Removing the “Westphalian Straitjacket:” Audiences in Securitisation Theory
Emeka T. Njoku University of Ibadan
Scott N. Romaniuk University of South Wales
ABTRACT Treatments of securitisation theory have tended to gloss over empirical applications of audience and the context in which they function in non-Western societies. This article engages with and integrates the role of audiences in the securitisation of civil society since the advent of the “Global War on Terror” (GWoT). Turning to a variety of audiences, as cases are crucial for grasping a crisper image of who has constituted the audience and what role those audiences have played and continue amid the backdrop of the GWoT as a macro- securitisation program. Focusing on these concerns, this article assesses the role of audiences in two settings, those of: Kenya and Uganda. We show how audiences have been defined and how they have responded to securitisation moves of the securitising actor in order to demonstrate the inter-subjective character of the securitisation process. This article lays the basis for assessing roles in the context of securitising civil society for further mapping, including the (in)congruencies, of audience character as an ascribed subjective value/meaning. The framework also sheds light on motivating factors of “speech actors” during the course of their securitising performances.
Key Words: Counter-terrorism, Euro-American model, macro-securitisation, national assemblies, “silent act,” terrorism laws
1. Introduction What is the nature of audience1 in non-Western societies? How can we study audiences in in ways that nuance existing debates on its passivity in the securitisation process? Specifically, how do audiences in non-western societies positively or negatively influence the outcomes of the inter-subjective construction of security threats? Securitisation theorists from the Copenhagen School, as established by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and John De Wilde, view the audience as a normative concept (Wilkinson 2007) that ought to be seen in the receptive mode in the securitisation process (Balzacq 2011). However, the Copenhagen School’s pioneers have been criticised for their failure to account for events in which the audience rejects the securitisation performance or “the actual politics of acceptance” (Salter, 2008: 324). Consequently, the Copenhagen School’s theorisation of the audience has been termed problematic (Côté 2016) and unsuitable as a unit of analysis in empirical research (Balzacq, 2005, 2011). Scholars (Balzacq 2005, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007; Salter, 2008; William, 2011; Côté, 2016), who view securitisation sociologically have taken notice of some of these
1 Scholars within the securitisation field have divergent views on who constitutes an audience (Côté, 2016). While scholars conceptualised audiences as the security experts (Salter and Piché, 2011), an arm of government (Salter, 2008; Vouri, 2008; Bright, 2012), the “masses” (Roe, 2008; Floyd, 2010; Hayes, 2012), or a combination of audiences (Salter, 2008; Vaughn 2009; Bourbeau 2011), for the purpose of this study we draw inspiration from Salter and Piché’s (2011) conceptualization of a branch of government as audience. In this regard, we conceptualise audience as MPs in Kenya and Uganda. The rationale behind our choice is premised on the unique roles played by these parliaments in the emergence of counter-terrorism policies and institutions that led to the securitisation of civil society within the two countries.
1 complexities, theorising that the illocutionary speech act in the construction of security threats should also be seen as a pragmatic process involving both the securitising actor and the audience in the construction of security threats (Balzacq, 2011). Indeed, arguments that securitisation theory has not completely escaped the Westphalian “straitjacket” that defines most International Relations (IR) theories have been put forward (Wilkinson, 2007). As such, further questions have surfaced about the suitability of the theorisations offered up by both the Copenhagen School and the sociological schools of thought, particularly its applicability in non-western societies. On this premise, this article examines the character of audience in non-Western countries and in doing so the focus lies on: members of the Kenyan and Ugandan parliaments. Our aim, in short, is to show how audiences in non-Western societies influence the outcomes of securitisation. We illustrate this by examining the securitisation of civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of these states’ counter-terrorism framework. Specifically, we are arguing in that the Kenyan and Ugandan parliaments played key roles in the successful securitisation of CSOs in counter-terrorism context. In Kenya, the opposition party in the parliament rejected the proposed counter-terrorism laws on the grounds that impinges on individual and groups’ rights, and they strongly resisted President Mwai Kibaki’s counter-terrorism efforts following the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi. Kenyan MPs accepted proposed counter-terrorism laws, but only following a decade of continuous dialogue, persuasion, and conviction on the need for counter-terrorism laws despites their repressive qualities as well as their securitisation of civic space and civic society actors. In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni faced few challenges when it came to convincing members of his National Resistance Movement (NRM) party-dominated parliament on the need to formulate laws regulating or closing civic space to combat terrorism. In other words, Museveni was successful in exploiting the inherent neo-patrimonial relations he holds with the majority of lawmakers for establishing the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Laws, which effectively securitised civil society actors, particularly NGOs that have been critical of the government, including the press, activists, and members of the opposition. The cases above underscore that in emerging democracies in Africa, the history of state repressive culture, ethnic and religious contestations make it difficult for a securitising actor to unilaterally securitise CSOs through counter-terrorism measures. This is so as securitising CSOs and civil society more broadly without the consent of the audience threatens the actors’ legitimacy and future political ambition. The cases have shown that unilateral approach questions the motive of the securitising actor and raises fear of ethnic, religious domination or a reversal of gains of democratic consolidation. With this article we contribute to the discourse on the importance of the audience in securitisation theory by showing the nuanced nature of audience in non-western societies. We highlight how the “politics of acceptance” mantra influences the intersubjective constructions of security threats and the success of securitisation process. That is, focusing on varieties of audiences has become pertinent for understanding who or what audiences are, and their influences amid the framework of the GWoT as a macro-securitisation program. This article assists in the establishment of a foundation for assessing subsequent roles in the context of securitising civil society and CSOs for further mapping, including the (in)congruencies of audience character as an ascribed subjective value.
2. Empirical Challenges of the Copenhagen School’s Illocutionary Speech Act Discourses on securitisation theory have been fixated on the weaknesses inherent in the Copenhagen School’s treatment of the intersubjective construction of security threats as an illocutionary speech act (Balzacq, 2011; Côté, 2016) as well as the centralised role of the
2 securitising actor as the key feature of the securitisation process and consequently ascribing the audience a peripheral role (Salter, 2008; Williams, 2011; Côté, 2016). These standpoints by the Copenhagen School have also complicated an empirical approach in the treatment of the concept of the audience in securitisation theory (Wilkinson, 2007). The idea presented above supplements the argument that securitisation theory is intrinsically Western-centric in its view and becomes limited in its analytical purchase outside the West as a result (Wilkinson, 2007). Therefore, there is a need to re-examine the underlying concepts that forms the core securitisation theory with a view to advance the debate on its applicability beyond the “Westphalian straitjacket.” Moreover, the adoption of empirical approaches in understanding the often-neglected concepts in the postulations of securitisation theory such as the audience is equally important. A brief recap of the extant debate on the securitisation is important at this point. Scholars within the securitisation field are divided between the philosophical and the sociological schools (Balzacq, 2011). The philosophical school, also known as the Copenhagen School, conceptualised securitisation as a speech act that emerges from the intersubjective construction of security threats to a referent object. The speech act is illocutionary because it bears certain actions or “by saying security something is done” (Wæver, 1995: 55). Hence, it is performative; it is intended to achieve a specific objective. Discursive politics between the securitising actor and the audience influences the construction of a security threats to a referent object according to this School. However, critics of the Copenhagen School have adopted a sociological approach as part of their differentiated interpretation about the construction of security threats. They criticised the epistemological arrangements of the Copenhagen School in two ways. First, they argue that theorisations of the School remain incomplete, as discursive politics explains how security threat emerges but stop short of illuminating the actually processes involved in the intersubjective construction of those very same threats. They view speech acts as the actions between the securitising actor and the audience, which goes beyond illocution of a securitising actor. Balzacq (2011: 2) explains that, “securitization is better understood as a strategic (pragmatic) process that occurs within and as part of configuration of circumstances, including the context, the psycho-cultural disposition of the audience, and the power that both speaker and listener bring to interaction.” In effect, sociological school critiques the Copenhagen School’s perception of the audience in the “receptive mode” (Balzacq, 2011). In other words, while the Copenhagen School treats the acceptance of the audience of the securitising moves by the securitising actor as important for securitisation to take place, it comes up short when accounting for cases in which audiences reject the securitising moves. The sociological school’s argument, by contrast, that securitisation is both a speech and pragmatic act, aids in providing context in which securitisation takes place. For instance, the historical, socio-political, and economic conditions of a particular state may influence the nature of the “speech act,” securitising actor, the audience, in addition to their actions on issues such as counter-terrorism and migration (Balzacq, 2011). Therefore, the sociological approach provides platforms from which explanatory measures can be deployed to fully comprehend the nature of the audience, and factors that may influence the audience’s acceptance or rejection of a securitising of moves by the one seeking to securitise. The Copenhagen School’s normative approach of understanding the various concepts on securitisation results in an approach unsuitable for empirical studies (Balzacq, 2011; Côté 2016). Both the Copenhagen and Sociological Schools have been criticised for propagating Western-oriented epistemology of securitisation theory as constructed by both schools. The nature of their orientation or Western focus raises questions on the applicability of securitisation theory outside the West as too often Western intellectualizing of political and
3 social issues have often been applied to other non-Western societies with distinct socio- political and historical contexts (Wilkinson, 2007). This practice among scholars and experts has been termed the “Westphalian straitjacket” in IR theory (IRT) (Buzan and Little, 2001: 25). Accordingly, Wilkinson argues that the Copenhagen School’s conceptualizations complicate its applicability as a general scholarly approach that lends itself to all scholarship irrespective of geographical location. Wilkinson (2007: 24) asserts:
Euro-American assumptions about concepts such as society, identity and the state, combined with the presumption of western democracy and primacy of the speech act, means that, particularly in a non-western setting, security dynamics are edited and westernized through the applications of theoretical framework.
Wilkinson (2007) analyses the basic assumptions of the Copenhagen School and tested the extent to which the “Westphalian straitjacket” regenerates in the theorisations of securitisation using Kyrgyzstan as a test case (Wilkinson, 2007: 24). He concludes that in the case of Kyrgyzstan the relationship between the securitising actor and the audience are much more complex than the postulations of the Copenhagen School. That is, in the process of intersubjective construction of security threats in the Kyrgyz political context, the securitising actor carried-out securitising moves well before engaging in a speech act (Wilkinson, 2007). In the same vein, (Bourbeau, 2014) theorised that, “security practices are implemented before security discourses occur; in this case, the role of security discourses is to legitimise and institutionalise a pre-existing situation.” This we term “inverse securitization.”2 Therefore, the groundwork mapping where Copenhagen School’s assumptions of securitisation theory are ill suited for tackling the convoluted dynamism of the interactions between the securitising actor and the audience in the intersubjective construction of security threats had been laid. To date, securitisation theory discourse has by and large focused on a critique of Copenhagen’s normative theorisations of the concepts that make-up the core structure of the theory, specifically the incapacity of illocutionary speech acts in expansively elucidating the processes involved in a successful securitisation of an issue. It has revealed its inability to explicate the interactive politics between the securitising actor and the audience, particularly in the event of the rejection of a securitising move by the audience. Moreover, the Copenhagen School’s consignation of the audience only in the receptive mode holds us back when attempting to inquire into the complete nature of the audience and its capacity to influence the outcomes of the intersubjective construction of security threats. In addition, the Copenhagen School’s theorisations have also failed the “Westphalian straitjacket” test defining the bulk of IRT due to its normative approach in defining the concepts of securitisation. Hence, this study is premised on Wilkinson (2007) view on the importance of examining securitisation theory beyond the Western standpoint, Côté’s (2016), for a “greater focus on the audience as a complex unit of analysis,” and Balzacq’ (2011) assertion on the need for more empirical study for the development of the securitisation theory. Based on the exploration of the existing state of play, the article empirically analyses the nature and role of
2 Reverse securitisation is different from Vuori’s (2011) conceptualization in which he argues that the securitiser uses discourses or narratives that frame them (securitised) as security threats to label securitising actors as the major threat. In other words, the actors that were securitised present the securitising actor as threats to their existence (Vuori, 2011:192). However, in this study, “reverse securitization” is refers to the process through which securitisation takes a different form. Rather than the security speech-act preceding the securitisation of an issue, the issue is already securitised through the establishment of appropriate policies. Hence, the speech act becomes a legitimating process or a way consolidating the securitising act. We also termed this process of securitisation the “silent act.”
4 the audience in the construction of civil society as security threats, as part of counter- terrorism programs in Kenya and Uganda, post-9/11. However, to appreciate the nature of audiences in non-Western societies we need to appraise how the Western-oriented view of securitisation theory continues to blur the imagery of the processes of securitisation beyond the West. It will also distil how the speech act is conceptualised in different regions, nature of securitising actors, and audiences in non-Western contexts. In other words, the primary task is to reconfigure securitisation theory’s intrinsic Western character, which limits its theoretical and empirical application and in turn, development.
3. The Eurocentric Character of Securitisation Theory The interplay of power between Western states has largely influenced the discourse of IR theories and concepts (Bull, 1977; Watson, 1992; Grovogui, 2002; Bilgan, 2007). Western states are typically used as unit of analysis in the explanation of various issues in international politics (Oren, 2003; Bilgan, 2007). This influenced critical scholarship on the dangers of employing such epistemologies and methodologies in understanding events in other, non-Western, parts of the world (Walker, 1990). Such theories and concepts, or what has been termed “Westphalian common sense” in IR discourse have becomes problematic in explaining peoples, states, and societies in non-Western societies with Western characteristics and especially non-Western societies that bear no resemblance to the typical Western units of analysis at all (Kuhn, 1990; Kratochwil, 1995; Frost, 1996). Moreover, Jackson (1992), Claphman (1996) and Englebert (1997) argued that the “Westphalian common sense” has influenced understandings of how states should behave in the international system. Deviations by states, particularly in with respect to less-developed countries (LDCs), from this established international morality, influences the theorisation that these states lack the capacity to meet the requirements for being viewed as sovereign. Bilgan (2007: 6) attributed the use of Western-oriented epistemologies nested within IR theories to three major factors:
Such explanations include foundational assumptions of neo-realism (that states can be treated as like-units and small states are of little consequences in world politics), the false promise of Area Studies (which succeeded in neither ‘universalizing’ nor ‘de-parochializing’ the social sciences) and the limited number of interlocutors who could ideally have helped the ‘West’ and the ‘non-West’ to engage in conversations on IR.
Consequently, the relegation of non-Western society in IRT has also reflected in its security studies sub-discipline. Although non-traditionalists within security studies succeeded in projecting the idea of security beyond the interplay of powers among state actors to include non-state actors (NSAs) and issues like the environment, culture, identity, and societies within states, and how these factors define the discourse on security. Nevertheless, debates on non-traditional security issues have been, until recently, completely dominated by Western standpoints (Wilkinson, 2007). Wilkinson (2007) argues that the “Westphalian straitjacket” of IRT limits it development in several ways. These include the erroneous belief that understandings of state and society along the Euro-American model can accurately explain the dynamics of these concepts globally, the challenge of contrast between theoretical expectation and empirical evidence leads to a situation whereby the “Westphalian straitjacket” acts as an editor, highlighting similarities to the Euro-American model, rephrasing to better suit western understandings and exercising specificities deemed irrelevant to western model” (Wilkinson, 2007: 7).
5 In the same vein, the Copenhagen School remains wrapped-up in its own “Westphalian straitjacket” when it comes to theorising security threats despite its proponents having critically assessed that an essentialist view of states within IRT can be misleading. The Copenhagen school advanced the argument that states are not the same and their uniqueness is largely influenced by certain historical and socio-political conditions (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). However, this taxonomy of states by the school is understood within the normative “Westphalian straitjacket” that other IR theories and concepts suffer from, specifically, “in form of inherently Eurocentric assumptions about the social and political context in which any securitisation occurs” (Wilkinson, 2007: 11). Furthermore, this Eurocentric depiction of securitisation is illuminated in the manner in which the Copenhagen School glossed over the socio-political interactions by agents that not only influenced the securitisation process but also show how “internal relationships” between agents influence the character of the state and the agents that acts on their behalf (Huysmans, 1998: 494; Wendt, 1992). That is, the identity of the referent object and the nature of the agents the Copenhagen School espouses are oft-times constructed through the intrinsic rapport between the securitising actors and the audience(s). Another major area that brings the Eurocentric standpoint into focus is the privileging of speech acts over other forms of expression that can equally invoke the securitisation of an issue (Hansen, 2000; Williams, 2003). Reiterating this, Wilkinson (2007: 12) further asserts that the aptness of the “speech act,” as defining cog within the securitisation process, may augur well in Western democracies where free speech is generally seen as entrenched, however, this is not the case in non-Western states where freedom to effectively express security concerns is never fully guaranteed, and where citizens search for other methods of expressing security concerns such as “migrations and protest.” Hence, Wilkinson (2007: 12) argues the necessity to “consider, first, by what means ‘security’ is expressed, and second, how securitising actors and referent objects are constructed, given that they are mutually reinforcing.” Therefore, this article is inspired by Wilkinson (2007) charge on the comprehensive understanding of the nature of agents of securitisation and the processes of securitisation within non-Western societies. We study the roles of audiences in the securitisation of CSOs as part of the post-9/11 counter-terrorism measures.
5. Securitisation of CSOs in the Contexts of GWoT The 9/11 attacks on the US birth global coalition efforts to defeat terrorism globally. Thus, at global, regional and domestic level there were discourses on the roots and expansion of terrorism with a view to curbing it. One of the prominent narratives emerging from these conversations was the culpability or vulnerability of CSOs as conduits for terrorism financing (Sidel, 2010), and ideological and recruitment platforms for the rise of terrorism (Njoku, 2020). Consequently, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), which was formed to curb international money laundering crimes by the G-7 summit in 1989 was directed to incorporate countering terrorism financing as part of its new roles. Hence, FATF established Recommendation 8- a legal instrument that direct states and private financial organisations to domesticate and enforce laws that regulates their activities of CSOs due to perceived threats to national security (Watson and Burles, 2018). What followed was the birth of a “compliance industry” as state actors moved to establish national laws to seek to regulate the operations of CSOs (Hayes, 2017). Scholars such as Skokova et al. 2018, Howell and Lind (2009, 2010) contend that the directive to domesticate international legal instruments that regulate CSOs well embraced by state actors in hybrid and authoritarian regimes. It provided these actors with the opportunity to deploy the language of counter-terrorism to repress CSOs, particularly those that were critical or termed as uncooperative by state actors. The above was reiterated by Bayas and
6 Green (2018, 5) this notion of extreme risk in the sector has done incalculable damage to civil society. In addition to giving governments an excuse to crack down on peaceful, legitimate organisations that are a thorn in their side, many countries have directly or indirectly used FATF compliance as a justification to pass restrictive laws in the name of countering terrorism.” Using Kenya and Uganda we examine the discursive politics and strategies that the executives and legislature employed in these countries that played significant roles in the successful securitisation of CSOs in counter-terrorism context. Before, delving into the main arguments, a look at the methods that informed this study is expedient
6. Methodology Recognizing the debate about the reliability of empirical approaches as rational tools in the development of securitisation theory and selection, we justify this approach by following the arguments and positions of scholars (Lupovici, 2009; Balzacq, 2011; Côté, 2016) within the field of securitisation studies. First, while the speech act mantra of the Copenhagen school privileges the use of discourse analysis as a key methodological approach in understanding securitisation, the sociological or “pragmatic” approach of theorising securitisation can also be studied empirically owing to the fact that interactions between two actors that results in the emergence of policy are involved. Therefore, empirical methods assist in understanding the actions and decisions of these actors and what informed their actions. Lupovici (2009), Balzacq (2011: 53) Côté (2016: 5) emphasised the importance of empirical studies, alongside other methodological tools or what Balzacq (2011: 53) termed “methodological pluralism” for the study and development of securitisation theory. The employment of multiple-case design for the study is warranted because the study focuses on influences of audiences in securitising civil society. Emmers (2004) states that the multiple-case design is suited for studies addressing the evolution of threat imaginary and how threats are constructed by multiple security actors. A major challenge of case design involves the question of selection bias. To overcome this challenge, we focus on specific cases in the Africa where civil society were successfully securitised. Balzacq (2011: 34) stated that a good strategy of checking for validity of the findings of case study approaches is to make certain that, “securitization is satisfied by the acceptance of the enabling audience of a securitizing move.” Furthermore, he concludes that, “we learn something about security logic only if we select cases that have a particular outcome” (Balzacq, 2011: 34). In addition, (George and Benneth, 2005: 23) also assert that the case study approach supports the recognition of “potential causal paths and variables leading to the dependent variable of interest.” We narrow our lens to audiences situated in Kenya and Uganda on the basis of the above methodological arguments in addition to the dearth of empirical literature of securitisation audiences in the global south. The rationale behind our selection is premised firstly on the implementation of counter- terrorism programs by the governments of these countries that targets the ability of CSOs to work in these countries because the conceptualization of these groups as security threat. In sum, these groups were purposively selected on the bases of successful securitisation process that has taken place. Second, the qualitative research design was deployed in analysing the findings of this study. Data was derived from primary and secondary sources. Through a purposive sampling technique, eight oral interviews were conducted on national parliamentarians and members of the executive arm of the Kenyan and Uganda governments. These include four from Kenya and four From Uganda, of which three from both were included. These lawmakers have participated in or were involved in the discourse, framing, and implementation of counter- terrorism measures, particularly those affecting CSOs in the respective countries by directly
7 modifying or influencing their activities. The field research was accomplished between 2016 and 2019. Although we had difficult assessing Kenyan and Uganda lawmakers for interview, as requests were initially not granted. To overcome this difficulty, we had to establish confidence and trust in the respondents. The generated qualitative data was content analysed. The study balanced primary data with secondary data on relevant and grey literature on the issue of counter-terrorism and CSOs. Therefore, the methods section was comprehensive and engaging
7. Audiences in the Securitisation of CSOs 7.1. Kenya Prior to 9/11, Al Qaeda and its affiliates had made inroads in East Africa by exploiting the weak political institutions in an effort to establish foothold that would position them well for targeting Western interest. In 1998, Al Qaeda attacked the US embassy in Nairobi, Kenya and Tanzania and subsequently, the 2001 attacks in the US. The attack on the US embassy in Kenya drew the country into the GWOT. Consequently, between 2002 and 2008 the former Kenyan President, Mwai Kibaki, with US support, established counter-terrorism institutions such as the Anti-Terrorism Police Unit in 2003, the Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTF) in 2004, National Security Advisory Committee (2004), and a National Counter-Terrorism Centre (2004). However, these counter-terrorism initiatives lacked the necessary legal backing to function as legitimate counter-terrorism and security mechanisms. As a way to remedy this major challenge, the executive, under Kibaki sought to establish counter- terrorism legislation by presenting the Suppression of Terrorism Bill to the national parliament in 2003. However, the parliamentary members rejected the bill on the grounds that the law was direct contravention of Kenya’s constitution. They argued that the law undermines human rights and civil liberties and thus threatens democratic consolidation in the country (Barkan, 2004; Whitaker, 2008, 2010; Mogire and Agade, 2011). Subsequently, Kibaki sought to address the legislature’s concerns over the Suppression of Terrorism Bill (Mogire and Agade, 2011) and employed expert legal services, namely the Law Society of Kenya, to draft a new terrorism bill (Whitaker, 2008). This led to the formation of the Anti-Terrorism Bill in 2006. However, the parliament obstructed the passage of this bill and it failed to become law. Parliamentary members asserted that the law does not reflect the will of the Kenyan people and thus there is no sense of ownership of the law. Similarly, the counter-terrorism financing bill presented by the government in 2007 in response to international resolutions of countering terrorism financing was also frustrated by members of parliament (MPs) from being passed into law (Whitaker, 2008, 2010). The parliament’s rejection of the proposed counter-terrorism bills created legal challenges to the effective implementation of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy. However, between 2009 and 2012, the executive and the legislature were able to reach consensus on the formulation of anti-terrorism legislation with parliament having passed the Proceeds of Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act (No. 9 of 2009), Prevention of Organised Crimes Act (No. 6 of 2010), and the Prevention of Terrorism Act (No. 30 of 2012). However, despite the initial contestation between the executive and the legislature on how counter-terrorism measures violate human rights and civil liberties, both actors reached a consensus on the threat posed by CSOs, particularly Muslim and human rights groups toward national security; thus, requires state’s regulations of their operations. For example, a member of the Kenyan parliament stated:
8 [non-governmental] organisations in solidarity against the government’s efforts to safeguard this country against the violence and insecurity sewn by terrorist extremists have been shown to poison the oxygen Kenyan society needs to breathe. Some of their operations contradict Kenya’s laws and takes for granted the democratic space, expanding it, and justifying the erosion of Kenyan national security (Member of Kenyan parliament, personal communication, September 29, 2018).
The perception of both executive and legislature that Muslim groups and communities in Kenya was said to be providing ideological support to terrorist groups and as organisations acting as terrorism financiers influence the emergence of counter-terrorism laws that securitise these groups. The presented narrative on the security threats posed by Muslim groups is derived from global discourse on the role of CSOs in perpetrating acts of terrorism has been localised in Kenya and went a long way in securitising these non-governmental public actors. Furthermore, the strength of lawmakers’ argumentation for the implementation of repressive laws finds a natural source of support in the form of previous and ongoing acts of violent extremism and terrorism in Kenya. These episodes serve as convenient and stand-by rationalization for laws regarded as essential, often without reference made the interconnectedness of geography, ethnicity, the type of setting (i.e., either urban or rural), or any direct, indirect, or lack of connection between Muslim communities and Islamic extremists claiming to be Muslim. When asked about relationship between terrorist threats and Muslim communities in the country, a government official explained:
Many citizens, people of Muslim background live in regions under constant risk of terrorist attacks. Some areas suffered repeated attacks. In those areas, the people are not the threat; but, those militants that enter into the communities and conduct shooting raids or attacks are. Their mutual religion is the link that associates that real, militant threat, with perceived ones (Member of Kenyan Government, personal communication, October 2, 2018).
Authorities, accordingly, transpose the clear and unambiguous threat from Islamic-militants to what the government official refers to as perceived threats, which become threats by association. Given the prevalence of Muslims in the country, turning the perceived threat into a political issue becomes a relatively simple task.
Another MP punctuated the momentum of terrorism in Kenya and the country’s threat-level, advocating:
[c]onscious of the fact that attacks in our country and our neighbours have necessitated greater awareness, vigilance, and response, we need to appeal to MPs within the National Assembly to prioritise the protection of the country and its security needs against those who would like to destroy it (Member of the Kenyan parliament, personal communication, October 28, 2018).
The perceive need for government concerning growing terrorism and resistance by organisations and their representatives within the state is echoed by member of the government:
9 There is tremendous cross-party support for the legislation to contain terrorism in Kenya. For those who call necessary legislation into question, accusing the government of attempting to put retrogressive laws into force, their connivance in terrorism should be considered. … Existing laws are not always effective or even relevant. They need to be amended to answer calls for action when the nation faces with events that see non-Muslims parted from Muslims and executed (Member of the Kenyan Government, personal communication, October 28, 2018).
Lind and Howell (2010) reason that following the 1998 terrorist bombing of US embassy in Kenya, the Kenya government went after Muslims CSOs thought to be providing relief support to refugees in the north-eastern parts of Kenya on the suspicion that they were harbouring terrorist operatives. This practice, reason Lind and Howell (2010: 334), continued afterwards as:
[…] pressures and threats for civil society generated by new counter- terrorism structures have disproportionately impacted Muslim organizations and groups where a ‘siege mentality’ has begun to take hold. This is reflected not only in the aforementioned raids in Muslim neighborhoods but also in the targeting of Muslim NGOs.
Following the Garrisa University College attack on April 2, 2015, the Kenya government backlisted 87 institutions, including CSOs as supporters of terrorism and issued orders to freeze their accounts and financial traffic. Illustrative of Kenya’s securitisation of CSOs, as part of the counter-terrorism programs, the government instantly revoked the registration licenses of three CSOs: Muslim for Human Rights (MUHURI) Agency for Peace and Development (APD) and Haki Africa. The empirical evidence presented and explored in this case advances the critique of the normative treatment and Eurocentric conception of securitisation by the Copenhagen School on one hand and a rejection of Floyd’s (2016) thesis seeking to modulate or completely eliminate the role of audience in the securitisation process on the other. Two major factors can be deduced from the Kenyan case. First, in non-Western societies, securitisation can take place inversely. Specifically, the securitisation actions can precede the speech act. In other words, the securitising actor establishes policies that securitise an issue even before tabling such matters before parliament or the public. The Kenya case shows that following the 1998 and 2002 terrorist attacks in that country the government, in with strong backing from the US, established a host of counter-terrorism institutions and policies well before presenting any of its concerns or responses to parliament. According to Whitaker (2008: 264), “a great deal of Kenya’s involvement in the ‘‘war on terror’’ has been kept out of the public eye.” Her assertions ought to be taken in tandem with Wilkinson’s (2007) argument and analysis of how President Askar Akaev of Kyrgyzstan was securitised by political opponents. Wilkinson (2007: 22) noted that the “relationship between speech act and action is more complex than the portrayal offered by securitization. Particularly in the case of domestic politics, action may precede speech act that is fundamental to securitization.” Hence, Wilkinson emphasised the not-so- straightforwardness of processes of securitisation as theorised by the Copenhagen School. Although arguments against instances in which the executive government appears to unilaterally enforce counter-terrorism policies, as a case of successful securitisation is not tenable on the basis that such policies implemented in legal vacuum could be easily overturned in a court of law. Moreover, there is really no unilateral enforcement, as the
10 executive arm of government has secretly received backing by just a few MPs in the clandestine enforcement of counter-terrorism policies (Whitaker, 2008). Furthermore, securitisation is only successful to the extent that the secret implementation of counter- terrorism policies impacts the operations of CSOs as specific time pending the implementation of legislation or open ratification by the parliament, we argue that these are cases of successful securitisation. Second, we can also deduce from the Kenya case just how powerful Kenyan parliament as audience can be in influencing the intersubjective construction of security threats and the securitisation of an issue. Parliament, particularly members of the opposition party stalwartly opposed the establishment of counter-terrorism laws that would legally backed the counter-terrorism structures and activities established by Kenya’s executive arm of government. Whitaker (2008: 264) touched on this by stating that, “this sense of prideful defiance also is reflected within the Kenyan government as members of the legislative branch seek to counterbalance the power of the president.” Kenya’s terrorism bills became law only upon consensus reached by the executive and parliament. As such, the securitisation of an issue in nascent democracies in Africa, based on the Kenya case, is not a clear-cut process where the audience is receptive to securitising moves; rather, it is an interactive process shown as one marred by contestation between the securitising actor and audience. Through the Kenya case, successful securitisation can be seen as premised on unanimity between both actors.
7.2. Uganda Uganda has been described as a nascent democracy in which established multiparty systems and competitive politics influence a legislature that challenges the executive on unpopular proposals, specifically fiscal policies. However, comparatively, the Uganda legislature has not fully attained the level of independence seen in Kenya and some other parts of Africa (Barkan, 2009). Therefore, the executive-legislature relationship can be well-described as largely neo-patrimonial, a patron-client relationship, or dictatorship-lite, where the executive seeks to favour some members of the parliament financially in return for its support in the parliament (Mwenda, 2007). According to Green (2010: 93):
[Uganda’s] ongoing creation of new patron-client relationships can be seen as part of the same dynamic that has led to the ever-increasing size of the cabinet and the Parliament, whereby potentially dangerous opposition leaders can be brought under the government payroll and thereby neutralized.
Green’s depiction explains how unpopular security legislation, particularly anti-terrorism laws can emerge in contemporary Uganda. Although the adoption of counter-terrorism measures began in 1999 following the establishment of the Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATTF), the arrest of individuals for terrorist acts were tried under extant criminal laws (Whitaker 2008). In 2002, the Ugandan parliament passed the Anti-Terrorism Act. We argue here that although scholars (Whitaker 2008), claim that the terrorist activities of Lord Resistance Army (LRA) against Museveni’s government influenced the position of the Ugandan parliament in the establishment of the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) passed in 2002, the neo-patrimonial relations between Museveni and MPs played a seminal role. This arrangement was cleverly-crafted and grew from the existence of ideal conditions in parliament, with the result being a parliament that the government could turn to as a service mechanism for its own operations and interests within the country (Member of the Parliament of Uganda, personal communication, May 2, 2018). This argument is premised on the nature of the counter-terrorism measures that are more repressive in comparison to other
11 African countries such as Nigerian and Kenya where similar polices were established. Diverse components of the ATA targeted oppositions groups and activist CSOs that include media houses critical of Museveni’s policies and approaches. The law was used to restrict the operations of these organisations and in most cases these organisations were forced to stop operations (Howell and Lind, 2010; Rubongoya, 2010). Two media organisations – Monitor and Radio Kyoga – were the first victims of Uganda’s counter-terrorism practices following critical reportage of the counter-terrorism operations in northern Uganda and the NRM. Museveni responded by labelling both media organisations supporters of terrorist groups and were consequently closed. In the same vein, the government exiled Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) opposition leader Kizza Besigye following allegations that he declared war on the state. Thus, Museveni’s government invoked the ATA (Rubongoya, 2010). Accordingly, Museveni’s support of the US-led “War on Terror” and domestication of international resolutions on terrorism includes use of the terrorist card to repress credible forms of opposition and civil society groups that are critical to his government (Rubongoya, 2010). Irrespective of its repressive character and nature, the NRM-dominated parliament acted as a rubber stamp unit for Museveni’s domestic proposals and policies that explicitly aimed at actors in Ugandan society seen as acting in collusion with terrorist groups. However, as democratic institutions continue to solidify or grow and citizen awareness and political participation increases, the capacity of the executive to sway parliamentary decisions in its favour is incrementally plummeting. However, this is not to suggest that parliament is no longer haranguers of the executive, nor have political figures on the side of Museveni voiced their concern about the dangers of human rights organisations and other CSOs. Instead, opposition between and within political parties in Uganda is on the rise, where decisions are reached based on mutual interest. We base our assertion on the political contestations associated with the amendment of the Anti-Terror Law of 2002 in parliament. In 2015, the opposition party interdicted the passage of the amended versions of the Anti-Terrorism Law in the parliament and did so due to the unambiguous definition of the word “terrorism” in the Act. Moreover, the phrase, “damage to property” – interpreted as a threat to public security, and enormous powers reposed on the Inspector General of Police (IGP) to serve as both the prosecutor and judge – were issues of major contestations between the executive and legislature in the amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Act in 2015 and 2016. The law was amended and passed in 2017 after much debate (Global Legal Monitor, 2017). One of the principle divers of earlier legislations was a tactic that the government attempts to put into effect today, though arguably resulting in less success. Ambiguous government legal and security terminology has acted as open but somewhat untouchable enablers of controversial policies and laws. An advocate of clear and refined language behind government security legislation in the Ugandan parliament reinforced this point, reasoning that the likeliness of violating ambiguous provisions as well as undefined expectations and obligations exponentially rises as they overlap, effectively creating an impenetrable net that the government employs to its advantage (Member of the Parliament of Uganda, personal communication, May 2, 2018). A government minister further remarked:
Arbitrary law-making and enforcement of policies is a familiar story in Uganda and the government has come time and time again, sometimes hiding behind a false veneer, to manage the Ugandan people for its own interest. … Consensus is often a simulation, built on patronage to establish shows of support for the government (Member of the Parliament of Uganda, personal communication, August 7, 2018).
12 We argue that the neo-patrimonial relations in executive-legislation relations in Uganda do not suggest a complete disempowerment of the legislator or an instance of a weak or powerless audience. By contrast, we argue that the executive could not have successfully securitised civil society without the support of the legislator as this provides a form of legitimacy for the government and its policies. This reasoning is braced by the judgement of a government official critical of Uganda’s existing political system and culture:
Corruption and maladministration [are] endemic at all levels, from many of the people occupying government positions to elites in public and non-public positions and to the institutions themselves. Those who have been corrupt in the past will be corrupt again. As this is a well-understood fact, the government can turn to the pervasiveness of corruption and those who are corrupt to establish a desired loyalty on particular issues and mobilise a cadre of support to champion the policies of the government (Member of the Ugandan government, personal communication, May 29, 2018).
The role of the audience in this process is particularly more impacting when the extant political system in Uganda considered, where a multiparty system and competitive politics are gradually becoming mainstay features of the state. Hence, “naked” dictatorial policies from the executive will ultimately be counter-productive, possibly leading to political or constitutional crises in LDCs that have weak institutions. The effectiveness of the securitisation of civil society in the context of Uganda is premised on a mutual collaboration between the securitising actor and the audience.
8. Conclusion This article is a response to the extant discourse on the importance of examining audiences in non-Western contexts. It illuminates the nature of diverse audiences and the positions they occupy that ultimately enable them to influence the construction of threat(s) in a given society. The preceding argument contends that the Euro-American treatment of securitisation concepts and processes downplays how securitisation occurs in non-Western societies, such as those in Africa and glosses over the active roles that audiences play in determining the outcome of securitisation processes in nascent democracies. We argue that contextual factors inherent in African countries such as the historical and socio-political dynamics of executive- legislature relations and the state-civil society relations shapes the outcome of a securitisation process. Specifically, issue such as religious and ethnic contestations, the rentier nature of political institutions, fears over the reverse of democratic gains influences the success of a securitising move. As the case of Kenya have shown, despite the concerted effort by Kibaki and Kenyatta to establish counter-terrorism laws that constricts the civic space, these efforts were frustrated by the Kenyan parliament, which felt that such laws reverse democratic consolidation within the country, and targeting the rights and civil liberties of individuals and groups, particularly Muslim communities. The securitisation of CSOs and closing of civic space was only possible through after a decade of the executives’ dialogue and persuasion of the parliament on the need to establish counter-terrorism laws that amongst other issue securitise the operationality of CSOs due to their perception of threats to national security. In the case of Uganda, Museveni was able to tapped into its neo-patrimonial relations with its majority controlled NRM in the national parliament to established counter-terrorism policies before making the illocutionary speech. Museveni also relied on its renter relations with the majority of lawmakers to established the 2002 ant-terrorism laws with targets CSOs, activists and opposition groups.
13 The roles of the audiences in non-Western and nascent democracies in Africa, particularly Kenyan and Ugandan parliaments in shaping the contours and influence the outcomes of the securitisation processes reinforce the assertions put forward by Balzacq (2011) and Salter (2008:324) on the “politics of acceptance or rejections” of securitisation moves by securitisation audiences. The above further influences Côté’s (2016) argument that the contradiction of the Copenhagen School’s treatment of audience is an important element in determining securitisation processes and at the same conceived only receptively remains a major barrier in removing the Westphalian “Straitjacket.” Thus, our study differs from Floyd’s (2016) assertion on the exclusion of the audience in securitisation process due to its supposed passivity. Floyd (2016: 2) deployed the concepts of “executive unilateralism or decisionist theory of sovereignty,” in clarifying the key role of the securitising actor in influencing the outcome of the securitisation process within the context of the GWoT. Executive unilateralism, invoked during exceptional events that demand exceptional response through the establishment of radical policies. The Africa cases have shown that even in hybrid regimes that downplaying of the audience in the process of securitisation is not only a selective reading of the Copenhagen School (Côté, 2016) but even exacerbates the latent contradictions in securitisation theory with respect to actor-audience relations. Audience restraint equally generates confusion in empirical understandings of the securitisation process. Furthermore, our argument that the “speech act” can assume other forms like the establishment of security polices to address a threat before a speech act is performed, as shown in the Uganda case fortifies Wilkinson’s (2007: 22) assertions in his discussion on securitisation processes in Kyrgyzstan where the processes of securitisation are not as clear- cut as the Copenhagen School suggests. According to Wilkinson (2007), in the non-Western Society of Kyrgyzstan, “[…] action may precede the speech-act that is fundamental to securitization.” Yet, the Copenhagen School does not currently possess the theoretical vocabulary to reflect this dynamic whereby ‘sufficient action’ may replace or supplement the speech-act as the driving logic in the process of securitization.”
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