Sabre Squadron - Troop Definitions for the Vietnam War 1965-1975 Barrie Lovell Contents Introduction US Army and Marine Corps Australian Task Force Republic of Korea (ROK) Army and Marines Royal Thai Army Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) Military Forces Communist Forces Unit Strengths Appendix 1: Defending the Americal Division Sources and Notes Introduction The "American Phase" of the Vietnam War (aka The Second Indo-China War) started in the late 1950s and early 60's with the commitment of US money, equipment and personnel (in an advisory role), however it was not until 1965 that the US sent major ground forces to fight in Vietnam. At the same time other countries, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and Thailand also sent troops to support South Vietnam in it's fight against the communists. The "American Phase" ended in 1972 with the withdrawal of the last US combat troops. The Australians and Thai forces also left in 1972 while the Koreans remained until March the following year. From 1973 up until their final defeat in 1975 the South Vietnamese forces fought on alone. The ratings given to the various combatants during the Vietnam War (1965-1975) are based on information gleaned from a variety of sources, the primary one being "The History of the Vietnam War" by Charles T Kamps 1. This impressive single volume account of the war allocates all of the major combatant units into one of the following categories: Excellent Good Fair Poor Bad The author does not explain how these categories were arrived at but hints that they were based on "official" data and as such provide a baseline for categorising the armies within the Troop Definitions used in Sabre Squadron. They do not provide the whole story however and there is sufficient evidence available to question some of Kamps' ratings, particularly those relating to the US 23rd Americal Division. In Sabre Squadron terms I have classified the units as follows: Kamps' Rating Training Morale Excellent Expert Excellent Good Trained Superior Fair Trained Average Poor Trained Poor Bad Raw Poor or Dire This Sabre Squadron module based upon my interpretation of the historical background and understanding of the rules. Any historical errors are mine, however players are encouraged to use the wealth of available historical material to do their own research, particularly when examining actual battles where details of the units involved are known. Copyright Barrie Lovell October 2018 Sabre Squadron is Copyright © 2015 www.sabresquadron.com - All Rights Reserved 1 Kamps' book is probably the best single volume account of the war which looks at the overall history and is worth picking up a copy if only for the orders of battle given in the Appendices. However, he does support the idea that the Americal Division was some sort of perennial failure, and seems to tar all who served in it with the same brush, despite more modern evidence to the contrary. 1 US Army and Marine Corps While there can be no doubt that units such as the 1st Cavalry Division (aka "The Cav" or "The First Team"), the 173rd Airborne Brigade (aka "The Herd" and the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (aka "The Black Horse Regiment") were considered outstanding formations, the case of other US units is not so clear cut. There are a number of factors which should be considered when rating US units. Firstly, between 1965 and 1967 the formations deployed to Vietnam mostly comprised volunteer regular soldiers with a cadre of experienced career officers and ncos. In addition, during the early years the war was frequently looked on as an adventure and the young troops were often keen to have a chance to prove themselves on the battlefield. The American "can do" philosophy meant that motivation and morale were high. Secondly, elite units, such as the Cavalry and Airborne units, often had the pick of talented young officers and career ncos as well as volunteer soldiers who wished to serve in units in which they felt themselves part of an elite, and also in which they felt they had a better chance of survival. The US Marine Corps being the Marine Corps, naturally considered themselves an elite, regardless of what anyone else thought. Unit cohesion began to be affected towards the end of 1967, when heavy casualties during the preceding two years coupled with the rotation home of time expired troops (US army soldiers served 12 months in Vietnam, Marines served 13 months) meant that the disciplined and closely knit units which entered the war and 1965 and 1966 were becoming increasingly fragmented due to the turnover in personnel. Also about this time the US military found that it was unable to supply enough trained soldiers to keep the forces in Vietnam up to strength and the draft was increased to try and build up the numbers. This introduced a new generation of not so willing conscripts to the war (although in fact the majority of soldiers were still volunteers). In addition, again partly due to heavy losses amongst junior officers (Lieutenant to Captain ranks) and long service ncos, replacements were pushed through the system as quickly as possible, with a consequent lowering of both standards and ability which affected the combat effectiveness of the units. Many units at this time were already operating with front line companies at 50 or 60 percent of their authorised strength. Naturally the elite formations such as the airborne still managed to attract a higher percentage of volunteers and career officers and ncos. By 1969 the US Government was trying to find a way to extricate itself from the war and in June President Nixon announced troop reductions to reduce the forces stationed in Vietnam. This was a tacit acceptance that the war was no longer considered winnable and morale and discipline began to decline from this point. Generally, most of the problems associated with drug use, race relations, poor morale and lax discipline were more often to be found in the rear echelon units rather than the front line infantry and other combat troops, however this was not always the case and all units, including the elite formations suffered a decline in combat effectiveness. By 1971, nobody wanted to be the last soldier to die in Vietnam and units operated accordingly. Search and Destroy missions became "search and avoid" where units actively avoided contact with the enemy and "combat refusals" began to be reported in the media. One notable incident involved a company from the 1st Cavalry and occurred in front of a TV news camera crew. The worst case scenario - the Americal Division; myth, opinion and reality The US 23rd Infantry Division (11th, 196th and 198th Light Infantry Brigades), usually known as the Americal Division, has often been claimed as the worst formation to serve in Vietnam and is rated as Bad in the book by Kamps. Other authors, even those with Vietnam experience, have also rated the Division poorly, often accompanied by scathing comments about the lack of discipline, with one author even going so far as to describe the line companies of the 11th Brigade as little better than gangs of armed thugs. To justify this claim the most often quoted examples are generally: The actions of C Company, 1/20th Infantry and B Company 4/3rd Infantry at the My Lai Massacre on the 16th March 1968. The actions of C Company, and in particular the soldiers of Lt William Calley's platoon are the most notorious. The defence of Firebase Mary Ann in March 1971 where, so it is claimed, the defenders "cringed in their bunkers" while the enemy attacked the base. The alleged "rout" of the 1/46th Infantry and 2/1st Infantry at Kham Duc in 1968. The My Lai Massacre, which occurred within several months of the 11th Infantry Brigade deploying to Vietnam, was unarguably the result of poor training, inexperienced soldiers and ncos, and serious and inexcusable leadership 2 failures on the part of both officers and ncos within C Company itself and further up the chain of command. Tragically, the one man whose presence or intervention would possibly have prevented the massacre, SSgt George Cox - an experienced and respected platoon sergeant, was killed two days earlier by a booby trap, further weakening the leadership within Lt Calley's platoon.2 The attack on Firebase Mary Ann was not simply the result of any discernible incompetence on the part of the soldiers but involved a number of circumstances which, when combined, left the Firebase vulnerable at the time when the enemy attacked. With regard to the "rout" at Kham Duc, I have yet to find any firm evidence that the two US battalions "routed", however there are a number of eyewitness accounts which state that the Vietnamese CIDG soldiers did flee. When examining the historical record of the three brigades which formed the Americal Division the evidence shows that: 1. The Brigades initially performed poorly during the first few months of their deployment. This was not necessarily due to the quality or lack of training of the soldiers themselves, although the units did include a higher number of draftees and inexperienced junior ncos than was usually found in other units. This was however the result of being rushed into active service, coupled with a lack of a lack of higher level training at the company, battalion and brigade levels, and staff shortages and inexperience at the higher command levels which hindered operational abilities at all levels3. After six months these problems were generally resolved as the units and their parent formations settled down and gained practical experience in operations.