Removing the “Westphalian Straitjacket:” Audiences in Securitisation Theory Emeka T. Njoku University of Ibadan Scott N. Romaniuk University of South Wales ABTRACT Treatments of securitisation theory have tended to gloss over empirical applications of audience and the context in which they function in non-Western societies. This article engages with and integrates the role of audiences in the securitisation of civil society since the advent of the “Global War on Terror” (GWoT). Turning to a variety of audiences, as cases are crucial for grasping a crisper image of who has constituted the audience and what role those audiences have played and continue amid the backdrop of the GWoT as a macro- securitisation program. Focusing on these concerns, this article assesses the role of audiences in two settings, those of: Kenya and Uganda. We show how audiences have been defined and how they have responded to securitisation moves of the securitising actor in order to demonstrate the inter-subjective character of the securitisation process. This article lays the basis for assessing roles in the context of securitising civil society for further mapping, including the (in)congruencies, of audience character as an ascribed subjective value/meaning. The framework also sheds light on motivating factors of “speech actors” during the course of their securitising performances. Key Words: Counter-terrorism, Euro-American model, macro-securitisation, national assemblies, “silent act,” terrorism laws 1. Introduction What is the nature of audience1 in non-Western societies? How can we study audiences in in ways that nuance existing debates on its passivity in the securitisation process? Specifically, how do audiences in non-western societies positively or negatively influence the outcomes of the inter-subjective construction of security threats? Securitisation theorists from the Copenhagen School, as established by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and John De Wilde, view the audience as a normative concept (Wilkinson 2007) that ought to be seen in the receptive mode in the securitisation process (Balzacq 2011). However, the Copenhagen School’s pioneers have been criticised for their failure to account for events in which the audience rejects the securitisation performance or “the actual politics of acceptance” (Salter, 2008: 324). Consequently, the Copenhagen School’s theorisation of the audience has been termed problematic (Côté 2016) and unsuitable as a unit of analysis in empirical research (Balzacq, 2005, 2011). Scholars (Balzacq 2005, 2011; Wilkinson, 2007; Salter, 2008; William, 2011; Côté, 2016), who view securitisation sociologically have taken notice of some of these 1 Scholars within the securitisation field have divergent views on who constitutes an audience (Côté, 2016). While scholars conceptualised audiences as the security experts (Salter and Piché, 2011), an arm of government (Salter, 2008; Vouri, 2008; Bright, 2012), the “masses” (Roe, 2008; Floyd, 2010; Hayes, 2012), or a combination of audiences (Salter, 2008; Vaughn 2009; Bourbeau 2011), for the purpose of this study we draw inspiration from Salter and Piché’s (2011) conceptualization of a branch of government as audience. In this regard, we conceptualise audience as MPs in Kenya and Uganda. The rationale behind our choice is premised on the unique roles played by these parliaments in the emergence of counter-terrorism policies and institutions that led to the securitisation of civil society within the two countries. 1 complexities, theorising that the illocutionary speech act in the construction of security threats should also be seen as a pragmatic process involving both the securitising actor and the audience in the construction of security threats (Balzacq, 2011). Indeed, arguments that securitisation theory has not completely escaped the Westphalian “straitjacket” that defines most International Relations (IR) theories have been put forward (Wilkinson, 2007). As such, further questions have surfaced about the suitability of the theorisations offered up by both the Copenhagen School and the sociological schools of thought, particularly its applicability in non-western societies. On this premise, this article examines the character of audience in non-Western countries and in doing so the focus lies on: members of the Kenyan and Ugandan parliaments. Our aim, in short, is to show how audiences in non-Western societies influence the outcomes of securitisation. We illustrate this by examining the securitisation of civil society organisations (CSOs) as part of these states’ counter-terrorism framework. Specifically, we are arguing in that the Kenyan and Ugandan parliaments played key roles in the successful securitisation of CSOs in counter-terrorism context. In Kenya, the opposition party in the parliament rejected the proposed counter-terrorism laws on the grounds that impinges on individual and groups’ rights, and they strongly resisted President Mwai Kibaki’s counter-terrorism efforts following the 1998 US embassy bombing in Nairobi. Kenyan MPs accepted proposed counter-terrorism laws, but only following a decade of continuous dialogue, persuasion, and conviction on the need for counter-terrorism laws despites their repressive qualities as well as their securitisation of civic space and civic society actors. In Uganda, President Yoweri Museveni faced few challenges when it came to convincing members of his National Resistance Movement (NRM) party-dominated parliament on the need to formulate laws regulating or closing civic space to combat terrorism. In other words, Museveni was successful in exploiting the inherent neo-patrimonial relations he holds with the majority of lawmakers for establishing the 2002 Anti-Terrorism Laws, which effectively securitised civil society actors, particularly NGOs that have been critical of the government, including the press, activists, and members of the opposition. The cases above underscore that in emerging democracies in Africa, the history of state repressive culture, ethnic and religious contestations make it difficult for a securitising actor to unilaterally securitise CSOs through counter-terrorism measures. This is so as securitising CSOs and civil society more broadly without the consent of the audience threatens the actors’ legitimacy and future political ambition. The cases have shown that unilateral approach questions the motive of the securitising actor and raises fear of ethnic, religious domination or a reversal of gains of democratic consolidation. With this article we contribute to the discourse on the importance of the audience in securitisation theory by showing the nuanced nature of audience in non-western societies. We highlight how the “politics of acceptance” mantra influences the intersubjective constructions of security threats and the success of securitisation process. That is, focusing on varieties of audiences has become pertinent for understanding who or what audiences are, and their influences amid the framework of the GWoT as a macro-securitisation program. This article assists in the establishment of a foundation for assessing subsequent roles in the context of securitising civil society and CSOs for further mapping, including the (in)congruencies of audience character as an ascribed subjective value. 2. Empirical Challenges of the Copenhagen School’s Illocutionary Speech Act Discourses on securitisation theory have been fixated on the weaknesses inherent in the Copenhagen School’s treatment of the intersubjective construction of security threats as an illocutionary speech act (Balzacq, 2011; Côté, 2016) as well as the centralised role of the 2 securitising actor as the key feature of the securitisation process and consequently ascribing the audience a peripheral role (Salter, 2008; Williams, 2011; Côté, 2016). These standpoints by the Copenhagen School have also complicated an empirical approach in the treatment of the concept of the audience in securitisation theory (Wilkinson, 2007). The idea presented above supplements the argument that securitisation theory is intrinsically Western-centric in its view and becomes limited in its analytical purchase outside the West as a result (Wilkinson, 2007). Therefore, there is a need to re-examine the underlying concepts that forms the core securitisation theory with a view to advance the debate on its applicability beyond the “Westphalian straitjacket.” Moreover, the adoption of empirical approaches in understanding the often-neglected concepts in the postulations of securitisation theory such as the audience is equally important. A brief recap of the extant debate on the securitisation is important at this point. Scholars within the securitisation field are divided between the philosophical and the sociological schools (Balzacq, 2011). The philosophical school, also known as the Copenhagen School, conceptualised securitisation as a speech act that emerges from the intersubjective construction of security threats to a referent object. The speech act is illocutionary because it bears certain actions or “by saying security something is done” (Wæver, 1995: 55). Hence, it is performative; it is intended to achieve a specific objective. Discursive politics between the securitising actor and the audience influences the construction of a security threats to a referent object according to this School. However, critics of the Copenhagen School have adopted a sociological approach as part of their differentiated interpretation about the construction of security threats. They criticised