The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Azerbaijan's Global South
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Beyond Eurasian Mediation: The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict and Azerbaijan’s Global South Diplomacy Jason E. Strakes Visiting Research Fellow Foreign Policy Analysis Department Center for Strategic Studies (SAM) PRELIMINARY DRAFT—do not cite without permission of author 1 Paper prepared for presentation at the ISA Global South Caucus Conference, Singapore Management University, 8-10 January 2015 Table of Contents Introduction .............................................................................................................................................. 3 Conceptual and Theoretical Foundations .............................................................................................. 7 Evolution of the Minsk Process: From Conference to Hierarchy ..................................................... 13 Azerbaijan and Global South Diplomacy: A New Approach to Nagorno-Karabakh? ................... 22 NAM as an Alternative to European Institutions ..................................................................................... 24 NAM and Azerbaijan’s Extraregional Diplomacy................................................................................... 27 Azerbaijan’s Participation in Other Global South Institutions ................................................................ 30 “Feedback Loop”: Potential Impacts on Conflict Resolution ............................................................ 32 Conclusion and Policy Recommendations ........................................................................................... 36 2 Introduction In recent years, the foreign policy establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan has increasingly expressed its dissatisfaction with the structure and performance of the OSCE Minsk Group, which remains the primary institutional arrangement designated to implement the resolution process in the Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict since its formation in December 1994.1 Yet, while in previous decades this issue has most often been considered from the perspective of the successes or failures of European approaches to post-Soviet regional conflict management, contemporary conditions may reflect a broader and longer-standing dynamic within the international system. It is arguable that doubts among Azerbaijani policymakers regarding the legitimacy of the Co-Chairs (U.S., Russian Federation and France) exhibit certain parallels with the classical Third Worldist critique of global institutions such as the UN Security Council (UNSC)2: given the significant political representation of major Armenian diasporas in the former, and the lack of implementation of four previous resolutions supporting the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan (822, 853, 874 and 8843) by the latter, both are perceived by certain governments as a permanent membership dominated by major powers that repeatedly vote in favor of national or vested interests (the “veto power”) rather than upholding impartiality and equality under international law, and maintain recourse to the threat of armed intervention to impose peace upon smaller states.4 In accordance with the “balanced foreign policy” (balanslaşdırılmış xarici siyasət) doctrine introduced by second post-independence President Heydar 1 CSCE Budapest Document 1994: Towards a Genuine Partnership in a New Era, Budapest Decisions: Regional Issues: Intensification of CSCE action in relation to the Nagorno-Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, pp. 5-6. http://www.osce.org/mc/39554?download=true 2 A recent household survey of public opinion on foreign policy in Azerbaijan revealed that out of 1,502 respondents, 71.2 percent have a negative perception of the OSCE Minsk Group, while 53.6 percent expressed the same view of the UNSC. See “20. Siz beynelxalq ictimaiyyetin Qarabag probleminin hallinde rolunu nece qiymetlendirirsiniz (How do you assess the role of the international community in handling the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict)?”, in Rauf Garagozov and Sahib Jaffarov eds. Foreign policy of Azerbaijan Republic in public opinion: sociological survey. Unpublished account, SAM, 2014. 3 Kamal Makili-Aliyev, Nagorno-Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in International Legal Documents and International Law, Center for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Fall 2013, pp 76-82. 4 Jacek Kugler, “Political Conflict, War, and Peace,” in Ada W. Finifter, ed Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993, p. 488; Rethinking International Institutions: A Global South Agenda, Centre for Global Governance and Policy, Jindal School of International Affairs & Jindal Global Law School, O.P. Jindal Global University, pp. 13-14, 17-19. 3 Aliyev in the early 1990s5, on 25 May 2011, Azerbaijan became the fourth former Soviet republic (following Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Belarus) to enter full membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has often been conventionally regarded as an ineffectual relic of the Cold War era. As such, the official justification extended by Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov at the NAM 16th Ministerial Conference and Commemorative Meeting in Bali, Indonesia was to establish an auxiliary platform for conflict resolution, as well as to promote its position within wider international forums, especially the UN organization.6 As a decision which challenged the popularly held contention among observers of Azerbaijan’s fundamentally “pro-Western” and “Euro-Atlantic” orientation7, it has been suggested that this action motivated the joint statement by the presidents of the Co-Chair countries at the G-8 summit in Deauville, France on the need for a renewed commitment to achieving a final settlement.8 The successful campaign for a non-permanent UNSC seat representing the Group of Eastern European States from 2012 to 2013 is further indicative of the above objectives. By gaining an unprecedented position within the global status quo among former Soviet republics (also sought by Kyrgyzstan in recent years9), Baku was able to extend its presence to entirely new issue areas, such as potential contributions to humanitarian aid and security in the Great Lakes subregion of Africa.10 Yet, these activities have followed a lengthy precedent of extraregional diplomacy and participation in 5 For an intensive analysis of this approach, see Jason E. Strakes, “Situating the ‘Balanced Foreign Policy’: The Role of System Structure in Azerbaijan's Multi-Vector Diplomacy”, Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 15:1, pp. 37-67. 6 “Elmar Mammadyarov: “The Non-Aligned Movement will be an additional platform for delivering Azerbaijan’s fair position on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to the wider international community”, Azeri Press Agency, 27 May 2011. http://en.apa.az/print/148184 7 One such publication suggests that the country exhibits greater identification with Continental Europe than even EU candidate Turkey, as the absence of a ‘Kemalist legacy’ and the experience of Czarist and Soviet colonization ostensibly imbued its elites and society with Western cultural norms (i.e. secularism and literacy campaigns), while in contrast to popular support for authoritarianism in contemporary Russia, public opinion surveys purportedly demonstrate democratic values akin to those of Central European countries. See Svante E. Cornell, Azerbaijan since Independence, M. E. Sharpe, 2011, pp. 300, 425-426. 8 Paul Goble, “Azerbaijan Joins the Non-Aligned Movement”, Azerbaijan in the World: ADA Biweekly Newsletter, Vol. 4, No. 11 (1 June 2011). http://biweekly.ada.edu.az/issues/vol4no11/20110610060101177.html. 2011. 9 UN-OHRLLS, Report of the 10th Annual Ministerial Meeting of Landlocked Developing Countries, United Nations Headquarters New York, 23 September 2011, pp. 8-9. <http://unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/LLDC%20Documents/10th%20ministerial%20meeting%202011/Report%20of%20the% 2010th%20LLDCs%20ministerial%20meeting.pdf> 10 “Azerbaijan’s successful journey as a non-permanent member of the U.N. security council”, The Washington Times, Tuesday, December 10, 2013. 4 institutions related to South-South cooperation in which it has received substantial support, including the Organization for Islamic Cooperation (OIC), which has passed a total of 22 resolutions opposing Armenian occupation between 1993 and 201411, and the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) and International Conference of Asian Political Parties (ICAPP), which in addition to NAM all produced declarations upholding Azerbaijan’s territorial sovereignty in 2012.12 These were followed most recently by a statement adopted at the 4th Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA) in Shanghai, People’s Republic of China (PRC) in May 2014, which identified the conflict as a threat to international security and called upon the Minsk Group to intensify its efforts at peaceful resolution.13 The perception of a shift in Baku’s diplomacy away from an emphasis on engagement with the U.S. and Europe is reinforced by evidence derived from in-depth interviews with 54 Azerbaijani elites in 2001 and 2009 that revealed mistrust with the conduct of Western governments as well as Russia and Turkey after the signature of the Armenian protocols, which has possibly motivated a search for alternative partners in pressing its case in Nagorno- Karabakh.14 However, these developments have been largely overlooked due to the overwhelming preoccupation of observers with the role of Euro-Atlantic institutions in addressing security