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Post-Nkomati Mozambique A publication of the African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies No. 38 • January 8, 1985 Post-Nkomati Mozambique by Gillian Gunn Nearly 10 months after signing the March 16, 1984 other hand, signed the pact primarily to produce one Nkomati Accord with South Africa (see "Destabiliza­ specific result-liquidation of the MNR guerrilla war tion and Dialogue: South Africa's Emergence as a against the government. The principal Mozambican Regional Superpower" by John de St. Jorre in CSIS negotiator, Minister for Economic Affairs in the Presi­ Africa Notes no. 26, April17, 1984), Mozambique dent's Office Jacinto Veloso, warned in an October 6 resembles the paradoxical patient whose operation is interview: "If the bandit action does not stop, Nkomati a success but whose medical status remains critical. If will be put in jeopardy." the patient succumbs, the experiment will have little The threats to declare Nkomati a failure were in­ chance of being repeated, and the prospects for tended to force South Africa to take a more active peaceful coexistence between South Africa and its role in combatting the MNR-to focus on ends as well neighbors will diminish sharply. as means. They generated a new level of action on Both parties to the Nkomati Accord agree that the the part of South Africa in the second half of 1984 "operation" is a success in the sense that the other that culminated in an apparent breakthrough on Oc­ signatory is living up to the letter of the Accord. tober 3. On that date, delegations representing the South African officials affirm publicly that Mozam­ government of Mozambique and the MNR were pres­ bique has indeed ceased to provide logistical facilities ent in the same hall in Pretoria as South African for the military arm of the African National Congress, Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha read the follow­ as pledged in the Accord. The government of Mozam­ ing statement (the so-called "Pretoria Declaration"): bique, for its part, accepts as fact that the South (1) Samora Moises Machel is acknowledged as the African government has suspended direct support for President of the People's Republic of Mozambique. the guerrilla forces of the Resist~ncia Nacional (2) Armed activity and conflict within Mozambique Mo{:ambicana (known as Renamo or MNR), again as from whatever quarter or source must stop. pledged in the Accord. (For the history of this move­ (3) The South African government is requested to ment, see ''The MNR" by Colin Legum in CSIS Africa consider playing a role in the implementation of this Notes no. 16, July 15, 1983.) declaration. Even so, Mozambique is faltering. MNR operations (4) A commission will be established immediately have escalated. The country's transport network is to work toward an early implementation of this repeatedly mined; the capital is subjected to intermit­ declaration. tent power sabotage; aid agencies are pulling their Botha added that South Africa agreed to take part in technicians out of the countryside to avoid MNR kid­ the commission. nappings and killings. There was some initial confusion as to just what the Declaration meant. But it has now become clear that The Two Views of Nkomati it marked a shift in the South African government's Although Nkomati was viewed as an important gain public attitude toward Nkomati. Pretoria implicitly by both signatories, the reasons were not the same in recognized Mozambique's priorities in associating itself Pretoria and Maputo. For South Africa, the opening of with the statement that "armed activity . must the door and formal implementation of the respective stop." A month later, the South African government promises were reason enough. Mozambique, on the underscored the distancing from the MNR by blocking Editor: Helen Kitchen, Director of African Studies • Research Associate : J. Coleman Kitchen, Jr. • Production/Circulation: Sheilah Mclean CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 • Telephone (202) 887-0219 • JSSN 0736-9506 2 a Pretoria press conference scheduled by the move­ of Nkomati as a manifestation of a split within the ment's representatives; meanwhile, South African Botha government. According to their scenario, the newspapers began to give more attention to allega­ South African military, and particularly military in­ tions of MNR atrocities. MNR spokesmen responded telligence, was reluctant to abandon the MNR, while a to these developments by labeling Foreign Minister "moderate" group, represented by the Department of Botha an "unconditional ally of the [Mozambican Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Botha, signed government]." Nkomati in good faith. President Machel believes that Maputo's initial public statements on the Pretoria his government's interests will best be served by Declaration enlarged upon its actual language, im­ strengthening the hand of the relatively friendly plicitly characterizing it as a cease-fire agreement or elements in the South African government while an MNR surrender. As Radio Mozambique rejoiced: weakening the hard-liners. Some South African jour­ "The fact that the representatives of organized ban­ nalists and analysts suggest that this explanation may ditry recognized President Samora Machel means the be overly simplistic. "Thump and talk are not mutual­ recognition of the government and all institutions of ly exclusive," a Johannesburg academician reminded the People's Republic of Mozambique ... The result me, and "the Pretoria Declaration may simply be the of these negotiations is the acceptance by the armed latest twist in an ongoing two-track policy." bandits that their actions lead nowhere." In any case, Maputo has challenged South Africa to Despite this public posture, the Mozambican demonstrate its genuine commitment to the success of negotiators knew that the Pretoria Declaration was a the Nkomati Accord both by blocking any further compromise. Machel had sent Veloso to Pretoria with unofficial supply shipments to the MNR and by a draft declaration of a unilateral cease-fire. Instead meeting Machel's requests for three forms of military he got an ambiguous document, signed by none of the support: (1) SADF troops to protect vital infrastruc­ three parties. ture against MNR attacks; (2) sharing of detailed in­ The fact that the document was no armistice quick­ telligence concerning the location of MNR arms ly became apparent. Within hours after the Pretoria caches and specific radio frequencies used for com­ DeClaration was announced, the MNR sabotaged a munication; and (3) sophisticated arms to assist in the key Maputo power line, forcing the capital to limp counterinsurgency effort. along on emergency power supplies for three days. Pretoria has replied that it cannot, for reasons of After consulting with their delegation in Pretoria, both principle and limited supply, provide any MNR spokesmen in Lisbon announced that the strug­ materiel covered by the arms embargo imposed on gle would continue, and insisted that the Declaration South Africa by the UN Security Council in 1977. recognized Machel as Mozambique's president only Although a small number of South African military until new elections could be held. advisors are reportedly helping strengthen protection of the Cabora Bassa dam complex, no moves have South Africa's Dual Agenda? been made to send substantial numbers of troops. In­ The Pretoria Declaration was significant in that it was telligence coordination is increasing, but not sufficient­ South Africa's first public commitment to play a role ly as yet to give the Mozambican military a decisive in obtaining peace in Mozambique; but this is not to edge against the MNR. say that Pretoria's position on the MNR was unequi­ vocal. The evidence is pretty clear that some elements The Portuguese Factor in the South African ruling establishment agreed to South African ambivalence is not the only reason Nkomati with a dual agenda in mind. This faction Nkomati has not met all of President Machel's expec­ assumed and intended that the MNR would remain an tations. Another problem is that Nkomati did not take active element after the accord, and that the pressure account of all the actors in the drama, in particular of the guerrilla war would eventually force Machel to the MNR's Portuguese benefactors. Indeed, Mozambi­ agree to negotiate a power-sharing agreement. can officials believe that Portuguese support for the Whether with or without Prime Minister (now Presi­ MNR escalated after Nkomati, breathing new life into dent) Botha's approval, sufficient arms appear to have the guerrilla organization. moved across the border just before Nkomati to keep Machel first hinted publicly at Portuguese involve­ the MNR operating for some time-some observers ment in June 1984 when he referred to a "conspiracy say through the end of 1985. And somebody some­ against Mozambique's independence and sovereignty" where had to be deliberately looking the other way involving "personalities of governments which main­ when elements of South Africa's significant Portuguese tain diplomatic relations with our country" and "cir­ population (about 700,000, according to Portuguese cles nostalgic for colonialism." Since then, the diplo­ Prime Minister Mario Soares), many of them matic gloves have come off and the charges are more emigrants who had fled Mozambique just after in­ explicit. On October 21, Domingo published an article dependence, arranged their own cross-border supply specifically accusing Portuguese Deputy Prime
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