Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations
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Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations Özden Zeynep Oktav* Introduction Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism, which were allegedly backed by Iran throughout the 1990s, were the two main factors which brought about the deterioration in bilateral relations. This article mainly focuses on the reasons for the great shift in current relations between Turkey and Iran. As the article shows, with the l1 September terrorist attack, the changing security perceptions of Iran stemming from American threats concerning Tehran’s building of nuclear weapons and sponsoring terrorism, pushed Tehran to develop better ties with Turkey. Similarly, Ankara wanted to strengthen its ties with the Iranian administration at a time when the PKK wished to be recognised as a political organisation of Kurds living in Turkey. Most important of all, the common objection of both countries, to the foundation of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq, has cemented relations. The study also seeks to analyse the current relationship between Iran and the United States in respect to understanding its impact on Turkey’s policies toward Iran. From Turkey’s perspective, Kurdish separatism and Islamic fundamentalism, which were allegedly backed by Iran throughout the 1990s, were the two main issues which hindered positive relations between the two countries. Despite many rivalries, conflicts, and different regimes, Ankara has always governed its relations with Tehran diplomatically and avoided confrontation, even during the time when the two countries were on the brink of war. Moreover, in the last few years, Turkish-Iranian relations have undergone a dramatic change, which does not compare to anything in the past. This study will attempt to describe the evolving relations with Iran throughout the second half of the 1990s, within the context of Turkey’s changing security perceptions, and will seek to examine the reasons for the progressive developments in bilateral relations on the basis of two important issues; Kurdish Separatism and Islamic fundamentalism. In addition, Iran-US relations are also a concern of this study, in respect to understanding the reasons for changing security perceptions of Iran. * Ass›stant Professor at Y›ld›z Technical Un›versity, Department of Political Science & International Relations PERCEPTIONS • Summer 2004 103 Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations Background For Turkey, the advent of the Islamic revolution in Iran was a profound shock, and the mutual hostility emanating from an ideological divide led to the respective regimes’ suspicion of each other. From Turkey’s perspective, Iran, whose revolutionary regime has increased the level of instability in the region, has been a threatening neighbour, allowing Kurdish separatists, the PKK (Workers Party of Kurdistan), to use its territory to launch attacks on Turkey. The fact that Iran, Syria and Iraq used the PKK as leverage against Turkey, by supporting it in various ways, was the main reason why Turkey sought new alliances. In this context, the US supported alignment with Israel, indicated an important shift from Turkey’s traditional policy of balancing the Arabs with Israell and led to Turkey playing a leading role in the region. Throughout the 1990s, Turkey witnessed the emergence of new identities based on ethnic and cultural diversity. The juxtaposition of the rising tide of political Islam and Kurdish separatism was perceived as a twin threat to Turkey by bureaucracy and the military, and they led to the increase in the Turkish military’s role of protecting the democratic, secular and unitarian regime of the country. The Welfare-True Path Parties Coalition Government and Turkish-Iranian Relations The advent of the Welfare-True Path parties coalition,2 which coincided with the beginning of rumblings in society with regard to two sensitive issues; political Islam and the Kurds, challenged the delicate balance between the regime and society in Turkey. The Islamist Prime Minister Erbakan’s pro-Iranian policies led to the split between the politicians and the military. For example, he made his first foreign trip 1 Ofra Bengio and Gencer Özcan, "Old Grievances New Fears: Arab Perceptions of Turkey and its Alignment with Israel", Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.15, No. 2, (2000), p. 68. 2 "For the first time since 1923, a party with a religious orientation led the Turkish republic. Necmettin Erbakan, head of the Islamic Welfare Party took over as prime minister in a coalition government. His party's primary partner was the centre-right True Path Party, whose leader, Tansu Ciller, was named deputy premier and foreign minister. The newgovernment passed a vote of confidence in the national parliament on July 8 1996. Turkish military submitted a text with eighteen points of recommendations to the government during the National Security Council meeting in February 28, 1997. This led to the resignation of the coalition government in June 1997." Hürriyet, ‘Tepki Ya¤›yor’, 3 February 1997 and Hürriyet, ‘Tahrik Bitmiyor’, 4 February 1997. For the text containing these eighteen points, see Turkish Daily News, ‘Government Due to Receive MGK (National Security Council) Recommendations Today’, 3 March 1997. Alan Makovsky, "Islamists Take power in Turkish Coalition", Policy Watch, June 28, 1996 http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch1996/206.htm 104 PERCEPTIONS • Summer 2004 Özden Zeynep Oktav to Tehran and denied the allegations that Iran and Syria were sponsoring terrorism carried out by the separatist PKK, in spite of intelligence reports stating otherwise, given to him by the Turkish National Intelligence Agency (MIT).3 The new government also became the object of Washington’s critical thunderbolts by declaring a probable Defence - Industry Cooperation agreement between Iran and Turkey.4 Although the signing of a $23 billion gas deal with Iran on 11 August had nothing to do with ideology, and although it reflected Turkey’s increasing need to secure new sources of energy imports, the accord5 was described by Washington as Erbakan’s fraternisation with a rogue state because the gas deal came exactly a week after President Clinton had signed into law the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act.6 Developments such as the Sincan incident, which took place during the coalition government, were viewed with alarm by the Turkish military as well as the bureaucracy. During the meeting, described as, "A night for Jerusalem", which was held by the Mayor of Sincan, (a district of Ankara) whose municipality was in the Welfare Party’s control, the Iranian Ambassador Muhammed Riza Bagheri, spoke in a large tent, standing under posters of Hizbullah and Hamas. He stated that ‘those who signed agreements with the United States and Israel would, sooner or later, be penalised by Turkish youths.’7 Bagheri’s speech, which strengthened the contention that Iran was attempting to influence Turkish domestic affairs, led to his expulsion from his post in Ankara, and to the military coup in 1997.8 The Islamist members of the Welfare-True Path coalition government were accused of not only trying to fuse Turkey and Iran into a single Islamic state, by being in collaboration with Iranian Ayatollahs, but also of being in collusion with 3 Cumhuriyet, (Turkish Daily), ‘D›fl Politikada Skandal’, August 19, 1996 and Hürriyet,(Turkish Daily), ‘Hoca’n›n MIT Gaf›’, August 18, 1996. 4 "The U.S. ambassador Marc Grossman stated that Iran was among the countries supporting terrorism therefore it was impossible to approve any military or economic cooperation of Turkey with Iran", Cumhuriyet, ‘ABD’den Erbakan’a Uyar›’, December 14, 1996. 5 Sami Kohen, ‘D›fl Politikada De¤ifliklik mi?’, Milliyet, (Turkish Daily), August 7, 1996. 6 "The Iran-Libya Act gave President Clinton power to penalize non-U.S. companies that invest $ 40 million or more a year in two states’ oil and natural gas sectors. Therefore, although Turkish officials insisted that the agreement did not violate U.S. law because it involved trade and no Turkish investment, the natural gas accord marred Turkey’s relations with Washington. The Clinton administration opposed the gas deal and sought to persuade Turkey not to go ahead with it.", Wall Street Journal, ‘Iran-Turkey Gas Deal to Test New U.S. Law’, August 13, 1996. 7 Hürriyet, ‘Tepki Ya¤›yor’, February 3, 1997 and Hürriyet, ‘Tahrik Bitmiyor’, February 4, 1997 in Özcan & Bengio, International Journal of Turkish Studies, p. 25. For further information see: Robert Olson, The Kurdish Question and Turkish-Iranian Relations From World War I to 1998,California, Mazda Publishers, 1998, p. 56-57-58. 8 For the text of 18 points, see, Turkish Daily News, ‘Government Due to Receive MGK (National Security Council) Recommendations Today’, March 3, 1997. PERCEPTIONS • Summer 2004 105 Changing Security Perceptions in Turkish-Iranian Relations Iran regarding Turkey’s war with the PKK’s Kurdish separatism movement.9 This view, legitimised the military’s decision to bring down the Islamist government in order to preserve Turkish integrity. Irrespective of whether it is politicians or the military who have conducted relations with Iran, Turkish diplomacy towards Iran has always avoided assertive policies,l0 even during crises such as the Sincan incident, and during the expulsion of four Iranian diplomats who allegedly backed the Islamist Action Organizationl1 financially, when Çetin Emeç and Turan Dursun were killed by the above-mentioned organisation. However, Turkey could not preventl2 Tehran from harbouring PKK camps over the border, which the Tehran government consistently denied,l3 and could not obtain Iran’s collaboration in hunting down PKK militants. It was mainly due to Tehran’s objection both to the protected zone, and to Turkish military operations in northern Iraq,l4 on the grounds that Turkey violated Iraqi territorial integrity. Another factor was that Tehran’s sense of vulnerability was reinforced by Turkey’s cooperation with Israel on security issues such as manoeuvres and joint military exercises in Turkish airspace, thus helping Israel reach the edge of the Iranian border.