A publication of the African Studies Program of The Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies

No. 38 • January 8, 1985 Post-Nkomati Mozambique

by Gillian Gunn

Nearly 10 months after signing the March 16, 1984 other hand, signed the pact primarily to produce one Nkomati Accord with South Africa (see "Destabiliza­ specific result-liquidation of the MNR guerrilla war tion and Dialogue: South Africa's Emergence as a against the government. The principal Mozambican Regional Superpower" by John de St. Jorre in CSIS negotiator, Minister for Economic Affairs in the Presi­ Africa Notes no. 26, April17, 1984), Mozambique dent's Office Jacinto Veloso, warned in an October 6 resembles the paradoxical patient whose operation is interview: "If the bandit action does not stop, Nkomati a success but whose medical status remains critical. If will be put in jeopardy." the patient succumbs, the experiment will have little The threats to declare Nkomati a failure were in­ chance of being repeated, and the prospects for tended to force South Africa to take a more active peaceful coexistence between South Africa and its role in combatting the MNR-to focus on ends as well neighbors will diminish sharply. as means. They generated a new level of action on Both parties to the Nkomati Accord agree that the the part of South Africa in the second half of 1984 "operation" is a success in the sense that the other that culminated in an apparent breakthrough on Oc­ signatory is living up to the letter of the Accord. tober 3. On that date, delegations representing the South African officials affirm publicly that Mozam­ government of Mozambique and the MNR were pres­ bique has indeed ceased to provide logistical facilities ent in the same hall in Pretoria as South African for the military arm of the African National Congress, Foreign Minister Roelof ("Pik") Botha read the follow­ as pledged in the Accord. The government of Mozam­ ing statement (the so-called "Pretoria Declaration"): bique, for its part, accepts as fact that the South (1) Samora Moises Machel is acknowledged as the African government has suspended direct support for President of the People's Republic of Mozambique. the guerrilla forces of the Resist~ncia Nacional (2) Armed activity and conflict within Mozambique Mo{:ambicana (known as Renamo or MNR), again as from whatever quarter or source must stop. pledged in the Accord. (For the history of this move­ (3) The South African government is requested to ment, see ''The MNR" by Colin Legum in CSIS Africa consider playing a role in the implementation of this Notes no. 16, July 15, 1983.) declaration. Even so, Mozambique is faltering. MNR operations (4) A commission will be established immediately have escalated. The country's transport network is to work toward an early implementation of this repeatedly mined; the capital is subjected to intermit­ declaration. tent power sabotage; aid agencies are pulling their Botha added that South Africa agreed to take part in technicians out of the countryside to avoid MNR kid­ the commission. nappings and killings. There was some initial confusion as to just what the Declaration meant. But it has now become clear that The Two Views of Nkomati it marked a shift in the South African government's Although Nkomati was viewed as an important gain public attitude toward Nkomati. Pretoria implicitly by both signatories, the reasons were not the same in recognized Mozambique's priorities in associating itself Pretoria and Maputo. For South Africa, the opening of with the statement that "armed activity . . . must the door and formal implementation of the respective stop." A month later, the South African government promises were reason enough. Mozambique, on the underscored the distancing from the MNR by blocking

Editor: Helen Kitchen, Director of African Studies • Research Associate : J. Coleman Kitchen, Jr. • Production/Circulation: Sheilah Mclean CSIS Africa Notes, Suite 400, 1800 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006 • Telephone (202) 887-0219 • JSSN 0736-9506 2 a Pretoria press conference scheduled by the move­ of Nkomati as a manifestation of a split within the ment's representatives; meanwhile, South African Botha government. According to their scenario, the newspapers began to give more attention to allega­ South African military, and particularly military in­ tions of MNR atrocities. MNR spokesmen responded telligence, was reluctant to abandon the MNR, while a to these developments by labeling Foreign Minister "moderate" group, represented by the Department of Botha an "unconditional ally of the [Mozambican Foreign Affairs and Prime Minister Botha, signed government]." Nkomati in good faith. President Machel believes that Maputo's initial public statements on the Pretoria his government's interests will best be served by Declaration enlarged upon its actual language, im­ strengthening the hand of the relatively friendly plicitly characterizing it as a cease-fire agreement or elements in the South African government while an MNR surrender. As Radio Mozambique rejoiced: weakening the hard-liners. Some South African jour­ "The fact that the representatives of organized ban­ nalists and analysts suggest that this explanation may ditry recognized President Samora Machel means the be overly simplistic. "Thump and talk are not mutual­ recognition of the government and all institutions of ly exclusive," a Johannesburg academician reminded the People's Republic of Mozambique ... The result me, and "the Pretoria Declaration may simply be the of these negotiations is the acceptance by the armed latest twist in an ongoing two-track policy." bandits that their actions lead nowhere." In any case, Maputo has challenged South Africa to Despite this public posture, the Mozambican demonstrate its genuine commitment to the success of negotiators knew that the Pretoria Declaration was a the Nkomati Accord both by blocking any further compromise. Machel had sent Veloso to Pretoria with unofficial supply shipments to the MNR and by a draft declaration of a unilateral cease-fire. Instead meeting Machel's requests for three forms of military he got an ambiguous document, signed by none of the support: (1) SADF troops to protect vital infrastruc­ three parties. ture against MNR attacks; (2) sharing of detailed in­ The fact that the document was no armistice quick­ telligence concerning the location of MNR arms ly became apparent. Within hours after the Pretoria caches and specific radio frequencies used for com­ DeClaration was announced, the MNR sabotaged a munication; and (3) sophisticated arms to assist in the key Maputo power line, forcing the capital to limp counterinsurgency effort. along on emergency power supplies for three days. Pretoria has replied that it cannot, for reasons of After consulting with their delegation in Pretoria, both principle and limited supply, provide any MNR spokesmen in Lisbon announced that the strug­ materiel covered by the arms embargo imposed on gle would continue, and insisted that the Declaration South Africa by the UN Security Council in 1977. recognized Machel as Mozambique's president only Although a small number of South African military until new elections could be held. advisors are reportedly helping strengthen protection of the Cabora Bassa dam complex, no moves have South Africa's Dual Agenda? been made to send substantial numbers of troops. In­ The Pretoria Declaration was significant in that it was telligence coordination is increasing, but not sufficient­ South Africa's first public commitment to play a role ly as yet to give the Mozambican military a decisive in obtaining peace in Mozambique; but this is not to edge against the MNR. say that Pretoria's position on the MNR was unequi­ vocal. The evidence is pretty clear that some elements The Portuguese Factor in the South African ruling establishment agreed to South African ambivalence is not the only reason Nkomati with a dual agenda in mind. This faction Nkomati has not met all of President Machel's expec­ assumed and intended that the MNR would remain an tations. Another problem is that Nkomati did not take active element after the accord, and that the pressure account of all the actors in the drama, in particular of the guerrilla war would eventually force Machel to the MNR's Portuguese benefactors. Indeed, Mozambi­ agree to negotiate a power-sharing agreement. can officials believe that Portuguese support for the Whether with or without Prime Minister (now Presi­ MNR escalated after Nkomati, breathing new life into dent) Botha's approval, sufficient arms appear to have the guerrilla organization. moved across the border just before Nkomati to keep Machel first hinted publicly at Portuguese involve­ the MNR operating for some time-some observers ment in June 1984 when he referred to a "conspiracy say through the end of 1985. And somebody some­ against Mozambique's independence and sovereignty" where had to be deliberately looking the other way involving "personalities of governments which main­ when elements of South Africa's significant Portuguese tain diplomatic relations with our country" and "cir­ population (about 700,000, according to Portuguese cles nostalgic for colonialism." Since then, the diplo­ Prime Minister Mario Soares), many of them matic gloves have come off and the charges are more emigrants who had fled Mozambique just after in­ explicit. On October 21, Domingo published an article dependence, arranged their own cross-border supply specifically accusing Portuguese Deputy Prime Minis­ operation for the MNR. ter Mota Pinto, Minister of State Almeida Santos, and Mozambican officials see the foot-dragging and am­ industrialist Manuel Bulbosa of complicity with the bivalence of South African policy in the early stages MNR. Santos had owned property in Mozambique

CSIS Africa Notes, January 8, 1985 3 before independence. Bulhosa is the former owner of would be returned when the MNR comes to power. Mozambican oil refineries that were nationalized by Officials in Maputo also attach significance to the new the Machel regime and his Lisbon publishing opera­ MNR demand for the return of the regulado system (a tion employs two leading MNR figures, Evo Fernandes network of compliant chiefs who carried out Por­ and Jorge Correia. tuguese instructions in the colonial era) in the rural The decision to accuse Portugal was not taken light­ areas. Cited in further support of the Mozambican ly; indeed, the Domingo article was held up while the allegations is the August 1984 arrest of four Por­ Ministry of Information pondered the implications of tuguese "game hunters" in Tanzania. The four, who going public. The balance was tipped by reports of remain in Tanzanian custody, are accused of prepar­ Portuguese meddling in the trilateral "technical com­ ing bases, including airstrips, to facilitate continued mission" set up under the terms of the Pretoria supplies of arms to MNR units operating in the north Declaration. High-ranking officials in the Mozambican of Mozambique. Ministry of Foreign Affairs contend that Evo Fer­ The Portuguese government's motivations for per­ nandes had been on the verge of agreeing to a cease­ mitting the MNR to continue operating from Lisbon, fire during the first commission meeting when Pinto and, if Mozambique's allegations are valid, for allow­ telephoned from Lisbon, instructing him not to sign ing businessmen to coordinate and finance the MNR, anything and to return to Portugal for consultations. are somewhat baffiing. Since 1975, successive govern­ Whatever the reasons, the MNR's negotiating position ments have sought to solidify relations with the five did indeed harden midway in the first commission ses­ lusophone ex-colonies in Africa. Although recognizing sion, and soon afterward the guerrilla group pulled out that it lacks the financial resources to undertake ma­ of the talks altogether. jor initiatives in these countries, Lisbon has envisaged South Africa, by this point publicly committed to a growing role for Portugal as a channel for Western the technical commission talks, agreed that the Por­ assistance and investment. The path recently taken in tuguese role had been unhelpful, and Foreign Minister Mozambique would seem to place at risk the larger Botha undertook to visit Lisbon to discuss the matter goal of a special relationship with lusophone Africa. with Bulhosa, Santos, Pinto, and Prime Minister Even in the short run, the risks are considerable. Soares. As Botha prepared to board his plane on Oc­ Portugal has lost substantial revenue as a result of tober 12, however, Pinto cancelled the visit, saying MNR sabotage of the Cabora Bassa power project, in the timing was inconvenient. Diplomatic sources sug­ which there is a Portuguese financial interest. Por­ gest that the Portuguese did not want Soares to be in­ tuguese technicians have been kidnapped and killed, cluded in the discussions, as this would associate him and Portuguese directors of private companies in too closely with the MNR controversy. Mozambique are now receiving threats and demands The tension then heightened, as the dispute moved for protection money. from government-sanctioned newspaper commentary Some observers cite the MNR's anti-Portuguese ac­ to formal diplomatic protest. On November 2, tivities as evidence that the Mozambican government's Mozambican Foreign Minister Joaquim Chissano accusations of official Portuguese support for the guer­ called in the Portuguese ambassador and conveyed rillas are unfounded. Mozambican officials turn this "the serious concern of the Peoples' Republic of argument on its head. The reason the Portuguese Mozambique over the involvement of Portuguese government looks on impassively as the MNR "bim­ citizens and personalities in preparing and leading dits" strike indiscriminately at Portuguese interests, a acts of banditry from Portugal against Mozambique." Mozambican journalist close to the negotiations ex­ ''The free and unimpeded development of such plained to me, is that Portugal considers present in­ criminal acts from Portuguese territory," Chissano vestors in Mozambique as "second-class citizens" and added, "contradicts the principles of normal relation­ is willing to sacrifice them in a psychological war ships between states and endangers the good relations designed to secure final victory for the MNR and long­ between the two governments." term Portuguese interests. One piece of evidence lending credibility to the A more likely explanation is that the Portuguese charges of a greater Portuguese role in MNR strategy government and business community are not united formulation after Nkomati was a shift in the MNR's on the MNR issue. One faction, represented by demands. In the pre-Nkomati period, the emphasis businessmen currently active in Mozambique and was on free elections, free enterprise, and non­ possibly by Prime Minister Soares himself, wants to discrimination against neighbors with "different move forward to a more sophisticated economic rela­ political systems," an agenda that reflected the tionship with Mozambique, in which Portugal would priorities of the movement's South African patrons. be a middleman in aid and investment deals. This fac­ Now the MNR is making what Mozambican officials tion has an interest in stability in Mozambique and in call "colonial" demands-including the return of con­ maintaining good relations with the Machel govern­ fiscated Portuguese properties. In mid-November, the ment. It wants what one might call a "neocolonial" MNR sent letters to la rge numbers of colonial-era relationship. residents living in Lisbon, urging them to return to On the other side are the Portuguese businessmen Mozambique and promising that their former property and officials who lost their properties and roles in

CSIS Africa Notes, January 8, 1985 4

Mozambique. Rather than move forward to a new Evo Fernandes was invited to an academic conference economic relationship, they want to move back to an at Kiel University. The visit was set up by a German old one. They want to "recolonize" rather than friend of Fernandes resident in South Africa, and per­ "neocolonize." They believe that the MNR is on the mitted the MNR leadership to make contact with a verge of military victory, and believe it is worth a con­ number of politicians and businessmen. Since then, siderable gamble to replace the South Africans as the the MNR has received encouragement from these per­ bankroller of the movement's operations. One Mozam­ sonalities, and may be receiving funds. bican analyst offered this explanation: "We are seeing The MNR also has sympathizers in the United a delayed reaction. Had a viable opposition organiza­ States. MNR members say that they have declined of­ tion existed at the time of independence, [these fers of funds and mercenary services from several U.S. displaced Portuguese] would have moved immediately ... "war magazines." The Washington-based Heritage Now, 10 years later, the opportunity to win back Foundation and other conservative organizations have property and influence has presented itself, and this arranged meetings between MNR spokesmen and section of the Portuguese community is exploiting it. members of Congress. There is no evidence, however, Mario Soares might want to control this faction, but that the MNR is receiving funding from any of these he needs their support to maintain his majority in sources. parliament, and so his hands are tied." The FRELIMO Factor Other Friends of the MNR Another major reason why Nkomati has not yet Another factor undermining the Nkomati Accord is brought the peace envisaged is that the governing the support the MNR has enjoyed from Malawi and party of Mozambique, the Frente de Libertacao de West Germany. Although not as crucial as the aid it Mocambique (FRELIMO), made the mistake of plac­ received from South Africa, and apparently now ing all of the blame for the success of the MNR in­ receives from Portugal, this assistance is not surgency on the actions of outsiders. Like the Por­ insignificant. tuguese colonialists before it, FRELIMO failed to The Malawi connection goes back many years. recognize, until recently, that its own shortcomings in- Orlando Cristina, secretary-general of the MNR until . advertently created fertile recruiting grounds for its his death under mysterious circumstances in South enemies. Africa in April 1983, established close relations with In what ways have FRELIMO actions (and failures Malawi's President H. Kamuzu Banda when he trained to act) served the MNR's purposes? First, and perhaps that country's "Young Pioneers" organization. Malawi most important, a combination of policy blunders and subsequently permitted the MNR to infiltrate across its the worst drought in 50 years has resulted in border into Mozambique. Like South Africa, Malawi is widespread hunger in the countryside. After in­ host to a large number of Portuguese who lost proper­ dependence in 1975, FRELIMO undertook to manage ty in Mozambique, and these individuals provided every level of the food distribution system from the some financing. center. Thus, the hastily departed Portuguese petty Malawi's enthusiasm for the MNR began to falter in traders were replaced by a network of People's Shops 1983, however, as guerrilla activity blocked Malawian operating under a central administration. Too few exports exiting by rail and road through Mozambique. shops were established and they were inefficient and The rail line between Blantyre and Beira, which poorly stocked in basic consumer goods. When formerly carried up to 60 percent of Malawi's exports peasants realized they could buy little with the curren­ and imports, has been closed since early 1983, forcing cy they received for their crops, they not surprisingly Malawi to re-route traffic via South Africa at up to began to revert to subsistence farming. four times the cost. The policy of encouraging large state farms also In October 1984, Machel decided to capitalize on helped to alienate the peasantry from the party. Banda's unease over the MNR, and made his first of­ Although FRELIMO did not impose collectivization by ficial visit to Malawi. Mozambique did not get the force, the state farms' priority access to resources was specific security agreement it wanted, but the two a source of resentment in rural areas. neighbors did formulate a general cooperation agree­ These misjudgments were partly a result of the in­ ment stating that their governments will "not allow creasingly urban orientation of the FRELIMO leader­ their respective territories to be used as bases, or give ship. During the guerrilla war against the Portuguese, support to any organization or group of people which the FRELIMO leaders lived in the midst of the intends or prepares itself to launch violent acts, ter­ peasants, mainly in Cabo Delgado and Niassa pro­ rorism, or aggression against the other." Despite this vinces. Their very survival depended upon the good agreement, the Mozambican authorities apparently will of this rural constituency. Any peasant dissatisfac­ still believe that Malawian residents are supplying the tion was rapidly communicated, and rectifying the MNR, not necessarily with the approval or knowledge problem was given high priority by the party. When of the government. the FRELIMO leaders moved to Maputo after in­ The West German connection appears to consist dependence to take over operation of the central ad­ more of moral support than of direct aid. In 1983, ministration, they gradually fell out of touch with their

CSIS Africa Notes, January 8, 1985 5

rural constituents. It would be unfair to criticize A second fact of life is that the food shortage, caused FRELIMO too harshly for this breakdown; black in part by inappropriate agricultural policies, has im­ education in the colonial period was so limited that pelled some young men to join the MNR-not out of only a small number of FRELIMO cadres had the political conviction, but because it is the only avail­ training for administering a government and few could able alternative to a hopeless existence in their vil­ be spared for rural administration. lages. And finally, FRELIMO's uneven performance Western diplomats long resident in Mozambique has inevitably created a small but significant break­ also point out that FRELIMO support in those rural away group from its own ranks with specific grudges areas not directly controlled by the party during the against the party leadership. "liberation struggle" never ran as deep as in Cabo Delgado and Niassa. Many areas of the country, while Can the MNR Be Isolated? grateful for the independence FRELIMO won, did not President Machel's most immediate objective is to get closely identify with party goals. South Africa more actively committed to Nkomati. A range of policy excesses have also contributed to There are a number of conflicting pressures influenc­ growing rural, as well as urban, apathy toward ing Pretoria's decision-making on this issue. First, FRELIMO. Party leaders admit that individuals were President Botha must consider his country's economic sometimes arrested on suspicion of counterrevolu­ interests. South Africa needs new markets in black tionary activity and then, perhaps more out of disor­ Africa for its goods if the current economic slump is ganization than malice, were left to sit in jail for to be ended, and a market as conveniently located as several years without being tried. Some well-inten­ Mozambique is especially worth cultivating. It is for tioned political campaigns that backfired included this reason that Maputo has been flooded, since the "Operation Production," a 1980s undertaking to move signing of the. Nkomati Accord, with South African unemployed from the cities, where they were contri­ businessmen bringing suggestions for joint projects. buting to the rising crime rate. to rural areas where it South Africans are helping rehabilitate the port and was hoped that they would be able to farm. The railroad facilities, in part because improved transport scheme was executed in a heavy-handed manner; sel­ would once again permit goods from the Transvaal to ection of candidates was haphazard, and many men exit through Maputo-a much shorter route than the were separated from their families. Richards Bay alternative. Farmers from South Africa's The military also must share some of the blame for · lowveld area are investigating agricultural investment the present state of affairs. During the war against the opportunities in Mozambique, and various South Portuguese, the FRELIMO guerrilla army was highly African entrepreneurs are looking into the possibility politicized. Although some guerrilla leaders remained of developing tourism on Mozambique's Inhaca Island. in the army after independence, many, as noted South Africa had always maintained some economic above, moved to positions in the central government. relations with Mozambique, even when political ten­ The lower ranks have increasingly been comprised of . sions were at their highest, but Nkomati set in motion younger, poorly educated recruits whose level of na­ a new level of activity. tional consciousness is not comparable with that of South African businessmen, like other potential in­ the rank and file of the war years. Violent incidents vestors, realize that major investments or extensive with civilians, of a kind that would never have oc­ operations in Mozambique will not be feasible until the curred in the years when the force was highly polit- . security situation is brought under control. Therefore icized at all levels, have diminished the military's they are anxious that Nkomati succeed. Machel is image (and thus FRELIMO's) in the countryside. dexterously playing off the business interests of these While FRELIMO is now taking energetic steps to entrepreneurs against any ambivalence in Pretoria. He right previous errors of omission and commission (see has ensured that Botha now faces a business pressure the section below on economic reform initiatives), a group that would complain vigorously if promising number of their consequences linger. The matter of new opportunities were sabotaged due to official peasant apathy toward the government is especially foot-dragging. worrisome. While many in the rural areas of the coun­ Another factor influencing thought in Pretoria is the try still nominally support FRELIMO, their loyalty to example that a successful Nkomati follow-through the party is overshadowed by their desire to live un­ would set for relations with the rest of Africa. If molested, and their awareness that the MNR is not Nkomati brings peace to Mozambique, the Botha gentle with those who stand in its way. (Even sym­ government will be in a much stronger position to per­ pathetic South African sources admit that the guer­ suade other African states that it is to their benefit to rillas have been alarmingly brutal. Mutilation of ears, enter into similar accords. Pretoria knows that lips, and breasts is common, particularly when units Angola's MPLA government, in particular, is watching operate outside their home territories.) An advisor to carefully to see if South Africa truly does put a leash Machel has summed up the situation in the following on the MNR. One of the thornier issues in the ongo­ words: "[The peasants] feel the road to the city ing negotiations between Luanda and Pretoria is doesn't bring anything. Therefore they are not willing South Africa's long record of support for the guerrilla to risk their lives to prevent the MNR from mining it." forces of Jonas Savimbi's UNITA (see "Angola: A

CSIS Africa Notes, January 8, 1985 6

Quarter Century of War" by John A. Marcum in CSIS management, and, most important, moved the Africa Notes no. 37, December 21, 1984). agricultural focus from state farms to smaller-scale There is a reverse side to the Angola analogy that production units. The "family" sector was given the Botha government also must take into account­ special priority, with small cooperatives and private the effect leashing the MNR would have upon farmers also gaining greater access to funds. The UNITA's morale. Though Pretoria may be prepared to government now places higher priority on supplying cut support to UNITA (if by so doing it could obtain consumer goods to the rural areas, so· that farmers withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola and an ac­ will have an incentive to produce. Mozambique recent­ ceptable settlement in Namibia), it does not want to ly persuaded the USSR and Sweden to provide large lose (or even damage) the UNITA lever until key shipments of consumer goods to stock rural shops. South African goals are achieved. Since the Fourth Congress, FRELIMO has im­ And even if South Africa should decide to throw in plemented other realpolitik changes. In September its full lot with Machel, other considerations might 1984, in a sharp turn from previous policy, Mozam­ rule out sending in military units to help suppress the bique became a member: of the International Monetary MNR. The United States opposes in principle moves Fund (which the Mozambican press in the immediate that involve foreign troops in the countries of southern post-independence period had portrayed in cartoons as Africa, and is also concerned that Scandinavian coun­ a well-fed businessman feeding poison to an African tries might react by reducing aid to Mozambique. This baby through a bottle). Mozambique is currently en­ is no small matter, since more than 90 percent of the titled to an IMF quota of approximately $60 million. It budget of Mozambique's Ministry of Agriculture is is immediately entitled to draw its "reserve tranche," provided by Scandinavian aid. According to diplo­ which returns the foreign exchange it has contributed matic sources, Sweden is already unhappy with to the Fund in the process of joining. According to Mozambique's recent decision to spend some of its aid sources in the Bank of Mozambique, both the first money on South African goods in violation of the fine and second tranches, each equal to about 25 percent print in the Swedish aid agreement. Sweden is con­ of the total quota, will shortly be drawn. The first sidering focusing on aid projects in the north of tranche has virtually no conditions attached, while the Mozambique, because it believes that projects in the second has modest conditionality. south are more likely to be pulled into the South Membership in the IMF also entitles Mozambique to African economic system. membership in the World Bank and the International Given these conflicting pressures on the Botha Finance Corporation. A $100 million World Bank loan government, the most Machel can realistically expect· was negotiated earlier in 1984 and a team has been in the medium run may be some extra intelligence sent in to evaluate the economy. A Bank study re­ help and more careful monitoring of the border. portedly will recommend that almost all the Bank's Mozambique would also like to isolate the MNR grants be directed to the private sector. from its Portuguese backers. Machel has reportedly The decision to join the IMF is of more than pass­ threatened to move his embassy from Lisbon to ing interesting in light of previous associations. Madrid, and Mozambique could eventually adopt the Mozambique has had observer status in the Soviet­ Angolan tactic of excluding Portuguese companies dominated Council for Mutual Economic Assistance from business contracts. But whatever decisions are (CMEA), but was never offered full membership de­ taken at the official level, there are limits to the spite repeated hints of its desire to join. Perhaps a power of the Portuguese government to reduce sig­ certain amount of pique underlay a remark by one of­ nificantly support by private citizens for the MNR. If ficial that Mozambique found that it could be admitted Bulhosa is indeed financing the MNR, he could con­ to the IMF as "an equal" with other members, where­ tinue to do so via his investments in Brazil. as in the CMEA it was a "second-class citizen." (See It will also be hard to seal off Malawian support en­ "New Trends in Soviet Policy Toward Africa" by David tirely. Even if Banda signs a full-fledged security E. Albright in CSIS Africa Notes no. 27, April 29, agreement and makes a concerted effort to control in­ 1984, page 3.) filtration, some materiel will probably leak through. A Mozambique has exhibited increasing flexibility in large section of Malawi's border with Mozambique its negotiations with the so-called Paris Club. On Oc­ runs through the middle of Lake Malawi, so fishing tober 29, the rescheduling of about $300 million in boats leaving from one shore can easily change debts owed to Western governments was announced. course and head for the neighboring country. The Paris Club agreed to postpone payments original­ ly due in 1983, 1984, and the first half of 1985 to the Economic Reform 1990-96 period. The basis for the agreement is an At FRELIMO's Fourth Congress, held in April 1983, a "action program" outlining Mozambique's targets for long period of rethinking within the party culminated exports, imports, policies on prices and wages, and in a massive shift in economic policy. FRELIMO com­ the exchange rate. Although details have not been mitted itself to increasing the role of the private sec­ made public, Maputo reportedly agreed to fairly tor, shifted emphasis from large-scale to small- a nd stringent terms, with a 50 percent currency devalua­ medium-scale projects, decentralized economic tion due in March 1985. Mozambique will also link its

CSIS Africa Notes, January 8, 1985 7

currency more closely to the South African rand; this also actively encouraging South Africa to re-direct reflects the expectation that economic ties with South freight through the port of Maputo. South African ton­ Africa will grow. The rescheduling exercise is still not nage sent through Maputo dropped from 6.8 million in complete, since Mozambique has over $1 billion in re­ 1973 to an esti~ated 1 million in 1983. Finally, maining debt to renegotiate. But the reforms outlined Mozambique is encouraging South Africa to buy more in the "action program" are probably sufficient to power from the Cabora Bassa Dam complex. South meet the IMF's conditionality demands for access to Africa has agreed to pay a higher tariff, with a Mozambique's second tranche. premium if a reliable supply is maintained. Mozambique has also taken a more liberal attitude Rejuvenation of the economy could also be helped toward foreign investment. On July 28, 1984, it signed by more Western aid. After the signing of the an agreement with the U.S. government's Overseas Nkomati Accord, a ban on U.S. bilateral nonemergen­ Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a move neigh­ cy aid to Mozambique imposed by Congress in the boring Zimbabwe has thus far resisted. The agree­ late 1970s was lifted by presidential waiver. In late ment provides for bilateral investment guarantees to September 1984, one day before the U.S. fiscal year U.S. investors. In 1985 Mozambique will become a ended, an $8 million bilateral program was approved member of the Lome' Convention, the vehicle through by Congress. A Commodity Import Program designed which European Economic Community aid is chan­ to support the private agricultural sector accounts for neled to the Third World. $6 million of the funds. This will provide foreign ex­ A new investment code published on September 6 change for basic inputs such as fertilizer, seeds, hoes, guarantees compensation for nationalization, permits tractors, and (primarily) spare parts. The remaining nationalization only in "exceptional circumstances," $2 million will be spent on technical assistance, and and guarantees transfer of profits and repatriation of part will go through Portugal as "trilateral" aid. capital. This followed by only a few weeks a new law Mozambique was the world's largest recipient of U.S. on the management of foreign exchange that allows food assistance in FY 1983 and 1984-receiving ap­ enterprises (state; private, and foreign) to retain a por­ proximately $30 million each year. Private charitable tion of foreign exchange earned by exports. The funds programs added another $10 million to the U.S. total can be spent on import of essential materials and on in 1984. bonuses for workers. The move has been welcomed by Future U.S. aid almost certainly will depend partly the private sector, and represents a significant step upon Mozambique's willingness to maintain what away from centralized state control. Western diplomats call its "new genuinely nonaligned Similar pragmatism was evident in 1983 when stance." On this score, Washington has been en­ Mozambique introduced a new code to govern oil ex­ couraged by the relatively moderate tone of Foreign ploration. Oil companies cite it as one of the most Minister Chissano's October 1984 UN speech. But the generous in the Third World, and have responded United States may have problems with the Mozam­ positively. Esso and Shell started exploration in May bican definition of nonalignment. The Machel govern­ 1983 in the Rovuma Basin in the northeastern pro­ ment does not view nonalignment as a position vince of Cabo Delgado. In October 1984, an agree­ equidistant from the two superpowers, in the Yugosla­ ment was signed with Amoco (Standard Oil of In­ vian tradition. It believes that the socialist countries diana) covering four blocks in the Zambezi delta area are indeed the natural allies of the Third World, as in between Quelimane and Beira. In November, British the Cuban definition of nonalignment. Unlike Cuba, Petroleum signed an exploration contract covering however, Mozambique insists that the socialist orien­ 10,000 square kilometers from just south of Maputo to tation does not imply an obligation to cooperate close­ Xaixai in Gaza Province. Oil company sources in ly with the East's "military bloc." Mozambique report that initial surveys are more Even if all the new economic reforms, investment promising than originally anticipated and that there incentives, and aid appeals go well, it will be several are also large proven reserves of natural gas. years before Mozambique's economic emergency ends. Mozambique recognizes that it cannot change its The government predicts that imports will be more economy from a service-based to a semi-industrialized than three times larger than exports in 1985, and will one overnight. Whereas past rhetoric emphasized the remain more than double the amount of exports in desire to reduce economic ties with South Africa, cur­ 1986. Before the recent debt rescheduling, debt ser­ rent rhetoric concedes the economic logic of these vice payments were due to rise by 80 percent by 1987, links. In a ddition to the tourism and agricultural in­ and would begin to fall only in 1991. The debt prob­ vestment potential discussed in earlier sections of this lem is postponed slightly with the new rescheduling, article, Mozambique has requested that South Africa but post-1 990 payments will be very heavy. accept more mine labor. The reduction of the number In addition, the country's exports are subject to of Mozambicans in South Africa's mines from 120,000 price fluctuations in the international market. The before independence to around 45,000 by 1984 cost main products are shrimp, cotton, sugar, timber, Mozambique some $568 million. South Africa has coal, cement, citrus, and small amounts of petroleum now agreed to allow 8,000 more Mozambican miners by-products. The prices for these goods fell by 31 per­ to take jobs in the Republic in 1985. Mozambique is cent between 1980 and 1982.

CSIS Africa Notes, January 8, 1985 8------~------======

A FRELIMO-MNR Accommodation? with Fernandes and/ or Correia. Would he be in a The preceding analysis implies that neither attempts position to continue fighting independently? to cut off the MNR's external support nor economic A third problem concerns the vagueness and con­ reform can assure the rebels' defeat, at least in the tradictory nature of MNR demands. One week the short run. One of the remaining alternatives is to organization announces that it will not talk to engage in political negotiations with "the bandits." FRELIMO until it is recognized as an equal partner There are several problems inherent in this strategy. and until FRELIMO agrees to discuss substantive First, FRELIMO unity was somewhat strained by political issues. The next week it says President the Nkomati signing, and could be pushed to the Machel need only admit that he is indeed talking to breaking point by a decision to negotiate with the the MNR (an admission FRELIMO has been reluctant MNR. In the years before Nkomati, FRELIMO did not to make). The demands also seem to depend on the implement decisions until full consensus was obtained. geographic location of the MNR representative doing In a manner reminiscent of conflict resolution in tradi­ the talking. Portuguese-based spokesmen emphasize the return of nationalized properties, while those in tional African societies, the party would engage in 1 weeks of debate until all dissidents were convinced, or the United States focus on a call for new elections. at least stopped pushing their arguments. In contrast, FRELIMO does not know if these changes and con­ the early negotiations on Nkomati were discussed by a tradictions represent the views of different factions small group of FRELIMO leaders, and many high­ within the MNR, or shifting positions of a united ranking individuals were only informed in the closing leadership. Other outside observers are little better stages. Some were unconvinced, and Armando informed. Guebuza, then Minister of the Interior, was particular­ Despite these difficulties, FRELIMO has considered ly indiscreet in voicing his opposition even after the doing a deal with the black ra nk and file of the MNR signing. In June he was divested of the Interior port­ and excluding only the white leadership. (It has folio and, after a three-month period in limbo, shifted already offered an amnesty to guerrillas who sur­ to a lesser post as Minister of State in the President's render, which a small number have taken up.) Office. The official explanation was that he had im­ Another possibility would be to offer low-level ad­ plemented Operation Production in a particularly ministrative posts to middle-ranking MNR leaders, brutal manner, but Maputo-based diplomats are con­ though this would be bitterly opposed by some in vinced the disagreement over Nkomati was the trig­ FRELIMO. A third alternative involves persuading South Africa to take on large numbers of MNR guer­ ger. Guebuza is charismatic, has good relations with rillas as mining laborers, to be repatriated one year the army, and is one of the few FRELIMO figures who could conceivably rival Machel for the allegiance of later. Under this alternative, Mozambique would also the "masses." expect South Africa, Portugal, and other Western A second block to negotiating with the MNR is countries to fund resettlement of the white MNR uncertainty concerning the movement's composition. leadership in third countries. The MNR is apparently breaking into two distinct The problem with all these deals is that they do not groups, one in the south and one in the north, with respond to the MNR's main concern: power-sharing. the center of Mozambique relatively quiet. The South Machel cannot go much farther in meeting the MNR's Africans were most closely associated with the demands without threatening party unity. And with its southern group, and could help Mozambique force current military successes, the MNR sees no need to this part of the MNR to live up to any agreement. The be flexible. northern faction is far inore independent, however, and appears to be well-supplied (presumably from Gillian Gunn served as business editor of Business Portugal and Malawi). FRELIMO has no assurance International, a London-based research, publishing, that the northerners would live up to promises made and consulting firm, from 1981 until she was by the southerners or vice versa. named a Rockefeller Foundation International Rela­ There is also speculation concerning a split between tions Fellow in March 1984. As a specialist in the political and military leadership. Evo Fernandes Africa's economic development (her graduate and Jorge Correia, both whites with Portuguese studies were at the London School of Economics), passports, are viewed as political spokesmen, ·while she has written for the International Herald Afonso Dhlakama, a black Mozambican sometimes Tribune (Paris), The Times (London), The Guardian, called "Jacama" and carrying the title "Commander in Africa Economic Digest, and African Business. Her Chief," is viewed as "military." FRELIMO noted that many publications for Business International in­ clude business guides to various countries and Dhlakama was present for the negotiations preceding books on Zimbabwe and Nigeria. She is devoting the Pretoria Declaration, but did not appear in the her two years as a Rockefeller Fellow to in-country hall when the Declaration was read, and has not been studies of Mozambique's and Angola's relations present in any of the negotiations since. FRELIMO with the West since independence. questions whether he would respect any accord signed

CSIS Africa Notes, January 8, 1985