Legal Digest mately warranted further inquiry, but did not justify affirmed the decision of the Boone circuit court al- disqualification without substantiation. lowing a competent defendant to enter into a plea Discussion agreement to forgo a jury trial and sentencing and volunteer for the death penalty. The Su- The importance of this case involves matters rele- preme Court examined the legal standards for com- vant to autonomy in decision-making. It affirms that petence to waive counsel, to enter a guilty plea, and courts must respect the decisions that individuals to seek a punishment of death. make in choosing who would make their decisions in the event of incapacity and in retaining counsel of Facts of the Case their choice to represent them. Individual wishes are In August 2002, Marco Allen Chapman entered generally upheld as long as there is no suspicion of the home of Carolyn Marksberry and stabbed her lack of capacity. However, when a named conserva- and her three young children, resulting in the death tor or counsel has an apparent personal interest in of two of the children. Mr. Chapman told authorities controlling the incapacitated individual’s assets, such that he “bound Ms. Marksberry with a vacuum conflicts of interest may be considered in a legal chal- cleaner chord and gagged her with duct tape.” He lenge to the ability of a conservator, guardian, or then stabbed her and the children. When arrested, attorney to act in the best interests of the individual, Mr. Chapman asked a policeman to “do me a favor especially when that individual’s competence is in and put a bullet in my forehead.” The trial court question. In this case, the court also affirmed the ordered the first of three competency evaluations at importance of clearly defined prioritization of parties the Kentucky Correctional Psychiatric Center who may be in line to become a conservator of an (KCPC) during pretrial proceedings. Dr. Steven incapacitated individual. Although trial courts retain Free, a psychologist at KCPC, testified that, despite the discretion to bypass individuals with priority if having a history of mental health-related problems, necessary, this decision again must be based on a Mr. Chapman was competent to stand trial. “firm factual foundation,” and not merely suspicions Mr. Chapman wrote the trial court asking to “dis- of conflict of interest. This case reflects the legal sys- miss his attorneys, waive a jury trial and sentencing, tem’s desire to ensure appropriate legal representa- plead guilty to all charges, and be sentenced to tion and transfer of decision-making authority. death,” prompting a second competency evaluation. Dr. Free believed that Mr. Chapman was competent but thought that his legal choices might change with treatment. The trial court ordered the defendant to Competence to Plead Guilty KCPC for 30 days of treatment and evaluation. A and Seek the Death Penalty few weeks later, in a third competency hearing, Dr. Free found Mr. Chapman competent. The trial court Casey Helmkamp, MD Fellow in Forensic Psychiatry ruled that he was competent to “fire his attorneys, to plead guilty, and to seek death.” Over objections Hal S. Wortzel, MD from Mr. Chapman and his former attorneys, the Forensic Psychiatry Faculty trial court appointed the same lawyers as standby Richard Martinez, MD, MH counsel. At sentencing, the trial court acknowledged Director, Forensics Program receiving a psychological report delivered by standby University of Colorado Denver Health Sciences counsel. It had considered psychological evidence in Center determining competency on all three occasions, but Denver Health Medical Center did not consider it as mitigating evidence, citing Mr. Denver, CO Chapman’s choice not to present mitigating evi- A Competent Defendant May Enter Into a dence. He was sentenced to death. Plea Agreement to Forgo a Jury Trial and The Department of Public Advocacy filed an ap- Sentencing and Volunteer for the peal on Mr. Chapman’s behalf raising numerous Death Penalty claims: (1) the death penalty is unconstitutional; (2) In Chapman v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. LEXIS and electrocution violate the Eighth 178 (Ky. 2007), the Supreme Court of Kentucky Amendment; (3) Kentucky’s method of proportion-

Volume 36, Number 3, 2008 409 Legal Digest ality review of death sentences is unconstitutional; ceedings against one or to participate rationally in (4) his death sentence was arbitrary and dispropor- one’s own defense.” The United States Supreme tionate; (5) the trial court erred by requiring the same Court has rejected the notion that competence to attorneys he had already fired to serve as standby plead guilty or to waive the right to counsel should be counsel; (6) the trial court erred in refusing to con- held to a higher standard than competency to stand sider mitigating evidence; (7) the trial court should trial (Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993)). have used a more stringent competency standard Since Mr. Chapman was found competent under given his mental health and abuse history; and (8) he Kentucky law, he was competent to plead guilty and should not be permitted to commit “suicide by seek the death penalty. The court then considered court.” the question of whether a defendant may plead guilty to a capital offense to seek the death penalty: “There Ruling and Reasoning is nothing inherently unconstitutional about a per- The Kentucky Supreme Court cited prior rulings son deciding to take responsibility for his or her crim- concluding that Kentucky’s death penalty statute is inal misconduct without having first undergone a constitutional (Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 full-blown trial.” The court argued that adhering to a S.W.3d 22, 55 (Ky. 2004)). Similarly, repeated rul- defendant’s choice honors personal dignity and con- ings have held that neither lethal injection nor elec- cluded that safeguards such as “ensuring that the de- trocution violate the Eighth Amendment (Wheeler v. fendant is competent, that a factual basis exists to Commonwealth, 121 S.W.3d 173, 186 (Ky. 2003)). support the imposition of the death penalty, and our The court upheld their process for proportionality proportionality review—amply protect the state’s in- review as constitutional (Sanders v. Commonwealth, terests.” The court noted that a trial court is not 801 S.W.2d 665, 683 (Ky. 1990)). After conducting obligated to accept plea agreements, regardless of the required proportionality review (Ky. Rev. Stat. whether the plea calls for the death penalty. In re- Ann. § 532.075(3) (2007)), the court stated that Mr. viewing the trial court’s acceptance of Mr. Chap- Chapman’s death sentence was not disproportionate. man’s plea, it upheld the death sentence because it He had “brutally stabbed two innocent children to was based on appropriateness for the crimes, and not death,” and the court found that ample evidence met on the defendant’s wishes or plea agreement. Because the statutory aggravating factors. of the careful scrutiny required in accepting such a The court considered the matter of a pro se defen- plea, the court found that it is not possible for a dant’s having standby counsel and determined that defendant to use to commit “sui- the trial court had a right to appoint standby counsel cide by court.” despite his objections (Martinez v. Court of Appeal of California, 528 U.S. 152 (2000)) and found no error Discussion in appointing the same lawyers. The court next con- The United States Supreme Court has established sidered the question of mitigating evidence. The trial that a defendant may not be tried unless competent court had refused to consider a psychological report (Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966)), with the delivered before sentencing as mitigating evidence, “sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer because it was improperly submitted without the ap- with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” proval of the defendant. The Kentucky Supreme and “a rational as well as a factual understanding of Court supported the trial court’s ruling that once a the proceedings against him” (Dusky v. United States, defendant is validly proceeding pro se, standby coun- 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). In Godinez v. Moran, the U.S. sel may not “override that pro se defendant’s wishes as Supreme Court ruled that there is no difference in to what evidence, if any, will be presented on behalf the competency standard at any point in a trial. The of the defense.” Supreme Court of Kentucky closely followed this Next came the question of whether Mr. Chapman ruling in their decision about the standard of com- was competent to plead guilty and seek execution. petency Mr. Chapman required when entering a plea Under Kentucky law (Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § of guilty and waiving his right to counsel. 504.060(4) (2005)), incompetent to stand trial Although Godinez v. Moran has been determina- means that “[the defendant lacks the] capacity to tive in the area of competency standards for various appreciate the nature and consequences of the pro- rights, the question of having additional safeguards

410 The Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Legal Digest in capital cases is interesting. Should there be greater alty. The presentation of mitigating evidence may be protections for waivers when the defendant’s life is viewed as more than just the defendant’s optional on the line? In the Chapman appeal, it was argued right, but a vital safeguard in protecting the state’s that Kentucky should adopt the Arkansas statute that interest in assuring that all death sentences are ap- holds that a defendant charged with capital is plied in a consistent, nonarbitrary, and just manner. prohibited from: . . . waiving either a jury trial on the issue of guilt or the right to have his sentence determined by a jury unless (1) the court determines the waiver is voluntary and was made Mitigating Evidence in a Death without compulsion or coercion, (2) the death penalty has been waived by the State, and (3) the State has assented to Penalty Case the defendant’s waiver of his right to a jury trial, and such waiver has been approved by the trial court [Newman v. Gregory Kellermeyer, MD State, 106 S.W.3d 438, pp 456–57 (Ark. 2003)]. Fellow in Forensic Psychiatry Another interesting notion raised is that a defen- Hal S. Wortzel, MD dant may use the death penalty to commit “suicide Forensic Psychiatry Faculty by court.” In rejecting this argument, the Kentucky Richard Martinez, MD, MH Supreme Court found that because Mr. Chapman’s Director, Forensics Program plea was “competently, knowingly, intelligently, and University of Colorado Denver Health Sciences voluntarily made,” and because the death penalty was Center not a “disproportionate sentence for Chapman’s hei- Denver Health Medical Center nous offenses” (Chapman, p 58), it is not suicide by Denver, CO court. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Lam- A Knowing and Intelligent Waiver Is Not bert wrote that the “imposition of the death penalty Required to Waive Mitigating Evidence in is the ultimate expression of state outrage for criminal Capital Case conduct” and therefore, “the wishes of the defen- dant, whether motivated by sincere remorse, desire In Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933 (2007), to escape life imprisonment, or to assert control, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the waiver of miti- should play no part in the penalty determination” gating evidence by a capital defendant and the result- (Chapman, p 71). In this light, the defendant’s mo- ing death sentence. The Court found no requirement tivation and his intention to proceed with a death for a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to sentence is divorced from the imposition of the present mitigating evidence and found no error in sentence. defense counsel’s failure to investigate and prepare Finally, the Kentucky Supreme Court considered such evidence before sentencing. the right to present mitigating evidence and upheld Facts of the Case that a competent pro se defendant may refuse this Jeffrey Landrigan was convicted in Arizona of sec- right. However, this ruling seems contrary to that in ond-degree murder in 1982 and assault and battery Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), in which the with a deadly weapon in 1986. After escaping from U. S. Supreme Court argued that certain safeguards prison, he was convicted of theft, second-degree bur- must be in place to prevent implementation of the glary, and felony murder in 1989. At sentencing, his death penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner. defense counsel tried to present mitigating evidence Specifically, the majority argued: consisting of testimony from his ex-wife and birth . . . [T]hese procedures require the jury to consider the cir- mother, both of whom refused to testify at his re- cumstances of the crime and the criminal before it recom- quest. Defense counsel advised her client against this mends sentence. No longer can a Georgia jury...reach a finding of the defendant’s guilt and then, without guidance position. When the court asked him if he had in- or direction, decide whether he should live or die....Are structed his lawyer not to present mitigating evidence there any special facts about this defendant that mitigate and if he understood the implications of refusing against imposing capital punishment? [Gregg, p 197]. such evidence, he answered affirmatively. The miti- In the Gregg decision, the U.S. Supreme Court em- gating testimony available would have demonstrated phasized the need to know about the defendant via that his birth mother used drugs and alcohol, that he mitigating evidence before imposing the death pen- had abused drugs and alcohol, and that he had been

Volume 36, Number 3, 2008 411