Fang's and Tang's Appropriations of Huayan Thought and 'Scientism'

CHAPTER 5 Fang’s and Tang’s Appropriations of Huayan Thought and ‘Scientism’

As Jennifer Oldstone-Moore observes, the present Chinese Government now considers Confucianism a tool to complement ‘scientism’.1 I argue that Fang and Tang suggested a similar project nearly half a century ago, and their expe- rience is undoubtedly worthy of attention. Thus far, this study has discussed the historical context in which Thomé H. Fang and Tang Junyi developed their own ideas, as well as the characteristics of contemporary ‘scientism’ and those scholars’ interpretations of Huayan thought. All this helps answer the research questions I set at the beginning of this study, which are: first, why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth-century China; second, why Chinese thinkers at that time tended to go back to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas; and third, why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, in particular, to respond to ‘scientism’. In what follows, based on the findings of the previous chapters, I will discuss these questions section by section, aiming at evalu- ating the role Huayan thought played in both Fang’s and Tang’s response to ‘scientism’.

5.1 ‘Scientism’ as an Issue—From the Point of View of ‘Ti’ and ‘Yong’

The background to the development of ‘scientism’ in early twentieth-century China becomes clearer if we consider the historical problems facing the coun- try from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. As I discussed at the beginning of section 2.2, there have been some excellent studies on the historical events of that period. However, what is needed most for the purposes of this study is a theoretical framework to help provide a better explanation for these events. In brief, by using the concepts of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’, which I believe provide an appropriate theoretical framework, I aim at considering why rather than how ‘scientism’ became a focal issue at that time.

1 Jennifer Oldstone-Moore, ‘Scientism and Modern Confucianism’, in Kenneth J. Hammond and Jeffrey L. Richey ed., The Sage Returns: Confucian Revival in Contemporary China (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2015), pp. 39–63.

In Chapter 2, I emphasised that the history of science in China can be traced back to as early as the fourth century BC, while China’s encounter with Western science can be traced back to the seventeenth century. I therefore argued that science was not a new issue for the Chinese people in the early twentieth century. The aims of both Fang’s and Tang’s theories were thus not to reject scientific investigation as such but to reject ‘scientism’. In fact, we can think about the question of why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth- century China from a different perspective, namely, by asking why ‘scientism’ was not an issue in China before the twentieth century. In my opinion, this reorientation is necessary because it not only retains the original meaning of the research question but also helps to answer it more accurately. When discussing the Chinese attitude towards Western learning during the time of the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860–1894), I cited Li Hongzhang’s well-known criticism, arguing that to many Chinese people at that time, Western learning was a mixture of ‘strange techniques and tricky crafts’ (Chi. qiji yinqiao 奇技淫巧). This demeaning phrase shows, on the one hand, how negative the Chinese attitude was towards Western learning but, on the other hand, it indicates the perceived role of Western learning in China immediately prior to the twentieth century. As noted in section 2.1, while ‘ti’ is generally regarded as body, substance, principle or condition, ‘yong’ is seen as function, phenomenon or approach. I would therefore argue that, by using the words ‘technique’ and ‘craft’, Chinese people, during the time of the Self-Strengthening Movement, saw Western learning as a kind of function or approach. That is, Western learning was considered as ‘yong’, a point supported by the leading ideology of the Movement, that of ‘Chinese learning for funda- mental principles (ti), Western learning for practical applications (yong)’, as I discussed in section 2.2.1. However, considering Western learning as ‘yong’ only may contradict the important characteristic of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ that I have stressed throughout this study: that they are inseparable. In fact, in Chapter 2, I referred to the ideas of Yan Fu and Wang Fuzhi, which help sharpen our understanding of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’. As Yan argued, an animal with a cow’s ‘ti’ should not have the ‘yong’ of a horse, implying that ‘ti’ deter- mines ‘yong’. According to Wang, however, the content of ‘ti’ is also defined by the ‘yong’. Thus, not only does ‘ti’ determine ‘yong’ but ‘yong’ helps to define ‘ti’. As I will discuss below, this understanding of ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ helps explain why twentieth-century Chinese thinkers tended to return to ancient Chinese thought to develop their ideas, and why Fang and Tang appropriated Huayan thought, in particular, to respond to ‘scientism’. Returning to the discussion of why ‘scientism’ became an issue in twentieth- century China: Chinese thinkers, acknowledging that ‘ti’ and ‘yong’ are not