7 44.7 20.0 Total expected cost 220.4 416.1 195.7

28. Indirect Benefits. The improved drainage and installation of roof guttering have the potential to bring additional benefits to the community, such as: savings in water bills through the harvesting of intercepted rainwater from the roofs; improved access to and from the community due to reduced flooding and debris washed onto footpaths; possible reduced mosquito population. These benefits were estimated using the Revealed Preference Method, with results of XCD 106 thousand when maintenance to the works were carried out by the community, or XCD 64.9 thousand when no maintenance occurred.

29. Results. The results show higher benefits when maintenance is carried out with benefit cost ratio of 1.7 without maintenance and 2.7 with maintenance.

Results for MoSSaiC interventions NPV (000 XCD) With Maintenance Without maintenance Costs Investment 150.0 150.0 Maintenance 3.6 - Total 153.6 150.0 Benefits Benefits of Risk Reduction (direct) 304.2 195.7 Benefits for community residents (indirect) 106.3 64.9 Total 410.5 260.6 Net Benefit 256.9 110.6

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members Respo nsibili Names Title Unit ty/ Specia lty Lending Oliver Davidson Consultant LCSUW Francis Ghesquiere Program Manager SASDU Gerard L. Liautaud Consultant LCSTR Jose C. Joaquín Toro Landivar Sr. Disaster Risk Management LCSUW María Angélica Sotomayor Araujo Sector Leader LCSSD

Supervision/ICR Trish Barrett Disaster Risk Management Analyst LCSUW Ana Daza Program Assistant LCSUW Rossella Della Monica International Affairs Officer EXTBR Maricarmen Esquivel Consultant LCSTR Tiguist Fisseha Disaster Risk Management Specialist LCSUW Marc S. Forni Sr. Disaster Risk Management SASDU Joseph R. Goldberg Consultant C3PDR Niels B. Holm-Nielsen Sr. Disaster Risk Management LCSUW Mozammal Hoque Sr. Financial Management Specialist LCSFM Plamen Kirov Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPT Gerard L. Liautaud Consultant LCSTR Brett J. MC Farlan Libresco Evaluation Officer IEGPS Gerald E. Meier Environmental Consultant LCSEN Nara C. Meli Consultant LCSPS Ulrich Cedric Myboto Consultant CCAVP-LVL Maritza A. Rodríguez De Pichardo Sr. Financial Management Specialist LCSFM Seyoum Solomon Consultant PPIAF Jose C. Joaquín Toro Landivar Sr. Disaster Risk Management LCSUW Kimberly Vilar Social Development Specialist LCSSO Yao Wottor Sr. Procurement Specialist LCSPT

(b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY04 9.86 91.18 FY05 0.03 0.08 FY06 0.00 FY07 0.00 FY08 0.00 FY09 FY10 FY11

Total: 9.89 91.26 Supervision/ICR FY05 9.41 52.33 FY06 12.43 58.57 FY07 10.60 73.19 FY08 16.29 87.62 FY09 25.69 104.86 FY10 8.70 87.80 FY11 4.46 44.01 FY12 5.87 43.74 FY13 13.12

Total: 93.45 565.24

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

Not applicable

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

Not applicable

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

Executive Summary

In June 2004 the Government of Saint Lucia secured a loan from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) in the amount of US$3.7 million and a credit from the International Development Association (IDA) in an amount equivalent to US$3.8 million to finance the Second Disaster Management Project (SDMP). This Project became effective in October 2004 and should have been completed in December 2009. By December 2006 (mid-term) 46% of the total project cost, which was EC$23.9 million inclusive of counterpart funds, was disbursed, while project expenditure including commitments was estimated at EC$19.2 million (80% of the total project cost).

By mid-term it was evident that there would be significant savings available under the Project prior to project closure. It is important to note that by December 31, 2009 the IDA Credit was fully disbursed. Therefore, the available savings which had resulted from coastal protection works undertaken at Dennery Village and reprioritization of funds originally earmarked for the Vulnerability Reduction and Risk Transfer activity were available under the IBRD Loan. This activity (the Vulnerability Reduction and Risk Transfer) was met through the implementation of the OECS Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (P094539; IDA Credit 42710) implemented May 2007 – December 31, 2010. Consequently, in 2007 the GOSL sought additional financing (IDA Credit #4871-SLU) in the amount of US$3 million to undertake decisive interventions to build on the successes of the ongoing Project. Throughout its implementation, this project was rated satisfactory by both the World Bank and the GOSL as the project continued to meet the overall developmental objectives as outlined in the Financing Agreement.

The success and satisfactory rating was achieved through several factors, which included allotment of sufficient time for preparation of the project concept note and the Project Appraisal Document. The Team ensured that the lessons learnt from the first disaster management project (ERDMP –ERL) were carefully utilized. The team also ensured that there was consistency with the PAD and Loan Agreements, that adequate staff with the appropriate knowledge and skills were in the PCU at the onset of the project. Under the ERDMP, staff of the PCU and of the implementing agencies had been trained in procurement and these same staff members were retained for coordination and implementation of the Project. Therefore, the necessary institutional capacity building, which is integral for effective project implementation and management, had been created. The Project ensured that provisions were in place to further build on this capacity by providing training to participating agencies and staff. The World Bank facilitated this by hosting annual Fiduciary Workshops and Meetings of Project Coordinators meetings (the last meeting was held in 2006). The technical information (designs and bill of quantities) required for bidding of major civil works (such as the Dennery flood protection works) and for some of the small works were prepared prior to effectiveness of the Project. By December 2004, 41 small works contracts were awarded while the major civil works contracted for over EC$6.0 million was signed by mid-2005.

There was significant achievement upon completion of the project. The original objectives of the project were met. All of the equipment and the supplies were acquired and delivered to the various agencies, and all of the civil works of varying degrees of complexity were completed. The major activities, Territorial Planning and the Drought Hazard and Vulnerability Assessment under the Institutional Capacity Component were awarded by mid-term while the Physical Planning Section of the MOPD was finalizing for conducting of the Building Codes Training and the deliverables under the proposed contract. At mid-term, the Bank agreed to provide technical assistance on the way forward for the Study on Vulnerability and Risk Transfer of Government Assets.

Of major concern is the extent of borrowing by the GOSL and maintenance of physical infrastructures constructed under the Project. As such, a non-governmental organization has been formed to ensure adequate sustainability and maintenance of the works implemented at Dennery Village. An assessment undertaken by the World Bank following the passage of Hurricane Tomas in 2010 revealed that the civil works activities executed under the Project were able to withstand the effects and impact of the event. The Emergency Operations Centre constructed under the Project was fully operational during and after the Hurricane. Despite this, the GOSL must ensure that adequate security is provided for the newly acquired facilities, infrastructure, equipment and resources that have been provided to ensure future utilization. The GOSL must ensure that resources, both human and financial, are available to sustain the facilities well into the future. The Ministry of Finance has been exploring the possibility of insurance. Should this become a reality, then the objectives and benefits of the project would be fully realized.

The GOSL must express gratitude to the World Bank Team involved in supervision for the dedicated support and assistance given to the PCU throughout the implementation of this multifaceted project. Overall, the World Bank’s performance in this regard was highly satisfactory.

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Not applicable

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Project Appraisal Document. The World Bank. Report No. 27951. May 25, 2004.

Project Paper for Additional Financing. The World Bank. Report No. 44002-LC. June 17, 2008.

Development Credit Agreement. No.3936-SLU. July 29, 2004.

Loan Agreement. No.7238-SLU. July 29, 2004.

Financing Agreement. Additional Financing for Second Disaster Management Project. No.4498-LC. November 6, 2008.

Environmental Management Plan. Government of Saint Lucia. 2004 and updated in January 2009.

Resettlement Action Plan for the Construction of a communal and recreational facility at Dennery Village. Government of Saint Lucia. August 2011.

Project Files, including mission documents (Implementation Status and Results Report, Aide Memoires), Financial and Audit reports, Operations Manual.

Saint Lucia Emergency Recovery and Disaster Management Project - Performance Assessment Report, 2005.

MoSSaiC- Saint Lucia Second Disaster Management Project. Final Report. December 2011.

Review of World-Bank-Financed Disaster Risk Management Projects in the Aftermath of Hurricane Tomas. Assessment of Selected Structural and Non-Structural Disaster Mitigation Activities. January 2011.

UNECLAC – Macro Socio-Economic Damage Assessment Report (December 2010).

Project Mid-Term Review (May 1, 2007).

List of Interviewees: Implementation Completion Report Mission, December 12-14, 2011:

Name Organization Title Cheryl Mathurin PCU PCU Coordinator John Calixte Ministry of Finance Deputy Permanent Secretary Myrtle Drysdale-Octave PCU Procurement Officer Rosilia Joseph PCU Financial Management Officer

Calus Monchery PCU Project Officer Lester Arnold MCWTPU Chief Engineer Renata Mac Kie MCWTPU Engineer Peter Felix MoPD Chief Surveyor Augustin Poyotte MoPD Chief Architect Christopher Williams MoPD Survey and Mapping Officer Magdalena Henry- MoPD Physical Planning Officer Fontenelle Celsus Baptiste MoPD Commissioner of Crown Lands Marcus Edward Ministry of Education Deputy Chief Education Officer Hubert Harte Ministry of Health Building Officer Dawn French NEMO Director Joanne Haynes MoPD Architect

IBRD 39258

61˚00'W 60˚50'W Saint Lucia Channel Cap Point

Pigeon Island

SAINT Gros Islet LUCIA Rodney Bay

Cape Marquis GROSG R O S DauphinDauphin Choc Bay ISLETI S L E T

Pointe Seraphine DAUPHIND A U P H I N CASTRIESCASTRIES GrandGrand Grand 14˚00'N AnseAnse Anse 14˚00'N Grande Cul Bay de Sac Bay CASTRIESC A S T R I E S SansSans

SoucisSoucis C

Marigot Bay l

LaLa CroixCroix e S

a MaingotMaingot c

AnseAnse LaLa RayeRaye Denn er y Caribbean ANSEANSE DENNERYDENNERD E N N E R Y Fond d'or Bay LALA RRARAYEAYEYE DennerDDenneryennery Sea Canaries CANARIESCANARIES

Mt.Mt. GimieGimie PraslinPraslin Praslin Bay (950(950 m)m) Mt.Mt. TabacTabacabac Grand Caille Point Trou Gras Point (678(678 m)m) PRASLINP R A S L I N MonMon Soufrière ReposRepos Soufrière Bay SOUFRIERES O U F R I E R E

13˚50'N C an 13˚50'N e Mt.Mt. GrandGrand ll es Anse de Piton MagazinMagazin Micoud (616(616 m)m) MICOUDM I C O U D Vierge Point Gros Piton Point CHOISEULC H O I S E U L DesurisseauDesurisseau

LondonderrLLondonderryondonderry

Choiseul LABORIEL A B O R I E VIEUXV I E U X FORFFORTO R T 60˚50'W

LaborieLaborie SAINT LUCIA Laborie Bay SECOND DISASTER

Vieux Fort Maria I. MANAGEMENT PROJECT 0 1 2 3 Kilometers Vieux Fort Bay CITIES AND TOWNS Cape Moule 0 1 2 3 Miles Chique NATIONAL CAPITAL

This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. RIVERS The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other information shown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World Bank MAIN ROADS Group, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or any Saint Vincent Passage endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. QUARTER BOUNDARIES 61˚00'W INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES APRIL 2012