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Spotlight on Global Jihad (August 2-8, 2018)

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Spotlight on Global Jihad (August 2-8, 2018) רמה כ ז מל ו תשר מה ו ד י ע י ן ה ש ל מ ( ( למ מ"ל Spotlight on Global Jihad August 2 -8, 2018 Main events of the week On August 2, 2018, the Syrian army and its allies completed the campaign to take over southern Syria. The campaign lasted for nearly three weeks, during which the Syrian army took over the areas of Daraa and the Syrian Golan Heights. In most cases, the rebel organizations preferred not to fight, and most of their control areas fell into the hands of the Syrian regime through local surrender arrangements in which the Russians played a central role. ISIS tried to stop the army’s advance, but the balance of power, which was clearly against it, rendered the fighting ineffective and the Yarmouk Basin was taken over relatively easily. In order to ease the pressure on the Yarmouk Basin, the ISIS enclave northeast of As- Suwayda initiated a deadly showcase attack against the Druze population in the city of As- Suwayda and its rural area (July 25, 2018). In addition, an attack was carried out against the Khalkhalah military airfield (about 40 km north of As-Suwayda). These attacks demonstrated the increase in the power and self-confidence of ISIS operatives and their becoming a threat, which is liable to cast a shadow over the achievements of the Syrian regime in southern Syria. This is apparently the background for Syria’s decision to take over the ISIS enclave northeast of As-Suwayda, even at the expense of a certain delay in the campaign to take over the Idlib area (for which preparations continue). In early August, reinforcements (consisting of several divisions) were transferred to the area east of As-Suwayda. On August 5, 2018, after a brief period of organizing its forces, the Syrian army, with air support, launched a ground operation aimed at taking over the ISIS enclave. The Syrian forces are now operating within ISIS’s control area and the battles continue. This week, suicide bombing attacks continued in ISIS’s Khorasan Province in Afghanistan. In the city of Jalalabad, an attack was carried out against the Afghan government institutions (15 fatalities); in the city of Gardez (south of Kabul), an attack was 199-18 2 carried out against worshippers at a Shiite mosque (around 40 fatalities). On the other hand, the Afghan army recorded an achievement when over 150 ISIS operatives surrendered in the Jawzjan Province in northern Afghanistan. The background for the mass surrender was a month-long period of fighting in the area between the Taliban and ISIS, in which the Taliban recorded achievements (more than 150 ISIS operatives were reportedly killed by the Taliban and more than 130 were taken prisoner). Many ISIS operatives apparently preferred to surrender to the forces of the Afghan government and not to the Taliban. Russian involvement in Syria Statement by a senior Russian diplomat about the presence of Iranian forces in Syria On July 30-31, 2018, the tenth round of talks in the Syrian peace process (the Astana Process) was held in Sochi, Russia. The round of talks was attended by Russia, Iran and Turkey, the guarantor countries for the peace process. The Russian delegation was headed by the Russian President’s Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev, who was interviewed by the Russian media at the end of the meetings. In the interview, Lavrentiev addressed the presence of Iranian forces in Syria, among other things. Lavrentiev said that the Iranian forces had retreated from the Syrian-Israeli border and that there were no Shiite militias in the area. He stressed, however, that there was a possibility that there were a number of Iranian advisors in the ranks of the Syrian army (located in southern Syria). In addition, Lavrentiev said that there was no [Iranian] heavy equipment and weapons, which could pose a threat to Israel, within 85 km of the Syrian-Israeli border. He noted that these statements were based on an agreement between the Russian and Iranian representatives, following the end of the operation against “terrorist operatives” in the area, and that there was no longer a need for the Iranian military presence in southern Syria. According to him, during the talks in Sochi, it was claimed that efforts should be made to fight against ISIS in other areas of Syria, such as the areas of Deir ez-Zor and Albukamal (TASS News Agency, August 1, 2018). 199-18 3 Right: The 85-kilometer range from the Israeli border, where Lavrentiev says there are no [Iranian] heavy equipment and weapons that could pose a threat to Israel (Syrian NORS Institute for Strategic Studies, August 2, 2018). Left: Russian President’s Special Envoy to Syria Alexander Lavrentiev, during the round of talks (Russian Foreign Ministry’s Twitter account, August 1, 2018) Syria End of the campaign in the Syrian Golan Heights Takeover of southern Syria by the Syrian army: Areas taken over by the Syrian army through local surrender agreements are marked in blue; Areas where (mostly low intensity) fighting took place are marked in purple; Areas which were under Syrian control even before the beginning of the campaign are marked in red (Khotwa, July 31, 2018) 199-18 4 Resumption of the UN forces’ activity on the Syrian-Israeli border under Russian sponsorship Sergei Rudskoy, Chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian General Staff, said at a press conference that conditions were ripe for the resumption of the activity of the UN observation forces, which are deployed in the buffer zone between Israel and Syria, in accordance with the UN resolution from 1974. Rudskoy announced that on August 2, 2018, the UN forces, accompanied by the Russian Military Police, had visited the buffer zone for the first time in for six years.1 He added that in order to prevent “provocations” against UN positions, eight positions of the Russian Military Police would be set up along the Bravo Line (the Syrian border of the buffer zone). According to Rudskoy, when the situation in the area stabilizes, those positions will be handed over to the Syrian army (website of the Russian Defense Ministry, August 2, 2018). Right: Bullet-proof vehicle of the Russian Military Police leading a convoy of UN vehicles near the Syrian-Israeli border. Left: UN vehicles near the Syrian-Israeli border (Al-Quneitra Al-Youm, August 2, 2018) Sergei Kuralenko, deputy commander of the Russian forces in Syria, reported that units of the Russian Military Police assisted the UN forces in reopening the Quneitra crossing, which has been closed for the past six years (TASS, August 3, 2018). He noted that on August 3, 2018, the UN forces, assisted by the Russian Military Police, managed to move from Syria into Israeli territory for the first time since the beginning of the civil war in Syria (website of Zvezda Channel, owned by the Russian Defense Ministry, August 3, 2018). 1 The activity of the UNDOF forces in the buffer zone was stopped in 2012 for fear for their safety due to the Syrian Civil War. 199-18 5 Right: Syrian army soldiers opening the Quneitra crossing, with the Syrian flag waved above. Left: Members of the Russian Military Police, the UN and Syrian army soldiers near the Quneitra crossing (Al-Quneitra Al-Youm, August 2, 2018) Sergei Kuralenko also said that coordination was taking place with the UN with the aim of manning once again UNDOF positions in the Quneitra Province. According to Kuralenko, all UNDOF forces are due to return to their positions in late August 2018. He added that within a few days, a “settlement center” would be established in the Quneitra Province. At the center, Russian officers will try to solve problems of the residents in the “liberated villages” with the relevant elements (Al-Watan, July 30, 2018). Completion of the takeover of the Yarmouk Basin from ISIS On August 2, 2018, the Syrian regime announced that the Syrian army had completed the deployment of its forces in the area of the Yarmouk Basin (SANA, August 2, 2018). A day earlier, on August 1, 2018, the Syrian army took over the village of Qusayr, ISIS’s last remaining stronghold in the southern Syrian Golan Heights (Al-Manar, July 31, 2018). According to reports, only a few dozen ISIS operatives remained out of 1,000-1,500 who had previously held the Yarmouk Basin area. The remaining operatives are probably hiding near the Yarmouk Basin, in Syrian and Jordanian territory (Reuters, August 2, 2018). The army forces are searching the tri-border region to locate ISIS squads remaining in the area (Enab Baladi, August 5, 2018). 199-18 6 Right: Syrian army soldiers making the victory sign with the Yarmouk Basin in the background. Left: Syrian army soldiers looking at the Al-Wahda Dam in the Yarmouk Basin (SANA, August 2, 2018) The IDF kills an ISIS squad On the evening of August 1, 2018, an IDF aircraft attacked a squad of seven ISIS operatives in the southern Syrian Golan Heights. The operatives were seen walking at a distance of 200 meters from the border fence. The Israeli army soldiers found in their possession five Kalashnikov assault files and vests, with IEDs and hand grenades. In the ITIC's assessment, it was an ISIS squad whose operatives fled from the Syrian army rather than heading to carry out a terrorist attack in Israel. IMAGE Right: IDF forces searching the area where seven bodies of ISIS operatives were found in the southern Syrian Golan Heights. Left: Kalashnikov assault rifles, vest and equipment of ISIS operatives who were killed in the IDF attack (IDF Spokesperson’s Office, August 2, 2018) ISIS operatives killed by the Jordanian army On July 31 and August 1, 2018, the Jordanian army killed several ISIS operatives who had fled from the Syrian army and were getting close to the border between Syria and Jordan.
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