Anti- Weaponry: Keeping American Safe and Sound

Brian Britt August 2, 2020

Executive Summary

Satellites are foundational to American interests and capabilities across a variety of industries. Anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons that disable or destroy satellites pose threats to the U.S. and the international community generally. American space systems planners should harden and our protect satellite systems against the threat of ASAT weapons by increasing system redundancy and satellite radiation hardening, establishing “Do-Not-Orbit” zones, equipping reconnaissance and intelligence satellites with optical protectors, and ensuring satellites are equipped with sufficient maneuverability capabilities to avoid known threats. While the U.S. maintains preeminence in ASAT weaponry, it should construct international norms and pursue diplomatic efforts to prevent further ASAT tests, head off an ASAT arms race, and hinder the proliferation of ASAT weapons across the globe.

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Satellites are indispensable to modern life. They represent the backbone of commerce, navigation, entertainment, and our national security. “Navigation systems like the Navstar Global Positioning Systems,” made possible by satellite constellations, are used by “civilians and the military for navigation on land, sea, and air.” Credit card machines, automated teller machines, gas pumps, and video conferencing services rely on satellites. Accurate weather and climate monitoring are only possible through satellites. Much of space science progress in recent decades can be attributed to powerful research satellites, like the Hubble Telescope.1 Satellites allow the U.S. to project its force across the globe, maintain military dominance, and collect intelligence on malicious activities.

Why ASAT Weaponry Matters

Some claim ASAT weapons pose little real threat to U.S. capabilities. Pavel Podvig of the Russian Nuclear Forces Project explains that “any nation whose security could be significantly compromised” by ASAT technologies would work to reduce its vulnerabilities:

"There are clear ways of doing that. You go to distributed capability, you go to smaller satellites, you go to redundancy. And in the end, you can shoot down a satellite, but so what?" he said. "In that sense, I'm an optimist. I do believe that these [ASAT] capabilities will not be used, just because I do believe that they don't give you much in terms of military capability."2

Podvig’s language is misleading. It is indeed possible that the use of an ASAT weapon on an American satellite could have no impact on our capabilities. But such an action could be considered a provocation or act of war and could lead to larger military engagements. The use of an ASAT weapon could still trigger conflict, even if it had no direct impact on American capabilities. And in reality, shooting down a satellite could still do the United States harm amid an engagement. Many of our space systems “have designs that date back to the Cold War.” Too many satellites contributing to American constellations today are too vulnerable to attacks. Damage to American satellite systems could cripple our command and control capabilities. Counter to Podvig’s claim, most space system architectures lack ideal levels of redundancy.3 "The presumption that space assets will always be available" is foundational in current military .4 Not should the concept of an ASAT attack be limited to attacks on satellites. Ground stations that act as links between satellites and Earth are vulnerable, too. Nations lacking the ability to attack satellites directly could still hinder our ability to communicate with satellites through conventional attacks on ground stations.

1 What are satellites used for? | Union of Concerned Scientists. (2015, January 15). https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/what-are-satellites-used 2 Wall, M. (2020, April 30). Don’t panic about ’s recent anti-satellite test, experts say. Space.Com. https://www.space.com/russia-anti-satellite-weapon-fears-overblown.html 3 Air Force . (2020). Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures [White Paper]. Air Force Space Command. https://fas.org/spp/military/resiliency.pdf 4 Allen, T. (2005, December 16). Thinking about . https://fas.org/spp/military/program/asat/at_960422.htm

3 Desert Storm’s success brought our reliance on space systems into painful relief for our adversaries.5 It is all but certain that our adversaries have developed plans of attack to disable our space systems and/or our ability to access and use them. Whether these plans would be effective during a conflict should not be left to chance. Threats to satellites are threats to the industries and activities which rely on them. ASAT weapons give countries the ability to shoot down, disable, or destroy satellites, and therefore damage our capacity to conduct necessary activities in each industry. Satellite architectures and the degree to which U.S. interests rely on them remain a weak point in our defenses. Even if ASAT weapons are never used in a hostile manner, the use of these weapons in tests poses a significant threat to American interests and the international community. ASAT tests in space threaten to activate the Kessler Syndrome. The Kessler Syndrome stipulates that as the density of particles in Low Earth orbit (LEO) increases, the likelihood of collisions between these particles increases. Each collision results in the production of more debris pieces, thus increasing the likelihood of further collisions. The theory stipulates that the growth in LEO debris would grow exponentially, "even if a zero net input rate in the catalogue is maintained.”6 LEO, over the decades, has become increasingly densely populated by commercial, scientific, military, and intelligence satellites launched by a variety of nations and organizations across the globe. Some of these satellites have collided. Others have been victims of kinetic ASAT tests. In either case, these events have produced hundreds, if not thousands, of smaller debris pieces that have contributed to the rise in density of particles occupying LEO. Each subsequent ASAT test could significantly push forward the Kessler timeline. And as LEO density and thus object collisions increase in the region, satellites that support U.S. interests, be they commercial, scientific, or security, are increasingly threatened. The U.S. and the international community have a marked interest in preventing further ASAT tests that produce debris in LEO.

Relevant ASAT Testing History

To date, four countries have tested ASAT weapons: The United States, Russia, China, and . For the scope of this paper, cyberattacks will not be considered ASAT weapons. The United States and the Soviet Union were responsible for early ASAT tests. Original ASAT systems were constructed from ballistic defense (BMD) systems using imprecise endowed with nuclear capabilities. The United States was first to test ASAT weaponry in 1959, successfully launching a direct-assent “‘air-launched ’” from a “B-47 ” within 4 miles of a targeted satellite.7 8 Later, high altitude nuclear testing by both the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrated how radiation and high-speed electrons emitted in an electromagnetic pulse from nuclear weapons detonated at extremely high altitudes could disrupt satellite electronics. The 1962 Starfish Prime test, for example, damaged and eventually disabled

5 Air Force Space Command. (2020). Resiliency and Disaggregated Space Architectures [White Paper]. Air Force Space Command. https://fas.org/spp/military/resiliency.pdf 6 Kessler, D., Johnson, N., Liou, J.-C., & Matney, M. (2010). The Kessler Syndrome: Implications to Future Space operations. American Astronautical Society. 7 Parsch, A. (2005). WS-199. Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles. http://designation- systems.net/dusrm/app4/ws-199.html 8 George, J. (2019, March 27). History of anti-satellite weapons: US tested 1st ASAT missile 60 years ago. The Week. https://www.theweek.in/news/sci-tech/2019/03/27/history-anti-satellite-weapon-us-asat-missile.html

4 at least six satellites.9 In the mid-1960s, the Soviet Union tested a dedicated co-orbital ASAT system that was designed to “approach a satellite within one or two orbits” and then “detonate an explosive that would damage the target with shrapnel,” declaring the system operational in 1973.10 The U.S. successfully tested an air-launch kinetic kill missile called the ASM-135, nicknamed the Flying Tomato Can, in 1985. The missile was fired from an F-15A at “38,100 feet” and reached its target at roughly “345 miles above the Pacific Ocean.”11 The late 1980s brought reports of a Soviet ASAT to the attention to American force planners, spurring the U.S. Navy to develop an ASAT ground-based laser that successfully dazzled or damaged a satellite’s at 261 miles above sea level in 1997. The early 2000s brought developments of ASAT jamming and anti-jamming capabilities. “The United States deployed the ground-based Counter Communications System” (CCS) in 2002, thought its capabilities remain largely unknown.12 Russia is thought to possess a similar system. In 2007, China used a “mobile, ground-launched missile” to destroy one of its satellites "by direct impact.”13 In 2008, the U.S. successfully tested a sea-launched BMD SM-3 kinetic kill missile on an “an inoperative U.S. satellite.”14 India announced it had completed the most recent ASAT weapons test to date in 2019, using a ground-based “ballistic missile defense interceptor, the Prithvi Delivery Vehicle Mark-II,” to kinetically kill one of its satellites, making it the fourth country to demonstrate ASAT capability.15

Who Has What

To understand the risk posed to U.S. space architectures and where the U.S. stands among its competitors, it’s important to understand which countries have what weapons.

China

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made it clear they consider space to be “‘commanding point for the information battlefield.’” “PLA writings emphasize the necessity of ‘destroying, damaging, and interfering with the enemy's reconnaissance ... and communications

9 Plait, P. (2012, July 9). The 50th anniversary of starfish prime: The nuke that shook the world. Discover Magazine. https://www.discovermagazine.com/the-sciences/the-50th-anniversary-of-starfish-prime-the-nuke-that-shook-the- world 10 A history of anti-satellite programs | Union of Concerned Scientists. (2020, March 1). https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/history-anti-satellite-programs 11 Grier, P. (2009, February). The flying tomato can. Airforce-Magazine.Com. https://web.archive.org/web/20121120161047/http:/www.airforce- magazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/February%202009/0209tomato.aspx 12 A history of anti-satellite programs | Union of Concerned Scientists. (2020, March 1). https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/history-anti-satellite-programs 13 A history of anti-satellite programs | Union of Concerned Scientists. (2020, March 1). https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/history-anti-satellite-programs 14 Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress Updated July 28, 2020Congressional Research Service. (2020). Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (CRS Report No. RL33745). . https://fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL33745.pdf 15 Tellis, A. J. (2019, April 15). India’s ASAT test: An incomplete success. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/15/india-s-asat-test-incomplete-success-pub-78884

5 satellites,’” suggesting space assets would be a primary target in an engagement. China’s stated emphasis on the importance of space systems would suggest a robust ASAT program and adequate arsenal. According to public information, China possesses two tested versions of a direct-ascent ASAT missile, “the SC–19 and the larger DN–2.” China is also known to have launched satellites capable of maneuvering and robotically operating in orbit. These satellites could disable a target satellite through a suicidal collision or malicious repair.16 The PLA likely possesses that are “capable of damaging optical reconnaissance satellites.” Three Chinese researchers claimed to have successfully blinded a LEO-based satellite using a laser. In the future, China's ASAT arsenal could include "electromagnetic , powerful microwave weapons, and high-powered lasers.”17 China is “conducting research into directed-energy weapons for use as ASAT weapons” and experts predict China will have a more highly-powered laser capable of destroying satellites in the future.18

Russia

Russia’s ground-launched direct-ascent “Nudol mobile ASAT missile” has been tested multiple times in recent years.19 Like China, Russia is known to have launched multiple maneuverable satellites into orbit. Some of these satellites have proven capable of repairing, and therefore damaging, satellites.20 Russia is thought to have jamming technologies capable of impacting satellite uplink and downlink functions as far out as geosynchronous orbit (GEO). It remains unclear how effective Russia’s jamming technologies are against the CCS.

India

India is the newest member of the ASAT club. The weapon used to take out the target satellite in its 2019 test was a direct-assent missile from “India’s indigenously developed missile defense system, a PDV MK-II.”21

American ASAT Weaponry

America remains preeminent in the field of ASAT technology. The U.S. possesses a greater diversity of ASAT weaponry that can be deployed in a variety of situations. The successful 1997 test of a Navy laser used to dazzle and disable a satellite in LEO demonstrates the U.S. has moderately effective ASAT laser technology. Given that “high-energy laser

16 Pike, J. (2020, April 17). Russia Anti-Satellite Programs Protivosputnikovye Sistemy. GlobalSecurity.Org; John Pike. https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/asat.htm 17 Pike, J. (2017, November 3). Chinese Anti-Satellite [ASAT] Capabilities. GlobalSecurity.Org; John Pike. https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/china/asat.htm 18 George, J. (2019, March 27). History of anti-satellite weapons: US tested 1st ASAT missile 60 years ago. The Week. https://www.theweek.in/news/sci-tech/2019/03/27/history-anti-satellite-weapon-us-asat-missile.html 19 Hitchens, T. (2020, April 15). Raymond rips russian asat test, arms control hypocrisy. Breaking Defense. https://breakingdefense.com/2020/04/raymond-rips-russian-asat-test-arms-control-hypocrisy/ 20 Pike, J. (2020, April 17). Russia Anti-Satellite Programs Protivosputnikovye Sistemy. GlobalSecurity.Org; John Pike. https://www.globalsecurity.org/space/world/russia/asat.htm 21 Messier, D. (2020, April 24). An overview of India’s counterspace strategy and ASAT tests – parabolic arc. http://www.parabolicarc.com/2020/04/24/an-overview-of-indias-counterspace-strategy-and-asat-tests/

6 technology” for use as ASAT weaponry “received a large funding increase” under the George W. Bush Administration, today the U.S. likely has a more powerful with greater range and killing capacity. The U.S. possesses sea-launched (the SM-3 BMD missile) and air-launched (the ASM-135) direct-ascent ASAT missiles. The U.S. also has "ground-based midcourse missile defense interceptors (which can target most low-earth-orbiting satellites).”22 Like China and Russia, the U.S. has deployed multiple "service" satellites into orbit. Like Russia, we have jamming capabilities which could interfere with satellites uplink and downlink.

ASATs in the Global Community

Despite our advantage, the U.S. has an interest in preventing an ASAT arms race, which could lead to the proliferation of ASAT technologies across the globe and an increase in ASAT tests. Given the negative impacts of ASAT tests on the space environment, all countries would benefit from a treaty establishing a moratorium on ASAT testing. Each ASAT test conducted by a major power is a signal to smaller, developing space nations that ASAT technology is a necessary part of being a space power. Developing space powers may seek to improve their standing in the international community and garner prestige by conducting high-profile ASAT tests. An international treaty denouncing ASAT tests and binding signatories to a testing moratorium could eliminate these incentives and prompt developing space powers to forego ASAT tests. Such a treaty could help establish norms in space, an area in which U.S. leadership has failed. To work towards the goal of the in establishing space as a peaceful, non-militarized realm, it must be clear that ASAT tests are unacceptable. This would make ASAT weaponry a less desirable acquisition. Most roadblocks to international cooperation in this area have been established by the U.S. The Union of Concerned Scientists explains:

In 2006, the United States added a provision to its National Space Policy opposing the development of any new legal regimes or other mechanisms that would restrict U.S. access to or use of space, including any arms control proposals that would impinge on military space acquisitions or operations. Such categorical rejection of international efforts to address space security issues, however, runs counter to U.S. interests: by forgoing the possibility of new mutually agreed-upon rules or constraints, the United States limits its options rather than keeping them open. Without constraints on ASAT weapons, for example, threats to satellites will continue to proliferate and mature, leading to less predictability and stability in crises and forcing the United States to expend more effort in securing satellites.23

U.S. policymakers should reconsider the costs and the benefits of blocking international cooperation on ASAT weaponry.

22 Grego, L. (2012). A History of Anti-Satellite Programs. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf 23 Grego, L. (2012). A History of Anti-Satellite Programs. Union of Concerned Scientists. https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/2019-09/a-history-of-ASAT-programs_lo-res.pdf

7 Satellite Defense

Diplomatic agreements can take a long time to take effect. In the meantime, the U.S. should diminish vulnerabilities present in its space systems. This can be accomplished in several ways:

Increase System Redundancy

Smaller satellite sizes and reduced launch costs have made it cheaper than ever to put satellites into orbit. System planners should utilize these favorable conditions to ensure satellite systems enjoy sufficient redundancy. Planners should examine systems and ask the following questions: • How many satellites would need to become inoperable for this system to malfunction? • What impacts would users on Earth experience if this system lost one satellite? Two? Three? Four? If the answers to these questions prove less than desirable, system planners should consider adding satellites to the system to increase its damage tolerance. Planners should not limit their scope to satellites alone. Ground stations and the corresponding abilities to communicate and control satellite systems should be redundant.

Radiation Hardening

Scenarios exist in which an adversary would detonate a at high altitudes to disable satellites. “One low-yield (10-20 kt), high-altitude (125-300 km) nuclear explosion could disable – in weeks to months – all LEO satellites not specifically hardened to withstand radiation.”24 The severity of damage sustained by LEO satellites in this scenario makes hardening these satellites impractical. They are a lost cause. But satellites in GEO would receive a smaller dose of radiation and EMP effect.25 Hardening these satellites would increase the likelihood of their survival. To harden GEO satellites against the threat of a high-altitude nuclear detonation, the components of strategic or sensitive satellites should be housed in a radiation-safe vault. To guard against the threat of an EMP, satellites could be equipped with a nuclear event sensor that would turn the satellite off and then on once the EMP threat had passed. A variety of safeguards exist at relatively low costs (5-15% of total cost) to guard against serious damage.26

24 Defense Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). United States Space Systems: Vulnerabilities and Threats. Defense Intelligence Agency. https://fas.org/pubs/_docs/10072004163734.pdf 25 Johan, I. (2018, November 8). Nuclear hardening to protect satellites against high-altitude-nuclear-explosions (HANE). ESWW 2018 Leuven. http://www.stce.be/esww15/contributions/session7_J.Idestroem_Nuclear_hardening_topical_discussion_meeting.pd f 26 Johan, I. (2018, November 8). Nuclear hardening to protect satellites against high-altitude-nuclear-explosions (HANE). ESWW 2018 Leuven. http://www.stce.be/esww15/contributions/session7_J.Idestroem_Nuclear_hardening_topical_discussion_meeting.pd f

8 Establishing “Do-Not-Orbit” Zones

Space is a crowded space. Still, our strategic satellites should be given their space. The U.S. military should publicize policy that establishes a “Do Not Orbit” zone around each of our strategic satellites. Adversarial satellites that breach “Do Not Orbit” zones will be treated as hostile attackers and appropriate reciprocations will ensue.

Ensuring Maneuverability

Ensuring satellites are maneuverable could increase their chances of survival when faced with known man-made and natural threats.

Protecting Optics

Placing removable shields near optics could insulate reconnaissance or intelligence satellites from the threat of weaker lasers aimed at damaging or dazzling optics.

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